[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 87 (Wednesday, May 24, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H5502-H5552]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
AMERICAN OVERSEAS INTERESTS ACT OF 1995
The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments?
amendment offered by ms. mckinney
Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment numbered 16 offered by Ms. McKinney:
After chapter 5 of title XXXI of the bill, insert the
following new chapter (and redesignate the subsequent
chapter accordingly and make other appropriate conforming
amendments):
CHAPTER 6--ARMS TRANSFERS CODE OF CONDUCT
SEC. 3174. SHORT TITLE.
This chapter may be cited as the ``Code of Conduct on Arms
Transfer Act of 1995''.
SEC. 3175. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) Approximately 40,000,000 people, over 75 percent
civilians, died as a result of civil and international wars
fought with conventional weapons during the 45 years of the
cold war, demonstrating that conventional weapons can in fact
be weapons of mass destruction.
(2) Conflict has actually increased in the post cold war
era, with 34 major wars in progress during
1993. [[Page H5503]]
(3) War is both a human tragedy and an on-going economic
disaster affecting the entire world, including the United
States and its economy, because it decimates both local
investment and potential export markets.
(4) International trade in conventional weapons increases
the risk and impact of war in an already over-militarized
world, creating far more costs than benefits for the United
States economy through increased United States defense and
foreign assistance spending and reduced demand for United
States civilian exports.
(5) The newly established United Nations Register of
Conventional Arms can be an effective first step in support
of limitations on the supply of conventional weapons to
developing countries and compliance with its reporting
requirements by a foreign government can be an integral tool
in determining the worthiness of such government for the
receipt of United States military assistance and arms
transfers.
(6) It is in the national security and economic interests
of the United States to reduce dramatically the
$1,038,000,000,000 that all countries spend on armed forces
every year, $242,000,000,000 of which is spent by developing
countries, an amount equivalent to 4 times the total
bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance such countries
receive every year.
(7) According to the Congressional Research Service, the
Untied States supplies more conventional weapons to
developing countries than all other countries combined,
averaging $14,956,000,000 a year in agreements to supply such
weapons to developing countries since the end of the cold
war, compared to $7,300,000,000 a year in such agreements
prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
(8) In recent years the vast majority of United States arms
transfers to developing countries are to countries with an
undemocratic form of government whose citizens, according to
the Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices do not have the ability to peaceably change their
form of government.
(9) Although a goal of United States foreign policy should
be to work with foreign governments and international
organizations to reduce militarization and dictatorship and
therefore prevent conflicts before they arise, during 4
recent deployments of United States Armed Forces--to the
Republic of Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti--
such Armed Forces faced conventional weapons that had been
provided or financed by the United States to undemocratic
governments.
(10) The proliferation of conventional arms and conflicts
around the globe are multilateral problems, and the fact that
the United States has emerged as the world's primary seller
of conventional weapons, combined with the world leadership
role of the United States, signifies that the United States
is in a position to seek multilateral restraints on the
competition for the transfers of conventional weapons.
(11) The Congress has the constitutional responsibility to
participate with the executive branch in decisions to provide
military assistance and arms transfers to a foreign
government, and in the formulation of a policy designed to
reduce dramatically the level of international
militarization.
(12) A decision to provide military assistance and arms
transfers to a government that is undemocratic, does not
adequately protect human rights, is currently engaged in acts
of armed aggression, or is not fully participating in the
United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, should require
a higher level of scrutiny than does a decision to provide
such assistance and arms transfers to a government to which
these conditions do not apply.
SEC. 3176. PURPOSE.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide clear policy
guidelines and congressional responsibility for determining
the eligibility of foreign governments to be considered for
United States military assistance and arms transfers.
SEC. 3177. PROHIBITION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE
AND ARMS TRANSFERS TO CERTAIN FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS.
(a) Prohibition.--Except as provided in subsections (b) and
(c), beginning on and after October 1, 1996, United States
military assistance and arms transfers may not be provided to
a foreign government for a fiscal year unless the President
certifies to the Congress for that fiscal year that such
government meets the following requirements;
(1) Promotes democracy,--Such government--
(A) was chosen by and permits free and fair elections;
(B) promotes civilian control of the military and security
forces and has civilian institutions controlling the policy,
operation, and spending of all new enforcement and security
institutions, as well as the armed forces;
(C) promotes the rule of law, equality before the law, and
respect for individual and minority rights, including freedom
to speak, publish, associate, and organize; and
(D) promotes the strengthening of political, legislative,
and civil institutions of democracy, as well as autonomous
institutions to monitor the conduct of public officials and
to combat corruption.
(2) Respects human rights.--Such government--
(A) does not engage in gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights, including--
(i) extra judicial or arbitrary executions;
(ii) disappearances;
(iii) torture or severe mistreatment;
(iv) prolonged arbitrary imprisonment;
(v) systematic official discrimination on the basis of
race, ethnicity, religion, gender, national origin, or
political affiliation; and
(vi) grave breaches of international laws of war or
equivalent violations of the laws of war in internal
conflicts;
(B) vigorously investigates, disciplines, and prosecutes
those responsible for gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights;
(C) permits access on a regular basis to political
prisoners by international humanitarian organizations such as
the International Committee of the Red Cross;
(D) promotes the independence of the judiciary and other
official bodies that oversee the protection of human rights;
(E) does not impede the free functioning of domestic and
international human rights organizations; and
(F) provides access on a regular basis to humanitarian
organizations in situations of conflict or famine.
(3) Not engaged in certain acts of armed aggression.--Such
government is not currently engaged in the acts of armed
aggression in violation of international law.
(4) Full participation in u.n. register of conventional
arms.--Such government is fully participating in the United
Nations Register of Conventional Arms.
(b) Requirement for Continuing Compliance.--Any
certification with respect to a foreign government for a
fiscal year under subsection (a) shall cease to be effective
for that fiscal year if the President certifies to the
Congress that such government has not continued to comply
with the requirements contained in paragraphs (1) through (4)
of such subsection.
(c) Exemptions.--The prohibition contained in subsection
(a) shall not apply with respect to a foreign government for
a fiscal year if--
(1)(A) the President submits a request for an exemption to
the Congress containing a determination that it is in the
national security interest of the united States to provide
military assistance and arms transfer to such government; and
(B) the Congress enacts a law approving such exemption
request (including a law containing an approval of such a
request); or
(2) the President determines that an emergency exists under
which it is vital to the interest of the United States to
provide military assistance and arms transfer to such
government.
(d) Notifications to Congress.--
(1) In general.--The President shall submit to the Congress
initial certifications under subsection (a) and requests for
exemptions under subsection (c)(1) in conjunction with the
submission of the annual request for enactment of
authorizations and appropriations for foreign assistance
programs for a fiscal year and shall, where appropriate,
submit additional or amended certifications and requests for
exemptions at any time thereafter in the fiscal year.
(2) Determination with respect to emergency situations.--
The President shall submit to the Congress at the earliest
possible date reports containing determinations with respect
to emergencies under subsection (c)(2). Each such report
shall contain a description of--
(A) the nature of the emergency;
(B) the type of military assistance and arms transfers
provided to the foreign government; and
(C) the cost to the United States of such assistance and
arms transfers.
SEC. 3178. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate should hold
hearings on--
(1) controversial certifications submitted under section
3177(a).
(2) all requests for exemptions submitted under section
3177(c)(1); and
(3) all determinations with respect to emergencies under
section 3177(c)(2).
SEC. 3179. UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS
TRANSFERS DEFINED.
For purposes of this chapter, the terms ``United States
military assistance and arms transfers'' and ``military
assistance and arms transfers'' means--
(1) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to military assistance),
including the transfer of excess defense articles under
section 516 of that Act;
(2) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to international military
education and training); or
(3) the transfer of defense articles, defense services, or
design and construction services under the Arms Export
Control Act (excluding any transfer or other assistance under
section 23 of such Act), including defense articles and
defense services licensed or approved for export under
section 38 of that Act.
Ms. McKINNEY (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman
from Georgia?
There was no objection.
(Ms. McKINNEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
[[Page H5504]]
Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, today, I will offer the Code of Conduct
amendment to H.R. 1561. My amendment seeks to give Congress--for the
first time in two decades--a role in U.S. arms export policy.
As the law is currently written, Mr. Chairman, it is nearly
impossible for Congress to stop an arms sale. Not since 1986 has a
floor vote been taken on an arms sale, nor has a sale proposed by the
administration formally been disapproved by Congress.
In addition to the lack of congressional oversight in arms sales, the
economic cost to the American taxpayer is more than $7 billion a year
just to support the arms export bureaucracy.
U.S. weapons are being used in 90 percent of today's most significant
regional and ethnic conflicts. The weapons and technology that
devastated the Iraqi Army only a few years ago, are now available to
nations that are undemocratic, violate human rights, and are governed
by dictators.
In 1993, the U.S. Government cornered a colossal 70 percent of the
global arms sales market, and in 1994 U.S. foreign military arms sales
were a whopping $12.9 billion.
America's arms sales have skyrocketed since the end of the cold war.
As this first chart shows, Mr. Chairman, U.S. arms transfers from 1990
to 1993 averaged $21.7 billion a year, whereas, from 1986 to 1989, arms
transfers only averaged $10.6 billion. It is amazing and shameful that
as America solidifies its post-cold war leadership and encourages
global democracy, the U.S. Government sold $83.1 billion in foreign
military sales to dictators with no congressional review.
Despite this enormous dominance of the international arms market and
the ``Boomerang Effect'' against U.S. Armed Forces--only a few Members
of Congress have worked to restrain this dangerous trade.
Additionally, America spends billions of tax dollars to finance
exports to tyrants--highlighted by the second chart--while cutting
billions from key domestic programs like veterans benefits, Social
Security, and student loans.
Mr. Chairman, the Code of Conduct amendment would not prohibit arms
transfers to any country. Rather it would establish a higher standard
of scrutiny for countries receiving U.S. weapons and more congressional
oversight of arms sales. The Code of Conduct makes sure that we look
before we leap by providing four guiding principles for U.S. arms
transfers.
History demonstrates that as a result of Siad Barre's Somalia,
Cedras' Haiti, and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, our soldiers have paid the
price for selling U.S. materiel to dictators.
The code would require that both the President and Congress agree
that providing assistance to a certain country is in the best interest
of the United States. The code also gives the President flexibility. He
can request a 1-year waiver for countries not meeting the code's
standards, or in cases where vital U.S. interests are in jeopardy, use
an emergency authority.
The code is endorsed by 275 organizations from Amnesty International
to the YWCA and is supported by the European Parliament. Arms sales to
unstable governments must end, and the Code of Conduct will be the
first step in that direction.
There are 102 Members of Congress who support the guiding principles
of the code--democracy, respect for human rights, and nonaggression. I
urge all of you to cast your vote in favor of the Code of Conduct.
Let's ensure that America's leadership is positively reflected in our
arms export policy. Vote for the Code of Conduct.
[From World Policy Institute, May 1995]
U.S. Weapons at War: U.S. Arms Deliveries to Regions of Conflict
(By William D. Hartung)
executive summary
From Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton, it has been an article
of faith for executive branch policy makers that U.S. weapons
exports are only made to responsible allies who use these
systems for legitimate defense purpose. This report puts that
thesis to the test by documenting U.S. weapons deliveries to
50 current ethnic and territorial conflicts.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom in Washington, official
U.S. government data on arms transfers provides overwhelming
circumstantial evidence that U.S.-supplied weaponry is at the
center of many of today's most dangerous and intractable
conflicts:
In the past ten years, parties to 45 current conflicts have
taken delivery of over $42 billion worth of U.S. weaponry;
Of the significant ethnic and territorial conflicts going
on during 1993-94, 90% (45 out of 50) of them involved one or
more parties that had received some U.S. weaponry or military
technology in the period leading up to the conflict;
In more than half of current conflicts (26 out of 50), the
United States has been a significant arms supplier,
accounting for at least 5% of the weapons delivered to one
party to the dispute over a five year period;
In more than one-third of all current conflicts (18 out of
50), the United States has been a major supplier to one party
to the dispute, accounting for over 25% of all weapons
imported by that participant in the most recent five year
period;
Despite the popular perception that it is U.S. policy to
cease deliveries of weapons once a conflict is under way, as
of the end of 1993 (the latest year for which full statistics
are available) the United States was shipping military goods
and services to more than half (26 out of 50) of the areas
where there were wars being fought;
In a number of volatile areas the United States has been
the primary supplier to governments that are involved in
ongoing conflicts. In Turkey (76%), Spain (85%), Israel
(99%), Morocco (26%), Egypt (61%), Chad (27%), Somalia (44%),
Liberia (40%), Kenya (25%), Pakistan (44%), the Philippines
(93%), Indonesia (38%), Guatemala (86%), Haiti (25%),
Columbia (28%), Brazil (35%), and Mexico (77%), the United
States has been the primary supplier of imported weaponry in
the most recent five year period for which full data is
available.
Turkey's use of U.S.-supplied fighter aircraft,
helicopters, tanks and armored personnel carriers in its
recent invasion of Northern Iraq highlights the dangers of a
policy of uncritical
assistance to allies engaged in ethnic or territorial
disputes, as does the employment of U.S.-supplied
equipment on both sides of the 1995 Peru-Ecuador border
war.
Since the end of the Cold War, the continuing U.S. policy
of promoting weapons exports as a key element of U.S.
security strategy and economic policy has accelerated the
incidence of the ``boomerang effect'': the transfer of U.S.
weaponry to forces that end up doing battle against U.S.
troops. The last four times the United States sent troops
into combat in significant numbers--in Panama, Iraq, Somalia,
and Haiti--they faced adversaries that had received U.S.-
origin arms, training, or military production technology in
the period leading up to the conflict. This is a clear sign
that something is awry in U.S. arms transfer decision making
processes.
Last but not least, covert U.S. arms sales have come back
to haunt U.S. citizens by inadvertently strengthening
terrorist organizations. Two of the men convicted in the 1993
World Trade Center bombing received weapons training in
Afghanistan under the direction of fundamentalist Islamic
forces that were armed and trained by the CIA. The suspects
in the recent murders of several U.S. embassy employees in
Karachi, Pakistan are also suspected of having ties to the
CIA's Afghan arms pipeline. David Whipple, the former head of
counterterrorism at the CIA, has indicated that these are not
isolated cases: ``some of the people who are actual or
potential terrorists in this country are former guerrilla
fighters in Afghanistan.'' And an Algerian official has
described the existence of a ``floating army'' of Islamic
fundamentalist fighters who were trained with CIA assistance
in Afghanistan and are now engaged in organized attempt to
overthrow the governments of Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi
Arabia, among others.
As President Clinton tries to mobilize world public opinion
against Iran, in part for its alleged role in supporting
terrorism in the Middle East, it would behoove him to get his
own house in order by clamping down on the CIA's covert
weapons trafficking operations, which all too often end up
hurting innocent people, including U.S. citizens. The recent
revelations that a Guatemalan colonel on the CIA payroll is
implicated in the murders of Michael DeVine, an American who
ran a farm in Guatemala, and Efrain Bamaca Velazquez, a
Guatemalan rebel leader who was married to American lawyer
and activist Jennifer Harbury, is just the latest example of
a covert arms trading culture that is out of control.
recommendations
The report makes the following specific recommendations for
promoting greater accountability in arms transfer decision
making (for the full text of the recommendations, see section
IV, below):
Recommedation 1: Pass the arms transfer Code of Conduct bill
In February of 1995, Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) and
Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) reintroduced
legislation calling for the establishment of a Code of
Conduct for U.S. weapons transfers. Under the code,
governments that engage in aggression against their
neighbors, violate the human rights of their own citizens,
come to power through undemocratic means, or refuse to
participate in international agreements like the United
Nations arms register would not be eligible to receive
weaponry from the United States. If the President wanted to
make an exception for a specific country on national security
grounds, he would have to ask Congress to pass a bill
providing an exemption for that nation. [[Page H5505]]
The benefits of the Code of Conduct would be twofold.
First, it would place considerations about the character of a
given arms recipient and how that nation might use U.S.
weaponry up front in the arms transfer decision making
process, preventing sales to unstable regimes in the process.
Second, even in cases where the President sought an
exemption, members of Congress would be forced to go on the
record for or against, providing a measure of public
accountability that rarely occurs under current law.
Recommendation 2: Provide more detailed reporting on U.S.
transfers of arms and military technology, and press for
other nations to do the same
Up until the Reagan Administration, the State Department
issued an annual report under Section 657 of the Foreign
Assistance Act that listed most significant items of military
equipment delivered from the United States to any foreign
country in the prior fiscal year, ranging from rifles and
bullets on up to advanced combat aircraft. The section 657
report should be reinstituted as an annual publication, to
provide a tool for keeping track of potential abuses of U.S.-
supplied weaponry.
A full accounting of U.S. arms transfer policy must also
include regular, detailed reporting on U.S. transfers of so-
called ``dual use'' equipment--items such as advanced machine
tools and computers, measuring instruments, or unarmed light
helicopters and aircraft. If Congress and the public had been
aware of the particulars of the nearly $1.5 billion in dual
use export licenses that the Commerce Department granted to
companies seeking to sell equipment to Iraq during 1985
through 1990, some of the more dangerous items on the list
might not have been approved for sale.
Recommendation 3: The Pentagon and the intelligence community
should publish regular reports on the use of U.S.-
supplied weaponry in ongoing conflicts
All too often, U.S. weapons are supplied on a ``fire `em
and forget `em'' basis: the decision to sell is made based on
short-term political, strategic, or economic considerations,
with little thought given to how these arms might be used a
few years down the road. In an attempt to prevent this
``boomerang effect'' from repeating itself in the future,
Representative Cynthia McKinney sponsored a successful
amendment to the Fiscal Year 1995 Department of Defense
Authorization bill requiring the Pentagon to report annually
on how proposed arms transfers might create ``increased
capabilities'' on the part of potential adversaries, and how
they might ``pose an increased threat'' to U.S. forces in
some future conflict.
As a further step in the right direction, the Pentagon and
the Central Intelligence Agency should be required to file
annual reports on how U.S.-supplied weaponry is being put to
use in current conflicts, either by the original recipients,
or as the result of unauthorized transfers to third parties.
These reports could serve as a running record of the
consequences of past U.S. weapons trading activities, and
they would hopefully inject a note of caution into
congressional debates over new proposed transfers.
Recommendation 4: Outlaw covert weapons shipments
From Iran/contra to the arming of Iraq to the ongoing
proliferation of weapons originally intended for Afghan rebel
movements, covert weapons trafficking have been at the center
of a series of unmitigated foreign policy fiascos. As part of
the effort to restructure the CIA to better meet the
realities of the post-Cold War world, covert arms sales by
the CIA and other government departments should be strictly
outlawed.
Recommendation 5: The Clinton Administration (or its
successor) should vigorously pursue a policy of
multilateral arms transfer restraint designed to limit
sales of conventional weaponry to regions of conflict or
repressive regimes
Contrary to the findings of the Clinton Administraton's new
conventional arms transfer policy, Presidential Directive 41,
limiting the spread of weaponry to regions of conflict should
be the paramount priority governing U.S. arms transfer
decisions in the post-Cold War era. Economic and defense
industrial base concerns should take a back seat to efforts
to construct a multilateral arms export control regime that
can serve both as a tool for preventing conflicts, and for
limiting their duration and severity once they break out. At
a time when the United States controls 72% of new arms sales
agreements with the developing world, U.S. leadership remains
an essential prerequisite for implementing any meaningful
multilateral arrangement for limiting the flow of
conventional armaments.
I. Introduction: U.S. Arms Transfers--Promoting Stability or Fueling
Conflict?
``[T]here is almost no case since World War II in which
arms provided by the United States have been used by the
country receiving them for purposes of aggression.''--Richard
Nixon, ``The Real War,'' 1980.
``[T]here is almost no instance of a country which is
primarily dependent upon U.S. weapons using those weapons in
an offensive manner.''--Joel Johnson, Aerospace Industries
Association, February 1994.
``[T]here is strong evidence that countries relying on
American weaponry have not started wars with their neighbors
. . . To cite the most egregious example, Iraq . . .
purchased its weapons primarily from Russia and France.''--
Ethan Kapstein, ``Foreign Affairs,'' May/June 1994.
``Given the complexities of arms transfer decisions and the
multiple U.S. interests involved . . . decisions will
continue to be made on a case-by-case basis. These case-by-
case reviews will . . . draw the appropriate balance between
legitimate arms sales to support the national security of our
friends and allies, and the need for multilateral restraint
against the transfer of arms that would enhance the military
capabilities of hostile states or that would undermine
stability.''--Fact Sheet on Clinton Administration, Arms
Sales Policy Directive, February 17, 1995.
The Arms Export Control Act states that U.S. military
equipment and services shall be provided to other nations
only for purposes of internal security, ``legitimate self-
defense,'' participation in United Nations peacekeeping
operations, or involvement in operations consistent with the
U.N. Charter.[1] Based in part on this legislative
requirement and in part on their
ingrained assumptions regarding U.S. weapons sales, several
generations of executive branch officials, policymakers,
and independent analysts have taken it as an article of
faith that U.S.-supplied weapons are primarily used for
defensive purposes.
Now that the United States controls nearly three-quarters
of all weapons exports to the developing world, the question
of whether or not U.S. weapons are used aggressively is of
more than merely academic interest.[2]
As of early 1994, there were 50 significant ethnic and
territorial conflicts under way in Europe, Africa, the Middle
East, Asia and Latin America.[3] By the end of 1993, the
number of ongoing wars involving more than one thousand
battle-related deaths reached 34, marking the first increase
in this grim statistic since the end of the Cold War.[4] By
early 1995, progress towards peace in South Africa, the
Middle East, and Northern Ireland had been offset by the
escalation of conflicts in North Africa (Algeria) and Russia
(Chechnya), and the outbreak of a border war between Peru and
Ecuador.[5]
With the exception of Russia, China, and a few other
nations that produce a wide array of weapons systems for
their own use, the majority of participants in today's armed
conflicts depend upon imported weaponry.[6] The conventional
wisdom among U.S. policymakers is that the weapons that are
actually used in the majority of the world's conficts are
supplied by other, less ``responsible'' suppliers. To the
extent that U.S. officials raise questions about arms
supplies to regions of conflict, the usual targets of
criticism are either Russia or China, which have historically
been more willing to supply arms and military technology to
``rogue'' states like Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Iran.[7]
In addition, some observers make pointed references to
France's allegedly amoral, mercantile approach to arms
sales.[8] In contrast, it has been argued that U.S. arms
sales are grounded in carefully considered decisions to
bolster the security of trustworthy allies in critical
regions.
The notion that the United States is only arming the ``good
guys'' has a long history. In his book ``The Real War,''
Richard Nixon, the architect of the current U.S. role as the
world's leading weapons trafficking nation, argued that U.S.-
supplied weapons have rarely been used in a belligerent
manner, but that ``Soviet arms are the ones that are
constantly used to break the peace.''[9] Nixon's blanket
claim ignored a series of aggressive actions by major U.S.
arms clients during the Nixon/Ford administrations, including
Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, Indonesia's invasion of East
Timor, Morocco's occupation of the Western Sahara, and
General Augusto
Pinochet's reign of terror in the wake of his 1973 coup
d'etat in Chile.[10]
The Reagan Administration presided over one of the most
revealing incidents in the history of U.S. policy towards
aggressive uses of U.S. military equipment when it responded
to Israel's June 1981 bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear
reactor. Initially, U.S. weapons deliveries to Israel were
suspended until the State Department could determine whether
the bombing, which utilized U.S.-supplied F-15 and F-16
aircraft, violated Israel's pledge to use U.S. systems for
defensive purposes. After a ten week review, Secretary of
State Alexander Haig decided to resume arms shipments to
Israel, arguing that ``I think one in a subjective way can
argue to eternity as to whether or not a military action may
be defensive or offensive in character.'' Rather than making
a specific case that Israel's bombing of Osirak was justified
as a defensive act, Haig seemed to be saying, in Alice-in-
Wonderland style, that a defensive use of a weaponry is
whatever the U.S. government and its allies say it is.[11]
Turkey's 1995 invasion of Northern Iraq, which has been
justified by Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller on the
grounds that Turkish forces are in ``hot pursuit'' of Kurdish
terrorists, raises similar questions about what constitutes a
genuinely defensive deployment of U.S.-supplied weaponry (for
further discussion of Turkey's use of U.S. weapons against
its Kurdish population, see section II, below).
This ``see-no-evil'' approach to U.S. weapons trading has
survived into the 1990s. The last four times the United
States has sent troops into combat they have faced
adversaries that received U.S. arms or military technology in
the period leading up to the conflict, yet the Clinton
Administration's arms transfer policy review stubbornly
refused to take into account the very real possibility that
U.S.-supplied weapons may be used for purposes contrary to
U.S. interests. As if to [[Page H5506]] underscore the
business-as-usual tone of the Clinton approach, an official
involved in the policy review has indicated that under the
Administration's new guidelines, not a single one of the
hundreds of major U.S. arms sales of the past fifteen years
would have been rejected.[12] The administration's decidedly
upbeat perspective on arms sales was summed up early on by
Lt. General Teddy Allen, the former Director of the
Pentagon's Defense Security Assistance Agency, during
testimony to Congress in June 1993: ``Many friends and allies
depend on U.S. defense equipment, services, and training to
deter, and when necessary, defeat, armed aggression.''[13]
When it finally released the results of its arms export
policy review in February of 1995, the Clinton Administration
described the five key goals of its policy as follows:
(1) To ensure that our military forces can continue to
enjoy technological advantages over potential adversaries;
(2) To help allies and friends deter or defend themselves
against aggression, while promoting interoperability with
U.S. forces when combined operations are required;
(3) To promote regional stability in areas critical to U.S.
interests, while preventing proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their missile delivery systems;
(4) to promote peaceful conflict resolution and arms
control, human rights democratization and other U.S. foreign
policy objectives;
(5) to enhance the ability of the U.S. defense industrial
base to meet U.S. defense requirements and maintain long-term
military technological superiority at lower costs. [14].
The idea of controlling the spread of U.S. weaponry to
ensure that U.S. exports do not sustain ongoing wars, fuel
regional arms races, or strengthen potential U.S. adversaries
is only obliquely hinted at in the Clinton administration's
priority list; the underlying assumption is that U.S. weapons
transfers go to potential ``coalition partners'' to be used
for strictly defensive purposes. Despite recent evidence to
the contrary, the possibility that today's partner could be
tomorrow's adversary doesn't seem to enter into the
administration's thinking.
To further underscore how small a role the potential risks
of U.S. weapons exports will play in executive branch
decisionmaking, Clinton Administration officials have
indicated that the contribution of a given transfer to the
defense industrial base will now be an explicit factor in
deciding whether to go ahead with the sale. This could mean
that the fact that a deal might extend Lockheed's production
run for the F-16 fighter or sustain General Dynamics'
assembly line for the M-1 tank will carry greater weight than
whether these weapons are being provided to unstable regimes.
[15].
Not surprisingly, the claim that U.S.-supplied arms are
only used defensively has also been made repeatedly by
executives and lobbyists in the defense industry. For
example, Don Fuqua, president of the Aerospace Industries
Association, made the following claim in a November 1994
article entitled ``Merchants of Peace'': ``during more than
half a century, no American soldier ever faced any
significant American military equipment used by a hostile
power.'' [16] This industry argument has been echoed in
academic circles as well, most notably in an article by Ethan
Kapstein of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies
at Harvard which appeared in the May/June 1994 issue of
Foreign Affairs:
``. . . there is strong evidence that countries relying on
American weaponry have not started wars with their neighbors.
Contrast that record with the one compiled by countries that
have purchased their weapons from Russia, Western Europe, or
Third World suppliers. To cite the most egregious example,
Iraq, which attacked Iran in 1980 before turning on Kuwait a
decade later, had purchased its weapons primarily from Russia
and France.
``Why American arms should be used primarily for defensive
purposes is an interesting question. The most likely reason
is that countries reliant on the United States fear being cut
off and forced to look elsewhere if they misbehave.''[17]
The question of whether U.S. weapons transfers are as
overwhelmingly constructive and stabilizing as this version
of the conventional wisdom claims they are deserves closer
scrutiny. As the next section will demonstrate, the sheer
volume of U.S. arms shipments to areas of conflict calls into
question the notion that these transfers have exerted a
uniformly positive or predictable influence on local,
regional, and international security.
II. U.S. Weapons at War
A comparison of the Pentagon's own data on deliveries of
weapons through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and
Commercial Sales (CS) programs over the past decade with a
list of 50 significant wars that were under way during 1993-
94 indicates that U.S. weapons exports have played a major
role in fueling the ethnic and territorial conflicts that
have become one of the most difficult security challenges of
the post-Cold War era [18]:
In the past ten years, parties to 45 current conflicts have
taken delivery of over $42 billion worth of U.S. weaponry;
Of the significant ethnic and territorial conflicts going
on during 1993-94, 90% (45 out of 50) of them involved one or
more parties that had received some U.S. weaponry or military
technology in the period leading up to the conflict;
In more than half of current conflicts (26 out of 50), the
United States has been a significant arms supplier,
accounting for at least 5% of the weapons delivered to one
party to the dispute over a five year period;
In more than one-third of all current conflicts (18 out of
50), the United States has been a major supplier to one party
to the dispute, accounting for over 25% of all weapons
imported by that participant in the most recent five year
period;
Despite the popular perception that it is U.S. policy to
cease deliveries of weapons once a conflict is under way, as
of the end of 1993 (the latest year for which full statistics
are available) the United States was shipping military goods
and services to more than half (26 out of 50) of the areas
where there were wars being fought.
The data outlined above demonstrate that contrary to the
assertions of key policymakers, academic analysts, and
industry lobbyists, the United States is sustaining the
warfighting capabilities of a substantial number of the
parties to the world's current conflicts. In a number of
volatile areas the United States has been the primary
supplier to governments that are involved in either internal
or regional conflicts. In cases where the United States has
supplied a majority of a client government's imported
weaponry over an extended period of time, it is likely that
some U.S. systems will be utilized in future conflicts
involving these nations (see Table I, below)
Among the most serious conflicts in which the United States
has been the primary weapons supplier are Turkey, Morocco,
Somalia, Liberia, Kenya, Zaire, Pakistan, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Haiti, Guatemala, Colombia and Mexico. Official
U.S. weapons deliveries to Haiti, Guatemala, Liberia, and
Zaire were cut off as of the early 1990s, but U.S. deliveries
to conflict zones in Turkey, Morocco, Somalia and Kenya have
actually increased over the past few years. In the case of
Somalia, the increase is explained by the fact that a new
government has been installed as a result of a UN
peacekeeping mission in that nation. But continuing U.S.
deliveries to Morocco, Turkey, and Kenya have no such
rationale: in these cases, U.S. arms are shoring up regimes
that have been intransigent in their pursuit of military
solutions to sensitive ethnica and territorial disputes. Last
but not least, in both Haiti and Guatemala, legislative
attempts to terminate U.S. military assistance were subverted
by the implementation of covert aid programs that were
actually larger than the overt programs that were eliminated
by Congress (see sections II and III for further discussion).
TABLE I--AREAS OF CONFLICT IN WHICH THE U.S. HAS BEEN A PRIMARY WEAPONS
SUPPLIER
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of total arms
imports received from
Region (and recipient) the United States
-------------------------
1987-91 1991-93\1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Southern Europe:
Spain..................................... 85 86
Turkey.................................... 76 80
Middle East/North Africa:
Israel.................................... 99 91
Morocco................................... 26 76
Egypt..................................... 61 89
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Chad...................................... 27 25
Somalia................................... 44 100
Liberia................................... 40 \2\0
Kenya..................................... 25 100
Zaire..................................... 17 0
Asia:
Pakistan.................................. 44 3
Philippines............................... 93 75
Indonesia................................. 38 33
Latin America:
Guatemala................................. 86 \3\0
Haiti..................................... >25 \2\0
Colombia.................................. 28 19
Brazil.................................... 35 40
Mexico.................................... 77 64
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\The overlap in years covered by the two columns (1987-1991 and 1991-
1993) is a function of the way the data is reported in the two most
recent editions of the ``World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers'' report. For a brief description of the nature of the
conflicts in each of these nations, see Appendix A, Table I, below.
\2\The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) reported no arms
transfers to Haiti or Liberia from any source during 1991-1993; this
does not necessarily mean that there were no transfers of any kind--it
is likely that there was some black market trading in light weaponry
that was not detected by the intelligence sources that serve as the
basis for ACDA's data.
\3\It has recently been revealed that the Central Intelligence Agency
continued to make millions of dollars in payments to Guatemalan
military and intelligence officials after U.S. military aid was
officially cut off in 1991; it has yet to be determined whether some
of this money was used to import weaponry.
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ``World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers'', 1991-92 and 1993-94 editions, Table
III.
While data on the total volume of U.S. weapons supplies to
areas of conflict is readily available, specific information
on how U.S. weaponry is being put to use in today's wars is
harder to come by. This is in part because neither the media
nor the armed forces have made it their business to identify
the specific types of weaponry utilized in a given conflict
or to document the origins of these armaments. Even if
gathering such data was a priority, the reality of warfare,
particularly multi-sided civil conflicts involving light
weaponry, would make it difficult to obtain comprehensive
information. Nonetheless, accounts in the mainstream and
specialty press have uncovered a number of recent examples of
how U.S.-supplied weaponry is being put to use on the
battlefield, and a number of arms control and human rights
researchers have recently begun a concerted effort to gather
more information on the patterns of deliveries of light
weaponry to ethnic conflicts. The following examples are
illustrative of the ways in which U.S. weapons are being
utilized in current conflicts: a more comprehensive
accounting would require more open reporting of the nature of
U.S. weapons transfers to these areas. [[Page H5507]]
Turkey: Turkey received over $6.3 billion worth of military
equipment and services from the United States between F.Y.
1984 and F.Y. 1993.[19] The United States supplied 76% of all
weapons imported by the Turkish government between 1987 and
1991, a figure which increased to 80% for the period from
1991 to 1993. The majority of U.S. weapons supplies to Turkey
have been paid for by U.S. taxpayers as part of an extensive
military aid program that has provided over $5 billion in
assistance from F.Y. 1986 through F.Y. 1995.[20] Turkey has
also received
large deliveries of U.S. weaponry for free or at minimal
cost as part of the NATO ``cascading'' program, which
involves redistributing surplus weapons rendered redundant
by the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE).[21]
Last but not least, a number of U.S. weapons systems are
produced in Turkey under coproduction and licensing
agreements with U.S. firms, including Lockheed's F-16
fighter plane and the FMC Corporation's M-113 armored
personnel carrier.[22]
There have been reports in the international and Turkish
press indicating that U.S.-supplied weaponry has been used
extensively by the Turkish government in its war on the
Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) in southeastern Turkey. A wide
range of U.S. systems, including F-16, F-4, F5, and F-104
fighter aircraft, Cobra and Black Hawk helicopters, cluster
bombs, and M-60 tanks and M-113 armored personnel carriers
have been used in the conflict, which has claimed over 15,000
lives since 1984.[23]. The Clinton Administration and other
supporters of the Turkish government have argued that the PKK
is a terrorist organization, not a legitimate political
movement. However, regardless of their views on the PKK, most
independent observers agree that the politico-military
strategy of the Turkish government--strafing and depopulating
entire villages in the southeast--entails unnecessary
suffering and repeated violations of the human rights of
civilian noncombatants. Human Rights Watch has reported that
as of October 1994, the Turkish government has depopulated as
many as 1,400 villages and hamlets and displaced several
hundred thousand people in its prosecution of the war against
the PKK.[24] Major encounters involving U.S.-supplied
weaponry have included May 1993 bombing raids in the Karliova
valley that utilized F-4 fighter plans and Cobra helicopters
to kill 44 Kurdish fighters and a January 1994 incursion into
Iraq to bombard PKK camps with cluster bombs, 500- and 2000-
pound bombs dropped from F-16 and F-4 aircraft.
The Turkish government's March 1995 invasion of Northern
Iraq marks the latest chapter in its quest for a military
solution to the Kurdish question. A Turkish government
spokesperson proudly described the cross-border raid by 35,00
troops as ``the biggest military operation in the history of
the Turkish Republic.''[25] Ironically, the Turkish attack
targeted the same sector of Iraq in which the United States
had been enforcing a ``no fly zone'' as part of the United
Nations-backed Operation Provide Comfort, an effort designed
to protect Iraqi Kurds in the area from Saddam Hussein's
regime. Because the United States is far and away Turkey's
largest supplier of weapons and military aid, Turkish Prime
Minister Tansu Ciller cleared the operation with
President Clinton by telephone before sending her military
forces into Iraq. White House spokesperson Mike McCurry
reported that the President accepted Ciller's explanation
that the raids were strictly aimed at PKK ``terrorist
bases'' in Northern Iraq, and that Clinton expressed
``understanding for Turkey's need to deal decisively''
with the rebel group.[26]
In a move that may prompt debate for some time to come,
President Clinton and the Pentagon also ordered U.S. military
personnel in Northern Iraq to ``stand down'' from enforcing
the no fly zone against Turkey aircraft for the duration of
Turkey's intervention. when a reporter asked Pentagon
spokesperson Dennis Boxx whether the Pentagon was
``uncomfortable'' over the fact that a U.S. ally was
``beating up on . . . the same people we've been trying to
protect from Iraq for a number of years,'' Boxx argued that
Turkey was taking great care to focus its attacks on PKK
terrorist strongholds. When he was asked where U.S.
enforcement of the no fly zone would be rendered inoperative
for the duration of the Turkish intervention in Northern
Iraq, Boxx implied that it would, noting that ``it's simply
better not to put these people at risk [U.S. military
personnel involved in Operation Provide Comfort] until this
has been resolved.'' The chilling implication of Boxx's
remark is that the Pentagon actually feared that if U.S.
forces had tried to enforce the no fly zone against the
Turkish military, Turkish forces would have engaged in an air
war against U.S. troops, using U.S.-supplied aircraft. It was
almost as if the Pentagon spokesman was acknowledging that
Turkey had intimidated the U.S. into allowing its Iraqi
incursion to go forward unhindered.[27]
As has been the case in its major anti-Kurdish operations
of the recent past, Turkey's offensive in Northern Iraq has
relied heavily on U.S.-supplied equipment. Reports in the
European press have indicated that Turkey's air war against
the PKK (and against a number of Kurdish settlements and
refugee camps) in Northern Iraq has been conducted almost
entirely with U.S.-designed fighter planes such as the
McDonnel Douglas F-4, the Lockheed F-104, and the Lockheed
Martin F-16. Other U.S.-supplied aircraft such as the
Textron-Bell Cobra helicopter gunship and the United
Technologies/Sikorsky Black Hawk troop transport have also
been used in support of Turkey's move into Iraq.[28]
U.S. support of the Turkish intervention is based on the
assumption that it is a carefully crafted defensive operation
aimed at wiping out PKK bases in Iraq, with little or no
negative impact on Kurdish civilians. But press reports from
the area have raised serious doubts regarding Turkey's claim
that it has been mounting a ``surgical strike'' against
terrorists. Turkey's ongoing
war against the PKK, both in Northern Iraq and Southeastern
Turkey, is looking increasingly like it may become that
nation's Vietnam: a draining, divisive, and ultimately
unsuccessful effort to defeat a nationalist movement by
military means. An April 2nd news analysis piece by John
Pomfret of the Washington Post--appropriately entitled
``Turkey's Hunt for the Kurds: the Making of a
Quagmire?''--captured the dilemma faced by Turkish troops
in Northern Iraq as they attempted to sort out Kurdish PKK
militants from Kurdish civilians (both Turkish and Iraqi)
in the area:
``. . . by embracing a military answer to what it considers
a terrorist question, Turkey risks bogging its army down in a
vicious cycle of incursion and withdrawal, followed by
guerilla counterattacks and more incursions again. Such a
cycle, Western officials have said, would only empty
government coffers overtaxed by an ailing economy and a
similar counterinsurgency operation within Turkey.''[29]
A western relief worker underscored the futility of
Turkey's military strategy when he told Pomfret ``you can't
wipe out a terrorist operation that operates on two
continents by attacking the mountains. It's like killing a
fly with a sledgehammer.'' Turkish soldiers reported a
conundrum similar to that faced U.S. forces in Vietnam--an
inability to distinguish friend from foe. One soldier told
the Post ``we have a big problem because we don't know who is
a villager and who the PKK is . . . we can't do a
thing.''[30]
Unfortunately, contrary to the soldier's report, Turkish
troops did plenty of things in Northern Iraq, including a
number of documented cases of killings and displacement of
Kurdish civilians. There is no way of knowing at this point
whether these were isolated incidents or part of a larger
pattern of abuse, because at a number of key stages in the
conflict Turkish military commanders limited access to the
combat zones on the part of both journalists and relief
workers.[31] At the end of March, during the second week of
the Turkish invasion, residents of the Iraqi village of
Beshile reported that their village had been bombed and
burned to the ground by Turkish forces. Fevzi Rashid, a 43
year old farmer who witnessed the Turkish attack, described
it to a reporter from Reuters news service as follows:
``First the planes bombed our village. Then soldiers came
some days later and burned our houses. Yesterday they came
again and fired at the village with rockets and
mortars.''[32]
Turkey's claim to be targeting only PKK terrorists has been
further undercut by assertions by the
Iraqi National Congress, the Iraqi Kurdish organization that
controls most of the territory impacted by the Turkish
invasion, that on the very first day of the invasion
``Turkish soldiers . . . arrested hundreds of refugees as
suspected followers of the Kurdish Workers' Party.''[33]
Although the Clinton Administration firmly held to its
position that the Turkish invasion would be limited in
duration and narrow in focus, one expected withdrawal date--
Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller's April 19th visit to
Washington--came and went with no final timetable for
withdrawal in sight. A partial pullback of Turkish troops in
late April of 1995 still left at least 10,000 Turkish troops
inside Iraq, and there is some dispute even now as to whether
all Turkish troops have cleared out of the area (see
discussion below). In contrast to the policy of Germany,
which has cut off all weapons shipments to Turkey in response
to the Iraqi incursion, the Clinton Administration's position
on the Kurdish question appears to be ``Turkey right or
wrong.''[34] The U.S. arms industry has officially weighed in
on the side of the Turkish government's tactics as well, in
the form of a comment by Joel Johnson, chief lobbyist for the
Aerospace Industries Association, to the effect that Turkey's
military plan was no different from what other global and
regional powers have done in similar circumstances:
``It must be acknowledged that the Turks have not invented
Rolling Thunder. We used B-52s to solve a guerrilla problem
[in Vietnam]. The Russians used very large weapons platforms
[in Afghanistan]. And the Israelis get irritated on a
reasonably consistent basis and use F-16s in Southern
Lebanon. One wishes that it didn't happen. Sitting in the
comfort of one's office, one might tell all four countries
they're wrong. It's a lot easier to say that here than when
you're there and it's your military guys who are getting
chewed up.''[35]
Setting aside for a moment the obvious moral issues raised by
massive bombing raids as a tool of modern warfare, it must be
pointed out that Johnson's statement glosses over a key
strategic point: in two of the three examples he cites,
Vietnam and Afghanistan, the ``Rolling Thunder'' tactic was
employed by great powers that were ultimately defeated
militarily and politically by [[Page H5508]] smaller, better
motivated nationalist forces. Even staunch allies of the
current Turkish regime might find reason to advise Prime
Minister Ciller to abandon her country's current military
strategy vis-a-vis Kurdish separatist forces.
In response to a growing international outcry against the
Turkish government's tactics in its war against the PKK, the
Clinton Administration has repeatedly urged Turkey to stop
its indiscriminate approach of bombing and depopulating
entire villages. congress has gone beyond
rhetoric by withholding 10% of Turkey's U.S. military aid
for F.Y. 1995 pending a report on abuses against civilians
by the Turkish military. In December 1994, Human Rights
Watch published a report entitled ``U.S. Cluster Bombs for
Turkey?'' which called for a reversal of a plan to provide
advanced U.S.-built CBU-87 cluster bombs to Turkey on the
grounds that the weapons might be used against civilians.
As a result of the pressure generated by the report, the
cluster bomb sale has been shelved for the moment.[36]
Despite these efforts to restrict the flow of U.S. arms to
Turkey's war against the PKK, the United States remains
Turkey's number one weapons supplier, and Turkey's inhumane
warfighting tactics continue. As of the first week of May,
1995, Turkish officials claimed to have removed all of their
troops from Northern Iraq, but Prime Minister Ciller has
stated in no uncertain terms that she retains the right to
invade the area again if Turkey detects further PKK
activities there.[37] So far, moves to curb Turkey's use of
imported weaponry have had no discernible impact on Ciller's
approach to the Kurdish problem: she told members of her
governing coalition in early April that ``we have one thing
to say to those who threaten us about using their arms when
they should be standing by us--we will use our right to
defend ourselves under any circumstances. You can keep your
weapons.''[38] Maybe it's time for President Clinton to take
Prime Minister Ciller up on her offer.
Afghanistan: Beginning during the late 1970s under the
Carter Administration and accelerating during the 1980s under
the Reagan Administration, the United States supplied rebel
factions in Afghanistan with an estimated $2 billion in
covert military assistance.[39] This effort has been widely
cited as one of the great success stories of the Reagan
Doctrine of arming anticommunist rebels, and there is no
question that U.S. weapons supplies contributed to the
ability of Afghan guerrilla fighters to drive Soviet forces
out of their country. Unfortunately, the longer term
consequences of U.S. arms supplies to Afghan forces have been
far more problematic. Since Soviet troops withdrew from
Afghanistan in February 1989, U.S. weapons have helped to
sustain a vicious civil war amongst competing rebel
organizations inside Afghanistan. In addition, systems
supplied to the Afghan factions for purposes of fighting off
Soviet forces are now being resold on the international
market, turning up in conflicts where they were never
intended to be used.
As Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute has noted,
``[e]ven before they ousted the Soviet-backed government from
power in April 1992 feuding mujahadin guerrilla units spent
almost as much time battling each other as they did fighting
the communists.'' Far from setting the stage for a period
of peaceful reconstruction and reconciliation, the
fighting inside Afghanistan actually intensified after the
Soviet-supported regime was overthrown--2,000 people were
killed in one three-week period in August of 1992, and by
the spring of 1994 600,000 people had been displaced from
the capital city of Kabul. Much of the equipment used on
each side of the Afghan civil war comes from stocks
supplied to the various rebel factions by the CIA during
the 1980s. [40]
The violence sparked by U.S. weapons and training to the
Afghan rebel movements extends far beyond Afghanistan. An
Algerian government official has described the existence of a
``floating army'' of Islamic fundamentalist fighters who
received weapons and training in Afghanistan starting in the
1980s, and are now mounting terrorist attacks on U.S.-backed
governments in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. [41]
This international network of armed Islamic fundamentalists
that the CIA helped to create has struck in the United States
as well: two of the men convicted in the 1993 bombing of the
World Trade Center had received weapons and explosives
training from CIA-backed rebels in Afghanistan prior to their
attack in New York. And these two men may not be the only
examples of U.S. covert aid backfiring. According to David
Whipple, the former head of counterterrorism at the CIA,
``some of the people who are actual or potential terrorists
in this country are former guerrilla fighters in
Afghanistan.'' And it now appears that the suspects in the
recent murders of several U.S. embassy employees in Karachi,
Pakistan are also suspected of having ties to the CIA's
Afghan weapons pipeline.[42]
One of the most dangerous lingering side effects of the
CIA's Afghan weapons trafficking has been the proliferation
of U.S.-built Stinger missiles. The Stinger, a shoulder-fired
antiaircraft missile that can be used to shoot down anything
from a fighter plane to a civilian airliner, has been
described by Senator Dennis DeConcini as ``the ultimate
terrorist weapon.'' [43] Afghan rebel commanders have been
putting their U.S.-supplied Stingers up for sale to the
highest bidder in the international arms bazaar, and there
have been reports that some of the weapons have now turned up
in such unlikely places as Iran, Libya, Qatar, and North
Korea. [44]. The CIA was so disturbed by these reports that
they put up $65 million for a Stinger ``buyback'' plan; so
far the program has only succeeded in driving up the price
that Afghan forces can get for the missiles to two to three
times their original price, while recovering very few of the
missiles. [45].
The shortsighted attitudes of U.S. policymakers involved in
creating the Afghan weapons
pipeline were summarized by Edward Juchniewicz, the CIA's
associate director for covert operations during the Reagan
Administration:
``The Iranians have already captured or otherwise obtained
some Stingers and continue to accumulate them. I can
understand why people are exercised. I wouldn't want one to
hit the airplane I'm on . . . [but] one makes the assumption
when one goes to battle that one's equipment will be captured
by the enemy. So unfortunately, we lost some Stingers, and
now our enemy has one of our best weapons.''[46]
What Juchniewicz fails to acknowledge is that the Stingers
that were transferred to Iran were not captured by an enemy
in battle; they were provided to Iran by Afghan rebel forces
that had been considered friends of the United States.
While the spread of U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles poses an
ongoing threat because of their possible role in augmenting
the capabilities of terrorist organizations, the tens of
thousands of tons of light weaponry that the CIA funneled to
Afghan factions through its contacts in Pakistani
intelligence services may pose an even more serious risk to
the stability of South Asia. Analysts of the Afghan conflict
have reported that during the 1980s the United States
purchased literally hundreds of thousands of combat rifles
from such diverse sources as China, Turkey, Egypt, and Israel
and passed them on to Afghan rebel groups.[47] However, as
British researcher Chris Smith has noted, many of these
weapons were siphoned off along the way, because the Afghan
pipeline was ``extremely badly organized and poorly thought
out,'' to the point that it ``leaked profusely and virtually
ruptured.'' As a result, the Northwest Frontier area of
Pakistan is dotted with a series of open air weapons marts
that are doing a brisk business reselling weapons that were
originally intended to go to Afghan rebel forces. Pakistani
intelligence officials have been running guns to Islamic
fundamentalist forces in the India province of Kashmir,
increasing the level of violence of that conflict and
undermining efforts to encourage India and Pakistan to come
to a diplomatic resolution of the Kashmir issue. Sikh
militants fighting in the Punjab region of India have large
quantities of Chinese Type 56 assault rifles of the kind that
were supplied in large numbers by the CIA to the Afghan war,
indicating a likely spillover of the Afghan pipeline into
this conflict as well. U.S.-supplied weapons have also been
utilized by Islamic fundamentalist fighters engaged in a
civil war against Russian-backed government in the former
Soviet republic of Tajikistan.[48]
In reviewing the evidence of the spread of U.S.-supplied
guns and ammunition that was originally intended for the
Afghan war, Human Rights Watch has observed that ``[t]he
single most important factor in the introduction of small
arms and light weapons into South Asia was the effort by the
U.S. and Pakistan to arm the Afghan mujahidin
resistance.''[49]
Indonesia: Governed by one of the world's longest enduring
military rulers, General Suharto, Indonesia also has one of
the worst human rights records of any major U.S. weapons
client. There is direct evidence that some of these human
rights violations have been carried out using U.S.-supplied
equipment.
In addition to restrictions on freedom of the press,
freedom of assembly, and labor rights within Indonesia, the
Indonesian government has sustained an illegal military
occupation of neighboring East Timor for nearly 20 years. In
November of 1991, two U.S. journalists, Allan Nairn and Amy
Goodman, witnessed a massacre carried out by Indonesian
troops in the Timorese capital of Dili. The troops, armed
with U.S.-supplied M-16 rifles, opened fire on a memorial
mass and procession in honor of a young Timorese man who had
been murdered by the Indonesian army for attempting to speak
out about human rights abuses in East Timor.[50] Human rights
abuses by Indonesian forces have continued up to the present,
both in East Timor and within Indonesia; a recent summary of
Indonesia's record of Human Rights Watch described ``a
pattern of abuse . . . characterized by military intervention
in virtually all aspects of Indonesian public life and by the
arbitrary exercise of authority by President Soeharto.''[51]
The massacre in Dili and subsequent actions of the
Indonesian military have sparked calls by the public and the
Congress for a cutoff of U.S. military assistance, training
and sales to the Indonesian government, but so far these
demands have only been partially met. In October of 1992
Congress cut off U.S. assistance to Indonesia under the
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.
In 1994, the Clinton administration announced that it would
stop permitting arms sales or export licenses to Indonesia
for deals involving small arms or crowd control
equipment.[52] [[Page H5509]]
Despite these steps, there continues to be a significant
flow of U.S. weapons to Indonesia, adding to the more than
$583 million in U.S. weapons deliveries to that nation from
F.Y. 1984 through F.Y. 1993. In 1993, the last year for which
full data is available, U.S. deliveries to Indonesia through
the Pentagon's Foreign Military sales program and commercial
sales licensed by the State Department topped $34 million.
And the most recent statistics from the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency demonstrate that for a five
year period ending in 1991, the U.S. supplied 38% of all
weapons imported by the Indonesian government; for the
period from 1991 to 1993, the U.S. share of Indonesia's
weapons imports dropped slightly, to 33%. As this report
was going to press, Defense News reported that the Clinton
Administration was seriously considering giving clearance
for a multi-billion dollar sale of F-16 fighter aircraft
to Indonesia; the article reported some ambivalence within
the administration, noting that ``White House officials .
. . realize they must tiptoe around congressional
sensitivity over killings and arbitrary arrests in the
former East Timor.''[53]
Other examples: In addition to these specific examples of
the utilization of U.S.-supplied weapons in active areas of
conflict, there is strong circumstantial evidence to indicate
that U.S. systems have either already been used or may yet
come into play in a host of other wars. The mere fact that
U.S. weapons have been delivered to 45 of the 50 current
localities that are in the midst of significant conflicts in
one strong indication that U.S. weapons are involved in many
of today's wars.
Moving form statistical evidence to actual cases, a few
recent examples should suffice to demonstrate the myriad ways
in which U.S. weaponry may be used in ethnic and territorial
conflicts.
Guatemala has been on the front pages of American
newspapers in recent months because of revelations that CIA-
financed Guatemalan military officers were involved in the
murders of Efrain Bamaca Velazquez (a Guatemalan rebel leader
who was the husband of Jennifer Harbury, an American lawyer
and anti-war activist), and Michael DeVine, an American
citizen who owned a farm in Guatemala before he was killed in
1990. Ironically, it took the deaths of an American and the
husband of an American citizen to focus widespread media
attention on the routine use of U.S. arms to promote murder
and torture in Guatemala. As R. Jeffrey Smith and Dana Priest
noted in a Washington Post piece that ran after the
revelations of CIA complicity in these two deaths, ``while
U.S. public attention was distracted by civil wars in El
Salvador and Nicaragua, the CIA and U.S. military trained and
equipped anti-communist military forces widely believed to
have killed more than 100,000 peasants during a decades-long
simmering insurgency, according to U.S. intelligence,
military, and diplomatic officials.'' Once the Cold War aura
of anti-communist ``legitimacy'' is removed from these
activities, an objective view of the behavior of U.S.-backed
Guatemalan forces reveals that they have been engaged in a
campaign of systematic
terror against their own people for over three decades.[54]
As if the obscene spectacle of U.S. government funds
supporting the murder of a U.S. citizen were not evidence
enough that U.S. arms policies towards Guatemala have gone
seriously awry, subsequent revelations about the CIA's role
in Guatemala raise even more troubling questions.
From 1986 through 1991, the United States accounted for 86
percent of all weaponry imported by the Guatemalan military.
In response to ongoing human rights abuses in Guatemala in
general and the murder of Michael DeVine in particular, U.S.
military assistance to Guatemala was officially suspended by
the Bush Administration in 1990. As far as the public, the
media, most members of Congress, the Secretary of State, and
even the U.S. ambassador to Guatemala were concerned, this
cutoff of military aid meant that the U.S. government's role
in arming and financing the Guatemalan military had been
brought to an end. This reasonable assumption turned out to
be dead wrong.
In the wake of the revelations about the Guatemalan
military's role in the murders of Michael DeVine and Efrain
Velazquez, Tim Weiner of the New York Times revealed that
from the moment official U.S. aid to Guatemala was suspended
in 1990, the CIA immediately initiated a multi-million dollar
program of payments to key Guatemalan military and
intelligence officials. The payments, which were allegedly
aimed at ``maintaining good relations'' with Guatemalan
security officials, totaled $5 to $7 million per year, more
than twice the level of the public U.S. military aid that was
terminated by the Bush Administration. Among the recipients
of CIA funds was Col. Alpirez, the principal suspect in the
murders of Michael DeVine and Efrain Velazquez.[55]
In addition to the secret CIA payments, investigative
journalist Allan Nairn has uncovered documentation of 144
separate sales of rifles and pistols to Guatemala from U.S.
sources, all of which occurred after the 1990 aid cutoff.[56]
As the Clinton Administration and the Congress proceed with
separate investigations of the Guatemalan arms scandal, they
will have to consider new, tougher safeguards over the CIA's
role in the covert arming and financing of foreign military
and intelligence services. Otherwise, there will be no
guarantee that the will of the President, the Congress, or
the public will be respected in future arms sales
relationships. The CIA's conduct in Guatemala brings to mind
a remark made by former New Hampshire Senator Warren Rudman
with respect to another covert
arms trafficking scheme run amok, Iran/contra: ``If you
carry this to its logical extreme, you don't have a
democracy any more.''[57]
When Mexico moved to put down the rebel uprising in the
southern state of Chiapas in early 1994, they initially used
some of the nearly three dozen helicopters that the United
States had supplied to the Mexican Attorney General's office
for use in anti-narcotics activities. Under questioning from
Congress, Assistant Secretary of State Alexander Watson
acknowledged that ``USG-supplied helicopters were being used
in Chiapas,'' but argued that their use was acceptable
because ``[s]enior officials assured our Embassy that the
helicopters were use in a logistical, noncombat role.''[58]
Since a ``logistical'' function for the U.S.-supplied
helicopters could include the militarily essential task of
transporting troops and equipment to the front, the assertion
regarding a ``noncombat role'' is misleading at best.
In March of 1994, the San Antonio Express-News reported
that the Mexican government was ``quietly importing millions
of dollars worth of riot control vehicles across the Texas
border, apparently in preparation for any civil unrest after
the late-summer presidential election.'' The systems imported
from the United States included the 17-ton Cobra riot control
vehicle, equipped with water cannon and dye guns that can be
used to ``mark'' troublesome demonstrators for later
identification by the police; and the 12-ton Textron armored
water cannon, which can spray with an impact of 120 pounds at
a range of up to 50 feet. Pro-democracy activists in Mexico
roundly condemned the sale. Apparently, the vehicles have yet
to be utilized to put down any major demonstrations, but
given the continued political turbulence in Mexico they may
yet be used for that purpose.[59]
In February of 1995, Newsday reporter Ray Sanchez reported
that U.S.-supplied Black Hawk helicopters were being used to
ferry troops to Chiapas in the Mexican government's abortive
attempt to round up the top leadership of the Zapatista
movement. There is a strong possibility that U.S. weaponry
will be used again if there is further civil strife in
Mexico: the Mexican government has taken delivery of over
$300 million worth of U.S. weaponry over the past decade, and
U.S. deliveries accounted for over three-quarters of Mexican
weapons imports in the most recent five year period for which
information is available.[60]
The Bush Administration's initiative to utilize military
assistance to help Andean nations fight the ``war on drugs''
has led to a number of documented instances of the use (and
abuse) of U.S.-supplied weaponry in conflicts having little
or nothing to do with the problem of drug
interdiction. As the Washington Office on Latin America
(WOLA) noted in its 1991 report ``Clear and Present
Dangers; The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in the
Andes'', under the impetus of the Bush policy ``the Andean
region has supplanted Central America as the main locus of
U.S. military activity in the hemisphere.'' In the first
three years of the 1990s, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia were
slated to receive more U.S. military assistance than all
of Central America combined, with the rationale of
providing equipment and training that could be used to
fight drug trafficking in those countries. Despite
rhetoric about shifting its emphasis toward reducing
demand for drugs in the United States, the Clinton
Administration has carried on the Bush policy of providing
substantial amounts of military assistance to Andean,
Central American, and Caribbean nations for use in anti-
narcotics efforts.[61]
In Colombia, Black Hawk helicopters and Textron/Cessna A-37
counterinsurgency aircraft that were supplied as part of the
Bush Administration's September 1989 emergency antidrug aid
package to that nation were used just a few months later in a
series of bombing raids against the village of Llana Fria
that resulted in the displacement of 1,400 peasants. The
Colombian military claimed that the raids were aimed at
leftist guerrilla forces--clearly not a purpose that was
covered in the original rationale for the emergency U.S.
weapons shipments. To make matters worse, a report by the
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) indicated that
``witnesses claim that the attacks were not aimed at
guerrilla camps, as the military said, but at civilian
settlements.'' In a statement that proved to be prophetic,
WOLA Executive Director Alexander Wilde warned in a June 1990
congressional hearing that funneling U.S. aid to the
Colombian armed forces under the guise of fighting drugs
would just ``further fuel the crisis of human rights abuse
[in Colombia] . . . and undermine political stability, by
strengthening the Colombian armed forces.'' Five years and
hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. military aid later,
Colombia has made little progress in stemming the flow of
cocaine from its territory to the United States; in fact, in
March of 1995 the Clinton Administration stopped just short
of cutting off all U.S. aid to Colombia as punishment for the
current government's lackluster efforts to bring members of
the drug cartels to justice.[62]
When tensions between Ecuador and Peru erupted into a full-
scale border war in January of 1995, it marked the latest
case in [[Page H5510]] which the United States has provided
substantial amounts of weaponry to both sides of a conflict.
Ecuador received over $111 million in U.S. Military
equipment between F.Y. 1984 and F.Y. 1993. U.S. shipments
accounted for more than 33% of all Ecuadorean weapons imports
in the most recent five year period, and 50% of all such
shipments from 1991 through 1993. In the five years following
the announcement of the Bush Administration's Andean antidrug
initiative, Ecuador has received $21 million in security
assistance from the United States, including military grants
and training, giveaways of excess U.S. Defense equipment, and
balance of payments assistance under the Economic Support
Fund program (ESF).[63] A passage on the aid program for
Ecuador in the 1993 edition of the joint Pentagon/State
Department Congressional Presentation on Security Assistance
provided an ironic foreshadowing of precisely how the U.S.
Weaponry provided to that nation for the fight against drugs
would prove useful in its 1995 jungle border war with Peru:
``The proposed FY 93 FMF [Foreign Military Financing]
program will provide vehicles, aircraft spare parts, and
communications equipment to improve military mobility in
remote regions. It will also provide weapons and
ammunition.''[64]
This increased mobility apparently proved useful to
Ecuadorean forces during the early weeks of the war, as they
seized a decidedly remote border zone in the Amazon jungle.
When Peru counterattacked to win back the captured
territory, its armed forces were also well equipped with U.S.
Weaponry. Although U.S. Military aid to Peru has been an on
again, off again affair in recent years due to questions
raised by Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori's imposition of
martial law, the United States still managed to ship $136
million worth of military equipment to Peru between F.Y. 1984
and F.Y. 1993. In all, U.S. sources supplied 6% of Peru's
total arms imports between F.Y. 1987 and F.Y. 1991,
increasing slightly to 8.5% between 1991 and 1993.
Protestations over Fujimori's record notwithstanding, the
United States supplied over $293 million in security
assistance to Peru between F.Y. 1990 and F.Y. 1994, mostly in
the form of cash payments under the Economic Support Fund
(ESF) program.[65] A presentation to Congress on the F.Y.
1992 aid proposals for Peru provides a capsule summary of the
kinds of assistance and training that the United States has
attempted to provide to the Peruvian
government and armed forces in the period leading up to the
1995 border war with Ecuador:
``The proposed FY 1992 FMF [Foreign Military Financing]
program will provide individual troop equipment, small arms
and heavy weapons and ammunition, communications equipment,
vehicles, river patrol boats and spare parts for previously-
provided aircraft and helicopters. ESF [Economic Support
Funds] will provide balance of payments support and fund
alternative development activities in coca-growing areas and
judicial reform activities. IMET [International Military
Education and Training] will provide professional military
education, technical, management, and special police anti-
narcotics training, and training to improve military and
police human rights practices.''[66]
Important elements of this ambitious aid program were
sidetracked in April of 1992 when President Fujimori imposed
martial law, but previous U.S. weapons and training (not to
mention hundreds of millions of dollars in aid provided under
the Economic Support Fund program) left a substantial mark on
the shape and size of the Peruvian armed forces. In a
February 1995 briefing for foreign correspondents at the
presidential palace in Lima, Fujimori noted that one of the
Peruvian aircraft that was shot down in the air war with
Ecuador was an A-37 attack plane, a U.S. counterinsurgency
aircraft that is manufactured by the Cessna division of
Textron and nicknamed the ``Dragonfly.''[67]
In Asia, the fastest growing arms market in the world, U.S.
weapons are playing a central part in a critical conflict as
well.
The government of the Philippines has been waging
counterinsurgency campaigns against the New People's Army
(NPA) and several other indigenous guerrilla movements for
over two decades. The United States has taken sides in this
civil war by supplying the Philippine government with over
$619 million worth of U.S. weaponry over the past decade. The
U.S. supplied 93% of the Philippine government's arms imports
from 1987 through 1991, dropping to 75% for the period from
1991 through 1993.[68]
While there has been no detailed accounting of the role of
U.S. weapons and training in the civil war in the
Philippines, it is clear that at least some of the equipment
being supplied by the United States has direct applications
to counterinsurgency, and that the United States government
has gone to some effort to obscure this fact. For example,
when the United States made its first report to the United
Nations arms register in 1993, it indicated a delivery of
nine ``combat aircraft'' to the Philippines, with no further
description. When the Philippines reported on its weapons
imports for that same year, they
indicated receipt of 19 (not nine) combat aircraft, and they
identified the planes as Rockwell OV-10A Broncos, an
aircraft designed specifically for counterinsurgency
missions. [69] In early April, the International Herald
Tribune reported that Philippine forces had used U.S.
supplied Broncos to conduct bombing raids against Muslim
guerrilla forces near the city of Zamboanga. [70]
The war in Afghanistan is not the only instance of U.S.
covert weapons assistance being misused long after the
original purpose of that assistance has passed. In Angola,
where the U.S. provided approximately $250 million in covert
weapons shipments to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement between
1986 and 1991, U.S.-supplied systems were utilized
extensively in UNITA's efforts to shoot its way into power
and overturn the results of U.N.-sponsored elections. A
November 1994 report by Human Rights Watch notes that ``U.S.-
made 106mm recoilless rifles mounted on four-wheel-drive
vehicles have been particularly popular with UNITA.'' The
report also recounts Angolan government assertions that they
have captured U.S.-made antitank missiles, mortars, and
grenade launchers from UNITA forces. As in Afghanistan, UNITA
forces in Angola also received Stinger antiaircraft missiles
from the United States during the 1980s, although the Bush
Administration apparently got the Stingers back from UNITA by
swapping them for ``less sensitive lethal equipment.'' [71]
As of early 1995, it appeared that UNITA was finally prepared
to put down its arms as part of a United Nations sponsored
demobilization plan; but the question remains whether the
Angolan civil war could have been ended years sooner with
considerably less loss of life if the United States and other
major arms suppliers hadn't provided hundreds of millions of
dollars worth of armaments to both sides in that twenty year
conflict.
Last but not least, when a civil war erupted in Yemen at
the end of 1994, reporting focused on Soviet-origin weaponry
utilized by the government of Yemen, along with the
possibility that some of it had been maintained with the
assistance of Iraqi advisors. Less attention was paid to the
fact that the Yemeni government also had access to 11 F-5E
fighters, 50M60A1 tanks, and 70 M113 armored personnel
carriers that it had inherited from the government of North
Yemen (a former U.S. ally) when North and South Yemen merged.
Despite reports that the U.S. government withheld spare parts
for U.S. systems during the conflict, at least four of the
F5-Es and an unknown number of the U.S.-supplied tanks and
armored personnel carriers were utilized in the conflict.
[72]
III. Strengthening Potential Adversaries: The Boomerang Effect
One of the most striking features of U.S. arms sales policy
since the end of the Cold War has been the regularity with
which U.S.-supplied weapons have ended up in the hands of
U.S. adversaries. The last four times the United States has
sent troops into conflict in substantial numbers--in Panama,
Iraq,
Somalia, and Haiti--they faced forces on the other side that
had received U.S. weapons, training or military technology
in the period leading up to the outbreak of hostilities.
While representatives of arms exporting companies have
argued that this ``leakage'' of U.S. weaponry to potential
adversaries has been minimal (see section II, above), the
statistical evidence tells a different story.
Panama: When President Bush ordered U.S. troops into Panama
in December of 1989 to capture Panamanian President Manuel
Noriega and bring him back to the United States to face trial
on charges of drug trafficking and money laundering, they
faced a Panamanian defense force that had been to a
considerable extent made in the U.S.A. Panama received $33.5
million in U.S. weaponry under the FMS and commercial sales
programs during the 1980s, and the U.S. accounted for 44% of
Panama's weapons imports in the five years leading up to the
invasion. Equally important, a large part of the Panamanian
officer corps had been trained by the United States military:
from 1950 through 1987, 6,695 Panamanian military personnel
received training under the Pentagon's International Military
Education and Training program (IMET), at a cost of $8.3
million.\73\ Although U.S. troops encountered minimal
resistance in their effort to capture Noriega, the Panama
invasion was the first incident in a disturbing pattern that
has characterized every major U.S. military intervention
since the end of the Cold War: U.S. forces going into battle
against forces that have been armed or trained by their own
government.
Iraq: Despite recent efforts by the defense industry and
the Clinton Administration to argue that the United States
did not arm Iraq in the period leading up to the 1991 Gulf
War, there is ample documentation demonstrating that the
Reagan and Bush administrations supplied critical military
technologies that were put directly to use in the
construction of the Iraqi war machine. There is also strong
evidence indicating that the executive branch's failure to
crack down on illegal weapons traffickers or keep track of
third party transfers of U.S. weaponry allowed a substantial
flow of U.S.-origin military equipment and military
components to make their way to Iraq.\74\
The differences in perception regarding the degree to which
the United States government helped to arm Iraq center around
the fact that the most significant U.S. contributions to the
Iraqi military complex were not through direct transfers of
guns, tanks, helicopters, or other finished weapons systems,
but rather through supplies of so-called ``dual use''
technologies. This misunderstanding was at the heart of the
misleading press coverage of the Justice Department's
investigation of the BNL affair, a scandal involving
provision of U.S.-guaranteed loans to [[Page H5511]] Iraq by
the Atlanta branch of Italy's state-run Banca Nazionale del
Lavoro. For example, a headline in the New York Times
announced that ``Inquiry Finds No U.S. Involvement in the
Iraqi Arms Buildup,'' and the Washington Post reported that
the Justice
Department's lead investigator, John Hogan, had asserted
that ``Washington appears to have authorized the sale to
Saddam only of some communications gear and a single
pistol.'' In fact, the Justice investigators made it clear
in their summary of findings that their mandate was not to
assess the extent to which U.S. exports may have
contributed to Iraq's military production capabilities but
rather to ``determine whether chargeable crimes could be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'' The report went on to
note that ``[b]ecause our inquiry was limited in that way,
this report is not intended either to criticize or to
approve of any policy decisions.''[75]
To craft a policy for the future that avoids ``another
Iraq,'' it is necessary to undertake precisely the task that
the Justice Department's investigators viewed as outside
their purview: a critical analysis of the policymaking
process regarding transfers of militarily useful equipment to
the Baghdad regime during the period from 1985 through 1990.
As for the types of equipment that were approved for sale to
Iraq, the Justice Department report acknowledges that
hundreds of dual use items with applications to military
production were approved for export to Iraq in the five years
prior to the Gulf conflict of 1990-91. The Iraq issue was
never about pistols--it has always been about the transfer of
weapons production technology.
The first step in understanding the United States
contribution to the Iraqi military buildup prior to the 1991
Gulf War is to look at the concept of dual use technologies.
Dual use items include everything from unarmed light aircraft
or helicopters that can be adapted to military uses, to
instruments of torture like thumbscrews, to equipment like
computers, machine tools, and measuring devices that can be
applied to the production and testing of civilian or military
products. Between 1985 and 1990, the U.S. Department of
Commerce granted licenses for more than $1.5 billion in dual
use exports to Iraq, more than $500 million of which was
delivered before the outbreak of the Gulf War in August of
1990.[76] Under pressure from Congress and the public, in
March 1991 the Commerce Department released a list of the
dual use licenses it granted for exports to Iraq in the five
years leading up to the conflict. Even a casual perusal of
the list makes it evident that many of these items were put
directly to work in Iraq's military research and production
network. In addition to items that were licensed for export
to obvious military end users like the Iraqi Air Force or the
Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency, the list included numerous
licenses for equipment that was being sent to Saad 16, a
military production complex south of Baghdad that is known,
among other things, as the center for Iraq's research and
production work on ballistic missiles.[77] Congressional
investigators later learned that even this list, which
revealed significant U.S. contributions to Iraq's defense
industrial base, was incomplete and misleading; at least 68
entries had been
changed to obscure their military applications.[78]
While the Commerce Department's licensing process provided
the most direct channel for U.S. assistance to Iraq's
military buildup, there were also significant transfers of
U.S. military technology and knowhow through indirect
channels. When Chilean arms dealer Carlos Cardoen decided to
sell Iraq $400 million worth of cluster bombs along with the
technology for Iraq to build its own cluster bomb factory, he
apparently did so with the acquiescence of several agencies
of the U.S. government. According to Nasser Beydoun, a
Lebanese-born arms dealer who worked as Cardoen's U.S.
representative, the CIA was aware of the deal but ``looked
the other way'' because Cardoen and his associates had been
helpful in a covert CIA plan to provide missile technology to
South Africa. In addition, investigators for ABC News
discovered that in 1986 the U.S. Patent Office had improperly
granted Cardoen a patent for his own version of a U.S.
cluster bomb design, at a time when Chile was ineligible to
receive cluster bombs from the United States.[79] Howard
Teicher, who served on Ronald Reagan's National Security
Council from 1982 to 1987, has made even more explicit
charges of U.S. involvement in Cardoen's scheme to ship
cluster bomb technology to Iraq. In a recent sworn statement
filed in federal court in Miami, Teicher asserts that under
the direction of William Casey, the CIA ``authorized,
approved, and assisted'' Cardoen's effort to give cluster
bombs to Iraq, because Casey believed that the weapons would
be ``the perfect force multiplier'' for Iraq to fight off
Iran's strategy of sending ``human waves'' of attackers
against Iraqi positions during the Iran/Iraq war.[80] Whether
due to oversight or wilful negligence, U.S. government
agencies helped smooth the way for Cardoen's transfer of
U.S.-origin cluster bomb knowhow to Iraq.
Another major source of weapons for Iraq was Canadian-born
artillery specialist (and naturalized U.S. citizen) Gerald V.
Bull. During the 1970s Bull ran his firm, the Space Research
Corporation, on a 10,000 acre site on the Vermont/Canadian
border. It was here that he developed the technology for the
G-5 155mm howitzer, a state-of-the-art artillery piece
notable for its extensive range. Bull received considerable
help at key stages in his career from various agencies of the
U.S. government. Before he set up his U.S.-based company, he
was granted U.S. citizenship under a rare special act of
Congress sponsored by Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-AZ). During the
period when Bull was perfecting his howitzer design, Space
Research benefited from millions of dollars worth of
contracts from the U.S. Army. According to former CIA Angola
station chief John Stockwell, in the mid-1970s Bull was
assisted by the CIA in setting up a lucrative deal with to
supply howitzers, artillery shells, and howitzer production
technology to South Africa for use in its war against the
government of Angola. When this deal was uncovered, Bull was
prosecuted for violations of U.S. arms export laws and served
four and one-half
months in the U.S. federal prison at Allenwood,
Pennsylvania. However, the Customs Service investigator
who made the case against Bull has argued that the Justice
Department let Bull off relatively easily because his
illegal acts were linked to a CIA covert operation.
After Bull was released from prison in 1980, he set up shop
in Belgium, marketing his howitzer technology to a customer
list that included both China and Iraq. Because Bull was a
U.S. citizen and his howitzer technology was developed in the
United States, he was required under U.S. law to receive
clearance from the State Department's Office of Munitions
Control in order to market this system internationally;
despite his prior conviction for violating U.S. export laws,
the State Department readily granted Bull clearance to sell
his guns on the world market. Iraq ended up purchasing Bull-
designed G-5 howitzers from both South Africa and Austria. In
the case of the Austrian sales, U.S. officials were aware
that the guns were being sold to both Iran and Iraq, by
lodged protests with the Austrian government only with
respect to the sales to Iran. Bull's most ambitious project,
helping Iraq to build a ``supergun'' that would allegedly
have been capable of launching a projectile from Baghdad to
Tel Aviv, was cut short when he was assassinated in March of
1990. [81]
One final example of U.S. government complicity in the
arming of Saddam Hussein is the case of Sarkis Soghanalian,
who for years worked as an arms dealer for Iraq out of
offices based at the Miami airport. Among the deals that
Soghanalian worked on from his U.S. base were a successful
scheme to send 26 Hughes MD-50 helicopters to Iraq and a
failed deal to procure Romanian uniforms for Iraqi military
forces. Soghanalian has maintained publicly that his arms
deals with Iraq were not challenged during the 1980s because
key U.S. government agencies were ``in on the deal,'' a claim
that is lent some credence by the fact that he operated so
openly as an arms procurement agent for Saddam Hussein
without any interference from U.S. intelligence or law
enforcement agencies. He was finally convicted on charges of
illegally selling helicopters to Iraq in the fall of 1991,
long after his services as one of Saddam Hussein's most
valued arms brokers had been rendered irrelevant by Iraq's
defeat in the Gulf War. [82]
When he learned of the details of U.S. government
acquiescence in Gerald Bull's various illegal arms
transactions at the height of the Gulf conflict, Rep. Howard
Wolpe (D-MI) reacted angrily, with a statement that could
just as easily been applied to the whole executive branch
approach to private arms dealers and producers like Cardoen,
Bull, and Soghanalian:
``The bottom line here is that because we have been so lax
in our enforcement of American laws we are now finding
American-made technology in the hands of the Iraqi forces
that are pointing their cannons at American soldiers. That's
outrageous.'' [83]
Somalia: The U.S. arms supply relationship with Somalia
presents a textbook case of what can go wrong when short-term
political interests outrank long-term strategic
considerations in U.S. arms transfer decisionmaking. From the
end of the Carter Administration in 1979 through beginning of
the Bush Administration in 1989, the regime of Maj. Gen.
Mohammed Siad Barre received roughly $1 billion in U.S.
military and economic aid, including $154 million in weapons
deliveries under the foreign military sales and commercial
sales programs. U.S. arms deliveries accounted for 31% of
Somalia's arms imports from 1985 to 1989, making the United
States Somalia's top weapons supplier during the period
leading up to the overthrow of the Barre regime and the
outbreak of clan warfare in Somalia.[84]
The rationale for U.S. arms aid to Somalia was pure Cold
War geopolitics. The Carter Administration decided that
Somali ports and airfields would be useful as stepping stones
for a potential military intervention in the Middle East by
the new U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (since renamed and
reorganized as the Central Command). The Carter and Reagan
Administrations justified this new arms relationship with
Somalia (which was a Soviet arms client during the 1970s) as
a straight quid pro quo: U.S. arms were swapped for access to
Somalia military facilities such as the port of Berbera. An
added argument for supplying the Somalia regime was the fact
the Somalia's larger neighbor, Ethiopia, had recently fallen
out of the U.S. orbit and allied itself with the Soviet
Union. A run through the executive branch's justifications to
Congress from the 1980s for shipping weaponry to Somalia
provides a virtual catalog of wishful thinking regarding how
U.S. arms supplies might somehow turn [[Page H5512]] around
what was obviously a rapidly deteriorating security
situation. Time and again, despite mounting human rights
abuses and an emerging civil war, Pentagon and State
Department officials justified the arms flow to Siad Barre's
regime on the grounds that it would ``foster stability.''[85]
the most unintentionally ironic statement of the U.S. policy
of ignoring instability in Somalia and pressing ahead with
military-related assistance was offered by the Bush
Administration in a 1991 presentation to Congress:
``Prior to the civil war, ended by a January 1991 coup, we
urged the Siad Barre government to improve human rights,
undertake real political reform and promote national
reconciliation. * * * Despite the adverse impact of the civil
war and the coup of U.S.-Somali relations, our interests in
the region remain the same. The new Somali government has
expressed an interest in resuming bilateral relations, and
may be willing to undertake several democratic reforms which
we support''.[86]
This analysis was offered in support of offering U.S.
military training to the new Somali government.
A new round of fighting within Somalia ensured shortly
thereafter, and a year and one-half later President Bush
sent U.S. troops to Somalia as part of a United Nations
force charged with imposing some semblance of order upon
rival armed factions that were threatening the delivery of
humanitarian relief to a beleaguered and malnourished
Somali populace. From 1991 to 1993, the United States has
supplied 100% of all new weaponry imported by Somalia's
governing coalition.
When Siad Barre was overthrown in January of 1991, much of
the weaponry that the United States had so diligently
supplied to his government during the 1980s fell into the
hands of the rival factions that carried on the civil war
that served as the rationale for the dispatch of U.S. troops
to that nation in December of 1992. Despite the usual
assertions that U.S. weapons deliveries to Somalia were
largely ``defensive'' or ``nonlethal'' equipment, the U.S.
provided significant quantities of small arms, including
4,800 M-16 rifles, 84 106mm recoilless rifles, two dozen
machine guns, 75 81mm mortars, and an unspecified quantity of
land mines. Larger weaponry included 24 M-113 armored
personnel carriers, 18 155mm towed howitzers, and 448 TOW
anti-tank missiles. The smaller items on this list, including
the M-16s, machine guns, recoilless rifles, and land mines,
were precisely the kinds of weaponry that were utilized by
the forces of the warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed and other
Somali factions in their fighting with U.S. and United
Nations troops posted to Somalia. While the U.S. was far from
the only supplier to add to the atmosphere of armed chaos
that took hold of Somali society, U.S. weapons delivered
during the 1980s played a significant role, first in
supporting the regime of Siad Barre in its campaign of terror
against his own population, and then in supporting the
warfighting capabilities of the Somali factions involved in
the civil war that carried on after Barre was overthrown.[87]
Haiti: When President Clinton decided to dispatch U.S.
troops to Haiti in late 1994 to clear the way for the
restoration to power of Haiti's elected leader, Jean Bertrand
Aristide, most of the media attention was focused on the last
minute shuttle diplomacy carried out by former President
Jimmy Carter retired Gen. Colin Powell, and Senator San Nunn.
There was very little discussion of the historic U.S. role in
arming and training the Haitian military and intelligence
forces that United States troops were sent to keep in check.
From F.Y. 1984 to F.Y. 1993, the United States delivered $2.6
million worth of weaponry to Haiti under the FMS and
commercial sales programs. This seemingly modest amount was
significant by the standards of Haiti, which maintains 7,000
personnel in its armed forces and spends on average only
about $50 million per year on its military budget. Of equal
importance, during the past ten years the United States has
trained 164 members of the Haitian officer corps. In
addition, from 1986 through 1991, U.S. intelligence agencies
were secretly arming and training key military and
intelligence
officials in Haiti at a cost of up to $1 million per year,
allegedly for the purpose of assisting in the interdiction
of illegal narcotics. Taking into account these secret
weapons shipments, total U.S. arms deliveries to Haiti
during the period from 1987 through 1991 exceeded 25% of
total Haitian arms imports. Key U.S.-designed equipment in
the Haitian military's inventory include six Cadillac Gage
V-150 Commando armored personnel carriers (a vehicle
specially tailored for ``riot control''), two Cessna 337
aircraft armed with rockets, and a variety of naval
equipment and small arms. [88]
While the Haitian mission proceeded remarkably smoothly,
with minimal U.S. casualties, the question remains whether
past U.S. supplies of arms, training, and intelligence
resources to a series of military-dominated regimes in Haiti
may have unnecessarily complicated Haiti's transition to
democracy, calling forth an intervention that might have been
prevented if sounder arms transfer decisions had been made by
the United States during the 1970s and 1980s.
IV. Taking Control: Reforming the Arms Transfer Decisionmaking Process
Contrary to recent claims of the Clinton Administration and
other key participants in the arms export debate, U.S.
weapons are decidedly not limited to responsible suppliers
who are using them strictly for legitimate defensive
purposes. When 90% of the world's ongoing conflicts involve
parties that have received U.S. weaponry; when the last four
major U.S. troop deployments have been against adversaries
that received arms, training, or military technology from the
United States; and when U.S. weapons are utilized to kill
innocent civilians and abuse human rights in Indonesia,
Turkey, Angola, and Guatemala, something is clearly wrong
with the arms transfer decisionmaking process. This section
makes specific recommendations for promoting greater
accountability in arms transfer decisions, in the hopes of
preventing a repetition of the disastrous arms deals that
have been documented in this report.
Recommendation 1: Pass the arms transfer Code of Conduct bill
In February of 1995, Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) and
Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) reintroduced
legislation calling for the establishment of a Code of
Conduct for U.S. weapons transfers (bill number H.R. 772 in
the House and bill number S. 326 in the Senate). Under the
Code, governments that engage in aggression against their
neighbors, violate the human rights of their own citizens,
come to power through undemocratic means, or refuse to
participate in the United Nations arms register would not be
eligible to receive weaponry from the United States. If the
President wanted to make an exception for a specific country
on national security grounds, he would have to ask Congress
to
pass a bill providing an exemption for that nation.
The benefits of the Code of Conduct would be twofold.
First, it would place considerations and the character of a
given arms receipt and how that nation might use U.S.
weaponry up front in the arms transfer decisonmaking process,
preventing sales to unstable regimes in the process. Second,
even in cases where the President sought an exemption,
members of Congress would be forced to go on the record for
or against, providing a measure of public accountability that
rarely occurs that rarely occurs under current law.
Under current procedures, if a major arms sale does not
involve the provision of U.S. assistance, Congress can choose
whether or not to vote on the deal; failure to vote signals
acquiescence in the sale. Of the 50 to 100 major arms sales
notified to Congress each year, the vast majority of them are
not subjected to a vote, scrutizined in hearings, or debated
on the floor of the Congress. And in the more than twenty
years since Congress first acquired the power to vote down
arms sales, it has never successfully done so. There have
been a few ``close calls'' such as the 1981 Saudi AWACS sale.
There have also been a few cases where the executive branch
has withdrawn a deal or reduced it in size to avoid a battle
with the Congress, such as the 1986 decision by the Reason
Administration to forgo additional sales of F-15 aircraft to
Saudi Arabia (a decision which was reversed by the Bush
Administration when it offered the Saudis 72 F-15s in 1992).
But on the whole, the current system has allowed tens of
billions of dollars in arms sales to be made every year with
very little in the way of congressional scrunity or public
input. The Code of Conduit bill would correct this deficiency
by stimulating the kind of vigorous public debate that should
be a fundamental requirement for making decisions on
transfers of weaponry that can have dangerous and unforeseen
consequences for United States and international
security.[89]
Recommendation 2: Provide more detailed reporting on U.S.
transfers of arms and military technology, and press for
other nations to do the same.
Although the United States generally discloses more
information on sales of arms and military technology than any
other major weapons supplying nation, there are still a
number of significant gaps in reporting that to make it
difficult (and in some cases impossible) to assess the
potential impacts of U.S. transfers to a given regime.
At the high end of the trade, prospective sales of fighter
planes, tanks, and advanced attack helicopters, and other
sophisticated systems are routinely reported to the Congress
for its approval or disapproval. However, this information is
not always made readily available to the public in a timely
fashion. During the 1970s, the unclassified portions of all
major proposed arms sales were routinely
reprinted in the Congressional Record, thereby allowing
interested members of the public to inform themselves
about prospective weapons exports and make their voices
heard to the Congress when it would still make a
difference (Congress currently has thirty calendar days to
disapprove or acquiesce in a given sale). This practice
was discontinued in the early 1980s, allegedly because of
Pentagon concerns that releasing this data would reveal
too much information about the ``order of battle'' of U.S.
weapons clients. In the interests of stimulating an
informed debate, Congress should return to the practice of
printing the details of all major arms sales proposals in
the Congressional Record.[90]
At the mid-to-low end of the trade, there is no longer any
regular U.S. government reporting on the trade in small arms
or ``light weaponry''--the rifles, mortars, light vehicles,
land mines, and ammunition that are frequently the weapons of
choice in today's ethnic conflicts and civil wars. This was
not always the case. Up through fiscal year 1980, the State
Department issued an annual report under Section 657 of the
Foreign Assistance Act that listed every item of military
[[Page H5513]] equipment delivered from the United States to
any foreign country in the prior fiscal year, ranging from
rifles and bullets on up to advanced combat aircraft. The
report was discontinued during the Reagan Administration, but
the information upon which it was based is still regularly
collected by the Pentagon's Defense Security Assistance
Agency and the State Department's Office of Defense Trade
Controls. The section 657 report should be reinstituted as an
annual publication, to provide a tool for keeping track of
potential abuses of U.S.-supplied weaponry by undemocratic
regimes or nations at war with their neighbors. The report
should be widely disseminated in the Congress, the media, and
among interested members of the general public.[91]
Finally, a full accounting of U.S. arms transfer policy
must include regular, detailed reporting on U.S. transfers of
so-called ``dual use'' equipment--items such as advanced
machine tools and computers, measuring instruments, or
unarmed light helicopters and aircraft. These items can
either be adapted for military use, or, more importantly,
utilized to build advanced weapons systems. If Congress and
the public had been aware of the particulars of the nearly
$1.5 billion in dual use export licenses that the Commerce
Department granted to companies seeking to sell equipment to
Iraq during 1985 through 1990, some of the more dangerous
items on the list might not have been approved for sale. In
keeping with the findings of a 1991 Congressional review of
U.S. export procedures in the wake of the Persian Gulf War,
legislation should be passed requiring the Commerce
Department to make public the details of its dual use
licensing decisions, including the type of equipment and
company involved, the value of the proposed sale, and the
institution within the recipient country slated to receive
that equipment.[92]
If these steps toward greater transparency regarding U.S.
transfer of weapons and militarily useful technology are
implemented, the United States will be in a much stronger
position to press for increased reporting by other major
suppliers.
The United Nations arms register currently excludes
reporting on important categories such as small arms and dual
use technologies. The Clinton Administration should press to
have small arms added to the UN arms register, so that the
weapons of choice in today's ongoing wars are covered by this
important international monitoring mechanism. For dual use
items, in addition to pressing for consultation on sale of
major items in the context of developing a successor regime
to the Cold War-era Coordination Committee on Multilateral
Export Controls (Cocom), the administration should press for
some form of international, public reporting system on dual
use sales. This might take the form of an annual report by
the members of a Cocom successor regime detailing major dual
use licenses granted during the previous year, or a voluntary
reporting mechanism that could run in parallel to the United
Nations arms register.
Recommendation 3: The Pentagon and the intelligence community
should publish regular reports on the use of U.S.-
supplied weaponry in ongoing conflicts
All too often, U.S. weapons are supplied on a ``fire `em
and forget `em'' basis: the decision to sell is made basis on
short-term political, strategic, or economic considerations,
with little thought given to how these arms might be used a
few years down the road. The classic cases of this syndrome
are the ``runaway weapons'' that U.S.-backed Afghan rebel
forces have been putting up for sale on the world market
during the 1990s and U.S. arms supplies that fell into the
hands of eventual U.S. adversaries in Panama, Iraq, Somalia
and Haiti (see sections III and IV, above). In an attempt to
prevent this ``boomerang effect'' from repeating itself in
the future, Representative Cynthia McKinney sponsored a
successful amendment to the Fiscal Year 1995 Department of
Defense Authorization bill requiring the Pentagon to report
annually on how proposed arms transfers might create
``increased capabilities'' on the part of potential
adversaries, and how they might ``pose an increased threat''
to U.S. forces in some future conflict. The amendment also
requires the Pentagon to ``present alternative strategies for
regional security based on mutual reductions in the size,
spending, and capabilities of forces and among agreements
among arms supplying nations to join the United States in
reducing or halting military cooperation activities.''[93]
Representative McKinney's amendment represents an important
first step
toward shifting the terms of the debate over U.S. arms
transfers toward consideration of the long-term dangers of
unrestrained weapons trading rather than the apparent
short-term political and economic payoffs of a given arms
deal.
As a further step in the right direction, the Pentagon and
the Central Intelligence Agency should be required to file
annual reports on how U.S.-supplied weaponry is being put to
use in current conflicts, either by the original recipients,
or as the result of unauthorized transfers to third parties.
These reports could serve as a running record of the
consequences of past U.S. weapons trading activities, and
they would hopefully inject a note of caution into
Congressional debates over new proposed transfers. The
institution of this reporting mechanism would mark a sharp
break from past practice, which indicates that in some
instances the intelligence community hasn't even been keeping
close tabs on its own covert weapons shipments, much less
reporting them to the Congress or the public. For example,
the Justice Department's final report of its investigation of
the U.S. role in arming Iraq contained the following
troubling description of the CIA's handling of information on
its arms sales activities: ``Is one instance, it took the CIA
two months to identify the intended recipient of weapons
shipped at the CIA's request.''[94]
Recommendation 4: Outlaw covert weapons shipments
From Iran/contra to the arming of Iraq to the ongoing
proliferation of weapons originally intended for Afghan rebel
movements, covert weapons trafficking has been the driving
force behind a series of unmitigated foreign policy fiascoes.
Whatever rationale there may have been for covert weapons
trading during the Cold War, it is no longer a viable policy
instrument in today's unpredictable international security
environment. The cases of covert weapons trading gone awry
that have been documented in this report--Afghanistan, Iran/
contra, Iraq, Guatemala, and Haiti--provide ample indication
that secret wheeling and dealing in weapons does more harm
than good, both by subverting the democratic conduct of U.S.
foreign policy and by damaging U.S. credibility and standing
in the international community. As part of his restructuring
of the CIA, President Clinton should shut down its covert
operations directorate and press for legislation outlawing
all forms of secret weapons trading by any U.S. government
agency.[95]
Recommendation 5: The Clinton Administration (or its
successor) should vigorously pursue a policy of
multilateral arms transfer restraint designed to limit
sales of conventional weaponry to regions of conflict or
repressive regimes
Contrary to the findings of the Clinton Administration's
new conventional arms transfer policy, Presidential Directive
41, limiting the spread of weaponry to regions of conflict
should be the paramount priority governing U.S. arms transfer
decisions in the post-Cold War era. Economic and defense
industrial base concerns should take a back seat to efforts
to construct a multilateral arms export control regime that
can serve as a tool for preventing conflicts, and for
limiting their duration and severity once they break out. At
a time when the United States controls 72% of new arms sales
agreements with the developing world, U.S. leadership remains
an essential prerequisite for any meaningful multilateral
arrangement for limiting the flow of conventional
armaments.[96]
footnotes
1. On this point see Lora Lumpe, ``Arms and No Influence,''
Arms Sales Monitor, No. 27, Washington, DC, Federation of
American Scientists, November 30, 1994; and Dr. Louis J.
Samuelson, editor, The Management of Security Assistance
(Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio: April 1991),
p. 51.
2. Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the
Third World, 1986-1993, (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, July 1994).
3. The list of fifty conflicts was compiled by the author,
drawing upon the following sources: Ted Robert Gurr,
``Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the
Changing World System,'' International Studies Quarterly,
Vol. 38, No. 3, September 1994, pp. 347-377; Peter
Wallensteen and Karen Axell, ``Mayor Armed Conflicts,'' in
SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1994), pp. 81-95; and David Binder and Barbara Crossette,
``As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for a Policy,'' New
York Times, February 7, 1993. The list utilized in this study
includes all ``major conflicts,'' defined by SIPRI as
``prolonged combat between military forces of two or more
governments, or of one government and an organized armed
group, and incurring the battle-related deaths of at least
1,000 people during the entire conflict. This study also
covers all but a handful of the smallest wars covered in
Gurr's list of ``Serious and Emerging Ethnopolitical
Conflicts in 1993-94.'' Gurr's list uses a more inclusive
standard, namely deaths incurred ``directly through fighting
or massacres or indirectly through starvation, disease, and
displacement, from the beginning of its current phase through
mid-1993.''
4. Wallensteen and Axell, op. cit., p. 80.
5. Because the Peru-Ecuador border war erupted in January of
1995, it is not covered in the statistical appendix, but it
is discussed in the text (see section II, below).
6. Outside of the major producers in the developed world--the
United States, Russia, Germany, France, Italy and the United
Kingdom--there are only a handful of nations that can be
considered self-sufficient (or nearly so) in armaments
production. If one considers only smaller, less sophisticated
systems such as rifles, mortars, and light military vehicles,
the number of countries with significant indigenous
production capabilities increases to perhaps two to three
dozen. But even in these cases it is clear that arms imports
have a substantial impact on the levels at which violent
conflicts can be sustained. Unfortunately, trade in small
arms (also referred to as ``light weapons'' by some analysts)
is the least well documented aspect of the international arms
trade, even though it probably accounts for the bulk of the
weapons systems that are actually utilized in current ethnic
conflicts. For two recent accounts of the state of the small
arms trade, see Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura
Reed, editors, Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small
Arms and Light Weapons (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of
Arts and Sciences, 1995); and Swadesh Rana, Small Arms and
Intrastate Conflicts (New York: United Nations Centre for
Disarmament Affairs, February 1995). In addition, the Arms
Project at Human Rights Watch has done pathbreaking case
studies on the trade in small arms that have been used in
massacres and systematic human rights violations, most
notably Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses
in the Rwandan [[Page H5514]] War (New York: Human Rights
Watch Arms Project, January 1994).
7. This narrow emphasis on preventing transfers to ``rogue
states'' is at the heart of the Clinton Administration's
approach to arms sales, as embodied in Presidential Directive
41, which was released in February of 1994; in addition, the
Clinton foreign policy team has maintained the Bush
Administration double standard of denouncing Russia and China
for particular weapons deals they have entered into the
Middle East and Asia at the same time that the United States
dominates the overall arms market in each of these regions.
For a critical analysis of the ``rogue state'' strategy, see
Michael T. Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's
Search for a New Foreign Policy (New York: Hill and Wang,
1995).
8. It is a commonplace in discussions with representatives of
U.S. industry and arms sales policymakers in Washington to
hear the refrain that ``the French will sell to anybody,'' or
words to that effect. While criticism of French arms transfer
policy is certainly justified by France's recent record of
providing arms that were used in devastating wars such as the
1991 Gulf conflict and the slaughter in Rwanda, Paris is
hardly the only world power that needs to reexamine its
weapons export practices.
9. Richard M. Nixon, The Real War (New York: Random House,
1980), p. 197.
10. On aggression by U.S. arms clients during the Nixon era
see William D. Hartung, And Weapons for All, (New York:
HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 25-26.
11. Steven R. Weisman, ``Reagan Lifts Ban on Sending Israel
16 Jet War Planes,'' New York Times, August 18, 1981; and Lee
Lescaze, ``Reagan Lifts Ban on Delivery of 16 Jets to
Israel,'' Washington Post, August 18, 1981.
12. On this point see Chapter 13, ``Clinton Policy: Arms
Control or Business As Usual?'' in William D. Hartung, And
Weapons for All (New York: HarperCollins, paperback edition,
1995).
13. Statement of Lt. Gen. Teddy G. Allen, Director, Defense
Security Assistance Agency, before the Subcommittee on
International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans, and Environment
of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,
June 16, 1993.
14. Wording of the administration's policy goals is taken
verbatim from ``Fact Sheet: Conventional Arms Transfer
Policy,'' White House Press Office, Washington, DC, February
17, 1995.
15. Ibid. See also Thomas E. Ricks, ``Arms Sales to Take Into
Account Effect on Industry,'' The Wall Street Journal,
November 16, 1994.
16. Don Fuqua, President, Aerospace Industries Association,
``Merchants of Peace,'' Aerospace Industries Association
Newsletter, Volume 7, Number 5, November 1994, p. 3.
17. Ethan Kapstein, ``America's Arms Trade Monopoly,''
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3, May/June 1994, p. 18.
18. See appendix A, Table I for details on U.S. transfers to
fifty current conflicts. Data used for this analysis is drawn
from two principal sources: U.S. Department of Defense,
Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales,
Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance
Facts as of September 30, 1993 (Washington, DC: DSAA, 1994),
tables 2 and 6; and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1991-92
(Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1994), Table III. For further
details on sources, see the footnotes to Table I in Appendix
A, below.
19. See Appendix A, Table I.
20. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, U.S. Cluster Bombs for
Turkey?, (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1994), p. 9.
21. Ibid., p. 11; see also British American Security
Information Council, Fueling Balkan Fires: The West's Arming
of Greece and Turkey, Project on the Arms Trade Report 93.3,
(Washington, DC: BASIC, 1993), and British American Security
Information Council, ``US-German Arms Exports and Greece at a
Record High,'' May 20, 1994.
22. For an overview of Turkey's military industrialization
drive and the role of U.S. and other foreign firms in helping
to sustain it through coproduction and licensing deals, see
Gulay Gunluk-Senesen, ``An Overview of the Arms Industry
Modernization Program in Turkey,'' in SIPRI Yearbook 1993:
World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993), pp. 521-532.
23. For the best review of the evidence on the Turkish armed
forces use of U.S.-supplied systems against the PKK, see U.S.
Cluster Bombs for Turkey?, op. cit., pp. 4-6.
24. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Turkey: Forced Displacement
of Ethnic Kurds from Southeastern Turkey (Washington, DC:
Human Rights Watch, October 1994), p. 4.
25. ``Turkey Unleashes a Massive Raid on Kurdish Bases in
Turkey,'' International Herald Tribune, March 21, 1995.
26. Ibid.
27. Department of Defense News Briefing by Dennis Boxx, March
21, 1995, official DoD transcript.
28. ``Turkey Unleashes,'' op. cit., note 25; ``Turkish Army
Readies Final Assault on Kurd Pockets,'' International Herald
Tribune, March 25-26, 1995; and John Barham, ``Turkish Army
Invades Iraq to Strike at Turkish Bases,'' Financial Times
(London), March 21, 1995.
29. John Pomfret, ``Turkey's Hunt for the Kurds: The Making
of a Quagmire?'', Washington Post, April 2, 1995.
30. Ibid.
31. ``UN Evacuates Kurds from Path of Turkey's Offensive,''
International Herald Tribune, March 27, 1995; ``Turkey Plays
Down Criticism of Assault,'' International Herald Tribune,
March 29, 1995; and Pomfret, ``Turkey's Hunt,'' op. cit.
32. Suna Erdem, ``Iraqi Kurds Say Turkey Torched Their
Town,'' Washington Post, March 30, 1995.
33. ``Turkey Unleashes,'' op. cit.
34. ``Germany Withholds Materiel Over Drive on Kurds,''
International Herald Tribune, March 30, 1995.
35. David Morrison, ``Turkish War Concern for America,''
National Journal, April 15, 1995.
36. U.S. Cluster Bombs for Turkey, op. cit., pp .9-10; and
Thomas W. Lippman, ``Rights Group Seeks to Block Proposed
Cluster-Bomb Sale to Turkey,'' Washington Post, December 28,
1995.
37. ``Turkish Aid Says Troops Have Left Iraq,'' New York
Times, May 5, 1995. The article actually cites conflicting
reports from two different Turkish officials--Turkish Defense
Minister Mehmet Golhan is quoted as saying ``We have no one
there . . . We have withdrawn them all and we only have
security measures on the border.'' However, the article goes
on to indicate that ``Deputy Prime Minister Hikmet Cetin said
. . . that a few troops still remain in Northern Iraq, but he
did not give details.''
38. John Pomfret, ``Turkish Premier Assails Kurdish Attack's
Critics,'' Washington Post, April 5, 1995.
39. Kenneth Katzman, ``Afghanistan: U.S. Policy Options,''
Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, November 29,
1993, p. 15.
40. Ted Galen Carpenter, ``The Consequences of Afghanistan,''
World Policy Journal, Vol XI, No. 1, Spring 1994, p. 77.
41. Jim Hoagland, ``No More Frankensteins,'' Washington Post,
July 13, 1993.
42. Tim Weiner, ``U.S. Will Try to Buy Antiaircraft Missiles
Back From Afghans,'' New York Times, July 24, 1993; on the
ties of the World Trade Center suspects to Afghan weapons
training camps, see Caryle Murphy, ``U.S. Policies Trouble
Egypt,'' Washington Post, August 1, 1993 and Tim Weiner,
``Blowback from the Afghan Battlefield,'' New York Times
Magazine, March 13, 1994.
43. William D. Hartung, ``Proliferation's Profiteers,'' CEO/
International Strategies, February/March 1993.
44. Molly Moore, ``Missile Buyback Stumbles,'' Washington
Post, March 7, 1994; and Tim Weiner, ``U.S. Will Try to Buy
Back Antiaircraft Missiles from Afghans,'' op. cit.
45. David Rogers, ``U.S. to Buy Back Some of Missiles Held by
Afghans,'' Wall Street Journal, January 15, 1993.
46. Weiner, ``U.S. Will Try to Buy Back . . .,'' op. cit.
47. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, India: Arms and Abuses
in Indian Punjab and Kashmir, (Washington: Human Rights
Watch, September 1994), pp. 5-11.
48. Christopher Smith, ``Light Weapons: The Forgotten
Dimension of the International Arms Trade,'' in Brassey's
Defence Yearbook 1994 (London: Center for Defence Studies,
1994), pp. 280; and Human Rights Watch, India: Arms and
Abuses, op. cit., pp. 12-13; and Kenneth Katzman,
``Afghanistan: U.S. Policy Options,'' op. cit., p. 8.
49. Human Rights Watch, India: Arms and Abuses, op. cit., p.
5.
50. Matthew Jardine, ``Weapons for Genocide in East Timor,''
San Francisco Examiner, May 31, 1993; and Allan Nairn, ``A
Narrow Escape from East Timor,'' USA Today, 11/21/91.
51. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1995
(New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1994), p. 157.
52. Ibid., p. 162; and Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch
World Report 1993 (New York: Human Rights Watch, December
1992), pp. 177-178.
53. For the sources of the statistics cited in this
paragraph, see appendix, Table I; for the quote on the
potential sale of F-16s to Indonesia see ``F-16 Sale to
Indonesia Gains Wider Support,'' Defense News, May 1-7, 1995.
54. R. Jeffrey Smith and Dana Priest, ``In Washington: Covert
Aid Undermined Public Outrage,'' Washington Post, April 2,
1995.
55. Tim Weiner, ``Guatemalan Agent of CIA Tied to Killing of
American,'' New York Times, March 23, 1995; Tim Weiner,
``CIA's Workaday Cloak,'' New York Times, April 5, 1995; and
Tim Weiner, ``Retracting Words, White House Halts CIA Money
to Guatemala,'' New York Times, April 5, 1995.
56. Alan Nairn, ``CIA Death Squad,'' The Nation, April 17,
1995.
57. The Warren Rudman quote is cited in Michael T. Klare and
Peter Kornbluh, Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency,
Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the 1980s (New York: Hill
and Wang, 1988), p. 19.
58. ``Mexico: The Uprising in Chiapas and Democratization in
Mexico,'' Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of
Representatives, February 2, 1994 (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO,
1994), p. 103.
59. John MacCormack and Carmina Danini, ``Mexico Importing
Riot Control Vehicles,'' San Antonio Express-News, April 27,
1994.
60. Ray Sanchez, ``Mexican Army Maneuvers In--Crackdown
Overshadows Elections,'' New York Newsday, February 13, 1995;
see also Appendix Table I.
61. Washington Office on Latin America, Clear and Present
Dangers: The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes,
(Washington, DC: WOLA, October 1991), p. 1.
62. Testimony of Alexander Wilde, Executive Director,
Washington Office on Latin America, to the Subcommittee on
Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. House of Representatives, June 6, 1990; Daniel Williams,
``Colombia Remains Ally in Drug Fight,'' Washington Post,
March 2, 1995; and ``No Hail to Colombia,'' (unsigned
editorial), Washington Post, March 6, 1995.
63. Data on U.S. aid and arms transfers to Ecuador is from
U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance
Agency, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction
Sales, and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1993
(Washington, DC: DSAA, 1994); and U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers, 1991-92 (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1994), Table
III.
64. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense,
Congressional Presentation on Security Assistance, F.Y. 1993,
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State/Department of
Defense, 1992), p. 156.
65. Information on U.S. military assistance and arms
transfers to Peru is taken from appendix Table I; data on
assistance under the Economic Support Fund program is taken
from U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Presentation, op. cit., editions for F.Y. 1990
through F.Y. 1994.
66. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense,
Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance, F.Y. 1992
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State/Department of
Defense, 1991), p. 252.
67. James Brooke, ``Ecuador and Peru Trade Air Strikes Along
the Border,'' New York Times, February 12, 1995.
68. See appendix Table I.
69. United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Report of
the Secretary General (New York: United Nations General
Assembly, October 11, 1993), pages 83 and 111.
70. ``Philippine Planes Bomb Guerrillas,'' International
Herald Tribune, April 21, 1995.
71. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Angola: Arms Trade and
Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections (New
York: Human Rights Watch, November 1994), p. 47.
72. Philip Finnegan, ``Yemen's Iraqi Use Irks U.S., Defense
News, December 5-11, 1994.
73. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance
Agency, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction
Sales, and Foreign Military Assistance Facts as of September
30, 1990 (Washington, DC: DSAA, 1991); and United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures
and Arms Transfers, 1990 (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1991),
Table III.
74. See statements by Joel Johnson and Don Fuqua of the
Aerospace Industries Association (referenced in footnotes 16
and 17, above).
75. John M. Hogan, BNL Task Force Final Report--Report to the
Attorney General, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Justice, October 21, 1994--released to the public in January
of 1995); Neil Lewis, ``Inquiry Finds No U.S. Involvement in
the Iraqi Buildup,'' New York Times, January 24, 1995; and
Serge F. Kovaleski and R. Jeffrey Smith, ``Justice Department
Find No BNL Conspiracy,'' Washington Post, January 24, 1995.
[[Page H5515]] 76. Michael Wines, ``U.S. Tells of Prewar
Technology Sales to Iraq Worth $500 Million,'' New York
Times, March 12, 1991.
77. U.S. Department of Commerce, ``Fact Sheet on Export
Licensing for Iraq,'' with attached computer printout, March
1991.
78. Statement of Henry Gonzalez, Chairman, Committee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of
Representatives, at Hearings Before the Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, on the Issue of
Appointing a Special Counsel on Matters Relating to Iraq,
June 2, 1992, p. 7; and Congressional Record, March 16, 1992,
pp. H1274-H1282.
79. Andy Pasztor, ``Investigators Say Chilean Dealer Smuggled
U.S. Weapons to Iraq,'' Wall Street Journal, November 20,
1991; ABC News Nightline, show 2609, transcript, May 23,
1991; Kenneth Timmerman, The Death Lobby: How the West Armed
Iraq, (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), pp. 167-170 and
250; and ABC News 20/20, ``Made in the U.S.A.,'' February 1,
1991.
80. Dean Baquet, ``U.S. Supplied Arms to Iraq, Ex-Aide
Says,'' New York Times, February 5, 1995.
81. For a capsule history of Gerald Bull's arms trafficking
activities and his relationships with various U.S. government
agencies, see William D. Hartung, And Weapons for All (New
York: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 195-197 and 235-236.
82. Hartung, op. cit., pp. 189-90 and 236-237.
83. ``The Man Who Made the Supergun,'' Frontline transcript,
(Boston, MA: WGBH-TV, February 12, 1991).
84. William D. Hartung, ``Somalia and the Cycle of Arms
Sales,'' Christian Science Monitor, February 22, 1993; U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1990, op. cit.; and Richard
F. Grimmett, ``Somalia: Arms Deliveries,'' Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress, October 28, 1993.
85. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense,
Congressional Presentation on security assistance programs,
op. cit., editions for F.Y. 1980 through 1992.
86. Congressional Presentation, op. cit., F.Y. 1992 edition,
p. 273.
87. See Appendix A, Table 1; and Grimmett, ``Somalia: Arms
Deliveries,'' op. cit.
88. See Appendix Table I; Tim Weiner, Stephen Engelberg, and
Howard French, ``CIA Formed Haitian Unit Later Tied to
Narcotics Trade,'' New York Times, November 14, 1993; and
Jane's Defense Weekly Global Update: Flashpoints and
Conflicts, August 1994, pp. 21-24.
89. For a brief history of Congressional procedures for
reviewing arms sales, see Chapter 3, ``Congress Steps In,''
in William D. Hartung, And Weapons for All, op. cit. pp. 45-
62; and Richard Grimmett, Executive-Legislative Consultation
on U.S. Arms Sales (Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, 1982).
90. As of the early 1980s, it was still possible to construct
a list of major U.S. arms sales proposals by tracking the
announcements of new letters of offer that were reprinted in
the Congressional Record; for an example of an analysis
conducted using this data, see William D. Hartung ``Weapons
for the World Update--1982,'' New York, Council on Economic
Priorities, 1982, it is still possible to track major U.S.
arms sales through a combination of Pentagon press releases
and notices in the industry press, but this method can result
in time lags that limit the ability of the public to learn
about major sales proposals and make their views known to
Congress before the 30 day period within which Congress can
vote down a sale has passed. For current efforts to track
major arms sales, wee the ``Deals in the Works'' section in
Lora Lumpe, ed., Arms Sales Monitor (Washington, DC:
Federation of American Scientists, published 8 to 10 times
per year); and Sarah Walkling. ACA Register of U.S., U.S.
Arms Transfers, (Washington, DC: Arms Control Association,
February 1995).
91. The idea of reinstituting the section 657 reports has
been put forward in recent years by a number of non-
governmental organizations, including Human Rights Watch, the
British American Security Information Council (BASIC), and
the Project on Demilitarization and Democracy, See Natalie J.
Goldring and Ottfried Nassauer, ``Available Sources and Data:
The Trade in Light Weapons,'' paper prepared for the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences Conference, ``International
Trade in Light Weapons,'' February 24-25, 1994; and Stephen
D. Goose and Frank Smyth, ``Arming Genocide in Rwanda,''
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, no. 5, September/October 1994, pp.
86-96.
92. Strengthening the Export Licensing System: First Report
by the Committee on Government Operations (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 40-53.
93. Lora Lumpe, editor, Arms Sales Monitor, No. 27,
(Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, November
30, 1994), p. 9.
94. John M. Hogan, ``Addendum to the BNL Task Force--Final
Report,'' (Washington, DC: United States Department of
Justice, 1995), p. 3.
95. Caleb Rossiter of the Project on Demilitarization and
Democracy suggested prohibiting covert arms supplies and
training in his February 22, 1994 testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy, noting that ``[C]overt aid programs corrupt
the recipient precisely because they are covert and have no
leverage . . . If we are to engage in aiding foreign forces,
we should do so openly.'' A summary of Rossiter's testimony
appears in Lora Lumpe, editor, Arms Sales Monitor, No 24,
(Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, March 15,
1994), pp. 4-5.
96. See White House Press Office, ``Fact Sheet: Conventional
Arms Sales Policy,'' and ``Fact Sheet--Criteria for
Decisionmaking on U.S. Arms Exports,'' February 17, 1995; and
Richard Grimmett, Conventional Arms Sales to the Third World,
F.Y. 1986-F.Y. 1993, op. cit.
APPENDIX A: U.S. ARMS DELIVERIES TO AREAS OF CONFLICT, 1984-1993
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of imports
Region/Conflict (Major conflicts in U.S. deliveries, 1984-1993 Last year U.S. Arms provided by U.S. 1987- Other suppliers\5\
bold)\1\ ($ millions)\2\ delivered\3\ 91/1991-93\4\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Europe:
1. Former Yugoslavia (Conflicts in $163.4...................... 1991 13/0 Russia, Germany, Slovakia,
Croatia and Bosnia/Herzegovina). Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia.
2. Spain (Govt. vs. Basque 4,003.6..................... \6\1993 85/86 France.
Separatists).
3. United Kingdom (British forces and 6,318.5..................... 1993 100/95 ............................
protestant paramilitary groups vs.
IRA).
4. Russia\7\ (Conflicts in Chechnya None........................ ....................... ....................... NA.
and North Ossetia).
5. Moldova (Conflicts in Dniester None........................ ....................... ....................... NA.
region).
6. Georgia (Conflicts in Abkhazia and None........................ ....................... ....................... NA.
Southern Ossetia).
7. Turkey (Govt. vs. Kurdish 6,302.8..................... 1993 76/80 Germany.
separatists).
Middle East/North Africa:
8. Azerbaijan (Conflict with Armenia None........................ ....................... ....................... NA.
over Nagorno/Karabakh).
9. Iraq (Conflicts with Kurdish groups 4.4\8\...................... 1989 <1/0 (see\8\) Former Soviet Union, China,
in the North and Shiite Muslim groups France.
in the South).
10. Israel (Vs. Palestine intifada 9,544.1..................... 1993 99/91 ............................
through mid-1993 and vs. Hamas).
11. Algeria (Govt. vs. Islamic 105.2....................... 1993 1/0 Former Soviet Union, Egypt,
militants). China.
12. Morocco (Moroccan govt. vs. 404.0....................... 1993 26/76 France, other West European
Western Sahara independence movement; suppliers.
UN referendum to be held).
13. Egypt (Govt. vs. Islamic 7,227.9..................... 1993 61/89 France.
militants).
14. Sudan (Govt. vs. Sudanese People's 155.6....................... 1989 9/0 China, Middle Eastern
Liberation Army). suppliers, Italy.
15. Yemen (Civil war, North vs. South) 50.6........................ 1991 1/0\9\ Former Soviet Union, China.
16. Iran (Govt. vs. Kurdish Covert sales, value NA NA/0 Russia, China, European
separatists, Mujahaddin guerillas). undisclosed\10\. suppliers.
Sub-Saharan Africa:
17. Mauritania (Govt. vs. black 1.5......................... 1992 <1/0 Former Soviet Union.
minority).
18. Mali (Govt. vs. Tuareg ethnic .2.......................... 1993 <1/0 Former Soviet Union, Middle
group). Eastern sources.
19. Chad (Ongoing civil war between 50.3........................ 1993 27/25 France.
Anakaza and Bideyet ethnic groups).
20. Somalia (Multi-sided clan warfare) 109.3....................... 1991 44/100 Italy.
21. Senegal (Govt. vs. Diola tribe)... 13.6........................ 1993 11/100 France, other European
suppliers.
22. Liberia (Govt. & West African 33.4........................ 1990 40/0 Former Warsaw Pact, Middle
peacekeeping forces vs. rebels led by Eastern sources.
Col. Charles Taylor).
23. Togo (Govt. vs. opposition forces, 1.9......................... 1993 <1/0 Latin American sources.
including members of Ewe tribe).
24. Nigeria (Military-dominated govt. 82.4........................ 1993 9/2 Italy, Czechoslovakia,
vs. pro-democracy forces; Hausa vs. Former Soviet Union,
Yoruba ethnic conflict). France.
25. Uganda (Govt. vs. rebels based in 10.6........................ 1993 5/100 Former Soviet Union, Italy.
Northern Uganda).
26. Rwanda (Hutu-dominated govt. vs. 1.4......................... 1993 <5/0 China, France, Egypt,
Tutsi minority; govt. overthrown by Uganda, South Africa.
Rwandan Patriotic Front in 1994).
27. Burundi (Ethnic conflicts between .6.......................... 1993 <1/0 Former Soviet Union.
Hutu & Tutsi ethnic groups).
28. Kenya (Ethnic conflicts in Rift 100.2....................... 1993 25/100 U.K., France.
Valley region sparked by supporters
of President Moi).
29. Zaire (Multiple rebellions vs. 55.9........................ \11\1990 17/0 China, France.
regime of President Mobutu).
30. Angola (Govt. vs. UNITA rebels)... 250-300..................... NA NA/0 Former Soviet Union (to
Angolan govt.).
31. South Africa (Govt. & Inkatha 8.3\13\..................... 1988 NA/NA See\13\.
Party supporters vs. ANC, through mid-
1993; radical white ultra-
nationalists vs. ANC govt.).
Asia:
32. Tajikistan (Govt. vs. Islamic Rebels have rec'vd U.S. NA NA/0 NA.
opposition). weapons that were
originally supplied to
Afghan rebels by the
CIA\14\.
33. Afghanistan (Civil war among $2B in covert military 1991 NA/0 Former Soviet Union, Saudi
competing ethnic factions). assistance provided by U.S. Arabia (financier).
to Afghan rebel factions,
1980-1991.
34. Pakistan (Govt. vs. secessionist 1,801.7..................... 1993 44/3 China.
movements in Sindh and NW Frontier
Province; conflict with India over
Kashmir).
35. India (Govt. vs. secessionist 316.6....................... 1993 1/0 Russia, U.K., West European
forces in Kashmir; govt. vs. Sikh suppliers.
militants in Punjab; govt. vs.
secessionists in Assam; Hindu-Muslim
conflict in state of Uttar Pradesh).
36. Bhutan (Govt. vs. ethnic Nepalese 0.2......................... 1992 <1/0 NA.
rebels).
37. Sri Lanka (Govt. vs. Tamil 8.6......................... 1993 7/0 China.
insurgents; Sinhalese militants).
38. Bangladesh (Govt. vs. Chittagong 16.7........................ 1993 4/5 Former Soviet Union, China.
Hill People's Coordination
Association).
39. Myanmar (Burma) (Govt. vs. Karen 6.2......................... 1989 1/0 China.
separatists, Islamic opposition).
40. China (Govt. vs. Tibetan 423.9\15\................... 1993 8/1 Russia.
independence movement; govt. vs.
Muslim secessionists in Xinjiang
province).
[[Page H5516]]
41. Philippines (Govt. vs. New 619.3....................... 1993 93/75 Italy.
People's Army).
42. Cambodia (Govt. vs. Khmer Rouge).. Covert assistance to rebel NA NA/0 Former Soviet Union, China.
factions during 1980's;
reports of U.S.-supplied
Thai army transferring
weaponry to Khmer Rouge\16\.
43. Indonesia (Govt. vs. independence 583.3....................... 1993 38/33 Germany, Netherlands, U.K.,
forces in East Timor; govt. vs. other European suppliers.
separatist movement in Northern
Sumatra).
44. Papua New Guinea (Govt. None........................ ....................... ....................... Former Soviet Union.
independence movement on Bougainville
island).
Latin America:
45. Guatemala (Govt. vs. Guatemala 35.8........................ \17\1993 86/0 Israel.
National Revolutionary Unity).
46. Haiti (Govt. and paramilitary 2.6\18\..................... 1992 \19\>25/0 Latin American sources.
forces vs. democracy movement,
through mid-1994; new govt. and UN
forces vs. paramilitary groups 1994
on).
47. Colombia (Govt. vs. Revolutionary 647......................... 1993 28/19 Brazil.
Armed Forces of Colombia; govt. vs.
National Liberation Army).
48. Peru (Govt. vs. Shining Path 136......................... \21\1993 6/8 France, Former Soviet Union.
guerrillas; govt. vs. Tupac Amaru
revolutionary movement).
49. Brazil (Govt. vs. indigenous 528.8....................... 1993 35/40 Germany, France.
peoples of Amazon region).
50. Mexico (Govt. vs. rebel movement 301.2....................... 1993 77/64 ............................
in Chiapas).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\This table reviews U.S. arms transfers to a list of fifty significant ethnic and territorial conflicts that were under way during 1993 or 1994. The
informed reader will note that some of the conflicts listed here have since been resolved and/or reduced in intensity (for example, in South Africa
and Angola), while other, new conflicts are not covered (such as the January/February 1995 Peru-Ecuador border war). For an explanation of how the
list of conflicts was arrived at and the sources used in making that determination, see footnote 2 in the text, above. Countries listed in bold print
represent major conflicts that have resulted in 1,000 or more battle-related deaths since the outbreak of the war.
\2\Unless otherwise noted, figures in this column are based on U.S. deliveries under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and the
commercial arms sales program (which involves items on the U.S. Munitions List and requires a license from the State Department); the source of the
data is U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency, ``Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military
Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1993'' (Washington, DC: DSAA, 1994). One of the main limitations of this data source (a limitation common to all
other major compilations of data on the arms trade) is that it does not include covert arms sales or sales to non-government recipients such as
militias, guerrilla movements, and rebel organizations that are major players in the majority of today's ethnic and civil conflicts.
\3\The figures on the last year U.S. arms were delivered is based on data on deliveries under the FMS and commercial sales programs in ``Foreign
Military Sales . . . Facts,'' op. cit. In many cases commercial arms sales are allowed to continue even after the U.S. government has cut off military
aid and/or sales under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales programs.
\4\Data on the percentage of a nation's imports provided by the United States is drawn from United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ``World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers,'' 1991-92 and 1993-94 editions (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1994 and 1995), Table III. The column on % of
deliveries provided by the U.S. is divided into two time segments (1987-91 and 1991-93) separated by a slash. The one year overlap (1991 is covered in
both series) is a function of ACDA reports the data in its 1991-92 and 1993-94 reports. The ACDA data are not directly comparable to the data on
deliveries listed in column 2, because they cover a different range of equipment. The Pentagon's delivery figures include items considered to be
weapons by virtue of their inclusion on the U.S. Munitions List. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) report uses a broader definition that
includes ``weapons of war, parts thereof, ammunition, support equipment and other commodities designed for military use . . . Dual use equipment,
which can have application in both military and civilian sectors, is included when its primary mission is identified as military.'' Dual use equipment
is by definition ``not'' included in the Pentagon's figures on deliveries under the FMS and CS programs. The time lag between the currency of the data
on U.S. deliveries listed in column 2 and the ACDA data on the U.S. proportion of deliveries to each of the governments involved is a function of the
slower schedule for the release of the ACDA data, which is no doubt in part a function of the greater difficulty of compiling information on arms
deliveries and purchases by every nation in the world. As noted in note 2, above, the percentages listed here represent the proportion of weapons
imported by the governments involved in each conflict that came from U.S. sources; there are no comparably reliable figures on supplies to non-state
actors such as rebel movements and private militias. Listings of 0%* are marked with an asterisk to denote the fact that according to ACDA's figures
the country in question received no arms imports from any governmental source during the period covered--this does not mean that there were no weapons
deliveries at all, but rather that there are no known deliveries by governments (i.e., weapons may have flowed through covert or private channels).
\5\Unless otherwise noted, identifications of other major suppliers are drawn from two sources: U.S. ACDA, ``World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers,'' Table III, op. cit., and Ian Anthony, Paul Claesson, Elisabeth Skons, and Siemon T. Wezeman, ``Arms Production and Arms Trade,'' in
``SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament'' (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), Table 10B.3. Countries listed as other suppliers
provided approximately 10% or more of a recipient government's imported weaponry in the most recent multi-year period covered by one or both of these
sources. Since the periods covered begin before the breakup of the Soviet Union, all transfers involving constituent states of the former Soviet Union
are identified as ``former Soviet Union.'' In the case of ongoing arms transfer relationships, Russia is by far the most active arms exporting nation
amongst the former Soviet Republics, although its total deliveries in recent years have been only a fraction of the levels achieved by the Soviet
Union during the 1970s and 1980s.
\6\Since the main data source for this table only goes up through 1993, an indication that the last U.S. delivery was in 1993 does ``not'' mean that
U.S. arms shipments have been halted, but rather that as of the end of 1993 the nation in question was an active, ongoing weapons client of the United
States.
\7\Human rights monitors have reported war-related deaths in Russia's intervention in Chechnya at levels as high as 20,000 to 25,000; although some
observers have argued that these figures are an overstatement, there seems to be no question that this qualifies as a major conflict (based on a
standard of 1,000 or more battle-related deaths).
\8\This figure for U.S. arms deliveries to Iraq does not include the $500 million in dual use items shipped to Iraq from the United States between 1985
and 1990, nor does it encompass covert shipments or sales of U.S. equipment via third parties. For a summary of these U.S. contributions to the Iraqi
war machine, see the discussion of Iraq in section IV of the text, above.
\9\U.S. arms supplies to North Yemen from as early as 1978-79 made their way into the government arsenal of the combined state of Yemen formed by the
merger of North and South Yemen; these shipments are not reflected in this table. For further discussion of this point, see section III, above.
\10\According to the final report of Iran/Contra special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh, the Oliver North/Richard Secord ``enterprise'' that ran the Iran/
Contra arms operations for the Reagan Administration took in over $47 million and delivered substantial quantities of military equipment to Iran,
including over 1,000 TOW anti-tank missiles; on this point, see Lawrence E. Walsh, ``Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters,
Volume I: Investigations and Prosecutions'' (Washington, DC: Office of the Independent Counsel, August 4, 1993). In addition, according to a 1986
report in ``Aviation Week and Space Technology,'' (Paul Mann and James K. Gordon, ``Iran Secures Operational Gains from U.S.-backed Military Aid,''
``AW&ST,'' November 17, 1986), a Reagan Administration official involved in Middle East affairs asserted that ``at U.S. instigation Iranians bought
critical radar and landing gear components that at times . . . enabled Iran to double the number of sorties flown by its McDonnell Douglas F-4
aircraft against Iraq.''
\11\For many years Zaire served as a conduit for U.S. covert arms supplies to rebel forces fighting against the Angolan government. It is not known
precisely how much of this U.S. assistance may have been siphoned off to bolster the military forces of the Mobutu regime in Zaire. For a discussion
of the role of Zaire in the Angolan arms pipeline, see Lucy Mathiak, ``Light Weapons and Internal Conflict in Angola,'' in Boutwell, Klare, and Reed,
editors, ``Lethal Commerce,'' op. cit., pp. 89-90.
\12\The range of values cited for U.S. covert arms shipments to Angola in the 1980s is based on Human Rights Watch Arms Project, ``Angola; Trade and
Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections,'' op. cit., p. 47 (for the $250 million estimate); and Mathiak, op. cit., p. 89 (for the $300
million estimate).
\13\This figure does includes only officially sanctioned exports licensed by the U.S. government. There is considerable anecdotal evidence to indicate
that a number of U.S.-based firms made shipments of weaponry and weapons components to South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s in violation of the
United Nations arms embargo on the apartheid regime.
\14\On this point see Katzman, op. cit., ``Afghanistan: U.S. Policy Options,'' note 28 in the text.
\15\U.S. arms deliveries to China were suspended by the Bush Administration in response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, but the Clinton
Administration has been flirting with the idea of reopening military exports to China, beginning with dual use items.
\16\There have been recent reports to indicate that the flow of weapons to the Khmer Rouge from Thailand and China has been cut off, starting some time
in 1994 (cite new Human Rights Watch report).
\17\Although U.S. military aid and commercial arms sales to Guatemala were cut off in December of 1990 because of the Guatemalan government's record of
human rights abuses, modest commercial deliveries continued through 1993, as did military-related aid under the ``international narcotics control''
segment of U.S. security assistance. See ``Human Rights Watch World Report 1993,'' op. cit., p. 117-118.
\18\Deliveries to Haiti listed here exclude $500,000 to $1 million per year in covert military aid supplied to Haitian military and intelligence forces
between 1986 and 1991.
\19\This figure takes into account the provision of $3 to $6 million in military-related assistance justified as anti-narcotics aid (see note 18).
Dear Code of Conduct Supporter:
I would like to thank those who voted for the ``Code of
Conduct'' during the markup of HR 1561 on May 11. The close
vote (18-17) and the 101 cosponsors demonstrate the
commitment and support for the ``Code.'' It is one of the
most important reforms of the arms export process in two
decades.
I will be offering the ``Code'' as a floor amendment to HR
1561 on May 24. I urge your support as we move this
legislation forward.
Let's end the ``Boomerang Effect'' on our armed forces and
take a serious step toward underscoring America's leadership
role in the new world order and ending our role as the
world's number one gun dealer.
We must live up to our claim to protect human rights,
foster democracies and promote peace and stability. The arms
sales of today are the ``Boomerangs'' of tomorrow. Vote for
the ``Code of Conduct'' Amendment and end our role as the
client for tyrants!
Sincerely,
Cynthia McKinney,
Member of Congress.
____
[From the Christian Science Monitor, May 23, 1995]
It's Time the U.S. Stopped ``Boomerang'' Arms Sales--An Amendment to
Foreign Aid Bill Would Ban Weapons for Dictators
(By Cynthia McKinney and Caleb Rossiter)
A defining moment in post-cold-war foreign policy will come
today when the House of Representatives takes up the ``Code
of Conduct'' amendment to the foreign aid bill. The Code of
Conduct would ban US arms sales to dictators, human rights
abusers, and governments not participating in the United
Nations arms trade register.
On May 11, the code was narrowly defeated in the House
International Relations Committee by an 18-to-17 vote after a
heated debate. The vote on the House floor will be the first
time in 19 years that Congress debates which countries should
be permitted to receive our weaponry.
The code's surprisingly strong showing came despite the
opposition of the Aerospace Industries Association, which
represents arms-exporters whose political-action committees
gave $7.5 million to candidates in the last election cycle.
The Clinton administration also weighed in heavily against
the amendment, with Assistant Secretary of State Wendy
Sherman appearing before the committee and distributing a
letter ``firmly opposing'' passage of the code while
supporting its principles.
Congress is getting involved in arms restraint for the
simple reason that successive administrations have failed to
show leadership. In 1993, the administration approved a
record $12.9 billion in arms sales to developing countries,
three times the sales to all other countries combined. More
than 90 percent of those weapons went to dictators. Then in
February, 1995, the president issued a directive that, for
the first time, makes corporations' financial health a factor
in arms sales decisions.
As the Pentagon buys less, arms-makers pressure the
government to keep production lines open by approving
strategically questionable sales abroad. In fact, arms sales
to developing countries have doubled since the fall of the
Berlin Wall.
The arms industry claims that the increase in sales saves
jobs. As defense industry profits and CEO salaries rise,
however, layoffs of [[Page H5517]] line workers have
increased almost in direct relation. Even worse for the
American economy, one-third of all sales are paid for by the
taxpayer through foreign aid. ``Offset'' agreements that help
purchasing countries co-produce weapons and sell commercial
products in America displace as many workers as the arms
sales save.
Hence, we are giving bullies bigger sticks, even though in
the past they have used them against their own people and the
United States. We have already seen this ``boomerang effect''
from past sales to armed forces that oppressed their
citizens. In the last four overseas US engagements--Panama,
Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti--our troops faced the very weapons
we sold to those dictators who were once our friends. In
Somalia, we spent $2 billion and two dozen American lives
trying to clean up the mess that flowed from our $200 million
in arms sales.
Who among today's favored customers are tomorrow's Somalias
and Iraqs?
If the House passes the Code of Conduct, maybe we will not
have to find out. Until then, arms transfer policy will be
business as usual--big business as usual.
Cynthia McKinney (D) of Georgia is the primary House
sponsor of the McKinney/Hatfield Code of Conduct Bill. Caleb
Rossiter is the former deputy director of the Congressional
Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus.
____
House of Representatives, Committee on International
Relations,
Washington, DC, May 10, 1995.
Dear Colleague: During the full International Relations
Committee mark-up of the foreign aid authorization, my
colleague on the Committee, Cynthia McKinney, will be
offering as an amendment her ``Code of Conduct on Arms
Transfers'' bill (H.R. 772). I urge your support for this
important reform of the arms sales process.
The amendment establishes a Code of Conduct for recipients
of U.S. military exports and training. The President would
decide which countries meet the specific language of the four
criteria: promotes democracy, protects human rights, not
engaged in aggression, and participates in the U.N. arms
trade register. Countries not meeting the criteria would
require a waiver agreed to by both the President and
Congress.
At present, the decision on whether a country should be
eligible to receive U.S. weapons is made by the executive
branch alone. The Code of Conduct is really a congressional
responsibility act that restores the balance that existed in
the original Arms Export Control Act before a Supreme Court
decision on an unrelated case invalidated its review
procedures.
Arms transfers to undemocratic countries have been the
Achilles heel of U.S. foreign policy. Many times we have
spent scarce foreign aid cleaning up after conflicts fueled
by our own arms transfers; many times we have seen our own
troops face weapons we sold to once-friendly dictators. This
bill creates a presumption against such transfers while
providing a channel for a joint decision to approve them if
national security requires.
I have attached for your review a description of the bill,
which includes answers to questions about it. Thank you for
your consideration of the McKinney amendment.
Sincerely,
Howard L. Berman,
Member of Congress.
____
Amnesty International, USA,
Washington, DC, May 10, 1995.
Dear Member of the House International Relations Committee:
As a member of both the House International Relations
Committee (HIRC) and the Congressional Human Rights Caucus
you are in a strategic position to help stem the flow of U.S.
weapons to countries who violate the human rights of its
citizens. The ``Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers Act''
sponsored by Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), will be
presented to the HIRC as an amendment to ``Division C'' of
the Foreign Aid Reorganization bill (H.R. 1561) as early as
tomorrow. I urge you to vote in favor of this provision.
As an ally in exposing and stemming human rights
violations, you recognize the importance of governments
accepting accountability. Under this legislation, recipients
of U.S. weapons and security assistance would have to
vigorously investigate, discipline, and prosecute those
responsible for violations, as well as take other positive
measures to combat gross violation of internationally
recognized rights.
The Code of Conduct would require the President to make an
annual certification of countries eligible to receive U.S.
weapons. Arms would be prevented from going to countries that
are undemocratic, violators of human rights, engaged in armed
aggression, not full participants in the U.N. Register of
Conventional Arms. If a country does not meet the criteria,
transfers can still be made if it is found to be in the
interest of U.S. national security.
Amnesty International continues to investigate countries
known to have committed human rights violations and their
receipt of U.S. security assistance. The Code of Conduct
offers another avenue to make violators of human rights
accountable for their actions. We urge your support on this
important legislation.
Sincerely,
James O'Dea,
Director, Washington Office.
____
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, May 9, 1995.
Dear International Relations Committee member:
As you may be aware, our colleague, Rep. Cynthia McKinney,
will offer an amendment to attach the Code of Conduct for
international arms sales to the Foreign Aid bill later this
week. It is my hope that you will join Rep. McKinney, myself,
and almost 100 of our colleagues in supporting this timely
and reasonable legislation.
Often times, international terrorists acquire U.S.-supplied
weapons through pro-American dictators, aggressors, and human
rights abusers. A prime example of this was the supplying of
Afghani rebels through Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Moreover,
the arms we supplied to the Shah of Iran eventually ended up
in the hands of Khomeini and his global terror network. We
must stop the boomerang effect which ends up placing U.S.
troops, and even U.S. civilians, at the risk of being
attacked by our own weapons.
The guiding principle of the Code is that U.S. arms should
not be provided to countries that are undemocratic, violate
human rights, or are engaged in acts of aggression. However,
the United States currently provides 73 percent of all arms
to the third world, many of which have not yet held a free
and fair election or do not adhere to internationally
accepted standards of human rights.
Congress owes it to the American people to play a stronger
role in reaching decisions over the transfer and sale of
weapons to rogue nations. While the Code is not a ban on arms
sales, it will increase congressional oversight and public
scrutiny of arms sales.
Once again, I urge you to support Rep. McKinney's Code of
Conduct amendment in the International Relations Committee.
Sincerely,
Eliot L. Engel,
Member of Congress.
____
Department of Social Development and World Peace,
Washington, DC, May 10, 1995.
Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman,
Chairman, International Relations Committee,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Gilman: I write to express our concerns about
H.R. 1561. I enclose a letter, which the U.S. Catholic
Conference has co-signed, which opposes proposals to cut
drastically development assistance and U.N. peacekeeping, and
questions the wisdom of restructuring that could weaken
development and human rights programs.
The enclosed letter does not address our strong support for
continued U.S. funding for overseas assistance and protection
for refugees, the main provisions for which are contained in
a separate State Department Authorization Bill, H.R. 1564. It
is our understanding that the International Relations
Committee plans to vote on consolidated H.R. 1561, which
incorporates these other provisions, rather than allowing
them to be considered separately. We regret this decision as
it leaves us in the uncomfortable position of opposing a
consolidated bill that, in our view, is still fundamentally
flawed but which contains provisions we would wholeheartedly
endorse were they to be considered on their own merits.
In addition to these concerns, I would like to raise two
additional matters related to this legislation. First, I
encourage you to support the Code of Conduct on Arms
Transfers, an amendment that will be offered to H.R. 1561. In
his recent encyclical, The Gospel of Life, Pope John Paul II
condemned the arms trade as ``scandalous.'' That weapons of
war are bought and sold almost as if they were simply another
commodity like appliances or industrial machinery is a
serious moral disorder in today's world. The predominant role
of our country in sustaining and even promoting the arms
trade, sometimes for economic reasons, is a moral challenge
for our nation. The foreign aid cuts in H.R. 1561 are another
example of our country's increasing reluctance to share its
economic resources in support of sustainable economic
development, while we remain the dominant supplier of weapons
to the developing world.
The Code of Conduct is important for two reasons. It
imposes appropriate conditions for arms transfers: respect
for democracy and human rights, non-aggression, and
participation in the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms. And
it would bring greater openness and public accountability to
decisions to transfer arms by forcing these decisions to be
more openly debated in Congress. The Code could thereby
improve prospects that the United States would more strictly
enforce and strengthen controls on arms transfers and would
reduce substantially its role in this deadly trade.
Third, we are concerned about proposals to absorb the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) into the State
Department. While we do not normally comment on matters of
government reorganization, we are concerned that placing ACDA
within the State Department will reduce the prominence of
critical arms control and disarmament issues at a time when
they are already receiving less attention than they have in
the past. There is an urgent need to implement existing arms
control agreements, to move toward deeper reductions in
[[Page H5518]] nuclear weapons, to stem nuclear
proliferation, and to control conventional weapons, such as
landmines. Maintaining ACDA's independent voice in foreign
policy making is more likely to ensure that this important
arms control agenda receives the attention it needs.
Thank you for considering these various concerns about the
legislation currently before the International Relations
Committee.
Sincerely,
Drew Christiansen,
Director, Office of International Justice & Peace.
____
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, May 8, 1995.
Dear House International Relations Committee Member: The
``Code of Conduct Arms Transfer Act,'' restricts arms exports
to countries that are undemocratic, do not abide by basic
international human rights standard, and are engaged in acts
of armed aggression.
Today--given the new world order--it is in the best
interest of the United States to encourage the development of
stable, democratic, and economically viable allies that
respect the fundamental human rights of its citizens.
While there are current restrictions on exports of U.S.
arms to countries that demonstrate a ``gross and consistent''
pattern of human rights abuses, these restrictions are seldom
enforced. In fiscal year 1994, the State Departments' annual
``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,'' showed that
the U.S. sold weapons to at least four nations that had
significant human rights abuses. These four nations purchased
$6.2 billion in arms--nearly half of the total $12.9 billion
sold. Additionally, $2 billion in U.S. grant money or
subsidized U.S. loans to these nations was used to purchase
arms.
It is time for Congress to become more pro-active in
protecting international human rights. We need to end arms
exports to those nations that fail to respect the dignity and
fundamental well-being of their citizens.
Your vote on May 11 for the Code of Conduct is a vote for
the protection of basic human rights.
Sincerely yours,
Donald M. Payne,
Member of Congress.
____
Project on Demilitarization and Democracy
Washington, DC, May 5, 1995.
The McKinney-Hatfield Code of Conduct on Arms Trade: Restoring the
Congressional Role in the Arms Transfer Process
This is the first major reform of the arms export process
in two decades. Prior to enactment of the Arms Export Control
Act in 1976, there were virtually no restrictions on the
executive branch's arms transfers. Congress, led by Sen.
Hubert Humphrey, enacted the Arms Export Control Act in
response to record transfers of arms by Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger. The Shah of Iran and President Marcos of the
Philippines were among the leading recipients. Today's record
U.S. transfers to undemocratic and unstable governments
similarly threaten our interests in democracy and development
abroad.
The Arms Export Control Act originally gave Congress a
major role in reviewing proposed arms transfers, but the
Supreme Court's decision in the unrelated ``Chadha'' case in
1983 eliminated that role. The AECA gave each House of
Congress the ability to block a proposed transfer by passing
a resolution. The Supreme Court ruled such ``one-House
vetoes'' unconstitutional, declaring that Congress can only
change policy by enacting laws, not by taking such partial
steps as passing one-House resolutions. As a result, for the
past 12 years, Congress could only block a sale by passing a
resolution in both Houses and enacting it over a presidential
veto, all within 30 days. In terms of time alone, this is
nearly impossible. Congress has never enacted such a
resolution, and rarely even takes up a resolution opposing an
arms transfer, because there is no meaningful chance to
succeed.
The Code of Conduct legislation would restore Congress to
its earlier role as an equal partner in arms transfer
decisions, by requiring congressional approval for sales to
countries not meeting the Code's standards. Under the Code
legislation, the President would certify countries for
eligibility each year. The President could request a one-year
waiver for a country not meeting the Code's standards (for
democracy, human rights, aggression, and the U.N. arms trade
register). Both Houses of Congress would have to approve the
waiver, either by enacting a foreign aid bill containing the
waivers, or by enacting a separate law. The Congressional
Research Service has studied the Code of Conduct process, and
declared it constitutional.
Caleb Rossiter,
Director.
____
May 9, 1995.
Dear Member of the House International Relations Committee:
The undersigned arms control, development, religious, human
rights and veterans organizations are writing to voice
support for the ``Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers'' bill
sponsored by Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) and close
to 100 other members. A full committee vote on the Code, as
an amendment to the Foreign Aid bill, is expected this week.
We urge you to vote in favor of this provision.
The Code of Conduct would require the President to make an
annual certification of which countries are eligible, under
four criteria, to receive U.S. weapons. To be eligible to
receive U.S. weaponry a country cannot: grossly abuse human
rights; deny democratic rights; or attack a neighbor or its
own people. Also, countries must participate in the U.N.
Register of Conventional Arms to be eligible. By creating
these criteria weapons will be kept from countries that are
bad risks and, it is hoped, the Code will induce undemocratic
and aggressor nations to improve their current practices.
This bill is neither a ban nor a moratorium on arms sales.
If, for national security reasons, the President wants to
sell weapons to countries that are not certified, a majority
of Congress must vote to approve the arms transfer. Under the
current system, Congress can only vote to stop an arms sale.
Under the Code of Conduct Congress can, after careful
scrutiny, determine which countries are vital to U.S.
security interests and should therefore be eligible to
receive arms. The Code also underscores Congress'
Constitutional power to regulate trade with foreign nations.
History has shown that sometimes American weapons last
longer than U.S. friendships with foreign governments. In
Panama, Somalia and Haiti, U.S. troops faced forces that has
been equipped with American weapons. The Code of Conduct is
an attempt to reduce the likelihood that the men and women of
the armed forces will be affected by this ``boomerang
effect'' of the arms trade. Only by closely examining the
circumstances surrounding a pending arms sale can Congress
hope to minimize the chance of an American soldier being
injured by an American weapon.
Furthermore, in a time of tough budgetary decisions,
continuing to spend billions of dollars each year in foreign
aid to support arms transfers flies in the face of budget
cutting measures. Reducing arms transfers would be a prudent
way to cut federal spending while contributing to our
national defense by keeping advanced weapons out of the hands
of future potential adversaries.
As the world's leading arms supplier, the U.S. must
demonstrate restraint and international leadership regarding
weapons sales to undemocratic nations. The Code of Conduct
provides the President and Congress an opportunity to take
the first step to reduce the potential for conflict and to
prevent harm being done to lives and livelihoods. We urge you
to contact Representative McKinney's office to be listed as a
co-sponsor of the Code and to vote in favor of this amendment
when it comes before the full committee later this week.
Sincerely,
John Isaacs, President, Council For a Livable World;
Howard Hallman, Director, Methodists United for Peace
With Justice; Peter J. Davies, U.S. Representative,
Saferworld; Steve Goose, Program Director-Arms Project,
Human Rights Watch; Deborah Walden, Director of Policy
and Programs, Women's Action For New Directions; Edith
Villastrigo, National Legislative Director, Women
Strike for Peace; Tim McElwee, Director, Church of the
Brethren; John B. Anderson, President, World Federalist
Association; Robin Caiola, Co-Director, 20/20 Vision;
James Matlack, Director-Washington Office, American
Friends Service Committee; Lora Lumpe, Director-Arms
Sales Monitoring Project, Federation of American
Scientists; Joe Volk, Executive Secretary, Friends
Committee on National Legislation; Caleb Rossiter,
Director, Project on Demilitarization and Democracy;
Monica Green, Executive Director, Peace Action; Mark B.
Brown, Acting Director-Lutheran Office for Governmental
Affairs, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America; Vice
Admiral John Shanahan, Director, Center for Defense
Information; Maurice Paprin, President, Fund for New
Priorities in America; Darryl Fagin, Legislative
Director, Americans for Democratic Action; Jerry
Genesio, Chairman/Executive Director, Veterans for
Peace; Greg Bischak, Executive Director, National
Commission for Economic Conversion and Disarmament.
____
May 8, 1995.
Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Member: The officers, directors and members of
Veterans for Peace urge you to support passage of the
McKinney-Hatfield Code of Conduct on Arms Trade (H.R. 772).
We understand the bill may be offered as an amendment to the
Foreign Aid Authorization bill later this week.
Veterans for Peace (VFP) is a national membership
organization of U.S. military veterans, including decorated
veterans of both World Wars, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and
many other conflicts and skirmishes. Our members include
retired officers and enlisted men, some of whom served twenty
or more years. Many are graduates of military academies, a
number are former POWs. One, a pilot during the Vietnam War,
languished in the Hanoi Hilton for eight years. Two are
recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor, dozens
received Silver and Bronze Stars for valor, and hundreds were
awarded the Purple Heart for combat [[Page H5519]] wounds.
The work of VFP is primarily educational: to raise awareness
of the great costs of preparing for war and of war itself in
comparison to the alternatives of international behavior.
The Code of Conduct legislation should have universal
support, if for no other reason than the increasing
phenomenon of U.S.-made arms returning to threaten our own
U.S. forces. There are other reasons to support the bill. For
example, it would substantially help:
Keep arms from dictators and countries using weapons in
aggression against neighbors or even their own people;
Restore needed Congressional power and responsibility in
the area of arms trade and control;
Protect the U.S. jobs currently being destroyed by the
application of so-called ``offset'' agreements, by which
defense contractors promote foreign goods in order to secure
arms sales.
Thank you for your consideration of these important issues,
and, hopefully, for your support of H.R. 772.
Sincerely yours,
Jerry Genesio
Chairman and Executive Director
(USMC/1956-62).
____
Center for Defense Information,
May 8, 1995.
The McKinney-Hatfield Code of Conduct on Arms Trade: Ensuring the
Safety of U.S. Military Forces
The Clinton Administration's recent arms sales policy
states that the impact on defense jobs must be taken into
account when exports are considered. One wishes that the same
consideration was extended to the impact on the lives and
wellbeing of American service personnel. The current laissez-
faire status quo in the international arms trade, where
increasingly any conventional weapons sale is deemed
permissible as long as it purports to make a profit for its
manufacturer, is creating a self-generated danger--the
possibility that our service men and women will someday be
fighting nations or groups who obtained U.S. weapons and
technology.
Many of our former current and arms customers--Panama,
Iran, Iraq, Israel, numerous Arab countries, Taiwan, South
Korea, Pakistan, and India are in highly volatile parts of
the world or have undemocratic governments. Thus our arms and
technology sales potentially create--as in the Gulf--the very
threat our own forces may someday confront. Furthermore, the
threat we are building by our arms sales also justified the
continued inflated military spending for even newer equipment
to counter the items we have sold others.
Even the Pentagon now officially acknowledges that it faces
the prospect of American weapons being used against U.S.
military personnel. In the latest Annual Report of the
Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress Secretary
William Perry writes, ``In general, threats encountered in
MRCs [Major Regional Conflicts] would be standing armies of
foreign powers, armed with mixes of old and modern weapons
systems. . . Thus, U.S. forces must be prepared to face a
wide variety of systems, including some previously produced
in the United States.'' [author's emphasis, p. 170]
A comparison of the Pentagon's own data on deliveries of
weapons through the U.S. FMS and commercial sales programs
over the past decade with a list of fifty significant wars
that were under way during 1993-94 indicates that U.S.
weapons exports have played a major role in fueling the
ethnic and territorial conflicts that have become the primary
post-war security challenge as indicated by the Pentagon's
own Bottom-Up Review and National Military Strategy. These
are the same types of conflicts U.S. forces are most likely
to be deployed to in the future.
Parties to 45 current conflicts have taken delivery of over
$42 billion worth of US weapons in the past decade.
Out of the fifty significant ethnic and territorial
conflicts going on during 1993-94, 90% (45 out of 50) of them
involved one or more parties that had received some US
weapons or military technology in the period leading up to
the conflict.
In more than half of the fifty current conflicts (26 out of
the 50), the United States has been a significant arms
supplier, accounting for at least 5% of the weapons delivered
to one party to the dispute over a five year period.
Areas where U.S. weapons are most likely to be utilized in
current or future conflicts include southern Europe; the
Middle East and North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; Southwest
and Southeast Asia; and Central and Latin America.
This data raises serious questions about the claim that US
weapons are only used for defensive purposes. As a weapons
supplier to fully 90% of the areas where wars are now going
on and a major supplier to more than one-third of these
areas, it is clear that the US is bolstering the warfighting
capabilities of a substantial number of the parties to the
world's current conflicts. It does not take a stroke of
genius to realize that these capabilities can just as easily
be used against U.S. soldiers, sailors, and airmen. It is a
sad irony that the current U.S. arms trade policy confirms
the words of cartoonist Walt Kelly's character Pogo when he
said, ``We have met the enemy and he is us.''
____
Congress of the United States,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, May 8, 1995.
Dear Colleague: The House International Relations Committee
will mark up HR 1561, the Foreign Aid and Reorganization Bill
this week. I will offer HR 772, the Code of Conduct Arms
Transfer Act as an amendment to Title 31 of Division C. The
``Code'' now has 99 cosponsors in the House and would provide
guidelines for arms exports--prohibiting transfers to
governments that are undemocratic, violate human rights, or
are engaged in acts of armed aggression.
The ``Code'' would not ban all arms sales. Sales and
transfers would continue in the national interest of the
United States and to those nations which meet the ``Code's
criteria.'' Today's exports could be tomorrow's nightmare for
American forces. In the last four US deployments--Panama,
Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti--American troops faced armies
strengthened by US materiel and technology. In 1993, of the
14.8 billion in US arms sales, 90 percent were purchased by
nations that do not meet the Code's guidelines.
Americans throughout the nation support the ``Code''--with
more than 227 citizen's organizations endorsing its
principles and 96 percent of Americans demanding an end to
arms sales to dictators.
Let's stop the ``Boomerang effect.'' Vote for the ``Code of
Conduct on May 11!''
Please contact Robin Sanders at 51605 with questions or
concerns.
Sincerely,
Cynthia McKinney,
Member of Congress.
____
Friends Committee on
National Legislation,
May 10, 1995.
House International Relations Committee,
U.S. House of Representatives Washington, DC
Dear Representative: Does the United States need a Code of
Conduct on Arms Trade? Who answers Yes to that question?
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation; Amnesty
International; Human Rights Watch; Lutheran Office for
Governmental Affairs; Maryknoll Justice & Peace Office;
Federation of American Scientists; Bread for the World;
Committee for National Security.
Institute for Food & Development (Food First); United
Methodist Church, General Board of Church & Society, Peace
with Justice Program; American Baptist Churches, USA; Center
for Defense Information; Physicians for Social
Responsibility.
More than 250 other national and regional organizations
have endorsed the principles for a Code of Conduct on Arms
trade.
Humanitarisn aid, human rights, arms control, economic
development, women's religious, and veterans' agendas, all
would benefit from a Code of Conduct on Arms Trade. That is
why the Code is popular with a growing grassroots movement
for nonproliferation of conventional weapons.
The Friends Committee on National Legislation urges you to
vote for the Code of Conduct on Arms Trade when the House
International Relations Committee considers the amendment by
Representative McKinney on the Foreign Aid Authorization
bill.
Sincerely,
Joe Volk.
____
British American Security
Information Council.
To: Members of the House International Relations Committee.
From: Bronwyn Brady and Susannah Dyer, BASIC.
Re: Arms Transfer Amendment to Foreign Aid Bill.
Date: 10 May 1995.
It has come to our attention that the Committee is
scheduled to vote on the Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers as
an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill. Your consideration of
this legislation coincides with a parallel initiative being
pursued in the European Union.
Congress now has the opportunity to join its partners in
the European Union as they seek to implement similar
controls. According to the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, Europe and the United States together sell over 90%
of the world's weapons. Focusing narrowly on maintaining
market share, no country has been willing to take unilateral
steps toward control, fearing it will lose export markets to
competitors. Therefore, it is vital that as the world's
leading suppliers, the EU and the United States work together
to implement restraint. Cooperation will prevent either US or
European companies from undercutting one another in pursuit
of sales.
Tomorrow in Brussels, the European Code of Conduct will be
launched, calling on the EU to adopt stricter controls on
weapons exports. This Code builds on the eight existing
criteria on arms exports already agreed by member states in
1991-92. These criteria stress that weapons exports should
take into consideration: the purchasing country's human
rights record; the internal and regional stability of
recipient states; and the effects of weapons purchases on the
recipient country's economy.
A number of members of the European Parliament have
declared their support for this initiative, highlighting the
need for a coherent and controlled approach to European
weapons exports, and encouraging the Parliament to press for
the Code. In addition, [[Page H5520]] the proposed Code has
already been endorsed by almost 50 NGOs across Europe,
including Save the Children and Medico International. In the
lead-up to the review of the Maastricht Treaty in 1996, it is
critical that an effective EU arms export control regime be
an integral part of an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.
In addition to the US and European Code of Conduct
Initiatives, similar measures have also been pursued in other
international fora. In November 1994, a proposal was tabled
at the United Nations, calling for a Code of Conduct for
international conventional arms transfers with a view to
promoting restraint. These efforts will continue in both
working groups and the General Assembly. In addition, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
agreed a series of ``Principles Governing Conventional Arms
Transfers'' in December 1993, requiring member states to
consider human rights, and reiterating ``their strong belief
that excessive and destabilizing arms build-ups pose a threat
to national, regional, and international peace and
security''. It is clear that there is growing international
consensus regarding the urgent need to restrain the
international weapons trade.
In its position as the world's leading exporter of
weaponry, the United States has a special responsibility to
provide a global leadership in the area of restraint. Passage
of the Code will encourage the United States to work in
concert with its allies to control the spread of weapons to
rogue regimes and regions of conflict. This will prevent
scenarios such as the one which unfolded in the Gulf War,
where US troops faced weapons supplied to Iraq by both the
United States and its European allies.
As your European counterparts begin developing a harmonized
EU arms export policy, we urge you to support the Code of
Conduct amendment and demonstrate US leadership in promoting
unified international restraint of the global weapons trade.
Please feel free to contact our office in London or
Washington for further details on the European initiatives
described above.
____
Unitarian Universalist
Association of Congregations,
Washington, May 10, 1995.
Dear Representative: Unitarian Universalist Association of
Congregations, strongly supports the Code of Conduct on Arms
Transfers bill introduced by Rep. Cynthia McKinney and
Senator Mark Hatfield that would place restrictions on the
sale and transfer of conventional weapons by the United
States to dictators.
We think that the present U.S. arms sales policy which
permits the sale of arms to governments which abuse
internationally recognized human rights; engage in aggression
against their own people or other nations; and do not
participate in international efforts to control arms is not
in our national interest, fuels regional and local conflicts
and aids and abets undemocratic governments.
The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA) gave Congress
the power to review proposed U.S. arms exports using a human
rights standard. Unfortunately, the AECA has not stopped a
single arms transfer since it became law. The Supreme Court
in 1983 found the Congressional mechanism whereby either
House could block such sales to be unconstitutional. The
McKinney-Hatfield Code of Conduct bill would return to
Congress a mechanism for participating in the decision making
process on U.S. arms transfers.
We respectfully urge you to support the McKinney measure
when it comes before the Committee. The Code of Conduct on
Arms Transfers has gained more support among the Unitarian
Universalist grassroots than any other legislation we have
worked on.
The time has come for charting a new U.S. arms sales policy
that puts our country on the high ground and sets an example
for the international community to match.
Sincerely,
Robert Z. Alpern,
Director.
Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
(Ms. WOOLSEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the code of
conduct amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Georgia, and I would
like to commend her for her tireless work on this important issue.
As written, our current arms transfer policy is reckless and
dangerous. Over the past decade, we have sent weapons to countries who
have turned around and used them against our sons and daughters in the
Armed Forces. We have provided ammunition for governments who oppress
their people and commit acts of aggression against the international
community. U.S. arms transfer policy must be more responsible.
In the debate over military spending and foreign policy, we continue
to hear that ``the cold war is over, but the world is still a dangerous
place.'' Mr. Chairman, our current arms transfer policy is making the
world an even more dangerous place. I thought we fought the cold war in
order to make the world safe for democracy and human rights, not
dangerous for U.S. soldiers and innocent citizens worldwide.
Opponents of this measure argue that the United States should not
restrict itself to selling arms only to countries who promote democracy
and protect human rights. They suggest that we should be allowed to
sell weapons to countries which may not fit these categories, but who
are friendly to the United States.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the House, Manuel Noriega used to be
friendly. Iraq used to be friendly. Why do we refuse to learn that even
the Devil can be friendly if he wants to make a deal?
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the McKinney amendment
and reject the current reckless arms transfer policy.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. WOOLSEY. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to add my support for what the
gentlewoman said for the McKinney amendment. This is a restrained and
sensible set of guidelines which reinvolve the Congress in the way that
it used to be in the process of arms transfers before the Supreme Court
decision knocked that process out and made us essentially irrelevant.
This provides waiver authority. There may be times when a country
that is bad on human rights or a country that is not democratic should
get some of our assistance for other, larger kinds of considerations.
{time} 1245
There is waiver authority here. Come to Congress, let us go through
that process. I think it is a sensible, restrained approach to try and
deal with the causes of regional instability in so much of the world
and the fueling of an arms race.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to express my support for the amendment
offered by my colleague, the gentlewoman from Georgia, [Ms. McKinney].
This amendment establishes a code of conduct for recipients of U.S.
military exports and training. It gives the President the authority to
decide which countries meet the four responsible criteria: promote
democracy, protect human rights, not engaged in acts of aggression, and
participants in the U.N. arms trade register. Those countries which do
not meet the criteria would require a waiver agreed to by both the
President and the Congress.
As we apply conditions on our military aid to other countries, so
should we apply conditions to our weapons exports. It is outrageous
that in our last four overseas United States engagements--Panama, Iraq,
Somalia, and Haiti--our troops were threatened by weaponry that we sold
to various dictators who were once our friends, and later our enemies.
As the only superpower in the world, it is imperative that the United
States set the standard for responsible leadership. Congresswoman
McKinney's amendment would ensure our moral leadership by prohibiting
the sale of arms to those countries that are undemocratic, violate
human rights, or
are engaged in acts of armed aggression.
Arms transfers to undemocratic countries which past administrations
have courted for a variety of reasons, have often come to haunt us. We
have spent precious human and financial resources cleaning up after
conflicts which were fueled by our own arms transfers. Our own children
have been endangered by the very same weaponry that we sold because of
short-term foreign policy interests. This legislation will protect our
children in the future by creating a presumption against such
transfers, but does establish a thorough, responsible review process
for those sales that are in our best interest.
Mr. Chairman, I ask the Members to support the McKinney amendment.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I find myself in a kind of an uncomfortable position
because I do not particularly like some of the ways that the President
has conducted [[Page H5521]] foreign policy, and I did not particularly
like the invasion of Haiti or the way he conducted our operations in
Somalia and lost a bunch of American lives, but here is one case where
I do agree with the President. The President has to have some leverage
and be able to conduct foreign policy, and many times his ability to
negotiate with countries that are buying U.S. arms is one way that he
can get the job done.
So the President of the United States, Mr. Clinton, is against this
particular amendment. In this particular case, I concur with him
because I think it hamstrings him in one respect, as far as his ability
to conduct foreign policy is concerned.
But, in addition to that, there is another economic issue that needs
to be taken into consideration. If anybody believes that a country that
wants to buy weaponry is going to not buy it simply because they cannot
buy them from the United States, they are just barking up the wrong
tree. France sells weapons, Great Britain sells weapons, a number of
countries sell sophisticated weaponry. If they do not buy them from the
United States of America, then certainly they are going to buy them
from some place else.
It will have an adverse economic impact on many segments of our
society. If you go out to California and take a look at the aircraft
industry, it is in a depressed state. It is starting to come out of it
now because of the commercial sales. The fact of the matter is if you
put these kinds of constraints on the sales of these kinds of
materials, you are going to have an impact on industry in this country,
and there are going to be a lot of people lose their jobs and those
jobs will go overseas to manufacturers of this equipment in foreign
countries.
Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the
sentiments that the gentleman from Indiana is showing in terms building
up our own economic base here at home. It is a legitimate concern.
This amendment does not say that we cannot sell arms to Third World
countries, nor does it say we cannot sell arms to other countries
throughout the world. All it says is that when there are human rights
abuses, when there are gross inequities in terms of how the country
that is trying to purchase arms treats its neighbors, is overly
aggressive in those issues, in terms of spending far too much money on
its own arms industry rather than looking out after its own people,
that the United States ought to take those issues into account.
It gives the President the flexibility of overruling these on a
national security basis, and in any given year. So I think it does
provide the kind of flexibility that is necessary to address the
concerns the gentleman from Indiana has articulated, but it does put us
into the immoral position that we are currently in where we are actual
selling arms to our neighbors that end up using those arms, or to our
friends that end up using those arms against us when we get into
conflict.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I thank the gentleman for his contribution. I
disagree simply because the President of the United States has the
ability right now to put pressure on those countries by not allowing
arms sales to them. As a matter of act, the President has exercised
that authority already in a number of countries. If you followed what
has been going on in the past several years, you will find there are a
number of countries that even purchased equipment from the United
States and the President has not allowed those purchases to go forward.
So he does have some latitude. It is a Democrat President. He is
asking for this authority to be maintained. Whether it is a Republican
or Democrat, I would support it.
The fact of the matter is there is an inconsistency as far as our
foreign policy is concerned. There are many pieces of legislation which
I have sponsored, regarding human rights abuses in India, for instance,
that have not passed this House because the minority now, then the
majority, would not support them.
So I find it kind of interesting that here is the President of the
United States wanting to protect his ability to conduct foreign policy
and, because of human rights issues, his party is trying to stop it,
while at other times in our history when we were fighting for human
rights abuses to be removed on other pieces of legislation, we could
not get that support.
Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. If the gentleman would yield further,
maybe this kind of legislation would actually improve and get the kind
of result that you were looking for in terms of your amendment with
regard to Pakistan.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Not Pakistan. India.
Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. With regard to India in times past. The
fact of the matter is, if we had a uniform policy instead of the
hodgepodge policy that we have today, I think we would get the moral
leadership of the rest of the world to support us, as we have seen
today in the European Parliament, which is taking up legislation very
similar to this.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I appreciate the gentleman's contribution. In
a perfect world we might
have a consistent foreign policy worldwide. But as the gentleman well
knows, we do not have a perfect world; we have an inconsistency in
foreign policy. That is why the President, whether Republican or
Democrat, has to have latitude in conducting that foreign policy that
includes the ability to stop arms sales or allow those arms sales to go
forward.
I am very sympathetic to the human rights abuses issue being raised
here.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] has
expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Burton of Indiana was allowed to proceed
for 1 additional minute.)
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I am very sympathetic to the human rights
issue being raised here. This is a very, very complex world. It is a
dangerous world. Even though the so-called cold war is over, we still
have to have a foreign policy that will allow us to be able to deal
with friends to make sure that they have the ability to defend
themselves.
I might add one more time, if we do not sell them these weapons, we
will make sure that they will buy them someplace else. Let us allow
that the President of the United States will be able to make these
determinations where necessary and at the same time protect American
jobs by not letting them go overseas.
Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. If the gentleman will yield further,
the fact is that I have worked very closely with Members of the
Republican side in the Committee on Banking and Financial Services to
structure amendments that are very similar to this dealing with funding
for the World Bank and the IMF, which have received bipartisan support.
The question is whether or not Members of this body want to provide
this authority in the Presidency or whether or not we want to establish
this as a national policy for this country.
We have gotten bipartisan support for such a policy in times past,
and I would hope we would gain support on the Republican side for this
well-thought-through amendment that the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms.
McKinney] is offering.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] has
again expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Burton of Indiana was allowed to proceed
for 30 additional seconds.)
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I thank the gentleman for his contribution.
Let me just end up by saying that we have asked time and time again
that there be a stronger voice by the Congress in the conducting of
foreign policy, and the Administration has found that they do not want
that to be accomplished. They wanted to keep that power in the
executive branch, and I understand that. And we have not been
successful in making those changes.
In this particular case, I think the President's arguments are well
founded, and I, as a Republican, find myself once again in a difficult
position, but I am supporting the President in this particular case.
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
[[Page H5522]]
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from
California.
Mr. MILLER of California. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
I rise in strong support of this amendment. I think it is very
important that we consider it. I would hope we would pass it.
The gentleman is right. It is not a perfect world, but we have got to
strive to make it a better world.
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the
amendment offered by my colleague, the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms.
McKinney].
The United States has long been an arms merchant to the world, Mr.
Chairman, but this amendment is not about the quantity of arms sales.
This amendment is about who we sell arms to and who makes these
decisions.
At the present time, except in rare circumstances, the executive
branch alone decides what countries are eligible to receive weapons.
This process has resulted in arms transfers to undemocratic countries
that use our arms to maintain their own control and to oppress their
own people, and in recent United States military operations overseas,
in Panama, Iraq, and Somalia, our troops had to fight against hostiles
armed with the very weapons we previously sold to them.
We sold $200 million in weapons to Somalia. We spent $2 billion
fighting soldiers armed with these weapons, many times at the
destruction of the U.S. soldiers and citizens.
This amendment brings Congress into the arms sales process without
tying the hands of the President. This amendment sets reasonable
criteria that have to be met before arms can be transferred, including
promoting democracy, protecting human rights, participating in the U.N.
arms trade register, and refraining from aggression. A waiver is
provided for countries that do not meet this criteria if the national
security requires.
Mr. Chairman, the McKinney amendment is a very sound amendment. It is
reasonable and responsible reform. It restores the balance of power in
arms sales between the legislative and the executive branches. It helps
secure responsible decisions in this important policy area.
Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. McKinney]
for bringing forth this wonderful amendment, and I strongly urge its
passage.
Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
Let me commend the sponsor of the code of conduct amendment, and let
me try to be as brief as possible, Mr. Chairman.
I rise in support of this amendment. I think that we cannot divorce
American ideals from American foreign policy, and in the area of arms
sales, I do not think we would want our contribution and our legacy to
the world to be that we have sold arms to everyone and allowed for the
continuation of the practice of war as almost a permanent vocation in
this world.
So I would hope that we would support the McKinney amendment and the
companion effort in the Senate because I think it moves us in the right
direction, and even though it may be a debatable matter in some
people's minds, I think that for all of us, if we want to be on the
right side of history on this issue, that we should, in the final
analysis, find ourselves voting favorably for the McKinney amendment.
Mr. SALMON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment is offered in good faith. But it is
slightly misnamed. This amendment is not about human rights, and this
amendment is not about foreign policy. This amendment instead is about
a philosophical difference that exists within the Congress.
Some in this body simply believe that all arms sales to our allies
are wrong in all cases. They believe that helping our allies defend
themselves and helping them defend our vital interests amounts to
exporting violence.
{time} 1300
I disagree. Often selling arms to our allies may mean we do not have
to send U.S. troops, and that makes sense for Americans.
Moreover, responsible arms sales have for many years played an
important role in our Nation's foreign policy.
Obviously, opponents of arms sales to our allies could not hope to
enact a complete ban on the practice, so they have come up with this
lesser amendment.
But we should not artificially restrict our arms sales to our allies,
or hold them hostage to interpretations of vague definitions contained
in this amendment.
I welcome continued debate on whether we should ban all arms sales to
other nations. But this back door effort at beginning such a ban today,
should be defeated.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Mica].
Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman and my colleague, I just want to make a couple
of points and rise in opposition to the amendment that has been offered
here this afternoon.
First of all, this does address the human rights violation question,
and none of us favor any type of human rights violations anywhere in
the world or by any of our allies, but the matter of fact is that this
amendment is not a realistic amendment, and it is not a needed
amendment. I say to my colleagues: First of all, if you want to look at
human rights violations, just refer to--and I invite all my colleagues
to do this, and other folks that are listening--read the Amnesty
International human rights violation reports. You find actually one of
the countries that is cited is the United States. Not only is the
United States cited, but you also have Israel, Egypt, Turkey, and, if
this amendment passed, I think you really would jeopardize the status
of peace efforts in the Middle East if this was properly applied
according to the language in the amendment, and again I think it serves
no purpose. We must work against human rights violations wherever they
occur, and human rights violations are not condoned by this Congress.
Let me also point out that a major flaw in this amendment is the
President already has the authority. Maybe the other side of the aisle
or the sponsor does not trust the President of the United States, but
in fact under current law the President of the United States is
required to even notify Congress before there is an arms sale in the
appropriate committee of Congress.
So first of all, it is not a realistic amendment, and it is not an
amendment that recognizes that there are human rights violations,
whether it is in the United States or with our allies that are sometime
recipients of these arms; and, second, the amendment has no purpose
because the President really already has the authority, and the
Congress is, in fact, notified when there are these arms sales pending.
So it is not a needed amendment, and it is not a useful amendment, and
I urge its defeat.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of this amendment authored by the
gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. McKinney].
This amendment is about the new world order. The United States has
emerged as the undisputed political, economic, and military leader of
the world.
With the end of the cold war, the old ways of doing international
business--especially military business--are no longer adequate. This is
a time to re-evaluate. It is a time for America to live up to the
promise of its creed--across our borders as well as within them.
This Nation must not support dictators. It must stand strongly
against human rights abuses. We have the capacity--through diplomatic
pressure, business opportunity, and military arms relationships--to
make the world safer for its citizens. The United States should
exercise that power. This, Mr. Chairman, is what the McKinney amendment
is all about.
We only need to look at the recent past to find examples of good
intentions gone bad in the U.S. arms sales.
Many people have heard about the recent, gross violations of human
rights in Turkey. Turkey happens to be one of the largest recipients of
United States military aid. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Lawrence Korb testified yesterday that Turkey's rulers
[[Page H5523]] have used United States-supplied F-16's, Black Hawk
helicopters and M-60 tanks against its own Kurdish population.
The United States also militarily supplies human rights abusers in
Indonesia and Malaysia. Unfortunately, we are considering more aid to
the Government of Indonesia--despite widely reported human rights
abuses by the Indonesian military against East Timor.
In the not quite so recent past, this country felt forced to stop a
military exercise by Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein. We had a major war--
risking the lives of thousands of soldiers--against Iraq, a country
which had always been a human rights abuser, and which had been the
recipient of U.S. aid, including military aid.
Too many times in this country's history, we have been short-sighted
policy in our arms export policy. Too many times, short-term military
alliances have led to long-term human rights disasters, or worse.
The McKinney amendment does not preclude military assistance to any
country. If the President and Congress agree that an arms sale is in
the national security interest, that sale would be allowed.
However, the McKinney amendment would establish basic, humane, and
appropriate standards for the conduct of U.S. military export policy.
These standards are common sense standards such as requiring our
military exports to go to countries which hold free and fair elections;
such as being sure our sales go to countries which do not engage in
gross violations of human rights, and making sure that our arms exports
do not go to countries which engage in illegal acts of armed
aggression.
If there was ever a time when this country could justify working with
human rights abusers to further some longer-term strategic objective,
that time is surely past. This country, without any serious military
threat to our security, now must face its responsibility, and act as
the world's moral leader. The McKinney amendment would apply a moral
test to U.S. foreign policy.
Let us assert our role as a moral leader in the world. Support the
McKinney amendment.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the McKinney
amendment. I agree with some of her concerns, but not the solutions
embodied in the amendment.
Certainly, Mr. Chairman, during the cold war the two superpowers did
transfer billions of dollars of weapons to the developing world every
year as a part of their strategic competition. With the dissolution of
the former Soviet Union and excess conventional military equipment
flooding global markets, I believe it is essential to find a way to
stop the spiral of militarization. An overarmed developing world not
only has a terrible human cost, it is also contrary to American
interests in fostering democracy, building political stability, and
enhancing growing global economy, and I think those are some of the
gentlewoman's concerns, and I certainly agree with them.
In my mind the solution to the problem of militarization in arms
transfer must be a multilateral one. It would do us, nor the developing
world, any good if we reduce exports only to find the gap filled by
other suppliers. Yet it is also clear that multi-lateral solutions
require U.S. leadership both by the President and by the Congress.
Congress has already begun to address the need for arms restraint,
enacting several measures which I support, including, No. 1,
encouraging the President to establish a multilateral arms restraint
regime; No. 2, imposing a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel
land mines and calling on the administration to negotiate a worldwide
ban on their deployment; and, No. 3, calling on the administration to
oppose multilateral lending to countries who refuse to reduce military
spending in concert with their neighbors.
That brings me to the amendment at hand.
Mr. Chairman, I am in strong agreement with the sentiments, as I
said, which were expressed in the amendment which express the view that
we should not sell arms to countries that are democratic, that do not
respect human rights, and that do not promote peace and stability.
Where I have problems with this amendment is that it mandates, at least
as I read it, that human rights, democracy, and participation of the
U.N. arms registry of conventional arms be the only criteria that
should govern our arms transfers. To say that these criteria should be
paramount in evaluating a particular transfer is, I think, going too
far. This is too restrictive in my view. Arms transfers serve important
foreign policy and national security objectives. That can contribute to
regional stability and help deter aggression. They can even foster
interoperability should U.S. Assistance ever be required as in the
Desert Storm operation.
Human rights and the democratic make up of recipient governments
ought to be among the criteria in making a final decision on a proposed
transfer. In some cases they may be the primary criterion, but not in
all cases. The President must be able to weigh all relevant criteria to
reach sensible, sound decisions on the merit of each proposed transfer.
Moreover, the amendment would require the President to certify
annually those nations that qualify for arms transfer according to
these criteria. Transfer to other countries could only be made if the
President certifies to Congress that such a transfer is in the national
security interests of the United States and the Congress enacts a law
approving such an exception or if the President determines that an
emergency exists under which it is vital to the interests of the United
States to provide the transfer. If the President cannot meet this very
high standard, quote, that an emergency exists, end of
quote, then this amendment would force the Congress to enact a
resolution of approval for arms sale. This, of course, turns the
current system of congressional review of arms transfer on its head, a
system that I, for one, do not think to be broken.
Now, I do believe the author of this amendment has made a very
serious effort to modify the language to address concerns of limiting
Presidential flexibility by inserting new language under which
countries could receive arms if they were violating the criteria in the
bill if the President determines that an emergency exists, so there is
that flexibility for the President. I would only point out this is a
very high standard and one that I think cannot be met, at least not in
very many instances. The President's room to maneuver is largely
circumscribed, so in my view the modification does not fix one of the
fundamental flaws of the amendment.
I want to correct the conclusion here that I think supporters of the
amendment may be making. The Congress, contrary to what the
supporters----
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter]
has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Bereuter was allowed to proceed for 3
additional minutes.)
Mr. BEREUTER. The Congress, contrary to what the supporters of the
amendment are seeming to be saying, currently has a very important role
in determining which sales are made. In many ways, tangible or not so
tangible, the Congress influences the sales about which the
administration ends up notifying the Hill. There is an elaborate
consultation procedure which we will not find in the formal statutory
law whereby the administration vets possible sales with the appropriate
committees. Members and staff briefings are convened on proposed sales
that are controversial, and, contrary to what some may think, the
administration backs off and drops proposed sales, not just this
administration, but that has been the trend and the practice.
So, it is incorrect, I think, to argue that we have no role under the
current process. The administration and the Congress are in constant
dialogue about arms transfers which are conducted in accordance with
the Arms Export Control Act. The Congress significantly influences arms
transfers in direct and practical ways through the years beginning with
consultation on the Javits report. Critics of arms transfer point to
the fact that Congress [[Page H5524]] has never enacted a resolution of
disapproval on arms sales. That is not a correct measure. In fact,
congressional passage of such a resolution would represent a breakdown
of the existing process, not a measure of its success. The fact that we
have not passed a resolution then is evidence that in fact the
consultation process is working.
{time} 1315
Now, I have gone on at length here because I think this is a serious
amendment with much merit. But the author of this amendment is
committed to the issue, and I commend her. But for the reasons I
stated, I cannot support it in its current form, and I would urge a
``no'' vote for all of my colleagues.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge a ``no'' vote.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number
of words.
Mr. Chairman, will wonders never cease, where my colleague from
Georgia and I are standing together on an issue in this body?
Let me note that the cold war is over. I would not have supported
this amendment if it had been 10 years ago. I believe that now is the
time for us as a Nation to seriously consider what our policies are
around the world in a different light than what we did 10 years ago
during the cold war.
This amendment puts Congress squarely in the decisionmaking process.
My good friend, the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], just
suggested there is a process that is taking place right now, but it is
just not codified. It is not set down solid in legislation.
Well, I believe that now that the cold war is over we can afford to
take this decisionmaking process about what kind of countries that we
will be dealing with, especially arming to the teeth, what kind of
countries we will be selling our sophisticated weaponry to, is a
decision in which the Congress can play a legitimate and verifiable
role, and that we can be held accountable to our own people for the
moral basis of the decisions that are being made by our Government in
this area.
When the cold war was on, we left these decisions up to the President
of the United States, and I supported that, because we were up against
an enemy that wanted to destroy our country. I was, as many of you
know, a member of President Reagan's staff for 7 years. I felt it
appropriate that the President had the right to counter Soviet moves
that were aimed at putting us in a vulnerable situation to a military
threat, without necessarily having to come to Congress and have the
issue debated on for weeks.
We are not in that situation today. In fact, during the cold war,
human rights were secondary in many of the cases in our dealings with
foreign countries. In many cases, if we were not dealing with such a
hostile and horrible enemy as the communists, we should have been
ashamed of ourselves in dealing with the tyrants we were dealing with.
But just like in the Second World War when we allied ourselves with
Stalin, we allied ourselves in the cold war against the communists with
some unsavory characters.
That is no longer the case. The cold war is over,
and today human rights should play a more important role in our
decisionmaking process than it did when we were under attack. If a
country is crucial to our national security, even besides the fact we
are not in the cold war, this amendment provides us the ability to say
well, you may not be up to our democratic standards, and indeed we want
you to be more democratic and respect human rights, but we will put you
on an exception list. You are acceptable because you are crucial to the
national security interests of the United States.
I would imagine we might debate countries like Saudi Arabia, who I
believe is crucial to the security of the United States, and other
kingdoms where people in those countries are more inclined toward
having a kingdom than a democracy. That would be a legitimate decision
we could make. I have no doubt this Congress is capable to working with
the President to determine which nondemocratic countries are crucial to
our national security.
This gives the President in fact leverage even in those countries to
secure more human rights for their people, when now the President
cannot just say well, the Congress is forcing me and thus have a dialog
with these countries.
Now, I may, as I say, disagree with the proponents of this amendment
on many issues in terms of what countries we are dealing with, but the
principle is sound. Let me say this in terms of the practicality. When
Ronald Reagan became President of the United States, we decided we were
no longer going to be just anti-Communist and support anti-Communist
regimes. I believe that was the turning point in the cold war.
When Ronald Reagan made human rights and democracy the issue against
the Communists, when he turned away from just supporting dictators who
are anti-Communist but instead went to the people of then the Soviet
Union and other countries under Communist domination and said we in the
West do believe in democracy and we are willing to support those people
who are struggling for freedom, and we established the National
Endowment for Democracy, that is when the cold war turned around.
In the long run, that proved the downfall of communism. It was the
practical thing to do. In the short run, it gave us some problems,
because there were some anti-Communist dictatorships which basically
were on our side. This too will be practical if we have guts enough to
stand for our principles.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr.
Rohrabacher] has expired.
(On request of Mr. Burton of Indiana and by unanimous consent, Mr.
Rohrabacher was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman made one salient
point in his comments. He said during the Reagan administration, in
which he served, that the felt the President should have this latitude,
because of the critical time problems that the President should not
have to mess around with Congress for 3 or 4 weeks when he might have
to make a quick decision.
What makes the gentleman think that will not happen at some point in
the future with some future President?
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, the cold war is
over. The fact is that today we should not be operating under the same
rules as when our country was targeted by a very powerful enemy that
meant to destroy us. We now can afford to bring the moral questions
into play, and we should, the human rights questions, the democracy
questions. This is what America can stand for, and if we do, we will
have the allegiance of young people around the world, rather than the
fear of those young people of their own regimes that might be armed by
our people. That is the way America should be. That is the strength.
Abraham Lincoln said, ``Right makes might.''
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the gentlewoman from
Georgia's amendment to H.R. 1561, the McKinney Arms Code of Conduct.
The Arms Code of Conduct is a rational approach. It implements a
coherent and comprehensive arms control policy. This legislation would
prohibit U.S. military assistance and arms transfers to foreign
governments, unless the President certifies that the foreign government
adheres to a national code of conduct.
In order to be eligible for military assistance, the gentlewoman's
amendment specifically requires that the foreign government head be
elected through a fair and free elections process; that the country
respect human rights and not be engaged in any aggression which
violates international law; and must fully participate in the U.N.
Register of Conventional Arms.
The United States is the sole superpower in the world and the world's
undisputed leader in arms exports. Today, U.S. firms dominate more than
70 percent of the international arms sale market, up from 57 percent in
1991. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's 1993-
94 report, World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, the United States sold $10.3
[[Page H5525]] billion in arms exports worldwide, compared to our
closest competitor, which is Great Britain, which racked up $4.3
billion in sales. In 1994 alone, the U.S. taxpayer paid more to
subsidize weapons sales than we paid for the Federal elementary and
secondary education programs.
Ninety percent of the significant ethnic and territorial conflicts in
the world in the last 2 years involve one or more parties which had
received some type of U.S. weaponry or military technology in a period
leading up to the conflict. Additionally, in the war with Iraq there
were countless documented and verified instances where U.S. troops
faced the enemy who was armed with U.S. based technology and weaponry.
Mr. Chairman, as the world's leading exporter of weaponry, the United
States has an implicit responsibility to provide global leadership on
this issue by formulating a policy of restraint. While the world's arms
market is a lucrative venture, no country has been willing to take up
unilateral steps toward control, fearing loss of exports to market
competitors. Therefore, it is vital as the world's leading supplier,
that the United States take responsibility for initiating a
comprehensive and a rational approach to controlling arms sales, which
will prevent repeat scenarios, such as those that occurred in Iraq
where United States forces faced weapons supplied by the United States.
I urge my colleagues to support the adoption of the McKinney Arms
Code of Conduct amendment. This amendment is supported by 103
cosponsors, Democrats and Republicans alike, including the chair of the
Senate Committee on Appropriations. Approving this legislation will be
one of the most significant steps this body takes to enhance our
national foreign policy.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Wynn].
Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the gentleman for
yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I also rise in support of the McKinney amendment. I
think it is a very responsible amendment. I comment her for introducing
it. Quite simply, it seems to me in the absence of the cold war we have
lost our way in terms of foreign policy. Foreign policy is supposed to
advance our interests, our long-term interests, in the global
community. To do this, however, we cannot be passive. We have to have
some standards and objectives to pursue.
It seems to me our objective ought to be encouraging diplomatic
solutions around the world and discouraging warfare and the use of
weapons around the world. The McKinney amendment represents sound
policy advancing our foreign policy interests, because it sets a
specific criteria on which we can evaluate arms sales. Democracy,
adherence to human rights, the absence of aggression, and participation
in the U.N. Registry of Conventional Arms, all give us a sound basis on
which to evaluate who we ought to be selling arms to. It is correct
policy because it gives us leverage. It enables us to leverage those
people who are buying our arms in the direction that we wish them to
go.
It is also good policy because it imposes moral values. People throw
that around. We ought to have moral values in U.S. policy. Well,
opposing human rights violations, promoting democracy, and opposing
aggression represents the best of moral values.
I am not naive. There are certainly circumstances that are exigent
that will require changes in this policy. The bill addresses that. It
has a national security exception which the President can utilize. It
also has an emergency waiver which the President can utilize. But it
seems to me we have got to quit being passive and reactionary and
understand what advancing our interests really means. I urge adoption
of the McKinney amendment.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
Mr. Chairman, today I rise in support of the code of conduct
amendment that is offered by my friend and colleague, the gentlewoman
from Georgia [Ms. McKinney]. The code of conduct will be the first
major reform of U.S. arms transfer policy in almost two decades.
The code of conduct highlights guiding principles on human rights and
democracy which I believe are important to America's leadership role in
the post-cold-war era. This amendment would help stem the flow of U.S.
weapons to countries that violate human rights of its citizenry and
fail to respect international human rights standards. The code of
conduct offers an avenue for America to make violators of human rights
accountable for their actions if they wish to continue to receive U.S.
arms sales.
Mr. Chairman, two-thirds of all the foreign military sales went to
countries described by the State Department Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices as human rights violators, with undemocratic
governments. The code of conduct is supported by some 275 national
organizations who believe that human rights should play a key role in
our arms export policy.
Mr. Chairman, I will never forget some years back when I made a trip
to Croatia when it was under siege. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr.
Wolf] and I got into a place by the name of Vukovar. Vukovar was
surrounded by Serb artillery and tanks. We went there to try to bear
witness to peace and to try to encourage the people there. We followed
it up with meetings with President Milosevic and others. But I remember
looking at shell casings and bomb casings that littered the streets,
dozens of bomb casings, and they were U.S. made.
Now, some people can say ``Oh, big deal. That doesn't really matter.
We sell it to them and how they use it is their business.'' But it
greatly distressed me to know that people, innocent civilians, were
being destroyed by the dropping of these 500-pound bombs. I remember
bringing that issue to the attenetion of our National Security Adviser,
Brent Scowcroft. He surely agreed. He said, ``Yeah, we sold those
bombs, and other kinds of military hardware to the former Yugoslavia,''
which had a disgusting human rights record.
Now, I think we need to be more serious about who we are willing to
sell arms to. This code of conduct may not be perfect. It may be liable
to additional change as it makes its way through conference, should it
pass. There are reasonable objections by reasonable people about what
ought to be a part of this, whether or not the national security
exemption is the best and most properly drawn way of proceeding. But I
think it makes a clear statement that it will not be business as usual.
Arms sales ought to be conditioned and human rights ought to matter.
Unfortunately, we have had hearings in the Committee on Human Rights,
the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights which I
chair, two human rights hearings. Amnesty International came forward
and told us in this administration, the Clinton administration, human
rights is an island, disconnected from policy considerations.
{time} 1330
We have seen it in a myriad of other issues like the most-favored-
nation status for China and other kinds of human rights considerations.
There is a disconnect. This tries to, at least in the selling of arms,
which kill people, we try to make sure, the gentlewoman from Georgia
[Ms. McKinney] tries to make sure that, if we are going to sell arms,
that human rights is a significant factor.
I thank the gentlewoman for offering the amendment.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number
of words.
I rise to offer my strong support of the amendment offered by my
colleague and good friend the gentlewoman from Georgia, [Ms. McKinney].
Mr. Chairman, I recall one of the fundamental concerns raised by one
of our great Presidents in our time--the late President Dwight
Eisenhower. Before leaving the White House and in one of his speeches--
President Eisenhower warned our nation of the everincreasing power and
influence of the industrial military interests in our country.
Now don't get me wrong--I want our military industry complex to
produce weapons and military equipment that meet our national security
interest too--but the question is how much and to whom should we sell
these weapons?
Mr. Chairman, everyone here in this Chamber knows that our Nation is
the [[Page H5526]] largest producer and exporter of military equipment
and weapons of war. It is time that our national leaders need to be
more sensitive about exporting and selling of weapons of war to kill
and maim other human beings.
Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentlewoman for introducing this
amendment, and I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record the following article:
[From the Washington Post, May 24, 1995]
Arms Sales `Conduct Code' Opposed--State Department Says Proposal Could
Impinge on Policy and Friendly Nations
(By R. Jeffrey Smith)
The Clinton administration declared yesterday that it
opposes a ``code of conduct'' drafted by some members of
Congress to block U.S. arms sales to countries that commit
human rights abuses or are not democratic.
At a Senate hearing, Undersecretary of State Lynn E. Davis
criticized the proposed code on grounds that its rigid
criteria for arms sales would impinge on the administration's
authority to decide foreign policy and could force a cutoff
of military aid to friendly nations in regions important to
U.S. interests.
The code, which is scheduled to come up for a vote on the
House floor today, was crafted by Sen. Mark O. Hatfield (R-
Ore.) and Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-Ga.) to stanch estimated
annual sales or gifts of billions of dollars worth of U.S.
arms to countries that the sponsors claim are not upholding
important U.S. values. At the hearing, Hatfield particularly
criticized recent U.S. arms sales to Malaysia, Indonesia and
Turkey, which he said had each engaged in recent human rights
abuses.
The proposed code states that U.S. military assistance and
arms transfers should be provided only to nations with
governments chosen by free elections that protect basic
freedoms and are not engaged in ``gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights.''
It also bars aid to nations engaged in illegal acts of
armed aggression and to nations that do not register their
arms transactions with the United Nations. The president
could waive these restrictions for any country, but only with
congressional approval.
The code has collected 102 sponsors in the House, but last
week it missed gaining the International Relations
Committee's endorsement by a one-vote margin. Hatfield has
vowed to try to attach it to a foreign aid or defense
appropriations bill this year.
Davis told a Senate Appropriations subcommittee that while
the administration supports the ``principles'' expressed by
the code, it ``simply cannot agree to this weighting of
criteria'' for deciding on individual arms sales.
Instead, she said, the administration prefers its own
policy of selling arms based on ``national security,'' as
spelled out in flexible language approved by President
Clinton in February.
Under this policy, Davis said, no single criterion such as
respect for human rights ``takes precedence over another.''
Arms transfers can be made to nondemocratic nations if they
promote regional stability or help prop up failing U.S.
defense companies that produce key military technologies.
Although McKinney has charged that 90 percent of the $12.9
billion in U.S. arms sales approved last year went to
countries that Washington classifies as nondemocratic, Davis
said the ``vast majority [went to] . . . allies, major
coalition partners, and European neutrals.''
Davis confirmed that the administration is considering
offering F-16 jet fighters to Indonesia, despite recent
evidence of fresh abuses by Indonesian military forces in
East Timor.
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John
Shattuck, who appeared with Davis, said ``we are paying close
attention to Indonesia's human rights situation and will take
this into consideration'' in deciding on such sales.
With regard to Turkey, he said ``we are, as you know,
gravely concerned about the use of [U.S.-made] military
material, particularly cluster bombs'' during Turkey's
military assaults on Kurds in southeastern Turkey and
northern Iraq.
But Shattuck did not say whether the use of these arms
would affect future sales to Turkey, which he described as
``a crucial NATO ally.''
Lawrence J. Korb, an assistant secretary of defense in the
Reagan administration who is now at the Brookings
Institution, testified later that Turkey's use of F-16s,
Black Hawk helicopters and M-60 tanks against the Kurds
indicated that many U.S. arms transferred overseas ``are used
not against the foreign enemies of the U.S., but against the
indigenous populations.''
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton].
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I will not take the whole 5
minutes. I would just like to put some facts on the table.
Right now under the Export Control Act, the Congress of the United
States can stop sales. In the past when the President, any President,
has started to go ahead with arms sales and he found opposition was
rising under the Export Control Act that was passed by the Congress of
the United States, they have pulled in their horns and they have
renegotiated those sales deals with these foreign countries. So we
already have the authority in law to do what is being talked about
today. The only difference is we are turning the process around. That
hamstrings the President of the United States in his conducting of
foreign policy. That is a mistake
Ten years ago, the United States controlled only 15 percent of the
arms sales. My colleagues who spoke on the other side are absolutely
right; we do control a large part of arms sales today, but that is
because the Soviet Union has disintegrated. Ten years ago, they
controlled 50 percent of the arms sales worldwide, and they sold to
countries like Iraq, Iran, and Libya. We are not selling to those
pariah countries, but they did.
Now that they have fallen apart, our percentage of the market has
gone up, but we are still below, way below, where we were 10 years ago.
So while our percentage is higher, our actual sales are lower. So the
bottom line is this. Simply put, we have the control in the Congress to
stop any arms sales that we want to under the Export Control Act. We do
not need this legislation.
Second, we should not hamstring the President of the United States in
his conducting of foreign policy. And third, the economic concerns that
I talked about awhile ago are real, because there are other countries
who will sell this equipment to foreign governments if we do not. Along
with those sales will go American jobs.
I think those points should be considered by my colleagues. We have
the authority to deal with this problem already. We do not need this
amendment. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from Georgia. I can tell you that in the course of my
service in Congress, too often we have seen instances where we have
taken the scarce resources of the United States, bought military
weaponry, sent it to corners of the world and then find not too much
later that it has been turned either on our country or on our allies.
These so-called boomerang sales are addressed directly by the
amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Georgia. I think her
amendment is a step in the right direction. I rise in strong support.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentlewoman from Georgia.
Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to correct for the
record some misstatements and misrepresentations that have been made
about this amendment.
First of all, this amendment does not ban arms sales to any country.
Second, if there is a problem with this amendment in terms of human
rights, it is not that this amendment will fail because it does not
address human rights well enough; it will fail for other reasons.
Let me just begin to say what some of those reasons are.
One is that we are spending millions of dollars to quell regional
strife that we, in turn, are the fomenters of. First of all, we are
fomenting murder and rampage around the world by fueling conflict, by
arming potential adversaries, that is the boomerang effect that my
colleague just spoke about, by promoting territorial expansion and
crossborder aggression and also by facilitating terrorism and
repression. And, in fact, as we learned recently, the CIA funded Jihad
school over in Afghanistan trained two of the suspects in the World
Trade Center bombing.
Second, we are violating our own law. The law states that it shall be
the policy of the United States to exert leadership in the world
community to bring about an arrangement for reducing the international
trade in implements of war. We are violating our own policy.
And then finally, why is that the case? It is the case because in the
Washington Post story by Jeffrey [[Page H5527]] Smith in today's
newspaper, it says that the present administration takes the tack that
arms transfers can be made to nondemocratic nations if they help to
prop up failing U.S. defense companies.
So the bottom line, once again, is the amount of money that is being
spent in failing U.S. defense industries.
Finally, I would just like to compliment and thank those people who
have worked so hard on behalf of this amendment. They are the over 200
grassroots organizations that have gone around the country in support
of this amendment, the strong support of our colleagues who have spoken
here this afternoon and who have cosponsored this amendment, and
finally the strong staff work of Robin Sanders who put it all together.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman. I want to echo her
comments. It is a false economy for us to believe that we are
encouraging exports and creating American jobs by these arms transfers
and in questionable situations, because, as the gentlewoman alludes to,
many times we find in the future even greater expenditures are
necessary because of this so-called boomerang effect. We send guns to
the wrong people. They turn on us. They shoot at us and they shoot at
our friends.
What the gentlewoman is trying to do is to minimize that possibility.
She has the strong support of so many organizations, including the U.S.
Catholic Conference and others, and I hope my colleagues will take her
amendment very seriously and join me in supporting it.
Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Arms Trade Code of
Conduct.
The House International Relations Committee nearly passed this
historic piece of legislation in its markup last week, where it failed
by a margin of just 18 to 17. A Gallup Poll released in February found
that only 15 percent of those queried supported our Government selling
military equipment to other countries.
The European Union and the United States together sell 90 percent of
the world's weapons. No country has been willing to take unilateral
steps toward control, fearing it will lose export markets to
competitors. Therefore, it is vital that as the world's leading
suppliers, the European Union, and the United States work together to
implement restraint.
Fortunately, the European Parliament has started that process
already. In January of this year, the European Parliament passed a
resolution calling on the European Union to immediately implement a
coherent and comprehensive arms export control policy at the Union
level. A measure similar to this amendment before us today is being
considered by the European Union at this time.
As the world's leading exporter of weaponry, the United States has a
special responsibility to provide global leadership in the area of
restraint.
As to the issue of jobs in the United States, we must weigh the
limited economic benefits of expanding arms exports against the larger
costs to the economy as a whole. Arms exports do nothing to address the
fundamental problems of lagging U.S. competitiveness in nonmilitary
industries. Furthermore, arms exports undermine peaceful conflict
resolution upon which world trade, economic growth, and long-term job
creation are based.
Administration policy states that the impact on defense jobs must be
taken into account when exports are considered. Well, Mr. Chairman, I
wish we would extend the same consideration to the impact on the lives
and well-being of American service personnel. Our laissez-faire
approach to arms sales creates a self-generated danger--the possibility
that our service men and women will someday be fightings nations or
groups who obtained U.S. weapons and technology.
Even the Pentagon now officially acknowledges that it faces the
prospect of American weapons being used against U.S. military
personnel. In his latest Annual Report to the President and Congress,
Secretary of Defense Perry writes that ``threats encountered in major
regional conflicts would be standing armies of foreign powers, armed
with mixes of old and modern weapons systems. * * * Thus, U.S. forces
must be prepared to face a wide variety of systems, including some
previously produced in the United States.''
With its current policy, the United States is bolstering the
warfighting capabilities of a substantial number of those fighting
today's conflicts. It does not take a stroke of genius to realize that
these capabilities can just as easily be used against U.S. soldiers,
sailors, and airmen.
It is a sad irony that the current U.S. arms trade policy confirms
the words of cartoonist Walt Kelly's character, Pogo, when he said,
``We have met the enemy and it is us.''
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the Code
of Conduct on Arms Transfers and commend my colleague from Georgia,
Representative Cynthia McKinney, for bringing this important
legislation to the floor today.
Since 1990, the United States has been the top-selling merchant in
the international arms bazaar. We have dominated the global arms market
by sending billions and billions of dollars worth of all types of
weaponry to some of the world's worst human rights abusers and most
corrupt and repressive regimes. Sophisticated combat weapons exported
from the United States, such as armored personnel carriers, antitank
missiles, and specialized rifles, have found their way into the hands
of notorious international troublemakers and fueled conflicts raging
throughout the world.
Placing short-term economic interests above crucial security concerns
and fundamental human rights principles has serious consequences, both
for our stature as a world leader and for the safety of U.S. military
personnel engaged around the world. By cashing in on profits from arms
sales abroad without closely scrutinizing potential customers according
to criteria like the ones outlined by Representative McKinney, we risk
incurring substantial security and human costs. During the Gulf war and
in Somalia, for example, the safety of many of our men and women in the
Armed Forces was threatened by weaponry sold by our own Government.
Moreover, skyrocketing arms sales have contributed to regional arms
races, which in turn force us to increase spending to deal with greater
threats to our national security.
As we continue to adjust to the realities of the post-cold-war world,
we need to revise our philosophies concerning foreign military sales.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many of the principles which
guided our arms export policies in the past no longer are relevant. The
provisions of the Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers will establish a
sensible, much-needed framework for making decisions about what we send
abroad and to whom. The United States should take a leadership role in
forging new policies and encouraging new thinking in this area.
Being the world's No. 1 weapons supplier is a very dubious
distinction. As we approach the start of the 21st century, we should
re-evaluate the priorities which have placed us in this category and
look to the Code of Conduct as a model.
Again, I would like to thank Representative McKinney for all her hard
work on behalf of this important issue. I strongly support this
initiative and urge my colleagues to vote for the McKinney amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. McKinney].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 157,
noes 262, not voting 15, as follows:
[Roll No. 351]
AYES--157
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Beilenson
Berman
Bishop
Boehlert
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brown (CA)
Brown (OH)
Bryant (TX)
Cardin
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Danner
DeFazio
Dellums
Diaz-Balart
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Dornan
Durbin
Ehlers
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Fields (LA)
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Ford
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gephardt
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Horn
Houghton
Hoyer
Jackson-Lee
Jacobs
Johnson (SD)
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Lantos
Leach
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lincoln
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lowey
Luther
Maloney
Manton
Markey
Martinez
McCarthy
McDermott
McHale
McKinney
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Morella
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Orton
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Porter
Poshard
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Rivers
Rohrabacher
Rose
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sawyer
Schiff
Schroeder
Scott
Serrano
Skaggs
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Stark
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Tanner
Thompson
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Tucker
Velazquez
Vento
Volkmer
Ward
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Williams
Wise [[Page H5528]]
Wolf
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
Zimmer
NOES--262
Allard
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bentsen
Bereuter
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Brewster
Browder
Brown (FL)
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Camp
Canady
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chapman
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clinger
Coble
Coburn
Collins (GA)
Combest
Cooley
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cunningham
Davis
de la Garza
Deal
DeLauro
DeLay
Deutsch
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Flanagan
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Frost
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gejdenson
Gekas
Geren
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hancock
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Hostettler
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jefferson
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kelly
Kennelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaFalce
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Laughlin
Lazio
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
Lofgren
Longley
Lucas
Manzullo
Martini
Mascara
Matsui
McCollum
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
McNulty
Metcalf
Mica
Molinari
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moorhead
Murtha
Myers
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Ortiz
Oxley
Packard
Parker
Paxon
Payne (VA)
Petri
Pickett
Pombo
Portman
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Riggs
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Schaefer
Schumer
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Stockman
Stump
Talent
Tate
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas
Thornberry
Thornton
Thurman
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Upton
Visclosky
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
NOT VOTING--15
Andrews
Bateman
Calvert
Cubin
Fazio
Hansen
Kleczka
McDade
Meyers
Miller (FL)
Moran
Olver
Peterson (FL)
Scarborough
Sisisky
{time} 1358
Mr. COX and Mr. DICKS changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Messrs. REYNOLDS, DOOLEY, and EHLERS changed their vote from ``no''
to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
amendment offered by mr. bereuter
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment, amendment No. 26.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Bereuter: At the end of the bill, add
the following:
DIVISION D--ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
TITLE XLI--PUBLIC LAW 480
SEC. 4001. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR TITLE III.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding section 3242 of this Act,
there are authorized to be appropriated $25,000,000 for each
of the fiscal years 1996 and 1997 for the provision of
agricultural commodities under title III of the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (7 U.S.C. 1727
et seq.).
(b) Authority To Transfer Amounts.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, amounts authorized to be appropriated
by subsection (a) may be used to carry out title II of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (7
U.S.C. 1721 et seq.).
SEC. 4002. REDUCTION IN AUTHORIZATIONS FOR CERTAIN UNITED
STATES INFORMATIONAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND CULTURAL
PROGRAMS.
Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (3)(F) of section 2106
of this Act, the following amounts are authorized to be
appropriated to carry out international information
activities and educational and cultural exchange programs
under the United States Information and Educational Exchange
Act of 1948, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act
of 1961, Reorganization Plan Number 2 of 1977, the United
States International Broadcasting Act of 1994, the Radio
Broadcasting to Cuba Act, the Television Broadcasting to Cuba
Act, the Board for International Broadcasting Act, the
Inspector General Act of 1978, the North/South Center Act of
1991, the national Endowment for Democracy Act, and to carry
out other countries in law consistent with such purposes:
(1) Salaries and expenses.--For ``Salaries and Expenses'',
$445,645,000 for the fiscal year 1996 and $423,080,000 for
the fiscal year 1997.
(3) Educational and cultural exchange programs.--For
``Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Program'', ``Edmund S. Muskie
Fellowship Program'', ``International Visitors Program'', and
``Mike Mansfield Fellowship Program'', ``Claude and Mildred
Pepper Scholarship Program of the Washington Workshops
Foundation'', ``Citizen Exchange Programs'', ``Congress-
Bundestag Exchange Program'', ``Newly Independent States and
Eastern Europe Training'', ``Institute for Representative
Government'', and ``Arts America'', $67,265,800 for the
fiscal year 1996 and $67,341,400 for the fiscal year 1997.
Mr. BEREUTER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Nebraska?
There was no objection.
{time} 1400
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, the budget neutral Bereuter amendment
restores the $25,160,000 to the current funding level of the Food for
Development United States food assistance program for fiscal year 1996
and 1997. This is the Food for Peace Program, title III.
The current funding is $157 million. The legislation before us cuts
it to zero. What I am attempting to do is to take $25 million from the
USIA, the U.S. Information Agency's education and cultural exchange
programs, and restore at least $25 million to the title III program.
The Bereuter amendment helps ensure that U.S. foreign assistance is
directed to the world's most deserving aid recipients, starving people
in famine- and war-stricken countries.
Mr. Chairman, the U.S. food assistance has been reduced by 24 percent
in the last 2 years. In March the United States told other food donor
countries that we would decrease our minimum commitment of food aid
from 4.47 to 2.5 million metric tons. Over the past decade, the United
States has provided between 6.5 and 8 million metric tons. The Bereuter
amendment, through authorizing $25 million for the Food for Peace
Program, still represents a 50-percent cut in the President's fiscal
year 1996 budget request.
U.S. food assistance funds are spent here in the United States on
agricultural commodities, processing, bagging, enrichment, internal
transportation, port facilities and shipping. My amendment is supported
by the merchant marine organizations.
I am pulling the $25 million in this amendment from USIA's education
and cultural exchange programs and administrative accounts. The
Congressional Quarterly May 6, 1995, article pointed out a $2 billion
international exchange program, ``They have exploded into a hodgepodge
of seemingly duplicative and overlapping overseas activities.''
Mr. Chairman, I think it is an appropriate place for us to move $25
million to the Title III Food for Peace Program so it is not completely
zeroed out. It is important for humanitarian reasons. It is important
for our domestic purposes, as well, and it keeps a commitment we have
made. It still cuts the President's request by 50 percent. I think that
is too much, but $25 million seems to me at least to be a start back up
the hill.
I urge my colleagues to strongly support the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Kansas [Mr.
Roberts], the chairman of the Committee on Agriculture.
(Mr. ROBERTS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the gentleman's amendment to
restore the $25 million in funding for title III of the Food for Peace
Program.
I think it is essential, as the gentleman has pointed out, that we
fund [[Page H5529]] all titles of the Food for Peace Program. The
amendment does not increase spending. Let me emphasize that to all of
my colleagues. It cuts spending responsibly without really gutting the
program.
Last year marked the 40th anniversary of the Food for Peace Program.
It started in the Eisenhower years. It started with a gentleman who
formerly represented the district I have the privilege of representing
now, Mr. Cliff Hope, Sr.
We on the Committee on Agriculture have a very keen interest in
making the Food for Peace Program as sound and as effective as
possible. We are going to work very closely with the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Gilman], the chairman, and the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr.
Bereuter], and the rest of the committee to see that the Food for Peace
Program effectively and efficiently meets its goals.
The gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Emerson], chairman of the
Subcommittee on Department Operations, Nutrition, and Foreign
Agriculture, intends to hold hearings on this program. We intend to
address any concerns with the program as a whole in the 1995 farm bill.
I urge support in regards to the Bereuter amendment. I thank the
gentleman for his leadership in this regard.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Emerson].
Mr. EMERSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Nebraska for
yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I, too, rise in strong support of his amendment. I
wonder if we could have a brief colloquy here.
I am concerned that the most basic fundamental humanitarian
assistance, food and medical assistance, be maintained in the posture
that it currently sits; that is to say, immune from politics and the
whims of the State Department. I would like some assurance that it will
remain a tool of the PVO's who are so committed in the administration
of the most fundamental humanitarian assistance.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman, we have
done our best to assure that in fact we have an increase in the title
II program which is most important. Sometimes, as the gentleman knows,
however, we have to take from the title III program for those title II-
related humanitarian programs. This amendment I am offering will
continue to provide us that flexibility.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter]
has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Bereuter was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I will come back to the gentleman from
Missouri in a second, but I yield to the gentleman from New York [Mr.
Gilman], the chairman.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I just want to join with the gentleman from Missouri
[Mr. Emerson] and the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Roberts] with regard
to their concern on the Public Law 480 proposal. We want to make
certain that we keep that at reasonable levels. It is an important
program. I want to assure the gentleman we will do our best to make
certain it is going to be effectively administered.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for that assurance,
and I yield back to the gentleman from Missouri.
Mr. EMERSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding
further.
Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important to point out that what we
are talking about here is fundamental humanitarian assistance, food
that goes to people when they are starving to death. We are not talking
about pouring money down a rat hole here, or giving some Ambassador the
opportunity with the use of taxpayer dollars to build the Taj Mahal.
We are talking about keeping starving people alive. I think that
point needs to be made, and I think an understanding of the fact that
the Food for Peace Program is part of the foreign assistance program is
a fact with which most Americans are unfamiliar.
I mean, most Americans, I believe, would think that we are just
throwing money willy-nilly around the world for no good purposes, and I
happen to be one who believes that most Americans think that when there
are people who are starving, they ought to be fed.
I thank the gentleman for his contribution to this cause, and I look
forward to continuing to work with him to pursue our mutual interests
in this subject area.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his strong
statement. He is exactly right. This is the program that ends up
putting food in people's mouths across the world, in the most terrible
situations that we have seen so much in our electronic media.
The gentleman is a former ranking member of the Hunger Committee, he
knows well how directly this food assistance has been provided in
Ethiopia and Somalia and other places. I thank the gentleman for his
comments.
Mr. Chairman, I urge a strong ``aye'' vote.
amendment offered by Mr. brownback to the amendment offered by mr.
bereuter
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Brownback to the amendment offered
by Mr. Bereuter: Strike section 4002 of the Bereuter
Amendment and insert the following:
SEC. 4002. REDUCTION IN AUTHORIZATIONS FOR CERTAIN UNITED
STATES INFORMATIONAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND CULTURAL
PROGRAMS.
Notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (3)(F), (4)(A), and (5) of
section 2106 of this Act, the following amounts are
authorized to be appropriated to carry out international
information activities and educational and cultural exchange
programs under the United States Information and Educational
Exchange Act of 1948, the Mutual Educational and Cultural
Exchange Act of 1961, Reorganization Plan Number 2 of 1977,
the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1944, the
Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, the Television Broadcasting
to Cuba Act, the Board for International Broadcasting Act,
the Inspector General Act of 1978, the North/South Center Act
of 1991, the National Endowment for Democracy Act, and to
carry out other authorities in law consistent with such
purposes:
(1) Salaries and expenses.--For ``Salaries and Expenses'',
$445,645,000 for the fiscal year 1996 and $402,080,000 for
the fiscal year 1997.
(2) Educational and cultural exchange programs.--For ``Hubert
H. Humphrey Fellowship Program'', ``Edmund S. Muskie
Fellowship Program'', ``International Visitors Program'',
``Mike Mansfield Fellowship Program'', ``Claude and Mildred
Pepper Scholarship Program of the Washington Workshops
Foundation'', ``Citizen Exchange Programs'', ``Congress-
Bundestag Exchange Program'', ``Newly Independent States and
Eastern Europe Training'', ``Institute for Representative
Government'', and ``Arts America'', $82,265,800 for the
fiscal year 1996 and $62,341,400 for the fiscal year 1997.
(3) Radio construction.--For ``Radio Construction'',
$70,164,000 for the fiscal year 1996 and $52,647,000 for the
fiscal year 1997.
(4) International broadcasting activities.--For
``International Broadcasting Activities'', $311,191,000 for
the fiscal year 1996 and $246,191,000 for the fiscal year
1997.
Mr. BROWNBACK (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Kansas?
There was no objection.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, my amendment has been agreed to by the
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] and a copy of it has been shared
with the minority.
What my amendment simply does is it spreads the $25 million in cuts
around a little bit further than what the Bereuter proposal has. The
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] suggests cuts to USIA salaries
and exchanges, and my amendment would lighten those cuts in the
salaries and exchanges areas and broaden the reductions to radio
construction and broadcasting.
What we are attempting to do by this is to support what the gentleman
from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] is doing to put this money into the hunger
programs, to be able to feed those who are starving, but spreading
around a little bit more the cuts in the USIA program. That is what my
amendment to the Bereuter amendment would do. I would ask for it to be
considered.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
[[Page H5530]]
Mr. BROWNBACK. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman my colleague and my
neighbor for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I have no objections to the additional flexibility he
provides to USIA and where those cuts must come to make this basic
amendment budget neutral. I thank him for his initiative.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, with that, I would hope that we could
vote on this because I think it does do what most people would like,
let the USIA agency be able to take care of this within its own, and
that would be then supportive of the Bereuter amendment to put $25
million in additional food aid program.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BROWNBACK. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the proposed amendment
by the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Brownback] that has been accepted by
the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], the proponent of the
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Brownback] to the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter].
The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], as amended.
The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.
amendment offered by mr. wynn
Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Wynn: In section 3414 of the bill
(in subsection (e) of section 711 of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961)--
(1) in paragraph (1) of such subsection (e), strike
``$3,000,000'' and insert ``$15,000,000'';
(2) redesignate paragraph (2) of such subsection as
paragraph (3); and
(3) insert after paragraph (1) of such subsection the
following new paragraph:
``(2) Use of amounts for latin america and the caribbean.--
Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under paragraph
(1) for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, $12,000,000 for each such
fiscal year shall be made available for the sale, reduction,
and cancellation of loans, or portions thereof, for countries
in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Mr. WYNN (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent
that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Maryland?
There was no objection.
Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, the amendment I am proposing today is a very
straightforward one that addresses our economic interest in Latin
America. This amendment would put $12 million into a debt relief
program for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Yesterday in the course of our debates, we cut money out of a fund
called International Organizations, which is dues-assessed,
International Organizations. I wan to take a portion of that money, $12
million, and put it toward debt relief.
I believe in so doing we can advance our economic interests. One of
the things I said a little earlier today was this: that in a post-cold
war era, we have to understand that our foreign policy ought to advance
our interests. We have specific interests in the Western Hemisphere in
terms of encouraging and expanding trade opportunities.
Why? Because these trade opportunities in our own backyard can create
jobs in the United States. But unfortunately the debt burden in many of
our neighboring countries in Latin America and the Caribbean is a major
factor in inhibiting economic growth and decreases the absorptive
capacity. In other words, they cannot trade with us because they are
paying off these very old debts. A debt relief program would help
address this concern.
To be eligible for this program, these countries would have to meet
specific economic and political criteria included in existing
legislation for the region.
These requirements include an IMF program, a World Bank program,
significant investment reform and normalized relations with commercial
creditors. In addition, eligible countries must have governments which
have been democratically elected, are not in gross violation of human
rights, and have supported our efforts to combat narcotics and
terrorism. In other words, we want to deal with friendly, democratic
countries that are working with us and have normalized economic
conditions.
Why are we doing this? Debt reduction provides a catalyst for
Caribbean and Latin American countries undertaking economic reforms and
liberation programs.
{time} 1415
Debt reduction is specifically important for small countries in the
Caribbean, where most debt is bilateral. In Jamaica, for example, debt
service continues to consume more than 49 percent of the government's
budget. Debt relief will accelerate trade links by freeing vital
foreign exchange reserves that otherwise would have be used for debt
service. These reserves can now be used to import products from the
United States.
For example, with 70 cents of each dollar buying U.S. goods and
services in the Caribbean, debt reduction in the region can stimulate
significant U.S. exports. Think about that, 70 cents of every dollar in
that region is spent on our goods and services. We need to do business
with them.
After a decade of economic adjustment and reform, many countries in
Latin American and in the Caribbean are enjoying their best economic
prospects. Policy reforms in these countries and the resulting economic
stability encouraged will help our economic ties with these countries.
Total trade between the United States and Latin America and the
Caribbean has grown since 1987. There has been a steady growth in terms
of both imports and exports.
Latin America is the fastest-growing U.S. export market in the world,
and the only region where the United States now enjoys a trade surplus.
Open markets also promote economic development in poor Latin American
countries. This will help them stem the flow of illegal immigration to
the United States. My colleagues are going to hear my colleagues from
across the aisle say well, perhaps these are laudable goals, but we
just cannot afford it, but I think that argument misses the boat.
In the business of economic trade and foreign policy we have to
promote our long-term interests. It is terribly shortsighted not to
spend this small amount of money, only $12 million from our own
backyard to ultimately create jobs for our own people.
They can either spend the money on debt service or they can spend the
money buying U.S. products. Debt reduction, especially for heavily
indebted countries of the Caribbean basin, will send an important
signal of U.S. commitment to democratically elected governments in the
region.
I would like to urge all Members of the House to consider the
importance of our regional neighbors, to consider the importance of
trade in terms of our long-term economic picture, and begin to think of
foreign policy as a proactive endeavor and not just a reactive endeavor
and not just an area where we can find some savings here.
I think in that context Members will find this amendment is certainly
reasonable, modest in the amount of money involved, but the long-term
investment will certainly serve America's economic interests.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, this is a budget-breaking amendment. It
simply adds money to the bill without reducing funding elsewhere.
The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] gave us clear direction to cut
this bill, and we did so yesterday under the Brownback amendment by
reducing our spending by an additional over $400 million. This
amendment earmarks funds. The distinguished chairman of the Committee
on Appropriations, Mr. Livingston, has made it clear to all of us that
the Committee on Appropriations would oppose such earmarks.
Furthermore, the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Wynn] is seeking to add
[[Page H5531]] funds to a new and untested program. And I would like to
note that already in the bill we authorized $3 million for fiscal year
1996, and $3 million for fiscal year 1997, to do what the gentleman is
suggesting. It is a total of $6 million for an initial start on this
program to begin operations in a limited way.
Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to oppose the Wynn amendment even
though it has a worthy endeavor as its objective.
Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Let me
emphasize first to my colleagues the amount of money that I am
proposing to expend is less that the amount of money that was in the
bill when it came out of committee. There is not one nickel more than
came out of the committee in its original form.
Had I gone ahead of the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Brownback]
yesterday, I would have proposed moving $12 million out of the
international organizations account. Unfortunately, because he moved
ahead of me, he took $400 million out across the board. I am only
suggesting that of that $400 million he would remove that we preserve
$12 million to advance our economic interests in the region. But
clearly this is not a budget-buster in any form or fashion.
I would have to reiterate to the chairman that I believe that this is
also an opportune time to advance our interests in that region.
It seems to me that all of our foreign policy positions to date have
been reactive. Nothing has been done to advance or leverage the
direction in which we want to go. Nothing has been done to create new
jobs or new trade markets.
Mr. GILMAN. If I may reclaim my time from the gentleman, the
gentleman I think is incorrect in that he does specifically add $6
million to this proposal, without any offsets. So that creates a
budgetary problem for us, and it is for that reason that we are
opposing the gentleman's amendment.
Mr. WYNN. If the gentleman will yield further, I would say that all
of the money I am proposing to spend comes out of the money that the
gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Brownback] has already cut, so it is not any
additional money added on. The money has already been cut. I am just
suggesting it be moved into a second area.
Let me make one comment about appropriations. I feel very strongly
about this. This is an authorization bill. We are the Committee on
International Relations. We are the ones who ought to set foreign
policy that we recommend to our colleagues in the Congress. We should
not let the appropriators dictate to us what direction this money
should be spent. The purpose of the authorizing bill is just the
opposite, to give direction in terms of our priorities. We studied this
issue. We need markets in Latin America and the Caribbean. It seems to
me our directive to appropriators ought to be this is a worthwhile
purpose. It does not bust the budget. It does not exceed what we came
out of committee with.
Mr. GILMAN. If I may reclaim my time, once again I would like to
submit that the gentleman has a worthy purpose, but he has not provided
any offset. Mr. Brownback's measure put us in conformance with the
budget so we would not meet a budgetary problem.
Moreover we are trying to work very closely with the Committee on
Appropriations so we are not spinning our wheels here and so our
authorization measure will be finally met with approval by the
Committee on Appropriations.
So, I think since this is a new program, I will be pleased to work
with the gentleman in the future to see if we can work out a better
method of funding for the gentleman's worthy objective.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment. I think the
gentleman from Maryland is making a very worthy initiative here. What
you have in the context of the total bill is very, very sharp
reductions for all of Latin America. There is very little in this bill
which sends a favorable signal to Latin America. The gentleman from
Maryland is merely requesting $12 million, as he has requested.
This is a terribly important amendment from the standpoint of the
Caribbean. Our economic interests in that region are growing very, very
rapidly and the gentleman from Maryland has called that to our
attention again and again, and that is one of the fastest-growing
markets for us in the world. So the $12 million is a very modest move,
it is an important signal to countries that are much neglected in this
bill, and I commend him for it and I support the amendment.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I would just like to follow up on Chairman Gilman's
remark that this may well be a worthy purpose, but I want the people of
this House to know that we already have $3 million authorized for 1996
and 1997 for this program. What this amendment would do is to add
another $12 million to this bill, and that is going in the wrong
direction. We need to go in the opposite direction.
I will soon be offering an amendment to make some additional cuts,
but while this may be a worthy purpose, it would earmark some $12
million additional for Latin America. And as I mentioned, we already
have authorized in 1996 and 1997 $3 million to authorize this program.
So we are going along with the Treasury initiative. That is why we
authorized the program.
There are many, many good programs, but we have to draw fine lines,
and the fine line we drew was to start this program and authorize it at
1996 and 1997 levels at $3 million, and what the gentleman wants to do
in this amendment is add $12 million onto that. This is in the wrong
direction, so I would have to be constrained to ask the House to vote
against this particular amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Wynn].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 125,
noes 297, not voting 12, as follows:
[Roll No. 352]
AYES--125
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Bishop
Bonior
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant (TX)
Cardin
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Coyne
de la Garza
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Edwards
Engel
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Frank (MA)
Frost
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gonzalez
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoyer
Jackson-Lee
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
LaFalce
Lantos
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Lowey
Maloney
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
McKinney
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Pelosi
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Rose
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sawyer
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Skaggs
Slaughter
Stark
Stokes
Studds
Tejeda
Thompson
Thurman
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Tucker
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates
NOES--297
Allard
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Browder
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Camp
Canady
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chapman
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clinger
Coble
Coburn
Collins (GA)
Combest
Condit
Cooley
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cunningham
Danner
Davis
Deal
DeFazio
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dingell [[Page H5532]]
Doolittle
Dornan
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Durbin
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Eshoo
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (LA)
Fields (TX)
Flanagan
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fowler
Fox
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Furse
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Geren
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennelly
Kildee
Kim
King
Kingston
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Lincoln
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lucas
Luther
Manzullo
Martini
Mascara
McCarthy
McCollum
McCrery
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Meehan
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Minge
Molinari
Montgomery
Moorhead
Morella
Myers
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Obey
Orton
Oxley
Packard
Parker
Paxon
Payne (VA)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Regula
Riggs
Rivers
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Royce
Salmon
Sanders
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Schroeder
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Stockman
Stump
Stupak
Talent
Tanner
Tate
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Thornton
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Traficant
Upton
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Ward
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Wyden
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOT VOTING--12
Calvert
Conyers
Cubin
Fazio
Green
Hansen
Kleczka
McDade
McDermott
McNulty
Meyers
Peterson (FL)
1445
The Clerk announced the following pairs: On this vote:
Mr. Conyers for, Mr. Calvert against.
Mr. Gene Green of Texas for, Mrs. Cubin against.
Ms. ESHOO changed her vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Messrs. MARTINEZ, HILLIARD, and PALLONE, Ms. DeLAURO, Mrs. MINK of
Hawaii, and Messrs. WILSON, ORTIZ, BARRETT of Wisconsin, and DOGGETT
changed their vote from ``no to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
personal explanation
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I was unavoidably detained and
was not able to vote on the Wynn amendment, rollcall No. 352. Had I
been present, I would have voted ``yes''.
{time} 1445
amendment offered by mr. bereuter
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Bereuter: In section 2104(a)(1)(A)
(relating to authorizations of appropriations for migration
and refugee assistance) strike ``$560,000,000'' and insert
``$590,000,000''.
In section 2104 strike subsection (a)(4), subsection (b),
and subsection (d).
In section 2104 redesignate subsection (c) as subsection
(b).
Mr. BEREUTER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Nebraska?
There was no objection.
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, this Member rises to offer an amendment
to section 2104 of H.R. 1561, along with my colleagues, Mr. Lamar Smith
and Mr. Obey, which would restore common sense to the bill's handling
of the 47,000 Indochinese asylum seekers in refugee camps in Southeast
Asia. While the issues here are, in one sense, emotional and complex,
the justification for our amendment can be boiled down to one short
sentence. Economic migrants have no claim to resettlement in the United
States as political refugees and should return to their home countries.
The Bereuter-Obey-Lamar Smith amendment would allow the repatriation
of Indochinese in Southeast Asian camps who have been determined by the
U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees to have no, I repeat no, claim to
refugee status. These migrants--at least 12,000 of whom are North
Vietnamese--have been screened out by the UNHCR, i.e., they have been
declared economic migrants, not political refugees.
Let me make one crucial point so there is no misunderstanding about
the intent of this amendment. Since our departure from Vietnam in 1975
the United States has resettled more than 1 million Indochinese
refugees. This Member has always supported that effort and continues to
believe the United States must offer refuge to bona fide political
refugees who have a well founded fear of persecution in Indochina, as
elsewhere. This Member will work with others concerned about fair
treatment of legitimate refugees, but this Member cannot support a
program to give non-refugees the rights and privileges of bona-fide
political refugees.
The language in this section appears to be doing just that by calling
for the bulk of the 47,000 Indochinese in the camps to be, and I quote,
``offered resettlement outside of their countries or origin.'' Another
fundamental issue in this debate is the role of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees. The legislation suggests that UNHCR can no
longer be
trusted to make fair and objective refugee determinations. If that is
what the drafters intended, then I would ask them who should take over
this international refugee determination role, the United States?
Clearly, we cannot fill the breach. This is a very dangerous precedent,
which could undermine future refugee efforts worldwide.
Let me take a minute to point out the problems I see with the
existing language in the bill. Section 2104 calls for the resettlement
of tens of thousands of Indochinese economic migrants to the United
States. While the language does not name the United States explicitly
as the resettlement country, there should be no misunderstanding about
it--no other country would take them. The Governments of Canada and
Australia, also home to thousands of Indochinese refugees, have told my
office that they and the other resettlement countries would not be
willing to take any of the screened out from the camps.
In addition to the immigration problems that this language would
cause us, there are some real dangers in this legislation for the
asylum seekers themselves. I must say that I have been somewhat
surprised at the breadth and depth of concern about the legislation
among the non-government organizations which advocate refugee rights
and interests. Not only the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, but
also the U.S. Committee on Refugees, Save and Children, World Vision,
World Education, World Learning, and the Southeast Asian Resource
Action Center have all make issued statements opposing major elements
of this section. Many other groups have raised similar concerns with us
orally. These NGO's with many years of direct experience working with
Indochinese asylum seekers, have convinced me that the bill as written
holds the following dangers.
This provision could prompt a new exodus of Indochinese seeking entry
into the United States, putting them at risk on the high seas and
swelling the refugee camp populations. My colleagues, you should be
aware that last year, as reported in the New York
Times, more than a thousand Vietnamese took to the sea when a false
rumor was spread that Japan was offering employment opportunities. The
bill's message of hope for resettlement in the [[Page H5533]] United
States would likely have a similar effect on large numbers of
Vietnamese.
The UNHCR and the refugee groups have expressed fears that the
provision would increase the chance for violence in refugee camps by
giving the 47,000 asylum seekers false hope for resettlement in the
United States when the countries where the camps are located are
unlikely to give us access to them and, even if they did, many of the
asylum seekers would not be eligible for resettlement.
The bill would cause the absolute collapse of voluntary repatriation
through which 72,000 Indochinese have already returned home without
evidence of persecution. Now asylum seekers who can demonstrate that
the negative screening decision of the UNHCR was mistaken can request
reconsideration from U.S. officials or other resettlement countries in
Vietnam.
Finally, for my colleagues who have an interest in refugee issues in
other parts of the world, you should understand that this section would
reduce the funds available for other refugee programs, such as for bona
fide refugees from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, by
earmarking $30 million dollars to resettle economic migrants from
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Moreover, by conditioning use of these
funds on unmeetable conditions, it is likely that the funding would
disappear completely and not be available for any refugee programs.
In closing, let me reiterate what the Bereuter-Obey-Lamar Smith
Amendment would do. It would:
Stop the resettlement of Indochinese economic migrants in the United
States.
Make full refugee funding available for bona fide political refugees,
for example from the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Prevent a new outflow of boat people from
Indochina seeking entry into the United States.
Allow the international voluntary repatriation program to proceed
with U.S. assistance and under close U.S. monitoring.
Assist U.S. nongovernment agencies monitoring the migrants who have
returned home to ensure that they are not persecuted.
Maintain U.S. refugee policy that only bona fide political refugees
enter as refugees.
Support an international consensus on refugee determination and
processing that prevents the United States from having to bear the full
brunt of refugee programs all over the world.
Stop yet another example of refugee decisions being made without
regard to costs for local communities to educate, train and assist the
refugees.
I request your support for the Bereuter-Obey-Lamar Smith amendment to
the refugee provisions of H.R. 1561
amendment offered by mr. smith of new jersey to the amendment offered
by mr. bereuter
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the
amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey to the
amendment offered by Mr. Bereuter: Strike everything after
``$590,000,000'', and insert the following:
In section 2104(a)(4) (relating to authorizations of
appropriations for the resettlement of Vietnamese, Laotians,
and Cambodians) strike ``There'' and all that follows through
``who--'' and insert ``Of the amounts authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal year 1996 under paragraph (1) there
are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as are
necessary for the admission and resettle-
ment, within numerical limitations provided
by law for refugee admissions, of persons
who--''
At the end of section 2104 add the following new
subsection:
(e) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this section may be
construed to require or permit an increase in the number of
refugee admissions for fiscal year 1996 from the numerical
limitation for refugee admissions for fiscal year 1995.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, this amendment perfects the
language of section 2104, which protects certain high-risk refugees
from forced repatriation to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. This bill, as
it currently stands, contains important language that will prevent
United States tax dollars from being spent for the forcible
repatriation to Vietnam and Laos of people who fought side by side with
American forces.
Under current U.S. law, these people are refugees, and they are also
our friends. They should not be forced back to the places where they
were persecuted, but, at the very least, U.S. tax dollars should not be
spent to force them back. Thousands of people who served on our side in
the war and were later persecuted by the Communists on account of such
service are now being detained in camps throughout Southeast Asia. The
camps also hold Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists punished for
religious observance, and others who served time in reeducation camps
or new economic zones for their anti-communist views or activities.
Despite the strength of their claim to refugee status, almost all of
these people are scheduled for repatriation to Vietnam and Laos within
the next few months under a scheme known as the comprehensive plan of
action. I suppose the comprehensive plan of action [CPA] was intended
as a sincere effort to deal humanely with the Vietnamese boat people.
Unfortunately, it has turned out to be just the opposite. First, the
responsibility for deciding who is and who is not a refugee, which used
to be done by United States and U.N. refugee interviewers, was
transferred to local immigration officials who had no real experience
or training. Big mistake. Some of the interviewers were not only
incompetent but also corrupt. There are well-documented instances of
local officials demanding money and sexual favors from refugees as a
condition of favorable screening. And to the surprise of no one, almost
nobody now is a refugee.
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights visited and did in-depth
analysis of the refugee process in Hong Kong. Their conclusion, after
looking over several hundred cases, was the following: The entire
screening process and review procedures remain seriously flawed. The
process remains hostile to genuine refugees. Several international
standards were ignored. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Vietnamese
refugees have been wrongly rejected.
Because of unfair screening and defective screening, Mr. Chairman,
our tax dollars are about to pay to send back soldiers who served for
years in reeducation camps. They are going to send back anti-
Communists, writers and poets, members of the underground resistance
movement, and even people who work for the CIA.
{time} 1500
They are going to send back Buddhist monks whose temples were shut
down because they would not join the official church and Catholic nuns
whose convents were violated. That is what U.S. taxpayers will pay for
if the underlying amendment is adopted.
Mr. Chairman, a core provision of the CPA, the comprehensive plan of
action, that has been deep-sixed, was that repatriation to Vietnam and
Laos was to be strictly voluntary. The idea was that the United Nations
would work with governments of these countries to make sure that it was
safe, and then would work to convince the people in the camps that it
was safe for them to return. Unfortunately, some of the people who
returned were persecuted. In Laos some were even killed.
The U.N. monitoring program consists of only eight monitors for all
of Vietnam and two for the country of Laos, along with support staff
that has been hired through the Communist governments of these
countries. So they have been unable to check up on most of the people
who were returned.
Wonders of wonders, with government people interacting as translators
and being there as part of
this process, they never seemed to have discovered a single instance
of persecution. I would ask my friends if you were in the situation of
having been sent back against your will, and a so-called observer comes
in, or repatriation monitor, to talk to you, and with that person
happens to be a translator hired by the government, are you going to
talk about harassment, knowing when they walk out the door you are
going to be probably mistreated?
It reminds me of the visits to the POW camps during the Vietnam war
when people would go over there to Vietnam, Hanoi, and elsewhere, and
would meet with our prisoners. They would be told stories that there is
no torture. Of course, those prisoners, our [[Page H5534]] POW's would
not talk of torture. They would only go back to even more torture had
they spoken the truth.
One of our POW's, you might recall, ingenuously with his eyes flashed
out ``torture'' in Morse Code, getting the word out that indeed they
were using torture against these people.
Mr. Chairman, somehow the people in the camp with this situation just
do not believe there has not been a single instance of persecution.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith]
has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Smith of New Jersey was allowed to proceed
for 4 additional minutes.)
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, so the CPA soon ran out of
volunteers. They then began selecting people to volunteer and
imprisoning them when they refused. Sometimes they just dragged them
into airplanes, sometimes literally kicking and screaming. If they know
someone is going to resist, they may tranquilize him or her before
putting them on the plane.
So the CPA has become a looking glass world in which refugees are not
refugees and voluntary repatriation is not voluntary. Yet the United
States has given over $150 million during the last 6 years. The
language now in section 2104 that has been put there by myself and my
good friend, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], the chairman of
our committee, and other members of our subcommittee, would cut further
funding to the CPA unless the United Nations and other countries
involved agree to fix the program, to provide resettlement
opportunities for a limited number of high-risk refugees, again the old
soldiers, the nuns and others with compelling cases, within existing
refugee allotments.
Mr. Chairman, the amendment I am offering today is a perfecting
amendment to meet the objections raised by some, making it absolutely
clear that this language in the bill would not mean the admission of
large numbers of immigrants or even refugees. It provides explicitly
that the provision should not be construed either to require or to
permit an expansion of the numerical limitation on refugees beyond the
number that it was allocated for 1995. It gives the State Department
more flexibility in its refugee budget by eliminating separate
authorization of funds for resettlement of people.
The State Department has been lobbying very hard against this
provision. But after my perfecting amendment, the only thing to say to
the State Department is take a hard look at these people in high-risk
categories. If they are refugees under U.S. law, we should not hide
behind an inadequate third country screening to pay for them to be
forced back to persecution; second, no more money for the repatriation
program until you can certify that it has been fixed and everyone has
been given a fair screening and everyone that should be resettled has
been resettled.
Mr. Chairman, I do hope that Members will support the Smith amendment
to the Bereuter amendment. It has the support of a number of
organizations in the refugee communities who are adamantly opposed to
the Bereuter amendment and have come out as such within the last couple
of days, the list of which I will talk about further.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith perfecting
amendment.
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. This is not a simple
problem, but I think one of the darkest chapters in our country's
history in this century was called Operation Keelhaul. It occurred in
Europe after World War II when defecting Russians who were amassed in
camps were forcibly repatriated in boxcars back, to return and never to
be seen again. Our troops and our soldiers at gunpoint forced these
people, who had fled from the tyranny of the Soviet Union, back into
these boxcars. As I say, they were never seen again.
Forcibly repatriating people who have fled from their own homeland is
an atrocious act. We ought not to countenance it. We ought to help
people who have risked the seas and pirates and risked their lives to
flee to what they thought was a safe haven, and then finding that we
are participating in forcibly repatriating them.
These people deserve better. It is a matter of honor. They worked
with us, they fought with us, they moved where we are, the land of
liberty and freedom. We are not asking that they be repatriated to
America. We are asking only that they not be forcibly returned to the
places from which they fled.
A person born in a faraway country loves their homeland. If they
could return, they would. But these people face all sort of dangers.
They lived in reeducation camps. They have finally escaped. Now we are
going to forcibly repatriate them? I hope my country never does that.
If people want to leave tyranny and leave abuse and move towards the
light of freedom, we should facilitate that, not inhibit it.
So I strongly support, and I do not criticize Mr. Bereuter or Mr.
Obey or Mr. Smith, they are as well-intentioned as anybody can be. But
I just think they are dead wrong. We ought never at the point of a gun
or barbed wire or anything else force people to go back from whence
they have fled in terror.
So I hope the Smith amendment is adopted.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Smith perfecting
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I take a back seat to no one in this institution in
terms of my concern about decent treatment for refugees. I think all
who know me know that. But the fact is that section 2104 of this bill,
in the original bill, sets aside $30 million specifically for the
purpose of admitting for resettlement in the United States thousands of
Southeast Asian refugees who do not qualify for legitimate refugee
status. It also creates artificial incentives for those people to come
to the United States rather than return to their homeland, because it
in effect cuts off any aid to Southeast Asians who want to return to
their homeland and need tiny amounts of help to do so.
In my view, that is wrong-headed. The amendment that Mr. Bereuter and
Mr. Smith and I are trying to offer would eliminate that section of the
bill.
Now, I am supporting and offering this amendment with these other two
gentlemen for two reasons: First of all, I think the committee
provision really breaks an international agreement which was made by
the United States with 78 other countries. It makes no distinction
between legitimate political refugees and persons who simply want to
come to the United States for economic reasons. It also, I would point
out, leaves local communities holding the bag for the cost of educating
and training refugees who can often be very difficult to resettle and
train, because some of them, for instance, do not even have a written
language.
I want to get into the case of the Hmong, for instance. The United
States Government has allowed more than 120,000 of the 400,000 Hmong
who were living in Laos in 1975 to enter this country. There was a very
good reason for the United States doing that. The Hmong had done our
dirty work in Laos during the Vietnam War. When the government
collapsed, we allowed many of them to come into this country because of
the service they had provided to the United States during the war.
I understand that. But I would point out that the obligation that the
United States has to recognize what people like the Hmong did for us is
an obligation of the Federal Government. It is not an obligation of the
county government, it is not an obligation of the municipal government.
In fact, what we have now is
the Federal Government in effect posing for political holy pictures by
allowing into this country all of the refugees that we can allow in,
but then transferring the responsibility to pay for the cost of those
refugees to the States and local government. I do not believe that is
an equitable arrangement.
It seems to me that if this committee wants to create the impression
that it is allowing any and all refugees under this amendment to enter
this country, then they ought to be guaranteeing that the Federal
Government in fact is going to meet its responsibility by sharing the
costs of educating and training those refugees. If it does not, the
Federal Government is welching on [[Page H5535]] its commitment not
only to those refugees, but to local communities as well.
I would also point out that if you adopt the Smith amendment to the
Bereuter-Obey-Smith amendment, what you are doing in effect is creating
false expectations and making a shambles of what an orderly refugee
process is supposed to be.
I do not favor forcing a single refugee back into their original
country if they do not want to go. I believe even in the case of
refugees who have initially determined they want to go back to their
country of origin, that in the case of the Hmong, which is the one case
I know pretty intimately, it seems to me they ought to be given a
chance to change their minds so that there can be no doubt that the
United States is not forcibly repatriating a single refugee.
I did my graduate thesis on Operation Keelhaul. I am very familiar
with it. It was an outrageous chapter in American history. I do not
want to see us repeat that chapter. But neither do I want to see us in
a soft-headed way simply appear to be doing a favor for refugees, when
in fact what you will be doing is causing more turmoil in those refugee
camps, causing more confusion, causing them to believe that the refugee
program is now blown away and that they will therefore all have an
opportunity to enter the United States.
I would point out or simply ask why we should be creating an
artificial incentive so that not only do we make available resources to
bring refugees to this country, but we also shut off, in effect, the
resources necessary to allow refugees who want to return to their
original country to do so.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] has
expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Obey was allowed to proceed for 1
additional minute.)
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, it just seems to me in this instance the
opponents of the Bereuter amendment are well meaning, but I think in my
heart they are misguided. I would urge Members to reject the Smith
amendment because it will simply leave a false impression out there,
which will cause great additional turmoil in those refugee camps.
What we ought to be doing is saying to the Thai Government and other
governments in the area, we ought to be asking them to help us in the
process by which we give every refugee an opportunity to determine for
themselves whether they want to be repatriated or whether they want to
come to this country. We ought not be creating artificial incentives so
that in the end they have no financial alternative to coming to the
United States, unless this committee is willing to guarantee that it is
the Federal Government that will then bear the financial burden of that
decision. I do not think this committee is going to do that. Absent
that guarantee, I think we ought to support the Bereuter amendment.
Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
(Mr. DAVIS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment.
Mr. Chairman, many of the Vietnamese boat people and Hmong asylum
seekers in Southeast Asia are facing imminent deportation to communist
Vietnam and Laos. Many of them have been severely persecuted because of
their U.S. ties during the war or because of their political or
religious beliefs. However, many of them have been unfairly denied
refugee status by local governments under a screening program
established by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and
heavily funded by the U.S. Government. This screening program is rife
with corruption and other fundamental flaws. Among those already denied
refugee status, there are some 100 religious leaders, thousands of
former political prisoners and officers of South Vietnam, and many
human rights activists and dissident intellectuals.
{time} 1515
Classified as nonrefugees, they now face deportation to Vietnam. Many
of them have taken their own lives to protest the injustices in
screening to avoid deportation.
Thousands of Hmongs already recognized as refugees are also facing
deportation to Laos. In my judgment, no U.S. contribution to the UNHCR
should be used to finance such refoulement of refugees. Any use of
United States money for the repatriation of Vietnamese boat people or
Hmong asylum seekers must be conditioned on a fair review of their
refugee claims.
I would like to review with the House who some of these individuals
are, because you need to look sometimes beyond the numbers and the
rhetoric to look at who are the individuals we are talking about that
would be protected under the Smith amendment.
One of the people comprehensive plan of action would force back to
Vietnam is a lady, a Sister K, a Catholic nun. Her father served as a
counterintelligence officer for the Republic of Vietnam of Vietnam.
After 1975, he was sent to a reeducation camp for more than 6 years.
In 1988, the communists raided Sister K's convent. They arrested her
and the mother superior, who was accused of plotting against the
government. The seminary was confiscated. Sister K was sentenced to 6
months at hard labor. She then went to live with her family, but in
1991 her father and other Catholics were arrested for planning to build
a church. Sister K went into hiding and escaped from Vietnam. Sister K
has been labeled an economic migrant by the Thai immigration inspector
who was in charge or her interview under the comprehensive plan of
action. She is scheduled to be forced back to Vietnam. Her story of
persecution has been corroborated by her mother superior, who also
eventually escaped to the United States and is hospitalized through the
effects of the torture she underwent while in prison.
Another individual called Captain Tran was an officer in the Army of
the Republic of South Vietnam. He served side by side with American
troops. After 1975, he managed to evade capture and joined an
underground anti-Communist resistance movement. Eventually the movement
was uncovered by the Communist authorities. Many of its members were
tracked down, viciously tortured, and executed.
The members of the movement who managed to escape then plotted the
assassination of the Communist officer who had ordered the torture and
extrajudicial killings. Captain Tran eventually escaped from Vietnam.
But the Hong Kong authorities found him to be credible. They agreed
that he had reason to fear punishment by the Communists upon return,
but held that his participation in the counterrevolutionary plot was a
nonpolitical crime and that made him ineligible for asylum.
Captain Tran is scheduled to be forced back to Vietnam this year
under the comprehensive plan of action. Staff members of the House
Committee on International Relations interviewed him and found him
highly credible. He said he will commit suicide before returning to
Vietnam.
Mr. Chairman, as a nation, I think we have to take steps that will
bring about a fair, humane, and dignified solution to the Indo-Chinese
refugee problem once and for all within United States laws and without
any increase in quota or budget. So, Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of
the Smith amendment and ask my colleagues to support it.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Bereuter amendment regarding
Southeast Asian refugees. I have visited refugee camps in Thailand and
Hong Kong over the last 20 years, most recently just
last summer in Hong Kong. It is my observation that while the early
refugees were certainly tied in with U.S. interests and support of our
war efforts, the present refugees do not reflect this early perception
by the American people and veteran organizations.
Most of the refugee population in the Hong Kong camps have been
through a screening process and have been classified as economic
migrants, or to put it explicitly many are northern Vietnamese
fishermen who had nothing to do with supporting our war efforts.
The United States was a signature to the Comprehensive Plan of Action
in 1989 which strengthened the principles of first asylum in Southeast
Asia. For [[Page H5536]] example this program enabled the repatriation
of Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotians back to their country of origin
if not classified as a refugee. By this action countries like Thailand
that had become weary of holding refugees were able to see the end of
the tunnel, and stopped pushing back potential refugees into the sea.
We all remember the terrible piracy and raping of women on boats that
occurred. This new program helped to reduce such incidents. It also
worked out agreements with countries that were the source of the
migration like Vietnam to take back these people and encourage them to
utilize internationally accepted immigration programs like the
Orderly Departure Program that has allowed 500,000 to start new lives
in the United States and other countries. While there may be some
refugees who have been improperly classified, these cases could be
reviewed with U.S. intervention under the flexibility of the present
agreement.
Moreover, the root cause of the migration is the poor economic
conditions in these countries, especially Vietnam. By continuing our
agreement we encourage additional cooperation with Vietnam which will
lead to increased cooperation on the POW issue and complete the
normalization of relationships between our two countries.
The Bereuter amendment will also maintain funding to continue the
Comprehensive Plan of Action. It will also send a signal that the
United States remains a partner in this well-thought-out plan.
This will discourage those still detained in the Hong Kong camps from
rioting. Over 200 were wounded yesterday in Hong Kong fighting with
hand-made metal spears according to this morning's edition of the New
York Times. It is downright cruel for us to build expectancies that the
United States will take these migrants as refugees. Support the
Bereuter amendment and help to stop the bloodshed in Hong Kong.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
Mr. Chairman, what is even worse is to send them back to possible
death and torture at the hands of the Communist Vietnamese Government.
Some of those people have been disappearing.
Mr. Chairman, I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr.
Wolf].
Mr. WOLF. Mr. Chairman, I will be brief. I urge every Member to read
the letter of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] before they
vote on this. The gentleman is going to speak, so I will not reiterate
his letter. But his letter probably sums it up better than anything. In
his letter he points out in the PS that the important provision in H.R.
1561 has been endorsed by the American Legion. This is what the
American Legion says. They said:
These former members of the South Vietnamese armed forces
who escaped certainly have great reason to fear being
forcefully repatriated. All one needs to do is review the
latest State Department report on human rights in Vietnam to
realize that little has changed with respect to what happens.
We have talked to families in my area who have talked about their
family members who have literally committed suicide. I think the
gentleman is right, and I strongly support the Smith amendment. I think
it will be very good for the country.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr.
Smith].
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for
yielding to me.
I think it needs to be reiterated that human rights groups have
reported several instances of people being hurt upon their return,
jailing, interrogation about anticommunist political activities in the
camps, discrimination in employment and housing, and in Loas the
disappearance and the probable killing of Hmong leader Vue Mai.
The American Legion again, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Wolf],
brought the American Legion, relying on their own contacts with former
Vietnamese comrades in arms who corroborate these accounts. One reason
that the United Nations cannot find any persecution is that they have
only eight monitors for all of Vietnam and only two for Laos.
I wanted to remind the membership we are talking about people that
are going out with a support staff that has been hired through the
Vietnamese and the Laotion Government. This is a situation where the
person that is with the repatriation monitor is reporting to a
government, and the government is hostile in many instances to these
individuals. Who can blame them for not speaking openly after being
forcibly repatriated in the first place? I do think there is
underreporting as well.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, let me just end up by saying
that there is an anti-illegal-immigration attitude in America today
with justification. We have millions of people coming across the
Mexican-American border for economic reasons, and that has caused a
real problem with our economy in many States. But the fact of the
matter is there are still people in this world who are fleeing
Communist dictatorships, and to send them back to death or worse is a
horrible thought. It is analogous to taking people who came across the
Berlin Wall. It is a wrong-headed move. I hope my colleagues will
support the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith].
{time} 1530
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] has
expired.
(At the request of Mr. Obey and by unanimous consent, Mr. Burton of
Indiana was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from yielding to me.
Mr. Chairman, I very much respect the gentleman's concern about the
refugees in question, but I would simply ask this: Why should we engage
in a legislative process which in fact cuts off the assistance to
refugees who do, on a voluntary basis want to go back to their own
country? Why should we eliminate the financial assistance provided to
those people?
Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, because, with all due respect, I would say
to the gentleman from Wisconsin, the process has been corrupted by
money and sexual abuse, so some of these people are volunteering to go
back out of coercion.
Mr. OBEY. If the gentleman will continue to yield, the fact is that
under the process for Hmong refugees, each refugee will have to again
resign a statement indicating that he or she is engaging in voluntary
repatriation, and if they do not sign a statement, they are not
repatriated. It seems to me the gentleman's statement is off base.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, this is part of the problem.
If they do not sign the voluntary agreement, they are put in jail, in
many instances. In Thailand six Hmong leaders, all of whom were
screened in as refugees, but scheduled for voluntary repatriation to
Laos anyway, were jailed because they were actively resisting voluntary
repatriation.
Mr. OBEY. Tell the whole story.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. This is the whole story, if the gentleman
will yield further. These people, we wonder why there may be people who
may react, and I do not condone the violence, but when people come in
in riot gear to tell these people ``It is time for you to be
voluntarily repatriated,'' they react with an attitude.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] has
expired.
(At the request of Mr. Obey and by unanimous consent, Mr. Burton of
Indiana was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, let me simply ask the gentleman, why do we
not also explain the fact that the same organization which is peddling
those stories in fact is also raising funds by selling military,
police, and civilian titles in their resistance army? Why do we not
talk about the intimidation [[Page H5537]] from them that is going on
within the Hmong community? There is intimidation going on on both
sides.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, let me make clear to the
gentleman that our embassy confirmed this story. I want to go back to
something I said earlier on. The Refugee Committee of Lawyers for Human
Rights has so blasted the process of screening they have changed
international standards. The credibility is one where they are viewed
with unbelievable skepticism before they even open their mouths. It is
a flawed process.
We are saying that the President should certify, and if it is not a
flawed process, then the money is okay, but if he can certify these
people are being voluntarily repatriated, that is a different story.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] has
expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Burton of Indiana was allowed to proceed
for 30 additional seconds.)
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, let me just end real briefly by
saying this. If there is any doubt about these people being sent back
to possible death, or worse, at the hands of the Vietnamese Communists,
then we should err on the side of safety. That is the reasonable and
humanitarian thing to do.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Smith amendment. We
should not support the shameful forced repatriation of our allies who
fought by our side during the Vietnam war. The gentleman's amendment
would permit our Nation to end that period with honor and dignity.
The American Overseas Interest Act does not require one extra penny
to be spent nor would it increase the number of refugees admitted to
the United States. It merely disassociates the United States with
sending people back to Vietnam and Laos who have genuine refugee claims
because they fought with us during the war.
It is not accurate to speculate that it is safe for our allies to
return to Vietnam and Laos. The U.N. repatriation monitoring process in
place in Vietnam and Laos are run by Vietnamese and Laotian citizens
hired in coordination with those Governments. In Laos 14 of the 18
UNHCR repatriation monitoring personnel are citizens of Laos hired by
UNHCR with the coordination of the Laotian Government. In Vietnam 30 of
the 38 UNHCR repatriation monitoring personnel are Vietnamese citizens
hired by UNHCR with the coordination of the Vietnamese Government. It
is no small wonder that it is claimed that there have been no cases of
retribution. The Governments of those two repressive governments are
investigating themselves. This is clearly a case of allowing the fox to
guard the hen house.
It is for this reason that the American Legion and other veteran
organizations support Mr. Smith's amendment and fully support the
provision in the bill. Our military men and women who fought in Vietnam
and in Laos are unanimously opposed to any effort to abandon our
allies.
Permit me to read from a letter dated May 23 sent to me by John
Summer, the executive director of the American Legion.
The American Legion supports the initiative . . . which
would provide for a reexamination of the refugee status of
thousands of Vietnamese who fled their homeland out of fear
of political reprisal, up to and including death.
The American Legion considers it a debt of honor to
strongly support your efforts to authorize the proper
screening of those individuals who continue to be held in
refugee camps in Asia, and to allow for the resettlement of
those refugees who fought side-by-side with the American
forces during the Vietnam war, as well as their families.
The United Nations will not allow our Hmong allies living in camps in
Thailand and eligible under United States law to immigrate here, to
leave the camps. Instead the Thai Government and the U.N. are using our
funds to forcefully send our Hmong allies back to a dangerous fate in
Laos.
The screening process of refugees administered by the comprehensive
plan of action must be broadly reviewed in order to remedy unfair and
otherwise defective status determination. The use of U.S. funds must be
conditioned on a thorough review of this process. The American Overseas
Interests Act would allow for such a review.
Accordingly, I strongly support the Smith amendment, and oppose the
Bereuter amendment. Let us end this sad period of history in Vietnam
and Laos with honor and dignity.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentleman, does he really believe that
Save the Children would be participating in forced repatriation? Does
the gentleman really believe that? That is one agency we have provided
the $1.5 million to to assist people who want to return to their own
country.
Does the gentleman really believe Save the Children Foundation is in
the business of forcing people to be repatriated?
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, we are not talking about Save the Children
now, we are talking about the Vietnamese UNHCR personnel, the Laotian
UNHCR personnel, who are apparently not doing an effective job.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I
would simply say that I sent two of my staffers into the region to try
to determine what the facts were. They came back with many indications
that the voluntary agencies involved do not support the elimination of
the ability to assist people who want to go back to their own country.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentleman, does he believe
there has not been one single case of retribution? We sent our own
staff people over to look into the refugee camps, and they were refused
entrance and examination.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman continue to yield so I
could answer his question?
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman]
has expired.
(At the request of Mr. Obey and by unanimous consent, Mr. Gilman was
allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I would, frankly, be surprised if there had
not been any cases of retribution, because, after all, this is not
heaven. However, the fact is that I do not oppose anybody's efforts to
try to see to it that each and every refugee has an honest choice about
where they want to go, but I do think it is softheaded for this
Congress or for the American Legion or any other organization in this
country to say ``Oh, yes, we will accept the system which will in fact
bring financial incentives for all of them to come to the United
States, and by the way, we will not provide the funds for it, and we
will let the local units of government get stuck with having to support
them.'' That is not good.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, it does not help this debate
one iota for the gentleman to call it softheaded to say that the
screening process was influenced. The overwhelming consensus by the
human rights groups is that it is flawed.
Let me just, again, remind the gentleman, and this is not a
conservative human rights organization, the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights Refugee Project concluded, and I quote, ``The entire screening
process and review procedures remain seriously flawed.'' They went on
to state: ``The process remains hostile to genuine refugees, and
thousands may have been wrongly rejected.''
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment to the
Bereuter amendment.
Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
[[Page H5538]]
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, before I make any comments, I yield to my
colleague, the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
I also support the Smith amendment, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to
say how proud I am to be involved with a movement that would allow boat
people to be treated as the refugees that they really are. There are
thousands of these refugees lingering in miserable camps throughout
Southeast Asia, waiting for freedom. I think we need to stand by our
former allies and make sure that they are treated as the refugees they
are.
Mr. Chairman, I remember a few years back refugees were forced out of
the camps in Hong Kong, and a number of refugees committed suicide
rather than return to the Communist regimes from which they fled. Mere
economic refugees do not commit suicide when faced with repatriation.
Mr. Chairman, I know lawyers who have been involved in the Lawyers
Committee on Human Rights. They tell me what the gentleman has said,
that the process has been flawed. We need to stand by our former
allies. I remember when Vietnam fell 20 years ago, the efforts I made
to save those who were escaping from communism. We must not forget them
today.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me, and I
strongly urge support of the Smith amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Berman]
has expired.
(At the request of Mr. Vento and by unanimous consent, Mr. Berman was
allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)
Mr. VENTO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BERMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.
(Mr. VENTO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. VENTO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment and
the underlying intent of the bill.
It is really a difficult one. I understand the good intentions, but I
think there has been a shadow over this process. The increased interest
of the governments in camps, the Thai Government, to close refugee
camps has, I think, rushed the process greatly. There has been repeated
reports, and I mean extensive reports, even in the Minnesota papers,
concerning mistreatment and abuse of individuals in these areas.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment to the
Bereuter amendment which would rewrite a provisions in the legislation.
Specifically, I am very concerned that the Hmong currently in refugee
camps in Thailand, first, that they are voluntarily returning, and
second, that they receive whatever funding has been promised if they do
repatriate. These people are returning to very difficult conditions in
Laos and are in dire need of the minimal assistance being provided to
them in order to survive. They are often sent to locations where they
must glean a living from lands and communities with few resources. It
is, however, vital that we support the non governmental organization
and a truly objective UNHCR presence in Laos and Vietnam, because of
the necessary monitoring to ensure the safety of those repatriated.
There has been a great deal of trouble getting credible information out
of Laos with regards to the Hmong.
The Hmong are in a special situation. It is my understanding that
most of the Hmong have refugee status and therefore are already
eligible for resettlement in the United States or another country.
There are now reported less than 500 Hmong who have been determined to
be ineligible for resettlement. Other reports indicate a much higher
number. This legislation and initiative should be viewed as ensuring
that the process is credible and that the resettlement decisions are
voluntary.
Hopefully with the modifications now presented the Smith language
will more precisely resolve the questions raised.
Certainly some groups opposed to funding repatriation assistance
because of the possibility of persecution of the Hmong by the Laotian
Government. Unfortunately, our own State Department has done a poor job
of laying these fears to rest. The Hmong in the United States and those
still in the refugee camps hear from the State Department that there is
no need to worry about those who return to Laos at the same time they
hear stories of Hmong who have disappeared or been shot. It has been
extremely difficult to get satisfactory information or answers to
specific circumstances hence this legislative language attempts to
ensure certification of the circumstance, a common practice to verify
or qualify support that Congress has written into law, certainly we can
assume that the Clinton administration will proceed with dispatch and a
good faith effort.
The Hmong are special because the large majority of them already have
refugee status and are eligible for resettlement in the United States
or another country. What the United States Government needs to ensure
is that the Thai Government and other camp governments and the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees is making a proper determination of the
Hmong who are requesting resettlement. The Hmong are under considerable
pressure from the Thai to repatriate because the Thai want to close the
refugee camps and be done with this 20-year-old problem. We and
certainly the Clinton administration
and most in Congress don't want anyone to be forced to repatriate nor
do we want to cut off aid for those who choose to return, who do not
want to resettle in the United States or elsewhere.
Clearly, the situation of Hmong refugees in Thai refugee camps is an
ugly and sad one which we would all gladly see resolved. It is crucial
that these people be treated fairly, that they not be denied the
opportunity to resettle in the United States or elsewhere because they
have not previously chosen this option. Many of these people, although
they suffered persecution by the Government in Laos, many in fact some
would say most, hoped one day to be able to return to their native
land. They stayed in the refugee camps, a bad place to live, because
they dreamed that one day they would be able to return to life in their
country. Now these people are being faced with a choice they must make
now and they should be allowed to make the choice for which they are
eligible.
The United States cannot neglect its obligation to the Hmong people
who sacrificed lives and homeland to fight on the side of the United
States in the Vietnam war. They cannot be allowed to forget those who
are still suffering as a result of the Vietnam war. This amendment
maintains the fragile status quo, a situation that much concerns the
Hmong-Americans in Minnesota. Certainly, reports of serious human
rights violations need to be fully resolved and rectified. Often the
choice of Hmong within a refugee camp is being questioned as to whether
such a person made a voluntary choice to return to Laos. That must be
resolved. There can be no misunderstanding that when a refugee returns
to his or her homeland that there basic rights and personal safety are
secure. That funding and assistance provided for reintegration is
necessary should be obvious. The certification process in this measure
is viewed by my Hmong-American constituents as the last hope to rectify
this situation that affects their family members. The hearings held in
Congress and the letters written too often have left more questions
than answers, therefore I oppose stripping the language from the bill,
and am in support of the rewritten Smith amendment and the Hmong
refugees.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BERMAN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
(Mr. NADLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment. I
want to simply state that I differ from my friend, the gentleman from
Tennessee [Mr. Duncan], in that we ought to protect refugees, whether
they are refugees from communistic dictatorships or from any other
dictatorships. They have the same human rights, and we ought to protect
them.
Clearly in this instance the Smith amendment ought to be adopted, and
the Bereuter amendment replaced, because we should protect these
refugees, and because the so-called screening over there, most human
rights observers and organizations have said is not adequate.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment to the
Bereuter amendment. If adopted without the Smith amendment the Bereuter
amendment will make the United States complicit in the persecution of
thousands of Southeast Asian refugees.
Forget the rhetoric of the nativism demagogues, the Bereuter
amendment would not close any loophole in our immigration law, because
none exists. In fact, it would shatter what is best and most balanced
in our refugee policy.
Without Smith, the Bereuter amendment would eliminate language in the
bill requiring that no one can be returned to Vietnam with the
assistance of American taxpayer money until they receive a fair and
impartial screening to determine if they are genuine
refugees. [[Page H5539]]
Is there something wrong with that?
The language of the bill is straightforward:
It provides up to $30 million for the relocation of Vietnamese,
Laotian, or Cambodian refugees.
It prohibits the use of U.S. funds to repatriate those refugees
unless the President can certify that bona fide refugees, and only bona
fide refugees, have been offered, not even placed in but offered
resettlement outside their countries of nationality. That means
relocation anywhere else, not only to the United States.
It also requires the President to certify that the process of
determining refugee status conforms to our basic commitment to
fairness, honesty, and due process.
The bill does not, as you may have heard, require that all these
refugees come to the United States. Read the bill, it's on pages 102-
103.
The bill does not steal money away from refugees from the former
Soviet Union. Eighty million dollars is set aside for that purpose on
page 101.
So what is all the excitement about?
These refugees are not on U.S. soil; our Government is not running
these refugee camps. Is it too much to suggest that we should not pay
for their forced repatriation until we can be assured that they will
not face persecution?
For those refugees who will come to the United States, this bill does
not create any new refugee slots. In fact it does not even use all of
the slots available. These are refugees who quality for resettlement,
that is, refugees who are persecuted for their past affiliation with
the United State or who have been persecuted on the basis of religion
or ethnicity.
We must not abandon our commitment to honesty, fairness, and decency.
I know money for refugee programs is politically unpopular these
days. At the very least we should agree that those scarce dollars that
are available should not be used to move refugees involuntarily to
their countries of origin to face persecution.
Mr. Speaker, I opposed the war in Vietnam. Many of our colleagues
here supported that war, and some even fought there. Those differences
still have the power to divide this Nation. The mere suggestion that
some may come from the northern part of Vietnam sill seems to have the
power to suggest to some Members that these refugees will make war on
us when they arrive here. I think that, regardless of the stand you
took 25 years ago, if you ever cared about the people of Southeast
Asia, of if you were moved to take a stand on either side because the
preservation of fundamental American values was important to you, then
you must help adopt the Smith amendment. I urge a yes vote on Smith and
no vote on Bereuter.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, this is a very complicated and important
issue. There is a lot of right on both sides. The fact is the Orderly
Departure Program and CPA have dealt with the problem of boat people,
dealt with a way to allow people who are in fear of political
persecution to leave Vietnam directly to resettle in countries, and
have set up a process which, unfortunately, has been too flawed in the
camps on the countries of first asylum to resettle in other countries.
The gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith], by his amendment, has
taken a major step toward ameliorating concerns earlier expressed
during committee debate on the language which is in the bill. He has
softened the earmark, he has made it clear that the intention of his
amendment is not to increase the number of refugees admitted to the
United States above those currently permitted.
The gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] and the gentleman from
Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] are pointing out the potential problems with some
of the restrictions in the language of the gentleman from New Jersey
[Mr. Smith], or some of the requirements in the language. However, I,
at least at this particular point in time, want to focus on energizing
our State Department to get the UNHCR and the people in charge of that
screening process to take a look at a number of cases where it is clear
that people with a well-founded fear of persecution, if they were to be
repatriated back to Vietnam, should have a chance to prevent what could
be a catastrophe for them.
{time} 1545
Between now and the conference committee, we can look at how to do
this. I do not think every candidate should be rescreened. I do not
think we want to end voluntary repatriation. I do not think we want to
give the people in the camps false hopes about things that are going to
happen.
I do not want them to think we want to embark on something which
would become politically unsustainable in the United States, but the
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] and others were right. When you are
talking about people who fought on our side, who were imprisoned for 10
years for political acts and now are talked about being sent back, you
want to make sure that that is not being done in a fashion that is
going to put their lives and their liberty in jeopardy.
I think the Smith language in the bill as modified now helps to send
the message to the State Department, to the international community
about our concerns about the flaws in the rescreening process and in
the repatriation process and that between now--I actually hope this
bill does not get to a conference committee, but if it were to get to a
conference committee, we can deal with some of the problems that people
have correctly pointed out.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
of the Committee on International Relations, I rise in strong
opposition to the Smith amendment. It is well-intended but it is a
disastrously bad approach.
The gentleman from California has said the section of the bill is
made slightly better, by the amendment of the gentleman from New Jersey
[Mr. Smith]. The gentleman, Mr. Berman, was the person that raised the
initial concerns about this section in the committee. I say this
section of the bill is a disastrously bad approach. I do not use that
language very often. I know that the intention of the gentleman from
New Jersey is to be highly respected, and I respect it, too, but the
results, the bloodshed, the tragedies that will result from this
reversal of policy are just going to be extraordinary.
If we make this change in the refugee program in Southeast Asia the
blood is going to be on our hands for the additional boats of refugees
that are going to be launched. This section of the bill and the Smith
amendment completely devastates the UNHCR-multinational Comprehensive
Plan for Action which is being implemented.
Why is it that most of the refugee groups that have spoken out on the
issue have spoken against the language in the bill and would speak, if
they have not done so already, against the language offered by the
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith] as an amendment to my amendment?
It is because they understand that what you are unleashing here by
approving the Smith amendment is a tragedy.
Mr. Chairman, we have heard many comments about forced repatriation.
Of course no one is in favor of forced repatriation. We have accepted
over 1 million Indochinese refugees into this country because we have a
responsibility as our former allies to do so. We have done that
generously. Now we have the UNHCR trying to get a reasonable hold on
this economic refugee and boat people process. We have 47,000 refugees
waiting there at this moment, which are categorized by the UNHCR as
economic refugees.
I want to see any Member stand up in front of their local VFW chapter
and American Legion chapter and say, ``We granted refugee status to
economic refugees from North Vietnam, our former enemies.'' That is
what I want to see you do. If you vote in favor of this amendment which
guts my amendment offered for myself and for the gentleman from
Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] and for the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Smith], you
are devastating the Comprehensive Plan for Action.
What about UNHCR? Is it a corrupt process? Well, no, it is not. Are
there corruptive elements in it? Absolutely, there are.
Take a look at this. Since the screening process began in 1989, about
125,000 Indochinese have been screened under close supervision of the
UNHCR. One-quarter of those screened, representing more than 31,000
asylum seekers, have been found to be bona fide refugees and have been
resettled in the West. The screening process included the right to
appeal directly to UNHCR, which did not hesitate to overturn bad
screening decisions. In fact, it overturned 1,500 initial
refusals. [[Page H5540]]
While there are undoubtedly examples of error in such a massive
screening process, the bulk of informed opinion, both government and
NGO, disputes the assertion of mass fraud and corruption in the
process. If you destroy this process by the Smith language in the bill,
you have left the United States holding all of the responsibilities for
the tide of refugees that you are about to launch. I ask you to think
seriously about that.
What about the egregious cases that are mentioned and identified by
the NGO's? I will work with my colleagues and the NGO's to press UNHCR
and the State Department to be more active in seeking redress. I
understand that at least 48 cases from the list have been successfully
overturned, and more perhaps should be. But I caution my colleagues in
the House, do not launch this wave of refugees.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BEREUTER. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a specific question with
respect to a specific group of refugees.
Right now, there are a lot of Hmong refugees trapped in Thailand.
Some of them want to go back to Laos. A lot of them want to come to the
United States. And a lot of them, if given the opportunity, would
prefer to stay in Thailand.
I would simply ask this question of those who are supporting the
Smith amendment. If this country today unilaterally takes this action,
and sends a message to refugees around the world that we are about to
absorb all of the refugees discussed under this amendment, and if under
those circumstances the Thailand Government then decides against
allowing those Hmong refugees to resettle in Thailand, are we really
doing those Hmong refugees any good?
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter]
has expired.
(On request of Mr. Obey, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Bereuter was
allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I continue to yield to the gentleman from
Wisconsin [Mr. Obey].
Mr. OBEY. Are we not in fact by this action today going to make it
highly unlikely that the Thai Government would in fact make that third
option available to those Hmong refugees? And does that not in fact
mean, just as the gentleman says, that the United States is going to
unilaterally assume onto its own shoulders all of the burden for the
turmoil that will result and all of the financial burden that will
result as well?
It just seems to me that if we want to change the screening process,
we ought to focus on demands to change the screening process. We should
not in the process blow up an international agreement unilaterally,
which this language does.
Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman. That is exactly what it would
mean with respect to the Hmong refugees. About 2 months ago, I wrote to
the State Department in support of the Hmong. I now understand an
agreement is being worked out with the Thai Government to grant us
access to the Hmong in the camps later this year. But if we blow it up
by this action today, that is gone.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], the committee
chairman, asked me in his absence to make a unanimous-consent request.
I do that in concluding my remarks.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that debate on the pending
amendments and any amendments thereto be limited to 30 minutes, to be
controlled by the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith] for 15 minutes,
the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] for 7\1/2\ minutes, and myself,
the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], for 7\1/2\ minutes.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Nebraska?
Mr. GUNDERSON. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, there are
a number of us who have been patiently waiting to engage in this debate
and we are not about, when we have constituents and their families
whose fate is at the mercy of the outcome of this, to agree to that
kind of a unanimous-consent request when we have had no time, when
certain Members have continued to ask for more time, more time and more
time so they can conduct their discussions at our expense. At this
point, I object, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I have heard a lot of emotional debate today and I
would just like to try to put this in some perspective. I do not serve
on this particular committee, but I have served on the Immigration and
Refugee Subcommittee for over 14 years. I personally have visited the
Hmong camps, I have personally visited Hong Kong, I have been there
more than once, and I think I have some feel for the history of this
matter since about 1980.
The story that I would like to tell a little bit of to put it in
perspective is the story of the way in which the decisions were being
made back in the 1980's with regard to how we screened people in and
out among these groups of boat people and the Hmong and so on. In the
very early 1980's, there was a very strict screening. President Reagan
when he came into office, was in office a couple of years, and some of
us reported to him from our visits over there that this was a major
problem, that indeed the standards being used to screen in were not
allowing those to come in who had been those who had assisted us during
the war, who were truly people who have credible fears of persecution,
and so on and so forth.
So in light of that, in 1983 President Reagan adopted a command
performance, if you will, from our Immigration and Naturalization
Service and the State Department, for how we were going to handle the
screenings of refugees to come in from over in that part of the world.
That series of standard criteria, if you will, were later adopted into
statute in what is known as the Lautenberg amendment.
It is those criteria which the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith]
has offered and put in the bill which is underlying this today and
which we are trying to defend on this side, and I must reluctantly
oppose my good friend, the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter],
because he wants to strike that more liberal standard, if you will.
That standard prevailed, this standard I am talking about, for nearly
6 years, until 1989, when this comprehensive plan was adopted. It is
only since the comprehensive plan has been adopted that the U.S.
screeners are out of the picture pretty much, and all of the UNHCR
folks are doing the screening we are hearing the complaints about.
We do not want to let everybody in. The standard that Ronald Reagan
promoted and adopted and we operated under for 6 years is the standard
that we simply want, those of us supporting the Smith and the
underlying bill position want to have adopted at least for 1 year, to
look at the group that we are talking about forcibly repatriating in
many cases. Let's screen them under that standard.
Let me tell you what the preferences are to that standard, the
presumption almost that they still have to prove credible fear:
Former officials of the government in the south existing prior to the
takeover in 1975, and we are talking about Vietnam, national and local
officials.
Former members of the military of the government in the south
existing prior to the takeover in 1975.
Catholics and Buddhist monks. Now, there might be some of them, a
very tiny few of them, from the north. I think they are going to be the
only ones you hear today who could be even under this list.
Persons formerly or presently employed by the United States or
Western institutions, or persons educated in the West.
Persons required after the takeover in 1975 to undergo reeducation in
reeducation or labor camps, or
who were imprisoned or sent involuntarily to new economic zones
because they were considered politically or socially undesirable.
Ethnic Chinese.
Montagnards.
Chams.
Accompanying members of households or persons falling into any of the
preceding categories.
The same type of list, I am not going to read it, is there for the
Laotian and the Cambodian situation. [[Page H5541]]
We are not talking about just letting everybody in who is an economic
refugee. With all due respect to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr.
Bereuter], that is not what this whole debate is about.
What those of us who believe in the underlying bill and believe in
the modest amendment that the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith] is
offering today want to see happen is that for at least a year, maybe
two if it takes it, that we take a look at the boat people from Hong
Kong, the Hmong who are over in Thailand, the others in the camps in
Malaysia, and judge them and have them judged by the standards that
were on that list in 1983 to 1989, so that we can be satisfied in our
consciences as American people that we have indeed allowed those to
come out who really should and not be sending those back that would be
sent back in harm's way.
A lot of us just do not have confidence in the current process. We
have seen too many examples where it is not working. I do not see the
harm in it. I personally do not see the draw of the boat people, that
we are going to draw a whole bunch more people out with this.
The standard is pretty darn clear and it is pretty narrow. It is not
economic refugees, again, with all due respect. It is substantially
below the 40,000 figure some have used that would ever be allowed in
under this standard. I suspect a very small number, comparatively
speaking, would actually qualify under this Lautenberg or this Ronald
Reagan standard, which is really what it is. It would be a modest
number of people who would be ultimately screened out.
Again, we are not actually going to accomplish this necessarily
because the underlying proposal simply says we are not going to provide
money for the comprehensive plan anymore. We are not going to be a
party to what we think is wrong unless these standards are adopted and
used in the screening process. That is all it does.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum]
has expired.
(On request of Mr. Bereuter, and by unanimous consent, Mr. McCollum
was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I
appreciate his expertise and his experience.
Mr. Chairman, I have two questions for the gentleman. I will ask them
both first and let the gentleman respond.
First of all, the gentleman said we may need a year, perhaps two
years. What happens when the country of first asylum begins to fail to
cooperate, an action which I fully expect to take place immediately?
The second question: In light of the fact that even a small rumor
floated that there were jobs available in Japan caused a boat flotilla
of over 1,000 people to leave. They had to be rescued from the sea.
Given that example, why does the gentleman think we are not about to
launch a major exodus of boat people?
Mr. McCOLLUM. First of all, I do not personally believe we are going
to launch any major exodus, because the amount involved in this as far
as what the changes are concerned is modest. They are not comprehensive
like the gentleman I know in all due respect believes; I understand he
does.
Second, I believe, yes, there is a chance that Thailand and some of
the other countries, Hong Kong perhaps, will not accept this standard
that we would say we will impose. If we do not provide them the money,
they may very well forcibly send a lot of these folks on back, anyway,
and I think that that may very well continue to happen. I do not know.
But I do not want my name and the name of this Congress and the money
of the American people being spent for the kind of forcible
repatriation that I believe is going on with a substantial number, not
all, but a substantial number of these folks.
{time} 1600
I in good conscience, and I think most of the Members who are on our
side of this issue are really voting with that in mind, and we believe
the downside is not as great as the upside of what we are doing. There
is some risk, but I think it is a modest risk.
Mr. BEREUTER. If the gentleman will yield one more time, the UNHCR I
believe the gentleman understands, has screened in 125,000 Indochinese.
And then when we had the appeals process for those screened out at
least 1,500 were screened in. So in fact it is not a totally corrupt
process and it isn't a hopeless process for legitimate political
refugees.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Reclaiming my time, I realize they have done a modestly
good job, maybe a good job in some cases, but there have been enough
reports to this Member and experienced staff, including one sitting
beside me in the gentleman's committee that have not been able to get
the answers to satisfy this Member that convinces me there is a
corruption in its process and there is something going on I cannot
condone. While some may have been good, all of it has not been good. It
is my personal belief, with all due respect to the gentleman, if we
need to give it a second look, we will give it, and if it does not
work, so be it. But we owe it to the people involved and all those who
came out in the past and that have been allies of us in the process and
in the long since Vietnam period to do this, in my judgment, and that
is why I feel as passionate about it as I do.
I think we need to give them the one more chance. I urge an aye vote
for the Smith amendment as a major alteration and as the gentleman
said, it will change your amendment. It restores the basic bill to what
it should be, allowing all of the refugees to come in under the
existing ceiling now so we would not be taking in any additional, and
at no additional cost, I submit.
Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I have friends on all sides of this debate. But I rise
in strong support of the Smith amendment and sadly against the Bereuter
amendment, and I do so not only as a matter of intellect but with some
measure of heart.
It was in the Central Highlands 27 years ago this summer when the
village chieftain of a Hmong tribe, the Montagnard mountain people,
wound a small piece of cheap silver around my wrist, and I have not had
it off in 27 years. And I promised him I would not take it off until,
as he put it, the Communists stopped kidnaping, killing, and abusing
his people.
Now we have finally gotten around to treating native Americans with
respect simply because they were here first by 10,000 to 20,000 years.
The Hmong people are perfectly analogous to our American native Indian
tribes in this country. And they have been terribly abused.
And it is not only for them but for the Vietnamese, and all of the
other various backgrounds in that small abused country for almost two
centuries of Laos that I speak.
Once about every 10 years, Mr. Chairman, so this may be the last time
I will be sitting in the front bench, I will look at these Roman
letters that are cut into the front bench of our clerks and our
leadership. It reads union on the eastern end and peace on the western
side, but these three words I think are apropos to this debate--
justice, tolerance and liberty. Most of them, even the economic
refugees, are yearning for freedom and for liberty so badly that it
enables them to be horribly abused.
I have been fascinated that all sides here agree there is abuse. We
are arguing over how much abuse. To ask a man to give you his daughter
for sexual abuse, a type of coercive rape over seeking liberty, is
probably the most offensive sex crime that you could possibly imagine.
To keep upping the ante from a few hundred dollars to thousands of
dollars. I have gotten names of people here that I will not put in the
Record, because we have a defense mechanism in this well where we can
name people, and I am not prepared to do it outside of this Chamber so
I will not use their names. But they are colonels, higher ranking men,
hired by the United Nations refugee people to operate in this screening
process. Some of these high-ranking men will make families in the camps
put together their money and fly a leader all the way down to the
capital of Indonesia, to then be told that half his family will get
refugee status but the other half, [[Page H5542]] generally including
wives and daughters, will have to submit to more bribes if not to this
form of coercive rape.
I think it is terrible that screening officials have charged as low
as $400 U.S. dollars, demanding U.S. currency, up to $4,000 and there
have been substantiated cases as high as $10,000 or $12,000.
I have been to Southeast Asia eight times while the war for freedom
was going on, twice to Hanoi as a Congressman and several times to go
back to those camps. My oldest of my five children, my daughter Robin,
spent a year in those camps in 1980 and 1981. She saw abuses then,
Mercedes Benz cars arriving from Bangkok, air-conditioned cars
extorting money from those people. This corruption has been going on
for 14 years. I do not care if it is 3 percent, 5 percent, or 10
percent. My evidence shows me it is
even more than that. We have got to come to a screeching halt here.
Of course we do not like to see people fashioning spears and stakes.
God forbid they get hold of guns to fight for their liberty as this
country has done. There are excesses and innocent people in Hong Kong
who are law enforcement authorities that have been terribly wounded,
but the whole process, we must step back from it and look at it. The
Smith amendment is the best way to do it.
As the gentleman from Florida, Mr. McCollum, did not point out in his
letter, but the gentleman from Virginia, Frank Wolf, who is an
absolutely sterling person in this Chamber in either party on these
human rights issues, pointed out that the American Legion is asking us
to step back from this process. I have never found people in any
American Legion hall, with all due respect to the gentleman from
Wisconsin, Mr. Obey, to be soft-headed. Far from it. I think what we
have got to do is give these people the benefit of the doubt that they
have put their lives at stake, on the road and more often at sea, have
fielded Thai raping, pirates. They have fielded shark attack,
dehydration and at least 700,000 or 800,000 people drowned on the high
seas.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DORNAN. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I want to
make clear when I used the term soft-headed I was referring to Members
of Congress, not members of the American Legion.
Mr. DORNAN. I will try not to take that personally. As a member of
the American Legion I guess I have a pass on that. I would urge to
rarely vote ``no'' on my good friend the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr.
Bereuter, and ``yes'' for my friend, the gentleman from New Jersey,
Christopher Smith.
[From the Washington Times, May 22, 1995]
U.S. Bankrolls Corrupt U.N. Program
Since 1989, the United States has contributed roughly 150
million dollars to a United Nations program that screens
refugees for resettlement and non-refugees for repatriation.
This screening program is, however, seriously corrupt and has
placed numerous refugees at risk. It affects thousands of
U.S. citizens whose tax dollars have gone into financing it,
ironically.
In Indonesia, for instance, screening officials have
charged asylum seekers 500-4,000 U.S. dollars for refugee
status at the initial screening stage. At the final appeal
stage, the price goes as high as $10,000-12,000.
The head of the corruption racket is none other than
Colonel Wim Roesdi, Chairman of the Indonesian Task Force, in
charge of Vietnamese asylum seekers. He has even opened a
bank account under the name of Obrien Sitepu, his right-hand
man, at Chemical Bank, New York to collect cash directly from
U.S. relatives of the asylum seekers.
Several lawyers working for the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) to oversee the screening process also took
part in the racket. Rahmad Irwan, representing UNHCR on the
Refugee Status Appeal Board, is known to have demanded both
money and sexual favors from asylum seekers in exchange for
refugee status. He then shared the proceeds with his
Indonesian counterparts on the Appeal Board.
In a number of instances, the boat people had to offer
their wives and daughters for several nights or longer,
sometimes for weeks, as part of the deal. Many refugees with
strong persecution claims have been denied refugee status
because they could not afford the bribes or because they
refused to offer their wives or daughters.
In some cases, U.S. relatives were required to travel to
Jakarta to pay cash directly to Colonel Roesdi. Some female
relatives had to satisfy his sexual demands in addition to
the cash.
A number of officials affiliated with U.S. consular offices
are also involved. For instance, Sumarno, an Office Manager
of the Joint Voluntary Agency--a U.S. agency funded by the
State Department and operating out of U.S. consular offices--
routinely proposed deals to U.S. citizens who came to visit
their relatives in Galang Camp. Several U.S. citizens have
denounced his criminal activities to U.S. consular officials
but were met with bureaucratic indifference. Meanwhile, their
relatives in Galang Camp suffered retaliation by the
Indonesian authorities. They have become victims of threats
and physical abuses, and their correspondences have been
intercepted and confiscated.
As a consequence of corruption, those with cash as well as
collaborators, operators, and mistresses of screening
officials are recognized as refugees and resettled. On the
other hand, genuine refugees with compelling claims but
without money to pay, or who refuse to offer their wives or
daughters to screening officials, have often been denied
refugee status and now face deportation.
Many religious leaders severely persecuted in Vietnam, have
been ``screened out'' because they have nothing to offer. For
instance, Ven. Thich Thanh Lien, Chief Representative of the
Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam in Galang Camp was denied
refugee status despite his strong refugee claims. In 1993,
his disciples and colleagues in the United States and other
countries had to pool money to pay Colonel Roesdi $7000 to
get the screening decision reversed. Similarly, Ven. Thich
Minh Hau, another Buddhist monk, was granted refugee status
only after his disciples paid $5000 to the screening
authorities so as to prevent his deportation to Vietnam.
Several other monks are less fortunate. They have spent the
past seven months in prison awaiting eventual deportation to
Vietnam, where their Church had been outlawed.
Thousands of former political prisoners, human rights
activists, resistance fighters, who had been imprisoned for
their U.S. ties during the war or because of their political
beliefs have also been denied refugee status.
In a number of instances, screening officials intentionally
screen in only have of the family. Once resettled, they must
pay to get the rest of their family out. Those who do not
have the means to pay have to accept indefinite separation
from their loved ones,
Many boat people recently resettled have offered to
testify. A number of former UNHCR lawyers have gone public.
In late 1993, Simon Jeans, formerly with UNHCR in Indonesia,
publicly denounced the flawed screening system. In his words,
``several refugees whose status had been accepted by UNHCR
officials were turned down by Indonesian officials after
failing to come up with the cash.''
Another lawyer, who established the screening program in
Indonesia but who later resigned, reported that ``the reason
why corruption was possible to such an extent in Indonesia
was that the UNHCR leadership in that country was never
interested in enforcing qualitative standards in screening.
Despite the many appeals by asylum seekers and refugee
advocates and the many undeniable evidences, UNHCR has
steadfastly denied any wrongdoing by its own officials or
local screening officials. Instead, the agency has invested
considerable resources into silencing protesters and into
explaining away the egregious screening decisions.
The United States ends up bank rolling a corrupt U.N.
program, which victimizes not only victims of persecution in
Vietnam but also thousands of U.S. citizens who have been
coerced into paying bribes to screening officials. Those who
refuse to cooperate have seen their relatives abused and
threatened by camp officials. Some of their relatives have
committed suicide to protest the injustice or to escape
deportation to Communist Vietnam.
It is time to stop the tragedy and save lives.
Mr. GUNDERSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
(Mr. GUNDERSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. GUNDERSON. Mr. Chairman, I think I am as much of an establishment
guy or at least accused of that as any of my colleagues, and I come
here today with the highest respect for the gentleman from Nebraska
[Mr. Bereuter] and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey], and
frankly, I think they are partially right. But it is the part where
they may not be right that drives me to this particular debate and why
I rise in such strong support for the Smith amendment.
The fact is that we are dealing with either an intentional or an
unintentional misinformation game, and people's lives are at stake as
this game goes on.
I want Members to know that last fall the gentleman from New York
[Mr. Gilman], the distinguished chairman of this committee, the
gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Leach], and myself wrote a letter to the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. We wrote that letter
because six members of the Hmong community who were in the
[[Page H5543]] Ban Napho camp had tried to provide a petition to Mr.
Gilman's staff raising their concerns about the repatriation process.
Those six gentlemen were as a result of that effort arrested, and they
were taken to a prison or an immigration detention center at Suan Phlu.
Now we wrote asking about them, and we received a letter back on
December 7 which said: ``Their well-being, like that of other persons
of concern to UNHCR, are monitored by full-time UNHCR personnel. You
might be interested to know that the persons concerned are in good
health and are receiving preferential treatment, including English
classes. They are only complaining of boredom.''
Why do I tell Members that? I tell them that because between
Christmas and New Year's of this past year a member of my staff and
five other staff people gave up of their holidays to go over to
Thailand and to try to investigate the circumstances. They were able to
get in during visitation hours to that detention center, and while they
were there they were able to talk to these six individuals. Do you know
what these six individuals told them? They told them that there had
only been one visit over the entire 4-month detention process by anyone
from the U.N. High Command on Refugees. They had only been out of their
cell once, and that was when a friend from the Ministry of Interior
came to visit them. No one from the United States Embassy, despite our
requests, had been there to visit them, and the U.S. Embassy was
only 2\1/2\ blocks away. They were quarantined in a small cell of 18
people. They were required to sleep on concrete floors with only a
towel as their bedding. They were given only two meals a day of bamboo
and rice. They were given no medical care at all. Two people complained
of fevers and two others complained of ulcers.
Now, I tell you all of that because as this debate was emerging last
week, our State Department sent a new letter regarding this same
situation at which they said, ``Although the six were taken to Suan
Phlu, they were still considered refugees by the Thai Government and
UNHCR. They were well treated and their welfare was monitored by the
UNHCR.''
I do not enjoy calling people like our State Department or the UNHCR
liars, but I have to tell my colleagues when we are talking about
truth, when we are talking about justice, when we are talking about
people's lives, both of these agencies are misrepresenting the truth.
I do not doubt for 1 second that what the gentleman from Nebraska
[Mr. Bereuter] and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] are
suggesting is that there is some room for some problems that need to be
resolved. But let us not kid ourselves about this debate this
afternoon. This is a debate that is going to be heard around the world,
because this is a debate about whether the United States Congress
approves of the forced repatriation procedures as they are ongoing at
this very moment, and if we reject the Smith amendment, Members will
reject the hopes and the lives of many people of the Hmong community to
torture and in many cases eventual death.
I would suggest that since we voted on the Desert Storm resolution
and the vote to send our troops into hostility and harm's way, it is
this vote this afternoon on the Smith amendment which will affect more
lives of more individuals than any vote since that time.
I plead with Members for the sake of these people who stood with us
as our friends, support the Smith amendment.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I think that we have had a good debate on this
amendment this afternoon, and I compliment the previous speaker from
Wisconsin. I think that his heart is in the right place, and like him
and many of you I have been contacted by our Hmong community, and our
hearts go out to them. But we also have an obligation to our own people
and our own taxpayers.
We are being flooded with legal and illegal immigrants in this
country. Now we are going to open up the borders. In fact we do not
have borders over our own country anymore. We are going to take in tens
of thousands of economic refugees again.
Yes, we should help these people in the camps. We should look out for
them. They did stand with us. But the war was 20 years ago. How many
more are we going to bring into this country? Yes, we would like to
bring everybody into America, but that is not possible.
This is well-intentioned, but we cannot allow a new outflow of boat
people. Is that fair to these people, to give them hope to bring them
on the high seas again? This would not be in their best interests.
Yes, we also have to consider our own people. You know who is going
to pay for this. We had unfunded mandates we passed in the first 100
days. These people coming into local communities, who is going to
educate them, who is going to train them? This is going to cost a lot
of money. I heard here in debate before that we have 1 million that we
have brought into the country. How many more can we absorb?
{time} 1615
Yes, the Hmong are good citizens. We have a million here now. How
many more can we absorb? How many more can we assimilate?
We have an obligation to our own people, too, and we have to draw
fine lines, our own people, your taxpayers and mine. The American
people are a people with a great heart, but we must also have a level
head, and that is why this is a good amendment. It is an amendment with
a heart, but it is also an amendment with reason, and that is why I am
for the Bereuter-Obey amendment.
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
last words.
I rise in support of the Bereuter-Obey amendment and against the
amendment by my friend, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith].
Mr. Chairman, there are two very fine Vietnamese restaurants in
Arlington, Cafe Saigon and Nam Viet. They are owned by a Vietnamese
gentleman who served South Vietnam in the army. In fact, he was
imprisoned afterward, tortured.
I met with him in my office, as he is a constituent, on Friday. He
showed me dozens of pictures. One of those pictures was of the chief of
intelligence for the South Vietnamese army, who is a very wealthy man
now. He is a consultant to the Vietnamese Government. He showed me any
number of other pictures of people who had been very active in high-
ranking positions for the South Vietnamese army who had been considered
enemies of the people on the fall of Saigon but are now very much a
part of society and the economy. He showed me pictures of him standing
in Hanoi, pictures of him standing in every place that we would have
thought was off limits.
He explained that he was able to travel anyplace. He went over there
because he has helped to set up an orphanage for Vietnamese children,
particularly the Amerasian children, the children of American GIs, who
had been orphaned who are left in Vietnam, and he told me, Mr.
Chairman, that the real need is for American involvement, not for us to
turn our backs and continue trying to punish Vietnam. He felt his
country and his people had been punished enough, that it is now time
for healing, it is time for people like him and others like him to
participate in Vietnam's economy.
He feels very strongly that the people who are living in very
difficult conditions in refugee camps ought to be repatriated back to
Vietnam to see, as he did, the changes that have occurred in Vietnam,
to realize that time marches on, that the Vietnamese people now are far
more focused on the future, a fairly bright economic future, than they
are obsessed in the past.
There seem to be more people in this country who are looking upon
Vietnam with the blinders of the past than there are in Vietnam itself.
This body time and again has made wrong decisions with regard to that
country. That country has suffered a great deal. I do not want that
country to be a Communist nation, but when you trace the history, we
were in many ways complicit with what occurred.
I am not going to go through a whole history at this point, but I
think we would be far better off taking a constructive role, helping
Vietnam develop a free enterprise economy, develop a democracy at some
point, [[Page H5544]] which I think is possible, and work with them to
show them how important protection of human rights is to us and should
be to them. We can only do that when we have face-to-face contact with
the Vietnamese people.
That is why the Bereuter-Obey amendment is the appropriate,
constructive one, and I think the Smith amendment, with all due
deference to my friend from New Jersey, is focused too much in the past
and past bigotries and does not take into consideration the enormous
progress that has been made in the last few years.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith] to the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 266,
noes 156, not voting 12, as follows:
[Roll No. 353]
AYES--266
Ackerman
Allard
Andrews
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Bateman
Becerra
Bentsen
Berman
Bevill
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Brewster
Browder
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Camp
Canady
Chabot
Chambliss
Chapman
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Coble
Coburn
Collins (GA)
Condit
Cooley
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cunningham
Davis
de la Garza
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Doyle
Dreier
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Evans
Everett
Farr
Fawell
Fields (LA)
Flake
Flanagan
Foglietta
Forbes
Fox
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frisa
Funderburk
Ganske
Gekas
Geren
Gilman
Goodling
Graham
Gunderson
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hinchey
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Hostettler
Hoyer
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jackson-Lee
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kim
King
Kingston
Klink
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Lantos
Largent
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Lincoln
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Longley
Lowey
Lucas
Manzullo
Martini
Mascara
McCollum
McCrery
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
McKinney
Menendez
Metcalf
Mica
Mineta
Molinari
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moorhead
Murtha
Myers
Myrick
Nadler
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Oberstar
Ortiz
Orton
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pastor
Paxon
Peterson (MN)
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Pryce
Quillen
Radanovich
Rahall
Rangel
Regula
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Sabo
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Schumer
Scott
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Stockman
Stupak
Talent
Tate
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thornton
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Torricelli
Towns
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Waters
Watts (OK)
Waxman
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zimmer
NOES--156
Abercrombie
Archer
Baldacci
Barrett (WI)
Barton
Bass
Beilenson
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant (TX)
Cardin
Castle
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clinger
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Combest
Costello
Coyne
Danner
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Duncan
Durbin
Ensign
Eshoo
Ewing
Fattah
Fields (TX)
Filner
Foley
Ford
Fowler
Frank (MA)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Furse
Gallegly
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Green
Greenwood
Hamilton
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Horn
Houghton
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson (CT)
Johnston
Jones
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Klug
LaFalce
Latham
Laughlin
Lewis (GA)
Lightfoot
Lipinski
Luther
Maloney
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
McCarthy
McDermott
Meehan
Meek
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Miller (FL)
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Moran
Morella
Neal
Obey
Olver
Pallone
Parker
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Petri
Pickett
Ramstad
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Riggs
Rivers
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rose
Roth
Roukema
Rush
Sanders
Sawyer
Schroeder
Sisisky
Skaggs
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (TX)
Stearns
Stokes
Studds
Stump
Tanner
Thomas
Thompson
Thornberry
Thurman
Torres
Traficant
Tucker
Visclosky
Ward
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
Zeliff
NOT VOTING--12
Calvert
Conyers
Cubin
Fazio
Hansen
Kleczka
McDade
McNulty
Meyers
Peterson (FL)
Quinn
Watt (NC)
{time} 1649
Messrs. EWING, MANTON, THORNBERRY, STEARNS, BARRETT of Wisconsin,
JACOBS, MATSUI, and MEEHAN, and Ms. WOOLSEY changed their vote from
``aye'' to ``no''.
Messrs. ALLARD, LAZIO of New York, BONO, JOHNSON of South Dakota,
UPTON, MARTINI, BACHUS, HOYER, NETHERCUTT, PETERSON of Minnesota,
BROWDER, HALL of Texas, STENHOLM, MONTGOMERY, CRAMER, CONDIT, BEVILL,
McHALE, TAUZIN, BISHOP, TOWNS, CHAPMAN, SPRATT, HOLDEN, KILDEE, PASTOR,
THORNTON, TORKILDSEN, WILLIAMS, POMEROY, WISE, de la GARZA, PORTER, and
EDWARDS, and Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas changed their vote from
``no'' to ``aye''.
So the amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], as amended.
The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.
amendment offered by mr. hastings of florida
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Hastings:
At the end of the bill add the following new title:
TITLE XXXVI--ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 3601. ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT FUND
FOR AFRICA.
Notwithstanding section 3221(a)(2) of this Act,
$802,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated for each of the
fiscal years 1996 and 1997 to carry out chapter 10 of part I
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2293 et
seq.).
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask
unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed
in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Florida?
There was no objection.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment today to
increase by $173 million the Development Fund for Africa account. This
additional $173 million will restore this account to the current
funding level.
The Development Fund for Africa was established by a bipartisan
majority in 1987. Why? Because development aid is clearly in our long-
term interest. Development assistance ensures that underdeveloped
economies become stable friends and future trading and business
partners.
The Development Fund for Africa has been critical to supporting the
transition in South Africa, crucial in turning around Africa's economic
decline, has helped bring about market liberalization efforts in some
20 countries, and has addressed basic issues such as girls education,
vaccinations against curable diseases, and halting the spread of
AIDS. [[Page H5545]]
The Development Fund for Africa helps develop the physical
infrastructure, the human resource base, and the rule of law structures
which provide a safe and hospitable locale for American businesses to
operate successfully. The Development Fund for Africa
was specifically created to target development resources efficiently
in countries that both need the assistance and have the potential to
become self-sufficient economies which can later buy our products.
Cuts in the Development Fund for Africa account would undercut our
efforts to strengthen export markets and fledgling democracies in
southern Africa; undermine our ability to prevent Somalia-like crises
and famine; and diminish support for democracy building to countries in
political transition, allowing countries like Mozambique and Angola
(which are on the cusp of recovery) to slip into chaos and crises
similar to Rwanda.
Those who would dismiss Africa as being unimportant are taking a
narrow, shortsighted view of American interests. We are making a long-
term investment in Africa, and we know from our own experience that the
United States benefits directly from the development which foreign aid
helps fuel.
We hear a lot of talk about Africa being a sinkhole for foreign aid
and that the U.S. has no reason to remain engaged in Africa.
But I am not sure that many Members are aware that South Africa
played a key role in the recent indefinite extension of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
U.S. engagement, and U.S. assistance, has played an important part in
the emergence of South Africa as a democratic partner for the United
States.
South Africa's role in the NPT conference shows that our support is
already bringing dividends.
Nor are many Members aware that American exports to Africa are
growing faster than U.S. exports to Europe and that U.S. trade with
Africa exceeds our trade with the former Soviet Union.
It is in our national interest to prevent crises like we have
witnessed in Rwanda and Somalia, which together cost us $2.25 billion
in emergency assistance funds. Preventive diplomacy will help us avoid
these crises.
Aid to Africa is not only in our self-interest, it is consonant with
our national values. We have a long and proud tradition in this great
country of helping the needy both home and abroad. Emergency aid is
invaluable for relieving human suffering, but sustainable development
assistance is critical to breaking the cycle of dependency and despair
by addressing the root causes of poverty.
We have unavoidable responsibilities around the world. Some of the
problems around the world which currently demand our attention are
problems of our own making. Our foreign policy goal for the past 40
years was the dissolution of the communist system. We have been largely
successful in achieving this goal, but the repercussions of the breakup
mean that there is both a political and financial vacuum in many
troubled spots. Now that we have forced so many countries to abandon
either their type of government or their support system, do we now say,
``Sorry, you're on your own? We can't help?'' I don't think so.
Senator Claude Pepper of Florida was the only Member of Congress to
criticize the isolationist mood in the U.S. Congress when Hitler began
toppling nations in 1939. Senator Pepper argued that it was the
responsibility of all mankind to intervene in the face of evil. Senator
Pepper said, ``when a few men are wronged and the force of brutality
and the jungle are let loose, when civilization is denied and godliness
and goodness scorned, that is no private war, that is a war against
man. Hence, to vindicate those things for which good men stand, good
men everywhere must stand together against wrong, not only wrong to a
chosen few, but wrong to any man, woman or child.''
To ignore our responsibilities to nations less fortunate, to refuse
to share our bounty, to silence our teachers, to shut out friends who
cry for our help, these are crimes against humanity. The American
people are not that cruel, nor should we be. I beg my colleagues,
support the Hastings amendment.
{time} 1700
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, it is with great reluctance that I rise to oppose this
amendment to increase the funding level for aid to Africa.
If we had an unlimited amount of money to allocate to foreign aid, I
would join Mr. Hastings in supporting $802 million for the Development
Fund for Africa.
Mr. Hastings has been a good friend, both as a fellow member of the
Florida delegation, and, as one of the most active members of the
Subcommittee on Africa.
Whenever we have a subcommittee meeting--not just at the hearings or
formal briefings, but in the many informal, private activities we have,
such as meetings with foreign officials or the local members of the
African diplomatic corps--I can always count on Mr. Hastings to be
there and to be a very active participant.
And, as someone who is new to the assignment on the Africa
Subcommittee, I have found that Mr. Hastings is a very valuable
resource as I study the issues of American policy toward Africa.
But we don't live in an age of unlimited resources.
We live in a time of fiscal austerity and we have to make the hard
decisions on how to allocate limited resources among the various
spending priorities.
It was in that context of competing priorities that the committee,
while considering the bill at our mark up sessions, gave a great deal
of attention to the funding of the Development Fund for Africa.
While the budget climate required that all programs contribute their
fair share to the deficit reduction effort, we cut aid to Africa less
than other development assistance programs.
Aid for Latin America and the Caribbean, areas of the world also of
great concern to every member of the Florida delegation, has not been
protected with funds destined as a separate line item in this bill.
What will happen is that by raising the aid for Africa without
specifying the source of the funds, eventually it could hurt the poor
nations of the Caribbean and Latin America whose development assistance
programs will be cut or perhaps other areas will be cut.
This has been the history of the aid program over the last few
years--as other regions of the world have received increased
development assistance funding, at least some part of the money to
provide that assistance has been taken from the aid programs in Latin
America and the Caribbean or other areas of the globe.
I think this would be a mistake.
We are trying to help countries in the Caribbean to improve their
standard of living, just as we are trying to help Africa, Latin
America, Europe and on and on.
Economic development programs in Latin America are an important part
of our overall efforts to control the illegal immigration and drug
trafficking that has had an impact on the people of Florida and other
southern States.
There was an intensive debate in Committee, and the bill's funding
level of $629 million for the Development Fund for Africa is one that
was given great care.
We had to find other programs in the bill and forced them to accept
disproportionately large cuts in order to provide this level of aid to
Africa.
I should note that the Development Fund for Africa is not the only
source of funding for aid programs in Africa.
It is important to keep this in mind.
President Clinton has the authority to take funds from the PL-480
program and channel PL-480 resources to Africa.
He also has the authority to allocate general development assistance
funds and apply them to projects and programs in Africa.
In addition to the DFA funding, Africa projects are funded by A.I.D.,
through its Global Programs Bureau and out of regular Development
Assistance funding.
About $60 million a year in Peace Corps programs, and a quarter
billion dollars of PL-480 programs, are also provided to Africa each
year. [[Page H5546]]
One should, in the current climate of cutbacks in all programs, allow
the administration some flexibility in managing these program cuts.
Increasing the funding for Africa will actually deprive President
Clinton, and his Secretary of State, of the flexibility they need to
manage the program cutbacks in accord with their foreign policy needs
and priorities.
I therefore urge Members to vote against this amendment.
Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I ask most respectfully, is the
gentlewoman aware that the accounts that she identified are all being
cut as well?
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, absolutely, we agreed. That is part
of the basis of my speech. All of the programs are being cut.
In fact, the Africa program, in relation to the other programs that
are being cut, is not nearly cut as much. I think that is the point
that I was making; all of the programs are cut, just as we are cutting
domestic programs, so we should cut foreign programs.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
I yield to the gentlewoman from Texas [Ms. Jackson-Lee].
Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support restoring the
development fund for Africa to its current funding levels which is good
for people and for business and for all of America.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the
Development Fund for Africa. The DFA protects some of the most
vulnerable people on earth. And efforts to slash it by $173 million are
simply unacceptable.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the African continent represents one of
the last untapped markets in the world. And the continent has seen
tremendous progress, with new democracies taking root throughout:--
South Africa being the most shining example.
If the DFA is cut by $173 million, not only will ordinary people
suffer, but the U.S. image as a world leader will be seriously damaged:
The aid program to South Africa--a role model of evolutionary change
with respect for market economics--will be undermined. Should the
United States cut and run after campaigning against apartheid for so
long?
The AIDS epidemic will worsen--an estimated two million additional
people will become infected with HIV due to cutbacks in U.S.-supported
programs.
Programs that help prevent hunger by investing in sustainable farming
will be decimated.
And the expansion of United States exports to the African continent,
which now amount to over $4.4 billion, will be hindered.
Mr. Chairman, U.S. aid is not a give away; it's an investment that
brings about exports to the developing world--exports which amount to
40 percent of all U.S. exports.
But for there to be a market there needs to be healthy, educated and
economically productive societies. Slashing the DFA to bits will not
accomplish that goal. Not at all.
That is why I am cosponsoring this amendment, along with some of my
distinguished colleagues on the International Relations Committee, to
raise the DFA to the fiscal year 1995 level of $802 million.
Strangely enough, while this bill slashes lifesaving programs like
the DFA, we are finding room to increase our military sales program.
Unlike the DFA, this is not a program geared to help people that are
starving, or are in the midst of democracy building. Maintaining aid to
Africa is within our responsibility as a world leader and it is the
least that we can do for people who are deserving of our assistance. I
strongly urge your support for this amendment.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, as a member of this subcommittee, the Subcommittee on
Africa, I know how heartfelt this amendment is. I congratulate the
author of this amendment. I agree that the people of Africa need help.
I would like to support my friend from Florida in his efforts to help
deserving people in Africa. Like everyone else, I have a question,
however. Where is the money going to come from?
If my colleague could offer a corresponding cut and make his
amendment budget neutral, then possibly we could all support his
amendment. But just to come in with a blank amendment is not going to
get the job done. It is only a wish list.
If instead the money must come from the taxpayers packets, then I
must oppose the amendment. I cannot agree to add $173 million to the
budget deficit. It is clear as a bell that there are many worthwhile
programs, but that is how we got into this budget mess that cries out
today for a solution. So let me reiterate; the goals here are laudable,
but the ladder to the goal is missing.
If the 167 million can be found in other programs, if we can find the
money in other projects, then I think this would be an amendment that
we should go with. But this Congress cannot abide and adhere to every
Member's wish list.
On my way into the Capitol this afternoon I was looking again. Is
there any money growing on the trees? And to everybody's surprise, I
must say I did not find any money growing on trees. Until that happens,
i.e., money grows on trees, we must find money from sources in this
bill. Reallocate or find new funds.
Again, the goals of this amendment are laudable. I appreciate what
the gentleman is trying to do. But the question remains, the $173
million, where will it come from?
Therefore, without the funding, I must be opposed to this amendment.
Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
Mr. Chairman, at the markup of the full committee, I made probably
the improprietous observation that this bill is racist. And I want to
point out that it is not racist through malice, it is racist through
ignorance. The fact is that I do not think that many of the Members of
the full committee have any idea about Africa.
For the last 2 years, I chaired the Subcommittee on Africa of the
Committee on International Relations. I toured 26 countries during that
period of time. Each time I went, I asked Members of the minority
party, then Republicans, to accompany me. In fact, I begged them to
come with me to Africa, and in that 2-year period not one ventured to
travel.
In the majority report to this bill, they refer to ``Africa did
this'' and ``Africa did that.'' You would think that Africa was a
country in itself. I made the flip remark in the committee that someday
I am going to expect a Republican to come up to me and ask me where the
capital of Africa is. But would we say the same thing about Asia? Would
we say Asia did this and Asia did that and, therefore, let us cut off
relief to this entire continent?
My colleagues, this is Africa. This is a continent four times larger
than the United States. It is a continent that has over 56 countries in
there, and it is a continent which is exploding with democracies.
Let me go around there. Let us start out with South Africa, the jewel
of the crown. South Africa now is an emerging democracy. It has $100
billion in GNP. You can just go around the continent. Botswana.
Botswana has surplus now in its treasury. Malawi just ended up having
its elections and is a democracy.
Zimbabwe. Mozambique is coming out of a depression there. Uganda, Idi
Amin's country, is now a democracy there and is trading with the United
States.
Tanzania. Look at the French francophone countries, Chad, Niger,
Benin, Carte de Vois, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali, all of these
countries want to have better relationships with the United States and
are breaking away from the French codes there and will be great trading
partners.
Look at Ghana. Jerry Rawlings now in Ghana is trying to settle the
dispute in Liberia, a great ally there and a great trading partner.
{time} 1715
Namibia down here, free elections, and a democracy. Seychelles,
Mauritius, Eritrea, such a new country it is not even on my map here.
Eritrea is a democracy which we will trade with. Next year, see Angola
come around. Angola can feed this entire continent. Zambia, Central
African Republic, the [[Page H5547]] Congo and even Kenya. Look at
1997, where Liberia, our colony in this continent and our
responsibility, will probably be a democracy, along with Ethiopia and
Nigeria.
My friend, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Roth], at the committee
meeting said ``Gee, Egypt is in Africa.'' Of course it is in Africa.
Egypt gets about $1.5 billion. I might point out, though, that Egypt is
not sub-Saharan Africa. Egypt is not black Africa, which I came up with
the phrase, this being racist. Egypt is not in the jurisdiction of the
subcommittee on Africa. Egypt is not under the Assistant Secretary of
State for Africa. Egypt is now considered the Middle East. Let us talk
about sub-Saharan Africa.
We now have the development fund for Africa. The development fund for
Africa is $600 million for 600 million people. There is where I think
it is immoral. That is why I feel this bill is immoral.
If we want to get the funds for this, last night the gentleman from
Indiana [Mr. Burton], said ``We can cut the State Department by 5
percent and nobody will be harmed.'' Why not cut the Defense Department
by 5 percent, that is $12 billion 5 million, and it can underwrite the
entire foreign affairs bill that we are stripping to pieces here today.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the Hastings amendment. I think
these funds should be restored, or we are going to lose Africa. We are
going to lose a great trading partner. We are going to lose 28 emerging
democracies, which we have pumped money into, and we are seeing results
for the first time.
announcement by the chairman
The CHAIRMAN. Our visitors in the gallery are admonished not to
applaud during the debate.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
First of all, Mr. Chairman, I am very sympathetic to the remarks made
by my colleague, the gentleman from Florida. I do not believe anybody
in this Chamber is racist, but I do believe there are problems in
Africa that should be addressed. We are trying our best to do that. We
are sending $629 million there this year, and $614 million next year.
This amendment would, over a 2-year period, increase by $360 million
the amount of money that is going over there.
I notice we have a lot of young people visiting with us today. Many
of them applauded. Many of us in this Chamber are very concerned about
their futures, because we know if we do not get control of Government
spending in this country, that at one point, some point in the future,
we are going to have a debt so great that the interest on the debt
alone is going to gobble up a lot of our tax dollars, and their quality
of life will start to deteriorate. We have to get control of Federal
spending, so we have to make hard choices.
Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? I would like to
know why he is cutting student loans.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. The school lunch program was increased 4
percent per year. We are just sending it back in block grants, we are
not cutting it. We are cutting the rate of growth. However, that is
another subject.
The fact of the matter is we have to control spending. That means we
have to make hard choices. I am very concerned about the people in the
Sudan. My colleague, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Wolf], has been
down here on the floor talking about that.
We have met with some of the people from the Sudan about the horrible
atrocities that are taking place, and the people starving to death over
there. We worked very hard to get food aid in there. We did the same
thing in Somalia. However, we cannot cut the defense budget to take
care of those problems. The fact of the matter is the defense budget
has been used in large part for a lot of the new military forays and
objectives in Somalia and in Haiti, and we have used an awful lot of
our military money in those areas.
The budget is so strapped in that area that we have a lot of people
who are in the military whose quality of life is already suffering. We
all know that. In fact, some of those people have been on food stamps,
people in our own military. We have to be careful when we start talking
about cutting the defense of this Nation.
Mr. Chairman, let me just get back to the case at hand. We need to
set priorities. Make no mistake about it, Africa is a priority. Maybe
it should be a higher priority, but as my colleague, the gentleman from
Wisconsin, said a while ago, let us find the money someplace else. If
we can find it someplace else and we can do it, then I do not have any
problem with doing that in conference committee.
The fact of the matter is that at this point, $629 million, plus $5
million for the Africa regional peacekeeping force, $1.1 million for
the Organization of African Unity, $10 million for Angola, or $5
million, and some other funds from other areas of government, is about
all we can afford.
I would just like to say to my colleagues, we are doing what we can.
This is a lean, mean foreign affairs budget, foreign aid package, but
it is one that I think is realistic and one that deals with the
problem.
I would like to end up by saying one other thing. I think the last
speaker that spoke on the Democrat side alluded to the fact that Angola
in a few short years could take care of the whole continent. There are
a number of countries in Africa that are mineral-rich. They have large
resources. They have diamond mines, all kinds of minerals. As a matter
of fact, during the cold war, 11 minerals that we had to have to
survive as a Nation only came from two sources, the Soviet Union, and
the southern part of Africa. Yet, because of the wars and because of
lack of democracy over there and because of the problems, those
minerals and those things that would make them self-sufficient have not
been mined.
Therefore, rather than just throwing money at the problem, we as a
Nation need to be working with those governments to bring about the
democracy that my colleagues have talked about, so they can start
taking care of themselves, so we can wean them away from the United
States foreign aid program. We cannot take care of the entire world
indefinitely. We are the only superpower left, we do have
responsibilities, but the amount of money we have in this budget is
realistic. I think this amendment, therefore, should be defeated.
Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this important amendment
which would restore funding for the Development Fund for Africa.
The African continent is in a state of transition. This transition
holds great promise as well as peril for the people of Africa and the
community of nations. In South Africa, we have witnessed the peaceful
transition to a multiracial democracy. In Rwanda, untold innocents have
been killed in the struggle between rival Hutus and Tutsis.
Despite the challenges, I believe that Africa's future can be one of
peace and economic prosperity.
However, they will need our help.
The Development Fund for Africa has proven to be a successful
economic development tool which has enabled many nations to begin the
transition to free market economies and stable democratic institutions.
This proven program has made valuable investments which have greatly
improved health care services, expanded educational opportunities and
boosted small business development.
Several years ago, Mozambique was embroiled in a vicious civil war.
Last year, with the help of American assistance, free and fair
elections were held and ninety percent of registered voters went to the
polls.
In Guinea, American assistance and training programs have helped to
increase elementary school attendence by 43 percent. In the country of
Mali, agricultural production has doubled since 1981 with the help of
American technical assistance.
These are the building blocks of a stable continent--a community of
nations which can help advance American interests in the world and can
become an important trading partner.
Working in partnership with the people of Africa we have made great
progress. With a relatively small investment--representing roughly 0.05
percent of our 1.5 trillion budget, we can continue this work and build
a bright future.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the people of Africa
and [[Page H5548]] American interests in this important part of the
world by supporting this amendment.
Mrs. CLAYTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by my
colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Hastings] and others. I
believe it is short-sighted to think that we can promote democracy,
encourage world peace and expand trade opportunities in America, while
pursuing a policy of isolation. That is particularly true when it comes
to developing nations--nations that may hang in the balance--when it
comes to their tilt towards democracy. I have been encouraged, in
recent years, by the growing number of African nations that have
converted to democracy, and, I believe, foreign aid has been a vital
element in those conversions.
I also believe that foreign aid is particularly critical to the
expansion of trade opportunities. Although, I believe that the policies
we pursue to encourage the expansion of trade should be evaluated, an
across-the-board budget cutting is an unwise position. Unfortunately,
the House-passed budget resolution and the Senate committee budget
resolution propose the elimination or major reduction of the
International Trade Administration, the Trade Development Agency, the
Eximbank and agricultural export promotion programs. The Overseas
Private Investment Corporation [OPIC] would be privatized. On top of
that restructuring, the bill we are now considering, H.R. 1561, would
reduce the amount of foreign aid authorized by $1 billion, and would
eliminate three agencies--The Agency for International Development, the
U.S. Information Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
The functions of those agencies would be moved to the Department of
State. The Senate version of the bill had proposed moving the functions
of the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service to the Department of State
and combining the Eximbank, the Trade Development Agency and OPIC into
one quasi-independent agency. Those provisions, however, did not
survive committee consideration last week and are not now included in
the Senate bill.
Mr. Chairman, I do not think we should lose sight of the fact that,
compared to other, major industrialized nations, the United States
ranks last in terms of the percentage of gross national product [GNP]
devoted to exports. There seems, therefore, to be little wonder that we
have a growing balance of trade deficit when Britain, France, Canada,
Italy, Germany, and Japan, spend more per thousand dollars of gross
national product than we do. The irony of these proposals is that this
radical change comes at a time when our export promotion programs and,
presumably, our foreign aid programs, are helping to produce
unprecedented gains in peace and commerce. In the area of agriculture,
for example, we now export about one-third of the products we produce.
Last year, farm and farm-related exports generated more than $100
billion in economic activity for America, producing nearly 1 million
jobs here. With respect to merchandise trade, farm
production actually generates a trade surplus which, this year, is
expected to be some $20 billion. In North Carolina, farm and farm-
related jobs constitute at least one-fifth of the employment and, on
average, 25 to 30 percent of the revenue. It, therefore, greatly
concerns me when I see proposals to impose deep cuts in foreign
development for Africa programs which provide opportunity for trade. We
should not blindly cut programs in our march toward a balanced budget
by the year 2002. We should pass a budget bill that aims at a balanced
budget. I support that goal.
We must be certain that our actions do not further weaken the United
States as we seek to compete in an increasingly competitive global
marketplace. This is not 1946, Mr. Chairman. America no longer
maintains the dominant position we once held in the world marketplace.
We are being dramatically outspent by other nations whose goal is to
promote their products and replace us whenever they can. Perhaps, even
more importantly, Mr. Chairman, I believe we can best achieve security
in this Nation by interacting economically with other nations. Foreign
aid and economic interaction with other nations is not a giveaway, it
is a sound and prudent investment in our own security. The best way to
avoid war is to promote peace. An effective way of promoting peace is
to engage in commerce and finance with the World community. The
Hastings amendment focuses on mineral rich and strategically important
Africa--a continent where democracy can flourish. By investing in
Africa now, we can assure that we will continue and expand trade with
them in the future. And, by investing in Africa now, we establish
relationships that will be vital if the security of the United States
is threatened. Support the Hastings amendment.
Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
(Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the
Hastings amendment to restore the $802 million level for the
Development Fund for Africa.
In order to put this subject in perspective it would be helpful to
look at the three periods in recent Africa history that have bearing on
changing the course of events for Africa. First, the independence era
in the early 1960's when the continent was freed of their colonial
masters, and leaving them without adequate resources and preparation
for their new freedom.
Second, during the cold war, when Africa was used and abused. Used by
both the Soviet Union and the United States to fight hot wars on
African soil. The most symbolic were in Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and
Somalia, and you know there were others.
Abused, because we ignored humanitarian principles, and turned our
eyes away from corruption and human rights abuses when it seemed in the
interest of winning.
It now would seem fair that preferential rehabilitation assistance is
needed to right the wrongs of the past, even though they may have been
justified in winning the cold war.
We really were not very good teachers in preparing Africa for our
grand plans of multi-party democracies and free markets economies to be
operated free of corruption.
Measures of the quality of life in Africa have spiralled down in the
last two decades, at the same time going up in other parts of the
developing world. Many, like Vice President Gore, who read the Kaplan
article in Atlantic Monthly were appalled at the condition of Africa,
and determined to assist the continent. Unfortunately, others doubted
Africa was even salvageable.
We are now a few years into the third period, which I would call the
post cold war period. Armed conflict continues to afflict sub-Saharan
Africa where fighting persists in Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and
we have our fingers crossed on Angola, despite the cease fire
agreement. The potential for renewed outbreaks in Rwanda, Burundi, and
Somalia is high, and other countries like Zaire and Nigeria are at
risk. Human rights problems have been accelerated due to overpopulation
and lack of sustainable development. However, all is not gloom and
doom. There have been historic advances. In South Africa, Namibia,
Botswana, Ghana, and other countries we could name.
I would also like to relate the historic Congressional Black Caucus
efforts to reverse the inequalities of the past lead by former
Congressmen Diggs, Dymally, and Gray, not to mention the contribution
of Ron Dellums in sponsoring the Anti-Apartheid Act which mobilized
Americans against racial discrimination in South Africa. And, remember
the late Mickey Leland, who gave his very life in pursuit of increasing
the awareness of all Americans to the plight of our Africa.
I do not feel aid to Africa should be considered a partisan issue.
Both the Republicans and Democrats have been most cooperative in
preserving the Subcommittee on Africa when Congress was requested to
scale down the number of committees. Africa, which usually comes last,
was considered important by both parties. Members like former Chairman
Hamilton, Chairman Gilman, Speaker Gingrich, and Henry Hyde were most
helpful.
There are many Republicans on the Senate side like Nancy Kassebaum,
Chair of the Senate Africa Affairs Committee, James Jeffords, Paul
[[Page H5549]] Coverdell. All have Africa's interest at heart.
Just think, Africa has almost 60 countries with a population over 600
million. If we do not adopt the Hastings Amendment this will leave us
providing less than $1 per person in the neediest of all continents.
In closing I would like to quote Tony Lake, the President's national
security advisor in a recent speech he made on May 3. He said:
If the United States cuts aid to Russia, the pace of
economic reform will be slowed and important American
interests will be harmed. If the United States cuts Aid to
Africa, while our interests are less effected, people will
die.
I ask you--is an African life not worth the investment of a few more
pennies per person to come back to the $802 million level for the
Development Fund for Africa. Support the Hastings amendment and save
African children.
{time} 1730
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have been informed that we have 5
speakers on the other side remaining and that we have several on this
side.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this
amendment be concluded by 6 p.m. with the time to be equally divided on
both sides.
The CHAIRMAN. On this amendment and all amendments thereto?
Mr. GILMAN. On this amendment and all amendments thereto, Mr.
Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. With 12 minutes on each side and the time to be managed
by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] and the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Hastings].
Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, preserving the right to
object, if I could engage the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], the
chairman, in dialogue further, I misunderstood the gentleman.
Did the gentleman say 12 minutes for each side total?
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, the total
would be concluded by 6 p.m., with the time remaining to be equally
divided.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, further reserving the right to
object, I most respectfully will have to object because I do have a
number of speakers that have been waiting, and I recognize that they,
too, deserve an opportunity to be heard.
Mr. GILMAN. How many speakers does the gentleman have?
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Probably there are 6 additional speakers. I
could ask them to curtail some of their remarks and doubtless they will
be able to do that.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased to reduce our time to 10
minutes and give the remainder of the time to the gentleman as long as
we conclude by 6 p.m.
Would the gentleman find that acceptable?
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Further reserving the right to object, I
would still need an additional 15 minutes, Mr. Chairman. If we could
conclude by 6:15, then that would be acceptable.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, we will accept the 6:15 deadline, with the
time to be equally divided.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of
objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from New York [Mr.
Gilman] will be recognized for 20 minutes, and the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Hastings] will be recognized for 20 minutes.
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr.
Gilman].
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think since they have more speakers on
the other side, I would reserve my time and allow the other side to
proceed.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr.
Hastings].
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Wynn].
Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the
time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the amendment of the
gentleman from Florida to restore full funding to the Development Fund
for Africa.
You have heard a lot of talk about how we cannot afford it. Let me
set the record straight. For anyone who is under a misconception,
foreign aid amounts to 1 percent of the United States budget.
I think we can afford it, because it is consistent with our long-term
objectives. Someone said, ``Well, money doesn't grow on trees. Where
are we going to get the money?''
I suggest that there are a lot of Republican pork projects laying
around from which we can get the money. I suggest there are a lot of
tax breaks for the wealthy from which we can get the money. At any
rate, when you are only talking about a fraction, 1 percent, of the
budget, it seems to me the money ought to be found.
I would like to talk today about some of the success stories involved
in the Development Fund for Africa because I think they illustrate the
point. Our foreign aid program ought to advance our interests. Our
interests are reflected in these successes.
American exports to Ghana expanded by 73 percent between 1992 and
1993 as a result of U.S. programs that helped revise the investment
code, remove regulatory bottlenecks and improve infrastructures.
In Zimbabwe, U.S. programs to strengthen the business climate have
helped to formulate antitrust laws, lowered interest barriers for U.S.
exporters, and investors.
Forty years ago we had a very different situation. Nine out of ten
African countries were still under colonial rule. That is not true
today. Today nearly two-thirds of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
have or are in the transition to democratically elected governments.
In some of the poorest regions of Africa, U.S. support for childhood
immunization and oral rehydration therapy has resulted in saving
800,000 children per year. We have had great successes.
But the important point today is we can have far greater successes if
we make a very small investment. An investment has two benefits: First,
it helps us avoid humanitarian crises which we may ultimately be called
on to address. Second and most importantly, though, it opens new
markets for U.S. goods. What does that mean? It means jobs for American
workers.
I think we have an opportunity to advance our long-term interests,
provide assistance with infrastructure in Africa, and create new open
markets receptive to U.S. exports. We have got examples of our export
situation improving dramatically in Africa. We need to take advantage
of it. The money is there. It may not grow on trees but it is certainly
available in this budget. I hope the House will concur and support the
Hastings amendment.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my
friend, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Engel].
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend, the gentleman from
Florida, for yielding me the time.
Mr. Chairman, last November he was my colleague, along with the
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Johnston] and the gentleman from Louisiana
[Mr. Jefferson] on a trip to West Africa. We visited five countries in
West Africa, and it was just unbelievable.
These countries, many of which were leaning toward the Soviet bloc
during the 1960's, are now looking to the United States for aid and
help. I said it the other day. I will say it again now. My colleagues,
did we win the cold war to just throw it all away?
A little bit of U.S. money goes such a long way, No. 1, in helping
democracy take root in these countries; No. 2, in making these
countries effective as a trading partner with the United States; No. 3,
in ensuring that these countries will continue to have friendly
relations with the United States; and, No. 4, in ensuring that the
United States will have influence in these countries.
The other side talks a lot about free market economies and business
and whatever. I can think of no better way to spend our money than in
these emerging African nations which will develop free market economies
which will be good trading partners with the United States with just a
little bit of help from us.
It makes no sense for me, and that is why I have problems with this
bill. This is essentially an isolationist bill. We are retreating from
our traditional role in the world. I know some people
[[Page H5550]] say, well, America cannot be the policeman of the world.
I do not think we can, either, but we certainly can help with
technology. We certainly can help democracy take root.
My colleagues, it is to our benefit, it is to America's benefit.
Seventy-five percent of all foreign aid moneys are spent right back in
this country, stimulating our economy, helping us by creating jobs. One
percent of our budget, that is all foreign aid is, and all we hear is
cut, cut. It makes no sense whatsoever.
I am on the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International
Relations. I want to be on that subcommittee because I want to be part
of a generation of Americans that does something for this continent,
that shows a partnership with the countries of Africa. I can think of
no more important place whereby America can establish democracy in
these emerging republics.
Mr. Chairman, I support the gentleman's amendment to restore funding
for the Development Fund for Africa to current levels. If I had my
druthers, we would do even more. I hope my colleagues support this
amendment.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my
colleague and neighbor in service, the distinguished gentlewoman from
Florida [Mrs. Meek].
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I have the greatest
amount of respect and admiration for my colleague, the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Hastings] who has conducted himself so notably in his
pursuit of fairness for Africa
Today we keep talking about cuts and reductions in the Development
Fund for Africa. We all know that there must be cuts. The cuts are too
deep, Mr. Chairman, for the development funds in Africa, because these
deep reductions could prove to be penny wise and pound foolish, and we
will need to respond to humanitarian emergencies, and it will be more
costly than our investment that we make in development activities.
For example, Mr. Chairman, we have spent $2 in humanitarian aid for
every $1 in development aid in the greater Horn of Africa in recent
years. The record is already there. It has already been spent. We need
to address some of the root causes and not the symptoms, and I am
hoping that you are willing to do that for Africa as you have some
other developing countries.
It is very, very important that you think of the image of providing
lesser funds for Africa now when they were not even even in the very
beginning. We did not have a Development Fund for Africa until the
1980's, and now that they are at the bottom of the list, it would show
a greater strength if this Congress were to bring them up to par so
then they could take a cut that would not ostensibly take away
everything.
Foreign aid for Africa has never received full funding. That is
really not an argument here.
It is not hard to imagine reductions severely compromising the many
gains that you have made in helping create strong economies, reduce
population growth and protect the environment in Africa. Deep cuts
could also lead to the rapid destabilization of these early
democracies, possibly resulting in untenable and costly human crises
and conflicts.
This is not a situation in which the United States would want to find
itself. It is very, very important that we protect our interests in
Africa. Three of them. We want to help them develop the economies which
will create exports, which we have heard before, and jobs here in the
United States. We do not want to have any more Somalias or Rwandas
which had a terrible cost in terms of human suffering and social
significance.
The Development Fund for Africa is our main policy instrument in
developing these interests. I think we should just be fair and be sure
that the Development Fund for Africa does not keep the deep, deep cuts
which you have done to them already.
{time} 1745
Remember that to support the Hastings amendment; it is a good
amendment.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the
distinguished gentlewoman from Michigan [Miss Collins].
Miss COLLINS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from
Florida for yielding me this time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Hastings]. This amendment will restore
funding for the Development Fund for Africa. Maintaining effective aid
programs for Africa is in our national interests. The amount of
development assistance we provide to Africa is so small, even a slight
reduction in the Development Fund will have a drastic consequence that
far outweigh any short-term savings.
Cuts of funding will prevent us from providing African countries with
the resources needed to promote educational and economic opportunities
for its people.
Africa is a potentially significant partner in world trade, thus it
is in our national interest to assist African nations.
To the gentleman from Indiana who said that we must start getting
African nations to wean off of aid from America so they can develop
their own resources, I would like to say that two countries in this
entire world get one-half the foreign aid; Israel gets $3 billion, and
they have been getting that for the past 9 years or 10 years; Egypt
gets $2 billion. I do not want that money cut, I want Israel and Egypt
to get that money.
But we are talking about merely $802 million for 56 countries, a mere
$802 million for 56 countries. Gentleman, $629 million is simply too
little.
I urge my colleagues to support the Hastings amendment. The
Development Fund for Africa must not be singled out to carry a
disproportionate share of cutbacks simply to meet my colleagues'
commitment to reduce the budget.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, how much time is remaining?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Hastings] has 8 minutes
remaining.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Does my distinguished chairman have any
additional speakers?
Mr. GILMAN. We have one more speaker on this side, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Do I have the right to close, Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN. The manager of the bill has the right to close. The
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] has the right to close.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. That being the case, Mr. Chairman, I yield
myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, to close the debate on our side, nowhere is the
justification for foreign aid clearer and more compelling in terms of
our national values than Africa. Africa is the final frontier for
development. The great global challenges of tomorrow can be seen in the
challenges facing Africa today, and even if I were to turn to the
tragedy of disease which obviously foments within the confines of the
rain forests in that great country, there are also many discoveries yet
to be made in that same rain forest for medicinal purposes for the rest
of the world.
If we give up Africa, the continent could well slide into chaos, we
could find ourselves in a world of two distinct communities where the
difference between the rich and poor become unbearably extreme, and
that is not a world which we want for our children.
A lot of times my colleagues in this body need to have for them
language couched in business terms. Let me see if I can do that
briefly. In 1993 the United States exported more to sub-Saharan Africa,
$4.8 billion precisely, than to Eastern Europe, which was $2.3 billion,
or to the NIS, which was $4 billion, including Russia, where the United
States exports a total $3 billion.
The current 1992 figures for sub-Saharan international markets,
excluding South Africa, is $28.5 billion. If that market were to grow
at a nominal rate of 3 percent a year in constant terms, it would
double every 21 years, reaching a level of $83.2 billion in the year
2025. That market would exceed the size of Korea's market today.
I make those points for the reason that foreign aid is often thought
of by the American people as a giveaway. But there is something else
that is given away with foreign aid, and that is stability for American
companies to do business. [[Page H5551]]
In my district alone, there is one company that does $20 million a
year of exports to the continent of Africa. There are numerous
countries from Africa that provide immense resources ranging from crude
oil to other minerals for this country. I ask my colleagues to stop
looking at this continent as a battleground and to start looking at it
as marketplace as rightly we should.
I have asked not that there be money taken from any account. I have
asked merely that we restore to an account an amount for the
Development Fund of Africa that was already in existence and is meager
by comparison to the multiplier effect of the good that it does.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as she may consume to the
gentlewoman from Florida [Ms. Ros-Lehtinen], our ranking chairman of
the Subcommittee on Africa.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, we have heard a number of Members
come forward in support of this amendment. Unfortunately, I must remain
opposed to the Hastings amendment. It is a budget buster. Without
making corresponding cuts in other accounts, this amendment deviates
from our plan to balance our Federal budget by the year 2002.
Many Members have talked about the importance of development in
Africa. I agree. Chairman Gilman agrees. That is why, in this bill, aid
to Africa is cut less than any other region.
Those who say that the majority in this body do not care about Africa
are wrong. As my good friend Mr. Payne noted, the majority kept the
Subcommittee on Africa despite a reduction from seven subcommittees to
five.
The Development Fund for Africa, the DFA, is maintained in this bill.
Mr. Chairman, the American Overseas Interests Act is an excellent
bill. It keeps the United States engaged throughout the world,
including the continent of Africa. It does so while complying with our
plan to balance the Federal budget by the year 2002. Chairman Gilman
deserves great credit for this accomplishment.
I regret very much that I cannot support this amendment, but I firmly
believe that this bill maintains our United States commitment to
Africa.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I must oppose the Hastings amendment.
This amendment busts the budget, simply adds hundreds of billions of
dollars back into the bill.
I support aid to Africa, and we added money for Africa above the
level in the introduced bill because of our concerns, and the concerns
of the gentleman. Our committee supported the Houghton amendment and
added back even more funding for Africa. In the end we added $100
million back for aid to Africa above the amount introduced in the bill
initially.
Therefore, reluctantly, while I support the proposals of the
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Hastings], I oppose his amendment.
We are underbudgeted because we did make those cuts. Under the bill,
Africa was cut far less than all other development assistance. This
amendment, offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Hastings], while
well-intended, would add over a period of 2 years some $360 million in
foreign assistance in this bill. In addition to all of the aid that the
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] mentioned such as peacekeeping,
economic support, et cetera, we also provide funds for many U.N.
programs, and we also provide food aid under title II of Public Law
480.
Our bill is within the constraints of our budget resolution, and will
help to cut the deficit. But if we adopt the Hastings amendment, it
will add substantially to deficit spending, forcing us to borrow even
more.
Accordingly, I am urging my colleagues to oppose the Hastings
amendment.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the unanimous-consent agreement, all time on this
amendment has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Hastings].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 141,
noes 278, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 14, as follows:
[Roll No. 354]
AYES--141
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Bishop
Bonior
Borski
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant (TX)
Cardin
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Coyne
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dixon
Doggett
Durbin
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Ford
Frank (MA)
Franks (CT)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Hastings (FL)
Hayes
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoyer
Jackson-Lee
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kennedy (MA)
Kennelly
Kildee
LaFalce
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Lowey
Maloney
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
McCarthy
McDermott
McKinney
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Pelosi
Pomeroy
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Rivers
Rose
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sawyer
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Skaggs
Slaughter
Stark
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Tucker
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Ward
Waters
Waxman
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
NOES--278
Allard
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Boucher
Brewster
Browder
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Camp
Canady
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chapman
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clinger
Coble
Coburn
Collins (GA)
Combest
Condit
Cooley
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cunningham
Danner
Davis
de la Garza
Deal
DeFazio
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dingell
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Flanagan
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy (RI)
Kim
King
Kingston
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Lincoln
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lucas
Luther
Manzullo
Martini
Mascara
McCollum
McCrery
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Meehan
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Minge
Molinari
Montgomery
Moorhead
Morella
Myers
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Obey
Orton
Oxley
Packard
Parker
Paxon
Payne (VA)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Pryce
Quillen
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Regula
Riggs
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Stockman
Stump
Talent
Tanner
Tate
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry [[Page H5552]]
Thurman
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Traficant
Upton
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Williams
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--1
Fields (LA)
NOT VOTING--14
Calvert
Conyers
Cubin
Fazio
Hansen
Harman
Kleczka
Lantos
McDade
McNulty
Meyers
Peterson (FL)
Quinn
Watt (NC)
{time} 1819
Mr. EHLERS changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas changed her vote from ``no'' to
``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my strong opposition to
H.R. 1561, the American Overseas Interest Act, and the proposal to
eliminate the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). This agency
performs a unique advocacy role in formulating our nation's foreign
policy. Under this legislation, ACDA's strong and knowledgeable voice
on arms control and non-proliferation issues will be muted by a new
State Department ``super-bureaucracy.''
The State Department performs the necessarily broad mission of
advancing and protecting the global interests of the United States and
its citizens. To accomplish its responsibilities, the State Department
must consider many different issues as it formulates our Nation's
foreign policy. On the other hand, ACDA's mission if sharply focused on
strengthening our national security by advocating, formulating,
negotiating, implementing, and verifying sound arms control,
nonproliferation, and disarmament policies and agreements. As a result,
ACDA is staffed with physicists, chemists, engineers, and other
specialists who spend their entire careers dealing with one issue--arms
control. To fold ACDA into the State Department would be a serious
mistake. This nation needs ACDA to maintain a strong, independent voice
for arms control.
Even if the State Department could match ACDA's arms control
expertise, the goals of arms control and non-proliferation are
sometimes at odds with the broader objectives of the State Department.
In fact, if this bill had been enacted thirty years ago, we would not
have a nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]. In the 1960's, it was
ACDA that pressed for the NPT. The State Department had opposed the
original negotiations out of deference to friendly countries that
wanted to explore the nuclear option.
I have listened to the arguments that, because the cold war is over,
an independent voice for arms control is no longer needed. One only
needs to look at the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran or the
recent gas attacks in Japan to understand the continued importance of
battling the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of
mass destruction. Some have also claimed that the reorganization
proposed in this bill will save the taxpayers money. However, no study
has identified any savings from eliminating ACDA. In fact, a recent
Congressional Research Service study has found that merging ACDA into
the State Department could actually cost $10 million.
Clearly, this legislation doesn't take into account the importance of
having a strong and independent arms control and non-proliferation
viewpoint within the United States government. Instead, it appears to
me that organizational boxes are simply being moved in an arbitrary
manner. I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill, ACDA must be
protected.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to support a provision in the
American Overseas Interests Act, which modifies section 36(b)(1) of the
Arms Export and Control Act to require greater congressional oversight
and scrutiny of arms sales to the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia until such time as the Secretary of State certifies and reports
to Congress that the unpaid claims of American companies described in
the June 30, 1993 report by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to
section 9140(c) of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1993
(Public Law 102-396; 106 Stat 1939), including the additional claims
noticed by the Department of Commerce as page 2 of the report, have
been resolved satisfactorily.
The $43.4 million claim of Gibbs & Hill, Inc. is one of the claims as
yet unresolved. Gibbs & Hill was decimated by financial losses incurred
in the design of the desalination and related facilities for the Yanbu
Industrial City in Saudi Arabia in the late 1970's and early 1980's as
a result of the Kingdom's failure to honor its contractual obligations
and pay for additional work required of the company.
My involvement in this matter dates back almost 2 years. The company,
which is a large employer in my district, approached me for assistance
in having its claim paid through the Special Claims Process established
for the resolution of claims of American companies which had not
received fair treatment in their commercial dealing with the Government
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This Special Claims Process was
established between our Government and the Government of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, following congressional hearings on the unfair commercial
practices of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia first held in the House
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East in May 1992. In response to
my letter to Saudi Ambassador Bandar bin Sultan Abdulaziz of April 29,
1993, the Ambassador promised to spare ``no efforts in resolving this
claim in an expeditious and fair manner.'' Since this date, the
company, the Congress and the past and present administrations have
received a series of promises and commitments from the Government of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to resolve the claim favorably for Gibbs &
Hill. The most recent commitment coming on October 6, 1994, one day
prior to our country once again coming to the defense of the Kingdom
when threatened by invasion from Iraq, in fulfillment of our commitment
to our bilateral relationship.
I should note that I am not alone in my support of the full and
prompt resolution of the Gibbs & Hill claim. More than 3 dozen Senators
and Members of Congress, the President, the National Security Council,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senate Armed Services
Committee, the Department of Defense, State and Commerce have all
expressed their desire to see this claim resolved so as to successfully
conclude the Special Claims Process.
On January 23, 1995, I expressed my growing frustration with the
delaying tactics of the Saudi Embassy in fulfilling its commitment to
the company, the Congress and our Government. I also noted that the
failure of the Saudi Embassy to resolve this claim, under the mandate
established by its own Government, was beginning to grow into a
significant strain on the United States-Saudi relations. Again, this
was a sentiment shared by numerous of my colleagues in the Congress,
who wrote and communicated with the Department of State, and the Saudi
Embassy in January of this year. In these communications, it was made
clear that the delaying tactics of the Saudi Embassy would no longer be
tolerated, and unless serious discussions were held between the company
and the Kingdom leading to the full and prompt resolution of the claim,
legislative alternatives would be considered to bring this matter to a
close.
Despite several attempts to resolve the claim successfully, the
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has shown no signs of
cooperation. Therefore, I introduced H.R. 1243, which would focus its
attention on resolving all the unresolved claims with the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. Under the leadership of Congressman Chris Smith, this
bill was made part of the American Overseas Interest Act. I hope in the
long run we will focus on other remedies in our bilateral relationship
with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to ensure the prevention of unfair
treatment of any other United States company doing business with the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Fox
of Pennsylvania) having assumed the chair, Mr. Goodlatte, Chairman of
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R.
1561) to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies of the United States;
to authorize appropriations for the Department of State and related
agencies for fiscal years 1996 and 1997; to responsibly reduce the
authorizations of appropriations for United States foreign assistance
programs for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, and for other purposes, had
come to no resolution thereon.
____________________