[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 107 (Wednesday, June 28, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9227-S9231]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                        PAKISTAN AND THE F-16'S

  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, many years ago I sponsored an amendment 
dealing with our aid to Pakistan, and it has been a thorn in the side 
of our relationship with Pakistan. It ultimately involved the delivery 
of several F-16's. I had recently proposed a solution to that problem, 
a resolution of that problem, to the President of the United States.
  As my colleagues know, I have held a special interest in South Asia 
for a number of years. I have the highest admiration for the character 
of the South Asian people as they strive to better their conditions.
  The singular tragedy of South Asia has been war--the reality of 
conflicts past and the fear of future bloodshed. Pakistan and India 
have fought three wars since independence in 1947. Tension still 
remains high.
  What was once a conventional military standoff has now become more 
ominous. Both sides can assemble nuclear weapons. Both sides are 
striving to obtain modern delivery systems, such as ballistic missiles 
and aircraft. Just last week, the New York Times and Defense News 
reported that in the past 3 months, Pakistan has received from 
Communist China key components that could be used in M-11 ballistic 
missiles. Without question, a nuclear war between India and Pakistan 
would be cataclysmic. The names of the perpetrators, and their 
accessories, would be cursed for a millennium.
  To its credit, Mr. President, the U.S. Senate consistently has taken 
the initiative to promote peace and stability in South Asia--the core 
of that leadership has been the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A 
decade ago, the committee--under the chairmanship of the distinguished 
senior Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar]--decided to use the leverage of 
our aid to Pakistan to try to keep it from going nuclear. Just as 
important, the committee also decided that should Pakistan choose a 
nuclear option, we would not condone its action through United States 
aid.
  Mr. President, those were the key reasons why the U.S. Congress 
adopted the so-called Pressler amendment 10 years ago. It was the right 
thing to do. President Ronald Reagan agreed. So did the Government of 
Pakistan at that time. I believe the Pressler amendment is needed now 
more than ever. To the extent that the current administration and this 
Congress chooses to back away from that standard, the prospects for 
regional instability and war are increased accordingly. Unfortunately, 
some have called for a myriad of modifications to the Pressler 
amendment, ranging from one-time waivers to outright repeal.
  Mr. President, I have a more in-depth analysis of the Pressler 
amendment, which I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. PRESSLER. In summary, any unilateral attempt to weaken or modify 
the Pressler amendment for whatever reason--whether it be for economic 
assistance, or drug or terrorism control--would not be in the best 
interest of our more critical nuclear non-proliferation goals. I urge 
my colleagues to study this extended analysis before the Senate 
considers the foreign aid authorization bill later this year.
  Today, however, I would like to discuss the initiative I offered to 
the committee 1 month ago--a new, constructive initiative that will 
make a significant contribution toward achieving a number of our 
foreign policy goals.
  As my colleagues well know, in 1990, President Bush could no longer 
certify, under the terms of the Pressler amendment, that Pakistan did 
not possess a nuclear explosive device. As a result, 28 F-16 aircraft 
ordered by Pakistan could not be delivered. Today, those planes remain 
undelivered. Of these 28, 11 were sold on a foreign military sales 
basis--paid for up-front by the American taxpayer. The remaining 17 
were paid for by Pakistan for about $650 million.
  Let me be clear: I will oppose any attempt to waive the Pressler 
amendment to allow for Pakistan to take delivery of these aircraft. My 
rationale is simple: F-16's are capable of carrying a nuclear payload. 
It would be contrary to the spirit and letter of our Nation's nuclear 
non-proliferation policy for this Congress to allow Pakistan to take 
possession of nuclear delivery vehicles under any condition short of 
current law.
  Doing so would have grave implications. Delivery of the F-16's could 
spark an unprecedented, destabilizing arms buildup in South Asia. This 
is not in the best interests of the people of the region. I would hope 
that no Member of Congress would want his or her fingerprints on any 
proposal that would spark such an unfortunate turn of events.
  I recognize this leaves the United States in a quandary--a quandary 
that I hope we can eliminate. To do so, Mr. President, please allow me 
to turn our attention to the South China Sea, where the Communist 
Chinese military machine is on the march.
  Taiwan continues to be threatened with an increasing level of 
intimidating military exercises by Communist China. In addition, the 
Philippine Government is the victim of Chinese aggression in the 
Spratley Islands. The Philippines and the other surrounding countries 
in the region are concerned that this increased activity by the Chinese 
military is a prelude to an outright attempt to gain control over the 
South China Sea.
  Three points about the Philippines are worth mentioning:
  First, the Philippines is the democratic country in Asia with the 
weakest military. Its government needs modern planes and naval craft. 
Second, the Philippines has a security treaty with the United States. 
The Philippine people are our allies.
  Third, the U.S. Senate--through the leadership of former Foreign 
Relations Committee Chairman Lugar and the distinguished Senator from 
Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry--was instrumental in bringing democracy back 
to the Philippines in 1986. We must not turn our back on them now.
  My initiative is very simple. First, we arrange for the immediate 
delivery to the Philippines, on a FMS basis, of 11 F-16's of the 28 
held up by the Pressler amendment--the ones already paid for by the 
American taxpayer.
  At the same time, I recommended last month that we open negotiations 
with Taiwan on the immediate delivery of the remaining 17 aircraft. 
Taiwan already is purchasing 150 of the same model F-16 but the 
delivery date is not until June 1997.
  At the time of my announcement, I sent letters to President Clinton, 
Philippine President Ramos and President Lee of the Republic of China, 
detailing my initiative. Last week, President Clinton responded to my 
proposal, stating that he was open to a third-party sale if it met 
certain areas of concern. First, the President said that a third-party 
transfer must serve our national interest. I agree. In fact, my 
initiative produces a number of winners:
  For Pakistan, the F-16 issue goes away as an irritant in its 
relations with the United States. For India, 28 nuclear delivery 
vehicles do not show up on her border, and that is something I feel 
very concerned about. I think if these F-16's went to Pakistan, it 
would accelerate the arms race there. I feel strongly we should be 
friends with both India and Pakistan. Both countries have done a great 
deal with us and for us.
  I see in the long range a trading partnership with both countries, 
and friendship. But also this will help us with Taiwan.
  Taiwan can, for a price, close its 2-year window of vulnerability to 
modern Russian aircraft in the hands of Chinese pilots. Finally, the 
Philippines can get the air defense it needs.
  By this initiative, a number of American foreign policy goals would 
be furthered: lower tensions in South Asia, maintenance of a strong 
nuclear nonproliferation policy, and an enhanced deterrent capability 
of two democratic, nonnuclear powers in Asia. At home, American 
aerospace would have new markets, and the American taxpayer would 
receive a measurable enhancement of our global security for almost no 
cost.
  Second, the President stated that we would need to consider the 
return to Pakistan of the military equipment 

[[Page S9228]]
other than the F-16's for which it has paid. Frankly, I believe we must 
study this option carefully. I would oppose the return of any military 
equipment to Pakistan that would serve to undermine our nuclear non-
proliferation goals, and add to the current instability in the region. 
We should not limit the third-party sale option just to the F-16's 
exclusively.
  Third, the President noted that a third party sale may not be 
satisfactory to Pakistan if it does not receive most, if not all, of 
the funds they originally paid to the United States Government for the 
aircraft. As I stated last month, if the Congress opts to use any of 
the funds raised from my initiative to compensate Pakistan for the 
previously paid F-16's, I would not object. However, I would hope that 
full compensation is not made a condition by the President for pursuing 
a third party sale. As it stands right now, I believe it would be 
difficult to convince Congress to either authorize the delivery of the 
F-16's to Pakistan, or appropriate the full amount paid by Pakistan. My 
initiative provides the Government of Pakistan the first real 
opportunity to gain some compensation in the near future.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of my letter to President 
Clinton dated May 23, 1995, and his response dated June 22, be printed 
in the Record following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 2.)
  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I am pleased the President remains open 
to a possible third party sale. Frankly, I believe that is his only 
option. Let me state for the record that the Republic of China is open 
to my proposal. I also received a very positive initial response from 
representatives of the Philippine Government.
  This initiative is simple but bold. I hope my colleagues will join 
with me in urging the administration to make this initiative their own. 
I stand ready to do my part to reach a solution that serves our 
national interest--first and foremost being the preservation of a 
tough, sound nuclear nonproliferation policy.
  Mr. President, last month, I had the opportunity to testify before 
the Foreign Relations Committee and present this idea. I am glad that 
the President has responded favorably. But much remains to be done to 
work out this agreement.
  This has been a difficult matter to approach because in regard to the 
amendment that was passed in the 1980's, one could say that Pakistan 
purchased these planes with their eyes open, so to speak. They knew, on 
the one hand, of the existence of our law that said we would not 
continue aid if they developed a nuclear bomb. And, very frankly, they 
were not being candid in what they told the then Vice President and 
President George Bush about their nuclear program.
  So if you take it from that point of view strictly, when the 
Pakistanis got into this thing, they had full knowledge of what they 
were doing back home in terms of developing a nuclear bomb. They knew 
our law said what it said, and they moved forward with this purchase 
which would have been in violation.
  So we could say, ``Well, let us just let them be, that they made a 
bad deal, and they paid the price.'' On the other hand, there has been 
a great distinction in Pakistan. The military people have not always 
told the civilian government what is going on, very frankly. And the 
civilian government has engaged in some perhaps unwise decisions based 
on bad information. That is really Pakistan's problem, I suppose.
  But, as the years have gone by, I see an opportunity to get these F-
16's to Taiwan, which needs them to counterbalance China, and to the 
Philippines, which is a longtime ally of ours.
                               Exhibit 1

                  In Defense of the Pressler Amendment


                  What the Pressler Amendment Requires

       The Pressler Amendment requires Pakistan to satisfy two 
     conditions before it is eligible to receive U.S. foreign 
     assistance, including US military equipment or technology. 
     Aid may be provided in any fiscal year only if the President 
     has certified in that year that Pakistan (a) ``does not 
     possess'' a nuclear explosive device and (b) that the 
     proposed assistance ``will reduce significantly'' the risk of 
     possession.


              Common Criticisms of the Pressler Amendment

       Critics of the Pressler Amendment have alleged that this 
     legislation: (1) is unfair and discriminatory; (2) is not 
     effective; (3) is counterproductive; (4) penalizes Pakistan 
     when it has not even assembled, deployed, or tested weapons; 
     (5) is inflexible; (6) inhibits US encouragement of a free 
     market in Pakistan; (7) hurts US economic competitiveness; 
     (8) sets back US human rights initiatives; (9) interferes 
     with US counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics efforts; and 
     (10) fosters anti-Americanism in Pakistan.
       Not one of these criticisms holds up to responsible 
     analysis. The criticisms reveal more about the critics 
     themselves than about any real shortcomings in the 
     legislation. In particular, these criticisms reflect: (1) a 
     profound misunderstanding of the purposes of the Pressler 
     Amendment, (2) a flagrant case of historical amnesia; (3) a 
     cynical fatalism about the inevitability of proliferation; 
     (4) an ignorance of the regional, global, and US national 
     security consequences of a Pakistani bomb; (5) the 
     susceptibility of the legislative process to special interest 
     lobbying; (6) the triumpth of slogans over analysis as a 
     basis of policy; (7) an utterly bizarre conception of what 
     constitutes a ``friend'' of the United States; (8) a 
     distorted perspective on US national priorities; (9) a 
     preference for the management rather than the prevention of 
     proliferation; and (10) a compulsive desire to channel even 
     more taxpayer dollars into unproductive pursuits.


                    Rebuttals to Specific Criticisms

                    1. ``Unfair and Discriminatory''

       Between 1981 and 1990, Pakistan gave the US government both 
     formal and informal assurances about the peaceful nature of 
     its nuclear program, the level of enrichment of its uranium, 
     foreign nuclear procurements, cooperation with China, and 
     other such issues relating to nonproliferation issues--in 
     each case, Pakistan broke its word.
       It is not unfair for America to defend its interests by 
     punishing those who violate their commitments to us.
       On eight occasions, Congress authorized special waivers of 
     US nonproliferation laws to permit aid to continue to flow to 
     Pakistan. To this day, Pakistan is the only country ever to 
     have received (or required) a waiver of the Glenn/Symington 
     sanctions in order to qualify for US aid. It is true that 
     America engaged in discrimination, but this was 
     discrimination on behalf of Pakistan and against all other 
     countries that played by the rules.
       How can Pakistan simultaneously condemn the country-
     specific discrimination in the Pressler Amendment without 
     also condemning the country-specific discrimination that 
     authorized such aid?
       Pakistan is not the only country to be mentioned by name in 
     the context of nonproliferation sanctions--for years, Iraq, 
     Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba have been designated for 
     special controls and sanctions.
       US relations with India also have been affected by a 
     variety of US nonproliferation laws. Because of India's 
     unsafeguarded nuclear program, there is no US/Indian 
     agreement for nuclear cooperation; US military cooperation 
     with India is negligible; and the US will not export certain 
     forms of missile equipment and technology to India and other 
     goods related to weapons of mass destruction. Though 
     sanctions under Glenn/Symington have not been invoked against 
     India, it is because India, unlike Pakistan, has not violated 
     that law.

                          2. ``Not effective''

       US policy throughout the 1980s asserted that US aid was an 
     effective way to lure Pakistan away from the bomb--yet 
     Pakistan made its most significant nuclear achievements 
     precisely when US aid was flowing at its highest levels.
       The Pressler Amendment sanctions accomplished what $5 
     billion in US economic and military aid failed to 
     accomplish--it led Pakistan to stop producing highly-enriched 
     uranium.
       The Pressler Amendment succeeded in enabling the 
     continuation of US efforts to drive the Soviets out of 
     Afghanistan while not sacrificing a bottom-line US nuclear 
     nonproliferation objective: nonpossession. If it were not for 
     this compromise, aid could have been terminated in 1985.
       The Pressler Amendment was then and remains now a statement 
     of the priority that America attaches to nonproliferation as 
     a goal of policy.
       The Pressler Amendment has unquestionably made Pakistan--
     especially its air force, army, and navy--pay for its 
     misguided decisions to pursue the bomb. Indeed, if Pakistan 
     once again qualifies for US aid, it will no doubt be 
     Pakistan's military that will stand to benefit the most from 
     the new aid. This gives Pakistan a tangible incentive to 
     satisfy the certification terms under Pressler.

                        3. ``Counterproductive''

       Though the sanctions have undoubtedly weakened Pakistan's 
     military capabilities, there is no evidence that the 
     sanctions have ``driven'' Pakistan to rely more upon nuclear 
     deterrence as a national defense strategy.
       Pakistan's decisions to stop producing highly-enriched 
     uranium, not to test, and not to assemble or deploy nuclear 
     weapons hardly suggests a policy of increased reliance on a 
     nuclear deterrent.

[[Page S9229]]

       The US denial of technology and aid has slowed down 
     Pakistan's bomb-making potential, a long-standing goal of US 
     nonproliferation policy.
       Though Pakistan still has a nuclear weapons-capability and 
     is still cooperating with China on the bomb, these activities 
     were not ``caused by'' the Pressler Amendment. Pakistan was 
     seeking this capability and engaging in this cooperation with 
     China well before the Pressler Amendment came into existence.
       For a truly counterproductive policy, one must look to the 
     1980s, when US taxpayers shelled out $5 billion in aid that 
     was supposed to appease Pakistan's nuclear ambitions . . . 
     aid that coincided Pakistan's acquisition of the bomb. Today, 
     critics of the Pressler Amendment are arguing that more US 
     taxpayer money should be channeled down that drain.

               4. ``No assembly, deployment, or testing''

       Pakistan's decisions not to assemble, deploy, or test have 
     very little to do with the flow of US aid.
       The US nuclear arsenal in the 1950s was stored in separate 
     components: was the US a non-nuclear-weapon state as a 
     result?
       Even the State Department concedes that a country can still 
     possess the bomb even if it has not yet actually assembled 
     one.
       Pakistan's position is that it does not ``possess'' the 
     bomb because it has not assembled the requisite materials. By 
     this logic, Pakistan could acquire a nuclear arsenal with 
     hundreds of weapons simply by not tightening down the last 
     screw on the casing of each bomb.
       Pakistan's new emphasis on the issue of assembling is just 
     another chapter of Pakistan's long history of dissembling 
     about its bomb.
       It is widely believed that Pakistan got a pre-tested bomb 
     design from China. Why would Pakistan want to or need to test 
     a pre-tested design?
       Pakistan has very limited supplies of bomb-usable nuclear 
     material. Why should it waste such precious material on an 
     unnecessary test?
       Why should Pakistan engage in a test that would only give 
     India an excuse to commence a regional nuclear arms race that 
     Pakistan could never win?
       If Pakistan's nuclear program is, as its government claims, 
     devoted entirely to peaceful purposes, how can it claim that 
     it has ``kept components separate'' and not ``assembled'' the 
     bomb? What would it have to assemble if its program were 
     peaceful? If its program is so peaceful, why does it refuse 
     to agree to international inspections independent of what 
     India does?

                           5. ``Inflexible''
       Supporters of the Pressler Amendment make no apologies to 
     the charge that the law has been ``inflexible,'' assuming a 
     normal dictionary definition of this term: ``of an unyielding 
     temper, purpose, will, etc.'' The alternative of passive 
     accommodation has little attraction to supporters of 
     nonproliferation.
       Even with the so-called ``inflexible'' label, the following 
     activities take place: (a) the US still issues licenses to 
     export commercial munitions and spare parts to Pakistan, 
     including spares for Pakistan's nuclear-weapons delivery 
     vehicle, the F-16; (b) US military visits and joint training 
     exercises continue to take place; (c) US aid with respect to 
     agriculture, counter-terrorism, nutrition, population 
     control, literacy, advancement of women, health and medicine, 
     environmental protection, disaster relief, and many other 
     areas can continue to flow to Pakistan via nongovernmental 
     organizations; (d) the Export-Import Bank also has extended 
     loans, grants, and guarantees to Pakistan; (e) PL-480 
     agricultural aid continues; (f) arms control verification 
     assistance continues (a seismic station); (g) millions of 
     dollars of aid in the ``pipeline'' as of October 1990 was 
     allowed to flow to Pakistan; (h) cooperation on peace keeping 
     is continuing; and (i) Pakistan continues to receive billions 
     of dollars in development assistance via multilateral lending 
     agencies.
       Pakistan used almost $200 million in FMS credits to fund 
     the purchase of 11 F-16's between FY 1989 and 1993, of which 
     about $150 million were used after the Pressler sanctions 
     were invoked.
       The US continues to review and approve licenses of dual-use 
     technology to Pakistan.
       All the above hardly suggest that the Pressler Amendment 
     has been unduly inflexible.

                           6. ``Free Market''

       Pakistan has a long way to go before it has a free market 
     and the Pressler Amendment is hardly to blame.
       A recent Heritage Foundation worldwide review characterized 
     Pakistan's economy as ``Mostly Not Free.'' The report found 
     that Pakistan has a ``very high level of protectionism.''
       The only market that is truly free in Pakistan is its black 
     market.
       Free markets are an important US interest, but not an end 
     in themselves--they need to be weighed against other US 
     interests, especially national security, defense, and 
     nonproliferation objectives. Encouraging a free market in 
     weapons of mass destruction should not be high on America's 
     list of priorities.

                7. ``Hurts US Economic Competitiveness''

       The US has exported hundreds of millions of dollars in 
     defense goods to Pakistan since the Pressler Amendment came 
     into effect.
       In 1994, the Commerce Department approved $96 million in 
     exports of dual-use goods to Pakistan, about triple the 
     amount approved in each of the three previous years.
       Total US exports to Pakistan still come to less than $1 
     billion. Even if all of this trade was lost, it would have no 
     effect whatsoever upon the US national trade balance or US 
     economic competitiveness. By comparison,
      US exports worldwide in 1994 were worth well over a half 
     trillion dollars.

               8. ``Sets Back Human Rights Initiatives''

       Congress has expressly authorized the transfer of 
     assistance to Pakistan via nongovernmental groups to advance 
     the cause of human rights (as indeed several other non-
     military causes).
       Despite some modest improvements since the days of General 
     Zia, the Pakistani government continues to repress the human 
     rights of Pakistani citizens, as most recently documented 
     both by the State Department's annual human rights report and 
     a recent global survey by Amnesty International.
       The US experience in Iran should have taught us to beware 
     of cultivating cozy relationships with a repressive 
     government.

 9. ``Interferes with Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Narcotics Efforts''

       Congress has expressly authorized the transfer of 
     assistance to Pakistan via nongovernmental groups to 
     terrorism and narcotics trafficking.
       Widespread terrorism and narcotics trafficking persists in 
     Pakistan.
       Pakistan's recent cooperation with the US in apprehending 
     terrorists indicates that the Pressler Amendment is no 
     insuperable obstacle to such cooperation.

                    10. ``Fosters Anti-Americanism''

       Anti-Americanism was not born in Pakistan with the 
     enactment of the Pressler Amendment--it predated the 
     amendment and has causes far beyond a nuclear dispute between 
     the US and Pakistan.
       America opposes the global spread of nuclear weapons: it 
     should come as no surprise to witness leaders of governments 
     that are secretly building bombs encouraging anti-
     Americanism.
       America seeks to defend its national interests, not to win 
     popularity contests. As President Clinton stated on October 
     18, 1994: ``There is nothing more important to our security 
     and to the world's stability than preventing the spread of 
     nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.''
                                                                    ____

     U.S. Aid Policies and Pakistan's Bomb: What Were We Trying to 
                              Accomplish?

       Letters to Congress from Presidents Reagan and Bush, 1985 
     to 1989, required under sec. 620E(e) of Foreign Assistance 
     Act (Pressler Amendment):
       ``The proposed United States assistance program for 
     Pakistan remains extremely important in reducing the risk 
     that Pakistan will develop and ultimately possess such a 
     device. I am convinced that our security relationship and 
     assistance program are the most effective means available for 
     us to dissuade Pakistan from acquiring nuclear explosive 
     devices. Our assistance program is designed to help Pakistan 
     address its substantial and legitimate security needs, 
     thereby both reducing incentives and creating disincentives 
     for Pakistani acquisition of nuclear explosives.''--President 
     George Bush, 10/5/89; President Ronald Reagan, 11/18/88; 12/
     17/87; 10/27/86; and 11/25/85.
       President George Bush, letter to Congress (addressed to J. 
     Danforth Quayle as President of the Senate), 12 April 1991, 
     urging abandonment of Pressler certification requirement:
       ``. . .my intention is to send the strongest possible 
     message to Pakistan and other potential proliferators that 
     nonproliferation is among the highest priorities of my 
     Administration's foreign policy, irrespective of whether such 
     a policy is required by law.''
       Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Teresita Schaffer, 
     testimony before House subcommittee, 2 August 1989:
       ``None of the F-16's Pakistan already owns or is about to 
     purchase is configured for nuclear delivery . . . a Pakistan 
     with a credible conventional deterrent will be less motivated 
     to purchase a nuclear weapons capability.''
       Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Hughes, 
     testimony before House subcommittee, 2 August 1989:
       ``Finally, we believe that past and continued American 
     support for Pakistan's conventional defense reduces the 
     likelihood that Pakistan will feel compelled to cross the 
     nuclear threshold.''
       Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Peck, testimony 
     before House subcommittee, 17 February 1988:
       ``We believe that the improvements in Pakistan's 
     conventional military forces made possible by U.S. assistance 
     and the U.S. security commitment our aid program symbolizes 
     have had a significant influence on Pakistan's decision to 
     forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons.''
       Special Ambassador at Large Richard Kennedy, testimony 
     before two House subcommittees, 22 October 1987:
       ``We have made it clear that Pakistan must show restraint 
     in its nuclear program if it expects us to continue providing 
     security assistance.''
       Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, testimony 
     before Senate subcommittee, 18 March 1987:
       ``Our assistance relationship is designed to advance both 
     our non-proliferation and our 

[[Page S9230]]
     strategic objectives relating to Afghanistan. Development of a close 
     and reliable security partnership with Pakistan gives 
     Pakistan an alternative to nuclear weapons to meet its 
     legitimate security needs and strengthens our influence on 
     Pakistan's nuclear decision making. Shifting to a policy of 
     threats and public ultimata would in our view decrease, not 
     increase our ability to continue to make a contribution to 
     preventing a nuclear arms race in South Asia. Undermining the 
     credibility of the security relationship with the U.S. would 
     itself create incentives for Pakistan to ignore our concerns 
     and push forward in the direction of nuclear weapons 
     acquisition.''
       Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Howard Schaffer, 
     testimony before House subcommittee, 6 February 1984:
       ``The assistance program also contributes to U.S. nuclear 
     non-proliferation goals. We believe strongly that a program 
     of support which enhances Pakistan's sense of security helps 
     remove the principal underlying incentive for the acquisition 
     of a nuclear weapons capability. The Government of Pakistan 
     understands our deep concern over this issue. We have made 
     clear that the relationship between our two countries, and 
     the program of military and economic assistance on which it 
     rests, are ultimately inconsistent with Pakistan's 
     development of a nuclear explosives device. President Zia has 
     stated publicly that Pakistan will not manufacture a nuclear 
     explosives device.''
       Special Ambassador at Large Richard Kennedy, testimony 
     before two House subcommittees, 1 November 1983:
       ``By helping friendly nations to address legitimate 
     security concerns, we seek to reduce incentives for the 
     acquisition of nuclear weapons. The provision of security 
     assistance and the sale of military equipment can be major 
     components of efforts along these lines. Development of 
     security ties to the U.S. can strengthen a country's 
     confidence in its ability to defend itself without nuclear 
     weapons. At the same time, the existence of such a 
     relationship enhances our credibility when we seek to 
     persuade that country to forego [sic] nuclear arms . . . We 
     believe that strengthening Pakistan's conventional military 
     capability serves a number of important U.S. interests, 
     including non-proliferation. At the same time, we have made 
     clear to the government of Pakistan that efforts to acquire 
     nuclear explosives would jeopardize our security assistance 
     program.''
       Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harry 
     Marshall, 12 September 1983, before International Nuclear Law 
     Association, San Francisco:
       ``U.S. assistance has permitted Pakistan to strengthen its 
     conventional defensive capability. This serves to bolster its 
     stability and thus reduce its motivation for acquiring 
     nuclear explosives.''
       President Ronald Reagan, report to Congress pursuant to 
     sec. 601 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (``601 
     Report''), for calendar year 1982--
       ``Steps were taken to strengthen the U.S. security 
     relationship with Pakistan with the objective of addressing 
     that country's security needs and thereby reducing any 
     motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives.''
       President Ronald Reagan, report to Congress pursuant to 
     sec. 601 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (``601 
     Report''), for calendar year 1981--
       ``Military assistance by the United States and the 
     establishment of a new security relationship with Pakistan 
     should help to counteract its possible motivations toward 
     acquiring nuclear weapons. . . . Moreover, help from the 
     United States in strengthening Pakistan's conventional 
     military capabilities would offer the best available means 
     for counteracting possible motivations toward acquiring 
     nuclear weapons.''
       Assistant Secretary of State James Malone, address before 
     Atomic Industrial Forum, San Francisco, 1 December 1981.
       ``We believe that this assistance--which is in the 
     strategic interest of the United States--will make a 
     significant contribution to the well-being and security of 
     Pakistan and that it will be recognized as such by that 
     government. We also believe that, for this reason, it offers 
     the best prospect of deterring the Pakistanis from proceeding 
     with the testing or acquisition of nuclear explosives.
       Undersecretary of State James Buckley, testimony before 
     Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 12 November 1981:
       ``We believe that a program of support which provides 
     Pakistan with a continuing relationship with a significant 
     security partner and enhances its sense of security may help 
     remove the principal underlying incentive for the acquisition 
     of a nuclear weapons capability. With such a relationship in 
     place we are hopeful that over time we will be able to 
     persuade Pakistan that the pursuit of a weapons capability is 
     neither necessary to its security nor in its broader interest 
     as an important member of the world community.''
       Testimony of Undersecretary of State, James Buckley, in 
     response to question from Sen. Glenn, Senate Foreign 
     Relations Committee, 12 November 1981, on effects of a 
     nuclear detonation on continuation of cash sales of F-16's:
       ``[Sen. Glenn] . . . so if Pakistan detonates a nuclear 
     device before completion of the F-16 sale, will the 
     administration cut off future deliveries?
       ``[Buckley] Again, Senator, we have underscored the fact 
     that this would dramatically affect the relationship. The 
     cash sales are part of that relationship. I cannot see 
     drawing lines between the impact in the case of a direct cash 
     sale versus a guaranteed or U.S.-financed sale.''
       Undersecretary of State James Buckley, letter to NY Times, 
     25 July 1981:
       ``In place of the ineffective sanctions on Pakistan's 
     nuclear program imposed by the past Administration, we hope 
     to address through conventional means the sources of 
     insecurity that prompt a nation like Pakistan to seek a 
     nuclear capability in the first place.''
                                                                    ____

  From Myth to Reality: Evidence of Parkistan's ``Nuclear Restraint''

       Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained a 
     pre-tested, atomic bomb design from China.
       Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained bomb-
     grade enriched uranium from China.
       1980--US nuclear export control violation: Reexport via 
     Canada (components of inverters used in gas centrifuge 
     enrichment activities).
       1981--US nuclear export control violation: New York, 
     zirconium (nuclear fuel cladding material).
       1981--AP story cites contents of reported US State 
     Department cable stating ``We have strong reason to believe 
     that Pakistan is seeking to develop a nuclear explosives 
     capability . . . Pakistan is conducting a program for the 
     design and development of a triggering package for nuclear 
     explosive devices.''
       1981--Publication of book, ``Islamic Bomb,'' citing recent 
     Pakistan efforts to construct a nuclear test site.
       1982/3--Several European press reports indicate that 
     Pakistan was using Middle Eastern intermediaries to acquire 
     bomb parts (13-inch ``steel spheres'' and ``steel petal 
     shapes'').
       1983--Recently declassified US government assessment 
     concludes that ``There is unambiguous evidence that Pakistan 
     is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons development program . 
     . . We believe the ultimate application of the enriched 
     uranium produced at Kahuta, which is unsafeguarded, is 
     clearly nuclear weapons.''
       1984--President Zia states that Pakistan has acquired a 
     ``very modest'' uranium enrichment capability for ``nothing 
     but peaceful purposes.''
       1984--President Reagan reportedly warns Pakistan of ``grave 
     consequences'' if it enriches uranium above 5%.
       1985--ABC News reports that US believes Pakistan has 
     ``successfully tested'' a ``firing mechanism'' of an atomic 
     bomb by means of a non-nuclear explosion, and that US 
     krytrons ``have been acquired'' by Pakistan.
       1985--US nuclear export control violation: Texas, krytrons 
     (nuclear weapon triggers).
       1985--US nuclear export control violation: US cancelled 
     license for export of flash x-ray camera to Pakistan (nuclear 
     weapon diagnostic uses) because of proliferation concerns.
       1985/6--Media cites production of highly enriched, bomb-
     grade uranium in violation of a commitment to the US.
       1986--Bob Woodward article in Washington Post cities 
     alleged DIA report saying Pakistan ``detonated a high 
     explosive test device between Sept. 18 and Sept. 21 as part 
     of its continuing efforts to build an implosion-type nuclear 
     weapon;'' says Pakistan has produced uranium enriched to a 
     93.5% level.
       1986--Press reports cite US ``Special National Intelligence 
     Estimate'' concluding that Pakistan had produced weapons-
     grade material.
       1986--Commenting on Pakistan's nuclear capability, General 
     Zia tells interviewer, ``It is our right to obtain the 
     technology. And when we acquire this technology, the Islamic 
     world will possess it with us.''
       1986--Recently declassified memo to then-Secretary of State 
     Henry Kissinger states, ``Despite strong U.S. concern, 
     Pakistan continues to pursue a nuclear explosive capability . 
     . . If operated as its nominal capacity, the Kahuta uranium 
     enrichment plant could produce enough weapons-grade material 
     to build several nuclear devices per year.''
       1987--US nuclear export control violation: Pennsylvania, 
     maraging steel & beryllium (used in centrifuge manufacture 
     and bomb components).
       1987--London Financial Times reports US spy satellites have 
     observed construction of second uranium enrichment plant in 
     Pakistan.
       1987--Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist states in 
     published interview that ``what the CIA has been saying about 
     our possessing the bomb is correct.''
       1987--West German official confirms that nuclear equipment 
     recently seized on way to Pakistan was suitable for ``at 
     least 93% enrichment'' of uranium; blueprints of uranium 
     enrichment plant also seized in Switzerland.
       1987--US nuclear export control violation: California, 
     oscilloscopes, computer equipment (useful in nuclear weapon 
     R&D).
       1987--According to photocopy of a reported German foreign 
     ministry memo published in Paris in 1990, UK government 
     officials tells German counterpart on European 
     nonproliferation working group that he was ``convinced that 
     Pakistan had `a few small' nuclear weapons.''
       1988--President Reagan waives an aid cutoff for Pakistan 
     due to an export control violation; in his formal 
     certification, he confirmed that ``material, equipment, or 
     technology covered by that provision was to be 

[[Page S9231]]

     used by Pakistan in the manufacture of a nuclear explosive 
     device.''
       1988--Hedrick Smith article in New York Times reports US 
     government sources believe Pakistan has produced enough 
     highly enriched uranium for 4-6 bombs.
       1988--President Zia tells Carnegie Endowment delegation in 
     interview that Pakistan has attained a nuclear capability 
     ``that is good enough to create an impression of 
     deterrence.''
       1989--Multiple reports of Pakistan modifying US-supplied F-
     16 aircraft for nuclear delivery purposes; wind tunnel tests 
     cited in document reportedly from West German intelligence 
     service.
       1989--Test launch of Hatf-2 missile: Payload (500 
     kilograms) and range (300 kilometers) meet ``nuclear-
     capable'' standard under Missile Technology Control Regime.
       1989--CIA Director Webster tells Senate Governmental 
     Affairs Committee hearing that ``Clearly Pakistan is engaged 
     in developing a nuclear capability.''
       1989--Media claims that Pakistan acquired tritium gas and 
     tritium facility from West Germany in mid-1980's.
       1989--ACDA unclassified report cites Chinese assistance to 
     missile program in Pakistan.
       1989--UK press cites nuclear cooperation between Pakistan 
     and Iraq.
       1989--Article in Nuclear Fuel states that the United States 
     has issued ``about 100 specific communiques to the West 
     German Government related to planned exports to the Pakistan 
     Atomic Energy Commission and its affiliated organizations,'' 
     exports reportedly included tritium and a tritium recovery 
     facility.
       1989--Article in Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly states 
     ``sources close to the Pakistani nuclear program have 
     revealed that Pakistani scientists have now perfected 
     detonation mechanisms for a nuclear device.''
       1989--Reporting on a recent customs investigation, West 
     German magazine Stern reports, ``since the beginning of the 
     eighties over 70 [West German] enterprises have supplied 
     sensitive goods to enterprises which for years have been 
     buying equipment for Pakistan's ambitious nuclear weapons 
     program.''
       1989--Gerard Smith, former US diplomat and senior arms 
     control authority, claims US has turned a ``blind eye'' to 
     proliferation developments in Pakistan and Israel.
       1989--Senator Glenn delivers two lengthy statements 
     addressing Pakistan's violations of its uranium enrichment 
     commitment to the United States and the lack of progress on 
     nonproliferation issues from Prime Minister Bhutto's 
     democratically elected government after a year in office; 
     Glenn concluded, ``There simply must be a cost to non-
     compliance--when a solemn nuclear pledge is violated, the 
     solution surely does not lie in voiding the pledge.''
       1989-1990--Reports of secret construction of unsafeguarded 
     nuclear research reactor; components from Europe.
       1990--US News cites ``western intelligence sources'' 
     claiming Pakistan recently ``cold-tested'' a nuclear device 
     and is now building a plutonium production reactor; article 
     says Pakistan is engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran.
       1990--French magazine publishes photo of West German 
     government document citing claim by UK official that British 
     government believes Pakistan already possesses ``a few 
     small'' nuclear weapons; cites Ambassador Richard Kennedy 
     claim to UK diplomat that Pakistan has broken its pledge to 
     the US not to enrich uranium over 5%.
       1990--London Sunday Times cites growing US and Soviet 
     concerns about Pakistani nuclear program; paper claims F-16 
     aircraft are being modified to nuclear delivery purposes; 
     claims US spy satellites have observed ``heavily armed 
     convoys'' leaving Pakistan uranium enrichment complex at 
     Kahuta and heading for military airfields.
       1990--Pakistani biography of top nuclear scientist (Dr. 
     Abdul Qadeer Khan and the Islamic Bomb), claims US showed 
     ``model'' of Pakistani bomb to visiting Pakistani diplomat as 
     part of unsuccessful nonproliferation effort.
       1990--Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly reports ``US 
     officials now believe that Pakistan has quite sufficient 
     computing power in country to run all the modeling necessary 
     to adequately verify the viability of the country's nuclear 
     weapons technology.''
       1990--Dr. A. Q. Khan, father of Pakistan's bomb, receives 
     ``Man of the Nation Award.''
       1990--Washington Post documents 3 recent efforts by 
     Pakistan to acquire special arc-melting furnaces with nuclear 
     and missile applications.
       1991--Wall Street Journal says Pakistan is buying nuclear-
     capable M-11 missile from China.
       1991--Sen. Moynihan says in television interview, ``Last 
     July [1990] the Pakistanis machined 6 nuclear warheads. And 
     they've still got them.''
       1991--Time quotes businessman, ``BCCI is functioning as the 
     owners' representative for Pakistan's nuclear-bomb project.''
       1992--Pakistani foreign secretary publicly discusses 
     Pakistan's possession of ``cores'' of nuclear devices.
                               Exhibit 2


                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                     Washington, DC, May 23, 1995.
     The President,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: Occasionally there is an opportunity to 
     take a bold initiative which will further multiple American 
     foreign policy goals. Two of those goals are the maintenance 
     of peace and stability in South Asia and the deterrence of 
     aggression in East Asia. Such an opportunity is at hand.
       The inability of the President since October 1, 1990, to 
     make the necessary certification under section 620E(e) of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to the nuclear 
     activities of Pakistan) has prevented the delivery of twenty-
     eight F-16 aircraft to Pakistan. Since F-16s in American 
     service are nuclear delivery vehicles, the possibility that 
     these aircraft might yet be delivered to Pakistan has raised 
     enormous concern in neighboring India. At the same time, our 
     inability to transfer the aircraft is an irritant in our 
     relations with Pakistan. For now, the aircraft in question 
     are in storage in Arizona.
       In East Asia, both the Republic of China on Taiwan and the 
     Philippines have been the victims of aggression from the 
     People's Republic of China. In the case of the former, it's 
     military exercises designed to intimidate; in the latter it's 
     the actual take over of Philippine territory in the South 
     China Sea.
       To serve as a deterrent for aggression across the Taiwan 
     Straits, Taiwan has ordered 150 American F-16 aircraft. 
     However, these aircraft will not begin to arrive in Taiwan 
     until June of 1997 suggesting that there may be a ``window of 
     opportunity'' for conflict. With regard to the Philippines, a 
     combination of historical factors and the need to devote 
     defense resources to opposing internal subversion has led to 
     a severe lack of external defense capability.
       Considering the twenty-eight F-16 aircraft in storage, it 
     appears that eleven of them were to be delivered to Pakistan 
     under the United States Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. 
     Essentially, they were paid for already by the American 
     taxpayer. The remaining seventeen aircraft were paid for by 
     Pakistan.
       Therefore, I recommend that the Administration open 
     negotiations with the Governments of the Philippines and the 
     Republic of China on Taiwan for the transfer of the aircraft. 
     Eleven of the aircraft could be transferred to the 
     Philippines on an FMS basis and the remaining seventeen could 
     be the subject of negotiations for payment with Taiwan. If a 
     decision is made to return to Pakistan some or all of the 
     money collected, I would not object.
       If this initiative were carried out, it would directly 
     further American foreign policy goals in South and East Asia, 
     respectively. In South Asia tensions would be reduced as 
     twenty-eight potential nuclear delivery vehicles would be 
     removed from the region. In East Asia the military strength 
     of our friends and allies would be enhanced significantly and 
     a clear signal would be sent regarding our determination to 
     oppose aggression.
       This initiative is simple but it requires a bold 
     imagination for execution. I hope that you will join with me 
     in putting it into effect and making a significant 
     contribution to our national security.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Larry Pressler,
     U.S. Senator.
                                                                    ____

                                              The White House,

                                        Washington, June 22, 1995.
     Hon. Larry Pressler,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for writing to me about the 
     opportunity before us to resolve the F-16 issue with 
     Pakistan. I appreciate your initiative and hope some new 
     thinking will help create a consensus between the 
     Administration and Congress for a satisfactory solution.
       As you know, when I met with Prime Minister Bhutto in 
     April, I told her I would explore with Congress the options 
     for returning either the F-16s and equipment or the funds 
     Pakistan had paid. The proposal to sell the planes and return 
     the funds is one possibility if we can resolve some areas of 
     concern. First, we must determine that the transfer of this 
     equipment to third parties would be in our national interest. 
     Second, we would need to be prepared to return to Pakistan 
     the equipment other than F-16s for which it has paid. We 
     would need to work with Congress on the necessary authorities 
     to do so. Third, such a proposal may make this solution less 
     than satisfactory for the Government of Pakistan if it 
     results in the return to Pakistan of significantly less money 
     then they originally paid for the aircraft.
       Again, let me say that a solution accepted by Congress and 
     by Pakistan will clear the way for a more serious discussion 
     of the critical nonproliferation issues that concern us all. 
     It will also help to improve the atmosphere in our bilateral 
     relations and thus advance other U.S. interests in the 
     region.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.
     

                          ____________________