[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 108 (Thursday, June 29, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9339-S9343]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                       THE 1995 BASE CLOSURE LIST

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today in strong opposition to 
the 1995 base closure list and to urge the President to reject the Base 
Closure Commission's recommended hit list.
  In this base closure round, the Commission voted to close or realign 
9 out of the 12 military bases in California that were reviewed, many 
against the recommendation and advice of the Secretary of Defense.
  In addition to the adverse national security impact of the 
Commission's action, the economic impact on California--particularly 
the cumulative economic impact--will be enormous.


                    Economic Impact of Base Closures

  California is being hit disproportionately hard by base closures. In 
three previous rounds, 22 major bases in California have been slated 
for closure or realignment--more than double any other State.
  California is home to only 15 percent of all Defense Department 
personnel. Yet, California has lost more than 82,000 of the nearly 
120,000 net direct jobs--military and civilian--lost nationwide since 
1988 as a result of base closures alone.
  All total, these actions have resulted in the loss of more than 
200,000 direct and indirect jobs and $7 billion in annual economic 
activity in California.
  I do not believe it is appropriate to proceed with another base 
closure round when the full impact of previous base closures has not 
yet been felt. In California, bases slated for closure in 1988 are just 
now starting to close their gates, and few are having success in reuse 
and redevelopment efforts.
  If the current base closure round goes forward, 58,000 additional 
direct and indirect California jobs will be impacted--7,900 direct 
military and 19,000 direct civilian personnel. Major bases in 
California which the Commission has targeted include:
  McClellan Air Force Base in Sacramento;
  Long Beach Naval Shipyard in Los Angeles County;
  Onizuka Air Station in Sunnyvale;
  Oakland Army Base in Alameda County;
  Sierra Army Depot in Lassen County; and
  Fort Hunter Liggett in Monterey County.
  With the addition of defense industry layoffs in California--which 
have claimed 250,000 jobs in just the past few years--California stands 
to lose more than half-a-million jobs as a result of base closures and 
defense downsizing.
  And, defense industry downsizing is expected to continue through the 
end of the decade with the loss of another 250,000 jobs. Enough is 
enough.
  By law, economic impact must be considered by the Commission when 
determining what bases to recommend 

[[Page S 9340]]
for closure or realignment. The inclusion of economic impact as a 
criteria is for good reason: to prevent the piling on of base closures 
on one single community or State.
  Yet, it is clear to me that the Commission disregarded the economic 
impact of currently proposed and previously announced base closures on 
California when it made its final recommendation to close or realign 
nine California bases.


                      California's Fragile Economy

  The California economy cannot take additional base closures at this 
time. California was once the land of golden opportunity, where good 
paying jobs were available and investments in real estate resulted in 
high-paying dividends. Today, that dream of golden opportunities has 
disappeared.
  California's unemployment rate is nearly 3 percent higher than the 
national average. More than 1.28 million Californians are out of work. 
In fact, California has 17 percent of all the unemployed workers in 
America.
  As cuts in jobs, both military and civilian, loom on the horizon, 
consumer confidence has dwindled. Consumers are unwilling to move into 
homes and purchase durable goods as long as the State's economic 
prospects remain dim.
  ``Disappointing, disturbing, and traumatic''--those are the words 
used by the president of the California Association of Realtors to 
describe the current challenge of being a real estate agent in 
California.
  The facts about the current real estate market in California are 
startling. Home sales dropped 21 percent in California during the first 
quarter of 1995. In Los Angeles County alone, home prices dropped 23 
percent from January 1991 to January 1995. Prices fell another 3 
percent in March of this year.
  The crisis of confidence in California's economy extends well beyond 
the real estate market and the sheer number of unemployed residents. 
People are simply unsettled about the State's economic future.
  Orange County filed bankruptcy, and just this week, while hoping to 
earn $30 million in a real estate auction, had to settle for $15 
million. Bill Lange, who conducted the auction, remarked, ``On a scale 
of one to 10, it's about a five. It'd be an eight or nine if the real 
estate market wasn't in the tank.'' In any case, it is still a small 
fraction of the county's $1.7 billion in investment loses.
  Los Angeles County, the largest in the Nation, is faced with the 
prospect of eliminating a $1.2 billion deficit. Laying off more than 
18,000 employees--one out of five county workers--seems inevitable. 
Closing the County-U.S.C. Medical Center is another likely budget-
cutting measure that will be implemented.
  Twelve months ago, California's leading indicators were running 
slightly above the national trend. Six months ago, California dropped 
to next to last among all States. In a 3-month moving average of 
leading indicators--as compiled by the WEFA Group of Bala Cynwyd, 
Pennsylvania--California comes in dead last.
  If California continues to suffer blow after blow, not only will this 
slow our economic recovery, but could set it back. I cannot predict the 
total consequences of further devastating cuts.
  This is the Nation's largest State, and a weakened and uncertain 
economy here can lash like a chain reaction through our national 
economy and our balance of trade. Closing California's military bases 
can only make matters worse. Our economy, simply put, will continue its 
steep downward spiral with no end in sight.


                Base Closures Cost More Than Anticipated

  Base closures have turned out to be a lot more expensive than 
originally estimated, primarily because environmental costs are not 
included in closure estimates. As history indicates, costs for closing 
military bases in California have sky-rocketed:
  BRAC 88 clean-up costs were originally estimated at $126 million in 
1990. By 1994, the costs had quadrupled to $598 million;
  The costs to clean up bases from BRAC 91 were originally estimated at 
$389 million. Now, these costs have risen to $1.3 billion.
  Clean-up costs for BRAC 93 bases were originally estimated at $230 
million in 1990. By 1994, these costs had risen more than five-fold, to 
$1.4 billion.
  The costs to clean up and close California's bases for the first 
three rounds alone is nearly $3.5 billion, up from the $745 million 
that was originally estimated and budgeted. California bases alone 
could absorb all of the funds appropriated for clean-up in all the BRAC 
accounts from fiscal year 1990 through 1995.
  And the total costs to clean up BRAC 95 bases that were originally 
recommended for closure or realignment is estimated at more than $1 
billion--and these are just initial estimates. If history is any 
indication, then these costs will increase two-, three-, four-, or even 
five-fold. McClellan Air Force Base's environmental costs alone will 
more than double the original estimated clean-up costs for BRAC 95.
  Mr. President, I would like to discuss some specific details on the 
two largest bases in California that were targeted by the Commission: 
McClellan Air Force Base and Long Beach Naval Shipyard.


                       Mc Clellan Air Force Base

  McClellan Air Force Base was targeted for closure by the Commission, 
against the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and despite 
protests by the Air Force's military and civilian leadership. McClellan 
is northern California's largest industrial employer, with nearly 
15,000 mostly civilian workers.
  I believe that the Commission's action to target McClellan for 
closure will adversely impact U.S. national security and drain needed 
fiscal resources from higher priority programs and initiatives in the 
Pentagon budget.
  The Air Force has stated that the cost to close one Air Logistics 
Center is estimated at $500 million, excluding environmental clean-up 
costs. These prohibitively high closure costs would be greater than the 
total cost the Air Force has budgeted over the next 6 year for all of 
its base closures and realignments nationwide.
  According to a recent letter from Air Force Chief of Staff General 
Fogelman and Secretary of the Air Force Sheila Widnall, the 
Commission's action will:

       Cost the Air Force hundreds of millions of additional 
     dollars (in excess of $1 billion in environmental and 
     military construction costs) during the next five years; 
     disrupt military readiness because of the total restructuring 
     of the Air Force logistics and depot system; preclude the Air 
     Force from carrying through on vital readiness and 
     modernization programs; and have a devastating impact on as 
     many as 25,000 DoD employees in Texas and California who 
     would lose their jobs or have to relocate to other Air Force 
     installations at great personal and public expense.

  I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the letter, as well as 
a letter from General Moorman, the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, be 
printed in the Record at the end of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibits 1 and 2.)
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I have visited McClellan several times over the last 
few years. McClellan is an excellent base with superb, state-of-the-art 
facilities and is one of the most advanced installations in the entire 
military.
  McClellan has its own one-of-a-kind industrial nuclear reactor, a 
nondestructive aircraft inspection facility, logistics retrofit 
engineering capabilities, and a technical laboratory with specialized 
logistics facilities. McClellan is truly a unique asset to our Nation's 
defense.
  Finally with regard to McClellan, if economic impact--particularly 
cumulative economic impact--is going to be considered, then the impact 
on the northern California region must be considered when looking at 
McClellan.
  Already in the Sacramento area, Mather Air Force Base and the 
Sacramento Army Depot have been slated for closure, resulting in the 
loss of nearly 7,000 direct jobs. And, in nearby Vallejo, the closure 
of Mare Island Naval shipyard will result in the loss of an additional 
9,000 direct jobs.


                       Long Beach Naval Shipyard

  I do not believe that the Pentagon's recommendation to close Long 
Beach Naval Shipyard makes sense. In 1993, the Base Closure Commission 
addressed the issue of whether to close the Shipyard, and the 
Commission recognized the vital role that Long Beach plays in support 
of the Pacific Fleet and kept it open.
  Long Beach Naval Shipyard is strategically located in southern 
California--

[[Page S 9341]]
near 70 percent of the Pacific Fleet in San Diego--and has a large dry-
dock capable of docking every class of ship in the U.S. Navy's 
inventory, including large aircraft carriers. Other Naval shipyards are 
long distances from the west coast mega-port: Puget Sound is located 
1,135 nautical miles from San Diego and Pearl Harbor is located 2,600 
nautical miles away.
  Long Beach is also the most cost-effective shipyard in the Navy. It 
is the only one of the eight Navy shipyards that operates in the black 
with annual retained earnings. In just the last 6 fiscal years, Long 
Beach has been consistently under budget and $102.7 million has been 
returned to the Navy budget.
  The closure of Long Beach Naval Shipyard will also have a devastating 
economic impact. 13,000 jobs and $539 million in annual economic 
activity will be lost if Long Beach closes. Los Angeles County has 
taken the brunt of the State's defense downsizing and Long Beach 
previously suffered from a large base closure: Long Beach Naval 
Station.
  Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell may have 
provided the best defense of Long Beach when he said in 1991 that the:

       closure of Long Beach Naval Shipyard would seriously 
     degrade the dry dock capability for all large ships in the 
     Southern California area. Alternatives in Hawaii and 
     Washington simply could not provide the services found at 
     Long Beach.

  General Powell was right. Long Beach Naval Shipyard should not be 
closed.


                          Onizuka Air Station

  Onizuka Air Station has existed in Sunnyvale since the mid-1950's and 
was created to provide a place where the Air Force satellite control 
mission and other classified Defense Department tenants could function 
in collocation.
  While the Air Force has proposed realigning Onizuka and shifting many 
of its functions to other bases outside California, the Air Force's 
proposal actually amounts to a stealth closure of this state-of-the-art 
base. In the short-term, nearly 3,000 jobs will be lost as a result of 
Onizuka's realignment. In the long term, Onizuka's closure will cost 
several thousand additional jobs.
  In addition to the economic impact on the northern California region, 
I believe that Onizuka's realignment could have an adverse impact on 
U.S. national security, particularly with regard to the Nation's 
satellite control and communication network. I also question the cost-
effectiveness of Onizuka's proposed realignment in light of the long 
pay-back period--7 years--and the fact that the base will continue to 
operate well into the next century.
  I am also concerned that the recommendation to realign Onizuka could 
have been tainted by a 1993 internal Air Force study on the closure of 
Onizuka. This study was conducted outside of the official BRAC process 
and estimated the true cost to close Onizuka at hundreds of millions of 
dollars more than originally estimated by the Air Force. Unfortunately, 
the existence of this study--which was originally denied by the Air 
Force--was uncovered late in the BRAC process, thus impeding its full 
utilization.
  I ask unanimous consent that the copy of a 1993 Air Force letter, 
which initiated a study of Onizuka Air Station's closure outside of the 
official BRAC process, be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my 
remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 3.)


                           Oakland Army Base

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Once again the Commission rejected the recommendation 
of the Secretary of Defense, as well as the pleas of the Army's 
military and civilian leadership, and targeted Oakland Army Base for 
closure. In addition to being vital to U.S. national security, Oakland 
Army Base's closure will have an adverse impact on a region still 
feeling the brunt of previous base closures.
  The Oakland Army Base's mission is to support the rapid deployment of 
military equipment and other large cargo in times of peace and war. As 
the only exclusive use, Army-owned secure access facility on the west 
coast, the Oakland Army Base is crucial to the Pentagon's strategy of 
being able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.
  The senior Army leadership closely reviewed Oakland Army Base when 
preparing their 1995 base closure recommendations. The closure of the 
Oakland Army Base was flatly rejected by Secretary of the Army Togo 
West on operational grounds because there simply are insufficient 
commercial port facilities on the west coast to support the Army's 
military requirements.
  I personally spoke with General Sullivan, the Army Chief of Staff, 
who said he strongly opposes the closure of the Oakland Army Base. In a 
recent letter to me, General Sullivan wrote that:

       its loss represents an unacceptable risk. Oakland is 
     essential for the deployment of our CONUS-based forces to 
     respond to any national security threats which would emerge 
     in the Pacific. . . . The Army needs this critical facility 
     to support the rapid deployment of equipment during peace and 
     war.

  In addition to its adverse impact on U.S. national security, the 
closure of Oakland Army Base will result in the loss of at least 700 
jobs in the San Francisco Bay Area, an area hard hit by previous base 
closures. As you may recall, the 1993 base closure process claimed more 
than 30,000 jobs with the closure of Alameda Naval Air Station, Mare 
Island Naval Shipyard, Treasure Island Naval Station, and other 
facilities. The bay area's economy simply cannot take another major 
blow.
  I ask unanimous consent that the full text of General Sullivan's 
letter be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 4.)


                          Fort Hunter Liggett

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. In addition to the strong military and fiscal 
arguments for keeping the TEXCOM Experimentation Center at Fort Hunter 
Liggett, the realignment of the base will have an adverse economic 
impact on an area already suffering the consequences from one of the 
biggest BRAC actions in the county: the closure of Fort Ord. Monterey 
County's already fragile economy cannot afford the realignment of 
another major base.
  Fort Hunter Liggett provides a total test and experimentation package 
to the Department of Defense. TEXCOM's isolated location provides 
unequaled access to extremely versatile training areas with a wide 
variety of weather and terrain conditions, controlled airspace to 
24,000 feet, a 360-degree high energy laser testing area, isolation 
from ambient light and minimal radio frequency interference.
  While Fort Hunter Liggett was evaluated in the BRAC process only as a 
training area, the base performs vital test and evaluation functions. 
Thus, the recommendation to realign Fort Hunter Liggett and move 
TEXCOM--a test and evaluation asset--is based on a flawed analysis that 
did not take into account TEXCOM's unique capabilities. The Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation at the Defense Department has stated 
that moving TEXCOM would be a ``show stopper.''
  Finally with regard to Fort Hunter Liggett, I do not believe that the 
proposed realignment is cost-effective. Information presented to the 
Commission staff by Monterey County officials regarding one-time costs, 
return on investment, and accumulated savings showed that the 
realignment of Fort Hunter Liggett is not cost-effective. However, I 
understand that this new information was not utilized by or presented 
to the Commission.
  I ask unanimous consent that the full text of a letter from Mr. Phil 
Coyle, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, be printed in 
the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 5.)


                               Conclusion

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, California has been hit 
disproportionately hard by base closures once again. While California 
is willing to do its fair share of base closures and defense 
downsizing, this base closure round is simply not fair to the State. 

[[Page S 9342]]

  It is my contention that if this round of base closures goes through 
as proposed by the Commission, the cumulative economic impact of base 
closures on California will have a devastating impact on California and 
affect the State's recovery from the recession.
  Just after three base closure rounds, it is apparent in California 
that when base closures are combined with on-going large-scale defense 
downsizing, there is a substantial impact on jobs for working people. 
Therefore, a worker who loses a job in the defense industry or on a 
base, loses retirement benefits, health insurance and a good salary. 
Similar replacement jobs are simply not available.
  I strongly urge the President to reject the 1995 base closure list 
because of the devastating economic impact--including the cumulative 
economic impact--of base closures on California.
  In addition, several of the Base Closure Commission's recommendations 
are opposed by the Secretary of Defense, as well as our military and 
civilian leadership at the Pentagon, because of their adverse impact on 
U.S. national security. Surely our military leaders know what is best 
for the Nation's defense.
                             Exhibit No. 1


                                   Secretary of the Air Force,

                                    Washington, DC, June 21, 1995.
     Hon. Alan J. Dixon,
     Chairman, Defense Base Closure, and Realignment Commission, 
         Arlington, VA
       Dear Mr. Chairman: The Air Force approach to the depots is 
     prudent because it saves money for the taxpayers and protects 
     military readiness. it is also the product of exhaustive 
     analysis by military professionals and senior leadership who 
     have been working the proposal for over a year.
       Our depot proposal is simple. Building on the personnel 
     reduction that have already been taken from the Air Logistic 
     Centers and depots during the last five years (over 26,000 
     people), the pending Air Force proposal would reduce and 
     realign the depots by an additional 1,987 jobs (with a net 
     present value of $975 million). While there would be some 
     disruption, the business of the Air Force--flying combat and 
     transport aircraft, and maintaining our command and control 
     and space network--would continue unimpeded. This total Air 
     Force depot reduction of 28,000 jobs is almost two and a half 
     times the total depot reduction achieved by all other DoD 
     components in all four BRAC rounds combined.
       On the other band, the staff generated BRAC proposal 
     described to us will cost the Air Force hundreds of million 
     of additional dollars (in excess of $1 billion in 
     environmental and military construction costs) during the 
     next five years; disrupt military readiness because of the 
     total restructuring of the Air Force logistics and depot 
     system; preclude the Air Force from carrying through on vital 
     readiness and modernization programs; and have a devastating 
     impact on as many as 25,000 DoD employees in Texas and 
     California who would lose their jobs or have to relocate to 
     other Air Force installations at great personal and public 
     expense.
       Most importantly, the essential business of the Air Force--
     operations, logistics and budget dollars that are critical to 
     future modernization--would be greatly disrupted. Since the 
     end of the cold war, the Air Force has reduced its budget by 
     more than $20 billion and reduced personnel by over 200,000 
     people. Some further reductions and savings are necessary; 
     however, they must be taken in a way that permits the Air 
     Force to continue to carry out its essential mission. The 
     Department of Defense proposal does that; the Commission 
     staff alternative does not.
           Sincerely,
     Ronald R. Fogleman,
       General USAF, Chief of Staff.
     Sheila E. Widnall,
       Secretary of the Air Force.
                             Exhibit No. 2
                                      Department of the Air Force,


                                               U.S. Air Force,

                                                   Washington, DC.
     Hon Dianne Feinstein,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC 20510
       Dear Senator Feinstein: This responds to your request for 
     my views on McClellan Air Force Base, California, pertaining 
     to that base's consideration by the Defense Base Closure and 
     Realignment Commission. Given our limited fiscal resources, 
     the Air Force views the budgetary impact of a closure of any 
     of the depot installations as inconsistent with other budget 
     priorities. The estimated one-time cost of a closure of 
     McClellan AFB, not including environmental restoration costs, 
     is more than $500 million. Incurring these costs would be 
     harmful to our efforts in modernization, readiness, and 
     quality of life initiatives. The Air Force strongly opposes 
     the closure of any of our depot installations, including 
     McClellan AFB.
       I understand the Commissioners were impressed during their 
     recent visit to McClellan AFB with the quality and scope of 
     the work performed there. As you know, McClellan AFB 
     possesses several Air Force maintenance centers of excellence 
     and was recommended as a Technical Repair Center receiver 
     location for a number of commodities in the Air Force 
     proposal to downsize Air Force depots. These commodity 
     workloads include such vital areas as composites and 
     plastics, hydraulics, injection molding, and electrical/
     mechanical support equipment. The approval of our 
     recommendation in the BRAC process will clearly establish the 
     Sacramento Air Logistics Center as Air Force Materiel 
     Command's number one provider of these commodities for the 
     future.
       The skilled workers and leadership at McClellan AFB are 
     essential to the Air Force proposal. The Commission's 
     recognition of their deserved reputation for quality, 
     efficiency, and pride in their work will commend the approval 
     of the downsizing initiative. I trust this information will 
     prove helpful and please let me know if you would like to 
     discuss.
                                           Thomas S. Moorman, Jr.,
                               General, USAF, Vice Chief of Staff.
                             Exhibit No. 3

                                                        U.S. Army,


                                           The Chief of Staff,

                                                   May 24, 1995.  
     Hon. Diane Feinstein,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Feinstein: As we discussed by phone yesterday, 
     the Army's position regarding the recent decision by the 
     Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to consider 
     the closure of Oakland Army Base remains unchanged. The Army 
     studied the feasibility of closing the port at Oakland and 
     concluded its loss represents an unacceptable risk. Oakland 
     is essential for the deployment of our CONUS-based forces to 
     respond to any national security threats which could emerge 
     in the Pacific.
       Although our initial analysis indicated some financial 
     benefit, the resulting operational risk is unacceptable. The 
     Army needs this critical facility to support the rapid 
     deployment of equipment during peace and war. Its closure 
     would leave the Army without a port facility on the west 
     coast.
       While it has been difficult for the Army to identify the 
     excess infrastructure necessary for divestiture, we clearly 
     understand the impact of BRAC on our fellow Americans. Our 
     choices for realignment and closure are the right ones and 
     balance requisite infrastructure with the warfighting 
     capability needed to forge the Army into the 21st century.
       We will make certain the Commission clearly understands the 
     Army's position on Oakland Army Base. I appreciate your 
     personal interest in and support of the Army.
           Sincerely,
                                               Gordon R. Sullivan,
                                               General, U.S. Army.
                             Exhibit No. 4

                                      Department of the Air Force,


                                  Headquarters U.S. Air Force,

                                Washington, DC, February 10, 1993.
       1. During his visit to Onizuka AFB in 1992, Gen McPeak 
     asked about the cost and operations impacts of closing 
     Onizuka. This alternative is being considered by the Space & 
     C31 Resource Allocation Team [RAT] as a possible cut during 
     upcoming budget exercises. Request a joint study be initiated 
     to assess the impacts of such a closure, document the 
     development and support impacts of such a closure, and 
     determine if the mission of the AFSCN could continue while 
     meeting operational and User requirements.
       2. I recently received an AFSCN status. It described the 
     current Network, the acquisition methodology, and provided 
     detail on the planned Improvement and Modernization programs 
     essential to maintaining the AFSCN infrastructure, and 
     providing User support. These efforts must continue and may 
     provide the architecture that will allow a closure of Onizuka 
     that minimizes operational impacts and improves operational 
     efficiency in the future.
       3. All these considerations should be taken into account in 
     this study. The primary output of this study should be a 
     briefing and report fully defining the AFSCN mission in light 
     of the current world environment, updating the operational 
     and acquisition impacts of a closure, and fully describing 
     what must be done to accomplish the AFSCN mission in the 
     future. As you are aware, the AF will have to respond to 
     budget actions resulting from the new administration as well 
     as prepare for the FY 96 POM (the effect on the space 
     community will exceed $1.5B in FY 96). We need to be certain 
     all current and planned missions of the AFSCN are well 
     understood, and the operational impacts of a closure of 
     Onizuka include all AFSCN Users. Initial output of this study 
     should be a plan, to include a schedule, with interim 
     milestones, and a final briefing and report. We would like 
     the AFSCN PEMs in SAF/AQSL and AF/XORS to participate in this 
     study and would like to have access to the interim data to 
     support any on-going exercises. Please provide your plan and 
     schedule by 5 Mar 93.
                                               Sanford D. Mangold,
                                                    Colonel, USAF.
                             Exhibit No. 5


                           Office of the Secretary of Defense,

                                Washington, DC, February 10, 1995.

  Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security 
                    (Economic Reinvestment and BRAC)

     Subject: Functional Assessment of Proposed Military 
     Department Base Realignment and Closure Actions.
 
[[Page S 9343]]

       Proposed BRAC actions by the MILDEPs as available on 9 
     February 1995, have been reviewed, and except as identified 
     in the attachments, determined to be acceptable from the 
     perspective of the DoD test and evaluation mission. Of those 
     in the attachments, two are considered to be major 
     showstoppers (regarding Dugway Proving Grounds and Fort 
     Hunter-Liggett), and another a minor showstopper (Tunnel 9 
     inclusion in the White Oak closure). The remainder are 
     considered incomplete requiring additional alternatives to be 
     analyzed before we can agree to them.
     Philip E. Coyle,
       Director, Operational Test and Evaluation.
     John A. Burt,
       Director, Test, Systems Engineering, and Evaluation.
                                 issue

       The Army's proposal to move its Test Battalion from Fort 
     Hunter-Liggett (FHL) to Ft. Bliss would de facto ``close'' 
     FHL and remove its capabilities from operational test use.


                               rationale

       1. The TEXCOM Experimentation Center (TEC), located at Fort 
     Hunter-Liggett, California, has the unique capability to 
     provide a total test/experimentation package. TEC's isolated 
     location provides unequaled access to extremely versatile 
     training areas with a wide variety of weather and terrain 
     conditions, controlled airspace to 24,000 feet, a 360 degree 
     high energy laser play area, isolation from ambient light, 
     and minimal radio frequency (RF) interference.
       2. The terrain at FHL resembles Korea and is unlike that in 
     any of the desert test ranges. Its diverse terrain features--
     mountains, hills, rivers, creeks and lakes--were the reason 
     FHL was selected as a field laboratory site in 1957 and FHL 
     remains a unique asset today. For example, operational 
     testing prior to the final IOT&E of the SGT YORK was at Ft. 
     Bliss where only flat terrain was encountered. In the IOT&E 
     at FHL the valley walls caused ground clutter breakthrough 
     which rendered the radar useless. Also, FHL has a unique 
     capability--a natural 360 degree ``bowl''--and the necessary 
     state permits--to test high power military lasers. Recent 
     Longbow Apache tests at FHL required this capability, 
     revealing important limitations in modeling and simulation.
       3. By moving to Ft. Bliss a further test restriction would 
     be created. Radio frequency jamming essential to creating a 
     realistic test environment in a location that is close to 
     large metropolitan areas, international airports, and an 
     international border will be difficult to recreate and will 
     increase risks of not having an adequate test environment.
       4. Operating temporarily at FHL with mobil assets will be 
     more expensive. Just four years ago in March 1991, all of 
     TEC's command staff and operational functions were 
     consolidated at FHL because operating in temporary duty 
     status was too expensive. The projected savings reflected in 
     the Army's submission, the reduction of 17 military and 5 
     federal civilians, would be trivial when considering giving 
     up this valuable and important operational test capability.


                             recommendation

       Army withdraw proposal to move its test Battalion from Fort 
     Hunter-Liggett to Ft. Bliss.
     

                          ____________________