[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 100 (Monday, June 19, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8602-S8606]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to speak just a few moments 
about the situation in Bosnia today and share with my colleagues some 
of my thoughts on the subject.
  The Senate Armed Services Committee, under the leadership of Senator 
Thurmond, the chairman of the committee, has had a series of four 
hearings on the subject of Bosnia. We heard from a number of, I think, 
very well-informed witnesses.
  We heard from, of course, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Bill 
Perry, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Shalikashvili, the 
former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Al Haig, and former 
President of the United States, President Carter, and another former 
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Gen. Jack Galvin, now retired, [[Page S 
8603]] former Secretary of Defense, Jim Schlesinger, former top 
official in the State Department, Richard Armitage, and retired Col. 
Harry Summers, a frequent writer on this and many other national 
security subjects.
  Mr. President, I would like to express my disappointment--unrelated 
to the hearings but which took place simultaneously with our hearings 
last week--with the actions of the Clinton administration when they 
last week first delayed a vote in the U.N. Security Council, and then 
voted for the deployment of the French, British, and Dutch rapid 
reaction force to Bosnia which they at first opposed, but then 
deferring a decision on the financial cost for that force.
  I understand this action on the part of Clinton administration was 
taken primarily because of a letter from Senate Majority Leader Dole 
and House Speaker Gingrich objecting to U.S. financing of the rapid 
reaction force.
  I believe this is a serious mistake on the part of the Clinton 
administration, and on the part of the congressional leadership. I 
believe we will pay a price for this combined Presidential and 
congressional position in the years ahead with our allies.
  Mr. President, the United States during the administrations of both 
President Bush and President Clinton voted for every U.N. Security 
Council resolution on Bosnia, and endorsed and supported the efforts of 
our NATO allies who are participating on the ground in Bosnia as a part 
of the U.N. Protection Force or UNPROFOR.
  I myself disagreed with numerous actions that have been taken in 
Bosnia by both the United Nations and by NATO. Yet, we voted for it. 
Both Presidents--President Bush and President Clinton--voted in the 
Security Council for every one of these resolutions. Now we have our 
allies in difficulty. They are in difficulty on the ground. And that 
difficulty could intensify with the rapid reaction force that is now 
being inserted by our allies--not by America, but by our allies--which 
will be an integral part of UNPROFOR, and the cost should be 
underwritten to the same extent and in the same manner as all U.N. 
peacekeeping forces.
  We will have another day and another time to determine how much the 
United States should pay for U.N. peacekeeping assessments. But that is 
a long-term challenge. The question now is whether or not we are going 
to support in any way financially a crucial force that is being put in 
to protect the U.N. peacekeepers and the NATO peacekeepers that we 
ourselves voted to put in Bosnia. It is the ultimate irony for our 
congressional leadership and for the Clinton administration to not 
fully support a much stronger NATO-U.N. rapid reaction force.
  Mr. President, if the U.N. forces withdraw from Bosnia, the President 
of the United States has declared that he is going to help them with 
United States forces. The United States forces that would be placed 
there to help with this withdrawal would be working with this rapid 
deployment force. I think it is very important for us to understand the 
consequences of our not being willing to help pay for a rapid reaction 
force. That force, deployed by our allies and working with the United 
States forces assisting in the withdrawal, would help alleviate some of 
the responsibility for the United States forces in that situation and 
make it possible for a lot less United States forces to be placed in 
Bosnia to help with the withdrawal, and finally, greatly reduce the 
danger to United States forces that may be interjected there if and 
when the withdrawal comes about.
  So I find it ironic that we have congressional leadership as well 
as--at least at the beginning of last week--the administration 
leadership opposing the force that would help reduce the forces which 
the United States has to put in to help with withdrawal and also would 
certainly reduce the danger of U.S. forces being placed in that 
situation. I find that ironic.
  I hope that both the leadership in the Congress and in the 
administration will reconsider their position on this because I think 
we will pay a severe price for this--if not in Bosnia, then in other 
parts of the world where we ask our allies to help us. Alliances are 
not simply for good times and for when things are going smoothly. 
Alliances and allies have to stick together when things are not going 
well and certainly when things are getting to the dangerous stage as 
they certainly are in Bosnia.
  Mr. President, I would like to explain to my colleagues my views as 
to the policy that should be followed with respect to Bosnia. I would 
first state--and my friend from Virginia, who yielded the floor, 
participated in every one of the hearings and he certainly, I know, 
would agree with this statement--that every single witness we had 
before our committee for 4 days opposed the United States unilateral 
lifting of the embargo while our allies remain on the ground in Bosnia. 
Every single witness--not one supported the unilateral lifting of the 
embargo; 4 days of hearings in the Armed Services Committee, and not 
one single witness favored the unilateral lifting of the embargo while 
our allies are still in harm's way on the ground in Bosnia.
  Mr. President, my own views about where we go from here--and there 
are no good answers here--my views are heavily influenced by my support 
for NATO and my observation of NATO over the last four decades where it 
has been the strongest alliance in the history of the world. NATO has 
helped bring about the end of the cold war on peaceful terms without an 
explosion, and it has helped bring about the freeing of millions of 
people behind the Iron Curtain without huge bloodshed, which could have 
easily happened. So my views are influenced by both the history of NATO 
and also what we are going to need NATO to do in the future.
  I also believe that we should do everything in our power to prevent 
Bosnia from further eroding the NATO alliance, any further than has 
already occurred. Make no mistake about it. It is entirely possible for 
us to erode NATO's credibility and viability without saving Bosnia. I 
start with the view that there is no good answer in Bosnia. A number of 
mistakes have been made which I will not recount here. And we have to 
deal with the situation as it presently exists where we have 
peacekeepers on the ground with no peace to keep, and with the warring 
parties apparently not wanting peace. One side views the peacekeepers 
as shields from which to launch an attack, and the other side that is 
taking most of the territory views NATO and U.N. forces as hostages for 
leverage and protection.
  I favor one final round of diplomacy to ascertain if there is any 
possibility for a negotiated peace as called for last week in testimony 
before our committee by former President Carter, former NATO commander, 
General Galvin, and former Secretary of Defense, Jim Schlesinger.
 They all testified that we ought to have one more vigorous round of 
diplomacy. All of them had different emphases, but that was one common 
denominator of those three witnesses.

  I also strongly agree with Dr. Schlesinger's comments that this 
peacekeeping mission cannot continue under present circumstances and 
that both NATO and the United Nations should acknowledge that, absent a 
near-term diplomatic breakthrough, it is time to withdraw the U.N. and 
NATO peacekeepers from Bosnia.
  If after a reasonable period of time--and I favor setting a finite 
date for progress on the negotiated peace--if after that period of time 
there is no substantial progress, the U.N. forces should be withdrawn 
in an orderly manner. That is not going to be an easy task. U.S. forces 
should participate, in my view, in a NATO-led operation, as pledged by 
President Clinton, to assist in the U.N. withdrawal, and U.S. forces 
should come to the rescue of the forces of our allies if there is an 
emergency and if they come under an attack and there is no other 
capability available to rescue them. In other words, in a last-resort 
emergency situation, I would certainly favor supporting our allies on 
the ground when they are in extreme need.
  Once the U.N. forces have been withdrawn from Bosnia, the arms 
embargo on the Government of Bosnia should be lifted, multilaterally if 
at all possible.
  While this is all taking place, we should join with our NATO allies 
in a concrete plan of action to contain the conflict from spreading any 
further.
  Secretary of Defense Bill Perry made it clear in our committee that 
the spread of that conflict would be against [[Page S 8604]] America's 
``vital" interests. He used that term carefully. ``Vital'' means 
interests that are so important we are willing to go into conflict in 
order to protect them.
  The spread of the conflict would engage both U.S. and NATO interests 
in a very important way. And I think we ought to make it abundantly 
clear, while we are making one last effort for a diplomatic solution 
and while we are preparing for an orderly withdrawal of U.N. forces--
and I hope our allies will come to that view--we should make it 
absolutely clear that we intend as an alliance to prevent that conflict 
from spreading and to hold Serbia--by this I mean Belgrade, Serbia--
responsible for any breach of borders beyond what has already occurred 
in that region.
  Finally, those calling for withdrawal should realize that there will 
be a high price to be paid once the U.N. forces are withdrawn from 
Bosnia. This is no free ride here. This is going to involve some real 
consequences in all likelihood. Once the U.N. forces have been 
withdrawn, there is a high potential for atrocities, particularly in 
and around the eastern enclaves.
  Even recognizing what may occur, it is, in my view, however, past 
time to face the reality on the ground. The international community has 
failed to restore peace. That failure must be acknowledged. Unless 
there is a near-term diplomatic breakthrough, the warring parties must 
be left to fight it out until one party prevails or until they are 
exhausted and ready at last at some point in the future to negotiate a 
peace agreement.
  Mr. President, I repeat, there are no easy answers in Bosnia, and I 
hope that we will not search for easy answers but, rather, for a course 
of action that will do whatever we can to alleviate the suffering 
there, within reason, but to acknowledge, first and foremost, that the 
NATO alliance is an important alliance and we should not further erode 
that alliance.
  I repeat, Mr. President, I hope that the congressional leadership, as 
well as the Clinton administration, will review the position that they 
have taken, with lukewarm support and no financial support, for a rapid 
reaction force now being deployed there by our allies. That will 
alleviate some of the responsibility the U.S. forces might otherwise 
have, and that will certainly reduce the danger of any kind of harm to 
U.S. forces that may have to be injected into that country to help with 
a withdrawal of U.N. and NATO personnel. I find it supreme irony that 
we would not be willing to pay our part for other people deploying 
troops that will be to our direct benefit and an activity that has been 
voted for by both President Bush's and President Clinton's 
administrations at every single turn in the U.N. Security Council.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank my colleagues for letting me continue.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, could I detain the distinguished Senator 
from Georgia for a minute.
  We were together at a private meeting with President Chirac, and 
information has come to my attention with regard to a meeting that 
President Chirac had here on Capitol Hill with the majority leader of 
the Senate and the Speaker of the House. I am told that in that 
meeting, President Chirac made it clear, after being specifically asked 
by the two leaders, that the rapid reaction force was not--and I 
emphasize not--being deployed to pave the way for an UNPROFOR 
withdrawal--indeed, had no relationship with NATO withdrawal plans.
  I do not recall that subject being specifically addressed at the 
meeting that the Senator from Georgia and I had.
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, I read some of that in 
the newspaper, but I got a contrary impression. I always hesitate to 
quote a foreign leader in a private meeting, but I must say my 
impression was not consistent in the meeting we had, which was at the 
French Embassy, was not consistent with the reported statements of the 
President of France at the meeting with the congressional leadership 
that took place on the Hill. I did not hear anything like that in the 
private meeting that I had.
  He also made it clear, I believe, that he hoped that the U.N. forces 
would be able to remain. But I did not hear any statement that would 
indicate that those rapid reaction forces would not be used if and when 
there was a withdrawal. As a matter of fact, those forces would provide 
the very first protection if U.S. forces had to go in to help in the 
withdrawal. This is the first time the United Nations has put a much 
more heavily prepared force in there, which has been one of the 
problems all along. When you have a lightly armed force, as the Senator 
from Virginia well knows, they are nothing but hostage invitations and 
that is what has happened. So I know that probably the leadership of 
some of our allied countries would prefer not to withdraw, but I 
believe that all of them would acknowledge if withdrawal is necessary, 
this rapid deployment force will be the key ingredient in the early 
stages of withdrawal.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I remember, in response to a question that 
I posed, that there was some discussion at our meeting with President 
Chirac about the mission of the rapid reaction force. And I am also 
told that same discussion took place here in the Capitol, at the 
meeting with the two leaders. When President Chirac was asked by the 
leaders what the mission of the rapid reaction force would be, 
President Chirac said that the rapid reaction force would not be 
deployed to implement the U.N. mandate to protect the safe havens, such 
as Sarajevo. The rapid reaction force would only be deployed to protect 
UNPROFOR.
  It is my understanding that while Senator Dole and Speaker Gingrich 
did express support for the right of our allies to protect their 
troops, the leaders did not support the United States being assessed 31 
percent for this European operation, given, in the judgment of the 
leaders, the futility--and I think the distinguished Senator from 
Georgia expressed the same judgment--of the UNPROFOR mission at this 
time.
  So I hope, Mr. President, there will be some clarification of this in 
the very near future. I was also led to believe that the United Nations 
would soon be announcing some specific mission statements with regard 
to the new forces.
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, I share his feeling on 
this subject. I do not know what the President of France said in the 
meeting that I did not attend. I would not try to have any conjecture 
on that. But I do know that common sense tells us--I have met with the 
Ministry of Defense in Britain, I have met with the JCS staff here, the 
joint staff--I know that the withdrawal of those U.N.-NATO forces is 
going to be extremely complicated and complex.
  But one thing the people in the eastern enclaves may feel is that it 
puts them in great jeopardy of being in harm's way after those forces 
leave. It may be very difficult to disentangle from those eastern 
enclaves. So it is going to be a very difficult situation.
  I know something like this rapid reaction force will be essential--it 
has to be augmented--but it is an essential first step if there is to 
be a withdrawal. That is basic common sense. For us to be in a position 
of having pledged to come in and help with the withdrawal and urging 
withdrawal--and I think there are an increasing number of people urging 
withdrawal--and then not helping, or at least to even look like we are 
negative on the first step, which is for the allies to protect 
themselves, it seems to me that is contrary to our own best interest.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I could just discuss one other point 
with my colleague. He referred to the Administration's proposal to 
allow U.S. forces to perform emergency missions, and he will recall in 
the hearing before our committee when Secretary of Defense Perry and 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shalikashvili were 
testifying, they put up a chart concerning the use of U.S. forces in an 
emergency situation. I think both my friend from Georgia and I were 
somewhat unclear as to exactly the context in which they were using 
``emergency.''
  If I can restate my concern and perhaps he can restate, once again, 
his use of the term here, it was not clear to me whether or not we 
would involve ourselves in emergency missions only if those emergency 
missions were a part of a withdrawal operation, or whether we would 
involve our ground forces in emergency missions prior to the 
determination to withdraw UNPROFOR. [[Page S 8605]] 
  Can the Senator clarify exactly what he said today with reference to 
``emergency''?
  Mr. NUNN. I can clarify what I said. I hesitate to try and clarify 
what was said at that hearing, because I think there was at least 
implied conflict between what the Secretary of Defense was saying and 
perhaps what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said, although I thought 
later in the hearing Secretary Perry made it much clearer as to what 
the administration had in mind.
  I must say, in announcing that new dimension of possible U.S. ground 
force involvement, which occurred about a week prior to that, I did not 
think the administration ever made it clear as to what they intended. I 
can only give you my view, therefore, and that is I hope the United 
States will not have to put in any ground forces at all, but we clearly 
are pledged by the President of the United States to put forces in to 
help with the withdrawal.
  If there are emergencies related to that withdrawal, we would be, I 
am sure, part of any effort to come to the relief of our allies. But 
assuming, before there is a withdrawal, there is some dire emergency, 
that our allies get into an extreme situation--and I hope that is not 
going to happen--with jeopardy to the lives of perhaps a number of 
people that are basically under a U.N. mandate, under those dire 
circumstances where there is no other force available, I personally 
would favor the President of the United States having that authority 
and he probably would assert that under his Commander in Chief 
authority, whatever we do in the Senate, he is able to come to the aid 
of our allies in that situation.
  I just do not think you can have a successful alliance, if your 
allies get into an extremely dangerous situation, which you voted for 
and encouraged, and you leave them at their own peril to die in a 
situation where you could have taken steps to help alleviate that 
danger. So those are clearly my views. I do not say I speak for anyone 
else on that subject.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I join my colleague in expressing support 
for U.S. participation in an operation to withdraw UNPROFOR, if our 
participation is requested by our allies and necessary for the 
successful conclusion of the mission.
  It is also my view that I hope we do not have to put ground forces 
in. But I think our President has indicated that they would be 
available to assist in such a withdrawal operation, if necessary. 
Clearly, under those circumstances, I would support the use of our 
ground and air forces to help in emergency situations associated with 
the withdrawal. But prior to the decision to withdrawal UNPROFOR, the 
use of our forces in an emergency situation can have serious 
consequences, because the word ``emergency'' is really not definable. 
While it might be one situation, it could be another and another and 
another, and very shortly, prior to a withdrawal decision, if we are 
involved in a succession of emergency situations, we are in it. Plain 
and simple, we are in the battle at that time. It would be a clear 
perception worldwide, and the use of the term ``emergency'' as 
justification, I feel, would disappear.
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, I understand his position 
on this. I think it is an area where I hope we do not have to get 
involved. Of course, in an emergency situation we already are involved. 
We are flying flights over Bosnia. I think the situation the Senator is 
directing his comments to is ground forces as opposed to air forces. We 
have been participating for a year or two. The fact is that we lost a 
plane and, fortunately, thankfully, we rescued the pilot.
  I would call that an emergency situation. In that situation, we put 
air forces in--helicopters--and were prepared to put ground forces in 
at that time, and possibly had some on the ground at that time, to 
rescue a pilot. I hope if we needed the French to rescue that American 
pilot they would have been there. I would think if a French pilot went 
down tomorrow and they needed us and there was no other way, we would 
go in there and help that pilot. That is what an alliance is all about.
  Mr. WARNER. I associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished 
Senator. There an emergency is very clear. A downed aviator, no matter 
what nation he may come from, is clearly in an emergency situation. But 
I am concerned about the gray area of other situations as it relates to 
the disposition of the UNPROFOR forces all over that region, oftentimes 
two or three individuals by themselves.
  Mr. NUNN. I think the Senator makes a good point. I hope that kind of 
a situation would not develop. It may very well be that if we have some 
resolution on the floor, that we ought to leave that point without 
specific authority, perhaps, but leaving it up to the President's 
constitutional authority as Commander in Chief with consultation with 
Congress. It is hard to authorize that situation specifically, but to 
me it would be a fundamental error to preclude it, to block the 
resolution here. The Senator just acknowledged, if there was a British 
or French pilot that went down, we would want to help.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is part of a NATO operation. I think 
at this point we should also indicate the United States is also 
actively involved in a naval embargo in the Adriatic. In two ways, we 
are a very active participant in those NATO actions.
  Mr. NUNN. The Senator is entirely correct.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair for allowing a colloquy with my good 
friend from Georgia.
  In conclusion, we point out two areas that require further 
definition; namely, the purpose for the rapid reaction force, as well 
as the meaning of ``emergency.'' Those are areas in which I hope 
persons will step forward and provide clarification.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, before the Senator from Georgia leaves 
the floor, I would like to address a question to him along the lines of 
my colleague from Virginia. I, too, was at the hearing they were 
discussing earlier and I, too, raised questions about the emergency 
help that was being discussed and perhaps being offered by U.S. 
forces--the Senator from Georgia must catch a train and will not be 
able to stay, but perhaps I can talk to my colleague from Virginia, 
because I know he has some of the same concerns that I do.
  I raised a question about the emergency nature of what our commitment 
would be: Would it be only in conjunction with the evacuation, or would 
it be any emergency that might arise in a reconfiguration effort?
  It was my understanding in the hearing that we really were looking at 
any emergency, and I worry about that description because I believe 
that leaves us open to any conflict on the ground in Bosnia.
  But then the Senator from Georgia also raised the issue of the air 
flights in which we do now participate, and I am concerned that we are 
not doing everything necessary to protect our forces in those 
overflights. For instance, the question was asked at that hearing--I am 
sure the Senator from Virginia remembers--the question was asked:
 Are we going to take out the missiles, or are we going to stop the 
overflights until there is cover? I would like to ask the Senator from 
Virginia if he, too, is concerned about the continuing flying efforts 
if we do not at least have an understanding about what our role is 
going to be, if we are going to take out the missile sites before we go 
forward, or if we are going to continue to put our flights in jeopardy?

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Texas for joining 
us in this very important colloquy. Indeed, we serve together on the 
Armed Services Committee, and she has taken a very active role in the 
policy formulations of the committee on this tragic situation in that 
part of the world.
  Just recently, I say to my good friend, the Senator from Texas, I 
publicly said that our committee, the Armed Services Committee, has a 
responsibility to investigate very clearly the circumstances under 
which Captain O'Grady's mission was not performed in the accompaniment 
of other aircraft--aircraft which are specifically designed and 
equipped for suppression of ground-to-air missiles. And we will have to 
look into that, because no member of the Armed Forces of the [[Page S 
8606]] United States, wherever he or she may be in the world today, 
should ever be subjected to a risk, which risk can be lessened to some 
extent by the utilization of other assets possessed by the U.S. 
military.
  The Senator will recall that General Shalikashvili said that some 
69,000 missions had been flown successfully without a loss, such as 
Captain O'Grady, and that this particular mission was a longer route, 
where there had been--I think I quote him accurately--``no detection of 
ground-to-air systems,'' such as to justify the inclusion of other 
assets. Now, that is something we have to determine, because 
subsequently thereto in those reports and the testimony of the general 
before the committee on which the Senator from Texas and I sit, came 
the reports that there had been some collection of signals in another 
area of our intelligence which lent themselves to the theory that there 
was present on that particular flight path a ground-to-air system. And 
in fact there was. So that is one of the things we have to ascertain. 
Twofold: Was there a breakdown in intelligence if in fact those signals 
were collected and confirmed? And, second, exactly what policies and 
procedures does the Department of Defense employ at such time as they 
put our uniformed people in a situation of great risk?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I will just add to the two points that 
have been made by the Senator from Virginia that I think we also should 
inquire about exactly what flights we are going to participate in and 
if we are going to take some action to make sure that we either take 
out the missiles which had been suggested by NATO and vetoed by the 
United Nations earlier in this process, or if we should stop 
participating in those overflights, over that disputed territory, 
before we get into a situation where we have another of our young men 
shot down, as we witnessed.
  Thank goodness we had a good result, because we now have Captain 
O'Grady back safe and sound. But I think these are very important 
points that the Armed Services Committee should look into before any 
kind of authorization is given, and I think there are a lot of 
questions to be asked. I thank the Senator for his leadership in this 
effort.
  The Senator from Virginia has really been a wonderful conscience for 
this conflict. I appreciate the work he has done on the Armed Services 
Committee.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Texas for her 
thoughtful remarks, and indeed I could say the same about the Senator 
from Texas and her participation in her years on the committee.

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