[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 97 (Wednesday, June 14, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8297-S8302]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                        FLAG DAY--JUNE 14, 1995

  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, today is Flag Day. Utahns, and indeed 
Americans all across our great country revere the flag as a unique 
symbol of the United States and of the principles, ideals, and values 
for which our country stands.
  Congress has, over the years, reflected the devotion our diverse 
people have for Old Glory. During the Civil War, for example, Congress 
awarded the Medal of Honor to Union soldiers who rescued the flag from 
falling into rebel hands.
  In 1931, Congress declared the Star Spangled Banner to be our 
national anthem. In 1949, Congress established June 14 as Flag Day. 
Congress has established ``The Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag'' and 
the manner of its recitation. Congress designated John Philip Sousa's 
``The Stars and Stripes Forever'' as the national march in 1987.
  Congress has also established detailed rules for the design of the 
flag and the manner of its proper display. Congress, along with 48 
States, had regulated misuse of the American flag until the Supreme 
Court's 1989 decision in Texas versus Johnson.
  As I say, these congressional actions reflect the people's devotion 
to the flag; Congress did not create these feelings and deep regard for 
the flag among our people.
  The 104th Congress will have a chance to do its part to reflect our 
people's devotion to Old Glory by sending to the States for 
ratification Senate Joint Resolution 31, a constitutional amendment 
giving Congress and the States power to prohibit physical desecration 
of the flag of the United States.
  I recognize that, in good faith, some of my colleagues oppose this 
constitutional amendment. They love the flag no less than supporters of 
the amendment.
  I do hope those who have opposed the amendment in the past will 
reconsider their position. We can protect the flag without jeopardizing 
freedom of expression. Freedom of expression was extremely robust when 
the 49 flag desecration statutes were enforceable. And there is no 
danger of a slippery slope here because there is no other symbol of our 
country like the flag. We do not salute the Constitution or the 
Declaration of Independence, and no one has ever suggested a ban on 
burning copies of these hallowed documents. Numerous other methods of 
protest, including marches, rallies, use of placards, posters, 
leaflets, and much more clearly remain available. I hope we will send 
this amendment to the States for ratification.
  On June 6, Senator Hank Brown, chairman of the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights held a hearing on the 
flag amendment. The subcommittee heard from 11 witnesses, including 
opponents of the amendment. I hope those of my colleagues inclined to 
vote against Senate Joint Resolution 31 will review the very fine 
testimony of its supporters. I ask unanimous consent that two of the 
statements, that of Prof. Richard Parker and former Assistant Attorney 
General for Legal Counsel, Charles J. Cooper, be printed in the 
Congressional Record following my remarks, along with my opening 
statement from that hearing.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

  Statement of Richard D. Parker, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
       I am a civil libertarian. I believe that, in a democracy, 
     freedom of speech must be ``robust and wide-open''. Indeed I 
     believe it ought to be more robust and wide-open than, in 
     some respects, it is now and than the Supreme Court has been 
     willing, on some occasions, to grant. It's because of that 
     belief that I urge the Congress to propose to the states a 
     new constitutional amendment, one that would permit the 
     people--if, through the democratic process, they so choose--
     to protect the flag of the United States against physical 
     desecration.


                                   i

       Let me begin with general principles. It is, after all, at 
     the level of fundamental value that discussion of 
     constitutional provisions--meant ``to endure for ages to 
     come''--should be (and has traditionally been) conducted.
       My basic proposition is this: Whether freedom of speech is, 
     in fact, robust and wide-open does not depend solely, or even 
     primarily, on case-by-case adjudication by the courts. It 
     depends most of all on conditions of culture. First, it 
     depends on the willingness and capacity of people--in our 
     democracy, that means ordinary people--to express themselves 
     energetically and effectively in public. Second, it depends 
     on acceptance as well as tolerance, official and unofficial, 
     of an extremely wide range of viewpoints and modes of 
     expression. And, third, it depends on adherence to very basic 
     parameters that, like constitutional provisions in general, 
     help structure democratic life the better to release its 
     energies.
       This last condition is the one that concerns us now. 
     Everyone agrees that there must be ``procedural'' parameters 
     of free speech--involving, for example, places and times at 
     which certain modes of expression are permitted. Practically 
     everyone accepts some explicitly ``substantive'' parameters 
     of speech content as well. Indeed, despite talk of ``content-
     neutrality,'' the following principle of constitutional law 
     is very clear: Government sometimes may sanction you for 
     speaking because of the way the content of what you say 
     affects other people.
       What is less clear is the shape of this principle. There 
     are few bright lines to define it. The Supreme Court 
     understands the principle to rule out speech that threatens 
     to cause imminent tangible harm: face-to-face fighting words, 
     incitement to violation of law, shouting ``fire'' in a 
     crowded theater. And it does not stop there. It understands 
     the principle, also, to rule out speech that threatens 
     certain intangible, even diffuse, harms. It has, for 
     instance, described obscenity as pollution of the moral 
     ``environment.'' But what about ``political'' speech critical 
     of the government? Isn't there a bright line protecting that, 
     at least so long as no imminent physical harm is threatened? 
     The answer is: No. The Court has made clear, for instance, 
     that statements criticizing official conduct of a public 
     official may be sanctioned if they are known to be false and 
     damage the reputation of the official. There has been no 
     outcry against this rule. It was set forth by the Warren 
     Court--in an opinion by Justice Brennan, the very opinion 
     that established freedom of speech as ``robust and wide-
     open.''\1\ It has been reaffirmed ever since. Our 
     constitutional tradition, therefore, leaves plenty of room 
     for debate about the necessary and proper scope of the 
     ``substantive'' parameters of the content of free speech.
     Footnotes at end of article. [[Page S8298]] 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       In the past couple of decades, a consensus has been growing 
     around the following
      proposition: Important ``substantive'' parameters of public 
     expression, parameters that have long been taken for 
     granted, now need to be restored. The bonds that hold us 
     together--and so make it possible, as in a healthy family, 
     for us to engage in ``robust'' disagreement with one 
     another--appear to be disintegrating. On the right, on the 
     left and in the center, it is widely agreed that certain 
     parameters must be reestablished if free speech, in 
     general, is to flourish.
       On the right, it's believed that ``uncivil'' and 
     ``unreasoned'' speech content needs to be checked. The 
     Supreme Court, on occasion, has interpreted the First 
     Amendment in light of that belief. The problem, of course, is 
     that this tends to invite regulation of speech content that 
     is very broad and vague, suffocating free, spontaneous 
     participation in the marketplace of ideas. On the left, it's 
     believed that ``hate'' speech--beyond face-to-face harassment 
     or fighting words--that denigrates disadvantaged groups (and 
     so pollutes the ideological ``environment'') needs to be 
     checked. On occasion, the Court has read the First Amendment 
     in light of that belief as well. The problem, again, is that 
     this tends to invite broad and vague regulations suffocating 
     freedom and spontaneity in public speech. What's more, both 
     these prescriptions--by drawing blunt distinctions among 
     ``types'' of speech and speakers--may, unintentionally, tend 
     to set us apart from each other, even further 
     disintegrating--instead of reaffirming--the bonds that unite 
     us even in disagreement.
       In the center, however, there is widespread support for 
     restoration of a much narrower, more focused parameter: 
     protection of the U.S. flag from physical desecration. This 
     proposal, first of all, avoids the vices of the broader, 
     vaguer alternatives. Its virtue, moreover, is that--by means 
     of an extremely minimal constraint on freedom, taken for 
     granted until recently--it affirms the most basic condition 
     of our freedom: our bond to one another in our aspiration to 
     national unity. It leaves it to individuals, in a thousand 
     other ways, to criticize government and even that aspiration 
     to unity, if they want. But it affirms that there is some 
     commitment to others,
      beyond mere obedience to the formal rule of law, that must 
     be respected. It affirms that, without some aspiration to 
     national unity--call it patriotism if you choose--there 
     might be no law, no constitution, no freedom.
       Still, we know, objections abound. Is this ``important'' 
     enough? Is it ``needed?'' Is it likely to be ``effective?'' 
     Aren't there ``less drastic alternatives?'' These questions 
     deserve answers. Yet the truth is that they practically 
     answer themselves.
       A common objection goes like this: True, the aspiration to 
     national unity is vital but, as embodied in the flag, it is 
     just symbolic. What place does symbolism have in the 
     Constitution? The answer is that the framers of the 
     Constitution put symbolism of our unity at the very beginning 
     of the document, invoking ``We the People of the United 
     States''. And, very near the end, they required that all 
     officials, high and low, be ``bound by Oath or Affirmation, 
     to support this Constitution''--a provision that, surely, is 
     less functional than symbolic, yet whose symbolism fulfills, 
     nonetheless, an important function. Animating the whole 
     Constitution of 1787, after all, was the aspiration to call 
     into being a new sense of commitment, a commitment to a broad 
     and deep national unity-despite-difference. What was it, at 
     the beginning, but a bold symbolic effort?
       But, we hear, that's all over now. The nation exists. What 
     need is there to revisit old ideals? Yet the framers knew 
     that nothing, on its own, lasts forever. Every institution 
     must be reenergized by every generation to meet new 
     challenges. Can we deny that our generation is now challenged 
     to renew our commitment to unity-despite-difference? The 
     aspiration to even a minimal unity is, once more, commonly 
     put in question. We hear that the freedom the flag symbolizes 
     is the freedom to burn it, that our unity consists simply in 
     a celebration of disunity. These claims go to the heart of 
     our Constitution. It is in the Constitution that we must 
     answer them.
       We hear that flag desecrators are like a few ``naughty, 
     nasty children'' trying to ``provoke their parents.'' The 
     rest of the family, we hear, need only ``count to ten.''\2\ 
     What's the harm? Take the analogy seriously for a moment. How 
     healthy is a family in which there are no limits to 
     expressive abuse, in which everything can be trashed and will 
     be tolerated? Desecration of mutual bonds may be rate. But so 
     are other wrongs we believe it important to sanction. What is 
     at stake is a principle, a minimal one. It deserves minimal 
     respect--as a matter of principle.
       Still, we are told that the aspiration to unity-despite-
     difference cannot be instituted by law, that it can flourish 
     only in the ``voluntary'' feelings of the people. This 
     argument may, of course, be made, in specific contexts, 
     against using the narrow authority to be restored by the 
     proposed constitutional amendment. But such an argument ought 
     not short-circuit the process, denying the people the right 
     to find it invalid in certain circumstances. For who can 
     doubt that, in some circumstances, legal proscriptions do in 
     fact influence the ``voluntary feelings of the people?'' 
     Those who invoke these feelings should, in any event, be the 
     last to denigrate the people's expression of them, through 
     the processes of democracy.
       Finally, we hear there are other ways to do the job. If we 
     don't like physical desecration of the flag, we should 
     criticize the desecrators or fly the flag ourselves. 
     Ordinarily, I agree, ``counter-speech'' is the best response. 
     But this situation is unique, just as the flag is unique. If 
     it is permissible not just to heap verbal contempt on the 
     flag, but also to burn it, rip it and smear it with 
     excrement--if such behavior is not only permitted in 
     practice, but protected in law by the Supreme Court--then the 
     flag is already decaying as the symbol of our aspiration to 
     the unity underlying freedom. The flag we fly in response is 
     no longer the same thing. We are told, again and again, that 
     someone can desecrate ``a'' flag but not ``the'' flag. To 
     that, I simply say:
      Untrue. This is precisely the way that general symbols like 
     general values are trashed, particular step by particular 
     step. This is the way, imperceptibly, that commitments and 
     ideals are lost.
       To boil down the fundamental value at stake here: Recall 
     the civil rights movement. Recall not only its invocation of 
     national ideals, but also its evocation of nationhood. Recall 
     the famous photograph of the Selma marchers carrying flags of 
     the United States. The question is: Will the next Martin 
     Luther King have available to him or her a basic means of 
     identification with all the rest of us--an embracive appeal 
     to the bonds that, in aspiration and potential, make us one?


                                   ii

       What are the costs, if any, of proposing to amend the 
     Constitution this way? All kinds of fears have been stirred 
     up in opposition to the proposal. I'll comment on two kinds. 
     First, I'll address some rather specific fears: Would the 
     proposal ``amend''--or ``desecrate''--the First Amendment? 
     Then, I'll turn to more generic fears: Would it upset the 
     ``delicate balance'' of the Constitution as a whole?
       The proposal would not ``amend the First Amendment.'' 
     Rather, each amendment would be interpreted in light of the 
     other--much as is the case with the guarantees of Freedom of 
     Speech and Equal Protection of the Laws. When the Fourteenth 
     Amendment was proposed, the argument could have been made 
     that congressional power to enforce the Equal Protection 
     Clause might be used to undermine the First Amendment. The 
     courts have seemed able, however, to harmonize the two. The 
     same would be true here. Courts would interpret 
     ``desecration'' and ``flag of the United States'' in light of 
     general values of free speech. They would simply restore one 
     narrow democratic authority. Experience justifies this much 
     confidence in our judicial system.
       But, we're asked, is ``harmonization'' possible? If the 
     Johnson and Eichman decisions protecting flag desecration 
     were rooted in established strains of free speech law--as 
     they were--how could an amendment countering those decisions 
     coexist with the First Amendment?
       First, it's important to keep in mind that free speech law 
     has within it multiple, often competing strains. The 
     dissenting opinions in Johnson and Eichman were also rooted 
     in established arguments about the meaning of freedom of 
     speech. Second, even if the general principles invoked by the 
     five Justices in the majority are admirable in general--as I 
     believe they are\3\--that doesn't mean that the proposed 
     amendment would tend to undermine them, so long as it is 
     confined, as it is intended, to mandating a unique exception 
     for a unique symbol of nationhood. Indeed, carving out the 
     exception in a new amendment--rather than through 
     interpretation of the First Amendment itself--best ensures 
     that it will be so confined. Even opponents of the new 
     amendment agree on this point.\4\ Third, it's vital to 
     recognize that the proposed amendment is not in general 
     tension with the free speech principle forbidding 
     discrimination against specific ``messages'' in regulation of 
     speech content. Those who desecrate the flag may be doing so 
     to communicate any number of messages. They may be saying 
     that government is doing too much--or too little--about a 
     particular problem. In fact, they may be burning the flag to 
     protest the behavior of non-governmental, ``patriotic'' 
     groups and and to support efforts of the government to squash 
     those groups. Laws enacted under the proposed amendment would 
     have to apply to all
      such activity, whatever the specific ``point of view.'' One, 
     and only one, generalized message could be regulated: 
     ``desecration'' of the flag itself. And regulation could 
     extend no farther than a ban on one, and only one, mode of 
     doing it: ``physical'' desecration.\5\ Finally, and 
     perhaps most importantly, we mustn't lose sight of the 
     fundamental purpose of the proposed amendment. That 
     purpose is to restore democratic authority to protect the 
     unique symbol of our aspiration to national unity, an 
     aspiration that, I've said, nurtures--rather than 
     undermines--freedom of speech that is ``robust and wide-
     open.''
       One objection remains. It involves ``desecration.'' Would 
     this word, evoking sacredness, itself ``desecrate'' the 
     Constitution? Those who make the objection this way defeat 
     themselves, of course. If the Constitution as a whole is 
     ``sacred,'' as they proclaim it is, then there is no text in 
     which a reference to ``desecration'' of the symbol of the 
     nationhood that undergirds it could be more at home. Beyond 
     the play on words, however, it's useful to keep in mind that 
     this word-- [[Page S8299]] like any number of others in the 
     constitutional text--is a term of art. It has no religious 
     connotation. The Constitution of Massachusetts, for instance, 
     provides that the right to jury trial ``must be held 
     sacred,''\6\ and no one reads that as a theological mandate. 
     The question for courts interpreting the proposed amendment 
     would be: What sorts of physical treatment of the flag are so 
     grossly contemptuous of it as to count as ``desecration?'' 
     This is the type of question--raising
      issues of fact and degree, context and purpose--that they 
     resolve year in and year out under other constitutional 
     provisions. Thus there is nothing radical or extreme about 
     the flag amendment--unless it is the rhetoric, igniting 
     and fueling all kinds of fears, purveyed by some of its 
     opponents.


                                  iii

       What hides its moderation, I think, is a generic fear of 
     any proposed constitutional amendment--or, at least, of any 
     that is driven by wide public support. Opponents of a flag 
     amendment evoke this fear, suggesting the ``delicate 
     balance'' of the Constitution is in jeopardy. In the ways 
     they make the suggestion, however, they reveal it to be 
     misleading, even perverse.
       They tell us that the Constitution is perfect. Or they talk 
     of its fragility. The document, they imply, is too fine or 
     too delicate to amend. But a part of its ``perfection'' must 
     be Article V, which provides for its amendment. It has, after 
     all, been amended many times. (The framers' generation added 
     ten amendments in one swoop.) And, far from proving fragile, 
     it has proved to have extraordinary tensile strength, 
     enduring by adapting to circumstances--changing and 
     unforeseen--just as, long ago, Chief Justice John Marshall 
     promised it would.\7\
       Yet, they tell us, any proposed constitutional language 
     will have unintended consequences--unless we pin down, right 
     now and forever, every jot and title of its meaning. This is 
     sometimes an effective strategy of opposition. It was 
     deployed, for example, against the Equal Rights Amendment, 
     nickled and dimed to death in disputes over hypothetical 
     details.\8\ The proposed flag amendment is far narrower and, 
     so, far less vulnerable to such opposition. But
      those who supported the ERA--and deplored the strategy 
     then--should be loath to use it now. It is, in any event, 
     deeply misguided. For if (as John Marshall taught us) the 
     genius of our Constitution is to endure through 
     adaptation, then any pretense to fix its precise meaning, 
     once and for all, is futile. Few constitutional 
     provisions--few of those in the Bill of Rights, for 
     instance--could pass such a test. Hence, the lesson of our 
     history is: Leave future details of application to the 
     future; trust our judicial system; and stick, for the 
     moment, to issues of fundamental principle.
       When all is said, opponents are left with one line of 
     argument. You ought not, they say, ``fool with'' the 
     Constitution. You should not ``tinker'' or ``fiddle'' with 
     it. You must not ``trivialize'' it. Here is what's 
     fascinating: Such verbs are rarely used to describe judicial 
     interpretations or lawyers' interpretations or academic 
     interpretations of the Constitution. They're reserved, 
     instead, for the process of amendment prescribed by Article 
     V. They're reserved, especially, for amendments proposed not 
     by ``experts'' but by large numbers of ordinary citizens and 
     their representatives. The disdain in such language is clear. 
     It is, I believe, a disdain for the processes of democracy 
     and for the ordinary people who take part in them. The 
     implication is that the Constitution--which establishes 
     processes for its own amendment--is too elevated, too 
     refined, to be touched by those very processes.
       In the end, that's what is at stake here: Our flag 
     symbolizes our nation. It is a nation defined not by any 
     ethnicity, but by a political practice, the practice of 
     popular sovereignty, of democracy. It is through democracy 
     that our law, including constitutional law, is made. It is 
     through democracy that our liberties are nurtured and 
     exercised and guaranteed. It is through democracy that we are 
     bonded to one another. Shouldn't the people be authorized, if 
     they choose, to require a very minimal respect for that one 
     symbol, that one value, that one aspiration?
                               Footnotes

     \1\New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
     \2\Testimony of Charles Fried before the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the United States Senate, June 21, 1990.
     \3\I agree with the majority, for instance, that the Freedom 
     of Speech protects expressive conduct and that its protection 
     should not depend on how ``reasoned'' or ``articulate'' the 
     expression is thought to be. I also agree, as a general 
     matter, that government may not ``prohibit the expression of 
     an idea simply because society finds the idea itself 
     offensive or disagreeable.'' I do not support the broader, 
     vaguer proposals (described above) now being made on the 
     right and on the left.
     \4\See Frank Michelman, ``Saving Old Glory: On Constitutional 
     Iconography,'' 42 Stanford Law Review 1337 (1990).
     \5\It's entirely possible that the specific statutes declared 
     unconstitutional under the First Amendment in Johnson and 
     Eichman would not pass muster under the proposed amendment--
     because both may be worded too broadly. The Texas statute in 
     Johnson made it a crime to ``damage'' a flag in a way known 
     to ``seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe 
     or discover'' it. Thus it swept beyond ``desecration'' 
     defined by a more general standard. The United States statute 
     in Eichman was more sharply focused. But, before the Supreme 
     Court, the government interpreted it as extending to any and 
     all violations of the ``physical integrity'' of the flag, 
     again seeming to sweep beyond behavior that might count as 
     ``desecration.''
     \6\Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Part I, 
     Article 15.
     \7\McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
     \8\See Jane Mansbridge, ``Why We Lost the ERA'' (1986).
                                                                    ____


                     Testimony of Charles J. Cooper
       Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. 
     My name is Charles J. Cooper, and I am a partner in the law 
     firm of Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge. I appreciate this 
     opportunity to testify before this distinguished Subcommittee 
     on the proposed Flag Protection Amendment.
       Almost six years have passed since the Supreme Court 
     decided the case that the Flag Protection Amendment was 
     specifically designed to overturn. In Texas v. Johnson the 
     Court held that the First Amendment's guaranty extends not 
     only to a protester's expression of anti-American sentiments 
     (``America, the Red, White, and Blue, we spit on you.''), but 
     also to his act of burning an American flag to dramatize his 
     views. In so ruling, the Court in effect overturned the flag 
     desecration statutes of 48 States, as well as the Federal 
     Flag Desecration Statute, which prohibited knowingly and 
     publicly ``cast[ing] contempt upon any flag of the United 
     States'' by burning or otherwise physically mistreating it. 
     18 U.S.C. Sec. 700.
       The reaction of the American people to the Johnson decision 
     was swift, loud, and overwhelmingly hostile. President Bush 
     and several Members of Congress called for swift passage and 
     ratification of the Flag Protection Amendment, while other 
     Members of Congress supported a statutory response to the 
     decision--the Flag Protection Act. The purpose of the 
     legislation was to harmonize federal law with the Johnson 
     decision by establishing a ``neutral'' flag desecration 
     statute--
      that is, one that punished any impairment of the physical 
     integrity of the flag, whether performed in public or in 
     private, and regardless of any message that might be 
     intended or conveyed by the act of physical impairment.
       Several witnesses, I among them, testified before the 
     Senate Judiciary Committee that the proposed legislation, 
     even if cast in ``neutral'' language, could not be squared 
     with the reasoning of the Johnson decision and would 
     therefore almost certainly be invalidated by the Supreme 
     Court. The point was simply this: clothing the federal Flag 
     Desecration Statute in ``neutral'' language would not 
     disguise the undeniable fact that the central purpose of the 
     proposed measure was to preserve the flag's unique status as 
     ``the Nation's most revered and profound symbol, representing 
     what this Country stands for'' (the words are Senator 
     Biden's, the bill's chief sponsor). The governmental interest 
     in preserving the flag's unique status as a national symbol 
     simply cannot be divorced from expression, for only messages 
     concerning the flag can either advance or diminish its 
     symbolic value.
       Congress enacted the Flag Protection Act of 1989 (``Act'') 
     by overwhelming majorities in both Houses, and the Supreme 
     Court promptly struck it down in United States v. Eichman. 
     Noting that ``[t]he Government's interest in protecting the 
     `physical integrity' of a privately owned flag rests upon a 
     perceived need to preserve the flag's status as a symbol of 
     our Nation and certain national ideals,'' the Court held that 
     the federal
      statute, like the Texas statute invalidated in Johnson, 
     ``still suffers from the same fundamental flaw: It 
     suppresses expression out of concern for its likely 
     communicative impact.''
       The six-year period that has elapsed since the Johnson case 
     has provided time for tempers to cool. The anger and sadness 
     that consumed most Americans when the decision was announced 
     has had time, if not to abate, at least to be moderated by 
     reflection and thought. And yet it still appears that the 
     vast majority of Americans so revere their flag that they are 
     willing to undertake the arduous task of amending their 
     Constitution to authorize Congress and the States to protect 
     it from physical desecration. Congress has received 
     resolutions calling for passage of a flag desecration 
     amendment from the legislatures of 49 States. As a citizen, 
     my own support for the Flag Protection Amendment has not 
     weakened since Johnson was decided, for I remain convinced 
     that the policies underlying the Flag Protection Amendment 
     are sufficiently important to warrant its passage by Congress 
     and ratification by the States.
       But I have been invited to appear before this Subcommittee 
     as a constitutional lawyer, to provide my views on the legal 
     issues, as opposed to the policy issues, raised by the 
     proposed amendment. I make this point because policy 
     objections have dominated the arguments of constitutional 
     scholars who have testified thus far before congressional 
     committees in opposition to the Flag Protection Amendment. 
     These policy objections--for
      example, that the proposed amendment would ``trivialize'' 
     the Constitution, that flag desecration laws are popular 
     in Communist regimes, and that the best response to flag 
     desecration is to wave one's own flag--are important and 
     should be considered seriously by Members of Congress, as 
     well as by all Americans, in assessing the merits of the 
     proposed amendment. But they are entitled to no additional 
     weight when voiced by law professors (or Supreme Court 
     Justices for that matter) rather than by any other 
     citizen. I therefore will attempt to confine my testimony 
     insofar as possible to the legal objections that have been 
     advanced in opposition to the Flag Protection Amendment.
     [[Page S8300]]
     
       1. Some constitutional scholars have objected to the 
     wording of the proposed Flag Protection Amendment, which 
     provides simply that ``the Congress and the States shall have 
     power to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the 
     United States.'' These constitutional scholars object 
     particularly to the use of the word ``desecration'' because 
     it makes clear that the amendment would authorize Congress 
     and the States to prohibit only physical mistreatment of the 
     flag that conveys a political protest.\1\ Arguing that the 
     Constitution should protect the flag in a ``neutral'' manner, 
     they propose that the amendment be worded to authorize 
     Congress ``to prohibit any physical impairment of the 
     integrity of the flag.'' Such an amendment would ensure that 
     any statutory restrictions would apply across the board, 
     regardless of the purpose or circumstances of the conduct at 
     issue.
     Footnotes at end of article.
       The threshold question that must be answered by proponents 
     of this suggestion is whether anyone really wants a 
     ``neutral'' flag protection statue. Does anyone really want 
     to protect the physical integrity of all American flags, 
     regardless of the circumstances surrounding the prohibited 
     conduct? Certainly the constitutional scholars suggesting a 
     ``neutral'' flag protection amendment do not, for they 
     advance the idea only as a lesser evil than the Flag 
     Protection Amendment. Nor are supporters of the proposed Flag 
     Protection Amendment likely to be persuaded that a 
     ``neutral'' alternative would be preferable. The problem is 
     that a genuinely ``neutral'' flag protection measure simply 
     doesn't make sense.
       The act of burning an American Flag is not inherently evil. 
     Indeed, the Boy Scouts of America have long held that an 
     American flag, ``when worn beyond repair'' should be 
     destroyed ``in a dignified way by burning.'' Boy Scout 
     Handbook at 422 (9th ed.) Similarly, Congress has prescribed 
     that ``[t]he flag, when it is in such condition that it is no 
     longer a fitting emblem for display, should be destroyed in a 
     dignified way, preferably by burning.'' 36 U.S.C. 176(k). Nor 
     is the respectful disposition of an old or worn flag the only 
     occasion on which burning a flag might be entirely proper. 
     The old soldier whose last wish is to be cremated with a 
     prized American flag fast against his breast
      would be deserving of respect and admiration, rather than 
     condemnation.
       In contrast, Gregory Lee Johnson's conduct was offensive--
     indeed, reprehensible--not simply because he burned an 
     American flag, but because of the manner in which he burned 
     it. Yet, a truly neutral flag protection statute would 
     require us to be blind to the distinction between the conduct 
     of Gregory Lee Johnson and his comrades and the conduct of a 
     Boy Scout troop reverently burning an old and worn American 
     flag. It would also reach other forms of conduct that honor, 
     rather than desecrate, the flag. If, rather than burning an 
     American flag, Gregory Lee Johnson and his colleagues had 
     heaped dirt upon it in some sort of anti-American burial 
     ritual, their conduct would undoubtedly have violated not 
     only the Texas flag desecration statute, but a ``neutral'' 
     flag protection statute as well. A ``neutral'' statute, 
     however, would also have reached and punished the conduct of 
     the unidentified patriot who gathered up Johnson's charred 
     flag and buried it in his back yard.
       Moreover, not only would a ``neutral'' flag protection 
     statute prohibit conduct that should be praised rather than 
     punished, it would fail to prohibit an infinite variety of 
     public conduct that casts contempt upon the flag. Such a 
     statute would prohibit only conduct that comprises the 
     physical integrity of the flag. Conduct that is not 
     physically destructive of the flag, no matter how openly 
     offensive and disrespectful it may be, would
      presumably not be reached. Thus, affixing an American flag 
     to the seat of one's pants or simulating vulgar acts with 
     a flag would not come within such a prohibition.
       Thus, a ``neutral'' flag protection statute is at once too 
     broad, since it would prohibit conduct that no one wants to 
     prohibit, and too narrow, since it would permit conduct that 
     few people want to permit. The proposal therefore simply does 
     not mesh with the public sentiment that animated the passage 
     of 48 state flag desecration statutes and a similar measure 
     by the federal government, that led to the prosecution of 
     Gregory Lee Johnson under the Texas flag desecration law, 
     that provoked the extraordinary public outcry at the Supreme 
     Court's reversal of Johnson's conviction, and that inspired 
     this hearing. I submit that that public sentiment is not 
     ``neutral''; it is not indifferent to the circumstances 
     surrounding conduct relating to the flag. If such conduct is 
     dignified and respectful, I daresay that the American people 
     and their elected representatives do not want to prohibit it; 
     if such conduct is disrespectful and contemptuous of the 
     flag, I believe that they do.
       The simple truth is that no one really wants a genuinely 
     ``neutral'' flag protection statute. Accordingly, amending 
     the Constitution to authorize enactment of such a statute 
     obviously makes no sense.
       2. Some opponents of the Flag Protection Amendment objects 
     to the fact that its language does not explicitly state that 
     it overrides the First Amendment. They make two principle 
     points.
       First, they argue that the proposed amendment, as written, 
     does nothing more than confer upon Congress and the States a 
     legislative power that they already possess. And because the 
     proposed amendment does not expressly override the 
     limitations of the First Amendment, any exercise of that 
     legislative power would be subject to the same First 
     Amendment challenge upheld in Johnson and Eichman. In other 
     words, the Flag Protection Amendment, as written, would not 
     alter the result of the Supreme Court's decisions in Eichman 
     and Johnson.\2\
       The first point to be made in response to this argument is 
     that the proposed Flag Protection Amendment contains no 
     statement that it overrides the First Amendment because such 
     a statement is wholly unnecessary. The First Amendment is the 
     only constitutional provision that has been construed, or 
     could have been construed, by the Supreme Court to prohibit 
     Congress and the States from criminalizing the physical 
     desecration of an American flag. The proposed amendment 
     clearly and directly grants (many would say restores) that 
     legislative power to Congress and the States. A couple of 
     examples will suffice to illustrate this point. If the 
     Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment
      forbids capital punishment in all cases, a constitutional 
     amendment empowering Congress and the States to impose the 
     death penalty would not also have to contain the entirely 
     redundant statement that it overrides the Eighth Amendment 
     in order to be effective. Similarly, a constitutional 
     amendment granting the States power to require a moment of 
     silence at the beginning of each school day would plainly 
     overrule the Supreme Court's contrary Establishment Clause 
     cases, and it would be far-fetched, to put it mildly, to 
     suggest that the purpose and effect of such an amendment 
     would be unclear in the absence of express language 
     overriding the First Amendment.
       Beyond this point, I must confess that I am perplexed by 
     the claim that the claim that the States and Congress 
     currently possess, notwithstanding Johnson and Eichman, the 
     legislative power that the Supreme Court so decisively and 
     permanently prevented them from exercising in Johnson and 
     Eichman. In those cases, the Court held that neither the 
     States nor the Congress have constitutional power to prohibit 
     the physical desecration of the American flag. In both cases, 
     the Court overturned convictions for conduct that plainly 
     constituted the physical desecration of American flags. The 
     sole purpose of the proposed Flag Protection Amendment is to 
     overturn the Eichman and Johnson decisions and thus to return 
     to the States and to Congress the legislative power that they 
     thought they had to prohibit the physical desecration of the 
     American flag.
       I am even more perplexed, however, by the suggestion that 
     passage and ratification of the Flag Protection Amendment 
     would not alter the outcome of a future Johnson or Eichman 
     case. Suffice it to say that there is no reasonable 
     possibility that the Supreme Court, in some future Johnson or 
     Eichman case, would interpret the Flag Protection Amendment 
     as being utterly meaningless.
       The second point made by these opponents of the proposed 
     amendment is that because its language does not expressly 
     override the First Amendment, ``it leaves entirely unclear 
     how much of the Bill of Rights it would dump.''\3\ Apparently 
     the argument is that the omission from the Flag Protection 
     Amendment of any statement that it overrides the First 
     Amendment may be construed to mean that the legislative power 
     granted by the proposed amendment is exempt from or otherwise 
     overrides all constitutional restrictions, such as the Due 
     Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment.\4\
       Before assessing this argument on its own merits, it is 
     important to note first the paradoxical nature of the dual 
     conclusions that these opponents draw from the absence of 
     language in the Flag Protection Amendment expressly 
     overriding the First Amendment. In one breath, they argue 
     that the omission of such language leaves the Supreme Court's 
     interpretations in
      Johnson and Eichman undisturbed and, thus, renders the 
     proposed amendment ineffective in accomplishing its 
     acknowledged purpose. In the next breath, they argue that 
     the omission of such language from the Flag Protection 
     Amendment presents a serious risk that all other 
     protections in the Bill of Rights will be ``trumped'' when 
     confronted with an exercise of the power to prohibit the 
     physical desecration of the flag. In other words, they 
     argue that by failing to include language explicitly 
     overriding the First Amendment, the authors of the Flag 
     Protection Amendment may have unwittingly overridden every 
     constitutional provision except the First Amendment. This 
     line of reasoning, frankly, is specious, and nothing more 
     need be said to dismiss the notion that the express terms 
     of the proposed amendment must contain a reference to the 
     First Amendment.
       In any event, there is no reasonable basis for concern that 
     the proposed Flag Protection Amendment will ``trump'' any 
     constitutional protections other than the constitutional 
     right to physically desecrate the American flag. To be sure, 
     the proposed amendment's grant of legislative power to 
     prohibit the physical desecration of the flag comprehends, 
     for example, the power to investigate and to punish 
     violations. But nothing in the language or history of the 
     proposed amendment even remotely suggests that federal or 
     state authorities would be free to enforce a flag desecration 
     statute by randomly invading and searching homes to 
     [[Page S8301]] ferret out violations or by summarily
      torturing or executing violators without a trial. Nor would 
     the proposed amendment authorize state or local 
     governments, for example, to punish Gregory Lee Johnson, 
     ex post facto, for his violation, to prosecute only black 
     people for violating a flag desecration statute, or to 
     prohibit the press from reporting on incidents of flag 
     desecration. There are simply no plausible arguments 
     supporting an interpretation of the proposed Flag 
     Protection Amendment that would yield these results.
       In short, the only constitutional right that will be 
     ``trumped'' by the proposed Flag Protection Amendment is the 
     one recognized by the Supreme Court in Johnson and Eichman--
     the right to physically desecrate an American flag.
       3. A particularly popular argument among opponents of the 
     Flag Protection Amendment is the concern that prohibiting 
     physical flag desecration will compromise the sacred values 
     reflected in the First Amendment and lead inevitably to 
     further compromises of our Constitution's protection ``for 
     the thought we hate.'' But if prohibiting flag desecration 
     would place us on this sort of slippery slope, we have been 
     on it for a long time. The sole purpose of the Flag 
     Protection Amendment is to restore the constitutional status 
     quo ante pre-Johnson, a time when 48 States, the Congress, 
     and four Justices of the Supreme Court believed that 
     legislation prohibiting flag desecration was entirely 
     consistent with the First Amendment. And that widespread 
     constitutional judgment was not of recent origin; it
      stretched back about 100 years in some States. During that 
     long period before Johnson, when flag desecration was 
     universally criminalized, we did not descend on this 
     purported slippery slope into governmental suppression of 
     unpopular speech. The constitutional calm that preceded 
     the Johnson case would not have been interrupted, I 
     submit, if a single vote in the majority had been cast the 
     other way, and flag desecration statutes had been upheld. 
     Nor will it be interrupted, in my view, if the Flag 
     Protection Amendment is passed and ratified.
       4. Finally, I should like to conclude my testimony with the 
     point that the Supreme Court is not the final word on the 
     content or meaning of our Constitution. The American people 
     are. And the idea that the act of desecrating an American 
     flag is ``speech,'' and that the people are therefore 
     powerless to intervene through law to prevent or punish such 
     a tragic spectacle, falls uneasily on the ears of most 
     ordinary Americans. When the Court errs in its constitutional 
     judgment on a matter of surpassing importance to the people, 
     it is entirely appropriate for them to correct that error 
     through the amendment process prescribed by Article V of the 
     Constitution. Indeed, I believe it is their responsibility to 
     do so.
       Again, thank you for inviting me to participate in this 
     important hearing.


                               footnotes

     \1\See Testimony of Henry Paul Monaghan before the Senate 
     Judiciary Committee (June 21, 1990); testimony of Cass R. 
     Sunstein before the Senate Judiciary Committee (June 21, 
     1990).
     \2\Testimony of Walter Dellinger before the Senate Judiciary 
     Committee at 2 (June 21, 1990) (hereinafter ``Dellinger 
     Testimony'').
     \3\Id.
     \4\See id. at 3, n. 2.
                                                                    ____

                    Statement of Senator Orrin Hatch

       The American people revere the flag as a unique symbol of 
     our country. It is the symbol that unites a very diverse 
     people in a way nothing else can. Despite our differences of 
     politics, philosophy, religion, race, ethnic background, 
     socio-economic status, or geographic origin, the flag is an 
     incomparable common bond among us.
       Moreover, Justice John Paul Stevens, dissenting in Texas v. 
     Johnson, aptly stated, ``A country's flag is a symbol of more 
     than `nationhood and national unity.' It also signifies the 
     ideas that characterize the society that has chosen that 
     emblem as well as the special history that has animated the 
     growth and power of those ideas . . .'' [491 U.S. at 436, 
     Stevens, J. dissenting] The flag itself represents no 
     political party or political ideology.
       I wish we did not have to resort to a constitutional 
     amendment. I believe the Supreme Court was wrong in Texas v. 
     Johnson. But the Supreme Court has given us no choice: if we 
     believe the flag is important enough to protect from physical 
     desecration, an amendment is necessary.
       Let me set the record straight about the origin of this 
     bipartisan movement. A grassroots coalition, the Citizens 
     Flag Alliance, has been working for some time in support of a 
     constitutional amendment regarding flag desecration. The 
     Citizens Flag Alliance, led by the American Legion, consists 
     of over 100 organizations, ranging from the Knights of 
     Columbus; Grand Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police; and the 
     National Grange to the Congressional Medal of Honor Society 
     of the USA and the African-American Women's Clergy 
     Association. Forty-nine state legislatures have called for a 
     constitutional amendment on flag desecration.
       The Citizens Flag Alliance approached Senator Heflin and me 
     last year, well before the November elections, and asked us 
     to lead a bipartisan effort in the Senate. They told us they 
     had reasonable hopes that President Clinton would support 
     this amendment. We were pleased to introduce this resolution 
     here. But, before we were asked to do so by the Citizens Flag 
     Alliance, we had no plans to reintroduce this amendment.
       This is an effort originating entirely among the American 
     people, over 75 percent of whom both favor protecting the 
     flag and sensibly believe that freedom of speech is not 
     jeopardized by so doing.
       There is more wisdom, judgment, and understanding on this 
     matter in the hearts and minds of the American people than 
     one will find on most editorial boards, law faculties, and, 
     regrettably, in the Clinton Administration.
       I believe the opponents of the amendment, including 
     President Clinton, have, in good faith, posed a false choice 
     to the American people. In effect, they say that if we wish 
     to protect the flag from physical desecration, we have to 
     trample on the First Amendment. If we want to safeguard the 
     First Amendment, they say, we have to let desecrators trample 
     on the flag.
       In my view, this amendment, granting Congress and states 
     power to prohibit physical desecration of the flag, does not 
     amend the First Amendment or infringe upon freedom of speech. 
     I believe the flag amendment overturns two Supreme Court 
     decisions which have misconstrued the First Amendment.
       The First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech has 
     never been deemed absolute. Libel is not protected under the 
     First Amendment. Obscenity is not protected under the First 
     Amendment. A person cannot blare out his or her political 
     views at two o'clock in the morning in a residential 
     neighborhood and claim First Amendment protection. Fighting 
     words which provoke violence or breaches of the peace are not 
     protected under the First Amendment. I might add that 
     legislative bodies are able to regulate conduct which people 
     might seek to use as part of a political message.
       Protecting the flag from physical desecration does not 
     interfere with the numerous ways of conveying an idea 
     whatsoever--through speech, use of placards, signs, 
     bullhorns, leaflets, handbills, newspapers, and more. A 
     protestor can burn or mutilate other symbols of our country 
     or government, or even effigies of political figures. This 
     amendment authorizes legislative bodies to prevent 
     disrespectful conduct with regard to one object, and one 
     object only, our flag. We can withdraw this one unique object 
     from physical desecration and our freedom of speech will 
     remain intact.
       The parade of horribles some opponents conjure up is a 
     diversion.
       Indeed, for many years before the 1989 Texas v. Johnson 
     decision invalidating flag desecration statutes, 48 states 
     and the federal government prohibited flag desecration. Was 
     freedom of speech impaired in this country all that time? To 
     ask that question is to answer it--of course not. The First 
     Amendment seemed to have survived these 49 statutes 
     remarkably well.
       Many academics have appeared before the Committee to tell 
     us the Johnson decision was correctly decided and that it is 
     just a natural development of the Supreme Court's previous 
     First Amendment jurisprudence.
       Yet, distinguished jurists regarded as great First 
     Amendment champions have agreed that flag desecration does 
     not fall within the ambit of the First Amendment. Chief 
     Justice Earl Warren wrote, ``I believe that the States and 
     the Federal government do have the power to protect the flag 
     from acts of desecration and disgrace . . .'' [Street v. New 
     York, 394 U.S. 576, 605 (Warren, C.J., dissenting)]. Justice 
     Hugo Black--generally regarded as a First Amendment 
     absolutist--stated, ``It passes my belief that anything in 
     the Federal Constitution bars a State from making the 
     deliberate burning of the American Flag an offense.'' [Id. at 
     610 (Black, J. dissenting)]. Justice Abe Fortas wrote: 
     ``[T]he States and the Federal Government have the power to 
     protect the flag from acts of desecration committed in public 
     . . .'' [Id. at 615 (Fortas, J., dissenting)].
       As Justice Stevens said in his Johnson dissent: ``Even if 
     flag burning could be considered just another species of 
     symbolic speech under the logical application of the rules 
     that the Court has developed in its interpretation of the 
     First Amendment in other contexts, this case has an 
     intangible dimension that makes those rules inapplicable.'' 
     [496 U.S. at 436, Stevens, J., dissenting].
       Even if, on the other hand, one agreed that the Johnson and 
     1990 U.S. v. Eichman cases were correctly decided under prior 
     precedents, one could still support this amendment--if one 
     views protection of the flag from physical desecration as an 
     important enough value. I am sorry that President Clinton 
     could not see his way clear to supporting protection of the 
     flag against physical desecration, apparently deferring to 
     the determinations made by his lawyers within the narrow 
     confines of a legal memorandum or brief. This is terribly 
     disappointing.
       And there is no slippery slope here. The amendment relates 
     only to the flag. The uniqueness of the flag renders the 
     amendment no precedent for any other amendment or 
     legislation. Most Americans understand this. Moreover, 
     neither the amendment, nor any legislation it authorizes, 
     compels any conduct or any profession of respect for any idea 
     or symbol, nor prescribes what is orthodox in any matter of 
     opinion.
       Johnson was a 5-4 decision of the Supreme Court. Had the 
     Court gone 5-4 the other way, and upheld flag desecration 
     statutes, would there have been an uproar by editorial 
     writers, law professors, and members of Congress to repeal 
     these flag desecration statutes? I think not. In effect, one 
     vote on the Supreme Court compels us to go the amendment 
     [[Page S8302]] route, we have no choice--if we think the flag 
     is important enough to protect.
       Our acquiescence in the Supreme Court's misguided 5-4 
     decisions itself devalues the flag. I hope Congress will not 
     stand idly by and tacitly accept the Court's wrongheaded 
     notion that the flag is of no more value than a common 
     object. As Justice Stevens wisely noted in his Johnson 
     dissent: ``sanctioning the public desecration of the flag 
     will tarnish its value . . . That tarnish is not justified by 
     the trivial burden on free expression occasioned by requiring 
     that an available alternative mode of expression including 
     uttering words critical of the flag . . . be employed.'' [436 
     U.S. at 437]
       I urge support for the amendment.
               race for the cure--breast cancer awareness

  Ms. MIKULSKI. Madam President, I rise today to join my colleagues in 
enthusiastically supporting the efforts of our Vice President and Mrs. 
Gore in bringing breast cancer awareness to the attention of our 
Nation's women. their participation in the Race for the Cure 
demonstrates their on-going commitment and dedication to finding a cure 
for breast cancer and for early detection.
  I am proud to have been an advocate for breast cancer research and 
early detection. When we passed the breast and cervical cancer 
amendments of 1993, it showed that we can build a preventive health 
care system using the community-level, public/private partnerships 
which are critical to success. This legislation saved women's lives.
  But our job is not over. There are many States that have no screening 
program for breast cancer and many other States are just getting 
started. Screenings are absolutely necessary if we are to prevent this 
dreaded health risk for America's women.
  All women in America are at risk. In fact, 50,000 mothers, daughters, 
relatives, and friends will die from breast cancer alone. but the women 
most at risk are also those who are our most defenseless--older women, 
women of color, and women of limited income.
  Over the past few years, we have made significant strides in breast 
cancer research--focused through the National Institutes of Health's 
Office of Women's Research. We know what it takes to save many of these 
lives.
  It takes regular screening for women over 40 using mammograms and 
self-exams. All women need to hear this message. All women should think 
of getting a mammogram as once a year for a lifetime. For the fortunate 
majority of America's women, following through on that message is not 
too much to ask.
  That is why I take pride in joining my colleagues today in urging 
participation in the Race for the Cure to be held this Saturday, June 
16. Events like this get the message out. The message of ``breast 
cancer is preventable'' and ``Once a Year for a Lifetime'' in getting 
that mammogram.
  I welcome the day when no woman turns away from the decision to have 
a mammogram for lack of funds, access to services, or lack of 
awareness. This is the noble cause I am dedicated to. America's women 
deserve no less. Join Race for the Cure.


                           race for the cure

  Mr. DASCHLE. Madam President, I would like to take a few moments to 
underscore the comments many of my colleagues made earlier today in 
support of the upcoming Race for the Cure, which will be held this 
Saturday in Washington. This weekend's race marks the 6th year that 
Washingtonians have participated in this important event. it is a time 
when policymakers, civil servants, media representatives, and other put 
their ideological differences aside and show their solidarity in 
support of the effort to find a cure for breast cancer.
  In the past, the Race for the Cure has helped raise critical funding 
for medical research and for mammograms. Much of this money remains in 
the local area to support research institutions and provide mammograms 
for women who could not otherwise afford them. The Race for the Cure 
has also done an exceptional job of raising the public's awareness 
about breast cancer, and of alerting women to the importance of early 
detection measures.
  As in the past, many of Saturday's race participants will be breast 
cancer survivors. Many more will be the spouses, children, siblings, 
and friends of both breast cancer survivors and, I am sad to say, the 
many women who have not survived their battle with this disease. It is 
for all these individuals that we race. And it is for them that we 
continue our efforts to support research and public awareness in the 
hope that one day all women who face this disease will be survivors.
  Although we have made significant strides in combating breast cancer, 
we are far from the finish line. Medical research into the causes, 
cure, and prevention of breast cancer is critical to this effort. 
Public awareness and prevention efforts are also critical components of 
our battle against breast cancer. Today doctors strongly recommend 
monthly self-examinations to check for the early warning signs of 
breast cancer. Sometimes these early warning signs are not early 
enough, however, and that is why it is so important for women at risk 
of breast cancer to have mammograms. I am hopeful that one day we will 
be able to detect all breast cancers at an early stage.
  I am even more hopeful, however, that we will someday have a cure for 
this disease. Over 70 percent of all women who have breast cancer do 
not exhibit any of the known risk factors. This year 182,000 women will 
be diagnosed with breast cancer, and 46,000 women will die from this 
terrible disease. Whether the answer to this disease is around the 
corner, or it takes years to discover, we cannot give up the fight. We 
must find a cure.
  Sometimes the most effective movements are born of tragedy, and the 
Race for the Cure is one of those movements. this race is a tribute to 
all women who have not survived their battle with breast cancer. It is 
in their memory that we continue our efforts to increase support for 
medical research and raise public awareness about this issue.
  This race is also a tribute to all those women who are surviving 
their battle with breast cancer. It is in their honor that we stand 
with them, walk with them, and run with them. It is in humble respect 
that we race with them--to find a cure for breast cancer.


                          ____________________