[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 92 (Wednesday, June 7, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H5648-H5681]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                AMERICAN OVERSEAS INTERESTS ACT OF 1995

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). Pursuant to House Resolutions 
155 and 156 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further 
consideration of the bill, H.R. 1561.

                              {time}  1538


                     in the committee of the whole

  Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole 
House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the 
bill (H.R. 1561) to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies of the 
United States; to authorize appropriations for the Department of State 
and related agencies for fiscal years 1996 and 1997; to responsibly 
reduce the authorizations of appropriations for United States foreign 
assistance programs for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Goodlatte in the Chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Wednesday, May 
24, 1995, amendment number 42 offered by the gentleman from Florida 
[Mr. Hastings] had been disposed of, and the bill was open for 
amendment at any point.
  Pursuant to House Resolutions 155 and 156, 6 hours and 35 minutes 
remain for consideration of the bill under the 5-minute rule.
  Only the following further amendments to the committee amendment in 
the nature of a substitute, as modified and amended, are in order:
  Pro forma amendments for the purpose of debate;
  Amendments printed before May 25, 1995, in the Congressional Record;
  Amendments en bloc described in section 2 of House Resolution 155 
comprising only amendments printed before May 25, 1995; and
  One amendment offered by the chairman of the Committee on 
International Relations.
  Are there further amendments to the bill?


         amendments en bloc, as modified, offered by mr. gilman

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendments en bloc, as modified.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendments and report the 
modifications.
  The Clerk designated the amendments en bloc and proceeded to read the 
modifications.
  Mr. GILMAN (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the modifications be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New York?
  There was no objection.
  The text of the amendments en bloc, as modified, is as follows:

       Amendments en bloc, as modified, offered by Mr. Gilman:
       Amendment No. 12 offered by Mr. Lantos: After section 3211, 
     insert the following new section:

     SEC. 3212. CENTRAL ASIAN ENTERPRISE FUND.

       Notwithstanding section 201(d)(3)(A) of the Support for 
     East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C. 
     5421(d)(3)(A)), the Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund 
     may, in lieu of the appointment of citizens of the host 
     countries to its Board of Directors, establish an advisory 
     council for the host region comprised of citizens of each of 
     the host countries or establish separate advisory councils 
     for each of the host countries, with which such Fund shall 
     periodically consult with respect to the Fund's policies and 
     proposed activities. Such host country citizens shall satisfy 
     the experience and expertise requirements set forth in 
     section 201(d)(3)(A) and (d)(3)(C) of that Act.
       Amendment No. 13 as modified, offered by Mr. Livingston: 
     Page 47, strike line 9 and all that follows through line 20 
     (section 348(e) of the bill), and insert the following:
       (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--Section 8(a) of such 
     Act (22 U.S.C. 1465f(a)) is amended in the second sentence by 
     striking ``United States Information Agency'' and inserting 
     ``Department of State''.
       In section 2101(a)(1)(B), strike ``only''.
       In section 2101(a)(2)(B), strike ``only''.
       In section 2102(b)(2)(A)(i), strike ``only''.
       In section 2102(b)(2)(B)(i), strike ``only''.
       In section 2102(b)(2)(C), strike ``to be made available''.
       In section 2102(b)(2)(D), strike ``only''.
       In section 2102(b)(2)(E), strike ``only''.
       In section 2102(b)(2)(G), strike ``only''.
       In section 2106(4)(B), strike ``only''.
       In section 2106(4)(C), strike ``only''.
       In section 3222(a)(1)(A), strike ``shall'' and insert 
     ``should''.
       In section 3222(a)(1)(B), strike ``shall'' and insert 
     ``should''.
       In section 3222(b), strike ``shall'' and insert ``should''.
       In section 3222(c), strike ``shall'' and insert ``should''.
       In section 3227(a), strike ``shall'' and insert ``should''.
       Amendment No. 30, as modified, offered by Mr. Condit: After 
     chapter 2 of title XXXIV (relating to special authorities and 
     other provisions), insert the following new chapter (and 
     redesignate the subsequent chapter accordingly):

          CHAPTER 3--FOREIGN AID REPORTING REFORM ACT OF 1995

     SEC. 3421. SHORT TITLE.

       This chapter may be cited as the ``Foreign Aid Reporting 
     Reform Act of 1995''.

     SEC. 3422. ANNUAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE JUSTIFICATION REPORT.

       (a) In General.--In conjunction with the submission of the 
     annual requests for enactment of authorizations and 
     appropriations for foreign assistance programs for each 
     fiscal year, the President shall submit to the Congress a 
     single report containing--
       (1) an integrated justification for all foreign assistance 
     programs proposed by the President for the coming fiscal 
     year; and
       (2) an assessment of when the objective of those programs 
     will be achieved so that the assistance can be terminated.
       (b) Specific Information To Be Provided.--Each such report 
     shall include the following:
       (1) Information regarding a foreign assistance program 
     generally.--For each foreign assistance program taken as a 
     whole--
       (A) the total amount of assistance proposed to be provided 
     under that program;
       (B) the justification for that amount;
       (C) the objectives that assistance under that program is 
     intended to achieve;
       (D) an explanation of the relationship of assistance under 
     that program to assistance under other foreign assistance 
     programs; and
       (E) the President's estimation of the date by which the 
     objectives of that program will be achieved and the program 
     terminated.
       (2) Information regarding specific assistance recipients.--
     For each country or organization which is a proposed 
     recipient of assistance under any foreign assistance 
     program--
       (A) the amount of each type of assistance proposed;
       (B) the justification for providing each such type of 
     assistance;
       (C) the objectives that each such type of assistance is 
     intended to achieve;
       (D) an explanation of the relationship of each type of 
     assistance proposed to other types of assistance proposed for 
     that recipient; and
       (E) the President's estimation of the date by which the 
     objectives of assistance for such recipient under each 
     foreign assistance program will be achieved and assistance 
     under that program to that recipient terminated.

     The information required by subparagraphs (A) through (E) 
     shall be provided on a recipient-by-recipient basis.
       (3) Information regarding centrally-funded programs.--For 
     each centrally-funded program under a foreign assistance 
     program--
       (A) the amount proposed for such program;
       (B) the justification for such program;
       (C) the objectives each such program is intended to 
     achieve;
       (D) an explanation of the relationship of such program to 
     other types of assistance proposed under that foreign 
     assistance program and under other foreign assistance 
     programs; and
       (E) the President's estimation of the date by which the 
     objectives of such program will be achieved and such program 
     terminated.

     SEC. 3423. DEFINITION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.

       As used in this chapter, the term ``foreign assistance 
     program'' includes--
       (1) any program of assistance authorized by the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 (such [[Page H5649]] as the 
     development assistance program, the economic support fund 
     program, and the international military education and 
     training program) or authorized by the African Development 
     Foundation Act, section 401 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1969 (relating to the Inter-American Development Foundation), 
     or any other foreign assistance legislation;
       (2) any program of grant, credit, or guaranty assistance 
     under the Arms Export Control Act;
       (3) assistance under the Migration and Refugee Assistance 
     Act of 1962;
       (4) assistance under any title of the Agricultural Trade 
     Development and Assistance Act of 1954;
       (5) contributions to the International Monetary Fund;
       (6) contributions to the International Bank for 
     Reconstruction and Development, the International Development 
     Association, or any other institution within the World Bank 
     group; and
       (7) contributions to any regional multilateral development 
     bank.
       Amendment No. 33, as modified offered by Mr. Gilman: At the 
     end of chapter 6 of title XXXI (relating to other provisions 
     of defense and security assistance), add the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 3194. RETURN AND EXCHANGES OF DEFENSE ARTICLES 
                   PREVIOUSLY TRANSFERRED PURSUANT TO THE ARMS 
                   EXPORT CONTROL ACT.

       (a) Repair of Defense Articles.--Section 21 of the Arms 
     Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2761) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new subsection:
       ``(l) Authority.--
       ``(1) In general.--The President may acquire a repairable 
     defense article from a foreign country or international 
     organization, if such defense article--
       ``(A) previously was transferred to such country or 
     organization under this Act;
       ``(B) is not an end item; and
       ``(C) will be exchanged for a defense article of the same 
     type that is in the stocks of the Department of Defense.
       ``(2) Limitation.--The President may exercise the authority 
     provided in paragraph (1) only to the extent that the 
     Department of Defense--
       ``(A)(i) has a requirement for the defense article being 
     returned; and
       ``(ii) has available sufficient funds authorized and 
     appropriated for such purpose; or
       ``(B)(i) is accepting the return of the defense article for 
     subsequent transfer to another foreign government or 
     international organization pursuant to a letter of offer and 
     acceptance implemented in accordance with this Act; and
       ``(ii) has available sufficient funds provided by or on 
     behalf of such other foreign government or international 
     organization pursuant to a letter of offer and acceptance 
     implemented in accordance with this Act.
       ``(3) Requirement.--(A) The foreign government or 
     international organization receiving a new or repaired 
     defense article in exchange for a repairable defense article 
     pursuant to paragraph (1) shall, upon the acceptance by the 
     United States Government of the repairable defense article 
     being returned, be charged the total cost associated with the 
     repair and replacement transaction.
       ``(B) The total cost charged pursuant to subparagraph (A) 
     shall be the same as that charged the United States Armed 
     Forces for a similar repair and replacement transaction, plus 
     an administrative surcharge in accordance with subsection 
     (e)(1)(A) of this section.
       ``(4) Relationship to certain other provisions of law.--The 
     authority of the President to accept the return of a 
     repairable defense article as provided in subsection (a) 
     shall not be subject to chapter 137 of title 10, United 
     States Code, or any other provision of law relating to the 
     conclusion of contracts.''.
       (b) Return of Defense Articles.--Section 21 of such Act (22 
     U.S.C. 2761), as amended by this Act, is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(m) Authority.--
       ``(1) In general.--The President may accept the return of a 
     defense article from a foreign country or international 
     organization, if such defense article--
       ``(A) previously was transferred to such country or 
     organization under this Act;
       ``(B) is not significant military equipment (as defined in 
     section 47(9) of this Act); and
       ``(C) is in fully functioning condition without need of 
     repair or rehabilitation.
       ``(2) Limitation.--The President may exercise the authority 
     provided in paragraph (1) only to the extent that the 
     Department of Defense--
       ``(A)(i) has a requirement for the defense article being 
     returned; and
       ``(ii) has available sufficient funds authorized and 
     appropriated for such purpose; or
       ``(B)(i) is accepting the return of the defense article for 
     subsequent transfer to another foreign government or 
     international organization pursuant to a letter of offer and 
     acceptance implemented in accordance with this Act; and
       ``(ii) has available sufficient funds provided by or on 
     behalf of such other foreign government or international 
     organization pursuant to a letter of offer and acceptance 
     implemented in accordance with this Act.
       ``(3) Condition.--Upon acquisition and acceptance by the 
     United States Government of a defense article under paragraph 
     (1), the appropriate Foreign Military Sales account of the 
     provider shall be credited to reflect the transaction.
       ``(4) Relationship to certain other provisions of law.--The 
     authority of the President to accept the return of a defense 
     article as provided in paragraph (1) shall not be subject to 
     chapter 137 of title 10, United States Code, or any other 
     provision of law relating to the conclusion of contracts.''.
       (c) Regulations.--Under the direction of the President, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall promulgate regulations to 
     implement subsections (l) and (m) of section 21 of the Arms 
     Export Control Act, as added by this section.
       Amendment No. 34, as modified, read by Mr. Gilman: At the 
     end of chapter 1 of title XXVI (relating to miscellaneous 
     foreign policy provisions), add the following new section:
     SEC. 2604. REPEAL OF TERMINATION OF PROVISIONS OF THE NUCLEAR 
                   PROLIFERATION PREVENTION ACT OF 1994.

       Part D of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 
     (part D of title VIII of the Foreign Relations Authorization 
     Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; Public Law 103-236; 108 
     Stat. 525) is hereby repealed.
       Amendment No. 35, as modified, read by Mr. Gilman: Page 
     203, line 2, strike ``for such fiscal year''.
       Amendment No. 43, as modified, offered by Mr. Hoke: At the 
     end of chapter 2 of title XXXIV of division C (relating to 
     special authorities and other provisions), add the following 
     new section:

     SEC. 3420. PROHIBITION ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN 
                   GOVERNMENTS NOT IMPLEMENTING EXTRADITION 
                   TREATIES.

       (a) Prohibition.--Except as provided in subsection (b), the 
     President may not provide foreign assistance to the 
     government of any country determined by the President to have 
     refused to implement an extradition treaty between such 
     country and the United States with respect to one or more 
     individuals of significant concern to the United States who 
     have been charged with or who have committed felony offenses.
       (b) Exception.--The President may provide foreign 
     assistance to the government of a country that would 
     otherwise be prohibited from receiving such assistance under 
     subsection (a) if the President--
       (1) determines that the provision of such assistance is in 
     the national interest of the United States; and
       (2) notifies the Committee on International Relations of 
     the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate of such determination.
       (c) Definitions.--As used in this section:
       (1) Felony offense.--The term ``felony offense'' means an 
     offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term 
     exceeding one year.
       (2) Foreign assistance.--The term ``foreign assistance'' 
     means any funds made available to carry out any program, 
     project, or activity under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     or the Arms Export Control Act, except such term does not 
     include funds used to provide humanitarian assistance.
       (d) Effective Date.--The prohibition contained in 
     subsection (a) applies with respect to the provision of 
     foreign assistance on or after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.
       Amendment No. 49 offered by Mr. King: Page 196, after line 
     13, insert the following section:

     SEC. 2712. POLICY TOWARD IRAN.

       (a) Iran's Acts of International Terrorism.--The Congress 
     makes the following findings with respect to Iran's acts of 
     international terrorism:
       (1) As cited by the Department of State, the Government of 
     Iran was the greatest supporter of state terrorism in 1992, 
     supporting over 20 terrorist acts, including the bombing of 
     the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 29 people.
       (2) As cited by the Department of State, the Government of 
     Iran is a sponsor of radical religious groups that have used 
     terrorism as a tool. These include such groups as Hezballah, 
     HAMAS, the Turkish Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for 
     the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP--GC).
       (3) As cited by the Department of State, the Government of 
     Iran has resorted to international terrorism as a means of 
     obtaining political gain. These actions have included not 
     only the assassination of former Prime Minister Bakhitiar, 
     but the death sentence imposed on Salman Rushdie, and the 
     assassination of the leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party 
     of Iran.
       (4) As cited by the Department of State and the Vice 
     President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism, the Government 
     of Iran has long been a proponent of terrorist actions 
     against the United States, beginning with the takeover of the 
     United States Embassy in Tehran in 1979. Iranian support of 
     extremist groups has led to the following attacks upon the 
     United States as well:
       (A) The car bomb attack on the United States Embassy in 
     Beirut killing 49 in 1983 by the Hezballah.
       (B) The car bomb attack on the United States Marine 
     Barracks in Beirut killing 241 in 1983 by the Hezballah.
       (C) The assassination of American University President in 
     1984 by the Hezballah.
       (D) The kidnapping of all American hostages in Lebanon from 
     1984-86 by the Hezballah.
       (5) The Government of Iran provides several hundred million 
     dollars annually in financial and logistical support to 
     organizations that use terrorism
      and violence as a [[Page H5650]] tool to undermine the 
     Middle East peace process.
       (6) The Government of Iran provides financial, political, 
     and logistical support and safe haven to groups that seek the 
     violent overthrow of secular governments in the Middle East 
     and North Africa.
       (b) Iran's Program To Acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction 
     and the Means by Which to Deliver Them.--The Congress makes 
     the following findings with respect to Iran's program to 
     acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means by which to 
     deliver them--
       (1) the Government of Iran has intensified its efforts to 
     develop weapons of mass destruction and the means by which to 
     deliver them:
       (2) given Iran's petroleum reserves, the desire of the 
     Government of Iran to obtain gas centrifuge equipment and 
     light water nuclear power reactors clearly demonstrates what 
     had already been apparent, that Iran seeks to develop its 
     nuclear weapons capability; and
       (3) Iran has been relentless in its attempt to acquire the 
     missiles needed to deliver nuclear and chemical weapons.
       (c) Iran's Violations of Human Rights.--The Congress makes 
     the following findings with respect to Iran's violations of 
     human rights:
       (1) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Special 
     Representative on Human Rights, Amnesty International, and 
     the United States Department of State, the Government of Iran 
     has conducted assassinations outside of Iran, such as that of 
     former Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhitiar for which the 
     Government of France issued arrest warrants for several 
     Iranian governmental officials.
       (2) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Special 
     Representative on Human Rights and by Amnesty International, 
     the Government of Iran has conducted revolutionary trials 
     which do not meet internationally recognized standards of 
     fairness or justice. These trials have included such 
     violations as a lack of procedural safeguards, trial times of 
     5 minutes or less, limited access to defense counsel, forced 
     confessions, and summary executions.
       (3) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Special 
     Representative on Human Rights, the Government of Iran 
     systematically represses its Baha'i population. Persecutions 
     of this small religious community include assassinations, 
     arbitrary arrests,
      electoral prohibitions, and denial of applications for 
     documents such as passports.
       (4) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Special 
     Representative on Human Rights, the Government of Iran 
     suppresses opposition to its government. Political 
     organizations such as the Freedom Movement are banned from 
     parliamentary elections, have their telephones tapped and 
     their mail opened, and are systematically harassed and 
     intimidated.
       (5) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Special 
     Representative on Human Rights and Amnesty International, the 
     Government of Iran has failed to recognize the importance of 
     international human rights. This includes suppression of 
     Iranian human rights movements such as the Freedom Movement, 
     lack of cooperation with international human rights 
     organizations such as the International Red Cross, and an 
     overall apathy toward human rights in general. This lack of 
     concern prompted the Special Representative to state in his 
     report that Iran had made ``no appreciable progress towards 
     improved compliance with human rights in accordance with the 
     current international instruments''.
       (6) As cited by Amnesty International, the Government of 
     Iran continues to torture its political prisoners. Torture 
     methods include burns, arbitrary blows, severe beatings, and 
     positions inducing pain.
       (d) United States Policy and Response.--The Congress makes 
     the following findings with respect to United States policy 
     and response to Iran:
       (1) The actions by the Government of Iran identified in 
     subsections (a), (b), and (c) threaten the national security 
     and offend the democratic values of the United States and 
     many other nations in the Middle East and elsewhere.
       (2) In response to this record of violent, destablizing, 
     and antidemocratic conduct, it has been the policy of the 
     United States to seek to isolate the Government of Iran 
     diplomatically and economically, thereby making the 
     continuation of such conduct increasingly costly.
       (3) The policies the United States has pursued in an effort 
     to pressure the Government of Iran diplomatically and 
     economically have included refusing to conduct normal 
     diplomatic relations with Iran; barring the importation of 
     Iranian oil and other products into the United States; 
     prohibiting the export or reexport to Iran of weapons or of 
     goods or technology with potential military uses; voting 
     against all loans to Iran by international financial
      institutions; and, most recently, imposing a total economic 
     embargo on Iran.
       (4) To further increase the cost to the Government of Iran 
     of its objectionable conduct the United States has urged 
     other countries with economic ties to Iran to take equivalent 
     steps to isolate Iran economically and diplomatically.
       (e) Congressional Declarations.--The Congress makes the 
     following declarations:
       (1) The imposition of an economic embargo on Iran by 
     President Clinton was an important and necessary measure to 
     increase economic and political pressure on Iran.
       (2) The President should, as a matter of the highest 
     priority, intensify efforts to persuade Iran's leading trade 
     partners and creditors to join with the United States in 
     ceasing all trade with Iran and ending any rescheduling or 
     other relaxation of debts owed to them.
       (3) The President should take whatever steps are 
     appropriate to dissuade those who are aiding Iran's efforts 
     to develop nuclear weapons and the means by which to deliver 
     them from continuing such assistance.
       (4) The United States should convene a special summit of 
     the world's leading heads of state to address the issue of 
     international terrorism and the means for improving the 
     efforts to combat international terrorism.
       (5) The Secretary of State should promptly take steps to 
     strengthen each of the existing multilateral nonproliferation 
     regimes to make them more effective in counteracting rogue 
     regimes such as Iran.
       (6) The President should make the development of a 
     multilateral economic embargo on Iran a top priority on the 
     agenda at the meeting of the G-7 industrial partners 
     scheduled for June 1995 in Halifax, Nova Scotia.
       Amendment No. 59, as modified offered by Mr. Roemer: At the 
     end of title XXVII of division B (relating to congressional 
     statements), add the following new section:

     SEC. 2172. CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) Russian troops advanced into Chechnya on December 10, 
     1994, and were met with strong resistance from Chechen rebels 
     who have now moved to the Caucasus mountains where they are 
     engaging in what even the most optimistic Russian military 
     officers predict will be a drawn-out guerrilla war.
       (2) The cost of the Chechen battle is estimated to cost the 
     Government of Russia at least $2,000,000,000 and could 
     exacerbate the budget deficit of the Government of Russia.
       (3) The United States has approved over $2,400,000,000 in 
     loan guarantees through the Export-Import Bank of the United 
     States and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
       (4) The United States has provided Russia with significant 
     direct assistance to promote a free market economy, support 
     democracy, meet humanitarian needs, and dismantle nuclear 
     weapons.
       (b) Declaration of Policy.--The Congress declares the 
     following:
       (1) United States investment in Russia has been significant 
     in promoting democracy and stabilizing the economy of Russia 
     and this progress could be imperiled by Russia's continued 
     war in Chechnya.
       (2) the inability to negotiate an end to this crisis and 
     the resulting economic implications could adversely affect 
     the ability of Russia to fulfill its commitments to the 
     International Monetary Fund, the Export-Import Bank of the 
     United States, and the Overseas Private Investment 
     Corporation.
       (3) In further contacts with President Yeltsin, it is 
     imperative that President Clinton repeat his call for an 
     immediate end to the war in Chechnya.
       Amendment No. 61, as modified, offered by Mr. Rohrabacher: 
     At the end of title XXXIII (relating to regional provisions), 
     add the following new sections:
      SECTION 3314. ASSISTANCE FOR LAOS.

       (a) It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) a permanent waiver on the prohibition of foreign 
     assistance for Laos should be granted following the fullest 
     possible accounting of all outstanding POW/MIA cases 
     involving Laos;
       (2) the United States should continue to improve its 
     relationship with Laos as the mutual cooperation between the 
     two countries on POW/MIA issues improves;
       (3) no Lao citizen or government official should be held 
     accountable by the United States for activities involved in 
     holding American POW/MIAs if those citizens or officials 
     cooperate with efforts to return such POW/MIAs alive or to 
     otherwise account for such POW/MIAs;
       (4) the future relationship of the United States with Laos 
     should be characterized by economic cooperation and friendly 
     diplomatic ties;
       (5) such bilateral relationship will improve as respect for 
     human rights in Laos improves, including human rights for 
     Hmong people; and
       (6) in the event an American POW/MIA is returned alive from 
     Laos, the United States should view this action as a positive 
     development and as strong incentive for the United States to 
     rapidly improve our economic and diplomatic relationship with 
     Laos.
       (b) Notwithstanding section 620 of the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961, foreign assistance may be provided for Laos for 
     fiscal years 1996 and 1997 only if the President determines 
     and certifies to the Congress that the Government of Laos is 
     cooperating with the United States on outstanding POW/MIA 
     cases involving Laos.
        Amendment No. 63 offered by Mr. Roth: Add a new Section 
     2604 as follows:

     SEC. 2604. ANNUAL ASSESSMENT

       The Secretary of State shall assess the impact of the 
     foreign policy of the United States on the ability of United 
     States entities engaged in the manufacture, sale, 
     distribution, or provision of goods or services to compete in 
     foreign markets. The Secretary shall provide such assessments 
     annually to the Committee on International Relations of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate and shall publish such assessments in 
     the Federal Register.

[[Page H5651]]

       Amendment No. 65 offered by Mr. Sawyer: At the end of title 
     XXVII (relating to congressional statements) insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 2712. UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE FOURTH WORLD 
                   CONFERENCE ON WOMEN IN BEJING.

       It is the sense of the Congress that the United States 
     delegation to the Fourth World Conference on Women should 
     include at least one representative of a United States-based 
     nongovernmental organization representing Tibetan women.
       Amendment No. 66 offered by Mr. Sawyer: At the end of 
     chapter 6 of title XXXI (relating to other provisions of 
     defense and security assistance), add the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 3194. ANNUAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE REPORT.

       The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by inserting 
     after section 654 (22 U.S.C. 2414) the following new section:

     ``SEC. 657. ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND MILITARY 
                   EXPORTS.

       ``Not later than February 1 of each year, the President 
     shall transmit to the Congress an annual report for the 
     fiscal year ending the previous September 30, showing the 
     aggregate dollar value and quantity of defense articles 
     (including excess defense articles) and defense services, and 
     of military education and training, furnished by the United 
     States to each foreign country and international 
     organization, by category, specifying whether they were 
     furnished by grant under chapter 2 or chapter 5 of part II of 
     this Act, by sale under chapter 2 of the Arms Export Control 
     Act, by commercial sale license under section 38 of that Act, 
     or by any other authority.''.
       Amendment No. 69 offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey: In 
     section 2102(b)(2)(C) (relating to voluntary contributions 
     for the war crimes tribunal for the former yugoslavia)--
       (1) in the heading strike ``for the former yugoslavia'';
       (2) strike ``budget for the tribunal'' and insert 
     ``combined budgets for the tribunals''; and
       (3) after ``Yugoslavia'' insert ``and the United Nations 
     International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda''.
       Amendment No. 71 Offered by Mr. Torricelli: At the end of 
     Title XXXII (relating to regional provisions) at the 
     following new section:
     SEC. 3314. RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE FOR GUATEMALA.

       (a) Restriction.--None of the funds authorized to be 
     appropriated for grant assistance under section 23 of the 
     Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763; relating to foreign 
     military financing) or for assistance under chapter 5 of part 
     II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et 
     seq.; relating to international military education and 
     training) may be made available to the Government of 
     Guatemala unless the Secretary of State determines and 
     certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that--
       (1) substantial progress has been made in the prosecution 
     of all those responsible for the human rights abuses against 
     Michael DeVine, Nicholas Blake, Griffin Davis, Dianna Ortiz, 
     Myrna Mack, and Efrain Bamaca Velasquez;
       (2) former Guatemalan Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Rene Ochoa 
     Ruiz, who is under indictment in the State of Florida for 
     narcotics trafficking, has been extradited to the United 
     States; and
       (3) substantial progress has been made in the dismantling 
     of the Voluntary Civil Self-Defense Committees, curbing their 
     patrols, and returning their weapons to the Guatemalan 
     military.
       (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--For 
     purpose of this section, the term ``appropriate congressional 
     committees'' means the Committee on International Relations 
     and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
       Amendment No. 78 Offered by: Mr. Zimmer: At the end of 
     title XXXIII (relating to regional provisions), add the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 3314. PROHIBITION ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, MILITARY 
                   ASSISTANCE OR ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE GOVERNMENT 
                   OF MAURITANIA UNLESS APPROPRIATE ACTION IS 
                   TAKEN TO ELIMINATE CHATTEL SLAVERY.

       (a) Prohibition.--The President may not provide economic 
     assistance, military assistance or arms transfers to the 
     Government of Mauritania unless the President certifies to 
     the Congress that such Government has taken appropriate 
     action to eliminate chattel slavery in Mauritania, 
     including--
       (1) the enactment of anti-slavery laws that provide 
     appropriate punishment for violators of such laws; and
       (2) the rigorous enforcement of such laws.
       (b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section, the 
     following definitions apply:
       (1) Economic assistance.--The term ``economic assistance'' 
     means any assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) and any assistance under 
     chapter 4 of part II of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.) 
     (relating to the economic support fund), except that such 
     term does not include humanitarian assistance.
       (2) Military assistance or arms transfers.--The term 
     ``military assistance or arms transfers'' means--
       (A) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2311 et seq.) (relating to 
     military assistance), including the transfer of excess 
     defense articles under sections 516 through 519 of that Act 
     (22 U.S.C. 2321j through 2321m);
       (B) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.) (relating to 
     international military education and training);
       (C) assistance under the ``Foreign Military Financing 
     Program'' under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
     U.S.C. 2763); or
       (D) the transfer of defense articles, defense services, or 
     design and construction services under the Arms Export 
     Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), including defense 
     articles and defense services licensed or approved for export 
     under section 38 of that Act (22 U.S.C. 2778).
       Amendment No. 80 Offered by: Mr. Bilbray: Page 100, line 
     10, strike ``$12,472,000'' and insert ``$19,372,000''.
       At the end of the bill, add the following:

     DIVISION D--ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS TITLE XLI--FOREIGN BUILDINGS

     SEC. 4001. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Notwithstanding section 2101(a)(4), there are authorized to 
     be appropriated for ``Acquisition and Maintenance of 
     Buildings Abroad'', $369,860,000 for the fiscal year 1997.
       Amendment No. 82 Offered by: Mr. Burton of Indiana: In 
     paragraph (1) of section 3309(b) (relating to the future of 
     the United States military presence in Panama)--
       (1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), strike ``a 
     new base rights'' and insert ``an''; and
       (2) strike subparagraph (B) and insert the following new 
     subparagraph:
       (B) to ensure that the United States will be able to act 
     after December 31, 1999, to maintain the security of the 
     Panama Canal and guarantee its regular operation, consistent 
     with the Panama Canal Treaty, the Treaty Concerning the 
     Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, and 
     the resolutions of ratification thereto; and
       Amendment No. 83: Offered by Mr. Chabot: At the end of the 
     bill, add the following:

                   DIVISION D--ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

               TITLE XLI--AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

     SEC. 4101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) Foreign Military Financing Program.--Notwithstanding 
     section 3101 of this Act, there are authorized to be 
     appropriated for grant assistance under section 23 of the 
     Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) and for the subsidy 
     cost, as defined in section 502(5) of the Federal Credit 
     Reform Act of 1990, of direct loans under such section--
       (1) $3,274,440,000 for fiscal year 1996; and
       (2) $3,216,020,000 for fiscal year 1997.
       (b) Economic Support Assistance.--Notwithstanding section 
     3201 of this Act, section 532(a) of the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 234a(a)) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(a) There are authorized to be appropriated to the 
     President to carry out the purposes of this chapter 
     $2,346,378,000 for fiscal year 1996 and $2,238,478,000 for 
     fiscal year 1997.''.
       (c) Development Fund for Africa.--Notwithstanding paragraph 
     (2) of section 3221(a) of this Act, there are authorized to 
     be appropriated $649,214,000 for fiscal year 1996 and 
     $634,214,000 for fiscal year 1997 to carry out chapter 10 of 
     part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2293 
     et seq.).
       Amendment No. 86 Offered by: Mr. Gilman: After section 510, 
     insert the following new section:

     SEC. 511. TRANSFER OF FUNCTION.

       Any determination as to whether a transfer of function, 
     carried out under this Act, constitutes a transfer of 
     function for purposes of subchapter I of chapter 35 of title 
     5, United States Code, shall be made without regard to 
     whether or not the function involved is identical to 
     functions already being performed by the receiving agency.
       Amendment No. 87 Offered by: Mr. Hamilton: On page 286 
     after line 19, amend the subsection ``(e)'' which would be 
     added to Section 222 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
     by adding at the end a new sentence as follows:
       ``The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to 
     guaranties which have been issued for the benefit of the 
     Republic of South Africa.''
       Amendment No. 96, as modified, offered by Mrs. Schroeder: 
     At the end of title XXVII insert the following new section:

     SEC. 2712. FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
       (1) female genital mutilation is a violation of women's 
     basic human rights;
       (2) female genital mutilation constitutes a major health 
     risk to women, with lifelong physical and psychological 
     consequences; and
       (3) female genital mutilation should not be condoned by any 
     government.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress 
     that--
       (1) the President should seek to end the practice of female 
     genital mutilation worldwide through the active cooperation 
     and participation of governments in countries where female 
     genital mutilation takes place; and
       (2) steps to end the practice of female genital mutilation 
     should include--
       (A) encouraging nations to establish clear policies against 
     female genital mutilation and enforcing existing laws which 
     prohibit it;
       (B) assisting nations in creating culturally appropriate 
     outreach programs that include [[Page H5652]] education and 
     counseling about the dangers of female genital mutilation for 
     women and men of all ages; and
       (C) ensuring that all appropriate programs in which the 
     United States participates include a component pertaining to 
     female genital mutilation, so as to ensure consistency across 
     the spectrum of health and child related programs conducted 
     in any country in which female genital mutilation is known to 
     be a problem.
       Amendment No. 98, as modified, Offered by Mr. Trafficant: 
     At the end of title XXVII (relating to congressional 
     statements), add the following new section:

     SEC. 2712. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING SYRIAN OCCUPATION 
                   OF LEBANON.

       It is the sense of the Congress that--
       (1) the Government of Syria should comply with the Taif 
     Agreement and withdraw all of its troops from Lebanon;
       (2) the United States should use its contacts at the 
     highest level of the Syrian Government to encourage the 
     Government of Syria to withdraw all of its troops from 
     Lebanon within a timeframe to be negotiated between the 
     Syrian and Lebanese Governments; and
       (3) the Secretary of State should inform the Congress as to 
     the actions the United States has taken to encourage 
     withdrawal of all Syrian troops from Lebanon.
       Amendment No. 99, as modified, offered by Mr. Traficant: At 
     the end of chapter 2 of title XXXIV of division C (relating 
     to special authorities and other provisions of foreign 
     assistance authorizations), add the following new section:

     SEC. 3420. LIMITATION ON PROCUREMENT OUTSIDE THE UNITED 
                   STATES.

       (a) Funds made available for assistance for fiscal years 
     1996 and 1997 under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, for 
     which amounts are authorized to be appropriated for such 
     fiscal years, may be used for procurement outside the United 
     States or less developed countries only if--
       (1) such funds are used for the procurement of commodities 
     or services, or defense articles or defense services, in the 
     country in which the assistance is to be provided, except 
     that this paragraph only applies if the total of such 
     procurement for a project or activity in that country would 
     cost less than procurement from the United States;
       (2) the provision of such assistance requires commodities 
     or services, or defense articles or defense services, of a 
     type that are not produced in, and available for purchase 
     from, the United States, less developed countries, or the 
     country in which the assistance is to be provided;
       (3) the Congress has specifically authorized procurement 
     outside the United States or less developed countries; or
       (4) the President determines on a case-by-case basis that 
     the procurement outside the United States or less developed 
     countries would result in the more efficient use of United 
     States foreign assistance resources, including to meet 
     unforeseen circumstances such as emergency situations.
       (b) For purposes of this section, the term ``less developed 
     countries'' includes the recipient country if that country is 
     not a developed country.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 155 and House Resolution 
156, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] will be recognized for 5 
minutes, and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] will be 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman].
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, the House is not in order.


                      announcement by the chairman

  The CHAIRMAN. Members and the guests in the gallery are advised that 
participants in this debate are entitled to be heard, and they should 
not conduct conversations on the floor of the House or in the gallery.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to offer this amendment, which hopefully 
will speed up and simplify the process of consideration of this bill.
  The amendment has been agreed to on both sides, and I want to thank 
the ranking Democratic Member, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. 
Hamilton], for his cooperation in putting together this list of 
amendments. These are noncontroversial amendments.
  There is only one amendment in this en bloc amendment that affects 
funding levels. At the suggestion of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. 
Chabot] we have shifted another $20 million per year into the 
Development Fund for Africa. This money comes from the Economic Support 
Fund and Foreign Military Financing functions of the budget.
  It does not increase the deficit or the overall spending levels in 
this bill.
  I would like to point out to my colleagues that once we will have 
passed this amendment, the Africa Development Fund will get 85 cents 
for every dollar the general development assistance account receives 
for the rest of the world. Right now, the Africa Fund only gets 62 
cents for every dollar the general fund receives. Although we are 
cutting many accounts, comparatively speaking, Africa is being treated 
very well in this bill.
  Mr. Chairman, the en bloc amendment contains new language affecting 
the transfer of functions between the various agencies to be 
consolidated into the State Department under this Act.
  Under the law, when functions are transferred, the employees 
performing those functions are likewise transferred, and the employees 
in the new combined agency may or may not be subject to a reduction in 
force, depending on the needs of the agency.
  However, an unduly restrictive interpretation of the phrase 
``transfer of function'' has cropped up in a little known case from the 
Merit Systems Protection Board, and the ruling in that case has 
unfortunately been adopted in recent regulations by the Office of 
Personnel Management.
  Without this amendment, the rights of employees whose functions were 
shifted to the Department of State would be adversely affected if they 
performed a function similar to a function already carried out in the 
Department of State, even if they were the best qualified employees, 
were entitled to veterans preference, or otherwise ought to be 
retained.
  In my opinion, the rights of employees should be protected in a 
merger regardless of whether some other employees performing their 
function works in a gaining Department. The gaining Department should 
have the right and duty to retain the best personnel of the combined 
agency work forces, consistent with RIF regulations, without giving 
special preference to Department of State employees.
  Accordingly, this section changes the definition of ``transfer of 
function'' for the purposes of this Act. This change rejects, and it is 
my explicit purpose to reject for the purposes of this Act, the 
restrictive definition of the phrase ``transfer of function'' in the 
Office of Personnel Management's current regulations at 5 C.F.R. 
Section 351.203 (1995), and the restrictive interpretation of that 
phrase by the Court of Claims in Childress v. United States, 650 F.2d 
285, 222 Ct. Cl. 557, 558 (1980), and by the Merit Systems Protection 
Board in Kentner v. National Transportation Safety Board, 20 M.S.P.R. 
595 (1984). This provision is meant to ensure that employees affected 
by a transfer of function and any attendant reduction in force are 
covered by OPM's regulations on transfers of functions, 5 C.F.R., Part 
351, Subpart C.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the en bloc amendment, as modified, has been cleared by 
this side of the aisle. I want to express my appreciation to the 
chairman of the committee for his cooperation in working with us, and 
his willingness to do so, to modify several of the amendments so they 
could be included in the en bloc.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge support of the en bloc amendment, and I yield 1 
minute to the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. Gejdenson].
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, while I have grave reservations about 
many parts of the bill, the en bloc is certainly acceptable. I want to 
commend the gentleman from New York [Mr. King] for the work we have 
done together on the Iranian provision within it. There is no country 
in the world today that is more active in the support of terrorism that 
is trying to derail the peace process in the Middle East to the degree 
that Iran is.

                              {time}  1545

  The signal that we must send from this Congress and from every 
government official in this country is that that kind of behavior is 
unacceptable, the United States will continue to resist it, and clearly 
the President's leadership on this issue is something we need to stand 
behind.
  As we learned in the first instance where Americans were taken 
hostage in Iran, Iran may begin terrorism elsewhere on the globe but 
the pain will inevitably come back to us in the United States. This is 
something we need to get our European allies to join us on.
  The efforts of this date are tremendous, but they are not sufficient 
without getting Europe to join us in this effort. Again, I would like 
to thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. King] for working together on 
this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to co-sponsor this amendment with my 
colleague from New [[Page H5653]] York, Mr. King, who has been a leader 
on this issue. This resolution puts our allies and others on notice 
that the Congress expects their cooperation in isolating Iran. The 
administration has no objection to this amendment.
  On April 30, the President took a bold and decisive step by imposing 
a total embargo on Iran. It left no room for interpretation. The United 
States considers Iran to be an outlaw and is simply unwilling to make 
believe that Iran is among the family of civilized nations. President 
Clinton has done the right thing and the smart thing.
  There seems to be little in the way of disagreement as to the United 
States objectives in regard to Iran. Iran needs to end its support for 
terrorism, much of which is designed to undermine the Middle East peace 
process. Iran must cease its development of weapons of mass destruction 
and the missiles by which to deliver them. Iran must significantly 
alter its abhorrent record on human rights.
  The burden is now on our allies to come along. Thus far, the strategy 
of constructive dialogue embraced by many of our allies has, to put it 
delicately, been less than successful; to put it bluntly, Iran has paid 
no price for its support for international terrorism or its efforts to 
obtain weapons of mass destruction.
  There are countries, even those with which we have significant 
differences, where a constructive dialogue could serve to further our 
objectives. Iran is not among them. It is a rogue regime hell bent on 
fomenting unrest in the region and determined to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction so that it can terrorize not only the region but the 
world.
  Unlike North Korea, Iran is by no means isolated. Iran exports $15.5 
billion of goods each year, $14 billion of which is comprised of oil. 
In addition, Iran has approximately $25 billion in foreign debt, $12 
billion of which was re-scheduled last year, most of it by our allies. 
So, those who purchased Iranian oil and those who chose not to compel 
payment of Iranian debts contributed upwards of $15 billion to Iran's 
ability to obtain weapons of mass destruction and train terrorists.
  I fully support efforts to deny United States exports to Iran. For 
the last 5 years I have sponsored legislation that would deny dual use 
technology to Iran. To maximize the impact of the embargo, we must get 
multilateral cooperation in denying Iran dual use and military 
equipment, and other items that Iran seeks to purchase. More important, 
we must forge a multilateral consensus to restrict imports from Iran 
and to limit relief to Iran on the terms of its foreign debt. We must 
deny to Iran the resources it needs to support terrorism and develop 
weapons of mass destruction.
  Our allies must understand how serious we are about Iran. An Iran 
with a nuclear bomb and the means by which to deliver it is a blueprint 
for international chaos. It is encumbent on the administration to 
apprise our allies on a regular basis of Iran's actions in supporting 
international terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction. The 
administration must continue to express at the highest levels the need 
to isolate Iran. The upcoming G-7 meeting in Nova Scotia is an 
appropriate place to raise this issue in very clear terms.
  Again, I join with Mr. King in offering this amendment and I urge my 
colleagues to vote for it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Florida [Ms. Ros-Lehtinen].
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
the time.
  Mr. Chairman, I support the Chabot amendment to the en bloc, which 
would increase funding for the Development Fund for Africa, because 
there are important developmental and humanitarian assistance needs on 
that continent.
  I am also pleased that the amendment of the gentleman from New Jersey 
[Mr. Zimmer] on slavery in Mauritania has been accepted. It is long 
past time for us to take action against any Nation that tolerates 
slavery. The State Department reports that there may be up to 90,000 
slaves in that country. Just one person held as a slave is reason 
enough for us, I believe, to refuse aid to the government that permits 
slavery to exist.
  Finally, I commend the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith] for his 
amendment to allow some of the funds authorized for the War Crimes 
Tribunal in Yugoslavia to be used for a similar tribunal in Rwanda. We 
must bring to justice those guilty of the crime of genocide in Rwanda.
  I thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], the chairman, for 
including these important Africa-related amendments in the en bloc 
amendments.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli].
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
the time.
  The Chairman, in the last several months the American people have 
learned a great deal about Guatemala. Ten Americans lost, disappeared, 
brutalized or raped. Their families have come forward to tell the story 
of their horrors in Guatemala.
  The Drug Enforcement Agency has told us a story that nearly one-third 
of all the cocaine reaching the United States is now warehoused in 
Guatemala before being shipped to our own cities and towns. Yet 11 
Guatemalan military officers indicted in the United States are 
protected by that country's laws where extradition is refused.
  Against this, the backdrop of 150,000 people in Guatemala who have 
lost their lives in the last 30 years through a genocidal campaign 
against their own people, led by civil defense patrols who roam the 
countryside harassing, exploiting and murdering poor civilians who are 
defenseless.
  Mr. Chairman, in the weeks since we have learned many of these things 
in the tragic history of Guatemala, President Clinton has suspended 
United States military assistance to that country's armed
 forces, demanding cooperation in the investigation of the deaths of 
Americans, insisting on cooperation in the extradition of military 
officers involved in cocaine trafficking.

  I have included in the en bloc amendment an insistence that until 
there is cooperation on narcotics, on ending human rights abuses and on 
investigating the deaths and abuse of American citizens, that there be 
no further assistance. This is indeed legislatively the equivalent of 
what President Clinton has already done unilaterally.
  I urge its adoption in the bill. I thank the gentleman from New York 
[Mr. Gilman], the chairman of the committee, for its inclusion in the 
en bloc amendments, and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] for 
his support, as well. It is simply a proper statement in this bill.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
Jersey [Mr. Smith], chairman of the Subcommittee on International 
Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International 
Relations.
  (Mr. SMITH of New Jersey asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend the 
gentleman for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Chairman, first I would like to thank the gentlewoman from 
Florida [Ms. Ros-Lehtinen] and the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. 
McKinney] for cosponsoring this amendment with me, and for their 
leadership on the issue of trying to provide a modest amount of funds 
to the War Crimes Tribunal for the people who has suffered in Rwanda.
  Mr. Chairman, the outbreak of warfare in Rwanda was accompanied by an 
outbreak of genocidal violence all too reminiscent of what happened in 
the former Yugoslavia. Under cover of long-standing tribal rivalries, 
an effort was launched by leaders of one tribe to bring about the 
systematic extermination of another.
  It is important that the international community show that this kind 
of crime against humanity will be detected, prosecuted and punished. 
The Rwanda tribunal was created by Security Council Resolution 955 on 
November 8, 1994. Many Members no doubt remember that date for other 
reasons, but for Rwandans it was an important sign of hope that the 
world had not forgotten their sufferings and there would be a 
prosecution for committing these heinous crimes.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Filner].
  (Mr. FILNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the en bloc amendment 
designated as number 80 which is a combination of amendments submitted 
by Congressman Bilbray and myself, to restore funding required by the 
International Boundary and Water Commission [IBWC] to operate a 
critical sewage treatment facility soon to be completed in San Diego.
  As many of you know, we are building a critically-needed $240 million 
[[Page H5654]] sewage treatment plant in San Diego, CA. This plant is 
under construction and will soon be completed. It is imperative that we 
provide the funds necessary to operate this treatment plant--and that 
we fulfill our commitment to the thousands of American citizens who 
suffer from the raw sewage that flows downhill from Mexico through our 
community and contaminates the Tijuana River and our beaches. This 
sewage is more than a nuisance, it is a health hazard!
  While this is only a minor technical correction in the context of the 
State Department's overall budget, this amendment is critical for the 
IBWC to operate the soon-to-be-completed sewage treatment facility. Our 
failure to operate this facility would present a serious health threat 
to San Diego and threaten our Nation's ability to fulfill an 
international treaty obligation.
  The failure of the federal government to operate this facility, after 
it is built, would be the height of absurdity--and would mark a tragic 
new day in our Nation's history, I urge my colleagues to support the 
bipartisan, Filner-Bilbray amendment!
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder].
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
the time, and I thank my colleagues for putting a generic form of my 
amendment into this area.
  Mr. Chairman, this is very historic, in that it is the first time 
this body will speak out and say that our government should recognize 
female genital mutilation as a major health risk to women and a major 
human rights violation, and we also should do everything we can to make 
sure that countries do not allow this practice to continue. This was 
important.
  I had wanted to target this to Egypt, since we give so much aid to 
Egypt and since this practice is so rampant there, and especially since 
their government has recently tried to medicalize it rather than 
condemn it. This is a more generic form, but I approve it, and I think 
very much all of my colleagues who worked very hard to take this very, 
very important step of saying violations against women are also human 
rights violations and not just cultural violations. There has never 
been any religious reason for this. There has never been any reason 
except cultural, and we are making a great progressive step today.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. King], a member of our committee.
  Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Gilman] for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the en bloc amendment. Iran is an 
outlaw state, the major destabilizing force in the Middle East, and is 
desperately attempting to obtain nuclear capability. I am proud I have 
been able to join my colleague, the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. 
Gejdenson], in sponsoring this amendment, amendment 49, which will 
establish on the record as a sense of Congress that Iran is an outlaw 
nation.
  In addition to that, Mr. Chairman, this amendment will go one step 
further than the President's boycott announcement of April 30, where 
the President announced a unilateral boycott against Iran. This was a 
very important first step but it is not enough.
  It is essential that all our allies join this embargo, and the sense 
of Congress resolution which is encompassed in amendment 49 will call 
upon the President to make the development of a multilateral economic 
embargo on Iran a major priority at the Halifax G-7 meeting.
  I want to thank the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. Gejdenson] for 
his support in working with me. I want to thank the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Gilman], the chairman, and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. 
Hamilton], the ranking member, for their support, and I urge support of 
the en bloc amendment and indeed final passage of the entire bill.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, with regard to the amendment offered by Mr. 
King, I would like to congratulate the gentleman on his amendment and 
his leadership on our effort to combat Iran and its terrorist policies. 
This amendment makes a positive contribution to our policy toward Iran 
and puts a much-needed multilateral focus on the President's Executive 
order of May 8 prohibiting U.S. trade and investment with that country.
  This amendment clearly identifies how Iran's policies pose a threat 
to our interests and to those of our allies in the region and urges the 
administration several policy initiatives that would help to isolate 
this outlaw regime.
  In particular, it directs the President to intensify his efforts to 
persuade Iran's leading trade partners and creditors to join with the 
United States in ceasing all trade with Iran and ending any policy of 
rescheduling of debts owed to them.
  Furthermore, the President is directed to convene a special summit of 
world leaders to address the issue of international terrorism. It would 
also call on the President to develop a comprehensive multilateral 
policy toward Iran with the goal of putting Iran on the agenda of the 
upcoming G-7 meeting in Canada and bringing consensus on the need to 
isolate this regime.
  This administration has finally begun to transform its rhetoric into 
a more realistic approach to limiting the ability of this one country 
to finance and support terrorism around the world. The adoption of this 
amendment will ensure that the administration remains focused and 
committed in our fight against state-supported international terrorism.
  Our allies still seem to believe that they can reap a short-term 
profit at our expense by continuing a policy of business as usual with 
Iran. They should be aware that there will be a long-term cost to our 
relationship and alliances if some kind of multinational consensus is 
not achieved on this issue.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Ohio [Mr. Chabot], another member of the committee.
  Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Gilman], the distinguished chairman, and the gentlewoman from Florida 
[Ms. Ros-Lehtinen], the chair of the Subcommittee on Africa, for their 
leadership in getting this amendment accomplished, and also the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Ackerman], the cosponsor on the other 
side of the aisle, for his assistance in this important amendment.
  While the African continent is making great strides toward democracy, 
economic development, free markets and human rights, many African 
nations continue to face terrible hardships. This modest amendment will 
provide much-needed help to Africa without costing American taxpayers 
any additional dollars.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from Ohio 
[Mr. Chabot] for his involvement and for his addition to our work.
  Mr. SAWYER. Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank the chairman of the 
International Relations Committee and his staff for their assistance 
with my amendment which is included in the amendments en bloc before 
us.
  Mr. Chairman, during the cold war our arms control efforts were 
directed at what was clearly the greatest threat to international 
security at that time--nuclear weapons. When we did undertake efforts 
in the realm of conventional weaponry--they were directed at large-
scale strategic weapons such as planes, missiles, and tanks which could 
alter regional balances of power.
  Well, times have changed, but unfortunately our thinking on arms 
control is still mired in the Cold War experience.
  Today, the greatest threat to international security and stability 
are the growing number of wars of ethnic hatred and the increasing 
cases of government oppression. In these conflicts, it is light 
weaponry--AK47s, hand grenades, and land mines--that are the weapons of 
choice. The ample supply, falling prices, and ease of purchase of these 
weapons has helped to increase the ferocity and number of conflicts we 
are witnessing across the globe--from Liberia to Rwanda to Kashmir.
  Of course, I do not mean to downplay the importance of arms control 
efforts directed at strategic weapons. I only wish to point out that 
the vast trade in light weapons, which is a real source of instability 
today, receives, comparatively little attention.
  Before we can begin any control efforts for small arms, we need an 
effective mechanism to monitor their trade. What types and how many of 
these deadly weapons are being sent where and by whom? We need answers 
to these questions.
  My amendment would reinstate a reporting requirement which existed 
from fiscal years 1978 through 1980. During those years the State 
Department and the Defense Security Assistance Agency produced an 
annual report [[Page H5655]] listing all U.S. military transfers and 
sales on a country-by-country basis.
  The information for this report is maintained in a readily accessible 
data base. Producing the report would not require much more than the 
hitting of a print command key and binding the pages together. In other 
words, this is not an onerous reporting requirement.
  Congress has a right and, indeed, an obligation to review the 
information contained in that data base. However, in 1993, I was denied 
a request for such information by the DSAA.
  Once we begin to produce this report, we can use it as leverage to 
encourage other arms producing nations to provide greater transparency 
for their own activities. With a comprehensive understanding of the 
small arms trade, we can begin to work towards a regime to control this 
scourge.
  But without good information, we can't formulate an effective policy. 
We will be left to witness the devastating effects of small arms 
proliferation and to pay the price both in terms of costly relief 
activities and in diminished international security.
  The better approach is to take preventive action--to avert crises 
before they begin. This amendment is the first step in that process.
  I urge support for the amendments en bloc.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to make special mention of Mr. Berman and 
Mr. Rose who are coauthors of this amendment. I also would like to 
thank the chairman and ranking members of the International Relations 
Committee and the International Operations Subcommittee.
  Mr. Chairman, when a government hosts an international conference, it 
also accepts certain obligations. The host government must abide by the 
terms which govern such gatherings and must uphold agreements it makes.
  Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, the Chinese Government has demonstrated 
that it does not intend to be a good host for the Conference on Women 
being held in Beijing this summer. The principle of openness, which is 
crucial to the success of this gathering, has run afoul of the 
communist instinct to suppress opposing points of view.
  The Chinese Government has worked quietly to exclude groups 
representing Tibetan women from the women's conference. Mr. Chairman, 
this is not right, and it is not what the international community 
expected when it agreed to hold the conference in Beijing.
  China's reneging on its obligations does not stop with the exclusion 
of groups it disagrees with. Originally, the Chinese had agreed to 
allow a gathering of nongovernmental groups in a downtown stadium near 
the official conference site.
  However, as the time for the conference drew nearer, the Chinese 
Government began to fear the consequences of their citizens coming into 
contact with the thousands of foreigners participating in the 
nongovernmental gathering. Mysteriously, the stadium where the NGO's 
were to meet was declared structurally unsound.
  The Chinese Government now wants to hold the NGO gathering an hour 
from Beijing in a remote location near the Great Wall.
  Mr. Chairman, China's leaders need to be sent a message that they 
cannot impose their intolerant standards on the rest of humanity, and 
that they cannot turn this gathering into a platform for advancing 
their narrow agenda.
  My amendment would urge the administration to include a 
representative of a U.S.-based group representing Tibetan women in the 
official U.S. delegation. This would ensure that Tibetan women have a 
voice at this conference. More important, it would send a message to 
the Chinese that we do not appreciate their attempt to muzzle groups 
with which they disagree.
  Mr. Chairman, the Chinese Government has challenged the international 
community by excluding these groups. If we allow them to succeed in 
this, we are legitimizing their actions, and we should expect more of 
the same in the future.
  I urge adoption of this amendment.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendments en bloc, as modified, 
offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman].
  The amendments en bloc, as modified, were agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the bill?


                     amendment offered by mr. hyde

  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendmemt offered by Mr. Hyde:
        Strike section 2707 (relating to recommendations of the 
     President for reform of war powers resolution) and insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 2707. REPEAL OF WAR POWERS RESOLUTION.

       (a) Repeal.--
       (1) In general.--The War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-
     148; 50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.) is repealed.
       (2) Conforming repeal.--Section 1013 of the Department of 
     State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (50 
     U.S.C. 1546a) is repealed.
       (b) Consultation With Congress.--
       (1) Prior Consultation.--The President shall in every 
     possible instance consult with Congress before introducing 
     United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into 
     situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is 
     clearly indicated by the circumstances.
       (2) Consultation after introduction of armed forces.--The 
     President shall, after every such introduction, consult 
     regularly with Congress until United States Armed Forces are 
     no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from 
     such situations.
       (c) Reporting to Congress.--
       (1) Initial report.--
       (A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), the President 
     shall, in the absence of a declaration of war, submit a 
     report to Congress in any case in which United States Armed 
     Forces are introduced.--
       (i) into hostilities or into a situation where imminent 
     involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
     circumstances;
       (ii) into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign 
     nation, while equipped for combat, except for a deployment 
     which relates solely to supply, replacement, repair, or 
     training of such forces; or
       (iii) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States 
     Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign 
     nation.
       (B) Exception.--The requirement that the President submit a 
     report to Congress in accordance with subparagraph (A) shall 
     not apply if the President determines that to submit such a 
     report would jeopardize the operational success of United 
     States Armed Forces in a situation described in clause (i), 
     (ii), or (iii) of such subparagraph.
       (2) Time and content of report.--A report under paragraph 
     (1) shall be submitted within 48 hours of the introduction of 
     United States Armed Forces described in that paragraph. Each 
     such report shall be in writing and shall set forth--
       (A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of 
     United States Armed Forces;
       (B) the constitutional and legislative authority under 
     which such introduction took place; and
       (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or 
     involvement.
       (3) Additional information.--The President shall provide 
     such other information as Congress may request in the 
     fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with 
     respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of 
     United States Armed Forces abroad.
       (4) Periodic reports.--Whenever United States Armed Force 
     are introduced into hostilities or into any situation 
     described in paragraph (1), the President shall, consistent 
     with the constitutional responsibilities of the President and 
     so long as such Armed Forces continue to be engaged in such 
     hostilities or situation, report to Congress periodically on 
     the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the 
     scope and duration of such hostilities or situation.

  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am offering an amendment that repeals the 
War Powers Act and sets up a structure for consultation and reporting 
by the President.
  This amendment that I am offering does three things: In addition to 
repealing the War Powers Resolution, it requires ongoing consultation 
between Congress and the President, the President to consult with 
Congress, before the introduction of troops, ongoing consultation while 
they are there and after the troops are introduced, and the third thing 
it does, it requires timely and comprehensive reports to Congress, 
within 48 hours of the engagement, and in detail. These also are 
ongoing.
  Mr. Chairman, the War Powers Resolution was passed in 1973. In 
casting about for the best way to describe it, I came up with the 
inelegant phrase ``wet noodle,'' but that is about what the War Powers 
Act has been. It has never been used. No President have ever 
acknowledged that it is there or that it is constitutional. The vice, 
the flaw, the fault with the War Powers resolution is that the 
President must withdraw troops within 60 days after he has committed 
them unless Congress acts specifically to endorse the deployment.
  Congress can halt a deployment after 60 days by doing nothing, by 
dithering, by debating. If Congress is unsympathetic or opposed to the 
commitment of troops, Congress can pass a bill cutting off the funding. 
The ultimate weapon, the ultimate power of the purse under the 
Constitution, remains with Congress. Therefore, that is all the 
authority we need to halt, to bring to a screeching halt, any 
commitment of troops. But to have on the books a law that says by doing 
nothing, by inaction we can halt and reverse and turn around a military 
commitment of troops is really an absurdity. What it does is provide 
our enemies with a statutory timetable. They can wait it out to see if 
Congress and the President are not getting along. [[Page H5656]] 
  There are a couple of things we ought to always bear in mind. First 
of all, the Constitution says that President is Commander in Chief. 
That is true whether Ronald Reagan, George Bush, or Bill Clinton is 
President. We are talking about the institution and constitutional 
powers that devolve on the President, whoever that may be.
  The second unshakable, immutable, important point is we always have 
the purse strings clutched in our hand. We can pass a bill, and we have 
passed several to withhold funding for certain military operations. 
That is the effective way to work our will should we disagree with the 
President.
  Congress alone can declare war but the President who is charged with 
the responsibility of defending this country needs flexibility, he 
needs to act quickly, and he should not, and the law should not provide 
our enemies, whether it is Saddam Hussein or Raoul Cedras or anybody 
else, with the hope, with the expectation that in 60 days they will all 
have to come home.

                              {time}  1600

  That is a disincentive to settle a dispute and to negotiate.
  So, I think that is a mistake and I think it has been on the books 
too long and it ought to be taken off.
  No President has ever considered the war powers resolutions as 
constitutional. I have letters from President Ford, President Jimmy 
Carter, President George Bush. Henry Kissinger said it should be 
repealed; it is misleading and ineffective. Howard Baker when he was 
the majority leader in the Senate said it is an attempt to write in the 
margins of the Constitution. It is confusing and gives comfort to our 
opponents.
  Congress has used its power of the purse to limit and even halt 
military operations, many, many times, and I have a list here from the 
congressional reference service. During the Vietnam war in December of 
1970 we prohibited the use of funds to finance the introduction of 
ground combat troops into Cambodia or to provide advisers to or for 
Cambodian military forces. In 1973 we cut off funds for combat 
activities in Indochina after August 15, 1973. We
 did. June 30, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be 
obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat 
activities by U.S. military forces in or over, above the shores of 
North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.

  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Hyde was allowed to proceed for 5 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, we set a personnel ceiling of 4,000 Americans 
in Vietnam 6 months after the enactment and 3,000 within a year; in 
Somalia we did the same. In Rwanda we did the same. And interestingly 
enough, the congressional reference service says, and I quote, ``With 
respect to your question regarding the number of instances when the 
Congress has utilized the War Powers Resolution, since its enactment in 
1973, to compel the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from foreign 
deployments, we can cite no single specific instance when this has 
occurred.''
  So it is a useless anachronism and we ought not to have it on the 
books. No Supreme Court test is even possible. Several attempts have 
been made to test it. The courts have said they are not justifiable. It 
did not stop what we did in Somalia, it did not stop what we did in 
Haiti. We had a vote on Desert Storm but nobody conceded that was 
pursuant to the War Powers Resolutions.
  It provides a false hope to our adversaries; it is confusing.
  My amendment does not just wipe the books clean of the War Powers 
Resolution, it requires adequate, timely, prompt consultation with 
Congress, and notice of what the President is going to do, and 
reporting, comprehensive reporting. There is a Presidential waiver, but 
that is for the Entebbe sort of situation and we still hold the 
ultimate weapon which is the purse.
  We cannot get, as I say, a constitutional test on it, but it 
emboldens our adversaries while hamstringing the President when he most 
urgently needs the authority and the flexibility to act.
  Permit me just to read from George Bush's letter of April 17, this 
year. ``Deal Henry, you are 100 percent correct in opposing the War 
Powers Resolution as an unconstitutional infringement on the authority 
of the President. I hope that you are successful in your effort to 
change the War Powers Resolution and restore proper balance between the 
Executive and Legislative Branches. George Bush.''
  Gerald Ford: ``Dear Henry, I share your views that the War Powers 
Resolution is an impractical, unconstitutional infringement on the 
authority of the President, I opposed it as a Member of the House. As 
President I refused to recognize it as a constitutional limitation on 
the power of the commander in chief.''
  Jimmy Carter to Congressman Henry Hyde: ``I fully support your effort 
to repeal the War Powers Resolution. Best wishes in this good work,'' 
et certa.
  So I just say to my colleagues, they are not yielding anything, they 
are retaining the power of the purse, which is the ultimate weapons. 
But my amendment requires notice, consultation, and reports, and with 
that in one hand and the power of the purse in the other, we are 
yielding no autonomy on the issue of committing troops, but are 
clearing off the books of unconstitutional infringement on the 
President's power, And are giving the President flexibility that the 
President may need over a weekend when something happens. And we are 
not giving hope and comfort to our adversaries that if they just wait 
it out, 60 days, will elapse, we will be dithering, we will be 
debating, and nothing will happen and the military engagement will end.
  So I respectfully request the support of the Members in adopting my 
amendment.
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I must say I rise to discuss the amendment by the 
distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary because I know 
he has given this very serious thought. But I think I come down on the 
other side and say maybe this is too hasty at this moment, and to move 
forward right at this time without more serious debate is very 
troubling.
  The gentleman from Illinois and I were both here when this amendment 
went through, and I would be the first to concede it has not worked as 
well as many of us had hoped it would work when it was passed in 1973.
  But let me talk about what I thought the driving factors were of that 
war powers amendment. If we go back and look at the history, the 
Constitution says in article I, section 2, the Congress is the one, the 
Congress is the one that gives the money and raises the army. We are 
the ones that must do that. And the President is the commander-in-
chief.
  If you also look at President Washington's speeches about foreign 
entanglements and many other such things, I think it is very clear that 
our forefathers and foremothers never really foresaw a day when we 
would be deploying hundreds of thousands of troops overseas. One of the 
incredible, unique things about this country is it had unloaded upon 
it, whether it wanted it or not, a world leadership role where even 
though we are only 3 percent of the world's population, we have been 
carrying a very heavy burden of maintaining freedom on this globe in 
this century, and the War Powers Act was a modification that came in 
this century.
  Part of that was we have been one of the very few governments on the 
planet that would deploy hundreds and hundreds of thousands of our most 
precious treasures, our young people, overseas for someone else's 
freedom. This War Powers Act would not have occurred if we had only 
been acting within our borders to protect our borders as most countries 
do and is much more traditional.
  But when you start deploying them overseas, and we had seen in both 
the Korean and the Vietnam war many hundreds of thousands deployed 
overseas without a declaration of war, without a consultation of 
Congress, and we were suddenly left there under article I, section 3 
having to raise the money, and raise the number of troops through 
drafts and many other things, and so this body said no, no, no, there 
should be, when we are doing these massive deployments overseas, a 
little more consultation at the beginning. [[Page H5657]] 
  The only area I can think of where this has worked very well since 
then has been the gulf war where we had a very historic debate on this 
House floor, and I must say I thought it was very valuable for the 
whole Nation. All over the Nation you could hear people listening to 
this debate, and when this debate ended and when one side won, 
everybody shut up and supported those troops that were over there until 
it was time to bring them home.
  I think that is important, because otherwise, if you allow a 
President to decide when we are going to commit troops, whether it 
would be today in Bosnia, say the President of the United States today 
decided OK, we are going to go into Bosnia, that is probably option 3. 
Option 1 would be you help them withdraw. Option 2 would be we do 
nothing. Option 3, we are going to go gangbusters, we are going to take 
a side and we are going to be in there. In fact, there are some Members 
out there now saying that is what we should do. Do you want the 
President of the United States to be able to make that decision, send 
off a half a million men, which is about what it would take, men and 
women, and go over there and just come tell us about it after they did 
it, and our only choice would be that we cut out the money? I think the 
War Powers Act has had an effect, and I think with the demise of the 
cold war I do not see any reason that we cannot work out a way to maybe 
make this better, to maybe make it more efficient, but I am not sure we 
need to do it in a haste right now where we just withdraw as Members of 
Congress and say we are going to let all of that fall on the shoulders 
of the President of the United States, and of course if he messes up or 
she messes up, then we all have the prerogative to jump up and down and 
scream at him. I would think that the last few days of Bosnia would be 
the greatest reason for why we should not do this right now, because 
you see no matter what the President does you have all sorts of other 
voices jumping up and down saying no not that, oh why did he do this, 
oh, you cannot connect the dots on his policy, oh, he is not being 
consistent. He should do more; he should do less.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. 
Schroeder] has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mrs. Schroeder was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that what we would be 
saying is we want to be able to criticize, but do not give us any 
responsibility. I would think the American people would think that if 
the President decided we were going to take a side in the Bosnian war, 
he would do more than just come tell us, consult us, and send someone 
to brief us on it. I think they would want their representatives to be 
involved in that debate at the beginning, so that we stay behind those 
troops when they are overseas in that difficult point.
  But I keep saying the War Powers Act came because of the new missions 
the United States had heaped upon it as a world leader after World War 
I and World War II. And I think it is a very, very, important addition, 
and I hope very much that maybe we take the concerns of the gentleman 
from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] into consideration and we all work very hard 
to figure out is there a better way to do this. But I think to back off 
and say we are giving it up would be the wrong way to go.
  Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my strong support for repealing 
the War Powers Resolution with the consultations as set forth in the 
Hyde amendment. I understand the history of the resolution that is 
described by the gentlewoman from Colorado, and I appreciate that, but 
it is my belief that this 22-year relic of the Vietnam era is both 
unconstitutional and ineffective. I want to commend the gentleman from 
Illinois for raising this issue, for bringing forth the amendment today 
and for all of his efforts over the years on this.
  I served in the Bush White House in the counsel's office, so I saw 
firsthand just how this resolution can interfere with the President's 
ability as the commander-in-chief to defend U.S. interests. I think the 
Constitution has its right, particularly in this dangerous world where 
rapid deployment is vital, vital to success. The President must 
maintain his authority as commander-in-chief to protect U.S. interests 
around the globe. Under the War Powers Resolution, however, as the 
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] stated earlier, if Congress fails to 
explicitly endorse the deployment of troops, the troops must return 
home. I think this is a flagrant intrusion on the President's 
constitutional rights inherent as commander-in-chief to defend and 
protect the Nation. There is a reason that all four former Presidents, 
Democrat and Republican, support repeal. The Constitution struck the 
right balance. It granted the President the right to act as commander-
in-chief to protect U.S. interests. It also provided appropriate checks 
for leaving the authority for funding military operations with 
Congress. The War Powers Resolution tips that healthy balance, tips it 
too far, by allowing Congress to override the President's 
constitutional authority by mere inaction. If Congress simply fails to 
act, 60 days after deployment U.S. troops engaged in hostilities must 
be withdrawn. In my mind this is a taking. It is Congress taking 
authority away from the President to act as commander-in-chief.
  As important, the practical application of the War Powers Resolution 
is essentially rendered ineffective. We have seen that over the years. 
It was noted earlier by both speakers. It has also increased the danger 
to U.S. personnel and interests.
 By requiring the withdrawal of troops within 60 days unless Congress 
acts, the resolution permits Congress to drag its feet until policy is 
established by inaction. More troubling I think is that the resolution 
unwisely undermines U.S. policy. It is dangerous. Our enemies have a 
strong incentive if the War Powers Act acts as intended to resist 
negotiations and wait out the 60 days. Why should they not? In other 
words, the effect of the War Powers Act is really to embolden our 
enemies and endanger our military personnel overseas unnecessarily.

  Whether we are dealing with Raoul Cedras, Manuel Noriega, or Saddam 
Hussein, we cannot simply afford to send our enemies the message that 
the actions of our military and the President are not the actions of 
the United States, do not constitute the will of Congress and the 
people. They must, until Congress explicitly acts otherwise. If we 
insist on keeping the War Powers Resolution, I would urge this Congress 
to make changes to it to force Congress to face the issue.

                              {time}  1615

  Let us vote up or down on the issue. Let us openly confront the 
question of deployment.
  Under the war powers resolution, we have got it both ways. We have 
got the best of both worlds. We can tie the hands of the President and 
avoid a direct up-or-down vote on an often tough issue whether to 
deploy or not. If we keep the resolution, I think it would be better to 
establish expedited procedures during that 60-day period, forcing to 
act by joint resolution on an up or down vote, either authorizing 
action or requiring disengagement.
  As President Nixon noted in his veto of the War Powers Act in 1973, 
``One cannot become a responsible partner unless one is prepared to 
take responsible action.''
  Let us act responsibly today, 22 years later, and end this 
congressional encroachment.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. PORTMAN. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding, I 
appreciate his comments and certain parts of his argument I find very 
compelling.
  Mr. PORTMAN. What part does the gentleman not find compelling?
  Mr. BERMAN. The part I am going to get into right now. You spoke 
about working in the Bush White House and the War Powers Act tended to 
create some uncertainty, tended to immobilize the administration in 
some fashion, undercut the administration's aims.
  I would like to develop this more extensively because the way I look 
at the War Powers Act, it is a law that no President recognizes, no 
court is willing to enforce, and as you pointed out, in almost every 
instance the Congress [[Page H5658]] is not willing to step up to the 
plate anyway because they do not want to take a firm position because 
they want to see how it is going before they jump on the bandwagon.
  Mr. PORTMAN. Reclaiming my time, the gentleman has made an excellent 
case for repeal of an ineffective act. Presidents have ignored the War 
Powers Act on an official basis. However, our enemies overseas know it 
exists. It is on the books. Frankly, it is a consideration taken into 
consideration as Presidents decide whether or not to go to Congress, as 
we saw with the Gulf War, to receive, and in that case approval, so it 
is something that is not working. It is unconstitutional.
  The reason it is not working, I believe, goes to the Constitution. In 
other words, the constitutionality of it is the reason it is not 
working.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Portman] has 
expired.
  (On request of Mr. Berman, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Portman was 
allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, is the 
gentleman saying that without the existence of the War Powers Act, the 
President would not have asked Congress to take a position authorizing 
the use of force in the Gulf?
  Mr. PORTMAN. The answer to that question, reclaiming my time, I would 
say that is a consideration that every President has to factor in is 
that it is a law on the books. It is a pressure applied to the 
executive branch. It is a factor when one is considering deployment, 
and necessarily so. I think it would also lead to a lot less ambiguity, 
as I said earlier, with regard to our foreign adversaries.
  Mr. BERMAN. If the gentleman wil continue to yield, I started out 
thinking that I would vote for the repeal of this act. But if the 
consequences of repealing the act, if the existence of the act did in 
fact argue for the President to come to Congress to ask for 
authorization for the use of force, you have given me the most serious, 
important, and useful purpose, more than I ever thought that I had.
  Mr. PORTMAN. I would encourage the gentleman to take a look at the 
Hyde amendment carefully because it requires the kind of notification 
and the kind of
 consultation that, frankly, I do not think we have now. I think, under 
this new iteration, with repealing the War Powers Act, by being 
required to come to Congress for notification and for consultation, I 
think you would find that in fact Congress would be more of a partner 
with the executive branch in the future.

  Mr. BERMAN. If you just would yield one more time, but that sort of 
begs the question. Consulting, we have all kinds of consultations, and 
all kinds of notifications, the fact is Desert Storm was a carefully 
planned, date-certain decision to use force. If it was not a war, then 
there is not any.
  You are telling me, it sounds like, that in the Bush White House one 
of the reason they decided to come to Congress, to not consult, not 
notify but to seek authorization for the use of force, was the 
existence of the War Powers Act, which makes a case for the existence 
of that act and an argument against the repeal. I think, perhaps more 
than any I had though of, making me change my mind.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Portman] has 
again expired.
  (On request of Mr. Hyde and by unanimous consent, Mr. Portman was 
allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. PORTMAN. I thank the gentleman.
  I thank my colleague from Illinois may have some salient comments on 
this. Let me say the power of the purse, to my friend on the other side 
of the aisle, is far more powerful and is a much more powerful 
inducement, I believe, to that President and other Presidents, than any 
other. Congress could always have acted to force us to withdraw troops 
from the Gulf had we used the power of the purse and pulled the 
appropriations. That is ultimately where I think our power derives. I 
think also, if you look at the amendment, you will see there is 
consultation and notification that would actually take place.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. PORTMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. HYDE. I would just tell my friend from California at that time in 
history I was ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee and, 
therefore, I got invited into the consultations, and we spent a lot of 
time, many, many days at the White House, Dante Fascell, Senator Nunn, 
everybody who had any connection with the military, foreign affairs and 
intelligence sat around and this was fully, fully debated. There was no 
question that the President was going to do something without 
Congress's knowledge and acquiescence.
  So I do not know what the gentleman doubts, because we require prior 
consultation, during consultation, after consultation, notification 
within 48 hours, and reports, detailed reports.
  Mr. BERMAN. If the gentleman will yield, I understand there was all 
kinds of consultation, and I was in some of those meetings as well.
  But what the gentleman in the well is saying is, in the end, the 
decision to come to Congress and ask for authorization was at least in 
part made because of the existence of the War Powers Act.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Portman] has 
again expired.
  (On request of Mr. Hyde, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Portman was 
allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. HYDE. If the gentleman will yield, I would just say to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Berman], and I hope I do live to see the 
day that you are President, I would be very thrilled and applaud that 
good judgment by our American voters, but I would say this----
  Mr. BERMAN. Would you endorse me for reelection.
  Mr. HYDE. I did not catch that. What did you say?.
  Mr. BERMAN. I said would you just endorse me for reelection?
  Mr. HYDE. I would not mind. I do not know who your opponent is.
  Mr. PORTMAN. Reclaiming my time----
  Mr. HYDE. You are getting me in trouble here. I would work very hard 
for the gentleman's vote.
  Let me just say this to you: There is no question that a law on the 
books has to be taken into account by a President. He may think it is 
unconstitutional, but to just deliberately flout a law that is on the 
books and has not been declared unconstitutional would be very foolish. 
So I do not think you can read into the fact that they considered the 
existence of this law that it animated them to do anything. Common 
sense and the President's own military experience and service in 
Congress required him to consult, and he did.
  Mr. BERMAN. If the gentleman would yield, but in the end, the 
Constitution gives the warmaking power to the Congress. Obviously, 
statute cannot repeal or modify or limit the power. I would have 
thought that the President would feel compelled to come to the Congress 
and that the use, authorization for use of force was the substantive 
equivalent of a declaration of war, and if in fact that is not the 
case, that was not the constitutional power of that provision that 
motivated him to come to Congress but, in part, was one of the 
considerations, it makes me a little concerned about what was, when I 
got up, an inclination to vote for repeal of this law.
  Mr. PORTMAN. Reclaiming my time for what little time remains, I would 
just say I would like to echo the comments of the gentleman from 
Illinois. I think it has to be a consideration when it is on the books. 
I think it is ineffective. I think it violates the constitutional 
rights of the commander-in-chief. I think the reason previous President 
may have come to Congress, including the case the gentleman from 
California mentioned, perhaps that was a factor, but there are other 
considerations that were overriding.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, the situation in the world today, there is a lot of 
focus on Bosnia.
  If this Congress votes to exclude itself in any active way from the 
process of engaging military forces around the globe, it will be very 
difficult for either [[Page H5659]] Republicans or Democrats to come 
back here if American troops are committed in a serious way to Bosnia, 
and say, ``Wait a minute, we want to get at this some way.''
  And what is the response going to be? ``Well, you have got 
consultation. You are guaranteed to be consulted with. They will call 
you in and they will explain there are now troops on the way to 
Bosnia.'' You will say, ``We want to do something about it.'' ``Well, 
there is going to be another consultation as soon as the troops get 
there. When we get time to take the troops out, you will get another 
consultation.''
  The war powers provisions are not perfect. This is not a world that 
can easily accommodate the two branches of government involved in the 
decision to commit American forces in war with a time frame that is 
often instantaneous.
  But there is no question that the war powers provision, as is evident 
from the comments of the gentleman who just spoke, have forced 
Administrations to recognize the need to involve the Congress.
  Now, is there an advantage to giving the Congress an opportunity to 
view the President's policy before making a commitment? Well, I would 
tell you that many of the Members of Congress who voted for the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution wish that they had not done so.
  Why? The most difficult act in American politics is not to be wrong, 
it is not to be even voting against your constituents' interests. It is 
to be inconsistent, and it is impossible to explain that the 
circumstances have changed.
  We all remember Mr. Romney when he ran for President changed his 
position on Vietnam. He said he was brainwashed. Well, that was 
probably a bad choice of terminology. But he was dead.
  It is very hard for a Congress that has at the ground level jumped in 
the boat on a strategy to then review that strategy. It is almost 
impossible for an executive. An executive in his first term, looking at 
reelection, takes a course of action, and then he is going to come back 
and say to the American people, ``I made a mistake. We lost 5,000, we 
lost 10,000, we lost 300 men. But it was a mistake being there.'' No, 
he has got to stay the course. That is what seems to sell politically.
  It is a lot better to have a Congress that has maybe sat back, in 
some instance out of lack of courage, I will grant you, but it is also 
timely, often, to sit back and view a policy and make a decision after 
more of the facts are in.
  This is not a perfect process. But it is no question that simple 
consultation, and I think the desires of the gentleman from Illinois 
here are honorable, there is no question he is frustrated by what we 
have done in Congress all too often, and that it sat back as Presidents 
took action, fearful to take a public position, and he is also probably 
frustrated by Presidents who did not come to the Congress and demand we 
get engaged, but the Presidents do have that authority.
  The President did not come here and ask us to give a declaration of 
war. The President can come here, as President Bush did, and ask for 
support for what he is doing, which may not be technically meeting of 
standards of being committed to war, but certainly was basically 
telling the same thing to the American people, that both the President 
and the Congress were on the same side of this particular issue.
  The war powers provisions, I think have worked. They have worked to 
force the dialogue, to force the President to take into account what 
Congress might do, what Congress's actions could be if things do not 
turn out as rosy as the generals and the CIA tell them they are going 
to be.
  To change the war powers provisions is for Congress to abdicate any 
serious role in the commitment of troops on the ground.
  Again, whether in the next 4 years or in the next 5 years, whether a 
Republican or a Democratic President, think of yourself as a Member of 
Congress who voted to get rid of the war powers provision, think about 
yourself at a town meeting, and they are saying, ``Congressman, my son 
is in a battlefield today. I want you to bring him home.'' Your answer 
is going to be, ``I get to be consulted by the President.''
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GEJDENSON. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, why does the gentleman assume paralysis on 
the part of Congress when it comes to appropriating money? Is the 
gentleman not aware that we have cut off funds time and time again for 
military operations? And the gentleman, as a Member of Congress, could 
join in the consensus that can be developed and cut the water off 
immediately.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. The problem with simply dealing with the funding 
issue, we saw at the tail end of the Vietnam war, we have seen it in so 
many other instances, that the Administration, one has multiple 
resources.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. 
Gejdenson] has expired.
  (On request of Mr. Hyde, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Gejdenson was 
allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, Administrations have multiple resources 
for smaller wars that they can operate without direct funding, and 
additionally, what it leaves us with is only one option to review the 
process, and often an option that is very difficult to bring to the 
floor.
  My HYDE. I just think the gentleman underestimates the power of 
Congress.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. I have been here not as long as has the gentleman from 
Illinois, but there is no question the power of Congress is enhanced by 
a law that gives us a role and a positive action in the process rather 
than simply being consulted.

                              {time}  1630

  The consultation process again is a very weak situation to find 
yourself in. The President fulfills the law if he calls up the Congress 
and tells them what he is doing. I think it is much better, both for 
Congress' responsibility and the President's responsibility, to force 
Congress to either take an action or, through its lack of action, to 
give the President support for his policies, and also clearly to give 
Congress and the American people some time to view the developments in 
the field.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, this is an extremely important debate. Although I was 
not going to talk on this issue, this is an issue that can affect the 
lives of many, many Americans, and I think that we all have to have our 
say. I rarely disagree with my friend, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. 
Hyde]. He is one of the best members, by far, that we have on this 
committee, and I have sat next to him in the International Relations 
Committee for 10 years.
  On this particular issue, which is of paramount importance, I 
listened closely to the comments from our former Presidents that were 
quoted here on the floor and from the people who worked in the White 
House. They are very eloquent. But, as my colleagues know, every 
president finds Congress inconvenient and an intrusion, but we are a 
democracy, not a monarchy, and that is why it is so important for 
Congress to be involved.
  The American people have a right to have a say, and the American 
people, especially on issues of war where we send or sons and daughters 
into harm's way, certainly should have a right to speak out.
  I once went on TV and debated the repeal of the War Powers Act with 
Representative Solarz. While debating, I said, yes, we have to repeal 
the War Powers Act. But when we stop to consider what we have seen 
since 1973, there is a reason why the War powers Act resolution was 
passed by this Congress. The history shows as I see it, that there are 
only two central issues involved in the War Powers Act: first, how to 
ensure that the president consults with Congress before U.S. troops are 
sent into hostilities; and second, that Congress must approve the use 
of forces or else they will be withdrawn within 60 days.
  Now in the last 22 years there have been 40 occasions when the 
Presidents have consulted with Congress under provisions of this act, 
and these have covered events from Lebanon, to the Persian Gulf, to 
Haiti, Somalia and even to Bosnia. Twice Congress has invoked the act 
in authorizing the use of troops in combat, in Lebanon and also in the 
gulf war. [[Page H5660]] 
  However, the crux of the law, which is forcing the withdrawal of U.S. 
troops when Congress does not approve, has never been invoked. There 
are some 12 cases that have come before the courts, and the courts have 
not become involved. This is the history of the War Powers Act.
  But let me suggest to the members that this is probably the most 
important time to debate this resolution, because we are on a brink of 
war today. I mean that last night we had some 1,500 troops ordered out 
of Germany and flown down into Italy to get ready to jump into Bosnia, 
into that civil war. So this is the time to debate this issue, because 
the deepening crisis in the Balkans may lead us at some point to invoke 
the war powers to withdraw these forces.
  After all, the American people are not in favor of this intervention. 
In matters of months, or weeks, or even days we may be grateful that we 
have the War Powers Act on the books. I want to be able to go back home 
and tell my people, You're darned right, I spoke up on the floor of 
Congress about this. This is an issue that involves the lives of young 
men and women here in our country, and it's important for us to speak 
out.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. ROTH. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. HYDE. I want to suggest to the gentleman I am as concerned as he 
is with the lives of young people. I have been in combat, I was in an 
invasion, so I am very sensitive to that.
  Now will the gentleman tell me why is it, does he believe, that 
Congress is impotent to stop within one day any military engagement if 
we cut off the funding? Is the gentleman aware of how many times we 
have done that?
  Mr. ROTH. Yes, I will----
  Mr. HYDE. Why are we impotent? Why do we need this act which is a 
nullity----
  Mr. ROTH. Let me take back the balance of my time, and I will be 
happy to respond. I say to the gentleman: With war powers you're giving 
the President 60 days to withdraw those troops. If he doesn't withdraw 
those troops, Congress is intervening.
  I feel that Congress has not only a right, but has an obligation, to 
speak out in cases of America getting into war. That is why I think 
that the war powers resolution at certain critical times is something 
that we should have. We should have the power----
  Mr. HYDE. When has it been used?
  Mr. ROTH. I think twice, once in Lebanon and once in the gulf war.
  Mr. HYDE. Nobody ever conceded that that was for the War Powers Act.
  Mr. ROTH. I know that is your view, but let me take back the balance 
of my time and say the reason the President, I think, has been more 
sensitive to Congress is because we have had the war powers resolution 
on the books. I think, if we had not had the war powers resolution on 
the books, the President may not have been that sensitive to Congress.
  I do feel that it is very important for the Congress to speak out. In 
my opinion, repealing war powers is like abolishing the fire department 
just because there has not been a fire in the last couple of years. We 
are facing an intervention in Bosnia right now. Just because Congress 
has not used the War Powers Act----
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Roth] has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Roth was allowed to proceed for 3 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. ROTH. For example, I think we are facing a very perilous time 
right now in Bosnia, and, as I mentioned before, there is a looming 
crisis. If we repeal the War Powers Act now in the face of a wider war 
in the Balkans, this Congress could, in my opinion, be guilty of 
dereliction of our duty to the American people and the young Americans 
whose lives may be at risk.
  I feel that we in Congress have an obligation to speak out, and I am 
sorry that we have not been speaking out more forcefully in Bosnia. If 
the President is going to put 25,000 troops in Bosnia, why is this 
Congress not speaking out? Why are we not debating that issue on the 
floors?
  On Friday we lost a pilot in Bosnia, one man, one American, and today 
it is Wednesday. We still have not found him. We do not know if he is 
alive or dead. Now we are getting ready to put 25,000 troops into 
Bosnia, and this Congress is not debating this issue.
  I think we are being derelict in our duty, quite frankly, and I think 
that is why the war powers resolution is important, because it keeps 
Congress in the act. But if the President, as we have seen, is 
listening to people other than Congress, I think that is why the war 
powers resolution is so important.
  How many of my colleagues here are aware just how close we are to 
fighting in Bosnia? I certainly hope we are aware of it. The Clinton 
Administration has promised to send some 25,000 ground troops into 
Bosnia. This is very serious; it is serious for our troops.
  Sure, the people here are not going to be fighting, but the kids off 
the dairy farms in Wisconsin, small cities of Wisconsin, are going to 
be fighting, and I do not want them going into Bosnia without my having 
a right to speak up on the floor and having this entire Congress 
debating that issue. That is why this is important.
  We all too often have been derelict in our duty. We have had 40 
engagements since the War Powers Act was instituted, and only twice, 
only twice, have we invoked the war powers, and I think it is very 
important, especially at a time like this, that we not repeal the war 
powers resolution.
  It has not harmed our foreign policy. We have had it for 22 years. 
Show me one instance where it has done any harm. It has not done any 
harm, so why repeal it?
  With this administration seemingly bent on jumping into the quagmire, 
we simply cannot afford the risk.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. ROTH. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. HYDE. Can the gentleman envision Saddam Hussein taking comfort in 
the fact that after 60 days maybe the troops would be withdrawn while 
Congress dithered?
  Mr. ROTH. Reclaiming my time, I say to the gentleman, Congress did 
not dither. I was here on the floor, and so were you, and so was 
everybody else when we voted to give George Bush, the President, the 
power to go into the Gulf War. So we were in that decision, and it 
didn't stop, hinder, us in any way because we had the war powers 
resolution.
  I do not think that the war powers resolution ties the hands of a 
President, and I say, You're never going to be able to do that, but I 
think what it does is put Congress into the equation, into the debate. 
When we go into these issues of life and death overseas, I think it's 
not only right but it's proper, and it's our duty to do that.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. ROTH. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. HYDE. I just want to say I was here in 1975, and I remember it 
was 2 o'clock in the morning, and we were debating, and we debated--the 
total debate lasted three weeks, and President Ford wanted authority to 
send troops to get our people out of Saigon, and Congress never could 
reach a decision, and I remember John Connolly--John Conlan, I guess 
his name was, from Arizona--standing there saying, ``It's Dunkirk over 
there. We're getting pushed in the sea.''
  Congress could never come to closure. The President finally sent the 
troops anyway, but that is what it was----
  Mr. ROTH. Reclaiming my time, in the 22 years that we have had the 
War Powers Act on the books, it has not inhibited the President for a 
second in any particular time, and the Congress has got to be involved 
in these important issues.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Roth] has 
expired.
  (On request of Mr. Berman and by unanimous consent, Mr. Roth was 
allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield for a question?
  Mr. ROTH. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BERMAN. Through the gentleman I would like to ask the gentleman 
from Illinois:
  ``I think there is a good case that the 60-day provision creates a 
level of uncertainty and can create an expectation in the enemy that 
doesn't serve [[Page H5661]] U.S. national interests. But you don't 
need to repeal the War Powers Act to do that. You need to deal with the 
60-day requirement, and I just wonder how the gentleman feels about 
that particular concern, given that it is not enough to say the 
appropriations process. If you are talking about rescinding the 
appropriations for the military in the middle of a fiscal year, you are 
talking about getting the votes to pass it to override a veto. It's 
very different than the majority of the Congress cutting off--as simple 
as cutting off the appropriations in the middle of the year. That can't 
happen.''
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my colleague from Illinois for 
graciously letting me go out of sequence here, although it does keep a 
continuity of pro-con, pro-con, and I will try and be brief here 
because I have pride of ownership here.
  H.R. 1111 was the only bill in either body all year building up to 
this debate. I am indebted to my friend, the gentleman from Illinois 
[Mr. Hyde], for carrying this. I am going to put Mr. Hyde's article, 
which I think says it all, when we go back into full House, and I will 
ask permission to do that at the end of the debate, and I am really 
curious to see how this debate is going to turn out because it has been 
a excellent debate, and I have got friends all over this.
  As a matter of fact, the reason I am a bit antsy and about to get a 
hernia to get my chance is I have got the Secretary of Defense, William 
Perry, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Shalikashvili, sitting there 
in the National Security Committee, and I do not want to send one 
single American young man or woman, not even fighter pilots, not ``Deny 
Flight,'' not top cover, not close air support. No American from this 
country, or Canada for that matter, should die for Europeans again in 
another civil war inside Bosnia-Herzegovina, and look what is seemingly 
contradictory. I am trying to give the President more power to act, and 
the reason I ask for that number 1111 is because this gives the 
Commander-in-Chief the ability to move quickly, effectively, 
unilaterally in our national interests before a prolonged debate here 
brings in Europe, Asia and Africa's opinions, and it enables him to 
move decisively.
  Now obviously I am doing this for future Presidents. Nobody thinks 
about some of these military expressions like over hill or over dale, 
or off we go into the wild blue yonder, when you think of our 
Commander-in-Chief, let alone Semper Fidelis or Semper Paratus. 
However, I am doing this for history, for the Presidents to come. I 
would not go back through all the President's letters.
  Suffice it to say this:
  ``Somalia proved the point of Mr. Hyde and myself, Mr. Funderburk. 
Somalia proved that the current chain of command is more concerned 
about meeting requirements of the war powers resolution than ensuring 
that we deploy adequate combat power when necessary. If it weren't for 
this darned War Powers Act, we never would have thought twice about 
lending one M-1, one tank, or one Bradley. They had six of those at 
Waco. We didn't have one to blow through those road blocks on the 
ground in those filthy alleys of Mogadishu. We would have had our AC-
130 Specter gunships in there. American troops would have had the 
support they needed, and maybe not one or most of the 19 of best-
trained sergeants and helicopter crews would have died in the alleys of 
Mogadishu.''
  Please support the Dornan-Hyde amendment. It is time to repeal the 
War Powers Act, and I look forward to an overwhelming vote today, and I 
tell the gentleman in front of my colleagues, ``Mr. Durbin of Illinois, 
I owe you one.''
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike requisite number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I respect my colleague, the gentleman from Illinois 
[Mr. Hyde], and I respectfully disagree with his amendment.

                              {time}  1645

  One of the saddest responsibilities of any Member of Congress is to 
stand at the funeral of a fallen soldier. Many of us have had to do it. 
After the crack of the rifles, after the honor guard has folded the 
flag from the casket into a neat tri-corner and handed it to the 
family, it is often our responsibility to walk over to the family of 
the fallen serviceman and to strain to find some words to say.
  I do not know that I could walk up to the family of a soldier who has 
died in the invasion of a foreign land, and say I am very sorry, but 
Congress voted just a few weeks ago not to have any voice in the 
decision as to whether your son or daughter would go to war. You 
elected me as your Representative, but I had no voice in a premeditated 
declaration of war which ultimately took the life of your son or 
daughter. You gave me your voice in Congress to represent you, and I 
gave it away. I could not say that.
  Our Constitution could not make it clearer. Article I, section 8, 
clause 11 of the Constitution confers on Congress, the House of 
Representatives and the Senate alone, alone, the power to declare war, 
and the War Powers Act, imperfect though it may be, is an effort to 
carry out the intent of our Constitution, the clear unambiguous intent 
of that Constitution, to require Congress, and the American people 
through them, to enter into a debate and deliberation before we send 
our sons and daughters off to die.
  I think today, 22 years after the fact, we may have forgotten the 
circumstances of the creation of this War Powers Act. It is said that 
those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it. This act was enacted 
in 1973 over the veto of President Richard Nixon. It followed the 
Vietnam war. It was an extraordinary situation. Congress came together, 
Democrats and Republicans, and rebuked the sitting President of the 
United States and said ``We have learned our lesson. Vietnam has taught 
us a bitter lesson. Never, never, never again will this country allow 
so many wonderful young men and women to give up their lives without 
the kind of full-scale national debate of this Nation through its 
Congress.''
  Then we enacted the War Powers Resolution, after 58,000 Americans 
lost their lives in an undeclared war which Robert McNamara now 
concedes as unwinnable in his infamous apologia. An America ravaged by 
the
 divisive national debate over Vietnam, an America devastated by the 
loss of so many good men and women in that war, an America cynical over 
being lied to and misled by Presidents of both political parties, that 
America of 1973 passed this law and vowed to do everything in its power 
to avoid any repetition of the national tragedy of Vietnam.

  So today, 22 years later, we come to repeal the law, to walk away 
from it, to basically abdicate our congressional responsibility, to say 
to this President and every President to come, it is your 
responsibility. It is your war. Come see us, consult us, talk to us. If 
we get upset with it after it is done, we will probably try to address 
it through an appropriations process.
  Like so many other actions we have taken over the last several 
months, this is a further erosion of the power of everyone sitting in 
this gallery and everyone listening to my voice who elects a man or a 
woman to come and stand in this well before this microphone and speak 
for them. It takes away that power. It takes away the authority of your 
family to be represented in that national debate.
  As I reflect on what I have accomplished in the years that I have 
served in the House of Representatives, one of my proudest moments was 
to cosponsor a resolution with former Congressman Charles Bennett 
before the Persian Gulf war. That resolution brought every Member of 
the House of Representatives to the floor in an all-night session to 
express their most heartfelt views as to whether or not we should 
engage in war. It was the finest hour of this Chamber in all the years 
that I have served. We stood tall for the constitutional principle that 
it was our responsibility to declare that war and to decide whether 
anyone's life would be risked. And we passed that resolution, saying it 
was the congressional responsibility, by a bipartisan vote of 302 to 
131. We then went on to vote on the question.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Durbin] 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Durbin was allowed to proceed for 3 
additional minutes.)

[[Page H5662]]

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Chairman, as was alluded to by the gentlewoman from 
Colorado, after that debate, after the bipartisan decision that it was 
Congress' responsibility to decide whether we would go to war, we voted 
on the question. You could have heard a pin drop in this Chamber. 
People were waiting to see what would happen. It prevailed. President 
Bush's position prevailed. And even those, and I was one, who were 
critical of the idea of engaging in that war then said the debate is 
over. We stand behind the men and women whose lives are on the line. 
And we went forward, united as a Nation, to a swift and decisive 
victory.
  Now, I know when the Constitution was written wars were conducted in 
a much different fashion. It took months, sometimes years, to muster an 
army and to bring about a war. There was plenty of time for 
deliberation. We live in a different time. The Commander in Chief of 
the United States, the President, has that express authority in the 
Constitution. He must respond to emergencies immediately. He cannot 
wait for Congress to debate it. The President of the United States as 
Commander in Chief must take defensive actions immediately. He cannot 
wait for a committee hearing.
  But in a Persian Gulf war situation, with a premeditated 
deliberation, we had a chance as a nation to decide as a nation what we 
would do. This decision today, if we adopt the Hyde amendment, 
completely walks away from this congressional opportunity and 
responsibility.
  To argue that we could take the funds away once the war has started, 
sure, that could happen, over months, maybe even over years, as we 
debate back and forth the right language, whether an appropriation will 
be changed, whether we can override a veto. Sure, Congress has a voice 
in it, but only a voice, and a muted one, because of this amendment.
  I implore my colleagues not to seize this amendment as the opportune 
moment today in today's circumstances, but to reflect on the history 
that led up to this war powers resolution, the history of Vietnam, the 
history that taught us as a country and as a Nation we must stand 
together as a people and debate whether or not we engage in 
premeditated war.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to oppose the Hyde amendment.
  Mr. FUNDERBURK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FUNDERBURK. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say I listened awestruck by 
what the gentleman from Illinois just got through saying. It appears to 
me that he really believes this act, this war powers resolution, which 
the Congressional Reference Service 2 days ago said, with respect to 
your question regarding the number of instances when the Congress has 
utilized the war powers resolution since its enactment in 1973 to 
compel the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from foreign deployments, 
we can cite no single specific instance when this has occurred.
  It has never been used. The gentleman seems to imply that Congress 
would be in a state of paralysis if we got into a combat situation. I 
would tell the gentleman, but he knows this, we have a Committee on 
Appropriations, a Committee on Armed Services, a Committee on 
International Relations, and they would be vigorously holding hearings 
and disbursing legislation, and we control the purse. The existence or 
nonexistence of the War Powers Act is utterly irrelevant.
  I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. FUNDERBURK. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to stand with Chairman Hyde 
and Congressman Dornan as an original sponsor of this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, there is no more vocal critic of this administration's 
foreign policy and its misuse of the military than this Member. My 
district borders Fort Bragg. The soldiers of the 18th Airborne Corps 
have borne the brunt of the Clinton administration's misadventures in 
Somalia and Haiti. As we speak the Clinton administration is even 
contemplating action in Bosnia. But, the issue here is not the 
competence of Bill Clinton. The issue is whether we will be faithful to 
the Constitution and restore the delicate balance of power between the 
President and the Congress.
  There will be some who say that the timing of this amendment is 
wrong. They argue that with war in Bosnia looming we should maintain 
the status quo. That argument is wrong on two accounts. First, adhering 
to the original intent of the Framers is never wrong. Second, the 
repeal of the War Powers Act increases the President's responsibility 
for explaining to the American people the reasons for expanding our 
role in Bosnia. Repeal the War Powers Act now and Mr. Clinton can't say 
his Bosnian policy was hamstrung by the Congress.
  Mr. Chairman, despite events in Bosnia, this isn't a partisan fight. 
Every President since 1973, Republican and Democrat, has urged the 
repeal of the War Powers Act. Plain and simple, it is a ticking time 
bomb. If we don't diffuse it now, at a time of relative peace, it has 
the potential to explode during a great national crisis. In a strange 
way, this act, first promoted by the so-called peace movement of the 
1960's and 1970's, reduces deterrence, increases the risk of war, and 
places our combat troops in greater danger.
  Let me put this debate in some historical context. The conflict 
between congressional and Presidential war powers is as old as the 
Constitution. But, until the twin disasters of Watergate and Vietnam, 
the President's authority over the deployment of American troops had 
been relatively undisputed. The War Powers Act, passed over the veto of 
President Nixon in 1973, changed that. The act was the centerpiece of 
the activist, radical Vietnam/Watergate Congress.
  As Ambassador John Norton Moore notes, the first problem is that the 
act itself is a product of a myth--the myth that somehow the Vietnam 
war was ``a presidential war'' and if Congress only had a veto over the 
President's war powers there would have been no lives lost in 
Indochina. That myth is nonsense. From the time of the 1964 Gulf of 
Tonkin resolution, the Congress passed appropriation after 
appropriation to pay for the increase in troop levels and material 
requested by the White House. The late Sam Ervin, the primary opponent 
of the War Powers Act and the leading constitutionalist in the 
Congress, argued that each Vietnam resolution and appropriation was a 
``declaration of war in the Constitutional sense.''
  Congress was a full and equal partner in the decision to prosecute 
the war. Only when the war became unpopular did the Congress try to 
shift the blame and the result was this misguided legislation.
  This act is clearly unconstitutional. At its heart is an attempt by 
the Congress to define the war powers of the President. The Congress 
has no such authority. The President's power comes solely from the 
Constitution of the United States not a temporary majority on Capitol 
Hill. Congress has the power to provide the President with an Army and 
a Navy and to declare war but it has no constitutional authority to 
deny the President his right to deploy and engage Americans forces in 
any action short of offensive war.
  Section 5 of the act contains the most egregious violations of the 
Constitution.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. 
Funderburk] has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Funderburk was allowed to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. FUNDERBURK. Mr. Chairman, it requires the President to withdraw 
troops in any situation in which hostilities are possible within 60 
days of the deployment. It gives the Congress a legislative veto over 
the constitutional prerogatives of the Executive. This is a flagrant 
attempt by the Congress to exercise the Commander-in-Chief authority 
vested by the Framers in the President.
  Section 5 is also practically dangerous. It tells friend and foe 
alike that the President's commitment of force is only good for 60 
days, after that American resolve is left to the whim of 535 
Secretaries of Defense in the Congress. It sends a signal that if the 
Congress can't determine the propriety of the President's actions, this 
act automatically assumes that the President is wrong and it works as a 
silent veto over his decision. Knowing that American forces will 
disappear in 60 days [[Page H5663]] might encourage an enemy to fight 
harder or wait us out in order to gain a political victory.
  We have been lucky so far. But we can't continue to gamble with 
American security. What happens during a crisis to a President who 
considers the War Powers Act unconstitutional? The President must 
either give up his right to uphold and defend the Constitution or force 
a fight with the Congress at a moment of maximum danger to America. Can 
we afford to have such a momentous decision left up to the unelected 
justices of the Supreme Court? Let's head that disaster off right now. 
Mr. Chairman, it is long past time to repeal this dangerous legacy of 
the Vietnam era--it is time to dispose of the War Powers Act.
  Support the Hyde-Dornan-Funderburk amendment.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on 
this amendment and all amendments thereto be limited to 30 minutes, to 
be equally divided and controlled by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. 
Hyde] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].

                              {time}  1700

  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New York?
  Mr. HAMILTON. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, we are 
prepared on this side at some point to enter into a limitation of time 
and agree to a unanimous consent request. We do have a bit of a problem 
here, because there is an important briefing going on now in the 
Committee on National Security on Bosnia. I am informed that several of 
those Members would like to speak.
  May I ask if the gentleman would defer his request for maybe 15 or 20 
minutes, and we will try to reach an agreement.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HAMILTON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased to defer for another 15 
minutes.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his 
cooperation.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my unanimous consent request.
  The CHAIRMAN. The unanimous-consent request is withdrawn.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, it is interesting, if you followed the debate, the 
discussion of the repeal of the War Powers Act, what we have here 
actually is a partial repeal of the War Powers Act without due 
deliberation.
  The committees of jurisdiction, the Committee on International 
Relations, has held no hearings and has marked up no legislation; the 
Committee on National Security, which is vitally concerned, has held no 
hearings and has marked up no legislation. Yet before us suddenly 
springs full blown a proposal to partially repeal the War Powers Act 
and to substitute a shadow of the constitutional powers delegated to 
the Congress by the Constitution.
  We would be better served if this were an absolute repeal. It would 
be cleaner, and it would not give anyone the impression that the role 
of Congress was ``the President shall in every possible instance,'' 
that is a pretty big loophole, ``consult with,'' does that mean, 
Congress, who are they? All 435? I am a member of Congress. Would I be 
consulted with? Would I have an opportunity to represent the people of 
my
 district? No. A few people could be selected; one person could be 
selected. What does it constitute? This is a shadow of the authority 
that was granted to the Congress by the Constitution.

  I admit that the War Powers Act is, in fact, effective and at the end 
of my 5 minutes I will sketch out a fix. But to partially repeal it and 
instead impose a very weak, prior consultation loophole-ridden 
provision certainly gives solace to those who believe that the 
commander in chief, the president, is preeminent. Unfortunately, none 
of the Framers of the Constitution felt that was a very good idea.
  If you would refer to James Madison's notes on the Federal 
Convention, he quotes:

       Mr. Sharman thought it stood very well. The Executive 
     should be able to repel and not to commence war. ``Make'' 
     better than ``declare,'' the latter narrowing the power to 
     much.
       Mr. Gerry never expected to hear in the Republic a motion 
     to empower the executive alone to declare war.
       Mr. Mason was against giving the power of war to the 
     Executive because not safely to be trusted with it; nor to 
     the Senate, because not so constructed as to be entitled to 
     it. He was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but 
     facilitating peace. He preferred ``declare'' to ``make.''.
       On a motion to insert ``declare'' in place of ``make,'' it 
     was agreed to.

  That is reserved to the United States Congress, as is the power to 
raise armies.
  The gentleman, the esteemed gentleman from Illinois has pointed out, 
certainly we have the powers of the purse, but once you of deployed 
troops, secretly, after consultation with one or more Members of 
Congress, if the opportunity arose and it was convenient for the 
President, once those troops are on the ground, under hostile fire, is 
this Congress going to stand up and repeal the funds immediately? No. 
Member after Member will come to the well and say, we must stand with 
the Commander in Chief, we must stand behind those troops, no matter 
how ill-intentioned the initial deployment. This Congress is not going 
to have anymore guts to cut off the funds than it does to use the 
implementation of the act and to require that the President submit a 
report, which has not happened during my time in this Congress.
  The key here is prior restraint before we get into
   a shooting war, before we have had casualties, before emotions run 
high. Prior restraint was in the Senate version of the War Powers Act 
and, had we adopted the Senate version instead of the more watered-down 
House version, we would have an effective War Powers Act. We can fix 
the War Powers Act. We can require prior restraint and require 
consultation as the Framers of the Constitution intended.

  It is no surprise that four former Presidents have said, ``Repeal the 
War Powers Act.'' Of course, every Executive, as the Framers of the 
Constitution pointed out, is wont to foreign adventures without the 
restraint of this body, without having to go through a torturous debate 
before the U.S. Congress on the passing of resolutions.
  But remember, again, if we are to do this through the appropriations 
of the powers of the purse, if a President has gone forward and if the 
Congress, a majority of the elected representatives of the people 
should say,'' Let us restrain the President, let us bring the troops 
home,'' the President could veto that resolution and it would require a 
supermajority of the Congress to exert our constitutional role.
  Under this act, if we adopt this amendment, this is not a repeal of 
the War Powers. If we adopt this amendment to the War Powers Act, 
future Congresses will require a two-thirds majority in order to 
restrain the President's war-making authority, certainly nothing that 
the Framers of the Constitution would have envisioned, nor endorsed.
  There is a fix to War Powers. It is possible. Three modifications: a 
return to the concept of prior restraint, as was in the original Senate 
bill, defining in advance those uses of the armed forces in hostilities 
for which the President needs no prior authorization; a prohibition on 
any other use of the Armed Forces in hostile situations and on any of 
the permissible uses lasting longer than 60 days.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. DeFazio] has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. DeFazio was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. DeFAZIO. A prohibition on any other use of the Armed Forces in 
hostile situations and on any of the permissible uses lasting longer 
than 60 days, unless such use is authorized by Congress, and using 
purse string restrictions to enforce the prohibition; and providing for 
judicial review.
  This is key. I am one who has gone to try and defend the 
constitutional prerogatives of the Congress several times in the last 
decade. But the courts will not act. We need to give standing so we 
need to provide for judicial review by conferring standing to bring 
suit upon Members of Congress in the event of presidential 
noncompliance and limiting the court's discretionary powers to dismiss 
such cases.
  That would fix War Powers. That would reassert the war-making powers 
[[Page H5664]] of the United States Congress. But if we adopt this 
amendment to War Powers, not repeal, we will superimpose and put in 
place a mere shadow of the power of Congress. And, yes, some Members of 
Congress might be consulted if it is convenient for the president and 
then we will have a war. I do not believe that that is what the 
American people want.
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, the preceding speaker in the course of his remarks 
acknowledged that the War Powers Resolution that we have before us that 
has been in effect for the last 22 years is toothless and weak. It is 
the weak version that was adopted that contains no restraint whatever 
on the Commander in Chief exercising the war power legitimately given 
to the Congress under the Constitution. In fact, it is a 60-day grace 
period during which this resolution unconstitutionally purports to 
confer that power for a time on the president.
  I rise in wholehearted support of the amendment of the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Hyde] to repeal the War Powers Resolution. It is now, and 
has been every day since it was passed, unconstitutional.
  As has been pointed out several times in the course of this debate, 
President Clinton, President Bush, President Reagan, President Carter, 
President Ford and President Nixon all have said that this War Powers 
Resolution in effect for the last 22 years is injurious to the national 
security of the United States.
  It is harmful to the United States. This resolution weakens both the 
President and the Congress. It is that bad. In time of crisis, it 
actually increases the risk of war. Most importantly for purposes of 
this debate, it offends two centuries of our constitutional history.
  First let us take a look at how it weakens the Congress. It is very 
important to recognize that that is exactly what this is all about. It 
is a 60-day abdication of Congress's legitimate war-making power. 
Article I, Section 8, clauses 1 and 11 of the Constitution give to 
Congress the power to provide for the common defense and to declare 
war. There is no requirement that the Congress wait 60 days in order to 
exercise its constitutional authorities in these respects.
  But the War Powers Resolution with its 60-day grace period purports 
to give the President carte blanche to wage war for a full 2 months 
without any congressional authorization, just as President Clinton did 
in Haiti. The War Powers Resolution has provided political cover for 
this Congress to sit back and do nothing for months, to abdicate its 
responsibility so that later it can take political pot shots at the
 President and the Commander in Chief after our troops are already in 
the field.

  It has bread flabbiness in the real war-making power of this 
Congress. It has caused this body to retreat utterly and shamelessly as 
it did in Haiti when the then-Speaker of the House went so far as to 
prevent this House of Representatives from even debating the use of 
force in Haiti.
  It weakens the Congress as well as the President. Here is how it is 
weakening the President. The vesting clause, Article II, section 1 of 
the Constitution, unambiguously grants to the President, not to the 
Congress, the totality of the executive power. Article II, section 2 of 
the Constitution provides that the President shall be the Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Navy. For centuries American Presidents have 
relied on these sweeping grants of authority to use our Armed Forces in 
a host of contexts without prior congressional action such as 
responding to attacks or threats on American forces, citizens or 
property, or when secrecy or surprise are essential.
  No one thinks that we ought to have weeks and weeks of debate before 
the Commander in Chief could act in those circumstances or where the 
necessity for an immediate military response leaves no opportunity for 
congressional action. But the War Powers Resolution in effect over 
these last 22 years purports to shrink these historic inherent 
Presidential powers to just one circumstance: a direct attack on the 
United States.
  Thankfully the War Powers Resolution was not on the books for a 
single one of the major wars in which our Nation has been involved over 
200 years. It is a distortion of our Constitution. It ignores the 
entire course of our constitutional history. If it were correct, then 
Presidents Adams, Jefferson, Lincoln, Grant, Wilson, FDR, Truman and 
Eisenhower were all lawbreakers.
  No American President of either party, including President Clinton, 
has ever recognized perversion of our constitutional order. None has 
ever pretended to follow its terms. It is instructive that in the 
course of this debate not a single Member has pointed to a single 
instance in which the War Powers Resolution was in fact invoked to 
withdraw U.S. troops from combat. It has not ever happened.
  The War Powers Resolution claims to force an end to hostilities in 60 
days unless Congress has affirmatively acted. This unwise and 
inflexible rule has emboldened our enemies. They have every reason to 
doubt our resolve.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Cox] has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Cox of California was allowed to proceed 
for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. COX of California. It has tempted our enemies to think that 
America's staying power in any conflict is limited to those 60 days. It 
is ironic that this measure enacted 22 years ago ostensibly for the 
purpose of limiting the use of force, minimizing it, has vastly 
magnified the risks of war, and it will continue to do so every day 
that it is on the books.
  The War Powers Resolution illegitimately pretends to allow Congress 
by simple concurrent resolution to compel the President to break off 
military action. That is a flatly unconstitutional legislative veto. As 
the chairman, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], has pointed out 
so eloquently, through the exercise of its legitimate constitutional 
powers this Congress has ample means to achieve the same result.
  Mr. Chairman, we can redress a grave constitutional injury today. We 
can improve the stature and the standing of Congress. We can protect 
our legitimate war-making prerogative by repealing the War Powers 
Resolution. We can strengthen the Commander in Chief simultaneously and 
restore his legitimate constitutional authority. And we can better 
defend the national security against tyrants and other external enemies 
by letting the world know our staying power in any conflict extends 
beyond a mere 60 days.
  Mr. Chairman, our Constitution is right. The War Powers Resolution is 
wrong. Let us repeal it today for the sake of our national security and 
for the peace of the world.

                              {time}  1715

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, let me say first of all that I think the gentleman from 
Illinois, Mr. Hyde, has performed a genuine service here in bringing 
this amendment forward. There just is not any doubt at all that the War 
Powers Act just has not worked well.
  The gentleman from Illinois has a serious amendment. It needs to be 
and is being carefully discussed. He very well points out that there 
are serious flaws in the War Powers Resolution. He is correct when he 
says that no President accepts the War Powers Resolution in its current 
form. He is correct, I think, when he says that the 60-day clock 
provision means the Congress can control by inaction, and thereby play 
into the hands of an adversary.
  He is correct, I think, when he says that the concurrent resolution 
mechanism does not work. Put aside constitutional questions, which are 
serious, but that mechanism does not work. The statute does not define 
hostilities, and that allows the executive branch to stretch the 
meaning of it beyond rationality. The consultative process could stand 
a
 lot of improvement. I concede all that. I acknowledge that.

  On the constitutional level, although it has not been finally 
determined, the concurrent resolution mechanism has likely been 
rendered moot by the Chadha decision on legislative vetoes. The 60-day 
clock by which congressional silence or inaction requires a President 
to bring the troops home very likely steps over the line into the 
President's Commander-in-Chief powers. [[Page H5665]] 
  Having said all of that, on the constitutionality of the core 
principle behind the War Powers Resolution, it is at that point that I 
think that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] and I disagree. I 
believe that the Constitution absolutely requires that Congress share 
with the President the decision to send troops abroad for combat. We do 
not always do it, we often do not like to do it, but I do not think 
that we should cede the power away. That is the way I read the 
gentleman's amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, it is very important to recognize the advantages of the 
War Powers Resolution. Despite all of its deficiencies, there are some 
real advantages to it. The decision to commit American forces to combat 
is the gravest decision that a government makes. Presidents are not 
infallible. They do make mistakes. They are surrounded by aides, almost 
invariably aides who favor the executive power. When faced with a 
judgment about committing troops abroad, I believe that the President 
needs the balanced judgment from the legislative branch.
  The core principle behind the War Powers Resolution is that sending 
troops abroad requires the sound collective judgment of the President 
and the Congress. I do not think that principle should be abandoned. 
The War Powers Act provides a framework for shared decision making. It 
gives the President strong incentive to consider the opinion of the 
Congress, and I think most of us who served in the Congress before the 
War Powers Act and after the War Powers Act understand that presidents 
now are much, much more careful about consulting with the Congress with 
the War Powers Resolution than without it. It provides a precedent 
process to get congressional advice to consult with the Congress, and 
it does, I think, give the Congress some leverage on this key decision 
of sending troops into combat.
  Mr. Chairman, the argument is made that the War Powers Resolution 
weakens the President's hand. I believe I would argue just the 
opposite. When the Congress goes on record in support of the 
President`s judgment to send combat troops abroad, that collective 
judgment strengthens the President's hand. I think it strengthens the 
role of the United States in the conflict, because it shows that the 
Congress and the American people support the President. Absent the 
clear indication of support what a congressional authorization 
provides, the President and his policies are vulnerable to every blink 
of public reaction when U.S. forces face hostilities.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Hamilton was allowed to proceed for 3 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, we do a lot of signal sending in this 
body. I think the signal sending we do today is important. I have come 
down on the side that repealing the War Powers Act sends the wrong 
signal, because, as others have stated, it represents an abdication of 
our powers. It gives the President a kind of a green light for his 
action without the legislative branch, except consultation.
  The argument is made, of course, that we have the power of the purse, 
and we certainly do, and that that is enough. I do not think I can 
agree with that. The power of the purse is not equivalent to Congress 
sharing the critical threshold decision, up front, about whether to 
send troops at all. The power of the purse is usually, not always, but 
usually exercised after the fact, weeks after the fact, sometimes 
months after the fact.
  It is true that we can cut off funding any time for a given 
operation. It is very difficult to cut off funding before an operations 
starts, although we have done it on occasion, but it is difficult to 
do. Presidents are going to fight, as they should, to keep their 
options open. However, it is also difficult to cut funding after the 
troops are in the field. Senator Javits I think rightly pointed out 
that Congress can hardly cut off appropriations when we have American 
troops fighting for their lives in the field.
  Mr. Chairman, I understand that the gentleman from Illinois has 
received a number of endorsements from former Presidents. However, I do 
not think that should surprise anyone. Former executives are not 
exactly disinterested parties in questions about war powers authority. 
This discussion goes to the very heart of what our institutional 
responsibilities are. Institutional prerogatives govern the war powers 
debate. It is not surprising that Presidents want fewer restrictions on 
their ability to take action.
  However, I believe that the Congress should hold tenaciously to the 
power to share the tough decision about putting troops into battle. I 
look upon the act of repealing the War Powers Act as an act of 
abdication by the Congress of its power.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Hamilton was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, the Congress can stand against a 
President. The Congress can stand beside a President. What Congress 
must not do is to stand aside. Congress should not cede its 
constitutional responsibilities. We are a co-equal branch of 
government.
  Of course, consultation is necessary and important, but it is not 
enough when it comes to the War Powers Resolution. This is an 
extraordinarily important debate that the gentleman from Illinois, [Mr. 
Hyde] has opened up. I know him well enough to know, and I have visited 
with him about it, that this amendment is the beginning, and not the 
end, of a serious dialogue on the war powers. It is my hope that his 
amendment, if it is adopted, is not the final proposal, but I do think 
our vote today sends a signal.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] 
has expired.
  (At the request of Mr. Hyde and by unanimous consent, Mr. Hamilton 
was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, if we are prepared to cede congressional 
power on this important decision, then the vote is yes. However, if 
Members believe, as I do, that Congress has a role to play when we send 
these troops into action, that we ought to be in on that decision, even 
though we reluctantly take that decision, or try to avoid it, then I 
think Members should vote against this amendment.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HAMILTON. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for a thoughtful, well 
reasoned, and illuminating statement, which is typical of the 
gentleman. I just want to simply say in Vietnam there was not a bullet 
shot, there was not a gun held by a GI, that was not authorized and 
paid for by this Congress, and this Congress can stop it, or can make 
it go ahead any time it wants.
  I suggest again to the gentleman that my amendment requires us to 
know, to be in at the take-off as well as the landing, to be not only 
informed but to be given reports, periodic reports. Then we have the 
power to stop it or go ahead, and be a full partner. We would be the 
dominating partner, because the President cannot wage war without our 
funding it.
  Lastly, the lesson of Vietnam, to anybody who is not deaf, dumb, and 
blind, is that you cannot carry on a war without the support of the 
people. That means the support of Congress. We are, under the 
Constitution, under the power to appropriate and raise the money and 
spend it, we are full partners. We are the senior partner with the 
executive.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Hamilton was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Illinois, of course, 
always states well and eloquently his position. I think the problem 
with the gentleman's position is that there comes a critical point, a 
very critical point when you have to decide to commit these troops or 
not. The power of the purse really is not involved at that point. We 
want the power at that critical point, at the threshold of the 
decision, to be part of that decision.
  It is not enough just to be consulted. We have to be consulted, but 
it is not [[Page H5666]] enough. We are a co-equal branch of 
government. This is the most important decision a government makes, and 
we ought to be in on that threshold decision when it is made, not later 
when we take up the appropriations bill.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have now had 13 Members speak on this 
debate.
  I ask unanimous consent that debate on this amendment and all 
amendments thereto be limited to 30 minutes, to be equally divided and 
controlled by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] and the gentleman 
from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New York?
  Mr. HAMILTON. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, the 
problem I confront here is that we have a list of 8 speakers on our 
side remaining. That could easily jump by a couple. A cut-off at 6 
o'clock, 15 minutes on each side, would just be extremely limiting.
  Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the gentleman would agree to 6:30.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, we only have three speakers on our side. 
would the gentleman agree to 6:15 as a cut-off time?
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I would agree only to 6:30.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that debate on this 
amendment and all amendments thereto be limited to 1 hour, to be 
equally divided and controlled by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. 
Hyde] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New York?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] is recognized 
for 30 minutes.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Michigan [Mr. Upton].
                              {time}  1730

  Mr. UPTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the author of the amendment for 
yielding me the time as he knows that I am opposed to his amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment for a number of 
reasons. As the previous speaker indicated, I do believe very strongly 
that we need a shared responsibility between the branches of the 
Government. I can remember well, probably the biggest vote that I have 
ever cast, certainly the biggest vote that I have ever cast was to give 
President Bush the authority to go into the gulf war. I view the War 
Powers Act as one of the major issues back then as to why the President 
came to this body and came to the American people and persuaded them 
convincingly that that was the right vote. I am not so certain that he 
would have done that had there not been a War Powers Act.
  I have talked to Members of Congress on this floor today who have 
indicated that had he not come to the House floor, they probably would 
have voted to impeach him, and yet they still voted for the resolution 
as it passed that night in January on a fairly convincing vote.
  Mr. Chairman, I remember well an earlier vote that same night, the 
Bennett resolution, a resolution that passed in this floor 302-131. It 
expressed the sense of Congress that the Constitution vested the power 
to declare war on Congress and that the President must gain 
congressional approval before any offensive military action could be 
taken against Iraq. That was a check and a balance. That is what this 
Government is about, a check and a balance.
  As I look at the votes that were cast on overriding the President's 
veto, President Nixon back in 1973, I look at a number of my colleagues 
past and present. I passed one today, Larry Coughlin, who voted to 
override the President that day. But I look at some of the names, Mr. 
Edwards and Dickinson of Alabama, later became the ranking members on 
the Committee on Armed Services here in the House and served in a 
distinguished way and on Appropriations as well. I look at Mr. 
Rousselot from California who voted to override, at the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Crane], still in the House, and Mr. Erlenborn and Mr. 
Anderson. I look at Trent Lott, now the majority whip in the Senate, 
who voted to override. I look at my own former Members from Michigan, 
Bill Broomfield, who were ranking Members of this committee. I look at 
Mr. Frenzel.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. UPTON. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois. I wish the 
gentleman had been in the Congress in 1973.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I would just point out to the gentleman that 
there was another issue overhanging that debate and that vote. The 
President had just gone through the Saturday night massacre. There was 
nobody more vulnerable on this planet than Richard Nixon, and I dare 
suggest, without knowing, a lot of those people wished to show a lack 
of support for the President because of the problems he was having. I 
could be wrong but I would just like to offer that. I thank the 
gentleman.
  Mr. UPTON. Again, I respect the gentleman from Illinois tremendously, 
but this is an issue that puts the Congress as a player in making 
decisions that are certainly, I think, the biggest ones that we make, 
sending, whether it is our children or our friends' and neighbors' sons 
and daughters off to war. I believe that it has to be more than a 
consultation process, it has to be one where we can take some action. 
Again, I look at the gulf war. I do not believe that President Bush may 
have come to this body seeking our approval without that hanging over 
his head. He did so, and he did so admirably. He made the point and we 
had strong bipartisan support. Thank goodness it was the right decision 
for all of us to live by.
  I would just suggest that perhaps we do need reform of the War Powers 
Act, having seen it play now for 20 some years. But I do not know that 
revocation is the answer. I would certainly welcome hearings before the 
Committee on National Security and others to look at ways that we can 
improve the bill rather than repeal it. I urge my colleagues to vote 
no.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] is recognized 
for 30 minutes. Does he choose to yield time?
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs].
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Colorado [Mr. Skaggs].
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs] is recognized 
for 7 minutes.
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlemen for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I have great respect for the gentleman from Illinois 
and believe that he has offered what is almost a good amendment. In a 
debate like this about one of the most significant powers that the 
Constitution grants to the Congress, I think it is well to look back to 
the thoughts of one of the Founders and perhaps the Father of the 
Constitution. Madison observed as follows about this power, and I 
quote:

       Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of 
     things be proper or safe judges whether a war ought to be 
     commenced, continued or concluded. They are barred from the 
     latter functions by a great principle of free government . . 
     . .

  In other words, the Executive who would be charged with the 
prosecution of the war should not be considered the proper authority 
for determining whether to commence one.
  We clearly have constitutional problems with the current War Powers 
Resolution. I think in order to understand those, we really need to 
parse out the kinds of situations that we face that implicate the war 
power provisions of the Constitution.
  First clearly we have those actions that truly involve the commencing 
of war in a constitutional sense. I would assume that the gentleman 
would agree that in those cases, the power of Congress is paramount. It 
is not a matter of consultation or reporting or a shared power. It is 
our responsibility, and no one else's, to make the decision.
  Then there are all other cases, deployments of one sort or another, 
emergency responses, humanitarian efforts, all of the variations on the 
theme in which I believe we have to concede a good deal of 
constitutional authority to the President of the United States both as 
Commander in Chief and as the individual with authority under our 
system to conduct the foreign policy of the country. [[Page H5667]] 
  The War Powers Resolution impinges on the constitutional authority on 
the one hand of the Congress, by ceding authority to the President in 
some instances where it is our paramount responsibility to act. And it 
impinges on the constitutional authority of the President as Commander 
in Chief in some instances, in those other wide-ranging examples that 
fall short of the commencement of war in a constitutional sense.
  It is a defective statute constitutionally with respect to both the 
executive and the legislative branches and the responsibilities we each 
have under the Constitution.
  This amendment is perhaps unfortunate in that it does not go far 
enough and simply repeal the War Powers Act in toto. Or better yet, we 
should attempt a constitutionally coherent effort to explain and to 
state the respective roles of the executive and the legislative 
branches with respect to military action abroad.
  Instead, this partial repeal, I fear, will leave a remainder of the 
War Powers Resolution that carries an unfortunate implication. And that 
implication is that the presidential authority in war is restrained 
only by a consultative and reporting requirement. I do not believe that 
is what the gentleman intends. It is certainly not what the 
Constitution permits. But relative to the current state of debate as 
reflected in the War Powers statute, that I think is the only inference 
to draw from making this change.
  I think we do a great disservice to the constitutional responsibility 
of the Congress under Article I if we appear to tilt too far in 
expressing deference to the executive.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SKAGGS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I think it is a fact of modern history that 
declarations of war are gone. I think they are anachronistic. I do not 
think they will happen. Clearly the Constitution assigns the 
declarations of war function to Congress and only to Congress. But 
declaring war has consequences in a technologically advanced world that 
nobody wants to face.
  Had we declared war against Vietnam, the fear was China and Russia 
would have had to declare war against us. So you get into a cascading 
snowball situation. Instead what you do is you call it a police action, 
as we did in Korea, or you call it something else, but you do not 
formally take that giant leap of declaring war.
  So we are back to the President as Commander in Chief having the 
authority to move troops around but we always have the inescapable 
function of Congress, and that, too, is constitutional, to provide the 
appropriations. Without the appropriations, they cannot get a drink of 
water.
  Mr. Chairman, I just suggest that requiring consultation does not 
exhaust Congress's authority. We have the untrammeled authority to 
unappropriate, disappropriate funds. That is the key, and that makes us 
the king of the hill. I suggest that by repealing the foolish, 
nonsensical, unusable parts of the War Powers Resolution and requiring 
the President to keep us informed comprehensively, we enhance the use, 
ultimate use of our appropriation authority.
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I simply disagree with 
the way the gentleman characterizes the ultimate impact of what he is 
proposing. I think it really would be a default to the executive on the 
powers that we must hold.
  I think the gentleman makes a good argument for amending the 
Constitution, perhaps, to reflect current times. I would disagree with 
that step, but that is the argument he is really making. In fact, I 
think we need a more constitutionally subtle and discrete approach to 
this issue than is encompassed in his amendment, perhaps one that would 
be the product of a full committee hearing and deliberation process in 
both the Committee on International Relations and Committee on National 
Security.
  In any case, under these circumstances with this debate on this bill, 
I would reluctantly urge a ``no'' vote on the gentleman's amendment.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I have been in the Committee on National Security this 
afternoon listening to testimony by the Secretary of Defense and by the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and so I missed the earlier part of this 
debate.
  I wonder if the gentleman from Illinois would answer some inquiries, 
some questions that I have regarding his amendment.
  The first is, would you explain as briefly as possible just what you 
repeal. Second, would you please explain the purpose behind that.
  I would like to add, if I may, is it not correct that Presidents in 
recent years, and my recollection is that during my term in Congress, 
which is the same as my friend from Illinois, that the Presidents have 
complied with the notification portions of the War Powers Act without 
acknowledging its force and effect.
  Mr. HYDE. If the gentleman will yield, as a practical matter, the 
Presidents are wise enough to consult with Congress, let Congress know 
because you can not keep a secret when you move troops around the 
world. So the President has consulted. But no President has 
acknowledged it was pursuant to the War Powers Resolution. It was just 
common sense and comity between two co-equal-and-essential-to-each-
other branches of government.
  Mr. SKELTON. But would the gentleman answer my first question. Please 
explain what you repeal and the basic reason therefor.
  Mr. HYDE. Yes. Section 2707(a)1, the War Powers Resolution, is 
repealed. That is the law that requires the President after 60 days to 
bring the troops home if we have not acted affirmatively to support the 
presence of the troops there. In other words, by doing nothing, the 
President has to call everybody home, which gives a false expectation 
to our adversaries, if they just wait us out. It has never been tested 
in court. No President ever, of either party, has recognized it as 
constitutional. It is unworkable. I am just trying to clean up the law 
so we have left a requirement of consultation and
 reporting timely and comprehensive and we always have that 
appropriations authority. You will remember the Boland amendments which 
cut off funds for the Contras. We passed one every year over my 
objection, but we did. Just one example of Congress cutting off funds 
for belligerencies we did not agree with.

  Mr. SKELTON. My next question, if you recall, deals with a bit of 
history back in the 1940 era, early 1941, when President Roosevelt made 
certain actions, particularly with the United States Navy. How would 
the War Powers Act have affected him?
  Mr. HYDE. It would not. What we did was transferred destroyers to 
Great Britain. He declared them surplus.
  Mr. SKELTON. No, no, no. In his activities in having patrols acting 
against the submarines of the Nazis at the time in the North Atlantic. 
Does that ring a bell?
  Mr. HYDE. If he was sending troops into hostilities or into a place 
where hostilities were imminent, that is the language of the War Powers 
Resolution.
  Mr. SKELTON. So, in other words, the War Powers Act had it been in 
effect in 1940-41 would have affected what President Franklin Roosevelt 
did at the time, is that correct?
  Mr. HYDE. I do not know what knowledge Congress had of what was going 
on. If they knew and were looking the other way, as I suspect was the 
truth, nothing would have happened.
  Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman.

                              {time}  1745

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli].
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time.
  Mr. Chairman, every American schoolchild learns to respect and revere 
the Constitution of our country and those who wrote it. It is a near 
perfect document, an expression of extraordinary wisdom. But it was not 
without flaw.
  Among those flaws has been a 200-year conflict in authority between 
the commander-in-chief and the powers incumbent upon him and the war-
making [[Page H5668]] powers of this Congress. The problem was masked 
for many years. But time, changes in technology and diplomacy made a 
collision inevitable, the speed of war, the powers of weapons, the 
change of diplomacy. That collision came most dramatically in Vietnam.
  The result was not simply the loss of life of thousands of Americans 
after a constituency for that war in this Congress and among our people 
had evaporated. There was another price, the near loss of legitimacy of 
this Government in its actions.
  It has been suggested by the gentleman from Illinois that this 
Congress was not without recourse, at any moment we could have 
abandoned the providing of appropriations, withdrawn funding, and by 
doing so expressed the wishes of our constituencies and ourselves. And 
indeed in the final analysis, after more than 10 years of combat that 
is exactly what happened. But the War Powers Act was enacted because 
Members of Congress themselves found that that choice was inadequate. 
Members were not going to choose to take away appropriations from our 
own sons and daughters who were fighting and dying while they were in 
combat. They would not do it, and neither would we. It was not a 
sufficient power. We needed the right to express ourselves before the 
Nation engaged in combat.
  The War Powers Act itself may not have been a perfect expression 
either. Indeed, from Grenada to Lebanon, for different reasons and 
different circumstances, we have seen the flaws in the act itself. But 
it has nevertheless in our own time been a valuable method of 
expression for this Congress, creating at a minimum a period of 
consultation, a consultation, a sharing of power between the Congress 
and the Presidency that did not exist when FDR invaded Nicaragua, or 
when Lyndon Johnson sent forces to the Dominican Republic.
  In our own time that power has been shared and has
   been different. Would the marines have stayed in Haiti for 30 years 
if the Congress had had power when Woodrow Wilson acted. Would we have 
remained for a generation in Nicaragua when Roosevelt acted? It has 
been different and it has been better because of the War Powers Act.

  Maybe George Bush never accepted its constitutionality. Maybe he did 
not agree and maybe today he would like to see us repeal it. But when 
he was faced with a judgment in the Persian Gulf, he was quick to bring 
Members of this Congress to the White House, and quick despite his 
objections to seek a congressional vote, because he understood not a 
problem, but an opportunity in the War Powers Act. He wanted Saddam 
Hussein to know that this was no Vietnam, you will not divide the 
American people in combat, that the Congress and the Presidency will 
act together, and so he did not seek to avoid a vote, he wanted it, 
because he knew of what it telegraphed to Iraq. That vote more than 
anything else brought the United States allies and showed solidarity.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New Jersey has expired.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent for 2 
additional minutes.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time is controlled by the gentleman from Indiana 
[Mr. Hamilton].
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I regret I do not have the time.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent the gentleman 
from Indiana have 2 more minutes on his time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Committee is operating under an existing unanimous-
consent agreement which equally divides the time on the Hyde amendment.
  Mr. HYDE. What was the gentleman's request?
  Mr. TORRICELLI. I asked unanimous consent for an additional 2 
minutes.
  Mr. HYDE. We should have an equal division then.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has asked unanimous consent that the 
amount of time be extended by 2 minutes.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield 2 additional 
minutes?
  Mr. HYDE. Of course I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
Jersey.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, there are many reasons why this system has survived for 
so long when so many other constitutional systems around the world have 
faltered, but there may be one which is more important, the idea of 
refusing to centralize power in the American constitutional system. 
Admittedly, this has been a conservative idea, central to conservative 
doctrine in the American political system, that no one individual and 
no one institution would monopolize power.
  Ironically, a great Member of this House, a leader in the 
conservative movement, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], today 
would repeal this idea, and leading us back to a different time when 
one man, one institution in this Government could so control 
constitutional power.
  I rise today in defense of that conservative idea, because cutting 
off appropriations is not an answer, and in an age with the technology 
today that exists, when the gentleman from Illinois is correct that war 
may no longer be formally declared, to give that power to one man is 
more dangerous than when Lyndon Johnson had it, more dangerous than 
when Franklin Delano Roosevelt had it. This constitutional system 
serves best by insisting that the Congress share in that right, and 
that the lessons of Vietnam and the opportunities of the Persian Gulf 
remain with us.
  When there is a better way to distribute power, better than the 
Persian Gulf war lessons, better than the resolution we would repeal 
today, let us do it. It is not before this House today.
  I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.
  Mr. HYDE. Would the Chair tell me how much time I have remaining?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] has 17 minutes 
remaining, and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] has 20 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Berman].
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I came to the floor this afternoon planning to support 
the Hyde amendment, and have been giving it a lot of thought since then 
and have decided to change my mind, one of those rare times where the 
debate on the floor actually affects somebody's decision.
  I agree with so much of what the gentleman says. First of all, the 
argument that this law could be at the center of congressional 
participation in the decisions about whether or not to go to war. When 
you get right down to a law that no President has ever considered 
constitutional, no court has ever been willing to enforce, and in most 
instances Congress has not even been willing to implement just does not 
I think, make a lot of sense to me.
  This is law that at its heart and at the part that Mr. Hyde wishes to 
change and repeal, since once the President submits a report pursuant 
to the War Powers Act, within 60 days after the hostilities or the 
imminent threat of hostilities for U.S. forces within 60 days either 
Congress has to extend, has to grant that authorization for additional 
time or the forces must come back.
  In the Lowry case, in the reflagging of the Kuwaiti tankers, the 
district court in response to the lawsuit seeking to compel a 
determination that the Presidential information on the reflagging of 
the Kuwaiti tankers constituted a report said we are not going to get 
into that, we are not going to declare it a report. If the report has 
not been made pursuant to the War Powers Act, the 60 days do not run. 
So the act becomes meaningless and it has become meaningless in any 
legal sense.
  The more interesting question is whether the act serves a purpose. 
There has been some discussion on the floor. Initially it was stated on 
the floor that in fact President Bush decided to come to the Congress 
with the authorization for the use of force in the Desert Storm because 
of the existence of the War Power Act, and that that played some role 
in this decision. Others have said that really played no role in the 
decision, and of course I do not know the full story of what went on in 
his mind. But what I do know is that the Committee on International 
Relations should conduct hearings on this [[Page H5669]] subject. We 
should look at modifications. We should get rid of the 60-days 
requirement. I think we should change the threshold. There are a lot of 
times where our forces are in imminent threat of hostilities where we 
do not want to trigger any particular congressional action.
  We should look at a meaningful consultative process that has an 
ongoing precedent the Executive Branch involved. If we pass the Hyde 
amendment today without more attention to what that consultative 
process will be, and that were to go into law, we have no leverage to 
get the more meaningful consultative process from a President who would 
like to see the repeal of the 60-day requirements and of the 
requirement for the report which triggers any time period set.
  So I would suggest a better course, and I do it very reluctantly, is 
to vote against the Hyde amendment today, for the Committee on 
International Relations have hearings, to draw up a bill which goes to 
the heart of what the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. HYDE, does but 
provides for a more meaningful consultative process with the executive 
branch, and hand the administration a package which allows them to get 
out of a requirement which they do not consider constitutional, which, 
as the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] points out, in some cases 
give aid and comfort to our adversaries by giving them hope that the 
Congress will not act, even though no one argues that the President 
will listen to what the Congress said on this subject anyway or is 
legally compelled to listen, get rid of that 60-days requirement and 
substitute a more carefully drafted consultative process and I would 
urge, and thereby maintain some legislative role in those decisions.
  So I would like to get a separation of two different kinds of 
questions. In Desert Storm I think the President was constitutionally 
compelled to come before Congress. I considered it would have been an 
impeachable offense for him to engage in that kind of attack with time 
for preparation, with a date certain set, without coming to Congress. I 
am not sure Mr. Hyde agrees with me. I would like to go through a 
process where we seek to separate the more minor incidents, which it 
does not work to have a congressional role, from the more serious 
incidents where we want to preserve the core congressional functions.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Torkildsen].
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Torkildsen].
                              {time}  1800

  Mr. TORKILDSEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to the 
amendment offered by my colleague, the distinguished gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Hyde], the Chair of the Committee on the Judiciary.
  The Constitution grants the President the power of Commander in Chief 
of our Armed Forces. Yet, the Founding Fathers also granted Congress 
the authority to ``organize, arm, and discipline'' an army.
  At our country's founding, we were insulated from attack by foreign 
powers by two vast oceans. Thus it wasn't necessary to keep large 
peacetime armies. Congress effectively limited the President's 
authority to make war by not funding large, peacetime standing armies.
  The framers of the Constitution were so intent on keeping a too-
powerful chief from making war, that not only did they give the power 
to make war to the Congress, they also specifically prohibited, in the 
Constitution itself, any appropriation to raise and support armies from 
lasting more than two years.
  But as our country grew, and technology made the insularity of the 
oceans limited at best, it became necessary, in our own national 
interest, to keep and maintain large armies in peacetime as well as 
during conflict. However, in funding these large peacetime armies, 
Congress was giving up much of its constitutionally authorized role in 
determining whether or not make war.
  The War Powers Resolution was passed in 1973 as one way to re-assert 
the Congress' constitutional authority to determine whether or not any 
President can make war in the name of the people of the United States.
  With passage of the War Powers Resolution, Congress sought--
rightfully so--to restore its legal authority to determine whether or 
not U.S. armed forces are involved in war.
  Today we are faced with an amendment which would effectively repeal 
the War Powers Act, and replace it with a requirement for simple 
consultation by the President with Congress.
  As a member of the National Security Committee, I am aware of many 
arguments for and against the War Powers Resolution. Clearly, the War 
Powers Act does need to be amended, both to take into consideration the 
many new missions we ask our troops to perform, and to make it work in 
times of crisis. Amending it is far different than repealing it.
  Now is not the time for Congress to give up its role in determining 
whether or not troops are committed to combat. I urge my colleagues to 
defeat the repeal of the War Powers Act, and work together for the 
logical amendment the act requires.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, does the gentleman have further speakers?
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I have three more speakers left, and I 
understand, if I yield the gentleman 2 minutes, we will then be 
permitted to close.
  Mr. HAMILTON. We are prepared to let you close, but let me make sure 
I understand how this debate plays itself out. My understanding is that 
you will want to call a quorum call?
  Mr. HYDE. Correct.
  Mr. HAMILTON. That would be toward the end here, after which there 
will be four speakers, two on each side? Is that correct?
  Mr. HYDE. That is correct.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Although we have the privilege of closing under the 
unanimous consent, it is my understanding the Speaker would like to 
speak, and we will be glad to yield him the privilege of speaking last.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.
  Does the gentleman require 2 additional minutes?
  Mr. HAMILTON. We may before we are through. The gentleman may hold 
them in reserve.
  Mr. HYDE. I will hold them in reserve. All right.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from 
Georgia [Mr. Barr].
  Mr. BARR. Mr. Chairman, the War Powers Act has become a resolution 
without meaning, honored in its breach rather than in its compliance. 
It has cost us credibility at home and abroad. It is time to reform it.
  It is time to get back to basics, to a basic understanding of the 
separation and the balance of powers in our carefully crafted system of 
government.
  Coequal does not mean the same. While the executive branch has 
certain powers, Congress likewise has certain powers. From time to 
time, in certain areas, these may converge, but they do not coincide. 
There are differences and shall always and should always remain 
differences.
  I have been honored over the years to work very closely on national 
security matters. As a matter of fact, at the time the war powers 
resolution was being debated and passed and enacted I was working in 
national security matters for the CIA. I know, as do other Members of 
this great learned body, how swiftly the affairs and matters of 
national security are, arguably, subject to the war powers resolution 
come up, how quickly they can change, how difficult it is
 to anticipate, except, of course, by our adversaries, how the War 
Powers Resolution would play itself out and constrict the ability of 
our commander-in-chief to operate.

  We cannot tie the hands of our commander-in-chief, because when we do 
that, when we tie his hands, we cost the lives of our soldiers, and it 
is improper and unconscionable to put their lives at risk.
  That is why, Mr. Chairman, for over 25 years our Presidents, 
Republican and Democrat alike, have found way after way after way 
around the War Powers Resolution, because it does not work. It will not 
work, Mr. Chairman.
  The amendment fashioned by the learned chairman of the Committee on 
the Judiciary brings this long out-of-balance resolution and separation 
of [[Page H5670]] powers back into balance for both parties and for 
both branches of Government, and importantly, also in the eyes of our 
allies and adversaries alike in the world.
  Let us remove this cloud, this fog hanging over the ability of our 
Government of which we are both a part, the Congress and the President, 
to conduct coherent and effective national security policy around the 
world in the most dangerous situations imaginable.
  I rise in strong support of the amendment offered by the learned 
gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, can the Chair tell us how much time is 
remaining on each side?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] has 15 minutes 
remaining, and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] has 14 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is 
not present.
  The CHAIRMAN. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  Members will record their presence by electronic device.
  The call was taken by electronic device.
  The following Members responded to their names:
                             [Roll No 358]

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
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                              {time}  1828

  The CHAIRMAN. Four hundred five Members have answered to their names, 
a quorum is present, and the Committee will resume its business.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Tanner].
  (Mr. TANNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)

                              {time}  1830

  Mr. TANNER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend from Indiana for 
yielding. I do not think I will take all of 2 minutes. I did not intend 
to speak on this matter, but I served on a committee with Larry Hopkins 
from Kentucky some years ago as we tried to perfect the War Powers Act. 
I served in the Navy during the Vietnam war, and I went into the Navy 
in 1968. By the time I got off of active duty or discharged in 1972, I 
saw our country divided as maybe never before, at least since the Civil 
War.
  Now, as imperfect at the War Powers Act is, my friends, it does put 
the Congress in the mix to express the will of the people into the 
equation. I saw during those 4 years our country divided in a way 
perhaps it has not been since the Civil War.
  My friends, it does put the Congress into the mix to express the will 
of the people. Any administration, be it the Kennedy, Johnson, or Nixon 
administration as it was in Vietnam, is going to get into matters that 
it cannot extricate itself. Never again let us go into war with bullets 
flying and people dying without the expressed will of the American 
people, at least with some resolution by the Congress, so that we do 
have that critical mass of popular support for whatever it is we may 
do. I really believe it is critical, even though it is imperfect, that 
we stay involved in the process.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] has 15 minutes 
remaining, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] has 11 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha].
  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, let me speak from a practical standpoint in 
favor of the Hyde amendment. In the last couple years we have had real 
problems with peacekeeping, for instance, and I have always felt that 
the President should get authorization from Congress before be deploys 
troops in peacekeeping mission. But I separate peacekeeping from war 
making. And I think there is a distinctive difference, and I think it 
is very difficult for us to insist on the convoluted war powers 
requirements for a President to make decision on sending troops into 
battle.
  Now, I remember vividly, and Vietnam war hangs over us with all the 
concerns and problems that we had, but I remember vividly going to meet 
with President Bush upstairs in the White House. And the thing we 
discussed it how long would the American public support a war in Saudi 
Arabia. As we discussed that, there were recommendations that probably 
the public would support it anywhere from 6 months to the next 
election. And this all grew out of the hostilities that were throughout 
the country during the Vietnam war. [[Page H5671]] 
  My prediction was that the public would support
   this deployment for about 6 months. And after 6 months, if you 
remember, we started to get requests, or at least in my office I did, 
we started to get requests from people in my district that were serving 
overseas in the hardship position that these folks ought to come home. 
It is never popular to put people in harm's way. Nobody believed that 
the Congress would pass an authorization to send troops into harm's 
way.

  As a matter of fact, I remember after talking to the public at home, 
I came up and called General Scowcroft, who was the national security 
advisor at that time, and I said to him, I think the Congress, because 
the public supports the need for national security and the importance 
of the Middle East and the energy supply, they will support an 
authorization to go to war. An awful lot of people did not agree with 
that. But when the Congress met and debated, one of the finest debates 
that this Congress has ever been involved in, we did the right thing. 
By an overwhelming margin in the House we authorized this great Nation 
to send our young people into harm's way.
  It worked out fine, and that is the way it should be. We had public 
support. We called up the Reserves, and we did it the right way.
  The danger in the War Powers Act in my estimation is by inaction. We 
can stop the President from making a decision. We should have to take 
action. It should be hard. No President is going to send troops into 
harm's way without a national security reason. It is not an easy thing.
  I supported President Reagan all through the Central American crisis. 
I supported President Bush in Saudi Arabia. I opposed him in Somalia 
because I felt Somalia was a mistake and we would not be able to solve 
it. It was an internal problem. I oppose using ground forces in Bosnia 
except to extract U.N. forces under NATO.
  But let me say this: I believe that when the American people elect a 
President, that President should have the leeway and the right to send 
people into harm's way with the advice and counsel of the Chiefs of 
Staff. I do not believe that in an emotional situation the Congress 
should be able to stop this in any way. I do not think there should be 
hope that because we have something on paper that the Congress of the 
United States is going to stop the President from making the right 
decision.
  So I support very strongly what the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. 
Hyde] is trying to do in getting rid of this. Now, can we do something 
in the future? I do not know. But at this time in our history, I think 
it is up to this Congress to step up and say that it is the President's 
prerogative, and if we want to take exception to that, we can stop the 
appropriation funds.
  So I strongly support and urge the Members of this Congress to vote 
for the Henry Hyde amendment and to eliminate the War Powers Act.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I was here many 
years ago when we debated the War Powers Resolution. It was back in my 
black haired days and many days have gone by. And I recall the debate 
vividly, Mr. Chairman. It was a significant debate. A freestanding 
resolution came to the floor as a product of a deliberative and 
substantive legislative process.
  To the consternation of a number of my colleagues on this side of the 
aisle, I found myself, Mr. Chairman, in opposition to the War Powers 
Resolution and was one of the few Democrats who voted against the 
resolution. And I did so for several reasons. One, I felt that the War 
Powers Resolution diminished the clarity of the Constitution on the 
issue of Congress' role in war making.
  Second, I felt that it was a mistake to allow the President to 
introduce American forces into a situation and seek retroactive 
approval from the Congress of the United States. I thought that our 
Founders thought brilliantly and thoughtfully and creatively about the 
issue of war making and war powers, because that was a grave decision 
that the body politic would engage in.
  While I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the post-cold-war era has 
introduced a new period in American and world history and that the War 
Powers Resolution should be looked at, we may very well need a new 
instrument to guide us through this transitional period into the new 
world of the 21st century. But I would submit, though I believe in the 
need for a new instrument and while in the early 1970 I opposed the War 
Powers Resolution, I find myself today on the floor of Congress asking 
my colleagues to oppose the amendment before us for two reasons: One, 
on process, and, two, on substance.
  With respect to process, Mr. Chairman, the War Powers Act is no small 
piece of legislation. The War Powers Act is not a minor instrument in 
our government. This is a high profile instrument. It is a contentious 
issue. There are thoughtful people on all sides of the question of what 
should be an appropriate instrument that guides us in the context of 
the post-cold-war world. I believe that this issue is so important that 
the policy with respect to war making, the role of the Congress of the 
United States vis-a-vis the President, is so significant, that it 
should not come to the floor simply and solely as an amendment. Though 
I would agree that there is some debate here, this is the end product 
of the legislative process, not where it should begin.
  It should begin in subcommittee and in full committee, where we hear 
and understand the subtleties and the nuances of any significant policy 
that affects our lives and millions of people in this country and 
throughout the world. The War Powers Resolution does just that.
  So I would suggest that we oppose it, first, because of the process 
being flawed. We should not come to the floor with policy 
considerations so exceptional and so profound and so extraordinary, and 
we simply debate them here on the floor of Congress. It needs to be 
substantive, deliberative, and thoughtful. Hearings were not held, 
markups were not held. This is much too large.
  Second, to the issue of substance. As I understand the resolution, 
it, A, repeals the War Powers Resolution, and, two, puts in place the 
following: A consultative process. The President consults with the 
Congress of the United States, with reporting requirements that are 
weaker than in the present War Powers Resolution.
  There are some of us, Mr. Chairman, in the body politic who believe 
that the role of Congress goes far beyond simply one of being 
consulted. There are times when this gentleman believes that we need 
prior approval.
  I would remind a number of my colleagues, some of whom were not here 
in the context of the debate on the Persian Gulf that the distinguished 
former speaker spoke to, this gentleman took the President of the 
United States to court trying to protect and defend the Congress' 
constitutional prerogatives in war making.
  So there are thoughtful and courageous people on both sides of the 
issue, some who think it is simply one of consultation, others who 
believe that we should embellish upon that with prior approval. I am 
simply saying that this does not get us here.
  Finally, and in conclusion, I think that the gentleman from Illinois 
[Mr. Hyde] is attempting to do something important. This is not the 
forum, this is not the product. I urge my colleagues to oppose the 
amendment.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time on 
this side.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized for 6 minutes.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, let me begin by simply saying that I 
think that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] has performed a 
genuine service in bringing before this body the question of a repeal 
of the War Powers Resolution. There is no doubt that the resolution has 
many defects to it. The gentleman from Illinois and others are quite 
right when they point out those defects.
  There is no President that accepts the War Powers Resolution. You are 
right about that. The 60-day clock provision means that the Congress 
can control whether or not we have combat troops there by inaction. 
That does not make any sense. I acknowledge that.
                              {time}  1845

  The concurrent resolution mechanism does not work; so all of us 
agree, [[Page H5672]] I think, in this Chamber that the War Powers 
Resolution needs major revision. But I want to put out to you what the 
Hyde amendment says. In its very first substantive sentence, the War 
Powers Resolution is repealed. I want Members to think a little bit 
about what that means.
  One of the mysterious attributes of this body is that we do not 
sometimes want the power that the Constitution gives us. And that is 
exactly what a repeal of War Powers means here. I believe that the 
Constitution absolutely requires the Congress to share with the 
President the decision to send troops into combat. Presidents make 
mistakes. Presidents are not infallible. And the gravest decision that 
a government makes, do you send young men and women into war, is a 
decision that should be made not by any person alone, even if that 
person is the president. It should be made with a collective judgment. 
And is that not the theory of the Constitution, that the war making 
power requires a collective judgment of the President and the 
legislative branch?
  That is the core of the War Powers Resolution. The other parts of it 
need to be corrected; but do not cede away the core power of the 
resolution because, when you do that, you are walking away from the 
constitutional power of the Congress.
  The War Powers Resolution has been helpful. Any of us in this Chamber 
who served before the War Powers Resolution and then served after the 
War Powers Resolution knows that presidents today consult a lot more 
with the Congress after the War Powers Resolution was enacted.
  Now, what does the amendment do by the gentleman from Illinois, [Mr. 
Hyde]? It does not acknowledge that Congress should share in this most 
important decision to go to war. It means that on this most important 
decision we are not a coequal branch. We say: Mr. President, please 
consult with us. We do not even require him to consult. We just say in 
every possible instance consult. The President can ignore us under this 
amendment if he wants to. The Congress becomes on this most important 
power a junior partner who will be consulted or not as the President 
chooses. Do not cede away this power. Work with us to improve it.
  I have talked with the sponsor of this amendment. He is a very 
reasonable man. I think he believes that this amendment is not the end 
but the beginning of a serious effort to revise and strengthen the War 
Powers Act. I believe that to be the case. But repealing the War Powers 
Act now sends a signal to the American people, and that signal is that 
we abdicate our power in this body and we give it to the President of 
the United States carte blanche, carte blanche authority. I do not see 
how we can do that. I do not see how we can do it and read the 
Constitution of the United States.
  We give a green light unchecked to the President, and we send that 
message that we have no role up front.
  Now, the point is often made that we have the power of the purse. But 
just think about that. There comes a critical point whenever you are 
making a decision to commit troops, we all know it, there is a critical 
point. And that critical point is when the decision is made to send 
them in or send them out. That is when you want the Congress involved, 
not months later when you are dealing with the power of the purse.
  Sure, we can cut off funding. But it is very difficult to cut off 
funding beforehand because you want to keep your options open. It is 
very difficult to cut off funding after the fact because the troops are 
already in the field. I am not saying we do not ever do it. I am just 
saying it is extremely difficult to do it.
  I think the Congress of the United States on this question of war 
powers can stand against the President. I think there are times when we 
should stand beside the President, but Congress should not stand aside 
when American soldiers go into combat; and that is precisely what this 
amendment puts forward.
  I urge a vote in order to keep the constitutional powers of this 
institution. I urge Members to vote ``no'' on the Hyde amendment.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  I want to respond very briefly. There is no carte blanche authority 
given to the President by this amendment of mine. This amendment 
strengthens. There is nothing requiring notification in the War Powers 
Act. This amendment says the President shall in every possible--not 
may--shall report to Congress before, before the troops go in; and then 
after the introduction, the President shall. So we will be informed. 
The same thing goes for the report.
  We are not required to leave our common sense out in the Rotunda. The 
facts of life are Lyndon Johnson could not even go to his own 
convention because the people did not support what he was doing in 
Vietnam. And that lesson has not been lost on anybody with a room 
temperature IQ. So do not think the War Powers Act forces the President 
to consult. No President who wants to survive another week will omit 
consulting.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 9 minutes to the Speaker of the House, the 
distinguished gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Gingrich].
  Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Illinois for 
yielding time to me.
  I rise for what some Members might find an unusual moment, an appeal 
to the House to, at least on paper, increase the power of President 
Clinton. And here we are in the middle of the Bosnian exercise with 
troops in Haiti and with all sorts of concerns, and yet I stand here to 
say that for America, the right thing to do is repeal these provisions, 
for America.
  The reason is simple. First of all, I listened carefully to my good 
friend, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], who I think is a 
very serious and a very committed scholar of this. But he said 
something that all of us need to be aware of. He said, he complained, 
``We have no role up front.'' I want to make two points about this, 
because he is right. We have no role up front.
  We have no role up front because in an age of instantaneous change, 
as we were tragically reminded in Oklahoma City, there are times and 
moments when you need what the Constitution called ``the Commander in 
Chief.'' And once we have designed the military and we have paid for 
the military and we have established the framework and we have created 
the laws, within the legal framework of those laws in an emergency the 
Commander in Chief has to actually act as the Commander in Chief.
  And that has been true of both parties. In fact, it was true of 
George Washington. It was true of Thomas Jefferson. People who say I am 
a Jeffersonian conservative, well, Jefferson sent the Marines to 
Tripoli and then told this Congress.
  So the fact is, in the real world, if we are going to be honest with 
our constituents, a Commander in Chief exercising those powers with 
American troops scattered across the planet and, I think, over 100 
different countries, if you count various advisory groups, they are 
there. We did advise. We passed the appropriations. We said, we 
established the Congress. We maintained the Navy, to use the two terms, 
and we established the Army and maintained the Navy, and the fact is 
they are there.
  And if tomorrow morning somebody were to attack our troops, there 
would be an instantaneous, immediate reaction. And I certainly hope, 
for one, they would not stand there taking casualties waiting for the 
President to come to the Congress to see if we could report out a 
resolution to allow our troops to defend themselves.
  My good friend would say, the War Powers Act does not stop that. 
Exactly. What the War Powers Act says is if the President decides to 
notify us that the troops are in imminent danger, then we have 60 days. 
I have been through this drill. I was through this drill with President 
Reagan. I was through this drill with President Bush. I am now going 
through this drill with President Clinton. Let me tell you what 
happens.
  We get committed somewhere. And then the military comes in and says, 
you could pass this. But if you pass this, you are now saying to every 
terrorist, why do you not kill some Americans to force them out? Do you 
want to set the standard that Americans are targets so that the 
Congress can be pressured and suddenly everybody in senior leadership 
in both parties. Somebody says, Well, maybe we do not 
[[Page H5673]] want to make Americans targets; maybe we do not want to 
set up Americans to get killed. What happens?
  Let me give you an example from the Clinton administration. A letter, 
written July 21, 1993. It said about Somalia, in a situation where 
people were being killed, ``intermittent activity, intermittent
 military engagements involving U.S. forces overseas, whether or not 
constituting hostilities, do not count.'' So an ambush in Mogadishu, 
the loss of 18 American lives, that does not count. They are not in 
imminent danger.

  Nobody jumped up, the Democratic leadership did not return to the 
floor, the then chairman of Committee on International Relations did 
not rush to the floor, did not say, 18 Americans have died. Clearly, 
are in imminent danger.
  Instead everybody agreed, let us hold hands, let us not risk any 
additional Americans being killed.
  Why, if that is the case, why am I for repealing this?
  Because it sends exactly the wrong signal to both branches. It says 
the Congress is just enough involved to have everybody downtown 
wandering in circles and being confused, and it says to the Congress, 
oh, you really have a role. You want to cut off troops in Haiti or 
Somalia or you want to cut off troops in Bosnia, there is an easy way 
to do it. It is called the power of the purse.
  In fact, we have done it before. In the case of Lebanon, we did it. 
In the case of Somalia we did it. We used the appropriations process 
exactly as the Federalist Papers described and exactly as the Founding 
Fathers wanted, and we had a clean and a decisive choice.
  Where we are responsible, which is the money, we said, No, after this 
date get out, period, end of story.
  Now, we negotiated to make sure the day was a safe one. We negotiated 
to protect our troops. But we exercised the power of the Congress 
without having a complicated, convoluted, and profoundly dishonest law. 
Because what this law does is it says to every administration, do not 
tell the truth. If Americans are in imminent danger, do not say it 
because if you say it, you will trigger the War Powers Act. And by the 
way, if it triggered the War Powers Act and we did not pass something 
and you had a strong President, they would promptly say, as the Clinton 
administration said last year, it does not count. And they would stay. 
And guess what, the only way you could get them out would be to pass an 
appropriations bill to cut off the funding or to impeach the President.
  So what I am begging for is clarity. Let us return to a system that 
worked from the founding of the country to the mid-1970's. Let us 
return to a system that says, we in Congress have awesome power. If we 
do not pass an appropriations bill, nothing happens. There is no 
government. There is no Army. There is no Navy. But if we delegate 
powers to the President and we establish a framework of law and we 
agree to establish something to happen, let us actually allow the 
Commander in Chief to be Commander in Chief.
  And I asked my good friend, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], 
to allow me to close because I think the American nation needs to 
understand that as Speaker of the House and as the chief spokesman in 
the House for the Republican party, I want to strengthen the current 
Democratic president because he is the President of the United States. 
And the President of the United States on a bipartisan basis deserves 
to be strengthened in foreign affairs and strengthened in national 
security. He does not deserve to be undermined and cluttered and 
weakened.
  When we get to disagreements, we will have the right place to have 
them. But this particular bill was wrong when it was passed. It has not 
worked in 20 years. And it is wrong now. And we should clean up the 
law, get it back to the constitutional framework and allow the 
President of the United States to lead in foreign policy with us 
deciding on key issues by our power of the purse.
                              {time}  1900

  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 201, 
noes 217, not voting 17, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 359]

                               AYES--201

     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehner
     Bono
     Borski
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Canady
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clinger
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Davis
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gillmor
     Gingrich
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaFalce
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     Longley
     Manzullo
     Martinez
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHale
     McHugh
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Mink
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Murtha
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Radanovich
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Talent
     Tate
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thornberry
     Thornton
     Tiahrt
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                               NOES--217

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bishop
     Boehlert
     Bonior
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Camp
     Cardin
     Chenoweth
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Condit
     Conyers
     Cooley
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Cunningham
     Danner
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Emerson
     Engel
     Ensign
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green
     Gunderson
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hayes
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     LaHood
     Lantos
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lincoln
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manton
     Markey
     Martini
     Mascara
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     McInnis
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Moakley
     Morella
     Nadler
     Neal
     Ney
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Reed
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Riggs
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Rohrabacher
     Rose
     Roth
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Scarborough
     Schiff
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shuster
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stump
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurman [[Page H5674]] 
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Tucker
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Walsh
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Williams
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--17

     Bonilla
     Bryant (TX)
     Cubin
     Dicks
     Houghton
     Johnson (CT)
     Kleczka
     Laughlin
     Lofgren
     Lucas
     Montgomery
     Paxon
     Peterson (FL)
     Stark
     Waldholtz
     Watts (OK)
     Wicker

                              {time}  1917

  Mr. SCARBOROUGH changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that debate on the 
amendment about to be considered and all amendments thereto be limited 
to 60 minutes, to be equally divided and controlled by myself and the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New York?
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I would 
like to ask the distinguished chairman if he has discussed this at all 
with the minority.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, I do not 
believe it has been discussed with the minority.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. In that case, I will be compelled to object, Mr. 
Chairman.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, further reserving the right to object, I 
yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, how many speakers does the gentleman have 
on his side on this amendment?
  Mr. ACKERMAN. We are not sure right now, but we would be delighted to 
discuss it with the gentleman. We think it is in the neighborhood 
possibly of anywhere from 4 to 6.
  Mr. GILMAN. If we could agree on some reasonable time, if the 
gentleman will yield further, we have until 9 o'clock to wind up this 
evening. We have one other major amendment to consider this evening.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. I think that we would be very amenable to discussing it 
on a staff level at this point while this amendment is being debated.
  Mr. GILMAN. We will be pleased to discuss it further with the 
gentleman's staff.
  Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my unanimous consent request.
                   amendment offered by mr. ackerman

  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Ackerman: On page 67, after line 
     9, insert the following new section:

     SEC. 501. CONSOLIDATION REPORT.

       (A) Report.--No agency of the United States Government may 
     be abolished or its functions transferred or consolidated 
     with another such agency pursuant to this division or any 
     other provision of this Act relating to reorganization unless 
     the Director of the Congressional Budget Office and the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget independently 
     calculate and submit to the Congress a joint report analyzing 
     the costs and benefits of any such action.
       (b) Contents of Report.--The cost/benefit analysis required 
     by subsection (a) shall include, but not be limited to--
       (1) An assessment of direct and indirect costs for the 
     first five years associated with the implementation of the 
     provisions of this division or any other provision of this 
     Act relating to reorganization; and
       (2) The effects of consolidation on personnel, management 
     systems, real property, decisionmaking processes, 
     administrative costs, and costs associated with terminating, 
     amending, renegotiating, or negotiating existing and new 
     contracts.
       (c) Further Congressional Action Required.--Notwithstanding 
     any other provision of this act, if the Director of the 
     Congressional Budget Office and the Director of the Office of 
     Management and Budget either jointly or independently 
     determine and report that the costs associated with the 
     consolidation required by this division or any other 
     provision of this act relating to reorganization exceed the 
     fiscal year 1995 operating costs of the affected agencies, 
     such provisions shall not become effective unless--
       (1) the President determines that such consolidation is in 
     the national interest of the United States; or
       (2) a joint resolution is enacted specifying that such 
     provisions shall become effective upon enactment of such 
     resolution.
       Redesignate sections 501 through 511 as sections 502 
     through 512.

  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is modeled on principles 
that the majority has articulated in this chamber since January, and it 
is my hope that we will have strong bipartisan support for its 
adoption. Members on both sides of the aisle--whether they support 
consolidation within the State Department or not--should find this 
amendment very attractive. We should know what our actions will cost or 
save before we engage in a massive reorganization.
  The amendment is designed to ensure that this body does not 
unknowingly write a blank check in the course of passing this bill, 
something that concerns all of us who are trying to save taxpayer 
dollars from frivolous Government spending.
  For those who are not on the International Relations Committee, let 
it be known that there is presently no way of knowing if the bill, as 
reported, will save one penny as a result of reorganization.
  Under this bill, we abolish three agencies and direct the former 
heads to report to work and assume new roles within the State 
Department. Yet there is no specific plan on how this will be 
accomplished.
  There is no plan in place to reduce any staff. There is no plan in 
place to eliminate the cost of maintaining buildings, if indeed any are 
found not to be needed, and there is no plan in place to determine the 
costs and savings in buying out leases and service contracts. In fact, 
as the legislation is written, a consolidation plan is not required 
until March 1996.
  How do we do this in the blind? Without this amendment we will be 
passing a blank check bill. At this point, there is simply no way to 
conduct a cost-benefit analysis because under the bill we won't even 
see a plan until March 1996.
  To rectify this problem my amendment does the following:
  First, it requires a joint report from the Director of OMB and the 
Director of the CBO, who is a Republican, requiring an analysis of the 
costs and benefits of the proposed plan for the first 5 years it is in 
effect. The report will cover effects of consolidation on personnel, 
management systems, real property, decision making processes, 
administrative costs and costs associated with terminating, amending or 
negotiating existing and new contracts.
  What if the proposed consolidation doesn't save money, but actually 
costs more money? That might come as a surprise to some. But you may 
want to go forward anyway--and you can.
  Second, if the report indicates that the costs of the reorganization 
exceed the fiscal year 1995 operating costs of the agencies, the 
President may determine it is in the national interest and proceed--and 
don't forget, this bill applies to the next president. If the President 
does not make that determination, the Congress must enact a joint 
resolution specifying that the consolidation, if more costly, may 
proceed.
  My goal here is simple: It is to guarantee that the Congress know and 
understand the costs of its action, and then proceeds to act with that 
knowledge. This provision is consistent with the vision of the 
Republican majority who have shown a consistent dedication to rigorous 
application of cost-benefit analysis. I look forward to strong 
bipartisan support in adoption of this amendment.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Ackerman 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, our colleague, the gentleman from New York, has put 
forth an amendment, but in reality what the amendment really does is to 
put a hold, to absolutely gut the provisions of the bill. This bill, as 
written in this section, will allow the consolidation of ACDA, AID and 
USIA functions within the State Department.
  Of the organizations that are in an unusual fashion expressing 
support for this bill today, the support is coming because we are in 
fact consolidating the agencies that now exist as separate agencies, 
AID, ACDA and, of course, USIA. That is the reason we are having the 
taxpayer groups and so many other conservative groups, who ordinarily 
would never come out and suggest that we ought to vote for a foreign 
assistance bill, but in fact it is one of the major ways that we are 
saving an extraordinary amount of money.
  I want to call my colleagues' attention to a couple of changes that 
the committee made in the course of deliberations on the proposal to 
consolidate [[Page H5675]] these agencies. One of the most important 
concerns I had early in the process was the fact that we may be burying 
ACDA, the arms control agency, and their recommendations, too deep in 
the bureaucracy of the State Department. So in fact we amended that and 
moved the placement so that the director of ACDA will be making 
recommendations not through some layer of bureaucracy but directly to 
the National Security Council, to the President. It cannot be delayed, 
cannot have his recommendations deferred or set aside by some assistant 
Secretary of State or even the Secretary of State.
  The other thing I wanted to mention is the fact that while the 
concept started in the other body and was once enunciated in the House 
bill at its earliest stage of having a separate foundation run what are 
now the programs of the Agency for International Development, that 
concept was jettisoned. Indeed, what we have kept is an assurance by 
the organization proposed that the programs of the Agency for 
International Development in its new home, it is not being eliminated, 
it is being placed and consolidated into the State Department, that 
those programs will in fact be a tool or set of tools to be implemented 
by the President of the United States.

                              {time}  1930

  After all, the development policies and the other programs run by the 
Agency for International Development ought to be under the direction of 
the President so that they can indeed serve our national interests, our 
foreign policy objectives.
  So I would say to my colleagues, if they vote for the Ackerman 
amendment they are basically gutting the bill's savings provisions, the 
part that conserves our dollars and makes a better use of them, they 
are gutting the consolidation efforts that we have shown in this bill.
  Importantly, the Ackerman amendment gives the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget an independent veto over this consolidation. A 
new statute would be required to override the veto. Now those are the 
kind of decisions I think properly are left to the Congress of the 
United States and not to CBO and not to OMB. I do not think we need 
additional studies. If there are savings in this approach, I think it 
is a rather extraordinary circumstance that they would have to 
demonstrate. It is very clear that the savings in the bill are in 
significant part because of this consolidation.
  So I urge my colleagues to reject the Ackerman amendment and to leave 
what we have crafted in the way of a consolidation effort. I think it 
focuses the programs, the decisionmakings that do relate to our foreign 
policy where it ought to be in the State Department but with careful 
placement of these three new subcomponents.
  I ask my colleagues to vote against the Ackerman amendment.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words, and I rise in support of the Ackerman amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I support the Ackerman amendment for one very simple 
reason: I think the matter of arms control policing is much too 
important to be left in the hands of the State Department. I recognize 
the efforts made by the committee to try to ensure that ACDA will in 
fact still directly report to the National Security Agency. But the 
fact is that so long as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency remains 
in any way a part of the State Department, it will be under pressure, 
regardless of the bureaucratic boxes, it will be under pressure to 
follow the party line of the agency. And with all due respect to the 
State Department, and I have a lot of respect for it, I think the 
Congress needs to know that it has an absolutely independent and 
fiercely independent agency which will call the shots as they see it 
when they are evaluating whether other countries who share this globe 
with us are in fact in compliance with arms control agreements or not. 
And so long as the arms control agreements or not. And so long as the 
arms control agency is folded into the State Department, we will always 
have the tendency of the State Department to want to take into account 
other factors, and they will bring pressure on ACDA to take into 
account other factors such as our political relationships with those 
countries.
  Political relationships are important. But when it comes to arms 
control, this Congress needs to be able to know that it has the 
unvarnished facts, and I think there are just too many pressures on the 
State Department to assure that we are going to get those unvarnished 
facts, and therefore I would oppose what the committee does.
  I cannot think of any more important information which the Congress 
needs to have than to know whether or not some other country in the 
world is either violating or getting close to violating arms control 
agreements which they have signed.
  I do not want to have even the slightest scintilla of pressure be 
brought on an arms compliance evaluating agency to take into account 
the fact that we need to have good relations with another country, or 
we need to take into account what is happening with the political 
opposition in that country. It just seems to me that the primary 
obligation of this Congress is to have clear, straight information, and 
I think we risk the fact that we will not have it if ACDA is submerged 
into the State Department.
  So I would strongly urge that the Ackerman amendment be supported. 
All it says is that this action cannot take place until there is a 
cost-benefit analysis. That to me refutes the argument of my good 
friend from Nebraska, with whom I very seldom disagree on foreign 
policy issues. It just seems to me in this case the Congress' 
overwhelming interest in having absolutely neutral, straight, hard-
nosed information about whether other countries are giving us a snow 
job or not in terms of their compliance overrides all other 
considerations. We ought to vote for this amendment.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  Mr. Chairman, have no doubt about it, this amendment would gut the 
reform that the Republicans have brought to the foreign policy 
establishment of this country. The American people voted for change. We 
have come forward with a bold plan of reform, and what we have now is 
an attempt to derail that reform, to study it to death.
  In answer to some of the arguments that have been made, whether it is 
arms control or whether it is AID policy, or whether it is 
communications policy, these are not separate efforts. These are not 
things that operate and should operate independently of a global 
strategy. These are part and should be part and parcel of a global 
strategy, part of the same effort. This is what is behind our whole 
reform proposal to take arms control, AID decisions, and communications 
and put them into the State Department so that we can have what this 
country needs, and that is bold leadership on the part of the executive 
rather than what we have had in the last 10 years, which is quite often 
nothing more than an attempt by people who hold executive power to 
reach a consensus among independent agencies.
  The fact is that if we are going to be efficient in the post-cold war 
world we need to make sure that our organizational structure is more 
efficient, and is operating with decisive leadership, which is exactly 
what you cannot have when you have different agencies operating 
independently.
  What we are trying to do is consolidate, reform, and restructure the 
foreign policy apparatus of the United States in order to bring down 
costs and to make the system more efficient. What this amendment would 
do is prevent that reform, and maintain an ineffective status quo.
  We need to provide American ambassadors, for example, more 
flexibility in their decisions with lower budgets, because they will 
have lower budgets. If we do not restructure at a time when we are 
bringing down the budgets of our foreign policy establishment, if we do 
not give them more flexibility, we are going to end up with a worse 
foreign policy apparatus. We need to change the way our foreign policy 
establishment has been doing business because this is a different 
world. And there is no way that you can force these types of reform 
decisions to be made than to force this type of restructuring by a 
reform process.
  Again what we have here is a proposal to study our reform measures to 
death. Instead it is time to act decisively, time to move forward, time 
to [[Page H5676]] change the status quo, and not sit back in indecisive 
studying of the problem.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. I appreciate the gentleman's yielding.
  First, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman misinterprets my intent. I am not 
intending for anything to be studied to death. I do not want it to be 
studied any more than the time necessary to make the appropriate 
decision, but the gentleman refers, as previous speakers have referred, 
to the supposed fact, and it may or may not be true, that this bill as 
constructed is going to save money. And the only thing that I am asking 
and those who support this bill are asking is, where is the savings? 
Has there been, as you have called for time and time again, a cost-
benefit analysis of any major change? Perhaps it is going to cost less, 
perhaps it is going to cost more. Without any delay, why can we not 
have somebody tell us where the savings are, where is it going to be 
more efficient, how many dollars. Could the gentleman tell me within 
$100 million how much we might save? There is not penny of savings in 
the bill.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Reclaiming my time in order to answer the question, 
we are bringing down these budgets, and by restructuring we are forcing 
those people, those managers within the system, to be more efficient, 
to make decisions that will make their operation more effective within 
decreased budgets. The fact is that in the post-cold-war world we need 
some restructuring, and we perhaps need our ambassadors in foreign 
countries to be able to operate a little bit more independently even 
though their budgets in foreign countries will be less than what they 
were 10 years ago at the height of the cold war.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. If the gentleman will yield further, as the gentleman 
knows, within the bill presently there is no plan for restructuring. 
The bill calls for a plan to be put forth by March of 1996. So there is 
no plan on which to base any costs. Why is there opposition to having 
somebody do an analysis of whether this will cost or save money?
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. There is a reform plan.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have only one remaining speaker.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would advise the Members we are under the 5 
minute rule.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, in answer to the gentleman's question, we 
have five additional speakers who are present in the room right now.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is proceeding under the 5 minute rule.
  Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman has five additional speakers?
  Mr. ACKERMAN. That is correct.
  Mr. GILMAN. We have only two. Would the gentleman consent to 
unanimous consent to wind up all debate by 8 o'clock?
  Mr. ACKERMAN. If he will limit each of his speakers to 1 minute each 
and allow us the balance of the time, the answer is yes, but obviously 
we have more speakers than he.
  Mr. GILMAN. We are pleased to limit our speakers so we can wind up by 
8 o'clock if we can share the time equally.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. I have to object; if the gentleman has two speakers and 
we have five, splitting the time equally would not be equitable.
  Mr. GILMAN. We will be pleased to try to limit our speakers to 3 
minutes each and reserve the balance for the gentleman's side.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. We will try to exercise the maximum restraint possible. 
We are not interested in dragging this out, but we do have Members who 
have signed up.
  Mr. GILMAN. May I further suggest that we limit the remaining 
speakers to 3 minutes each on both sides?
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New York?
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, I withdraw 
my reservation to object, but not to the 8 o'clock ceiling. But we will 
limit subsequent speakers to 3 minutes each.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my initial unanimous-consent 
request and I ask unanimous consent that each speaker be allowed 3 more 
minutes so we can wind up the debate at an early hour.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New York?
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, I just 
want to make it clear we are talking about this amendment specifically, 
and we are not amending the 5-minute rule to now be known as the 3-
minute rule for the remainder of the debate on this particular bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is the understanding of the Chair it will be this 
amendment and amendments to this amendment.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Ackerman 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for 3 minutes.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I think what strikes me about the 
provision in the bill with respect to reorganization is that we simply 
do not know what the bill's impact is on people, on costs, on the 
ability to carry out the mission. I do not know whether we make any 
savings with this bill or not, the reorganization.
                              {time}  1945

  The chairman of the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, 
during the committee debate, said there are no savings from the 
consolidation in this bill. The word ``abolish'' is used several times 
in the bill to abolish AID, abolish USIA, abolish ACDA, and put them 
all into one organization, but all of the functions of those agencies 
are continued. So we are simply moving boxes around, as far as I can 
see.
  What it does, the reorganization proposal, is to vastly expand the 
State Department. It doubles the number of employees in the State 
Department. It triples the budget of the State Department.
  Now, all of us agree that government has to be downsized, and I want 
to say that the Administration has worked pretty hard at that. Staff 
has already been reduced by 2,300 in the foreign policy agencies. That 
has contributed $500 million in cost savings thus far. It has pledged 
to cut another $5 billion from the international affairs budget from 
1997 through the year 2000.
  I want to point out that the Congressional Budget Office has not done 
any study on the potential cost savings that would result from the 
consolidation mandated by this bill, and it is important to compare the 
processes here with the processes used in the Defense Department and 
the intelligence agencies, where you really had a bottom-up review. 
Compare this bill with the approach taken in the intelligence community 
today, also a bottom-up review, but here we have no rationale. We are 
not connecting the changes in reorganization with the problems in 
American foreign policy.
  There is no effort to tie these reorganization proposals to any 
improvement in American foreign policy, and I simply do not have a good 
idea of what this reorganization does in terms of improving American 
foreign policy.
  The Ackerman amendment gives us the ability to know what we are 
buying into in this bill, and through that amendment we will find out 
whether there is money to be saved or there is not, whether 
decisionmaking will be enhanced or it will not be, whether 
effectiveness will be improved or it will be diminished.
  So this amendment, which mandates a cost-benefit analysis of agency 
reorganization prior to the implementation of any reorganization or 
consolidation plan, makes a lot of sense to me in terms of management.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I hope that the Members of this Chamber have had a 
chance to look at this amendment. You know, this is a very craftily 
adopted, created amendment. This amendment is very clever. It is 
Machiavellian in an effort to undo a major provision of this bill.
  I do not know if the people have all read this amendment, but when 
you read it there are a couple of sentences in here. It say, look at 
this, ``Unless [[Page H5677]] the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 
independently, calculate and submit to the Congress a joint report, 
nothing can be done.
  In other words, you have got 100 Senators, 435 Congressmen, and two 
bureaucrats can stifle the entire Congress and the will of Congress. 
That is what this amendment says, if you take a look at the amendment 
from line 5 to line 9. This amendment really guts the main provision of 
this bill.
  Now, our bill consolidates three out-of-date Cold War agencies. And 
how many times have you been home when people have said, ``Hey, our 
government is too big, our government costs too much?'' And basically 
what we are trying to do with this bill is take these three agencies 
and downsize them.
  The American people have loudly and clearly told us again and again 
that our government has gotten too big and costs too much. What is at 
issue here is basically a fight between the people who want to change 
what is happening in our government and the people who are fighting for 
a status quo. That is really at issue here, and the agents opposed to 
change are fighting a rear guard action here to gut the bill. It is the 
old adage, if you cannot defeat the bill, gut the bill.
  The President actually is given here a heck of a lot of authority. We 
are giving the President, under this bill, tremendous authority. He has 
all the advantages to structure this any way he wants, plus we are not 
giving him until tomorrow morning to do it. We are giving him 3 years 
to bring about this change. That certainly is enough. We are leaning 
over backwards to be fair.
  No one can argue the President is being disadvantaged. He has got all 
the time and all the
 abilities and all the advantages in carrying this out.

  This amendment merely says that we want change, and that change has 
to come about. This amendment is the old liberal welfare state 
philosophy of big government, of study, study, study, study. Study? How 
many studies do you need? You do not need any more studies. No matter 
how many studies are going to come here, you are going to make a 
decision whether to cut the government or not.
  Study, study, study, spend, spend, spend, but the real objective is 
to delay, delay, delay.
  What we are saying is we want to move forward. The American people 
have spoken, and we are saying that we are going to go ahead and 
downsize this government.
  Yes, we are going to move ahead, and we want to work with you, but we 
cannot allow you to totally stymie us and to keep us from doing what we 
have pledged to the American people that we will do. Let us do what the 
people have repeatedly asked us to do.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Roth] has 
expired.
  (On request of Mr. Ackerman, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Roth was 
allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. ROTH. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. I can understand and appreciate the gentleman's strong 
aversion and opposition to study. But could the gentleman cite for me 
one penny's worth of savings in this bill that you do not want to 
study? Not a dollar, not a thousand, not a million, not a billion. One 
penny. Tell me where it is saved in this bill.
  Mr. ROTH. We are bringing these three agencies into the State 
Department.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. At what cost?
  Mr. ROTH. We are downsizing them by one-third; each agency will be 
downsized by a third. Therefore, the cost of the agencies should be 
downsized by a third. That is what we are doing in this amendment.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. If the gentleman will explain how much the cost that 
offsets that in avoiding or renegotiating existing contracts.
  Mr. ROTH. Reclaiming my time, and I appreciate the gentleman getting 
me more time----
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Tell me how that saves more money on balance.
  Mr. ROTH. Reclaiming my time, we are going to be saving, because when 
we put these three agencies into the State Department, we are mandating 
to the President that when he brings these agencies in, he has to 
downsize them by a third.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. You do not mandate he saves any money?
  Mr. ROTH. Each one of these agencies will be downsized by a third. 
That is where the savings are going to be. This is a poor amendment, 
and I hope we all vote against it.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.
  I think, let us step back and take a look at what is going on. The 
majority party has put a bill on the floor which is a frontal assault 
on the President's authority to conduct foreign relations, micromanages 
to a level that the Democrats during Ronald Reagan's presidency never 
even presumed to go to, and massively slashes the amount of money spent 
on the foreign relations function.
  But they have got a problem because some of their members said they 
never would vote for anything, and the bill still is a $17 billion bill 
and they have got to get their members to vote for it. So they say, 
``Well, this does something else. This reforms the foreign affairs 
agencies by consolidating them.'' It gives total discretion, or pretty 
close to total discretion, to the executive branch as to how to 
consolidate it. There is no inherent savings in the consolidation.
  The gentleman from New York has pointed out why the act of 
consolidation will cost money, but now they can say it is reform, it is 
slashing, and it is attacking the President, so maybe now they can pick 
up the votes.
  The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Roth], my friend, says we are 
cutting each by one-third. You could leave the agencies separate and 
cut them by one-third. The act of consolidation does nothing to save 
money. What it does do is ensure commercial interests, like they did in 
Iraq, will supersede nonproliferation issues when you eliminate the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. What it does take independent 
radios and make them subordinate to the geopolitical relationships 
between countries, moves that independence which allows an accurate 
voice of what is going on in a country to be broadcast to that country 
where there is a dictatorship, where there is an absence of free press, 
and has caused conservatives, who are very much supportive of bringing 
that word to those countries, to oppose this consolidation.
  What it does is make development assistance goals and humanitarian 
goals subordinate to government-to-government relationships. There are 
major bad policy consequences from the consolidation.
  There are no savings. But now you can say you slashed and you 
reformed and you have attacked the President, and maybe you can pick up 
your party's members who said they would never vote for an even $17 
billion Foreign Assistance Act.
  The amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Ackerman] 
calls that bluff by saying, through a cost-benefit analysis, 
demonstrate the act of consolidation saves money. It puts you to the 
test. If this is the goal of consolidation, you will have no objection 
to the Ackerman amendment.
  If the goal is simply to put a label of reform onto a bill, then you 
probably want to oppose the Ackerman amendment.
  I urge adoption of it.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, well, let me just stress that I think we have probably 
exaggerated the debate.
  The fact is the Department of State can well function with the 
consolidated basis. The foreign policy of the United States can well 
function in a more decentralized basis.
  As perhaps the only Member of this body who has served in one of 
these agencies as a Foreign Service Officer, having spent 2 years in 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, it is my sense that for long 
term continuity the country's foreign policy probably operates better 
on a decentralized basis. We have a long and proud history of the 
United States Information Agency, under great leadership, of great 
independence and respect. Likewise with the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, and while AID is obviously a 
[[Page H5678]] controversial mission, we have had distinguished people 
serve at the Agency for International Development.
  I would only rise to stress whether one is for or against this bill, 
it should not relate to the outcome of this particular amendment.
  My view is to be sympathetic to it, and I will support it, but I 
would also stress that one can consolidate and function effectively. It 
all is a matter of leadership at any given point in time, and here we 
are involved in kind of a great political science debate in the sense 
of sometimes agencies of government, like business, are better off 
consolidated; sometimes, depending on leadership, they are better off 
with decentralized leadership. Sometimes there is a case for flux, 
where one has one circumstance to change it. Sometimes, in addition, 
there is a case for stability.
  Now, having said that and having noted that one can reach opposite 
conclusions, I think in the long term the best interest here is for 
stability and for decentralization and, therefore, I think on balance 
the Ackerman amendment makes the most sense at this particular time.
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Ackerman amendment. It quite 
clearly gives us the opportunity to take a more careful look at what I 
think is the not carefully thought through proposal for consolidation 
that is in the base bill.
  Mr. Chairman, effective foreign policy should represent the pursuit 
of enlightened self-interest. One of the most pressing interests in 
American foreign policy today is to control the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction. This becomes more and more important as regional and 
ethnic conflicts continue to explode across the globe. Today, more than 
ever before, it is in our critical self-interest to maintain an agency 
that advocates, negotiates, implements and verifies effective arms 
control, nonproliferation, and disarmament policies, strategies and 
agreements. That agency is the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
  Independent status means that ACDA brings to the policy table an 
expert and undiluted arms control viewpoint. Often, this viewpoint 
differs from the State Department's perspective, which must be 
primarily concerned with diplomacy. That is why ACDA was created and 
that is why ACDA has continued to prove its worth to U.S. national 
security over the years.
  H.R. 1561 eliminates ACDA's independent voice on arms control. It 
eliminates the ACDA's Director's access to the President, the National 
Security Advisor and the Secretary of State. It expels ACDA from 
interagency policymaking process where significant arms control and 
nonproliferation decisions are made.
  To understand the efficacy of ACDA's role in the foreign policy 
process one need only to look at recent newspaper headlines. I find it 
ironic that earlier this month, during the same week when the 
International Relations Committee proposed its abolition, ACDA's 
director was with the President at a summit in Moscow working on 
important national security matters while ACDA's deputy director was in 
New York securing one of the greatest American post-Cold War foreign 
policy successes--permanent extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty.
  Negotiation of the permanent extension of NPT was reached against the 
odds. Without the relentless effort of ACDA's expert negotiators over 
the last 3 years we might not have the NPT today. The protection that 
NPT helps provide against nuclear proliferation benefits all Americans.
  The supporters of H.R. 1561 claim that ACDA is a cold war relic. This 
claim shows how out of touch the authors of this legislation are with 
the realities of the foreign policy environment we face. Given the 
remaining dangers of Russian overarmament, and the new dangers of the 
post-cold-war world, ACDA is a relic today only if weapons of mass 
destruction are a rumor and proliferation is a myth.
  The authors of H.R. 1561 claim that it would save money by 
eliminating an independent ACDA. In fact, according to the 
Congressional Research Service, it will cost $10 million to eliminate 
ACDA.
  ACDA's basic budget is $50 million. According to the U.S. Strategic 
Command, the existing strategic arms limitation treaties have saved 
about $100 billion. Since these treaties took about a decade to 
negotiate, you could argue that there's a payoff of 200 to 1 from ACDA. 
I suspect that the impact of this ill-conceived legislation will be the 
reverse--one bill and 200 new problems caused by the disruption, 
dislocation, and crippling reductions contained in this bill.
  The creation of a mega-bureaucracy that absorbs ACDA comes at the 
worst time--as the U.S. Government is pursuing the biggest and broadest 
arms control and nonproliferation agenda in history. Now is not the 
time to be dismantling the one agency whose sole mandate is to 
fomulate, negotiate, and verify arms control and nonproliferation 
policies and agreements.
  This bill ought to be called the ``American Leadership Reduction and 
Avoidance Act of 1995.'' By silencing ACDA's independent voice on arms 
control and nonproliferation issues this bill presents a serious threat 
to the future security of this country. The purpose of ACDA is to bring 
the arms control perspective to the table when foreign policy decisions 
are made. This perspective has helped protect America and the world 
from dangerous proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons of mass destruction for a third of a century. Now is not the 
time to stop or shrink from responsibilities of leadership.

                              {time}  2000

  Now is not the time to be dismantling the one agency whose sole 
mandate is to formulate, negotiate, and verify arms control and 
nonproliferation policies and agreements. I urge a ``yes'' vote for the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Ackerman].
  Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words and rise in support of the amendment before the House.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment requires that the Directors of the 
Congressional Budget Office and the Office of Management and Budget to 
submit a joint report to the Congress analyzing the costs and benefits 
of proposals to abolish or consolidate the U.S. Agency for 
International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. This cost/benefit analysis will allow 
this Congress to make an informed decision that fully considers the 
effects of consolidation of agencies on the personnel and management 
systems involved.
  I support the goal of achieving a balanced budget over seven years, 
but I believe that we need to focus on the hard working citizens, many 
who live in Northern Virginia, who face possible job loss as a result 
of the agency consolidations proposed by this bill. I serve on the 
Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology where 
we are currently reviewing the costs and benefits of many of the 
consolidation and downsizing proposals that would reshape the Executive 
Branch of the Federal government. During our recent hearings, it has 
become evident that so-called downsizing and consolidation efforts can 
have the unintended consequence of actually increasing costs to the 
federal government. For example, it costs the federal government an 
average of $35,000 for each employee that is terminated from the civil 
service. This amendment would provide for enough time to make an 
informed decision regarding agency consolidation--a decision that could 
avoid the unintended costs associated with massive layoffs.
  Earlier this year, I strongly supported several measures that 
emphasize cost/benefit analysis and informed decision-making by 
regulatory agencies. My support for this amendment on agency 
consolidation is consistent with my support for regulatory reform. 
Congress has a fudiciary duty to ensure that it takes the time to 
consider the costs of legislative proposals. I urge my colleagues to 
join me in support of this amendment to delay the consolidation of U.S. 
AID, USIA, and ACDA, to preserve jobs, and to avoid an unintended waste 
of tax dollars.
  Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the 
gentleman [[Page H5679]] from New York [Mr. Ackerman] because it 
addresses one of the most egregious aspects in this bad bill. The 
problem with the proposal to gut the Agency for International 
Development, the United States Information Agency and the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency by putting them into the State Department is 
that it compromises the mission of every one of those agencies.
  The mission of the State Department, my colleagues, in diplomacy. 
That is not the mission of AID, USIA and ACDA.
  The mission of the United States Agency for International Development 
is to maximize the economic and the human potential of everyone around 
the world and, by doing so, create market opportunities for American 
industry.
  The mission of the U.S. Information Agency is very simply truth, not 
truth that complies with State Department policy that is politically 
oriented, that is acceptable, but simply, plainly credible truth. That 
is what the USIA delivers around the world.
  And the mission of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is to save 
us expenditures and arms procurement by enabling us to control the 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
  Of all the times in history to think about gutting the mission of the 
Arms Control Disarmament Agency, when we know how able dictators, 
tyrants, crazy nuts around the world have access to lethal weapons, and 
we are going to gut the mission of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency? Of all the times to gut the mission, to compromise the mission 
or the Agency for International Development.
  Consider the fact that as we move into the next millennium, the 21st 
century, there will be five new human beings born every second of every 
day, and three of them are going to go hungry, without adequate 
housing, without decent medical care. The Agency for International 
Development can enable them to become not desperate, hostile people, 
but constructive members and contributing to a world of peace and 
economic and social stability and, by doing so, create markets 
throughout the world for the American economy.
  That is what the Agency for International Development does, and let 
me quote just from the New York Times here on USIA.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Moran] has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Moran was allowed to proceed for 15 
additional seconds.)
  Mr. MORAN. In his directive granting the United States Information 
Agency independence, independence which would be eliminated by this 
bill, President Eisenhower empowered it to explain imaginatively the 
correlation between United States policies and the legitimate 
aspirations of other people of the world. Now is not the time to tear 
the United States Information Agency from that appointed task.
  President Eisenhower knew what he was doing. He would vote against 
this bill, but he would certainly support the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Ackerman].
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, the opponents of the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from New York [Mr. Ackerman] are saying that what his amendment would 
essentially do is gut the bill. I say that unless we have the Ackerman 
amendment, we are gutting America's role in the world.
  I said it before, and I will say it again. Did we spend billions upon 
billions of dollars to fight and win the cold war, only to throw it 
away after we are successful? American foreign aid, only 1 percent of 
the budget, has worked. The people pushing this bill--and I oppose the 
bill because I think the bill is an isolationist bill; I think the 
President is exactly right on that--the people pushing this bill are 
saying that consolidation of AID, ACDA, and USIA would be a good thing.
  Well, how do we know? I say to my colleagues, ``If you are for the 
Contract for America, then you ought to be for this amendment. All we 
are saying is do a cost-benefit analysis, see if indeed there will be 
savings, and then make an intelligent judgment after we see what the 
cost-benefit analysis says.''
  Voting this way is buying a pig in a poke. We do not know if it is 
going to save money. In fact, many of us believe it will lose money. We 
do not know if it is going to be more effective. In fact, many of us 
believe it will be less effective.
  I like AID, ACDA, and USIA as independent. Do we really want them 
rolled into the State Department? They have different roles. Do we 
really want them under the thumb of the State Department? I do not.
  I say to my colleagues, ``The only plausible reason you can make to 
consolidate is if it saves money, and, my colleagues, if it doesn't 
save money, then what are we doing this for?''
  So all my colleague from New York is saying is, ``Let's do a cost-
benefit analysis, which my friends on the other side of the aisle often 
talk about the cost, they often talk about wasteful government 
programs, they often talk about downsizing and consolidating if it 
saves money, but if it doesn't save money, what are you doing? You are 
shifting the bureaucracy from one part to the next, and you're probably 
making for a less efficient agency.''
  So again, whether my colleagues are for this consolidation or whether 
they are not, and I am not,
 what detriment can a cost-benefit analysis do. If it, indeed, saves 
money, it would seem to me that my friends on the other side of the 
aisle would have something to bolster their argument to consolidate, 
and, if it loses money, I would think a lot of people on both sides of 
the aisle would not want to vote for it anyway.

  So let us stop having our heads in the sand. Let us stop having the 
fervor of consolidation and downsizing only. Let us do something that 
makes sense. Where there is fat, let us cut it out. If it makes sense 
to consolidate, let us consolidate, and, above all, let us look at the 
cost. A cost-benefit analysis is right for America.
  Again I say to my colleagues, ``If you supported the Contract, you 
should be for this. Everybody ought to be for this on both sides of the 
aisle, so I urge my colleagues to support the Ackerman amendment.''
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Ackerman]. It seeks to gut 
our whole reorganization structure, and I merely want to quote from two 
former Secretaries of State.
  James Baker said,

       Your proposal is breathtaking in its boldness and visionary 
     in its sweep. It represents the fundamental reorganization 
     needed if we are to transform government institutions to meet 
     foreign policy challenges of the twenty-first century.

  Then Larry Eagleberger, former Secretary said:

       With regard to the consolidation, I am already on record in 
     testimony before Senator Helms in enthusiastic support of 
     what his committee and yours seek to accomplish. By 
     abolishing the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the 
     Agency for International Development, and the U.S. 
     Information Agency, the bill will eliminate bureaucratic 
     overlap, improve efficiency, save money, and enhance the 
     ability of the Executive branch to advance American interests 
     abroad.

  I urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Ackerman].
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, there are many reasons to oppose this 
bill. It undermines the ability of the U.S. Government to conduct 
foreign policy. It abdicates U.S. leadership worldwide. It wastes our 
resources on moving boxes when the challenges of the post-cold-war 
world demand our attention, and it ties the President's hands and 
eliminates many of the tools at his disposal. National Security Advisor 
Tony Lake rightly calls it the ``unilateral disarmament'' of American 
foreign policy.
  Under the reorganization provisions of this bill, we stand to lose a 
foreign policy tool which is vital to our national security. The Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency is charged with solving the nuclear, 
chemical, biological, missile technology and conventional arms 
proliferation problems of our day. ACDA is a small, lean agency with a 
budget of only $50 million. Yet the U.S. Strategic Command tells us 
that the strategic arms treaties ACDA administers save the nation's 
taxpayers about $100 billion.
  In its present form, ACDA's Director has an independent voice and 
direct access to the President, the National Security Council and 
[[Page H5680]] the Secretary of States. But this bill buries the 
director under three levels of bureaucracy. To make his voice heard, he 
will first have to make his case to an Assistant Secretary, then to an 
Undersecretary, and then to the Secretary of State.
  State Department decisions, by nature, are often grounded in 
diplomacy and sensitive to the political considerations of other 
nations. ACDA has no entrenched interest in diplomatic relations. 
Thirty years ago, it stood alone in support of a nuclear non-
proliferation treaty that the State Department opposed out of deference 
to some of our allies. It stood alone in support of a ban on deployment 
of multiple-warhead land-based missiles in the SALT treaty negotiated 
by Richard Nixon. When that effort failed, it took twenty years to 
negotiate a new agreement (START II) to remove the highly-threatening 
Soviet land-based missiles. And ACDA was the key to getting the Soviet 
Union's radar at Krasnayarsk removed as a violation of the ABM treaty 
in spite of reluctance at the State Department.
  An independent ACDA has made tremendous contributions toward peace. 
Ralph Earle, Deputy Director of ACDA, recently put it this way:

       If one thinks that arms control implementation and 
     compliance can largely take care of itself; that the dangers 
     of proliferation are overblown; that the chemical weapons 
     terrorism in Japan was a fluke; and that we should let arms 
     and sensitive dual-use technologies flow abroad more freely, 
     then the proposed legislation may be the way to go.

  But, Mr. Chairman, I submit that our President--and our country--
needs the full range of tools to make the most informed and effective 
decisions. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is a vital agency 
built around highly trained arms control specialists. Our national 
security necessitates its independent voice, its unique expertise, and 
its direct access to the highest levels of government. The 
reorganization provisions proposed in this bill will cost us money, 
disrupt arms control and non-proliferation progress, and surrender 
valuable expertise. They are harmful to our nation's security and I 
urge their rejection.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Ackerman].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 177, 
noes 233, not voting 24, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 360]

                               AYES--177

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Baesler
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bishop
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Clay
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Danner
     Davis
     de la Garza
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Emerson
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gibbons
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Holden
     Hoyer
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Klink
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lowey
     Maloney
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moran
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Rose
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Tucker
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                               NOES--233

     Allard
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bono
     Brewster
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clinger
     Coble
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooley
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cunningham
     Deal
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Lincoln
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Luther
     Manzullo
     Martini
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Minge
     Molinari
     Moorhead
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Riggs
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Upton
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--24

     Bonilla
     Bryant (TX)
     Clayton
     Coburn
     Cubin
     Dicks
     Foglietta
     Gephardt
     Houghton
     Johnson (CT)
     Kleczka
     Largent
     Laughlin
     Lofgren
     Lucas
     Montgomery
     Paxon
     Peterson (FL)
     Spratt
     Stark
     Thornton
     Waldholtz
     Watts (OK)
     Wicker

                              {time}  2029

  The Clerk announced the following pair:
  On this vote:

       Mrs. Clayton for, with Mrs. Waldholtz against.

  Mr. MASCARA changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 1561, 
the American Overseas Interests Act of 1995. By eliminating important 
foreign policy functions of the Federal Government this bill retreats 
from our obligations as Americans and human beings to the neediest 
citizens of the world. As the recent tragedies in Rwanda and Bosnia 
clearly demonstrate, this is not time for America to retire from the 
world community.
  The stated objective of the American Overseas Interests Act, is the 
elimination of the Agency for International Development [AID]. The U.S. 
Information Agency [USIA], and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
[ACDA] in addition to slashing $1.8 billion in foreign aid, 
international broadcasting, and diplomatic functions funding from the 
administration's requested level. In fact 29 percent of the development 
assistance for child survival programs, African development aid, 
disaster assistance, and Latin American and Caribbean aid will be cut 
by this draconian legislation. This shortsighted and rushed legislation 
will reorder American foreign policy objectives by abolishing foreign 
and peace organizations, interfering with the foreign policy 
prerogatives of the President and substantially cutting assistance to 
friends of America in great need.
  The American Overseas Interests Act of 1995 that we are considering 
here today is completely out of balance. H.R. 1561 seeks to isolate the 
United States by restricting America's role in the world. It recklessly 
cuts U.S. contributions to the United Nations and U.S. peacekeeping 
operations. It would be an abdication of American humanitarian 
leadership overseas to support this legislation. [[Page H5681]] 
  Contrary to the representations of the supporters of this bill, 
foreign aid constitutes less than 1 percent of the U.S. budget. This 
small investment is leveraged further by a public-private partnership 
involving several hundred U.S.-based charitable organizations. Without 
the U.S. contributions of seed money, these cuts in aid will be 
devastating.
  Foreign aid is no giveaway. These dollars work as an effective means 
of developing and expanding U.S. export markets. In fact, the 
recipients
 of U.S. Foreign aid constitute the fastest growing market for U.S. 
exports. In the past 10 years, our exports to developing countries have 
more than doubled from $71 to $180 billion. This valuable trade results 
in thousands of badly needed jobs for American workers.

  Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1561 is not only a bad deal for the American 
economy, it also compromises the President's initiatives in foreign 
affairs. In a seven to one decision, the U.S. Supreme Court in United 
States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) held that 
because of ``fundamental differences'' in national power with respect 
to internal and external affairs, the President of the United States 
possesses additional prerogatives in the foreign affairs field that, in 
my opinion, this legislation compromises.
  This bill imposes restrictions and limitations on the President's 
special authorities that would hamper the ability of the United States 
to respond to rapidly changing international circumstances. Therefore, 
the constitutionality of the American Overseas Assistance Act is in 
question and should be carefully examined prior to any further 
consideration of this bill.
  A dramatic example of the negative impact this legislation would have 
on the President's prerogatives in foreign affairs is the fact that 
H.R. 1561 directly inhibits vital Presidential objectives such as--
implementation and funding for the framework agreement with North 
Korea; debt reduction for poorer nations; democracy building and market 
reform in Russia; and funding for worldwide family planning activities.
  Contrary to the arguments that have been made by the supporters of 
H.R. 1561, President Clinton has proposed a budget that reasonably 
addresses the overseas interests of the United States. President 
Clinton's fiscal year 1996 foreign affairs budget has two key 
initiatives; reasonable consolidation and maintenance of our 
obligations to our friends and the world's neediest people.
  The administration has proceeded vigorously with its efforts to 
streamline AID, ACDA, USIA, and the Department of State. Under the 
administration's efforts, foreign affairs agencies are reducing 
staffing by 4,700 positions, cutting bureaucratic layers and 
duplication, eliminating low-priority
 posts and programs, reengineering their business processes, and 
establishing common administrative services. The administration has 
taken these steps to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of these 
agencies.

  By contrast, the approach of H.R. 1561 is to simply eliminate AID, 
ACDA and USIA. This extreme action would result in an unwieldy, costly, 
and ineffective compromise of U.S. foreign policy objectives and would 
constitute an abdication of American humanitarian leadership overseas.
  The ironic truth about H.R. 1561 is that it will actually weaken our 
influence overseas and therefore compromise our national defense, 
prestige, and effectiveness. As a result of the bill's redirection of 
$1.8 billion away from programs that help uplift the world's poor, 
American interests will be compromised.
  Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt that with the end of the cold war the 
United States now reigns supreme as the world's only superpower. Over 
the past 7 years, our foreign policy has undergone a massive 
undertaking to adjust to a post-cold-war world which has allowed us to 
maintain a better balance of our domestic and foreign interests. 
Because of these changes in world politics, the United States is faced 
with an unprecedented opportunity to redirect funds to relieve problems 
here at home and help improve the lives of our friends overseas.
  Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, as a political maneuver, the current 
majority has attached to this bad bill provisions authorizing aid to 
Israel and her Mid-East peace partners. This insulting and cynical 
attempt to force those of us who support Israel to endorse the 
overwhelmingly shortsighted and offensive objectives of H.R. 1561 will 
not work.
  My record in Congress supporting issues important to Israel and the 
Mid-East peace process has been consistent and steadfast. In the form 
of foreign aid, trade relations, and support for the peace process, I 
have recognized the wisdom of a vital Israel and a fair peace process. 
Despite the fact that I have been forced to vote against this bill, 
rest assured I will do all that I can to ensure that the President's 
budgeted aid for Israel and the Mid-East peace process is delivered by 
this Congress.
  In closing, H.R. 1561 reflects my colleagues' desire to sacrifice the 
interests and obligations of the American people in exchange for 
isolationism and inhumanity. I urge my colleagues to vote against this 
bill.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Walker) having assumed the chair, Mr. Goodlatte, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1561) to 
consolidate the foreign affairs agencies of the United States; to 
authorize appropriations for the Department of State and related 
agencies for fiscal years 1996 and 1997; to responsibly reduce the 
authorizations of appropriations for United States foreign assistance 
programs for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, and for other purposes, had 
come to no resolution thereon.

                          ____________________