[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 99 (Friday, June 16, 1995)]
[House]
[Page H6078]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            WE NEED ANSWERS

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Foley). Under a previous order of the 
House, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Saxton] is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise with some reluctance, but with some 
determination, to raise some questions about a very serious matter that 
occurred a short time ago. Together with Captain O'Grady we all thank 
God upon his return. It was, in fact, a miracle that he has been 
returned to us seemingly unharmed, and for that we are all very, very 
grateful, but I think some questions need to be asked about the 
circumstances under which Captain O'Grady had found himself in the air 
within the range of a SAM SA-6 missile.
  In reviewing some news reports and some quotes of some individuals 
recently, I was prompted to go back to a report that the House 
Republican task force on terrorism and unconventional warfare issued in 
June of 1993 about issues related to this subject. In that month we 
issued a report, and I would like to read a part of it because it has a 
direct bearing on this issue.
  Part of the report says the Serbian forces operate four SAM 
regiments, with the main concentration of Serb air defenses around the 
Banja Luka Air Base, including one SA-2 regiment, one battery of SA-
6's, and one battery of old triple-A antiaircraft weaponry. Now this 
Banja Luka Air Base also has a facility located on it that repairs and 
upgrades SA-6 missiles. This was all confirmed in June of 1994 by a 
well-respected defense publication known as Jane's Defense Weekly when 
they confirmed all of the information we had in 1993. Unfortunately for 
us, I think, on June 2 General Shalikashvili, in being interviewed by 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, said, and I quote:
  ``We had absolutely no intelligence that Serb SAM's were in the area. 
For months,'' he said, ``if not for years, there had never been 
detected an air defense site in that area,'' and he said the words 
``Banja Luka.''
  So I have very serious concerns about the fact that we knew this 3 
years ago, that Jane's Defense Weekly reported it in 1994, and our top 
officials at the Pentagon seemingly had no idea that this in fact was 
the case, and so I think it raises some very, very important questions.
  We read in the other news report more recently, June 13, after we 
released our report from 1993 just recently to the press, and that was 
reported that Ken Bacon, spokesman at the Pentagon, said at that time, 
``Finally, we were well aware of the Banja Luka facility where the 
Bosnian Serbs repair and maintain surface-to-air missile systems. The 
F-16 that Captain O'Grady was flying on June 2 was shot down outside of 
the area known as the threat envelope of the Banja Luka SAMs.''
  Now the F-16, as far as I can determine from news reports and from 
other information that we have been able to gather, was shot down less 
than 40 kilometers from Banja Luka. It is important to know that these 
SA-6's are track-mounted vehicles along with a second track-mounted 
vehicle which carries the radar which integrates into the system, 
travels 30 or 40 miles per hour, and so certainly it should have been 
considered, in my opinion, within the envelope that short distance from 
Banja Luka, and it seems to me that anyone making plans to carry out 
these missions should have taken that into consideration.
  So I think this raises at least three questions, maybe more:
  No. 1, what intelligence did the field commanders have at their 
disposal while making these very, very important and life-threatening 
decisions?
  No. 2, what were the operational policies, and where were they made? 
What were the operational policies?
  Our information is that there were 2 F-16's, and normally, if there 
is a threat of surface-to-air missiles, there are five aircraft, 
including radar jamming aircraft. I believe F-4's, known as Wild 
Weasels, would normally accompany our F-16's on these types of missions 
to guard against the type of events that actually happened.
  No. 3, was it not reasonable to assume that Banja Luka, less than 40 
kilometers away, was in fact part of the dangerous envelope into which 
these airplanes were flying?
  So I would just conclude, Mr. Speaker, by saying this:
  In 1993 we were able to gain information that said this was a danger. 
Jane's Weekly reported in 1994 that this was a danger. Captain O'Grady 
was shot down proving that it was a danger, and we planned and carried 
out the mission anyway.
  I would like answers to those questions. I have requested the same. I 
have requested Chairman Spence to hold hearings on this issue. I would 
like to know who is making these decisions, and where they are being 
made, and under what circumstances they are being made. We have other 
pilots, soldiers and sailors to think about. I believe this is a very 
serious issue.

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