[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 91 (Tuesday, June 6, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7763-S7776]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                   TRIP TO GUATEMALA, COLOMBIA, HAITI

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, during the period of May 26-29, 1995, my 
colleague on the Senate Intelligence Committee, Michael DeWine, and I 
traveled to Guatemala, Colombia, and Haiti for a firsthand view on 
matters of concern to the Intelligence Committee and to the Senate. The 
following represents my own personal impressions of the facts learned 
and my own judgments.
  Our first stop was Guatemala. On April 5, 1995 the Senate 
Intelligence committee held an open hearing on the role of the CIA in 
two human rights cases. In one case, the committee learned that a 
Guatemalan, Col. Roberto Alpirez, might be implicated in the murder of 
American farmer and innkeeper Michael DeVine on June 8, 1990. During 
the open hearing, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, Adm. Bill 
Studeman acknowledged that the CIA received information in October 1991 
that shed light on the possible presence of Colonel Alpirez in the 
interrogation of Mr. DeVine. Admiral Studeman also acknowledged that 
the CIA failed to inform the intelligence committees of the House and 
the Senate regarding this information which should have been done.
  In the second human rights case, Ms. Jennifer Harbury, the widow of a 
Guatemalan guerrilla Commander, Efraim Bamaca, repeatedly sought to 
learn the fate of her husband. Both Jennifer Harbury and Carole DeVine, 
the widow of Michael DeVine, were eloquent and dynamic hearing 
witnesses. They pleaded for our assistance to learn the facts of their 
husband's deaths, and, in the case of Ms. Harbury, the location of his 
remains. We were also interested to learn what happened in the cases of 
Nicholas Blake, Sister Diana Ortiz and Helen Mack.
  While the committee's staff is analyzing many documents pertaining to 
these cases, we traveled to Guatemala to learn more about these matters 
and to determine the willingness of the Guatemalan government to 
prosecute anyone legally responsible for these deaths. Our visit also 
sought to convince the Guatemalan Government that human rights are a 
top United States Government priority.
  Our first meeting was with Guatemala's President Ramirez deLeon 
Carpio, where we focussed on the Guatemala peace process and pressed 
hard on human rights, particularly the DeVine and Bamaca cases. 
President deLeon is the former human rights ombudsman in Guatemala.
  We expressed the U.S.'s wish to assist the peace process and our 
strong interest in resolving the DeVine and Bamaca cases. President 
deLeon responded by noting the serious challenges his government has 
had to face since he took power. He also stated he had confronted 
serious corruption in the Congress and the Courts by changing them 
through legal means. Finally he noted that he had succeeded in 
achieving a 5 percent economic growth and had to persevere in a 
confrontation with powerful interests in the private sector to achieve 
major fiscal reform which he characterized as being tougher than 
dealing with the Army, the guerrillas, and corrupt politicians 
combined.
  When we pressed on the DeVine and Bamaca cases, President deLeon said 
that both represented part of the general problem of impunity in 
Guatemala. He noted a difference between the cases. He characterized 
the DeVine case as a common crime. Six soldiers and a Captain Contreras 
had been convicted. It is widely believed that Captain Contreras was 
the leader of the group that murdered Michael DeVine, but after his 
sentencing to 20 years in jail, he escaped, perhaps with the complicity 
of the Guatemalan Army which had him in custody.
 Therefore, to cast this as strictly a common case of crime appears 
inaccurate in that the involvement of the Guatemalan military points to 
more than a common crime. In my view, not enough has been done to 
apprehend him in spite of the fact that the government of Guatemala had 
placed a $17,000 reward for the Captain's recapture.

  President deLeon stated that he would be calling Venezuelan President 
Caldera about the possibility that the Captain is a fugitive in that 
country and that the FBI and Interpol have been asked to join in the 
search for him abroad. The President added that he expected to send a 
special commission to Venezuela to pursue this and thought that 
President Caldera would be willing to cooperate.
  Later we met with Defense Minister General Mario Enriquez. The DeVine 
and Bamaca murders figured preeminently in our discussions. We 
underscored several times the importance of the cases to bilateral 
relations. General Enriquez stated investigations into both killings 
were going forward, but he drew a distinction between Bamaca and 
DeVine.
  General Enriquez also reported to us that he was hopeful that Captain 
Contreras had been captured just prior to our meeting. The next day, 
May 27, the newspapers were filled with front page stories of the 
capture of Captain Contreras. But a check with our Embassy in Venezuela 
did not shed any more light in the veracity of this reporting.
  The capture of Captain Contreras would be a critical element in the 
resolution of this crime. It might shed light on why and whether other 
military officers were involved. President deLeon noted that he had 
suspended Colonels Catalan and Alpirez pending investigation of their 
involvement in a crime, a step basically unprecedented in Guatemala. We 
also learned of the rumored existence of a tape reportedly held by 
Colonel Alpirez which allegedly recorded instructions to him to cover 
up the DeVine case.
  President deLeon asserted that he would go as far as necessary in 
pursuing the DeVine case which he added would benefit the army as an 
institution in Guatemala.
  In regard to Guatemalan guerrilla commander, Efraim Bamaca, President 
deLeon made the same distinction between this case and the DeVine 
matter as did General Enriquez. In President deLeon's view Bamaca was a 
product of war and to push prosecution of that case would de-stabilize 
the army. He felt the Bamaca case should be referred to the Historical 
Clarification Commission, otherwise known as the ``truth commission,'' 
established by agreement between the government of Guatemala and the 
URNG guerrillas to deal with the many abuses committed during the war 
once it was over.
  Nonetheless, we continued to press hard. We asked the President to 
make an example of the Bamaca case as a human rights violation. It was 
important to the relations between the government of the United States 
and the government of Guatemala. I noted that this is a special case 
and added that if the body of Efraim Bamaca were found, it would 
represent a big step forward.
  I noted how the testimony of both Jennifer Harbury and Carole DeVine 
to the Intelligence Committee on April 5th had been very moving and, 
how Colonel Alpirez was linked to both cases. President deLeon 
acknowledged as a former human rights ombudsman he knew that there was 
no excuse for torture even in war. Many priests had also been murdered. 
He stated he wished to strengthen the bi-lateral relations with the 
U.S. and improve Guatemala's image. However to pursue the Bamaca case 
would threaten the peace process and the stability of the government. 
In his words, it would put a ``sword of Damocles'' over the head of all 
2,500 Guatemalan military officers who had seen hundreds of their 
comrades die in the 34 years of the conflict. What was needed, he 
added, was a peace agreement and genuine reconciliation, not 
recriminations.

[[Page S7764]]

  We also met with human rights activists, including Ronald Ochaeta, 
Director of the Archbishop's Human Rights Office; Helen Mack, sister of 
the slain Myrna Mack; and Karen Fisher de Carpio, the daughter-in-law 
of the slain two-time Presidential candidate and newspaper publisher 
Jorge Carpio. Jorge Carpio was a cousin of the President deLeon Carpio. 
They requested that the United States government reveal all the 
intelligence about Guatemalan military people who may have been 
involved in human rights crimes. They also expressed the fear that, 
after the Guatemalan army returns Captain Contreras to justice in 
Guatemala, that the United States Government and human rights pressure 
will diminish; and absent that pressure, the Guatemalan Army will no 
longer even remotely respond to human rights concerns. They termed the 
Guatemalan justice system as being dysfunctional. Within the Army, they 
felt that there is brotherhood in which only some individual members 
are involved in a variety of illegal activities: human rights 
violations; stealing of cars; and drug trafficking, etc. They expressed 
the view that while most members of the army may not have been involved 
in these activities, all have taken ``a blood pact'' not to disclose 
any details on their fellow military comrades.
  I agree with the human rights activists and monitors that only with 
the pressure of the U.S. Government and the international community 
will cause the Army to improve its human rights performance in the 
future and to shed light and sanctions on past crimes.
  Our next stop took us to Colombia where we met with President Ernesto 
Samper, his Foreign Affairs Minister, Rodrigo Pardo, and his Defense 
Minister, Fernando Botero. We met the leaders of this country in 
Cartagena. Our discussions centered on narcotics trafficking and 
terrorism. While the United States has been riveted for years over the 
taking of hostages in the Middle East, scant attention has been paid to 
hostage taking in South America, particularly in Colombia where 
presently seven Americans are being held by the terrorist group known 
as FARC. I raised these issues with our Ambassador Myles Frechette and 
with President Samper. The view of both of them is this hostage taking 
is different in the sense that it is financially motivated. Terrorists 
have been taking Americans and other foreign nationals captive for 
ransom purposes. In meetings with President Samper, Senator DeWine and 
I pressed for more action to prevent the taking of these hostages and 
greater efforts to release them. In my view, not enough has been done 
in this area.
  Of paramount importance were our discussions regarding narcotics 
trafficking. The conditional certification of Colombia by the President 
on February 28, 1995 has clearly had an impact on the government on 
Colombia.
  Prior to February 1995, there had been sporadic support by some 
quarters of the Colombian political establishment in preventing 
significant damage to the Colombian drug syndicates. For example, in 
1994 the government of Colombia took no legislative steps to reverse 
its 1993 criminal procedures code which made it very difficult to bring 
mid-level and senior syndicate heads to justice. As a result, following 
the trend set in 1993, there were no arrests, incarcerations, or fines 
imposed on such traffickers. In addition, a number of frequently 
convicted traffickers were able to benefit in significant reductions to 
their sentences pursuant to Colombia's woefully inadequate sentencing 
laws.
  In 1994, total drug seizures through interdiction efforts were above 
those of 1993 but didn't reach the levels accomplished in 1991 as the 
U.S. Government has recommended. Performance on eradications has 
supposedly improved; but results have not met expectations. In 1994 
there were no senior government officials indicted for corruption. The 
Colombian Congress did not pass bills introduced by the Samper 
administration to counter money laundering activities. There was 
insufficient progress to detect and remove corrupt officials. There 
continues to be a problem with drug syndicate control of foreign soil 
such as San Andreas Island.
  The conditional certification by the Administration on March 1, 1995 
of
 Colombia's counter-narcotics effort appears to have changed Colombia's 
attitude. Since that date, Colombia has conducted over 170 operations 
against the Cali cartel by attempting the capture of drug king pins and 
by the efforts to disrupt their operations.

  Nonetheless, it appears that only the surface has been scratched. The 
Cali cartel is well financed and sophisticated. A captured warehouse 
disclosed a great amount of electronic equipment ranging from computers 
to direction finders. In addition, the cartel is controlling the phone 
companies and conducting telephone taps to uncover counter-narcotics 
directed against it.
  The bottom line is that Colombia still is the largest supplier of 
cocaine into the United States. Much more needs to be done to counter 
this trafficking. For one, legal cooperation between the United States 
and Colombia needs to be reinvigorated. We have been forced to shut 
down evidence sharing because Colombia has been misusing what we have 
provided to date; and, as a result, families of witnesses have been 
killed.
  We raised directly with President Samper, the need for extradition 
and reform of Colombia's legal system. While Colombian law now 
prohibits extradition, we urged President Samper to revisit this issue. 
If extradition is not re-instated, Colombia should consider seriously 
the proposal to allow drug traffickers to be tried in the United States 
and then serve their sentence in Colombia. This would serve to preserve 
evidence and remove the case from the inadequate Colombian code of 
criminal law. A longer range alternative is for Colombia to transfer 
proceedings to an international criminal court which could be 
established.
  President Samper acknowledged that drugs are a major problem not only 
in Colombia, but also internationally. He said that he intends to make 
every effort to stop the Cali cartel. It is not enough to destroy the 
fields, labs and aircraft used in trafficking, but also to have 
effective interdiction and to counter money laundering.
  When I raised the need for reinstating extradition, he noted the past 
ramifications: drug traffickers countered by killing four Presidential 
candidates and 63 magistrates in a reign of terror. In his view, 
extradition would come at a high cost. He was frank in stating he 
supported the Constitutional amendment to stop extradition to the U.S. 
If his judicial reform does not work in the next 2 to 3 years, he 
stated that he would consider other alternatives such as extradition. 
He was also confident that he will dismantle the Cali cartel within 2 
years.
  He also found the idea of an international criminal court worth 
considering.
  On Monday, May 29, 1995 we met with Ambassador William Swing in Haiti 
along with Maj. Gen. Joe Kinzer. General Kinzer is Commander of the 
United Nations mission in Haiti as well as senior commander of U.S. 
forces there.
  To gain some perspective on Haiti, it is instructive to note the 
volatility of this country over its last 190 years. It has had 21 
constitutions, 41 heads of state, 7 of whom have served more than 10 
years, 9 of whom have declared themselves heads of state for life, and 
29 of whom were assassinated or overthrown.
  It has been a country of great political and economic instability, 
over-populated, possessing limited resources and having the worst 
environmental degradation in the hemisphere. It is the poorest nation 
in the western hemisphere.
  Prior to the return of President Aristide, the country had 3 years of 
illegal, military de facto government, 8 years of chronic instability 
and some 30 years of Duvalier family dictatorship. Since the 1991 coup, 
the country has
 suffered a 30 percent loss of its gross domestic product and its 
treasury has been emptied. It has the highest birth rate in the western 
hemisphere. Between September 30, 1991 and the return of Aristide in 
October 1994, imposed severe sanctions and the toughest embargo ever in 
the western hemisphere. The human rights violations by the Cedras 
regime escalated. This resulted in many Haitians attempting to escape 
the politically oppressive climate. On July 4, 1994 over three thousand 
Haitians fled in one day.

  On September 19, 1994 over 21,000 U.S. troops were deployed there 
without [[Page S7765]] any loss of life. Paramilitary forces of Haiti 
were disbanded and its leaders were arrested. General Cedras departed 
in exile on October 13, 1994. President Aristide returned on October 
15, 1994.
  General Kinzer noted that he is operating under Presidential Decision 
Directive 25, U.N. Security Council Resolution 940 and Chapter 6 of the 
U.N.'s charter which technically limits him to observing, reporting, 
and verifying. It does not give him full authority for peacekeeping. 
Nonetheless, General Kinzer has set up rules of engagement which, in 
essence, give him the ability to carry out peacekeeping. General Kinzer 
did point out the importance of intelligence support to the U.S. forces 
there and also to the United Nations forces. While such intelligence 
was not as critical as in Somalia, he warned that any efforts to 
restrict the flow of intelligence of U.N. forces would not be in the 
best interests of U.S. forces who are participating.
  Ambassador Swing emphasized the serious challenges which lie ahead. 
First, there is a need to create a credible security force by February 
1996 when the mandate for U.N. forces ends. There is a need to 
stimulate badly needed economic development in the country. Third, the 
electoral process must be fair for the parliamentary elections in June, 
and the Presidential elections in December. Finally, there needs to be 
improvement in Haiti's justice system.
  We met with President Aristide who pointed out the need for security 
forces in the number of about 7,000, which he expects to have ready by 
February 1996. Given the rate of training timetable, it is dubious that 
this can be achieved. President Aristide represented that the machinery 
is in place for a fair and democratic process for the forthcoming 
elections.
  There are some rumors that President Aristide may not comply with the 
Haitian Constitution and step down when his term ends. We questioned 
him on this. When asked if there were any circumstances under which he 
would stay on as President, his response was ``no''. He stated that the 
Constitution requires him to leave no matter what the majority of 
Haitians might say. In response to what more he would want from the 
United States, he responded by saying he would be ashamed to ask for 
more money. What is needed, in his view, is more economic development, 
more job opportunities, and a need for a free market.
  Mr. President, in the absence of any further proceedings on the 
pending legislation, I thought this might be a good time to make a 
brief report on a trip which Senator Michael DeWine and I made on 
behalf of the Senate Intelligence Committee to Guatemala, Colombia, and 
Haiti over a 4-day period, May 26 through May 29, with the principal 
focus in Guatemala being to determine the civil rights abuses on the 
murder of an American innkeeper, Mr. Michael DeVine, and a Guatemalan 
soldier, Commander Bamaca.
  These deaths had been the subject of an Intelligence Committee 
hearing where there were very, very substantial questions of violations 
of human rights.
  At that Intelligence Committee hearing in April, Mrs. Carol DeVine 
testified about the brutality with respect to her husband, Michael 
DeVine, and the perpetrators have not yet been brought to justice. Ms. 
Jennifer Harbury, the wife of Commander Bamaca, testified as to the 
difficulties in determining what had happened to her husband and even 
to finding his body.
  On our trip, we talked about the matter with President deLeon of 
Guatemala and also with the Minister of Defense and urged that every 
effort be made by the Guatemalan Government to find out exactly what 
had happened to the American citizen, Michael DeVine, and Commander 
Bamaca.
  President deLeon pledged the full efforts of the Guatemalan 
Government as to the murder of Mr. DeVine but had a difference of 
opinion with respect to Commander Bamaca, which he classified as a 
military incident. We urged in the strongest possible terms President 
deLeon proceed to vindicate human rights and make a thorough 
investigation as to both of their matters.
  In Colombia, we had extensive discussion with ranking Colombian 
officials, including President Samper, principally on the issues of 
terrorism and narcotics trade.
  I must say, Mr. President, that there is insufficient evidence being 
taken by the Colombian Government on the very serious problems of 
narcotics traffic which comes to the United States. Since efforts had 
been undertaken with some success in the mid to late 1980's, those 
efforts have materially decreased with Colombia now refusing to have 
extradition. It is my judgment that our efforts in interdiction and the 
funds which we are expending in that direction could much more usefully 
be placed on the so-called demand side in the United States on 
education and on rehabilitation. It seems that the more acreage or 
hectares of ground taken away from the growth of cocaine or drugs in 
Latin America, in Colombia, illustratively, or Ecuador or Peru, the 
more replacement drug growth occurs in those States.
 Although we are spending a tremendous sum of money, there has been no 
significant lessening of the source of supply. We have to maintain a 
very active and vigorous law enforcement program in the United States 
to combat supply. But our efforts of international interdiction have 
been largely unsuccessful, and I think the Government of Colombia is 
doing much less than ought to be done.

  Senator DeWine and I finished our short trip with a one-day stay in 
Haiti, where we had an opportunity to visit with President Aristide and 
visit with General Kinzer. There a real effort has been made by the 
U.N. forces to establish order, and U.N. forces are scheduled to leave 
in February of next year. There will have to be significant 
accomplishments by the Haitian Government to have a local police force 
to handle the issue.
  Rumors had come to our attention that there might be a question as to 
whether President Aristide would step aside after a new President is 
elected late this year when his term is set to expire in February. 
Senator DeWine and I were very direct and blunt in asking the question 
as to whether he did intend to step down, and he was unequivocal in 
stating that he would do so. We noted that a real sign of progress in 
Haiti would be whether there would be an orderly transition of 
government from one elected President to his successor. In light of 
what has happened in Haiti historically, that would really be a 
remarkable achievement.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Santorum). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.


                           Amendment No. 1250

  (Purpose: To ensure due process in deportation proceedings)
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, we have now completed the drafting of the 
amendment which had been discussed earlier. I now send this to the desk 
on behalf of myself, Mr. Simon, and Mr. Kennedy.
  This amendment provides that under circumstances where the Department 
of Justice is unwilling to present a witness or witnesses to establish 
that an alien is a terrorist, that there will be an unclassified 
summary presented, sufficient to enable the alien to prepare a defense.
  It has provisions which protect the government in a number of 
directions, and ultimately in the situation where there is a threat 
that the alien's continued presence in the United States would likely 
cause serious or irreparable harm to the national security, or death or 
serious bodily injury to any person, and the provision of either 
classified information or classified summary that meets a higher 
standard would cause, again, irreparable harm or the possibility of 
death or serious injury, then there may be an unclassified summary 
prepared by the Justice Department sufficient to allow the alien to 
prepare a defense.
  There is a provision here for an interlocutory appeal. It would be my 
hope this might be acceptable on both sides, or if not, that it would 
receive an affirmative vote by the Senate. I send this amendment to the 
desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. [[Page S7766]] 
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Specter], for himself, 
     Mr. Simon, and Mr. Kennedy, proposes an amendment numbered 
     1250.

   Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent further reading 
be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       Strike page 36, line 13, through page 38, line 20, and 
     insert the following in lieu thereof:
       ``(B) The judge shall approve the summary within 15 days of 
     submission if the judge finds that it is sufficient to inform 
     the alien of the nature of the evidence that such person is 
     an alien as described in section 241(a), and to provide the 
     alien with substantially the same ability to make his defense 
     as would disclosure of the classified information.
       ``(C) The Attorney General shall cause to be delivered to 
     the alien a copy of the unclassified summary approved under 
     subparagraph (B).
       ``(D) If the written unclassified summary is not approved 
     by the court pursuant to subparagraph (B), the Department of 
     Justice shall be afforded 15 days to correct the deficiencies 
     identified by the court and submit a revised unclassified 
     summary.
       ``(E) If the revised unclassified summary is not approved 
     by the court within 15 days of its submission pursuant to 
     subparagraph (B), the special removal hearing shall be 
     terminated unless the court, within that time, after 
     reviewing the classified information in camera and ex parte, 
     issues written findings that--
       ``(i) the alien's continued presence in the United States 
     would likely cause
       ``(I) serious and irreparable harm to the national 
     security; or
       ``(II) death or serious bodily injury to any person;
     and
       ``(ii) provision of either the classified information or an 
     unclassified summary that meets the standard set forth in 
     subparagraph (B) would likely cause
       ``(I) serious and irreparable harm to the national 
     security; or
       ``(II) death or serious bodily injury to any person;
     and
       ``(iii) the unclassified summary prepared by the Justice 
     Department is adequate to allow the alien to prepare a 
     defense.
       ``(F) If the court issues such findings, the special 
     removal proceeding shall continue, and the Attorney General 
     shall cause to be delivered to the alien within 15 days of 
     the issuance of such findings a copy of the unclassified 
     summary together with a statement that it meets the standard 
     set forth in subparagraph (E)(iii).
       ``(G)(i) Within 10 days of filing of the appealable order 
     the Department of Justice may take an interlocutory appeal to 
     the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
     Columbia Circuit of--
       ``(I) any determination made by the judge concerning the 
     requirements set forth in subparagraph (B).
       ``(II) any determination made by the judge concerning the 
     requirements set forth in subparagraph (E).
       ``(ii) In an interlocutory appeal taken under this 
     paragraph, the entire record, including any proposed order of 
     the judge or summary of evidence, shall be transmitted to the 
     Court of Appeals under seal, and the matter shall be heard ex 
     parte. The Court of Appeals shall consider the appeal as 
     expeditiously as possible, but no later than 30 days after 
     filing of the appeal.
                 Amendment Nos. 1218 and 1225, En Bloc

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the chairman of 
the Judiciary Committees, Senator Hatch, is prepared to accept Kennedy 
amendment 1218 and the Feinstein amendment 1225 en bloc.
  I send the two amendments to the desk and ask unanimous consent that 
they be considered en bloc.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden] for Mr. Kennedy, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 1218, and for Mrs. Feinstein, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 1225.

   Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent further reading be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments en bloc are as follows:
(Purpose: To require the same procedures for the use of secret evidence 
 in normal deportation proceedings as are accorded to suspected alien 
                              terrorists)

                           Amendment No. 1218

       On page 48, line 12, before the period insert the 
     following: ``, except that any proceeding conducted under 
     this section which involves the use of classified evidence 
     shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures of 
     section 501.''
                                                                    ____


                           Amendment No. 1225

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC.   . PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE UNDER ARMS EXPORT CONTROL 
                   ACT FOR COUNTRIES NOT COOPERATING FULLY WITH 
                   UNITED STATES ANTITERRORISM EFFORTS.

       Chapter 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2771 et 
     seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 40A. TRANSACTIONS WITH COUNTRIES NOT FULLY COOPERATING 
                   WITH UNITED STATES ANTITERRORISM EFFORTS.

       ``(a) Prohibited Transactions.--No defense article or 
     defense service may be sold or licensed for export under this 
     Act to a foreign country in a fiscal year unless the 
     President determines and certifies to Congress at the 
     beginning of that fiscal year, or at any other time in that 
     fiscal year before such sale or license, that the country is 
     cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts.
       ``(b) Waiver.--The President may waive the prohibition set 
     forth in subsection (a) with respect to a specific 
     transaction if the President determines that the transaction 
     is essential to the national security interests of the United 
     States.''.
                           amendment no. 1218

  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, the bill before the Senate contains a 
procedure to permit the use of secret evidence in deportation 
proceedings for suspected terrorists. Many Members have reservations 
about this procedure, and I believe the sponsors have made a genuine 
attempt to strike a balance between our concerns about terrorism and 
the fundamental requirements of due process.
  However, another section of the bill, section 303, contains no such 
balance. It permits the use of secret evidence in any deportation case, 
without any due process safeguards at all. The amendment I am offering 
would extend the same minimal due process safeguards to these 
proceedings that are available in terrorist cases, in the rare 
situations in which classified evidence must be protected.
  The terrorist deportation procedure in section 301 acknowledges the 
sensitive issues surrounding the use of classified evidence. It 
requires a special designation by the Chief Justice of five Federal 
judges to keep the evidence secure and ensure due process.
  However, section 303 allows secret evidence to be used in normal 
deportation cases before any of scores of low-level immigration judges 
in the Justice Department, with no protection for either the classified 
evidence or the immigrant.
  While this provision exempts permanent residents from its broad 
reach, there are others who reside in the United States under legal 
immigration status who also deserve such protection, including the new 
spouses of American citizens. If we are to take the extraordinary step 
of permitting the use of secret evidence in general deportation 
proceedings, I believe the evidence and the immigrant should be 
afforded at least the same protections that we give to terrorists.
  This can be done without unduly burdening the courts. The number of 
cases which rise to the level of requiring secret evidence to justify 
deportation is extremely small.
  The kinds of cases which could be subject to this procedure would 
have substantial equities. The use of secret evidence should not be 
taken lightly.
  Under this procedure, the immigrant spouses of American citizens 
could be deported with secret evidence. By law, these spouses are 
``conditional residents,'' not permanent residents, during their first 
2 years of marriage.
  The same sort of equities apply to refugees. A Vietnamese refugee who 
fought on our side in Vietnam, who experienced years of re-education in 
Communist concentration camps, and who has now lived here for many 
years, but does not have permanent residence, would be subject to 
secret deportation with illegally obtained evidence. His only offense 
could be that he rescued a fellow soldier from Vietnam by allowing him 
to pose as a relative.
  There are also 14,000 Chinese students in this country, many of whom 
were activists in the democracy movement in China. They qualify for 
permanent residence, but they have not yet received their green cards. 
They could be subjected to this procedure.
  There are 85,000 individuals whom the Immigration Service has allowed 
to remain in the United States because of special circumstances 
surrounding their cases. They may have American citizen children with 
disabilities requiring special attention that cannot [[Page S7767]] be 
offered in their parents' home country. These families have not been 
given permanent residence, but the courts have declared them 
``permanent residents under color of law.''
  Some may argue that these are unlikely victims of this procedure. But 
there is nothing in this language that prevents immigrants and refugees 
with substantial ties to this country from being deported using secret 
evidence. Under this procedure, they may never know why they were 
deported.
  A long line of judicial decisions requires the protection of 
immigrants under the fifth amendment from due process violations in the 
deportation process.
  The fifth amendment states that no person shall be ``deprived of 
life, liberty or property, without due process of law.'' The Supreme 
Court has consistently ruled that this protection means what it says, 
it extends to all persons within the United States, not just citizens.
  As the Supreme Court stated in the Japanese Immigrant case in 1903,

       This court has never held, nor must we be understood as 
     holding, that administrative officers, when executing the 
     provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may 
     disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in ``due 
     process of law'' as understood at the time of the adoption of 
     the Constitution.

  In 1915, in Whitfield versus Hanges, the Court outlined the 
requirements of a fair deportation hearing, including the right to be 
notified of charges, to cross-examine witnesses, and to see the 
evidence and have a fair opportunity to rebut it.
  To underscore the gravity of deportation, the Supreme Court in 1921, 
in Ng Fung Ho versus White, observed that not only does deportation 
deprive a person of liberty, but ``[it] may result also in loss of both 
property and life; or of all that makes life worth living.'' Again in 
1948, in Tan versus Phelan, the Court characterized deportation as ``a 
drastic measure'' and ``the equivalent of banishment or exile.''
  In 1976, Mathews versus Diaz, the Court noted, ``There are literally 
millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The 
fifth amendment, as well as the 14th amendment, protects every one of 
these persons from deprivations of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law.''
  In Landon versus Plasencia in 1982, the Court stated that the 
interest of an immigrant facing expulsion from the United States ``is, 
without question, a weighty one. She stands to lose the right to stay 
and live and work in this land of freedom. Further, she may lose the 
right to rejoin her immediate family, a right that ranks high among the 
interests of the individual.''
  We are all concerned about addressing terrorism and expediting 
legitimate deportation cases.
  The bill before us contains a procedure in section 301 which permits 
our courts to handle classified evidence to decide the deportability of 
aliens suspected of terrorism.
  At a minimum, other deportees should be given the same protections as 
terrorists when it comes to using secret evidence against them. For 
this reason, my amendment says that the use of evidence in other 
deportation settings must follow what is being proposed for suspected 
terrorists. This means the evidence must be handled by designated 
Federal judges. And before the deportation proceeding is allowed to 
continue on the basis of the secret evidence, the judges must weigh the 
threat which the presence of the person poses against the likely 
consequences of revealing the classified information.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
                           amendment no. 1225

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, today I offer an amendment that 
establishes a clear standard of behavior other countries must meet in 
order to be eligible to purchase military equipment from the United 
States.
  It amends the Arms Export Control Act by adding a section which 
states that no defense article or defense service may be sold or 
licensed for export to a country unless the President has certified to 
Congress that the country is cooperating fully with the United Stats, 
or taking adequate steps on its own, to help achieve U.S. antiterrorism 
objectives.
  This amendment does recognize that certain transactions of military 
equipment do have a direct bearing on our national security, so it 
allows the President to waive the prohibition with respect to specific 
transactions if he determines that they are essential to the national 
security interests of the United States.
  The United States is the leading exporter of military equipment in 
the world. In fiscal year 1994, the United States sold some $12.86 
billion worth of defense equipment and services around the world. By 
and large, these exports serve the interests of the United States by 
helping to build up the security of our allies. Improving our allies' 
abilities to defend themselves is one of the most effective ways we can 
advance and protect our own interests abroad.
  It is not unreasonable to expect a certain level of cooperation from 
countries to whom we sell military equipment. Obviously cooperation in 
defense matters is taken into consideration, as it should be, because 
of the clear benefit it brings to United States security interests.
  But our security these days is affected by other, less conventional 
problems. Today, terrorism poses a major threat to U.S. security 
interests, and to our way of life. Because of that, we must demand and 
expect cooperation from our allies to help us achieve our antiterrorism 
objectives. When we share our most advanced military technology with 
our allies, we should be able to expect full cooperation in these 
crucial areas.
  For the most part, the commitment to combat terrorism is strong among 
our allies who purchase U.S. military equipment. Many of them know 
first-hand the scourge of terrorism, and have been deeply affected by 
it. Indeed, the State Department's 1994 Patterns of Global Terrorism 
report describes some 321 international terrorist attacks in 1994, in 
Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. Occasionally, 
however, we have been disappointed by the cooperation we have received 
in our antiterrorism efforts.
  This amendment is designed to add an additional incentive for those 
states to cooperate with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. We need their full 
cooperation in: Apprehending, prosecuting, and extraditing suspected 
terrorists; sharing intelligence to deter terrorist attacks; pressuring 
state sponsors of terrorism to change their behavior; curbing private 
fundraising efforts for terrorist organizations within their country; 
and, taking actions to prevent or deter terrorist attacks. Where we 
have signed agreements and treaties, they should be fulfilled in both 
letter and spirit. Where we do not have such agreements, our allies 
should work with us to put them in place as quickly as practicable.
  The threat of international terrorism demands that the civilized 
nations of the world band together to defend against those who would 
use violence for political ends. This amendment will help ensure that 
the United States gets the cooperation it needs from our allies to 
fight this threat.
  Mr. BIDEN. For the sake of clarification, I would ask the Senator 
from California if the certification requirement in her amendment means 
that a separate certification of a country's cooperation with U.S. 
antiterrorism objectives must accompany every notification of an arms 
sale sent to Congress under section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control 
Act.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. No, the certification procedure is designed to 
require one certification annually for each country that purchases 
defense articles or defense services, or has them licensed for export, 
from the United States in a given fiscal year. Most certifications will 
probably be provided at the beginning of the fiscal year, but a country 
that is not certified at that time may, if eligible, be certified at 
any time prior to the first sale or export license to it in the fiscal 
year.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendments 
en bloc.
  The amendments (Nos. 1218 and 1225) were agreed to.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we are perilously close to finishing all 
but the habeas amendments. The Nunn-Biden [[Page S7768]] amendment on 
posse comitatus is either going to be debated very shortly or accepted 
very shortly.
  That leaves, I think, after the vote on the Specter-Simon amendment, 
we will know then on the outcome of that vote, whether or not the 
Abraham amendment is still relevant. If Specter-Simon prevails, as I 
hope it does, then the Abraham amendment would be dropped.
  The only amendment I am aware of on the Republican side which we do 
not have any agreement on at this point--we thought we did--was the 
Brown amendment. If Senator Brown is available, we are ready to enter 
into a very short time agreement and debate that amendment tonight.
  Mr. DOLE. Have the yeas and nays been ordered?
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, again I think we are going to know in a 
moment whether we will need to debate the Nunn-Biden posse comitatus 
amendment, but in the meantime while that is being ironed out, I ask my 
friend from Utah whether or not Senator Brown is available to introduce 
his amendment. I think that is the only thing we have left.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the Lieberman 
amendment numbered 1215.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. HATCH. I understand that Senator Brown is on his way over, and I 
will chat with him.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I say to the majority leader that I think 
when we dispose of the Brown amendment and we dispose of the Nunn-Biden 
amendment, that other than habeas amendments, there is nothing left.
  It is my understanding that the leader, at an appropriate time this 
evening, if we complete action on Nunn-Biden and Brown, would move to 
vitiate the cloture vote tomorrow.
  I would assure the Senator, as well, we would withdraw all 5 
amendments relating to firearms or ammunition. They would not be 
considered on this bill.
  Mr. DOLE. I have not discussed that with the Democrat leader. That 
would be my intention. They would be germane, in any event. No need to 
have a cloture vote.
  So, if we can complete action on all except habeas corpus, we would 
like to start fairly early in the morning on the habeas corpus 
amendments.
  So is there anybody who has amendments? I guess Senator Brown is the 
only one on this side?
  Mr. BIDEN. Senator Brown is the only one who has a nonhabeas 
amendment on the Republican side and the only one we have left on the 
Democratic side, as I understand it, is Nunn-Biden.
  Mr. HATCH. You have Abraham as well.
  Mr. BIDEN. The Senator points out the Abraham amendment is still on 
the Republican side, and I have discussed this with Senator Abraham and 
he points out to me that if Specter-Simon passes, then his amendment is 
redundant, is no longer necessary. It is only if Specter-Simon fails 
would we go to the Abraham amendment, in which case we could accept the 
Abraham amendment.
  Mr. DOLE. So we are waiting on Senator Brown.
  Mr. BIDEN. And waiting on a decision by our Republican colleagues 
whether or not they can accept the Nunn-Biden posse comitatus 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                      Amendment No. 1229 Withdrawn

  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am very grateful to our distinguished 
Senator from Colorado, Senator Brown. Because, as much as he likes his 
amendment regarding terrorist countries, it has hit a snag where it has 
had an objection from both sides of the aisle.
  In the interests of moving this bill forward he has authorized me to 
withdraw that amendment at this time.
  I ask unanimous consent the Brown amendment be withdrawn.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 1229) was withdrawn.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me say I know he has decided not to run 
again, and this will probably hurt his reputation, but it is a pleasure 
to work with the Senator from Colorado. He is always reasonable. I 
thank him very much.
  As Senator Eastland once said to me, ``I will come and campaign for 
you or against you, whichever will help the most.'' Maybe if I said 
something negative it would help more but I really mean it. I thank him 
for his cooperation. This is the second time he has moved this 
legislation along. I truly appreciate it.
  I want to correct something I said earlier. I referred to the posse 
comitatus amendment as the Nunn-Biden amendment. That is not accurate. 
This is not a minor point. It is the Nunn-Thurmond-Biden amendment. 
Senator Thurmond has been a leader in this issue and I did not mean in 
any way to leave him out. It is the Nunn-Thurmond-Biden amendment. I 
yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.


                Amendment No. 1213 to Amendment No. 1199

    (Purpose: To authorize the Attorney General to request, and the 
 Secretary of Defense to provide, Department of Defense assistance for 
 the Attorney General in emergency situations involving biological or 
                 chemical weapons of mass destruction)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I am going to start with the explanation of 
the amendment which I hope we will be voting on this evening. If the 
majority leader would like to interrupt at any point in time, I know 
there will be other things that will be coming up, I will be glad to 
yield and I invite that.
  I am pleased to propose on behalf of myself, Senator Thurmond, 
Senator Biden, and Senator Warner, an amendment to address a 
significant gap in the law regarding the use of chemical and biological 
weapons of mass destruction in criminal terrorist activities.
  The Armed Forces have special capabilities to counter nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons. They are trained and equipped to 
detect, suppress, and contain these dangerous materials in hostile 
situations.
  Most of our law enforcement officials do not have anything like the 
capability that our military does in these unique circumstances. At the 
present time the statutory authority to use the Armed Forces in 
situations involving the criminal use of these weapons of mass 
destruction extends only to nuclear materials. In my opinion, chemical 
and biological attacks on the United States, terrorist attacks, are 
much more likely than nuclear, although all would be horrible. Section 
831 of title 18, United States Code, permits the Armed Forces to assist 
in dealing with crimes involving nuclear materials when the Attorney 
General and the Secretary of Defense jointly determine that there is an 
emergency situation requiring military assistance. There is no similar 
authority to use the special expertise of the Armed Forces in 
circumstances involving the use of chemical and biological weapons of 
mass destruction.
  In the wake of the devastating bombing of the Federal building in 
Oklahoma City, with its tragic loss of life and disruption of 
governmental functions, I think it is appropriate to reexamine Federal 
counterterrorism capabilities, including the role of the Armed Forces. 
I would also add that the Tokyo chemical attack in the subway is the 
kind of situation that very well could happen, also, in this country.
  For more than 100 years, military participation in civilian law 
enforcement activities has been governed by the Posse Comitatus Act. 
The Act precludes military participation in the execution of laws 
except as expressly authorized by Congress. That landmark legislation 
was the result of congressional concern about increasing use of 
[[Page S7769]] the military for law enforcement purposes in post-Civil 
War era, particularly terms of enforcing the Reconstruction laws in the 
South in and suppressing labor activities in the North.
  There are about a dozen express statutory exceptions to the Posse 
Comitatus Act, which permit military participation in arrests, 
searches, and seizures. Some of the exceptions, such as the permissible 
use of the armed forces to protect the discoverer of guano islands, 
reflect historical anachronisms. Others, such as the authority to 
suppress domestic disorders when civilian officials cannot do so, have 
continuing relevance--as shown most recently in the 1992 Los Angeles 
riots.
  It is important to remember that the Act does not bar all military 
assistance to civilian law enforcement officials, even in the absence 
of a statutory exception. The Act has long been interpreted as not 
restricting use of the armed forces to prevent loss of life or wanton 
destruction of property in the event of sudden and unexpected 
circumstances. In addition, the Act has been interpreted to apply only 
to direct participation in civilian law enforcement activities--that 
is, arrest, search, and seizure. Indirect activities, such as the loan 
of equipment, have been viewed as not within the prohibition against 
using the armed forces to execute the law.
  Over the years, the administrative and judicial interpretation of the 
Act, however, created a number of gray areas, including issues 
involving the provision of export advice during investigations and the 
use of military equipment and facilities during ongoing law enforcement 
operations.
  During the late 1970's and early 1980's, I became concerned that the 
lack of clarity was inhibiting useful indirect assistance, particularly 
in counterdrug operations. I initiated legislation, which was enacted 
in 1981 as chapter 18 of title 10, United States Code, to clarify the 
rules governing military support to civilian law enforcement agencies.
  We not have, as a matter of fact, and have had since 1981 military 
ships in the Caribbean--and other places for that matter where we have 
heavy drug traffic--where the military, the Navy, has the right to 
intercept vessels, but the power of arrest is reserved for Coast Guard 
personnel that are on the Navy ships for that purpose. So we have been 
very careful about how we approach this matter.
  The administration has requested legislation that would permit direct 
military participation in specific law enforcement activities related 
to chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, similar to the 
exception under current law that permits direct military participation 
in the enforcement of the laws concerning improper use of nuclear 
materials.
  We had a hearing under the auspices of Senator Hatch and Senator 
Biden. During that hearing it came to the attention of the committee--
and the Armed Forces Committee was also invited to participate in that 
hearing, and I was there--that, although the overall direction that the 
President was laying out seemed to me to make sense, I thought the 
statute that had been submitted was not properly drawn. It used the 
words ``technical assistance'' without defining that term properly; 
used the term ``disabling and disarming'' but precluded the power of 
arrest.
  In effect, I reached the conclusion that the military would be in a 
position where they were basically able to disable and disarm, which 
would include the use of force, and perhaps even the use of fatal 
force, but not have the power of arrest, which did not make sense.
  I think the ultimate depriving of civil liberties is when you kill 
someone. If you can kill them without arresting them you are not really 
protecting someone's civil liberties. So we decided to carefully 
reconstruct that statute to try to deal with chemical and biological 
weapons, and we worked diligently to do that, and are continuing to 
work on possible amendments in good faith with colleagues on both 
sides. Senator Hatch has participated in that. Senator Thurmond and I 
have worked hard on it. Senator Biden has participated, and others. 
Senator Dole and others have been involved in trying to make sure we 
know exactly what we are doing. I hope we can work it out this evening. 
But, if not, we will certainly have to vote on the matter at some 
point.
  In my judgment, Mr. President, the question of whether we should 
create a further exception for chemical and biological weapons should 
be addressed in light of the two enduring themes reflected in the 
history and practice of the Posse Comitatus Act and related statutes:
  First, the strong and traditional reluctance of the American people 
to permit any military intrusion into civilian affairs.
  Second, the concept that any exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act 
should be narrowly drawn to meet specific needs that cannot be 
addressed by civilian law enforcement authorities and that pose a grave 
danger to the American people.
  As I previously mentioned, these issues were examined at a hearing 
before the Judiciary Committee on May 10, led by the chairman of the 
Committee, Senator Hatch, and the ranking minority member, Senator 
Biden. At their invitation, I participated in the hearing, and I am 
grateful for the courtesies extended to me.
  At the hearing, we heard from former Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger, and from current representatives of the Departments of 
Justice and Defense. During the hearing, five major themes emerged:
  First, we should be very cautious about establishing exceptions to 
the Posse Comitatus Act, which reflects enduring principles concerning 
historic separation between civilian and military functions in our 
democratic society.
  Second, exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act should not be created 
for the purpose of using the armed forces to routinely supplement 
civilian law enforcement capabilities with respect to ongoing, 
continuous law enforcement problems.
  Third, exceptions may be appropriate when law enforcement officials 
do not possess the special capabilities of the Armed Forces in specific 
circumstances, such as the capability to counter chemical and 
biological weapons of mass destruction in a hostile situation.
  Fourth, any statute which authorizes military assistance should be 
narrowly drawn to address with specific criteria to ensure that the 
authority will be used only when senior officials, such as the 
Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, determine that there is 
an emergency situation which can be effectively addressed only with the 
assistance of military forces.
  Fifth, any assistance which authorizes military assistance should not 
place artificial constraints on the actions military officials may take 
that might compromise their safety or the success of the operation.
  In other words, Mr. President, as a result of that hearing, I came to 
the conclusion that in this area we ought to set a very high threshold 
for participation by the military and define those terms very 
carefully. Once the military is involved and, for example, they have on 
chemical gear, they are in a very difficult situation. Law enforcement 
may not even be able to be on the scene because of the heavy presence 
of chemical or biological agents. Once that happens, we do not want to 
put our 19, 20-, 22-, 23-, 24- or 25-year-olds out there without having 
enough authority to go ahead and do the job.
  So we have tried to draft this authority with a very high threshold 
for any involvement of this military and to make that authority very 
limited, very carefully drawn. Once they are involved, then we want to 
give the military personnel authority to protect themselves and to take 
action as required by the circumstances, the very emergency type of 
circumstances we are describing.
  The amendment that Senator Thurmond, Senator Biden and I are 
sponsoring has been drafted to reflect the traditional purposes of the 
Posse Comitatus Act and the limited nature of the exceptions to the 
Act.
  Under the amendment, the Attorney General may request DoD assistance 
to enforce the prohibitions concerning biological and chemical weapons 
of mass destruction in an emergency situation.
  The Secretary of Defense may provide assistance if there is a joint 
determination by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General that 
there is [[Page S7770]] an emergency situation, and the Secretary of 
Defense determines that the provision of such assistance will not 
adversely affect military preparedness.
  Military assistance could be provided under the amendment only if the 
Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense jointly determine that 
each of the following five conditions is present:
  First, that the situation involves a biological or chemical weapon of 
mass destruction.
  Second, that the situation poses a serious threat to the interests of 
the United States.
  Third, that civilian law enforcement expertise is not readily 
available to counter the threat posed by the biological or chemical 
weapon of mass destruction involved.
  Fourth, that Department of Defense special capabilities and expertise 
are needed to counter the threat posed by the biological or chemical 
weapon of mass destruction involved.
  Fifth, that enforcement of the law would be seriously impaired if the 
DoD assistance were not provided.
  The types of assistance that could be provided during an emergency 
situation would involve operation of equipment to monitor, detect, 
contain, disable, or dispose of a biological or chemical weapon of mass 
destruction or elements of such a weapon. This includes the authority 
to search for and seize the weapons or elements of the weapons.
  This authority must be given. I do not know of any way to avoid that 
because what you have to do is stop the possibility or the probability 
in some cases of massive death of American people.
  The Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense would issue joint 
regulations defining the types of assistance that could be provided.
  The regulations would also describe the actions that Department of 
Defense personnel may take in circumstances incidental to the provision 
of assistance under this section, including the collection of evidence. 
This would not include the power of arrest except in exigent 
circumstances or as otherwise authorized by law.
  Now, that word ``exigent'' is one we are now considering, whether 
there are other words that would more precisely define the kind of 
circumstances we are talking about. The word ``exigent" though is used 
in criminal statutes and has been used over and over again, and that 
word is well known in law enforcement circumstances.
  Also, this provision is designed to address two important concerns. 
First is the general principle that types of assistance provided by the 
Department of Defense should consist primarily of operating equipment 
designed to deal with the chemical and biological agents involved and 
that the primary responsibility for arrest should reside in all 
circumstances with civilian officials where that is possible. As a law 
enforcement situation unfolds, however, military personnel must be able 
to deal with circumstances in which they may confront hostile 
opposition.
  I repeat, Mr. President, there can very well be circumstances, a 
subway, for instance, involving chemical agents, just like the 
situation in Tokyo, or a situation similar to that where chemical 
agents are present, where law enforcement people are not even able to 
go into the area, where the only people who can go into the area are 
the military personnel.
  In that situation, we do not want to put handcuffs on the military 
and say you are going into this dangerous situation but you cannot take 
steps necessary to protect not only your lives but the lives of the 
people who are in the area.
  In such circumstances, the safety of the military personnel involved, 
and the safety of others, and the law enforcement mission cannot be 
compromised by precluding the military from exercising the power they 
need, including the use of force.
  The amendment requires the Department of Defense to be reimbursed for 
assistance provided under this section in accordance with section 377 
of title 10, the general statute governing reimbursement of the 
Department of Defense for law enforcement assistance. This means that 
if DOD does not get a training or operational benefit substantially 
equivalent to DOD training, the DOD must be reimbursed.
  Under the amendment, the functions of the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of Defense my be exercised, respectively, by the Deputy 
Attorney General and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, each of whom 
serves as the alter ego to the head of the Department concerned. These 
functions may be delegated to another official only if that official 
has been designated to exercise the general powers of the head of the 
agency. This would include, for example, an Under Secretary of Defense 
who has been designated to act for the Secretary in the absence of the 
Secretary and the Deputy.
  Mr. President, I will not go into more detail at this time, but the 
limitations set forth in this amendment are designed to address the 
appropriate allocation of resources and functions within the Federal 
Government and are designed to avoid providing a basis for excluding 
evidence or challenging an indictment.
  Current law contains offenses involving the unlawful use of nuclear 
and biological weapons. The amendment sets forth the administration's 
proposal for a similar offense concerning the unlawful use of chemical 
weapons which is not now on the books.
  Mr. President, this is a prudent and narrowly drafted amendment. It 
is consistent with the traditional separation of civilian and military 
functions and the exceptions for unusual and unique circumstances which 
require the special expertise of the Armed Forces to address serious 
threats to the national interest.
  I might add there is an amendment that is incorporated in this 
amendment as it now stands, or it will stand when it is sent to the 
desk, proposed by the Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen], basically saying 
that the Government should take every step possible to get the law 
enforcement community in a position where we can in the future reduce 
the need for using military personnel.
  So we are not saying this is going to be here for all time. We are 
saying we need it now, and as the months go by and the years go by 
there would be the goal in this amendment to reduce the need to rely as 
much on the military as we must necessarily rely on them now in the 
chemical and biological area where they do have extensive training and 
equipment and are virtually the only ones who are able to deal with 
certain circumstances that could be enormously dangerous to the 
American people.
  Mr. President, I will be glad to yield the floor. I know the Senator 
from South Carolina, the cosponsor of this amendment, would like to be 
heard.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, as chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee of the Senate, I was pleased to work with Senator Nunn, the 
ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, along with Senators 
Hatch, Dole, Biden, and Craig to draft this amendment.
  The purpose of this amendment is to have military assistance 
available to help Federal law enforcement in emergency situations that 
involve chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.
  In 1982, the Congress passed and then President Reagan signed into 
law a bill to authorize military assistance in instances involving 
nuclear devices. I supported that legislation in 1982 and believe it is 
now appropriate to extend that law to cover chemical and biological 
weapons of mass destruction.
  We have been careful to limit military assistance to circumstances 
that pose a serious threat to the interests of the United States and 
where civilian expertise is not readily available to provide the 
required assistance to counter the threat posed by the chemical and 
biological weapons of mass destruction.
  Mr. President, I believe this amendment will provide valuable 
assistance to law enforcement to protect the American people should we 
face terrorists with chemical and biological weapons. We have been 
careful to include safeguards to ensure that the military is not 
involved in routine law enforcement.
  I would encourage my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the amendment that the Senator from 
[[Page S7771]] Georgia [Senator Nunn], and I have proposed would create 
a narrow exception to the Posse Comitatus Act in order to permit the 
use of the military to assist law enforcement in emergency situations 
involving chemical and biological weapons.
  Before describing the amendment in detail, let me briefly review the 
origins of the Posse Comitatus Act and the existing exceptions to it.
  The term ``posse comitatus'' means literally the ``power of the 
county.''
  Its roots trace back to English common law, where the sheriff, 
obligated to defend the county against any of the king's enemies, was 
empowered to summon every person above 15 years old for this purpose.
  The first Congress provided similar power to Federal marshals in 
1789--authorizing the marshals to command all necessary assistance in 
the execution of their duty.
  Three years later, Congress explicitly authorized marshals to use the 
militia in assisting their posse.
  In the first half of the nineteenth century, the practice of using 
both the militia and regular military to assist law enforcement became 
commonplace--
  Although whenever military personnel were called into service as a 
part of a posse, they were subordinated to civilian authority.
  Following the Civil War, Federal troops were often used extensively 
in the South, as well as to quell labor unrest in the North.
  Dissatisfaction with this practice led to pressure from Congress for 
explicit restrictions on the use of the military in law enforcement 
operations.
  The result was the Posse Comitatus Act, enacted in 1878.
  The Act is brief and straightforward:

       Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly 
     authorized by the constitution or act of Congress, willfully 
     uses any part of the army or the air force as a Posse 
     Comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not 
     more than $250,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or 
     both.

  Over the past century, Congress has enacted numerous exceptions to 
this general principle.
  Many of these exceptions are for emergency circumstances, or where 
the need for use of the military is obvious.
  For example, the law permits use of the military: to suppress 
insurrections; to protect foreign officials and official guests; to 
enforce the neutrality laws and customs laws; and to assist in 
investigations of murderers of Members of Congress or the Cabinet.
  Congress has also provided some less compelling exceptions to the 
Posse Comitatus Act.
  For instance, the President is empowered to use the military: to 
protect certain Federal parks and timber on Federal lands in Florida; 
to assist States in enforcing quarantines and health laws; and to 
remove any unlawful inclosures on public lands.
  Most relevant to our present inquiry is an exception which permits 
the use of the military to assist law enforcement in countering the 
illegal possession or use of nuclear materials.
  This provision, enacted in 1982, gives the military broad authority 
to assist in the enforcement of the law. The provision explicitly 
provides that the armed forces may be used to arrest persons and 
conduct searches and seizures.
  The military has unique expertise concerning nuclear materials, which 
in my view justifies an exception.
  Should this Nation ever be faced with terrorists armed with nuclear 
materials--of whatever grade--I believe the Department of Justice and 
FBI should be able to draw on this expertise.
  I hold a similar view of the President's request for analogous 
authority with regard to chemical and biological weapons.
  The military's expertise with chemical and biological weapons give it 
special knowledge which would be impractical and expensive to duplicate 
in civilian law enforcement.
  The provision we have introduced is not--is not--the proposal sent to 
us by the administration.
  Both Senator Nunn and I believed that, as drafted, the administration 
bill would have presented many practical problems.
  Instead, we have drafted a new version which does the following:


                      Description of the amendment

       It permits the use of the military to assist law 
     enforcement to respond to emergency situations involving 
     biological or chemical weapons.
       This assistance can only be provided if certain conditions 
     are met: (1) civilian expertise is not readily available; (2) 
     defense department assistance is needed; and
      (3) enforcement of the law would be seriously impaired if 
     the Department of Defense assistance were not provided.

  Finally, the amendment requires the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of Defense to joint issue regulations concerning the types of 
assistance that may be provided.
  The provision permits the regulations to authorize arrest or search 
and seizure only in instances for the immediate protection of human 
life.
  We share the concern of many of our colleagues about using the 
military to enforce the law.
  And we do not want the military to have carte blanche to arrest 
suspects or engage in search or seizure.
  But once called in to assist law enforcement, we do not want to 
create the ludicrous circumstance where a soldier called in to assist 
law enforcement stands immobile where his safety--or the safety of 
others--is at risk.
  Mr. President, the issue comes down to this: Do we want to authorize 
the limited use of the military to combat chemical and biological 
weapons terrorism, or do we want to spend scarce resources to duplicate 
this capability in law enforcement?
  Mr. President, I am under the impression that our distinguished 
Republican colleague is likely to accept this amendment. I hope that is 
the case.
  Mr. CRAIG addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, let me thank Senator Thurmond and Senator 
Nunn for their cooperation in resolving some concerns in the posse 
comitatus amendment and the effort that they took in a most serious and 
appropriate way to cause the military to be involved in the areas of 
biological and chemical warfare and weaponry of mass destruction when 
it might be applied against civilian populations in this country.
  Many of us expressed some very real concern because of what has been 
debated here tonight, the very important separation of the military and 
civilian population which is rooted in our history and that we have 
cautiously and appropriately guarded throughout our country's existence 
with few exceptions.
  And so it was with that background we watched this amendment most 
closely, and I must say that in the end I can now support it because of 
some changes that have been made which I think we can all be very 
comfortable with, and that is to narrow this to not allow arrests, to 
prohibit those but to allow action where there is the exception for the 
immediate protection of human life. We think that narrows it and 
properly defines it, clarifies it so it is not ambiguous and so that it 
can be interpreted in the appropriate way by the Attorney General and 
the Secretary of Defense in their joint responsibility in the issue of 
regulations concerning the implementation of the statute.
  Mr. HATCH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I compliment the distinguished Senator from 
Georgia and the distinguished Senator from South Carolina for the extra 
efforts they have put into trying to resolve the problems on this posse 
comitatus issue.
  Everybody knows I was not very enthusiastic about changing the 
emergency powers of the President or by changing the current posse 
comitatus law. But after having worked with these two great Senators, 
and seeing the compromises that have been worked out to try to resolve 
the problems with this issue that have existed in the minds of a number 
of Senators on the Senate floor, I am happy to say I believe we are in 
a position to accept the amendment, and if the distinguished Senator 
from Delaware is also in the same position, I think we can urge passage 
of this amendment at this time.
  Mr. BIDEN. I would so urge, Mr. President. If I could have the 
attention of the Senator from Georgia, if he would send the amendment 
to the desk, I guess we can agree on it.
[[Page S7772]]

  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Delaware I have just taken the 
amendment to the desk, and it reflects all those changes that we worked 
out, and I would ask that the previous amendment not be called up but 
the one I just brought to the desk be called up.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending Specter 
amendment is set aside for consideration of the amendment of the 
Senator from Georgia. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows.

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for himself, Mr. 
     Thurmond, Mr. Biden, and Mr. Warner, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1213.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 160, between lines 11 and 12, insert the following:

     SEC, 901. AUTHORITY TO REQUEST MILITARY ASSISTANCE WITH 
                   RESPECT TO OFFENSES INVOLVING BIOLOGICAL AND 
                   CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

       (a) Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction.--Section 175 of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:
       ``(c)(1) Military Assistance.--The Attorney General may 
     request that the Secretary of Defense provide assistance in 
     support of Department of Justice activities relating to the 
     enforcement of this section in an emergency situation 
     involving biological weapons of mass destruction. Department 
     of Defense resources, including personnel of the Department 
     of Defense, may be used to provide such assistance if--
       ``(A) the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General 
     determine that an emergency situation involving biological 
     weapons of mass destruction exists; and
       ``(B) the Secretary of Defense determines that the 
     provision of such assistance will not adversely affect the 
     military preparedness of the United States.
       ``(2) As used in this section, `emergency situation 
     involving biological weapons of mass destruction' means a 
     circumstance involving a biological weapon of mass 
     destruction--
       ``(A) that poses a serious threat to the interests of the 
     United States; and
       ``(B) in which--
       ``(i) civilian expertise is not readily available to 
     provide the required assistance to counter the threat posed 
     by the biological weapon of mass destruction involved;
       ``(ii) Department of Defense special capabilities and 
     expertise are needed to counter the threat posed by the 
     biological weapon of mass destruction involved; and
       ``(iii) enforcement of the law would be seriously impaired 
     if the Department of Defense assistance were not provided.
       ``(3) The assistance referred to in paragraph (1) includes 
     the operation of equipment (including equipment made 
     available under section 372 of title 10) to monitor, contain, 
     disable, or dispose of a biological weapon of mass 
     destruction or elements of the weapon.
       ``(4) The Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense 
     shall jointly issue regulations concerning the types of 
     assistance that may be provided under this subsection. Such 
     regulations shall also describe the actions that Department 
     of Defense personnel may take in circumstances incident to 
     the provision of assistance under this subsection. Such 
     regulations shall not authorize arrest or any assistance in 
     conducting searches and seizures that seek evidence related 
     to violations of this section, except for the immediate 
     protection of human life.
       ``(5) The Secretary of Defense shall require reimbursement 
     as a condition for providing assistance under this subsection 
     in accordance with section 377 of title 10.
       ``(6)(A) Except to the extent otherwise provided by the 
     Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General may exercise 
     the authority of the Attorney General under this subsection. 
     The Attorney General may delegate the Attorney General's 
     authority under this subsection only to the Associate 
     Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General and only if 
     the Associate Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General 
     to whom delegated has been designated by the Attorney General 
     to act for, and to exercise the general powers of, the 
     Attorney General.
       ``(B) Except to the extent otherwise provided by the 
     Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense may 
     exercise the authority of the Secretary of Defense under this 
     subsection. The Secretary of Defense may delegate the 
     Secretary's authority under this subsection only to an Under 
     Secretary of Defense or an Assistant Secretary of Defense and 
     only if the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary to whom 
     delegated has been designated by the Secretary to act for, 
     and to exercise the general powers of, the Secretary.''.
       (b) Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction.--The chapter 113B 
     of title 18, United States Code, that relates to terrorism, 
     is amended by inserting after section 2332a the following.

     ``Sec. 2332b. Use of chemical weapons

       ``(a) Offense.--A person who without lawful authority uses, 
     or attempts or conspires to use, a chemical weapon--
       ``(1) against a national of the United States while such 
     national is outside of the United States;
       ``(2) against any person within the United States; or
       ``(3) against any property that is owned, leased or used by 
     the United States or by any department or agency of the 
     United States, whether the property is within or outside of 
     the United States,

     shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, and if 
     death results, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for 
     any term of years or for life.
       ``(b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       ``(1) the term ``national of the United States'' has the 
     meaning given in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)); and
       ``(2) the term ``chemical weapon'' means any weapon that is 
     designed to cause widespread death or serious bodily injury 
     through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or 
     poisonous chemicals or their precursors.
       ``(c)(1) Military Assistance.--The Attorney General may 
     request that the Secretary of Defense provide assistance in 
     support of Department of Justice activities relating to the 
     enforcement of this section in an emergency situation 
     involving chemical weapons of mass destruction. Department of 
     Defense resources, including personnel of the Department of 
     Defense, may be used to provide such assistance if--
       ``(A) the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General 
     determine that an emergency situation involving chemical 
     weapons of mass destruction exists; and
       ``(B) the Secretary of Defense determines that the 
     provision of such assistance will not adversely affect the 
     military preparedness of the United States.
       ``(2) As used in this section, `emergency situation 
     involving chemical weapons of mass destruction' means a 
     circumstance involving a chemical weapon of mass 
     destruction--
       ``(A) that poses a serious threat to the interests of the 
     United States; and
       ``(B) in which--
       ``(i) civilian expertise is not readily available to 
     provide the required assistance to counter the threat posed 
     by the chemical weapon of mass destruction involved;
       ``(ii) Department of Defense special capabilities and 
     expertise are needed to counter the threat posed by the 
     biological weapon of mass destruction involved; and
       ``(iii) enforcement of the law would be seriously impaired 
     if the Department of Defense assistance were not provided.
       ``(3) The assistance referred to in paragraph (1) includes 
     the operation of equipment (including equipment made 
     available under section 372 of title 10) to monitor, contain, 
     disable, or dispose of a chemical weapon of mass destruction 
     or elements of the weapon.
       ``(4) The Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense 
     shall jointly issue regulations concerning the types of 
     assistance that may be provided under this subsection. Such 
     regulations shall also describe the actions that Department 
     of Defense personnel may take in circumstances incident to 
     the provision of assistance under this subsection. Such 
     regulations shall not authorize arrest or any assistance in 
     conducting searches and seizures that seek evidence related 
     to violations of this section, except for the immediate 
     protection of human life.
       ``(5) The Secretary of Defense shall require reimbursement 
     as a condition for providing assistance under this subsection 
     in accordance with section 377 of title 10.
       ``(6)(A) Except to the extent otherwise provided by the 
     Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General may exercise 
     the authority of the Attorney General under this subsection. 
     The Attorney General may delegate the Attorney General's 
     authority under this subsection only to the Associate 
     Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General and only if 
     the Associate Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General 
     to whom delegated has been designated by the Attorney General 
     to act for, and to exercise the general powers of, the 
     Attorney General.
       ``(B) Except to the extent otherwise provided by the 
     Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense may 
     exercise the authority of the Secretary of Defense under this 
     subsection. The Secretary of Defense may delegate the 
     Secretary's authority under this subsection only to an Under 
     Secretary of Defense or an Assistant Secretary of Defense and 
     only if the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary to whom 
     delegated has been designated by the Secretary to act for, 
     and to exercise the general powers of, the Secretary.''
       (c)(1) Civilian Expertise.--The President shall take 
     reasonable measures to reduce civilian law enforcement 
     officials' reliance on Department of Defense resources to 
     counter the threat posed by the use of potential use 
     biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction within 
     the United States, including:
       (A) increasing civilian law enforcement expertise to 
     counter such threat:
       (B) improving coordination between civilian law enforcement 
     officials and other civilian sources of expertise, both 
     within and outside the Federal Government, to counter such 
     threat;
       (2) Report requirement.--The President shall submit to the 
     Congress-- [[Page S7773]] 
       (A) ninety days after the date of enactment of this Act, a 
     report describing the respective policy functions and 
     operational roles of Federal agencies in countering the 
     threat posed by the use or potential use of biological and 
     chemical weapons of mass destruction within United States;
       (B) one year after the date of enactment of this Act, a 
     report describing the actions planned to be taken and the 
     attendant cost pertaining to paragraph (1); and
       (C) three years after the date of enactment of this Act, a 
     report updating the information provided in the reports 
     submitted pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B), including 
     measures taken pursuant to paragraph (1).
       (d) Clerical Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter 
     113B of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
     after the item relating to section 2332a the following:
                  ``2332b. Use of chemical weapons.''.

       (e) Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction.--Section 2332a(a) 
     of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
     ``without lawful authority'' after ``A person who''.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I urge acceptance of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If 
not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  So the amendment (No. 1213) was agreed to.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, it appears to me that we are down to the 
votes on Senator Lieberman's amendment and the Specter-Simon amendment. 
We are prepared to vote.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, that is my understanding. I have been 
informed by staff of the Democratic leadership it would be helpful if 
we did not start the vote for about 5 minutes, so we give people enough 
notice that we are about to start the vote.
  Mr. HATCH. Why not start the vote and add 5 minutes to it. Start it 
at 9:45.
  Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President. Have the yeas and 
nays been ordered on both amendments?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Specter amendment and the Lieberman 
amendment.
  Mr. BIDEN. And the first amendment will be?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Specter amendment.
  Mr. BIDEN. The second one is Lieberman, and the vote on the Specter 
amendment will start at 9:45? I ask unanimous consent that the vote on 
the Specter amendment begin at 9:45.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote on 
the Lieberman amendment be immediately following that amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                       Vote on Amendment No. 1250

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question occurs 
on agreeing to amendment No. 1250 offered by the Senator from 
Pennsylvania, Mr. Specter. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the 
clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Domenici], 
and the Senator from Texas [Mr. Gramm] are necessarily absent.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Conrad], 
and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Pryor] are necessarily absent.
  The result was announced--yeas 81, nays 15, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 235 Leg.]

                                YEAS--81

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Graham
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lott
     Lugar
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pressler
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thurmond
     Warner
     Wellstone

                                NAYS--15

     Brown
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Coverdell
     Dole
     Gorton
     Kassebaum
     Kyl
     Lieberman
     Mack
     McCain
     Nickles
     Roth
     Smith
     Thompson

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Conrad
     Domenici
     Gramm
     Pryor
  So the amendment (No. 1250) was agreed to.
                       vote on amendment no. 1215

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question is on 
agreeing to amendment numbered 1215, offered by the Senator from 
Connecticut [Mr. Lieberman]. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The 
clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Domenici] 
and the Senator from Texas [Mr. Gramm], are necessarily absent.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Conrad] 
and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Payor], are necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 77, nays 19, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 236 Leg.]

                                YEAS--77

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Exon
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Grams
     Grassley
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Pell
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Snowe
     Stevens
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                                NAYS--19

     Bryan
     Burns
     Chafee
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Dorgan
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Gregg
     Hatfield
     Inhofe
     Kempthorne
     Mack
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Smith
     Specter
     Thomas
     Wellstone

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Conrad
     Domenici
     Gramm
     Pryor
  So the amendment (No. 1215) was agreed to.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. FORD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise today in support of anti-terrorism 
legislation. After all, one of the principal purposes of any government 
is to ensure the safety of its citizens. And the destruction of the 
Oklahoma City Federal building and the bombing of the World Trade 
Center indicate that we need to do a better job in this area.
  But I continue to have concerns about some provisions of S. 735, just 
as I did about the President's proposal. In addition, I am concerned 
that the bill under consideration may divide the Senate at a time when 
all public officials should be unified in the fight against violence 
and terror. So while I am inclined to support this measure, I am also 
inclined to support amendments that would improve it.
  For many years, we have watched with growing concern as terrorist 
violence has escalated--and reached closer to home. We can no longer 
ignore the fact that post-cold-war violence knows no borders, and 
respects no distinction between soldiers and innocents.
  Mr. President, fundraising for international terrorism now has roots 
in America--and it has even reached the [[Page S7774]] Midwest. In 
fact, in 1993 a group of Palestinian immigrants, linked to the infamous 
Abu Nidal terrorist organization, actively raised money here for 
terrorism abroad. Surprisingly, this terrorist cell extended from St. 
Louis, MO, to Dayton, OH, to Racine, WI.
  After their arrest, three of the men were accused of plotting to blow 
up the Israeli Embassy in Washington. They admitted to smuggling money 
and information, buying weapons, and planning terrorist activities. In 
July 1994 they pleaded guilty to Federal Racketeering charges.
  Given these growing threats to American lives, both at home and 
abroad, it makes sense for Congress to create a comprehensive Federal 
criminal statute to be used against domestic and international 
terrorists, and to choke off fundraising by terrorist organizations. 
Such legislation is not a panacea but, by clarifying and elaborating on 
our current laws it could provide law enforcement with more effective 
tools in their fight to protect us.
  Unfortunately, while S. 735 accomplishes some of these laudable 
goals, it moves far beyond areas directly affecting terrorism and into 
issues--such as habeas corpus reform--that have frayed the consensus 
that Americans expect from us when their safety is at risk. Now, let us 
be clear: Many criminal appeals are frivolous, and the often convoluted 
habeas process is in need of reform. However, this divisive issue 
should be thoroughly debated on its own--not as a last minute 
attachment to a 160-page terrorism proposal.
  Moreover, attaching habeas reform to this bill opens the door to 
other issues that should be considered elsewhere. For example, others 
seem encouraged to offer amendments relating to arms sales, perjury, 
identification cards, and immigration. If these amendments are 
attached, this bill will become a christmas tree. And if these 
proposals are accepted, then I will consider offering my amendment to 
address the Supreme Court's concerns regarding gun free school zones. 
After all, this is one bill that will certainly be signed into law 
quickly.
  Beyond these concerns regarding habeas corpus reform, I also have 
some substantive concerns regarding the core antiterrorism provisions 
of this bill, just as I had with the Clinton bill. Specifically, I 
believe that S. 735 has not adequately addressed the constitutional 
objections that Members from both sides of the aisle have raised over 
the preceding months. While the substitute does address some of these 
concerns, it often creates more problems than it solves.
  For example, the current bill entirely deletes the licensing 
provisions of the President's fundraising proposal. While the original 
provision was already flawed, the Republican cure is worse than the 
disease. While we need to stop the flow of money to terrorist 
organizations, we also need to be sure that our final product allows 
groups to raise funds for nonviolent, legitimate political purposes. An 
overly broad ban--with no safety valve--may infringe upon the first 
amendment rights of donors to provide financial support to legitimate 
organizations of their choice.
  Similarly, the alien deportation provisions of S. 735 may undermine 
the due process rights of legal resident aliens. Specifically, these 
aliens should have some right to review--and challenge--evidence that 
the Government has marshalled against them. After all, none of us would 
want to be caught up in a kafkaesque procedure that takes place 
entirely behind closed doors. In the words of Benjamin Franklin, ``They 
that give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety 
deserve neither liberty nor safety.''
  In closing, Mr. President, we should not use this antiterrorism bill 
as a vehicle for moving a partisan agenda forward, destroying a rare 
consensus in the process. Moreover, in fighting terrorists, we must not 
be frightened into weakening the Constitution that we have sworn to 
uphold. Therefore, I hope we agree to several amendments to address 
these problems, so that we may present the American people with 
legislation that strengthens our defenses against terrorism, without 
weakening our commitment to the Constitution.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise in support of S. 735, the Dole-Hatch 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995. I thank Senator Dole and Senator 
Hatch for including in the bill my provision, which strengthens the 
protection of Federal computers against terrorism.
  Mr. President, the Internet is a worldwide system of computers and 
computer networks that enables users to communicate and share 
information. The system is comparable to the worldwide telephone 
network. According to a Time magazine article, the Internet connects 
over 4.8 million host systems, including educational institutions, 
Government facilities, military bases, and commercial businesses. 
Millions of private individuals are connected to the Internet through 
their personal computers and modems.
  Computer criminals have quickly recognized the Internet as a haven 
for criminal possibilities. During the 1980's, the development and 
broad-based appeal of the personal computer sparked a period of 
dramatic technological growth. This has raised the stakes in the battle 
over control of the Internet and all computer systems.
  Computer criminals know all the ways to exploit the Internet's easy 
access, open nature, and global scope. From the safety of a telephone 
in a discrete location, the computer criminal can anonymously access 
personal, business, and Government files. And because these criminals 
can easily gain access without disclosing their identities, it is 
extremely difficult to apprehend and successfully prosecute them.
  Prosecution of computer criminals is complicated further by 
continually changing technology, lack of precedence, and weak or 
nonexistent State and Federal laws. And the costs are passed on to 
service providers, the judicial system, and most importantly--the 
victims. Mr. President, section 527 will deter this type of crime.
  This section requires the U.S. Sentencing Commission to review 
existing sentencing guidelines as they apply to sections 1030(a)(4) and 
1030(a)(5) of title 18 of the United States Code--the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act. The Commission must also establish guidelines to ensure 
that criminals convicted under these sections receive mandatory minimum 
sentences for not less than 6 months. Currently, judges are given great 
discretion in sentencing under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. In 
many cases, the sentences don't match the crimes, and criminals receive 
light sentences for serious crimes. Mandatory minimum sentences will 
deter computer ``hacking'' crimes, and protect the infrastructure of 
Federal computer systems.
  Everybody recognizes that it is wrong for an intruder to enter a home 
and wander around; it doesn't make sense to view a criminal who breaks 
into a computer system differently. We have a national anti-stalking 
law to protect citizens on the street, but it doesn't cover stalking on 
the communications network. We should not treat these criminals 
differently simply because they possess new weapons.
  These new technologies, which so many Americans enjoy, were developed 
over many years. I understand that policy can't catch up with 
technology overnight, but we can start filling in the gaps created by 
these tremendous advancements. We cannot allow complicated technology 
to paralyze us into inactivity. It is vital that we protect the 
information and infrastructure of this country.
  Because computers are the nerve centers of the world's information 
and communication system, there are catastrophic possibilities. Imagine 
an international terrorist penetrating the Federal Reserve System and 
bringing to a halt every Federal financial transaction. Or worse yet, 
imagine a terrorist who gains access to the Department of Defense, and 
gains control over NORAD.
  The best known case of computer intrusion is detailed in the book, 
``The Cuckoo's Egg.'' In March 1989, West German authorities arrested 
computer hackers and charged them with a series of intrusions into 
United States computer systems through the University of California at 
Berkeley. Eastern block intelligence agencies had sponsored the 
activities of the hackers beginning in May 1986. The only punishment 
the hackers were given was probation.
  An example of the pending threat is illustrated in the Wednesday, May 
10, headline from the Hill entitled ``Hired Hackers Crack House 
Computers.'' Auditors from Price Waterhouse managed to break into House 
Members' [[Page S7775]] computer systems. According to the article, the 
auditors' report stated that they could have changed documents, 
passwords, and other sensitive information in those systems. What is to 
stop international terrorists from gaining similar access, and 
obtaining secret information relating to our national security?
  Mandatory minimum sentences will make the criminals think twice 
before illegally accessing computer files. In a September 1994 Los 
Angeles Times article about computer intrusion, Scott Charney, chief of 
the computer crime unit for the U.S. Department of Justice, stated 
``the threat is an incresing threat,'' and ``[i]t could be a 16-year-
old kid out for fun or it could be someone who is actively working to 
get information from the United States.''
  He added, there is a ``growing new breed of digital outlaws who 
threaten national security and public safety.'' For example, the Los 
Angeles Times article reported that, in Los Angeles alone, ther are at 
least four outlaw computer hackers who, in recent years, have 
demonstrated they can seize control of telephones and break into 
Government computers.
  The article also mentioned that Government reports further reveal 
that foreign intelligence agencies and mercenary computer hackers have 
been breaking into military computers. For example, a hacker is now 
awaiting trial in San Francisco on epionage charges for cracking an 
Army computer system and gaining access to FBI files on former 
Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos. According to the 1993 Department 
of Defense report, such a threat is very real: ``The nature of this 
changing motivation makes computer intruders' skills high-interest 
targets for criminal elements and hostile adversaries.''
  Mr. President, the September 1993 Department of Defense report added 
that, if hired by terrorists, these hackers could cripple the Nation's 
telephone system, ``create significant public health and safety 
problems, and cause serious economic shocks.'' The hackers could bring 
an entire city to a standstill. The report states that, as the world 
becomes wired for computer networks, there is a greater threat the 
networks will be used for spying and terrorism. In a 1992 report, the 
President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee 
warned, ``known individuals in the hacker community have ties with 
adversary organizations. Hackers frequently have international ties.''
  Mr. President, section 527 of this bill will deter terrorist activity 
and enhance our national security.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, the brutal and vicious bombing of the 
Federal building in Oklahoma City continues to tear at the Nation's 
soul. We are still mourning the loss of so many innocent lives, and 
asking ourselves how anyone could act with such savagery.
  The toll from this terrible tragedy would have been even worse, if so 
many rescue workers and volunteers had not acted so heroically. Their 
courageous and tireless efforts inspired the Nation. We should all take 
a minute to commend these heroes.
  The many law enforcement officials who have worked so hard on this 
case should also be commended. Their efficient apprehension of suspects 
and witnesses has impressed everyone. We can all be proud of their 
efforts.
  As we continue to deal with this terrible tragedy--the deadliest 
terrorist attack on American soil--we must find ways to prevent such 
acts in the future. While no one will argue that we can end terrorism, 
we can take steps to deter terrorists, make it more difficult for them 
to kill and injure, and ensure that they are brought swiftly to 
justice.
  The President deserves commendation for moving forcefully in that 
direction with a comprehensive proposal to crack down on terrorists. 
That proposal, which he submitted to the Congress shortly after the 
Oklahoma bombing, establishes new Federal offenses to ensure that 
terrorists do not escape through the gaps in current law. FBI director 
Louis Freeh explained the importance of closing these gaps in recent 
testimony before the Judiciary Committee.
  The President's proposal also provides additional investigative tools 
for Federal law enforcement officials. These include access to 
financial reports, telephone bills and other records in foreign 
counterintelligence investigations. Because these investigations are 
not always based on criminal offenses, it can be difficult for law 
enforcement to proceed in certain cases.
  Overall, the President's proposal will help the Nation prevent 
terrorism and help bring terrorists to justice. The bombing in Oklahoma 
made clear just how vulnerable we all are to terrorism, and we ought to 
move this proposal forward in an efficient, bipartisan way.
  To their credit, Senators Dole and Hatch have incorporated most of 
the President's proposal into the bill we are considering today. I 
commend them for negotiating with the democratic leadership and 
attempting to narrow differences.
  However, there are a few important Presidential proposals that are 
not in the Republican bill. The President sought to provide the 
Attorney General with the authority to order emergency wiretaps in 
foreign and domestic terrorism cases. When I met with Federal law 
enforcement officials last week in Connecticut, they stressed the 
important of this proposal. Regrettably, my Republican colleagues 
fought this amendment and it was defeated.
  Another critical Presidential proposal fared better. Bipartisan 
cooperation resulted in a unanimous vote in favor of Senator 
Feinstein's amendment, which authorizes the Treasury Department to 
promulgate regulations requiring tracing agents in explosives. This 
authority should help law enforcement officials track bomb builders and 
other criminals. Because this technology is relatively new, we will 
need to monitor the effectiveness of the department's regulations.
  There are other important differences between the Republican bill and 
the President's proposal. One critical difference is the Republican 
approach to habeas corpus reform. This has been a contentious issue for 
a number of years. No one in this body wants to see prisoners abuse the 
legal process, and delay justice for victims, by filing meritless 
appeals. But most of my colleagues also want to ensure that those 
people who have been unfairly convicted have some recourse.
  We have all struggled to strike the right balance on habeas corpus 
reform, and it is not an easy task. In this time of healing, we should 
not let a divisive political issue delay the counterterrorism measures 
that the Nation demands. I hope that we can reach some sort of 
compromise on this issue.
  There are other aspects of this bill that need to be worked out. Some 
of my colleagues have raised some important concerns about the effect 
of this legislation in civil rights. Clearly, no one in this body wants 
to act hastily and undermine the Constitution. We must not sacrifice 
the principles of freedom, fairness and privacy on the altar of fear. 
That would give the ultimate victory to the terrorists.
  So let us work together, resolve our differences, and rejoin the 
battle to strengthen the Nation against terrorist attack.
                           AMENDMENT NO. 1233

  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I would note the pending amendment 
concerns a matter, airline security, that is within the jurisdiction of 
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. I see 
the distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary is on the 
floor. Would the chairman be willing to enter into a short colloquy on 
this issue?
  Mr. HATCH. I would be pleased to discuss the matter with my friend.
  Mr. PRESSLER. I thank my colleague. Although I support the proposed 
amendment requiring a uniform security standard for passenger airlines, 
as chairman of the Commerce Committee I want the record to be clear on 
the point that the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
retains jurisdiction over matters concerning airline safety and 
security.
  Further, I want the record to be clear that simply by not objecting 
to this amendment on jurisdictional grounds, the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation will not be deemed to have waived its 
jurisdiction over the very important issue of air carrier security 
programs. [[Page S7776]] 
  I would ask whether the chairman agrees with my assessment of the 
jurisdictional situation and whether he would be willing to stipulate 
as much for the record?
  Mr. HATCH. I understand and appreciate that the chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation has always 
provided strong leadership on air passenger safety and security issues. 
Let me make it clear that my friend from South Dakota is absolutely 
correct. Aviation security is within the jurisdiction of the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. It is not my 
intention that this amendment will affect in any way that committee's 
jurisdiction over airline security matters in the future.
  Mr. PRESSLER. I thank my friend from Utah for clarifying this point. 
Having put my jurisdictional concern to rest, I join in supporting the 
amendment and urge my colleagues to support it. American citizens 
traveling on foreign carriers should have the same level of protection 
they have when traveling on U.S. passenger carriers. Moreover, U.S. 
passenger carriers should not be put at a competitive disadvantage vis-
a-vis foreign competitors whose relaxed security standards are less 
expensive.
  Mr. HATCH. I thank the chairman. I very much appreciate his support 
for this amendment and thank him for agreeing to proceed to its 
consideration.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, yesterday the Senate voted 90 to 0 to 
approve an amendment I authored to the counterterrorism legislation. 
Because of the importance of this amendment, I want to clarify its 
intent and language.
  This amendment will make it easier for law enforcement officials to 
trace the origins of bombs used for violent or criminal purposes. The 
legislation specifically requires the Secretary of the Treasury to 
conduct a study within 12 months on the use of taggants in all 
explosive materials, including black or smokeless powder. Once that 
study is completed, the Treasury Department must enforce the use of 
taggants in explosive materials within 6 months, depending on the 
study's findings and other factors. In addition, this amendment 
instructs the Treasury Department to also study ways of making common 
chemicals, such as fertilizer, inert and unusable as an explosive.
  This amendment exempts putting taggants in black or smokeless gun 
powder when that powder is used for small arms ammunition, or bullets--
an exemption that already exists under current law. In addition, black 
or smokeless powder used in antique firearms for recreational purposes 
is also exempted from this amendment. The amendment does allow for the 
use of taggants in black or smokeless powder produced for sale in large 
quantities or for other uses.
  I want to clarify that this amendment extends the existing exemption 
under current law. Under sections 845 (a)(4) and (5) of Title 18, 
United States Code, small arms ammunitiona and antique weapons used for 
recreational purposes are exempt from all explosive regulations, except 
for a few specific circumstances. This amendment simply reiterates 
current law.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, it is my understanding, after visiting with 
the managers, that the only amendments left are habeas corpus 
amendments.
  I want to thank the managers on both sides of the aisle for their 
hard work and cooperation for the last 6 hours, and also the Democratic 
leader, Senator Daschle, for his cooperation.
  So we are down now to the habeas corpus amendments. We disposed of 
virtually everything, 80, 90 amendments. We are down to about six, five 
on the Democratic side and one on the Republican side.
  I think we have agreed that we come in at 9:30, have 15 minutes of 
morning business, and at 9:45 we are on the bill. And Senator Biden 
will bring up the habeas corpus Federal prisoners, No. 1217, with 30 
minutes of debate equally divided.
  Then there would be a vote at 10:15 which would accommodate two 
Senators who are going to the Base Closure Commission, and one Senator 
who has someone in the hospital. Then we would try to reach time 
agreements on the remaining amendments, and if possible stack all of 
those votes so we can complete action probably sometime like 1 o'clock. 
We would have votes on those, plus final passage, unless there is a 
motion to reconsider a vote, or something like that.
  I think that is satisfactory. I wish to check with Senators.
  So we will proceed on that basis.

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