[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 88 (Thursday, May 25, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7491-S7492]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, dangerous nuclear leftovers from the 
cold war and the commercial spent fuel storage problem present the U.S. 
with two major environmental challenges. An explosion at the liquid 
high-level waste storage tanks at Hanford could result in a 
catastrophic nuclear accident, and electric utilities are running out 
of space for storage at commercial nuclear reactors. Although these are 
separate problems, the solutions are related. Unfortunately, President 
Clinton is AWOL (absent without leadership), and the DOE is playing 
legal games instead of taking responsibility for taking the commercial 
spent fuel by 1998. It's time for a comprehensive solution.
  First, let's review the facts:
  Thirty thousand tons of spent nuclear fuel is being temporarily 
stored at powerplants at 75 sites.
  In less than 3 years, 23 reactors will run out of space in their 
spent fuel storage pools.
  By 2010, a total of 78 reactors will have run out of space.
  We've already spent 12 years and $4.2 billion to find permanent high-
level repository and conduct site characterization at Yucca Mountain.
  DOE will decide if Yucca Mountain is a suitable site for a permanent 
repository in 1998. If it is, DOE will file for license in 2001. DOE 
has told us that the odds of the site being suitable are about 80 
percent. However, DOE has also indicated that the odds of getting a 
license for a permanent repository under our existing laws are about 
50-50, and probably much worse. These odds are not good enough to bet 
the taxpayer's money on.
  Still, the fact remains that, if after 3 to 6 years more work at 
Yucca Mountain, and a total expenditure of at least $9 billion on our 
nuclear waste disposal program, Yucca is either found not to be 
suitable or licensable, we have nowhere to turn. We currently have no 
contingency plan for waste storage. We will simply have to start over.
  Meanwhile, the President and DOE are dragging their feet. DOE has 
recently issued a ``Final Interpretation of Nuclear Waste Acceptance 
Issues,'' reaffirming its earlier position that its contracts with the 
utilities to take waste by 1998 are not enforceable in court. DOE has 
also asserted that it has no authority under existing law to site an 
interim repository. DOE has missed the point. While DOE is focusing on 
legal technicalities to avoid its obligations to the American people, 
we have had no suggestions from DOE regarding solutions to this 
problem.
  Although we have been told that DOE is studying the issue, all we 
have heard from the administration is a refusal to support any pending 
legislation at this time. I have received no response to my letter to 
the President requesting that the administration engage on this issue 
in a meaningful way.
  Finally, the State of Nevada and the Nevada congressional delegation 
remain opposed to the location of any nuclear waste facilities in their 
State.
  It is time to take a comprehensive look at the problem based on two 
basic principles: First, the Government must meet its obligation to 
take spent fuel by 1998 or as soon thereafter as practical. The 
ratepayers have paid for it. They deserve performance, not excuses. 
Even if it is found to be suitable, Yucca Mountain will not be ready 
before 2010. Therefore, interim storage of spent fuel is needed. 
Although there is nothing unsafe about the storage of spent fuel at 
reactor sites, for reasons of both economics and safety, we must 
consolidate our 74 spent fuel storage sites into 1 or 2.
  Second, the U.S. must continue efforts toward a permanent geological 
repository. While we can keep alternatives such as deep seabed disposal 
and transmutation alive (if Yucca is found unsuitable), our long-term 
goal remains geologic disposal.
  This raises a more difficult question: Where do we locate central 
interim storage? I would suggest the best location for an interim 
storage facility would meet the following criteria:
  Spent fuel should already be there.
  There should be adequate land area.
  The Federal Government should already own the land.
  There should be transportation infrastructure.
  There should be a security infrastructure.
  A skilled work force familiar with handling nuclear materials should 
be available.
  A nuclear safety/worker protection infrastructure should be in place.
  The location(s) should be in general proximity to the Nation's 
reactors, i.e., one for the East and one for the West.
  The new economic activity associated with spent fuel management may 
address concurrent job losses.
  After all of these considerations are evaluated, the relative costs 
of the alternatives should be taken into account.
  Locations that meet the above criteria include some of our existing 
DOE weapons facilities. Geographically, the most likely candidates are 
Hanford and Savannah River. There are other important factors about 
Hanford, and Savannah River--each contain nuclear materials 
dramatically more dangerous than spent commercial fuel safety contained 
in dry casks. For example, Hanford has 61 million gallons of liquid 
high level wastes in 177 underground tanks--some of which have leaked 
or are leaking. Under certain conditions, one or more of these tanks 
could explode, resulting in a catastrophic nuclear accident. Also at 
Hanford are 4,300 metric tons of plutonium in various forms and 
locations, contaminated reprocessing facilities, corroding and possibly 
dangerous DOE nuclear fuels, and a contaminated plutonium finishing 
plant just to name a few. Savannah River has five closed reactors, two 
contaminated reprocessing facilities, and a variety of liquid and solid 
radioactive wastes.
  Despite the very real environmental health and safety risks that 
exist at Hanford and Savannah River, fiscal pressures are forcing us to 
cut the overall cleanup budget even as we squander millions of dollars 
cleaning up low risk sites to comply with environmental regulations 
designed for a perfect world. As Ivan Selin, Chairman of the NRC, said 
last week, Prioritization of the cleanup at DOE sites, based on an 
assessment of risk to the public and the cleanup workers, isn't 
happening to the extent it should.
  Finally, Hanford and Savannah River already have spent nuclear fuel. 
Not the safe, stable nuclear fuel found in commercial power reactors--
but military fuel designed to be quickly reprocessed to make plutonium. 
When we abruptly shut down plutonium production, this military fuel was 
left in limbo. Today it sits, corroding, in pools at Hanford and 
Savannah River . . . 206 metric tons at Savannah River, and 2132 metric 
tons at Hanford.
  To review the situation, we need one or two centralized, dry cask 
storage sites for spent commercial nuclear fuel, until Yucca Mountain 
or another permanent geologic repository is ready. We have spent 
military fuel at Hanford and Savannah River--along with a host of other 
environmental problems--that demand attention despite declining dollars 
and misplaced priorities dictated by current environmental statutes. 
Employment at Hanford and Savannah River is dropping. The local 
communities are feeling the economic pinch. the activity at Hanford and 
Savannah River is shifting from defense production to environmental 
restoration.
  Hanford and Savannah River meet all the criteria listed earlier:
  Spent fuel is already there.
  There is adequate land area.
  The Federal Government already owns the land.
  There is transportation infrastructure.
  There is security infrastructure.
  There is an available, skilled work force that knows how to handle 
nuclear materials.
  There is a nuclear safety/worker protection infrastructure in place.
  Savannah River is conveniently located with respect to civilian power 
reactors in the east, and Hanford is convenient to reactors in the 
west.
  The new economic activity associated with spent fuel management will 
help address economic declines in the area.
  The new dry cask storage facilities may even help safely contain the 
more dangerous spent military fuel that exists at both 
sites. [[Page S7492]] 
  Overall costs of transportation and storage would appear to be lower 
at these sites.
  Therefore, I believe Hanford and Savannah River offer excellent sites 
for the temporary, dry cask storage of civilian spent nuclear fuel 
until a permanent geologic repository is available. At this point, I 
would like to make clear my support for continued progress toward a 
permanent geologic repository. Hanford and Savannah River already have 
defense nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel from defense and research 
activities that is destined for the permanent geologic repository. This 
proposal is intended to hasten the day that those wastes, as well as 
the civilian spent fuel, are sent away from the sites for permanent 
disposal. I realize that at this time, nobody wants to store nuclear 
waste. Incentives must be offered. The communities near Hanford and 
Savannah River will understandably ask, what's in it for us?
  I would be prepared to pursue benefits for these communities if they 
are inclined to take spent commercial fuel on an interim basis only. 
First, I am working with several of my colleagues to develop 
legislation that will prioritize DOE cleanups in accordance with actual 
risks. That approach will result in Hanford and Savannah River being 
cleaned up faster, since many of the high-risk problems are located 
there. Second, I am encouraging the privatization of efforts to 
vitrify--or turn into glass--high-level liquid wastes at Hanford. This 
is the best way to stabilize the liquid tanks and make them safe.
  Third, we are offering new construction and economic activity 
associated with the construction and operation of an interim, above 
ground, dry cask storage site. This will help address the job losses 
and economic declines associated with the end of defense-related 
activities at Hanford and Savannah River. Fourth, there are other 
arrangements, including financial incentives, that can be considered. 
Whether or not DOE continues to exist as a Cabinet-level agency, its 
functions and operations will be significantly scaled back. As the 
various DOE sites compete for the remaining missions, special 
consideration could be given to a site that hosts the interim storage 
facility. Other benefits to communities agreeing to host an interim 
storage site can also be discussed.
  Finally, to provide assurances to the local communities of Richland/
Pasco/Kennewick, WA; Aiken, SC; and Augusta, GA, that the interim dry 
cask storage sites are not intended to be permanent, work on Yucca 
Mountain will be continued. Remember, there is already spent nuclear 
fuel at these sites that is destined for a permanent geologic 
repository, when one is available. It is in the long-term interest of 
these facilities to participate in a program that will take care of the 
immediate problem so that the work on the permanent repository can go 
forward.
  In addition to selecting a site, there are four elements that we 
should include in a legislative bill dealing with spent nuclear fuel. 
First, in order to construct a central interim storage facility in a 
timely manner, changes must be made in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 
These amendments should provide: that licensing of an interim storage 
facility can begin immediately; that the interim dry cask storage site 
can be constructed incrementally and that waste acceptance can begin as 
sections are completed; that the NRC will be the sole licensing 
authority; short-term renewable licenses to ease NRC rulemaking; and 
that DOE will be treated like a private licensee.
  Second, to help ensure that the spent fuel can be moved from reactor 
sites to interim storage as soon as possible, a transportation system 
must be developed. Legislative changes would provide: that utilities 
are responsible for obtaining casks; that DOE will take title to fuel 
at reactor site; that DOE will be responsible for delivery; and a clear 
regulatory regime related to the transportation of spent fuel.
  Third, to ensure that Yucca can be licensed, we should streamline 
licensing provisions, specifying repository performance standards.
  Finally, fourth, a budgetary framework must be established that 
ensures that the money put into the Nuclear Waste Fund by the 
ratepayers is available to the program in amounts sufficient to achieve 
the first three goals in a timely and efficient way.
  These draft proposals outline a workable and efficient interim 
storage program that would allow us to pursue the investigation of our 
permanent disposal options, including a full study of the Yucca 
Mountain site. However, one lesson we have learned is that we cannot 
put all of our eggs in one basket. We cannot solve every nuclear waste 
and spent fuel issue before this country in this Congress. However, we 
can set up the beginnings of a workable, integrated nuclear waste 
management system that will allow succeeding generations to apply new 
technologies to these problems.
  In conclusion, I have given a basic outline of principles Congress 
must address if we are to solve these two major environmental problems. 
As chairman of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, I pledge 
to continue our goal of reaching a common sense and comprehensive 
solution. We'd like to do that with the help of President Clinton and 
his Department of Energy. So far, I have not seen sufficient indication 
they really want to be a part of any solution. Unfortunately, this 
issue is not one where America can be without leadership. I will look 
forward to working with all of those who have an interest and concerns 
to resolve what is undoubtedly one of America's most frightening 
problems, the management of waste left at DOE defense weapons 
facilities, while providing a legislative framework for DOE to meet its 
obligation to take possession of the Nation's civilian spent nuclear 
fuel.


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