[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 87 (Wednesday, May 24, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H5502-H5552]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                AMERICAN OVERSEAS INTERESTS ACT OF 1995

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments?


                   amendment offered by ms. mckinney

  Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment numbered 16 offered by Ms. McKinney:
        After chapter 5 of title XXXI of the bill, insert the 
     following new chapter (and redesignate the subsequent 
     chapter accordingly and make other appropriate conforming 
     amendments):

               CHAPTER 6--ARMS TRANSFERS CODE OF CONDUCT

     SEC. 3174. SHORT TITLE.

       This chapter may be cited as the ``Code of Conduct on Arms 
     Transfer Act of 1995''.

     SEC. 3175. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds the following:
       (1) Approximately 40,000,000 people, over 75 percent 
     civilians, died as a result of civil and international wars 
     fought with conventional weapons during the 45 years of the 
     cold war, demonstrating that conventional weapons can in fact 
     be weapons of mass destruction.
       (2) Conflict has actually increased in the post cold war 
     era, with 34 major wars in progress during 
     1993. [[Page H5503]] 
       (3) War is both a human tragedy and an on-going economic 
     disaster affecting the entire world, including the United 
     States and its economy, because it decimates both local 
     investment and potential export markets.
       (4) International trade in conventional weapons increases 
     the risk and impact of war in an already over-militarized 
     world, creating far more costs than benefits for the United 
     States economy through increased United States defense and 
     foreign assistance spending and reduced demand for United 
     States civilian exports.
       (5) The newly established United Nations Register of 
     Conventional Arms can be an effective first step in support 
     of limitations on the supply of conventional weapons to 
     developing countries and compliance with its reporting 
     requirements by a foreign government can be an integral tool 
     in determining the worthiness of such government for the 
     receipt of United States military assistance and arms 
     transfers.
       (6) It is in the national security and economic interests 
     of the United States to reduce dramatically the 
     $1,038,000,000,000 that all countries spend on armed forces 
     every year, $242,000,000,000 of which is spent by developing 
     countries, an amount equivalent to 4 times the total 
     bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance such countries 
     receive every year.
       (7) According to the Congressional Research Service, the 
     Untied States supplies more conventional weapons to 
     developing countries than all other countries combined, 
     averaging $14,956,000,000 a year in agreements to supply such 
     weapons to developing countries since the end of the cold 
     war, compared to $7,300,000,000 a year in such agreements 
     prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
       (8) In recent years the vast majority of United States arms 
     transfers to developing countries are to countries with an 
     undemocratic form of government whose citizens, according to 
     the Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights 
     Practices do not have the ability to peaceably change their 
     form of government.
       (9) Although a goal of United States foreign policy should 
     be to work with foreign governments and international 
     organizations to reduce militarization and dictatorship and 
     therefore prevent conflicts before they arise, during 4 
     recent deployments of United States Armed Forces--to the 
     Republic of Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti--
     such Armed Forces faced conventional weapons that had been 
     provided or financed by the United States to undemocratic 
     governments.
       (10) The proliferation of conventional arms and conflicts 
     around the globe are multilateral problems, and the fact that 
     the United States has emerged as the world's primary seller 
     of conventional weapons, combined with the world leadership 
     role of the United States, signifies that the United States 
     is in a position to seek multilateral restraints on the 
     competition for the transfers of conventional weapons.
       (11) The Congress has the constitutional responsibility to 
     participate with the executive branch in decisions to provide 
     military assistance and arms transfers to a foreign 
     government, and in the formulation of a policy designed to 
     reduce dramatically the level of international 
     militarization.
       (12) A decision to provide military assistance and arms 
     transfers to a government that is undemocratic, does not 
     adequately protect human rights, is currently engaged in acts 
     of armed aggression, or is not fully participating in the 
     United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, should require 
     a higher level of scrutiny than does a decision to provide 
     such assistance and arms transfers to a government to which 
     these conditions do not apply.

     SEC. 3176. PURPOSE.

       The purpose of this chapter is to provide clear policy 
     guidelines and congressional responsibility for determining 
     the eligibility of foreign governments to be considered for 
     United States military assistance and arms transfers.

     SEC. 3177. PROHIBITION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
                   AND ARMS TRANSFERS TO CERTAIN FOREIGN 
                   GOVERNMENTS.

       (a) Prohibition.--Except as provided in subsections (b) and 
     (c), beginning on and after October 1, 1996, United States 
     military assistance and arms transfers may not be provided to 
     a foreign government for a fiscal year unless the President 
     certifies to the Congress for that fiscal year that such 
     government meets the following requirements;
       (1) Promotes democracy,--Such government--
       (A) was chosen by and permits free and fair elections;
       (B) promotes civilian control of the military and security 
     forces and has civilian institutions controlling the policy, 
     operation, and spending of all new enforcement and security 
     institutions, as well as the armed forces;
       (C) promotes the rule of law, equality before the law, and 
     respect for individual and minority rights, including freedom 
     to speak, publish, associate, and organize; and
       (D) promotes the strengthening of political, legislative, 
     and civil institutions of democracy, as well as autonomous 
     institutions to monitor the conduct of public officials and 
     to combat corruption.
       (2) Respects human rights.--Such government--
       (A) does not engage in gross violations of internationally 
     recognized human rights, including--
       (i) extra judicial or arbitrary executions;
       (ii) disappearances;
       (iii) torture or severe mistreatment;
       (iv) prolonged arbitrary imprisonment;
       (v) systematic official discrimination on the basis of 
     race, ethnicity, religion, gender, national origin, or 
     political affiliation; and
       (vi) grave breaches of international laws of war or 
     equivalent violations of the laws of war in internal 
     conflicts;
       (B) vigorously investigates, disciplines, and prosecutes 
     those responsible for gross violations of internationally 
     recognized human rights;
       (C) permits access on a regular basis to political 
     prisoners by international humanitarian organizations such as 
     the International Committee of the Red Cross;
       (D) promotes the independence of the judiciary and other 
     official bodies that oversee the protection of human rights;
       (E) does not impede the free functioning of domestic and 
     international human rights organizations; and
       (F) provides access on a regular basis to humanitarian 
     organizations in situations of conflict or famine.
       (3) Not engaged in certain acts of armed aggression.--Such 
     government is not currently engaged in the acts of armed 
     aggression in violation of international law.
       (4) Full participation in u.n. register of conventional 
     arms.--Such government is fully participating in the United 
     Nations Register of Conventional Arms.
       (b) Requirement for Continuing Compliance.--Any 
     certification with respect to a foreign government for a 
     fiscal year under subsection (a) shall cease to be effective 
     for that fiscal year if the President certifies to the 
     Congress that such government has not continued to comply 
     with the requirements contained in paragraphs (1) through (4) 
     of such subsection.
       (c) Exemptions.--The prohibition contained in subsection 
     (a) shall not apply with respect to a foreign government for 
     a fiscal year if--
       (1)(A) the President submits a request for an exemption to 
     the Congress containing a determination that it is in the 
     national security interest of the united States to provide 
     military assistance and arms transfer to such government; and
       (B) the Congress enacts a law approving such exemption 
     request (including a law containing an approval of such a 
     request); or
       (2) the President determines that an emergency exists under 
     which it is vital to the interest of the United States to 
     provide military assistance and arms transfer to such 
     government.
       (d) Notifications to Congress.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall submit to the Congress 
     initial certifications under subsection (a) and requests for 
     exemptions under subsection (c)(1) in conjunction with the 
     submission of the annual request for enactment of 
     authorizations and appropriations for foreign assistance 
     programs for a fiscal year and shall, where appropriate, 
     submit additional or amended certifications and requests for 
     exemptions at any time thereafter in the fiscal year.
       (2) Determination with respect to emergency situations.--
     The President shall submit to the Congress at the earliest 
     possible date reports containing determinations with respect 
     to emergencies under subsection (c)(2). Each such report 
     shall contain a description of--
       (A) the nature of the emergency;
       (B) the type of military assistance and arms transfers 
     provided to the foreign government; and
       (C) the cost to the United States of such assistance and 
     arms transfers.

     SEC. 3178. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of the Congress that the Committee on 
     International Relations of the House of Representatives and 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate should hold 
     hearings on--
       (1) controversial certifications submitted under section 
     3177(a).
       (2) all requests for exemptions submitted under section 
     3177(c)(1); and
       (3) all determinations with respect to emergencies under 
     section 3177(c)(2).

     SEC. 3179. UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS 
                   TRANSFERS DEFINED.

       For purposes of this chapter, the terms ``United States 
     military assistance and arms transfers'' and ``military 
     assistance and arms transfers'' means--
       (1) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to military assistance), 
     including the transfer of excess defense articles under 
     section 516 of that Act;
       (2) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to international military 
     education and training); or
       (3) the transfer of defense articles, defense services, or 
     design and construction services under the Arms Export 
     Control Act (excluding any transfer or other assistance under 
     section 23 of such Act), including defense articles and 
     defense services licensed or approved for export under 
     section 38 of that Act.

  Ms. McKINNEY (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman 
from Georgia?
  There was no objection.
  (Ms. McKINNEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
[[Page H5504]]

  Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, today, I will offer the Code of Conduct 
amendment to H.R. 1561. My amendment seeks to give Congress--for the 
first time in two decades--a role in U.S. arms export policy.
  As the law is currently written, Mr. Chairman, it is nearly 
impossible for Congress to stop an arms sale. Not since 1986 has a 
floor vote been taken on an arms sale, nor has a sale proposed by the 
administration formally been disapproved by Congress.
  In addition to the lack of congressional oversight in arms sales, the 
economic cost to the American taxpayer is more than $7 billion a year 
just to support the arms export bureaucracy.
  U.S. weapons are being used in 90 percent of today's most significant 
regional and ethnic conflicts. The weapons and technology that 
devastated the Iraqi Army only a few years ago, are now available to 
nations that are undemocratic, violate human rights, and are governed 
by dictators.
  In 1993, the U.S. Government cornered a colossal 70 percent of the 
global arms sales market, and in 1994 U.S. foreign military arms sales 
were a whopping $12.9 billion.
  America's arms sales have skyrocketed since the end of the cold war. 
As this first chart shows, Mr. Chairman, U.S. arms transfers from 1990 
to 1993 averaged $21.7 billion a year, whereas, from 1986 to 1989, arms 
transfers only averaged $10.6 billion. It is amazing and shameful that 
as America solidifies its post-cold war leadership and encourages 
global democracy, the U.S. Government sold $83.1 billion in foreign 
military sales to dictators with no congressional review.
  Despite this enormous dominance of the international arms market and 
the ``Boomerang Effect'' against U.S. Armed Forces--only a few Members 
of Congress have worked to restrain this dangerous trade.
  Additionally, America spends billions of tax dollars to finance 
exports to tyrants--highlighted by the second chart--while cutting 
billions from key domestic programs like veterans benefits, Social 
Security, and student loans.
  Mr. Chairman, the Code of Conduct amendment would not prohibit arms 
transfers to any country. Rather it would establish a higher standard 
of scrutiny for countries receiving U.S. weapons and more congressional 
oversight of arms sales. The Code of Conduct makes sure that we look 
before we leap by providing four guiding principles for U.S. arms 
transfers.
  History demonstrates that as a result of Siad Barre's Somalia, 
Cedras' Haiti, and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, our soldiers have paid the 
price for selling U.S. materiel to dictators.
  The code would require that both the President and Congress agree 
that providing assistance to a certain country is in the best interest 
of the United States. The code also gives the President flexibility. He 
can request a 1-year waiver for countries not meeting the code's 
standards, or in cases where vital U.S. interests are in jeopardy, use 
an emergency authority.
  The code is endorsed by 275 organizations from Amnesty International 
to the YWCA and is supported by the European Parliament. Arms sales to 
unstable governments must end, and the Code of Conduct will be the 
first step in that direction.
  There are 102 Members of Congress who support the guiding principles 
of the code--democracy, respect for human rights, and nonaggression. I 
urge all of you to cast your vote in favor of the Code of Conduct. 
Let's ensure that America's leadership is positively reflected in our 
arms export policy. Vote for the Code of Conduct.
                [From World Policy Institute, May 1995]

    U.S. Weapons at War: U.S. Arms Deliveries to Regions of Conflict

                        (By William D. Hartung)


                           executive summary

       From Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton, it has been an article 
     of faith for executive branch policy makers that U.S. weapons 
     exports are only made to responsible allies who use these 
     systems for legitimate defense purpose. This report puts that 
     thesis to the test by documenting U.S. weapons deliveries to 
     50 current ethnic and territorial conflicts.
       Contrary to the conventional wisdom in Washington, official 
     U.S. government data on arms transfers provides overwhelming 
     circumstantial evidence that U.S.-supplied weaponry is at the 
     center of many of today's most dangerous and intractable 
     conflicts:
       In the past ten years, parties to 45 current conflicts have 
     taken delivery of over $42 billion worth of U.S. weaponry;
       Of the significant ethnic and territorial conflicts going 
     on during 1993-94, 90% (45 out of 50) of them involved one or 
     more parties that had received some U.S. weaponry or military 
     technology in the period leading up to the conflict;
       In more than half of current conflicts (26 out of 50), the 
     United States has been a significant arms supplier, 
     accounting for at least 5% of the weapons delivered to one 
     party to the dispute over a five year period;
       In more than one-third of all current conflicts (18 out of 
     50), the United States has been a major supplier to one party 
     to the dispute, accounting for over 25% of all weapons 
     imported by that participant in the most recent five year 
     period;
       Despite the popular perception that it is U.S. policy to 
     cease deliveries of weapons once a conflict is under way, as 
     of the end of 1993 (the latest year for which full statistics 
     are available) the United States was shipping military goods 
     and services to more than half (26 out of 50) of the areas 
     where there were wars being fought;
       In a number of volatile areas the United States has been 
     the primary supplier to governments that are involved in 
     ongoing conflicts. In Turkey (76%), Spain (85%), Israel 
     (99%), Morocco (26%), Egypt (61%), Chad (27%), Somalia (44%), 
     Liberia (40%), Kenya (25%), Pakistan (44%), the Philippines 
     (93%), Indonesia (38%), Guatemala (86%), Haiti (25%), 
     Columbia (28%), Brazil (35%), and Mexico (77%), the United 
     States has been the primary supplier of imported weaponry in 
     the most recent five year period for which full data is 
     available.
       Turkey's use of U.S.-supplied fighter aircraft, 
     helicopters, tanks and armored personnel carriers in its 
     recent invasion of Northern Iraq highlights the dangers of a 
     policy of uncritical
      assistance to allies engaged in ethnic or territorial 
     disputes, as does the employment of U.S.-supplied 
     equipment on both sides of the 1995 Peru-Ecuador border 
     war.
       Since the end of the Cold War, the continuing U.S. policy 
     of promoting weapons exports as a key element of U.S. 
     security strategy and economic policy has accelerated the 
     incidence of the ``boomerang effect'': the transfer of U.S. 
     weaponry to forces that end up doing battle against U.S. 
     troops. The last four times the United States sent troops 
     into combat in significant numbers--in Panama, Iraq, Somalia, 
     and Haiti--they faced adversaries that had received U.S.-
     origin arms, training, or military production technology in 
     the period leading up to the conflict. This is a clear sign 
     that something is awry in U.S. arms transfer decision making 
     processes.
       Last but not least, covert U.S. arms sales have come back 
     to haunt U.S. citizens by inadvertently strengthening 
     terrorist organizations. Two of the men convicted in the 1993 
     World Trade Center bombing received weapons training in 
     Afghanistan under the direction of fundamentalist Islamic 
     forces that were armed and trained by the CIA. The suspects 
     in the recent murders of several U.S. embassy employees in 
     Karachi, Pakistan are also suspected of having ties to the 
     CIA's Afghan arms pipeline. David Whipple, the former head of 
     counterterrorism at the CIA, has indicated that these are not 
     isolated cases: ``some of the people who are actual or 
     potential terrorists in this country are former guerrilla 
     fighters in Afghanistan.'' And an Algerian official has 
     described the existence of a ``floating army'' of Islamic 
     fundamentalist fighters who were trained with CIA assistance 
     in Afghanistan and are now engaged in organized attempt to 
     overthrow the governments of Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi 
     Arabia, among others.
       As President Clinton tries to mobilize world public opinion 
     against Iran, in part for its alleged role in supporting 
     terrorism in the Middle East, it would behoove him to get his 
     own house in order by clamping down on the CIA's covert 
     weapons trafficking operations, which all too often end up 
     hurting innocent people, including U.S. citizens. The recent 
     revelations that a Guatemalan colonel on the CIA payroll is 
     implicated in the murders of Michael DeVine, an American who 
     ran a farm in Guatemala, and Efrain Bamaca Velazquez, a 
     Guatemalan rebel leader who was married to American lawyer 
     and activist Jennifer Harbury, is just the latest example of 
     a covert arms trading culture that is out of control.
                            recommendations

       The report makes the following specific recommendations for 
     promoting greater accountability in arms transfer decision 
     making (for the full text of the recommendations, see section 
     IV, below):
     Recommedation 1: Pass the arms transfer Code of Conduct bill
       In February of 1995, Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) and 
     Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) reintroduced 
     legislation calling for the establishment of a Code of 
     Conduct for U.S. weapons transfers. Under the code, 
     governments that engage in aggression against their 
     neighbors, violate the human rights of their own citizens, 
     come to power through undemocratic means, or refuse to 
     participate in international agreements like the United 
     Nations arms register would not be eligible to receive 
     weaponry from the United States. If the President wanted to 
     make an exception for a specific country on national security 
     grounds, he would have to ask Congress to pass a bill 
     providing an exemption for that nation. [[Page H5505]] 
       The benefits of the Code of Conduct would be twofold. 
     First, it would place considerations about the character of a 
     given arms recipient and how that nation might use U.S. 
     weaponry up front in the arms transfer decision making 
     process, preventing sales to unstable regimes in the process. 
     Second, even in cases where the President sought an 
     exemption, members of Congress would be forced to go on the 
     record for or against, providing a measure of public 
     accountability that rarely occurs under current law.
     Recommendation 2: Provide more detailed reporting on U.S. 
         transfers of arms and military technology, and press for 
         other nations to do the same
       Up until the Reagan Administration, the State Department 
     issued an annual report under Section 657 of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act that listed most significant items of military 
     equipment delivered from the United States to any foreign 
     country in the prior fiscal year, ranging from rifles and 
     bullets on up to advanced combat aircraft. The section 657 
     report should be reinstituted as an annual publication, to 
     provide a tool for keeping track of potential abuses of U.S.-
     supplied weaponry.
       A full accounting of U.S. arms transfer policy must also 
     include regular, detailed reporting on U.S. transfers of so-
     called ``dual use'' equipment--items such as advanced machine 
     tools and computers, measuring instruments, or unarmed light 
     helicopters and aircraft. If Congress and the public had been 
     aware of the particulars of the nearly $1.5 billion in dual 
     use export licenses that the Commerce Department granted to 
     companies seeking to sell equipment to Iraq during 1985 
     through 1990, some of the more dangerous items on the list 
     might not have been approved for sale.
     Recommendation 3: The Pentagon and the intelligence community 
         should publish regular reports on the use of U.S.-
         supplied weaponry in ongoing conflicts
       All too often, U.S. weapons are supplied on a ``fire `em 
     and forget `em'' basis: the decision to sell is made based on 
     short-term political, strategic, or economic considerations, 
     with little thought given to how these arms might be used a 
     few years down the road. In an attempt to prevent this 
     ``boomerang effect'' from repeating itself in the future, 
     Representative Cynthia McKinney sponsored a successful 
     amendment to the Fiscal Year 1995 Department of Defense 
     Authorization bill requiring the Pentagon to report annually 
     on how proposed arms transfers might create ``increased 
     capabilities'' on the part of potential adversaries, and how 
     they might ``pose an increased threat'' to U.S. forces in 
     some future conflict.
       As a further step in the right direction, the Pentagon and 
     the Central Intelligence Agency should be required to file 
     annual reports on how U.S.-supplied weaponry is being put to 
     use in current conflicts, either by the original recipients, 
     or as the result of unauthorized transfers to third parties. 
     These reports could serve as a running record of the 
     consequences of past U.S. weapons trading activities, and 
     they would hopefully inject a note of caution into 
     congressional debates over new proposed transfers.
     Recommendation 4: Outlaw covert weapons shipments
       From Iran/contra to the arming of Iraq to the ongoing 
     proliferation of weapons originally intended for Afghan rebel 
     movements, covert weapons trafficking have been at the center 
     of a series of unmitigated foreign policy fiascos. As part of 
     the effort to restructure the CIA to better meet the 
     realities of the post-Cold War world, covert arms sales by 
     the CIA and other government departments should be strictly 
     outlawed.
     Recommendation 5: The Clinton Administration (or its 
         successor) should vigorously pursue a policy of 
         multilateral arms transfer restraint designed to limit 
         sales of conventional weaponry to regions of conflict or 
         repressive regimes
       Contrary to the findings of the Clinton Administraton's new 
     conventional arms transfer policy, Presidential Directive 41, 
     limiting the spread of weaponry to regions of conflict should 
     be the paramount priority governing U.S. arms transfer 
     decisions in the post-Cold War era. Economic and defense 
     industrial base concerns should take a back seat to efforts 
     to construct a multilateral arms export control regime that 
     can serve both as a tool for preventing conflicts, and for 
     limiting their duration and severity once they break out. At 
     a time when the United States controls 72% of new arms sales 
     agreements with the developing world, U.S. leadership remains 
     an essential prerequisite for implementing any meaningful 
     multilateral arrangement for limiting the flow of 
     conventional armaments.
 I. Introduction: U.S. Arms Transfers--Promoting Stability or Fueling 
                               Conflict?

       ``[T]here is almost no case since World War II in which 
     arms provided by the United States have been used by the 
     country receiving them for purposes of aggression.''--Richard 
     Nixon, ``The Real War,'' 1980.
       ``[T]here is almost no instance of a country which is 
     primarily dependent upon U.S. weapons using those weapons in 
     an offensive manner.''--Joel Johnson, Aerospace Industries 
     Association, February 1994.
       ``[T]here is strong evidence that countries relying on 
     American weaponry have not started wars with their neighbors 
     . . . To cite the most egregious example, Iraq . . . 
     purchased its weapons primarily from Russia and France.''--
     Ethan Kapstein, ``Foreign Affairs,'' May/June 1994.
       ``Given the complexities of arms transfer decisions and the 
     multiple U.S. interests involved . . . decisions will 
     continue to be made on a case-by-case basis. These case-by-
     case reviews will . . . draw the appropriate balance between 
     legitimate arms sales to support the national security of our 
     friends and allies, and the need for multilateral restraint 
     against the transfer of arms that would enhance the military 
     capabilities of hostile states or that would undermine 
     stability.''--Fact Sheet on Clinton Administration, Arms 
     Sales Policy Directive, February 17, 1995.
       The Arms Export Control Act states that U.S. military 
     equipment and services shall be provided to other nations 
     only for purposes of internal security, ``legitimate self-
     defense,'' participation in United Nations peacekeeping 
     operations, or involvement in operations consistent with the 
     U.N. Charter.[1] Based in part on this legislative 
     requirement and in part on their
      ingrained assumptions regarding U.S. weapons sales, several 
     generations of executive branch officials, policymakers, 
     and independent analysts have taken it as an article of 
     faith that U.S.-supplied weapons are primarily used for 
     defensive purposes.
       Now that the United States controls nearly three-quarters 
     of all weapons exports to the developing world, the question 
     of whether or not U.S. weapons are used aggressively is of 
     more than merely academic interest.[2]
       As of early 1994, there were 50 significant ethnic and 
     territorial conflicts under way in Europe, Africa, the Middle 
     East, Asia and Latin America.[3] By the end of 1993, the 
     number of ongoing wars involving more than one thousand 
     battle-related deaths reached 34, marking the first increase 
     in this grim statistic since the end of the Cold War.[4] By 
     early 1995, progress towards peace in South Africa, the 
     Middle East, and Northern Ireland had been offset by the 
     escalation of conflicts in North Africa (Algeria) and Russia 
     (Chechnya), and the outbreak of a border war between Peru and 
     Ecuador.[5]
       With the exception of Russia, China, and a few other 
     nations that produce a wide array of weapons systems for 
     their own use, the majority of participants in today's armed 
     conflicts depend upon imported weaponry.[6] The conventional 
     wisdom among U.S. policymakers is that the weapons that are 
     actually used in the majority of the world's conficts are 
     supplied by other, less ``responsible'' suppliers. To the 
     extent that U.S. officials raise questions about arms 
     supplies to regions of conflict, the usual targets of 
     criticism are either Russia or China, which have historically 
     been more willing to supply arms and military technology to 
     ``rogue'' states like Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Iran.[7] 
     In addition, some observers make pointed references to 
     France's allegedly amoral, mercantile approach to arms 
     sales.[8] In contrast, it has been argued that U.S. arms 
     sales are grounded in carefully considered decisions to 
     bolster the security of trustworthy allies in critical 
     regions.
       The notion that the United States is only arming the ``good 
     guys'' has a long history. In his book ``The Real War,'' 
     Richard Nixon, the architect of the current U.S. role as the 
     world's leading weapons trafficking nation, argued that U.S.-
     supplied weapons have rarely been used in a belligerent 
     manner, but that ``Soviet arms are the ones that are 
     constantly used to break the peace.''[9] Nixon's blanket 
     claim ignored a series of aggressive actions by major U.S. 
     arms clients during the Nixon/Ford administrations, including 
     Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, Indonesia's invasion of East 
     Timor, Morocco's occupation of the Western Sahara, and 
     General Augusto
      Pinochet's reign of terror in the wake of his 1973 coup 
     d'etat in Chile.[10]
       The Reagan Administration presided over one of the most 
     revealing incidents in the history of U.S. policy towards 
     aggressive uses of U.S. military equipment when it responded 
     to Israel's June 1981 bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear 
     reactor. Initially, U.S. weapons deliveries to Israel were 
     suspended until the State Department could determine whether 
     the bombing, which utilized U.S.-supplied F-15 and F-16 
     aircraft, violated Israel's pledge to use U.S. systems for 
     defensive purposes. After a ten week review, Secretary of 
     State Alexander Haig decided to resume arms shipments to 
     Israel, arguing that ``I think one in a subjective way can 
     argue to eternity as to whether or not a military action may 
     be defensive or offensive in character.'' Rather than making 
     a specific case that Israel's bombing of Osirak was justified 
     as a defensive act, Haig seemed to be saying, in Alice-in-
     Wonderland style, that a defensive use of a weaponry is 
     whatever the U.S. government and its allies say it is.[11] 
     Turkey's 1995 invasion of Northern Iraq, which has been 
     justified by Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller on the 
     grounds that Turkish forces are in ``hot pursuit'' of Kurdish 
     terrorists, raises similar questions about what constitutes a 
     genuinely defensive deployment of U.S.-supplied weaponry (for 
     further discussion of Turkey's use of U.S. weapons against 
     its Kurdish population, see section II, below).
       This ``see-no-evil'' approach to U.S. weapons trading has 
     survived into the 1990s. The last four times the United 
     States has sent troops into combat they have faced 
     adversaries that received U.S. arms or military technology in 
     the period leading up to the conflict, yet the Clinton 
     Administration's arms transfer policy review stubbornly 
     refused to take into account the very real possibility that 
     U.S.-supplied weapons may be used for purposes contrary to 
     U.S. interests. As if to [[Page H5506]] underscore the 
     business-as-usual tone of the Clinton approach, an official 
     involved in the policy review has indicated that under the 
     Administration's new guidelines, not a single one of the 
     hundreds of major U.S. arms sales of the past fifteen years 
     would have been rejected.[12] The administration's decidedly 
     upbeat perspective on arms sales was summed up early on by 
     Lt. General Teddy Allen, the former Director of the 
     Pentagon's Defense Security Assistance Agency, during 
     testimony to Congress in June 1993: ``Many friends and allies 
     depend on U.S. defense equipment, services, and training to 
     deter, and when necessary, defeat, armed aggression.''[13] 
     When it finally released the results of its arms export 
     policy review in February of 1995, the Clinton Administration 
     described the five key goals of its policy as follows:
       (1) To ensure that our military forces can continue to 
     enjoy technological advantages over potential adversaries;
       (2) To help allies and friends deter or defend themselves 
     against aggression, while promoting interoperability with 
     U.S. forces when combined operations are required;
       (3) To promote regional stability in areas critical to U.S. 
     interests, while preventing proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction and their missile delivery systems;
       (4) to promote peaceful conflict resolution and arms 
     control, human rights democratization and other U.S. foreign 
     policy objectives;
       (5) to enhance the ability of the U.S. defense industrial 
     base to meet U.S. defense requirements and maintain long-term 
     military technological superiority at lower costs. [14].
       The idea of controlling the spread of U.S. weaponry to 
     ensure that U.S. exports do not sustain ongoing wars, fuel 
     regional arms races, or strengthen potential U.S. adversaries 
     is only obliquely hinted at in the Clinton administration's 
     priority list; the underlying assumption is that U.S. weapons 
     transfers go to potential ``coalition partners'' to be used 
     for strictly defensive purposes. Despite recent evidence to 
     the contrary, the possibility that today's partner could be 
     tomorrow's adversary doesn't seem to enter into the 
     administration's thinking.
       To further underscore how small a role the potential risks 
     of U.S. weapons exports will play in executive branch 
     decisionmaking, Clinton Administration officials have 
     indicated that the contribution of a given transfer to the 
     defense industrial base will now be an explicit factor in 
     deciding whether to go ahead with the sale. This could mean 
     that the fact that a deal might extend Lockheed's production 
     run for the F-16 fighter or sustain General Dynamics' 
     assembly line for the M-1 tank will carry greater weight than 
     whether these weapons are being provided to unstable regimes. 
     [15].
       Not surprisingly, the claim that U.S.-supplied arms are 
     only used defensively has also been made repeatedly by 
     executives and lobbyists in the defense industry. For 
     example, Don Fuqua, president of the Aerospace Industries 
     Association, made the following claim in a November 1994 
     article entitled ``Merchants of Peace'': ``during more than 
     half a century, no American soldier ever faced any 
     significant American military equipment used by a hostile 
     power.'' [16] This industry argument has been echoed in 
     academic circles as well, most notably in an article by Ethan
      Kapstein of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies 
     at Harvard which appeared in the May/June 1994 issue of 
     Foreign Affairs:
       ``. . . there is strong evidence that countries relying on 
     American weaponry have not started wars with their neighbors. 
     Contrast that record with the one compiled by countries that 
     have purchased their weapons from Russia, Western Europe, or 
     Third World suppliers. To cite the most egregious example, 
     Iraq, which attacked Iran in 1980 before turning on Kuwait a 
     decade later, had purchased its weapons primarily from Russia 
     and France.
       ``Why American arms should be used primarily for defensive 
     purposes is an interesting question. The most likely reason 
     is that countries reliant on the United States fear being cut 
     off and forced to look elsewhere if they misbehave.''[17]
       The question of whether U.S. weapons transfers are as 
     overwhelmingly constructive and stabilizing as this version 
     of the conventional wisdom claims they are deserves closer 
     scrutiny. As the next section will demonstrate, the sheer 
     volume of U.S. arms shipments to areas of conflict calls into 
     question the notion that these transfers have exerted a 
     uniformly positive or predictable influence on local, 
     regional, and international security.

                        II. U.S. Weapons at War

       A comparison of the Pentagon's own data on deliveries of 
     weapons through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and 
     Commercial Sales (CS) programs over the past decade with a 
     list of 50 significant wars that were under way during 1993-
     94 indicates that U.S. weapons exports have played a major 
     role in fueling the ethnic and territorial conflicts that 
     have become one of the most difficult security challenges of 
     the post-Cold War era [18]:
       In the past ten years, parties to 45 current conflicts have 
     taken delivery of over $42 billion worth of U.S. weaponry;
       Of the significant ethnic and territorial conflicts going 
     on during 1993-94, 90% (45 out of 50) of them involved one or 
     more parties that had received some U.S. weaponry or military 
     technology in the period leading up to the conflict;
       In more than half of current conflicts (26 out of 50), the 
     United States has been a significant arms supplier, 
     accounting for at least 5% of the weapons delivered to one 
     party to the dispute over a five year period;
       In more than one-third of all current conflicts (18 out of 
     50), the United States has been a major supplier to one party 
     to the dispute, accounting for over 25% of all weapons 
     imported by that participant in the most recent five year 
     period;
       Despite the popular perception that it is U.S. policy to 
     cease deliveries of weapons once a conflict is under way, as 
     of the end of 1993 (the latest year for which full statistics 
     are available) the United States was shipping military goods 
     and services to more than half (26 out of 50) of the areas 
     where there were wars being fought.
       The data outlined above demonstrate that contrary to the 
     assertions of key policymakers, academic analysts, and 
     industry lobbyists, the United States is sustaining the 
     warfighting capabilities of a substantial number of the 
     parties to the world's current conflicts. In a number of 
     volatile areas the United States has been the primary 
     supplier to governments that are involved in either internal 
     or regional conflicts. In cases where the United States has 
     supplied a majority of a client government's imported 
     weaponry over an extended period of time, it is likely that 
     some U.S. systems will be utilized in future conflicts 
     involving these nations (see Table I, below)
       Among the most serious conflicts in which the United States 
     has been the primary weapons supplier are Turkey, Morocco, 
     Somalia, Liberia, Kenya, Zaire, Pakistan, Indonesia, the 
     Philippines, Haiti, Guatemala, Colombia and Mexico. Official 
     U.S. weapons deliveries to Haiti, Guatemala, Liberia, and 
     Zaire were cut off as of the early 1990s, but U.S. deliveries 
     to conflict zones in Turkey, Morocco, Somalia and Kenya have 
     actually increased over the past few years. In the case of 
     Somalia, the increase is explained by the fact that a new 
     government has been installed as a result of a UN 
     peacekeeping mission in that nation. But continuing U.S. 
     deliveries to Morocco, Turkey, and Kenya have no such 
     rationale: in these cases, U.S. arms are shoring up regimes 
     that have been intransigent in their pursuit of military 
     solutions to sensitive ethnica and territorial disputes. Last 
     but not least, in both Haiti and Guatemala, legislative 
     attempts to terminate U.S. military assistance were subverted 
     by the implementation of covert aid programs that were 
     actually larger than the overt programs that were eliminated 
     by Congress (see sections II and III for further discussion).

 TABLE I--AREAS OF CONFLICT IN WHICH THE U.S. HAS BEEN A PRIMARY WEAPONS
                                SUPPLIER                                
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Percent of total arms 
                                                  imports received from 
            Region (and recipient)                  the United States   
                                               -------------------------
                                                  1987-91     1991-93\1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Southern Europe:                                                        
    Spain.....................................           85           86
    Turkey....................................           76           80
Middle East/North Africa:                                               
    Israel....................................           99           91
    Morocco...................................           26           76
    Egypt.....................................           61           89
Sub-Saharan Africa:                                                     
    Chad......................................           27           25
    Somalia...................................           44          100
    Liberia...................................           40         \2\0
    Kenya.....................................           25          100
    Zaire.....................................           17            0
Asia:                                                                   
    Pakistan..................................           44            3
    Philippines...............................           93           75
    Indonesia.................................           38           33
Latin America:                                                          
    Guatemala.................................           86         \3\0
    Haiti.....................................          >25         \2\0
    Colombia..................................           28           19
    Brazil....................................           35           40
    Mexico....................................           77           64
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\The overlap in years covered by the two columns (1987-1991 and 1991- 
  1993) is a function of the way the data is reported in the two most   
  recent editions of the ``World Military Expenditures and Arms         
  Transfers'' report. For a brief description of the nature of the      
  conflicts in each of these nations, see Appendix A, Table I, below.   
\2\The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) reported no arms      
  transfers to Haiti or Liberia from any source during 1991-1993; this  
  does not necessarily mean that there were no transfers of any kind--it
  is likely that there was some black market trading in light weaponry  
  that was not detected by the intelligence sources that serve as the   
  basis for ACDA's data.                                                
\3\It has recently been revealed that the Central Intelligence Agency   
  continued to make millions of dollars in payments to Guatemalan       
  military and intelligence officials after U.S. military aid was       
  officially cut off in 1991; it has yet to be determined whether some  
  of this money was used to import weaponry.                            
                                                                        
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ``World Military      
  Expenditures and Arms Transfers'', 1991-92 and 1993-94 editions, Table
  III.                                                                  

       While data on the total volume of U.S. weapons supplies to 
     areas of conflict is readily available, specific information 
     on how U.S. weaponry is being put to use in today's wars is 
     harder to come by. This is in part because neither the media 
     nor the armed forces have made it their business to identify 
     the specific types of weaponry utilized in a given conflict 
     or to document the origins of these armaments. Even if 
     gathering such data was a priority, the reality of warfare, 
     particularly multi-sided civil conflicts involving light 
     weaponry, would make it difficult to obtain comprehensive 
     information. Nonetheless, accounts in the mainstream and 
     specialty press have uncovered a number of recent examples of 
     how U.S.-supplied weaponry is being put to use on the 
     battlefield, and a number of arms control and human rights 
     researchers have recently begun a concerted effort to gather 
     more information on the patterns of deliveries of light 
     weaponry to ethnic conflicts. The following examples are 
     illustrative of the ways in which U.S. weapons are being 
     utilized in current conflicts: a more comprehensive 
     accounting would require more open reporting of the nature of 
     U.S. weapons transfers to these areas. [[Page H5507]] 
       Turkey: Turkey received over $6.3 billion worth of military 
     equipment and services from the United States between F.Y. 
     1984 and F.Y. 1993.[19] The United States supplied 76% of all 
     weapons imported by the Turkish government between 1987 and 
     1991, a figure which increased to 80% for the period from 
     1991 to 1993. The majority of U.S. weapons supplies to Turkey 
     have been paid for by U.S. taxpayers as part of an extensive 
     military aid program that has provided over $5 billion in 
     assistance from F.Y. 1986 through F.Y. 1995.[20] Turkey has 
     also received
      large deliveries of U.S. weaponry for free or at minimal 
     cost as part of the NATO ``cascading'' program, which 
     involves redistributing surplus weapons rendered redundant 
     by the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE).[21] 
     Last but not least, a number of U.S. weapons systems are 
     produced in Turkey under coproduction and licensing 
     agreements with U.S. firms, including Lockheed's F-16 
     fighter plane and the FMC Corporation's M-113 armored 
     personnel carrier.[22]
       There have been reports in the international and Turkish 
     press indicating that U.S.-supplied weaponry has been used 
     extensively by the Turkish government in its war on the 
     Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) in southeastern Turkey. A wide 
     range of U.S. systems, including F-16, F-4, F5, and F-104 
     fighter aircraft, Cobra and Black Hawk helicopters, cluster 
     bombs, and M-60 tanks and M-113 armored personnel carriers 
     have been used in the conflict, which has claimed over 15,000 
     lives since 1984.[23]. The Clinton Administration and other 
     supporters of the Turkish government have argued that the PKK 
     is a terrorist organization, not a legitimate political 
     movement. However, regardless of their views on the PKK, most 
     independent observers agree that the politico-military 
     strategy of the Turkish government--strafing and depopulating 
     entire villages in the southeast--entails unnecessary 
     suffering and repeated violations of the human rights of 
     civilian noncombatants. Human Rights Watch has reported that 
     as of October 1994, the Turkish government has depopulated as 
     many as 1,400 villages and hamlets and displaced several 
     hundred thousand people in its prosecution of the war against 
     the PKK.[24] Major encounters involving U.S.-supplied 
     weaponry have included May 1993 bombing raids in the Karliova 
     valley that utilized F-4 fighter plans and Cobra helicopters 
     to kill 44 Kurdish fighters and a January 1994 incursion into 
     Iraq to bombard PKK camps with cluster bombs, 500- and 2000-
     pound bombs dropped from F-16 and F-4 aircraft.
       The Turkish government's March 1995 invasion of Northern 
     Iraq marks the latest chapter in its quest for a military 
     solution to the Kurdish question. A Turkish government 
     spokesperson proudly described the cross-border raid by 35,00 
     troops as ``the biggest military operation in the history of 
     the Turkish Republic.''[25] Ironically, the Turkish attack 
     targeted the same sector of Iraq in which the United States 
     had been enforcing a ``no fly zone'' as part of the United 
     Nations-backed Operation Provide Comfort, an effort designed 
     to protect Iraqi Kurds in the area from Saddam Hussein's 
     regime. Because the United States is far and away Turkey's 
     largest supplier of weapons and military aid, Turkish Prime 
     Minister Tansu Ciller cleared the operation with
      President Clinton by telephone before sending her military 
     forces into Iraq. White House spokesperson Mike McCurry 
     reported that the President accepted Ciller's explanation 
     that the raids were strictly aimed at PKK ``terrorist 
     bases'' in Northern Iraq, and that Clinton expressed 
     ``understanding for Turkey's need to deal decisively'' 
     with the rebel group.[26]
       In a move that may prompt debate for some time to come, 
     President Clinton and the Pentagon also ordered U.S. military 
     personnel in Northern Iraq to ``stand down'' from enforcing 
     the no fly zone against Turkey aircraft for the duration of 
     Turkey's intervention. when a reporter asked Pentagon 
     spokesperson Dennis Boxx whether the Pentagon was 
     ``uncomfortable'' over the fact that a U.S. ally was 
     ``beating up on . . . the same people we've been trying to 
     protect from Iraq for a number of years,'' Boxx argued that 
     Turkey was taking great care to focus its attacks on PKK 
     terrorist strongholds. When he was asked where U.S. 
     enforcement of the no fly zone would be rendered inoperative 
     for the duration of the Turkish intervention in Northern 
     Iraq, Boxx implied that it would, noting that ``it's simply 
     better not to put these people at risk [U.S. military 
     personnel involved in Operation Provide Comfort] until this 
     has been resolved.'' The chilling implication of Boxx's 
     remark is that the Pentagon actually feared that if U.S. 
     forces had tried to enforce the no fly zone against the 
     Turkish military, Turkish forces would have engaged in an air 
     war against U.S. troops, using U.S.-supplied aircraft. It was 
     almost as if the Pentagon spokesman was acknowledging that 
     Turkey had intimidated the U.S. into allowing its Iraqi 
     incursion to go forward unhindered.[27]
       As has been the case in its major anti-Kurdish operations 
     of the recent past, Turkey's offensive in Northern Iraq has 
     relied heavily on U.S.-supplied equipment. Reports in the 
     European press have indicated that Turkey's air war against 
     the PKK (and against a number of Kurdish settlements and 
     refugee camps) in Northern Iraq has been conducted almost 
     entirely with U.S.-designed fighter planes such as the 
     McDonnel Douglas F-4, the Lockheed F-104, and the Lockheed 
     Martin F-16. Other U.S.-supplied aircraft such as the 
     Textron-Bell Cobra helicopter gunship and the United 
     Technologies/Sikorsky Black Hawk troop transport have also 
     been used in support of Turkey's move into Iraq.[28]
       U.S. support of the Turkish intervention is based on the 
     assumption that it is a carefully crafted defensive operation 
     aimed at wiping out PKK bases in Iraq, with little or no 
     negative impact on Kurdish civilians. But press reports from 
     the area have raised serious doubts regarding Turkey's claim 
     that it has been mounting a ``surgical strike'' against 
     terrorists. Turkey's ongoing
      war against the PKK, both in Northern Iraq and Southeastern 
     Turkey, is looking increasingly like it may become that 
     nation's Vietnam: a draining, divisive, and ultimately 
     unsuccessful effort to defeat a nationalist movement by 
     military means. An April 2nd news analysis piece by John 
     Pomfret of the Washington Post--appropriately entitled 
     ``Turkey's Hunt for the Kurds: the Making of a 
     Quagmire?''--captured the dilemma faced by Turkish troops 
     in Northern Iraq as they attempted to sort out Kurdish PKK 
     militants from Kurdish civilians (both Turkish and Iraqi) 
     in the area:
       ``. . . by embracing a military answer to what it considers 
     a terrorist question, Turkey risks bogging its army down in a 
     vicious cycle of incursion and withdrawal, followed by 
     guerilla counterattacks and more incursions again. Such a 
     cycle, Western officials have said, would only empty 
     government coffers overtaxed by an ailing economy and a 
     similar counterinsurgency operation within Turkey.''[29]
       A western relief worker underscored the futility of 
     Turkey's military strategy when he told Pomfret ``you can't 
     wipe out a terrorist operation that operates on two 
     continents by attacking the mountains. It's like killing a 
     fly with a sledgehammer.'' Turkish soldiers reported a 
     conundrum similar to that faced U.S. forces in Vietnam--an 
     inability to distinguish friend from foe. One soldier told 
     the Post ``we have a big problem because we don't know who is 
     a villager and who the PKK is . . . we can't do a 
     thing.''[30]
       Unfortunately, contrary to the soldier's report, Turkish 
     troops did plenty of things in Northern Iraq, including a 
     number of documented cases of killings and displacement of 
     Kurdish civilians. There is no way of knowing at this point 
     whether these were isolated incidents or part of a larger 
     pattern of abuse, because at a number of key stages in the 
     conflict Turkish military commanders limited access to the 
     combat zones on the part of both journalists and relief 
     workers.[31] At the end of March, during the second week of 
     the Turkish invasion, residents of the Iraqi village of 
     Beshile reported that their village had been bombed and 
     burned to the ground by Turkish forces. Fevzi Rashid, a 43 
     year old farmer who witnessed the Turkish attack, described 
     it to a reporter from Reuters news service as follows:
       ``First the planes bombed our village. Then soldiers came 
     some days later and burned our houses. Yesterday they came 
     again and fired at the village with rockets and 
     mortars.''[32]
       Turkey's claim to be targeting only PKK terrorists has been 
     further undercut by assertions by the
      Iraqi National Congress, the Iraqi Kurdish organization that 
     controls most of the territory impacted by the Turkish 
     invasion, that on the very first day of the invasion 
     ``Turkish soldiers . . . arrested hundreds of refugees as 
     suspected followers of the Kurdish Workers' Party.''[33]
       Although the Clinton Administration firmly held to its 
     position that the Turkish invasion would be limited in 
     duration and narrow in focus, one expected withdrawal date--
     Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller's April 19th visit to 
     Washington--came and went with no final timetable for 
     withdrawal in sight. A partial pullback of Turkish troops in 
     late April of 1995 still left at least 10,000 Turkish troops 
     inside Iraq, and there is some dispute even now as to whether 
     all Turkish troops have cleared out of the area (see 
     discussion below). In contrast to the policy of Germany, 
     which has cut off all weapons shipments to Turkey in response 
     to the Iraqi incursion, the Clinton Administration's position 
     on the Kurdish question appears to be ``Turkey right or 
     wrong.''[34] The U.S. arms industry has officially weighed in 
     on the side of the Turkish government's tactics as well, in 
     the form of a comment by Joel Johnson, chief lobbyist for the 
     Aerospace Industries Association, to the effect that Turkey's 
     military plan was no different from what other global and 
     regional powers have done in similar circumstances:
       ``It must be acknowledged that the Turks have not invented 
     Rolling Thunder. We used B-52s to solve a guerrilla problem 
     [in Vietnam]. The Russians used very large weapons platforms 
     [in Afghanistan]. And the Israelis get irritated on a 
     reasonably consistent basis and use F-16s in Southern 
     Lebanon. One wishes that it didn't happen. Sitting in the 
     comfort of one's office, one might tell all four countries 
     they're wrong. It's a lot easier to say that here than when 
     you're there and it's your military guys who are getting 
     chewed up.''[35]

     Setting aside for a moment the obvious moral issues raised by 
     massive bombing raids as a tool of modern warfare, it must be 
     pointed out that Johnson's statement glosses over a key 
     strategic point: in two of the three examples he cites, 
     Vietnam and Afghanistan, the ``Rolling Thunder'' tactic was 
     employed by great powers that were ultimately defeated 
     militarily and politically by [[Page H5508]] smaller, better 
     motivated nationalist forces. Even staunch allies of the 
     current Turkish regime might find reason to advise Prime 
     Minister Ciller to abandon her country's current military 
     strategy vis-a-vis Kurdish separatist forces.
       In response to a growing international outcry against the 
     Turkish government's tactics in its war against the PKK, the 
     Clinton Administration has repeatedly urged Turkey to stop 
     its indiscriminate approach of bombing and depopulating 
     entire villages. congress has gone beyond
      rhetoric by withholding 10% of Turkey's U.S. military aid 
     for F.Y. 1995 pending a report on abuses against civilians 
     by the Turkish military. In December 1994, Human Rights 
     Watch published a report entitled ``U.S. Cluster Bombs for 
     Turkey?'' which called for a reversal of a plan to provide 
     advanced U.S.-built CBU-87 cluster bombs to Turkey on the 
     grounds that the weapons might be used against civilians. 
     As a result of the pressure generated by the report, the 
     cluster bomb sale has been shelved for the moment.[36]
       Despite these efforts to restrict the flow of U.S. arms to 
     Turkey's war against the PKK, the United States remains 
     Turkey's number one weapons supplier, and Turkey's inhumane 
     warfighting tactics continue. As of the first week of May, 
     1995, Turkish officials claimed to have removed all of their 
     troops from Northern Iraq, but Prime Minister Ciller has 
     stated in no uncertain terms that she retains the right to 
     invade the area again if Turkey detects further PKK 
     activities there.[37] So far, moves to curb Turkey's use of 
     imported weaponry have had no discernible impact on Ciller's 
     approach to the Kurdish problem: she told members of her 
     governing coalition in early April that ``we have one thing 
     to say to those who threaten us about using their arms when 
     they should be standing by us--we will use our right to 
     defend ourselves under any circumstances. You can keep your 
     weapons.''[38] Maybe it's time for President Clinton to take 
     Prime Minister Ciller up on her offer.
       Afghanistan: Beginning during the late 1970s under the 
     Carter Administration and accelerating during the 1980s under 
     the Reagan Administration, the United States supplied rebel 
     factions in Afghanistan with an estimated $2 billion in 
     covert military assistance.[39] This effort has been widely 
     cited as one of the great success stories of the Reagan 
     Doctrine of arming anticommunist rebels, and there is no 
     question that U.S. weapons supplies contributed to the 
     ability of Afghan guerrilla fighters to drive Soviet forces 
     out of their country. Unfortunately, the longer term 
     consequences of U.S. arms supplies to Afghan forces have been 
     far more problematic. Since Soviet troops withdrew from 
     Afghanistan in February 1989, U.S. weapons have helped to 
     sustain a vicious civil war amongst competing rebel 
     organizations inside Afghanistan. In addition, systems 
     supplied to the Afghan factions for purposes of fighting off 
     Soviet forces are now being resold on the international 
     market, turning up in conflicts where they were never 
     intended to be used.
       As Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute has noted, 
     ``[e]ven before they ousted the Soviet-backed government from 
     power in April 1992 feuding mujahadin guerrilla units spent
      almost as much time battling each other as they did fighting 
     the communists.'' Far from setting the stage for a period 
     of peaceful reconstruction and reconciliation, the 
     fighting inside Afghanistan actually intensified after the 
     Soviet-supported regime was overthrown--2,000 people were 
     killed in one three-week period in August of 1992, and by 
     the spring of 1994 600,000 people had been displaced from 
     the capital city of Kabul. Much of the equipment used on 
     each side of the Afghan civil war comes from stocks 
     supplied to the various rebel factions by the CIA during 
     the 1980s. [40]
       The violence sparked by U.S. weapons and training to the 
     Afghan rebel movements extends far beyond Afghanistan. An 
     Algerian government official has described the existence of a 
     ``floating army'' of Islamic fundamentalist fighters who 
     received weapons and training in Afghanistan starting in the 
     1980s, and are now mounting terrorist attacks on U.S.-backed 
     governments in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. [41] 
     This international network of armed Islamic fundamentalists 
     that the CIA helped to create has struck in the United States 
     as well: two of the men convicted in the 1993 bombing of the 
     World Trade Center had received weapons and explosives 
     training from CIA-backed rebels in Afghanistan prior to their 
     attack in New York. And these two men may not be the only 
     examples of U.S. covert aid backfiring. According to David 
     Whipple, the former head of counterterrorism at the CIA, 
     ``some of the people who are actual or potential terrorists 
     in this country are former guerrilla fighters in 
     Afghanistan.'' And it now appears that the suspects in the 
     recent murders of several U.S. embassy employees in Karachi, 
     Pakistan are also suspected of having ties to the CIA's 
     Afghan weapons pipeline.[42]
       One of the most dangerous lingering side effects of the 
     CIA's Afghan weapons trafficking has been the proliferation 
     of U.S.-built Stinger missiles. The Stinger, a shoulder-fired 
     antiaircraft missile that can be used to shoot down anything 
     from a fighter plane to a civilian airliner, has been 
     described by Senator Dennis DeConcini as ``the ultimate 
     terrorist weapon.'' [43] Afghan rebel commanders have been 
     putting their U.S.-supplied Stingers up for sale to the 
     highest bidder in the international arms bazaar, and there 
     have been reports that some of the weapons have now turned up 
     in such unlikely places as Iran, Libya, Qatar, and North 
     Korea. [44]. The CIA was so disturbed by these reports that 
     they put up $65 million for a Stinger ``buyback'' plan; so 
     far the program has only succeeded in driving up the price 
     that Afghan forces can get for the missiles to two to three 
     times their original price, while recovering very few of the 
     missiles. [45].
       The shortsighted attitudes of U.S. policymakers involved in 
     creating the Afghan weapons
      pipeline were summarized by Edward Juchniewicz, the CIA's 
     associate director for covert operations during the Reagan 
     Administration:
       ``The Iranians have already captured or otherwise obtained 
     some Stingers and continue to accumulate them. I can 
     understand why people are exercised. I wouldn't want one to 
     hit the airplane I'm on . . . [but] one makes the assumption 
     when one goes to battle that one's equipment will be captured 
     by the enemy. So unfortunately, we lost some Stingers, and 
     now our enemy has one of our best weapons.''[46]
       What Juchniewicz fails to acknowledge is that the Stingers 
     that were transferred to Iran were not captured by an enemy 
     in battle; they were provided to Iran by Afghan rebel forces 
     that had been considered friends of the United States.
       While the spread of U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles poses an 
     ongoing threat because of their possible role in augmenting 
     the capabilities of terrorist organizations, the tens of 
     thousands of tons of light weaponry that the CIA funneled to 
     Afghan factions through its contacts in Pakistani 
     intelligence services may pose an even more serious risk to 
     the stability of South Asia. Analysts of the Afghan conflict 
     have reported that during the 1980s the United States 
     purchased literally hundreds of thousands of combat rifles 
     from such diverse sources as China, Turkey, Egypt, and Israel 
     and passed them on to Afghan rebel groups.[47] However, as 
     British researcher Chris Smith has noted, many of these 
     weapons were siphoned off along the way, because the Afghan 
     pipeline was ``extremely badly organized and poorly thought 
     out,'' to the point that it ``leaked profusely and virtually 
     ruptured.'' As a result, the Northwest Frontier area of 
     Pakistan is dotted with a series of open air weapons marts 
     that are doing a brisk business reselling weapons that were 
     originally intended to go to Afghan rebel forces. Pakistani 
     intelligence officials have been running guns to Islamic 
     fundamentalist forces in the India province of Kashmir, 
     increasing the level of violence of that conflict and 
     undermining efforts to encourage India and Pakistan to come 
     to a diplomatic resolution of the Kashmir issue. Sikh 
     militants fighting in the Punjab region of India have large 
     quantities of Chinese Type 56 assault rifles of the kind that 
     were supplied in large numbers by the CIA to the Afghan war, 
     indicating a likely spillover of the Afghan pipeline into 
     this conflict as well. U.S.-supplied weapons have also been 
     utilized by Islamic fundamentalist fighters engaged in a 
     civil war against Russian-backed government in the former 
     Soviet republic of Tajikistan.[48]
       In reviewing the evidence of the spread of U.S.-supplied 
     guns and ammunition that was originally intended for the 
     Afghan war, Human Rights Watch has observed that ``[t]he 
     single most important factor in the introduction of small 
     arms and light weapons into South Asia was the effort by the 
     U.S. and Pakistan to arm the Afghan mujahidin 
     resistance.''[49]
       Indonesia: Governed by one of the world's longest enduring 
     military rulers, General Suharto, Indonesia also has one of 
     the worst human rights records of any major U.S. weapons 
     client. There is direct evidence that some of these human 
     rights violations have been carried out using U.S.-supplied 
     equipment.
       In addition to restrictions on freedom of the press, 
     freedom of assembly, and labor rights within Indonesia, the 
     Indonesian government has sustained an illegal military 
     occupation of neighboring East Timor for nearly 20 years. In 
     November of 1991, two U.S. journalists, Allan Nairn and Amy 
     Goodman, witnessed a massacre carried out by Indonesian 
     troops in the Timorese capital of Dili. The troops, armed 
     with U.S.-supplied M-16 rifles, opened fire on a memorial 
     mass and procession in honor of a young Timorese man who had 
     been murdered by the Indonesian army for attempting to speak 
     out about human rights abuses in East Timor.[50] Human rights 
     abuses by Indonesian forces have continued up to the present, 
     both in East Timor and within Indonesia; a recent summary of 
     Indonesia's record of Human Rights Watch described ``a 
     pattern of abuse . . . characterized by military intervention 
     in virtually all aspects of Indonesian public life and by the 
     arbitrary exercise of authority by President Soeharto.''[51]
       The massacre in Dili and subsequent actions of the 
     Indonesian military have sparked calls by the public and the 
     Congress for a cutoff of U.S. military assistance, training 
     and sales to the Indonesian government, but so far these 
     demands have only been partially met. In October of 1992 
     Congress cut off U.S. assistance to Indonesia under the 
     International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. 
     In 1994, the Clinton administration announced that it would 
     stop permitting arms sales or export licenses to Indonesia 
     for deals involving small arms or crowd control 
     equipment.[52] [[Page H5509]] 
       Despite these steps, there continues to be a significant 
     flow of U.S. weapons to Indonesia, adding to the more than 
     $583 million in U.S. weapons deliveries to that nation from 
     F.Y. 1984 through F.Y. 1993. In 1993, the last year for which 
     full data is available, U.S. deliveries to Indonesia through 
     the Pentagon's Foreign Military sales program and commercial 
     sales licensed by the State Department topped $34 million. 
     And the most recent statistics from the U.S. Arms
      Control and Disarmament Agency demonstrate that for a five 
     year period ending in 1991, the U.S. supplied 38% of all 
     weapons imported by the Indonesian government; for the 
     period from 1991 to 1993, the U.S. share of Indonesia's 
     weapons imports dropped slightly, to 33%. As this report 
     was going to press, Defense News reported that the Clinton 
     Administration was seriously considering giving clearance 
     for a multi-billion dollar sale of F-16 fighter aircraft 
     to Indonesia; the article reported some ambivalence within 
     the administration, noting that ``White House officials . 
     . . realize they must tiptoe around congressional 
     sensitivity over killings and arbitrary arrests in the 
     former East Timor.''[53]
       Other examples: In addition to these specific examples of 
     the utilization of U.S.-supplied weapons in active areas of 
     conflict, there is strong circumstantial evidence to indicate 
     that U.S. systems have either already been used or may yet 
     come into play in a host of other wars. The mere fact that 
     U.S. weapons have been delivered to 45 of the 50 current 
     localities that are in the midst of significant conflicts in 
     one strong indication that U.S. weapons are involved in many 
     of today's wars.
       Moving form statistical evidence to actual cases, a few 
     recent examples should suffice to demonstrate the myriad ways 
     in which U.S. weaponry may be used in ethnic and territorial 
     conflicts.
       Guatemala has been on the front pages of American 
     newspapers in recent months because of revelations that CIA-
     financed Guatemalan military officers were involved in the 
     murders of Efrain Bamaca Velazquez (a Guatemalan rebel leader 
     who was the husband of Jennifer Harbury, an American lawyer 
     and anti-war activist), and Michael DeVine, an American 
     citizen who owned a farm in Guatemala before he was killed in 
     1990. Ironically, it took the deaths of an American and the 
     husband of an American citizen to focus widespread media 
     attention on the routine use of U.S. arms to promote murder 
     and torture in Guatemala. As R. Jeffrey Smith and Dana Priest 
     noted in a Washington Post piece that ran after the 
     revelations of CIA complicity in these two deaths, ``while 
     U.S. public attention was distracted by civil wars in El 
     Salvador and Nicaragua, the CIA and U.S. military trained and 
     equipped anti-communist military forces widely believed to 
     have killed more than 100,000 peasants during a decades-long 
     simmering insurgency, according to U.S. intelligence, 
     military, and diplomatic officials.'' Once the Cold War aura 
     of anti-communist ``legitimacy'' is removed from these 
     activities, an objective view of the behavior of U.S.-backed 
     Guatemalan forces reveals that they have been engaged in a 
     campaign of systematic
      terror against their own people for over three decades.[54]
       As if the obscene spectacle of U.S. government funds 
     supporting the murder of a U.S. citizen were not evidence 
     enough that U.S. arms policies towards Guatemala have gone 
     seriously awry, subsequent revelations about the CIA's role 
     in Guatemala raise even more troubling questions.
       From 1986 through 1991, the United States accounted for 86 
     percent of all weaponry imported by the Guatemalan military. 
     In response to ongoing human rights abuses in Guatemala in 
     general and the murder of Michael DeVine in particular, U.S. 
     military assistance to Guatemala was officially suspended by 
     the Bush Administration in 1990. As far as the public, the 
     media, most members of Congress, the Secretary of State, and 
     even the U.S. ambassador to Guatemala were concerned, this 
     cutoff of military aid meant that the U.S. government's role 
     in arming and financing the Guatemalan military had been 
     brought to an end. This reasonable assumption turned out to 
     be dead wrong.
       In the wake of the revelations about the Guatemalan 
     military's role in the murders of Michael DeVine and Efrain 
     Velazquez, Tim Weiner of the New York Times revealed that 
     from the moment official U.S. aid to Guatemala was suspended 
     in 1990, the CIA immediately initiated a multi-million dollar 
     program of payments to key Guatemalan military and 
     intelligence officials. The payments, which were allegedly 
     aimed at ``maintaining good relations'' with Guatemalan 
     security officials, totaled $5 to $7 million per year, more 
     than twice the level of the public U.S. military aid that was 
     terminated by the Bush Administration. Among the recipients 
     of CIA funds was Col. Alpirez, the principal suspect in the 
     murders of Michael DeVine and Efrain Velazquez.[55]
       In addition to the secret CIA payments, investigative 
     journalist Allan Nairn has uncovered documentation of 144 
     separate sales of rifles and pistols to Guatemala from U.S. 
     sources, all of which occurred after the 1990 aid cutoff.[56]
       As the Clinton Administration and the Congress proceed with 
     separate investigations of the Guatemalan arms scandal, they 
     will have to consider new, tougher safeguards over the CIA's 
     role in the covert arming and financing of foreign military 
     and intelligence services. Otherwise, there will be no 
     guarantee that the will of the President, the Congress, or 
     the public will be respected in future arms sales 
     relationships. The CIA's conduct in Guatemala brings to mind 
     a remark made by former New Hampshire Senator Warren Rudman 
     with respect to another covert
      arms trafficking scheme run amok, Iran/contra: ``If you 
     carry this to its logical extreme, you don't have a 
     democracy any more.''[57]
       When Mexico moved to put down the rebel uprising in the 
     southern state of Chiapas in early 1994, they initially used 
     some of the nearly three dozen helicopters that the United 
     States had supplied to the Mexican Attorney General's office 
     for use in anti-narcotics activities. Under questioning from 
     Congress, Assistant Secretary of State Alexander Watson 
     acknowledged that ``USG-supplied helicopters were being used 
     in Chiapas,'' but argued that their use was acceptable 
     because ``[s]enior officials assured our Embassy that the 
     helicopters were use in a logistical, noncombat role.''[58] 
     Since a ``logistical'' function for the U.S.-supplied 
     helicopters could include the militarily essential task of 
     transporting troops and equipment to the front, the assertion 
     regarding a ``noncombat role'' is misleading at best.
       In March of 1994, the San Antonio Express-News reported 
     that the Mexican government was ``quietly importing millions 
     of dollars worth of riot control vehicles across the Texas 
     border, apparently in preparation for any civil unrest after 
     the late-summer presidential election.'' The systems imported 
     from the United States included the 17-ton Cobra riot control 
     vehicle, equipped with water cannon and dye guns that can be 
     used to ``mark'' troublesome demonstrators for later 
     identification by the police; and the 12-ton Textron armored 
     water cannon, which can spray with an impact of 120 pounds at 
     a range of up to 50 feet. Pro-democracy activists in Mexico 
     roundly condemned the sale. Apparently, the vehicles have yet 
     to be utilized to put down any major demonstrations, but 
     given the continued political turbulence in Mexico they may 
     yet be used for that purpose.[59]
       In February of 1995, Newsday reporter Ray Sanchez reported 
     that U.S.-supplied Black Hawk helicopters were being used to 
     ferry troops to Chiapas in the Mexican government's abortive 
     attempt to round up the top leadership of the Zapatista 
     movement. There is a strong possibility that U.S. weaponry 
     will be used again if there is further civil strife in 
     Mexico: the Mexican government has taken delivery of over 
     $300 million worth of U.S. weaponry over the past decade, and 
     U.S. deliveries accounted for over three-quarters of Mexican 
     weapons imports in the most recent five year period for which 
     information is available.[60]
       The Bush Administration's initiative to utilize military 
     assistance to help Andean nations fight the ``war on drugs'' 
     has led to a number of documented instances of the use (and 
     abuse) of U.S.-supplied weaponry in conflicts having little 
     or nothing to do with the problem of drug
      interdiction. As the Washington Office on Latin America 
     (WOLA) noted in its 1991 report ``Clear and Present 
     Dangers; The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in the 
     Andes'', under the impetus of the Bush policy ``the Andean 
     region has supplanted Central America as the main locus of 
     U.S. military activity in the hemisphere.'' In the first 
     three years of the 1990s, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia were 
     slated to receive more U.S. military assistance than all 
     of Central America combined, with the rationale of 
     providing equipment and training that could be used to 
     fight drug trafficking in those countries. Despite 
     rhetoric about shifting its emphasis toward reducing 
     demand for drugs in the United States, the Clinton 
     Administration has carried on the Bush policy of providing 
     substantial amounts of military assistance to Andean, 
     Central American, and Caribbean nations for use in anti-
     narcotics efforts.[61]
       In Colombia, Black Hawk helicopters and Textron/Cessna A-37 
     counterinsurgency aircraft that were supplied as part of the 
     Bush Administration's September 1989 emergency antidrug aid 
     package to that nation were used just a few months later in a 
     series of bombing raids against the village of Llana Fria 
     that resulted in the displacement of 1,400 peasants. The 
     Colombian military claimed that the raids were aimed at 
     leftist guerrilla forces--clearly not a purpose that was 
     covered in the original rationale for the emergency U.S. 
     weapons shipments. To make matters worse, a report by the 
     Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) indicated that 
     ``witnesses claim that the attacks were not aimed at 
     guerrilla camps, as the military said, but at civilian 
     settlements.'' In a statement that proved to be prophetic, 
     WOLA Executive Director Alexander Wilde warned in a June 1990 
     congressional hearing that funneling U.S. aid to the 
     Colombian armed forces under the guise of fighting drugs 
     would just ``further fuel the crisis of human rights abuse 
     [in Colombia] . . . and undermine political stability, by 
     strengthening the Colombian armed forces.'' Five years and 
     hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. military aid later, 
     Colombia has made little progress in stemming the flow of 
     cocaine from its territory to the United States; in fact, in 
     March of 1995 the Clinton Administration stopped just short 
     of cutting off all U.S. aid to Colombia as punishment for the 
     current government's lackluster efforts to bring members of 
     the drug cartels to justice.[62]
       When tensions between Ecuador and Peru erupted into a full-
     scale border war in January of 1995, it marked the latest 
     case in [[Page H5510]] which the United States has provided 
     substantial amounts of weaponry to both sides of a conflict.
       Ecuador received over $111 million in U.S. Military 
     equipment between F.Y. 1984 and F.Y. 1993. U.S. shipments 
     accounted for more than 33% of all Ecuadorean weapons imports 
     in the most recent five year period, and 50% of all such 
     shipments from 1991 through 1993. In the five years following 
     the announcement of the Bush Administration's Andean antidrug 
     initiative, Ecuador has received $21 million in security 
     assistance from the United States, including military grants 
     and training, giveaways of excess U.S. Defense equipment, and 
     balance of payments assistance under the Economic Support 
     Fund program (ESF).[63] A passage on the aid program for 
     Ecuador in the 1993 edition of the joint Pentagon/State 
     Department Congressional Presentation on Security Assistance 
     provided an ironic foreshadowing of precisely how the U.S. 
     Weaponry provided to that nation for the fight against drugs 
     would prove useful in its 1995 jungle border war with Peru:
       ``The proposed FY 93 FMF [Foreign Military Financing] 
     program will provide vehicles, aircraft spare parts, and 
     communications equipment to improve military mobility in 
     remote regions. It will also provide weapons and 
     ammunition.''[64]
       This increased mobility apparently proved useful to 
     Ecuadorean forces during the early weeks of the war, as they 
     seized a decidedly remote border zone in the Amazon jungle.
       When Peru counterattacked to win back the captured 
     territory, its armed forces were also well equipped with U.S. 
     Weaponry. Although U.S. Military aid to Peru has been an on 
     again, off again affair in recent years due to questions 
     raised by Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori's imposition of 
     martial law, the United States still managed to ship $136 
     million worth of military equipment to Peru between F.Y. 1984 
     and F.Y. 1993. In all, U.S. sources supplied 6% of Peru's 
     total arms imports between F.Y. 1987 and F.Y. 1991, 
     increasing slightly to 8.5% between 1991 and 1993. 
     Protestations over Fujimori's record notwithstanding, the 
     United States supplied over $293 million in security 
     assistance to Peru between F.Y. 1990 and F.Y. 1994, mostly in 
     the form of cash payments under the Economic Support Fund 
     (ESF) program.[65] A presentation to Congress on the F.Y. 
     1992 aid proposals for Peru provides a capsule summary of the 
     kinds of assistance and training that the United States has 
     attempted to provide to the Peruvian
      government and armed forces in the period leading up to the 
     1995 border war with Ecuador:
       ``The proposed FY 1992 FMF [Foreign Military Financing] 
     program will provide individual troop equipment, small arms 
     and heavy weapons and ammunition, communications equipment, 
     vehicles, river patrol boats and spare parts for previously-
     provided aircraft and helicopters. ESF [Economic Support 
     Funds] will provide balance of payments support and fund 
     alternative development activities in coca-growing areas and 
     judicial reform activities. IMET [International Military 
     Education and Training] will provide professional military 
     education, technical, management, and special police anti-
     narcotics training, and training to improve military and 
     police human rights practices.''[66]
       Important elements of this ambitious aid program were 
     sidetracked in April of 1992 when President Fujimori imposed 
     martial law, but previous U.S. weapons and training (not to 
     mention hundreds of millions of dollars in aid provided under 
     the Economic Support Fund program) left a substantial mark on 
     the shape and size of the Peruvian armed forces. In a 
     February 1995 briefing for foreign correspondents at the 
     presidential palace in Lima, Fujimori noted that one of the 
     Peruvian aircraft that was shot down in the air war with 
     Ecuador was an A-37 attack plane, a U.S. counterinsurgency 
     aircraft that is manufactured by the Cessna division of 
     Textron and nicknamed the ``Dragonfly.''[67]
       In Asia, the fastest growing arms market in the world, U.S. 
     weapons are playing a central part in a critical conflict as 
     well.
       The government of the Philippines has been waging 
     counterinsurgency campaigns against the New People's Army 
     (NPA) and several other indigenous guerrilla movements for 
     over two decades. The United States has taken sides in this 
     civil war by supplying the Philippine government with over 
     $619 million worth of U.S. weaponry over the past decade. The 
     U.S. supplied 93% of the Philippine government's arms imports 
     from 1987 through 1991, dropping to 75% for the period from 
     1991 through 1993.[68]
       While there has been no detailed accounting of the role of 
     U.S. weapons and training in the civil war in the 
     Philippines, it is clear that at least some of the equipment 
     being supplied by the United States has direct applications 
     to counterinsurgency, and that the United States government 
     has gone to some effort to obscure this fact. For example, 
     when the United States made its first report to the United 
     Nations arms register in 1993, it indicated a delivery of 
     nine ``combat aircraft'' to the Philippines, with no further 
     description. When the Philippines reported on its weapons 
     imports for that same year, they
      indicated receipt of 19 (not nine) combat aircraft, and they 
     identified the planes as Rockwell OV-10A Broncos, an 
     aircraft designed specifically for counterinsurgency 
     missions. [69] In early April, the International Herald 
     Tribune reported that Philippine forces had used U.S. 
     supplied Broncos to conduct bombing raids against Muslim 
     guerrilla forces near the city of Zamboanga. [70]
       The war in Afghanistan is not the only instance of U.S. 
     covert weapons assistance being misused long after the 
     original purpose of that assistance has passed. In Angola, 
     where the U.S. provided approximately $250 million in covert 
     weapons shipments to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement between 
     1986 and 1991, U.S.-supplied systems were utilized 
     extensively in UNITA's efforts to shoot its way into power 
     and overturn the results of U.N.-sponsored elections. A 
     November 1994 report by Human Rights Watch notes that ``U.S.-
     made 106mm recoilless rifles mounted on four-wheel-drive 
     vehicles have been particularly popular with UNITA.'' The 
     report also recounts Angolan government assertions that they 
     have captured U.S.-made antitank missiles, mortars, and 
     grenade launchers from UNITA forces. As in Afghanistan, UNITA 
     forces in Angola also received Stinger antiaircraft missiles 
     from the United States during the 1980s, although the Bush 
     Administration apparently got the Stingers back from UNITA by 
     swapping them for ``less sensitive lethal equipment.'' [71] 
     As of early 1995, it appeared that UNITA was finally prepared 
     to put down its arms as part of a United Nations sponsored 
     demobilization plan; but the question remains whether the 
     Angolan civil war could have been ended years sooner with 
     considerably less loss of life if the United States and other 
     major arms suppliers hadn't provided hundreds of millions of 
     dollars worth of armaments to both sides in that twenty year 
     conflict.
       Last but not least, when a civil war erupted in Yemen at 
     the end of 1994, reporting focused on Soviet-origin weaponry 
     utilized by the government of Yemen, along with the 
     possibility that some of it had been maintained with the 
     assistance of Iraqi advisors. Less attention was paid to the 
     fact that the Yemeni government also had access to 11 F-5E 
     fighters, 50M60A1 tanks, and 70 M113 armored personnel 
     carriers that it had inherited from the government of North 
     Yemen (a former U.S. ally) when North and South Yemen merged. 
     Despite reports that the U.S. government withheld spare parts 
     for U.S. systems during the conflict, at least four of the 
     F5-Es and an unknown number of the U.S.-supplied tanks and 
     armored personnel carriers were utilized in the conflict. 
     [72]

     III. Strengthening Potential Adversaries: The Boomerang Effect

       One of the most striking features of U.S. arms sales policy 
     since the end of the Cold War has been the regularity with 
     which U.S.-supplied weapons have ended up in the hands of 
     U.S. adversaries. The last four times the United States has 
     sent troops into conflict in substantial numbers--in Panama, 
     Iraq,
      Somalia, and Haiti--they faced forces on the other side that 
     had received U.S. weapons, training or military technology 
     in the period leading up to the outbreak of hostilities. 
     While representatives of arms exporting companies have 
     argued that this ``leakage'' of U.S. weaponry to potential 
     adversaries has been minimal (see section II, above), the 
     statistical evidence tells a different story.
       Panama: When President Bush ordered U.S. troops into Panama 
     in December of 1989 to capture Panamanian President Manuel 
     Noriega and bring him back to the United States to face trial 
     on charges of drug trafficking and money laundering, they 
     faced a Panamanian defense force that had been to a 
     considerable extent made in the U.S.A. Panama received $33.5 
     million in U.S. weaponry under the FMS and commercial sales 
     programs during the 1980s, and the U.S. accounted for 44% of 
     Panama's weapons imports in the five years leading up to the 
     invasion. Equally important, a large part of the Panamanian 
     officer corps had been trained by the United States military: 
     from 1950 through 1987, 6,695 Panamanian military personnel 
     received training under the Pentagon's International Military 
     Education and Training program (IMET), at a cost of $8.3 
     million.\73\ Although U.S. troops encountered minimal 
     resistance in their effort to capture Noriega, the Panama 
     invasion was the first incident in a disturbing pattern that 
     has characterized every major U.S. military intervention 
     since the end of the Cold War: U.S. forces going into battle 
     against forces that have been armed or trained by their own 
     government.
       Iraq: Despite recent efforts by the defense industry and 
     the Clinton Administration to argue that the United States 
     did not arm Iraq in the period leading up to the 1991 Gulf 
     War, there is ample documentation demonstrating that the 
     Reagan and Bush administrations supplied critical military 
     technologies that were put directly to use in the 
     construction of the Iraqi war machine. There is also strong 
     evidence indicating that the executive branch's failure to 
     crack down on illegal weapons traffickers or keep track of 
     third party transfers of U.S. weaponry allowed a substantial 
     flow of U.S.-origin military equipment and military 
     components to make their way to Iraq.\74\
       The differences in perception regarding the degree to which 
     the United States government helped to arm Iraq center around 
     the fact that the most significant U.S. contributions to the 
     Iraqi military complex were not through direct transfers of 
     guns, tanks, helicopters, or other finished weapons systems, 
     but rather through supplies of so-called ``dual use'' 
     technologies. This misunderstanding was at the heart of the 
     misleading press coverage of the Justice Department's 
     investigation of the BNL affair, a scandal involving 
     provision of U.S.-guaranteed loans to [[Page H5511]] Iraq by 
     the Atlanta branch of Italy's state-run Banca Nazionale del 
     Lavoro. For example, a headline in the New York Times 
     announced that ``Inquiry Finds No U.S. Involvement in the 
     Iraqi Arms Buildup,'' and the Washington Post reported that 
     the Justice
      Department's lead investigator, John Hogan, had asserted 
     that ``Washington appears to have authorized the sale to 
     Saddam only of some communications gear and a single 
     pistol.'' In fact, the Justice investigators made it clear 
     in their summary of findings that their mandate was not to 
     assess the extent to which U.S. exports may have 
     contributed to Iraq's military production capabilities but 
     rather to ``determine whether chargeable crimes could be 
     proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'' The report went on to 
     note that ``[b]ecause our inquiry was limited in that way, 
     this report is not intended either to criticize or to 
     approve of any policy decisions.''[75]
       To craft a policy for the future that avoids ``another 
     Iraq,'' it is necessary to undertake precisely the task that 
     the Justice Department's investigators viewed as outside 
     their purview: a critical analysis of the policymaking 
     process regarding transfers of militarily useful equipment to 
     the Baghdad regime during the period from 1985 through 1990. 
     As for the types of equipment that were approved for sale to 
     Iraq, the Justice Department report acknowledges that 
     hundreds of dual use items with applications to military 
     production were approved for export to Iraq in the five years 
     prior to the Gulf conflict of 1990-91. The Iraq issue was 
     never about pistols--it has always been about the transfer of 
     weapons production technology.
       The first step in understanding the United States 
     contribution to the Iraqi military buildup prior to the 1991 
     Gulf War is to look at the concept of dual use technologies. 
     Dual use items include everything from unarmed light aircraft 
     or helicopters that can be adapted to military uses, to 
     instruments of torture like thumbscrews, to equipment like 
     computers, machine tools, and measuring devices that can be 
     applied to the production and testing of civilian or military 
     products. Between 1985 and 1990, the U.S. Department of 
     Commerce granted licenses for more than $1.5 billion in dual 
     use exports to Iraq, more than $500 million of which was 
     delivered before the outbreak of the Gulf War in August of 
     1990.[76] Under pressure from Congress and the public, in 
     March 1991 the Commerce Department released a list of the 
     dual use licenses it granted for exports to Iraq in the five 
     years leading up to the conflict. Even a casual perusal of 
     the list makes it evident that many of these items were put 
     directly to work in Iraq's military research and production 
     network. In addition to items that were licensed for export 
     to obvious military end users like the Iraqi Air Force or the 
     Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency, the list included numerous 
     licenses for equipment that was being sent to Saad 16, a 
     military production complex south of Baghdad that is known, 
     among other things, as the center for Iraq's research and 
     production work on ballistic missiles.[77] Congressional 
     investigators later learned that even this list, which 
     revealed significant U.S. contributions to Iraq's defense 
     industrial base, was incomplete and misleading; at least 68 
     entries had been
      changed to obscure their military applications.[78]
       While the Commerce Department's licensing process provided 
     the most direct channel for U.S. assistance to Iraq's 
     military buildup, there were also significant transfers of 
     U.S. military technology and knowhow through indirect 
     channels. When Chilean arms dealer Carlos Cardoen decided to 
     sell Iraq $400 million worth of cluster bombs along with the 
     technology for Iraq to build its own cluster bomb factory, he 
     apparently did so with the acquiescence of several agencies 
     of the U.S. government. According to Nasser Beydoun, a 
     Lebanese-born arms dealer who worked as Cardoen's U.S. 
     representative, the CIA was aware of the deal but ``looked 
     the other way'' because Cardoen and his associates had been 
     helpful in a covert CIA plan to provide missile technology to 
     South Africa. In addition, investigators for ABC News 
     discovered that in 1986 the U.S. Patent Office had improperly 
     granted Cardoen a patent for his own version of a U.S. 
     cluster bomb design, at a time when Chile was ineligible to 
     receive cluster bombs from the United States.[79] Howard 
     Teicher, who served on Ronald Reagan's National Security 
     Council from 1982 to 1987, has made even more explicit 
     charges of U.S. involvement in Cardoen's scheme to ship 
     cluster bomb technology to Iraq. In a recent sworn statement 
     filed in federal court in Miami, Teicher asserts that under 
     the direction of William Casey, the CIA ``authorized, 
     approved, and assisted'' Cardoen's effort to give cluster 
     bombs to Iraq, because Casey believed that the weapons would 
     be ``the perfect force multiplier'' for Iraq to fight off 
     Iran's strategy of sending ``human waves'' of attackers 
     against Iraqi positions during the Iran/Iraq war.[80] Whether 
     due to oversight or wilful negligence, U.S. government 
     agencies helped smooth the way for Cardoen's transfer of 
     U.S.-origin cluster bomb knowhow to Iraq.
       Another major source of weapons for Iraq was Canadian-born 
     artillery specialist (and naturalized U.S. citizen) Gerald V. 
     Bull. During the 1970s Bull ran his firm, the Space Research 
     Corporation, on a 10,000 acre site on the Vermont/Canadian 
     border. It was here that he developed the technology for the 
     G-5 155mm howitzer, a state-of-the-art artillery piece 
     notable for its extensive range. Bull received considerable 
     help at key stages in his career from various agencies of the 
     U.S. government. Before he set up his U.S.-based company, he 
     was granted U.S. citizenship under a rare special act of 
     Congress sponsored by Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-AZ). During the 
     period when Bull was perfecting his howitzer design, Space 
     Research benefited from millions of dollars worth of 
     contracts from the U.S. Army. According to former CIA Angola 
     station chief John Stockwell, in the mid-1970s Bull was 
     assisted by the CIA in setting up a lucrative deal with to 
     supply howitzers, artillery shells, and howitzer production 
     technology to South Africa for use in its war against the 
     government of Angola. When this deal was uncovered, Bull was 
     prosecuted for violations of U.S. arms export laws and served 
     four and one-half
      months in the U.S. federal prison at Allenwood, 
     Pennsylvania. However, the Customs Service investigator 
     who made the case against Bull has argued that the Justice 
     Department let Bull off relatively easily because his 
     illegal acts were linked to a CIA covert operation.
       After Bull was released from prison in 1980, he set up shop 
     in Belgium, marketing his howitzer technology to a customer 
     list that included both China and Iraq. Because Bull was a 
     U.S. citizen and his howitzer technology was developed in the 
     United States, he was required under U.S. law to receive 
     clearance from the State Department's Office of Munitions 
     Control in order to market this system internationally; 
     despite his prior conviction for violating U.S. export laws, 
     the State Department readily granted Bull clearance to sell 
     his guns on the world market. Iraq ended up purchasing Bull-
     designed G-5 howitzers from both South Africa and Austria. In 
     the case of the Austrian sales, U.S. officials were aware 
     that the guns were being sold to both Iran and Iraq, by 
     lodged protests with the Austrian government only with 
     respect to the sales to Iran. Bull's most ambitious project, 
     helping Iraq to build a ``supergun'' that would allegedly 
     have been capable of launching a projectile from Baghdad to 
     Tel Aviv, was cut short when he was assassinated in March of 
     1990. [81]
       One final example of U.S. government complicity in the 
     arming of Saddam Hussein is the case of Sarkis Soghanalian, 
     who for years worked as an arms dealer for Iraq out of 
     offices based at the Miami airport. Among the deals that 
     Soghanalian worked on from his U.S. base were a successful 
     scheme to send 26 Hughes MD-50 helicopters to Iraq and a 
     failed deal to procure Romanian uniforms for Iraqi military 
     forces. Soghanalian has maintained publicly that his arms 
     deals with Iraq were not challenged during the 1980s because 
     key U.S. government agencies were ``in on the deal,'' a claim 
     that is lent some credence by the fact that he operated so 
     openly as an arms procurement agent for Saddam Hussein 
     without any interference from U.S. intelligence or law 
     enforcement agencies. He was finally convicted on charges of 
     illegally selling helicopters to Iraq in the fall of 1991, 
     long after his services as one of Saddam Hussein's most 
     valued arms brokers had been rendered irrelevant by Iraq's 
     defeat in the Gulf War. [82]
       When he learned of the details of U.S. government 
     acquiescence in Gerald Bull's various illegal arms 
     transactions at the height of the Gulf conflict, Rep. Howard 
     Wolpe (D-MI) reacted angrily, with a statement that could 
     just as easily been applied to the whole executive branch 
     approach to private arms dealers and producers like Cardoen, 
     Bull, and Soghanalian:
       ``The bottom line here is that because we have been so lax 
     in our enforcement of American laws we are now finding 
     American-made technology in the hands of the Iraqi forces 
     that are pointing their cannons at American soldiers. That's 
     outrageous.'' [83]
       Somalia: The U.S. arms supply relationship with Somalia 
     presents a textbook case of what can go wrong when short-term 
     political interests outrank long-term strategic 
     considerations in U.S. arms transfer decisionmaking. From the 
     end of the Carter Administration in 1979 through beginning of 
     the Bush Administration in 1989, the regime of Maj. Gen. 
     Mohammed Siad Barre received roughly $1 billion in U.S. 
     military and economic aid, including $154 million in weapons 
     deliveries under the foreign military sales and commercial 
     sales programs. U.S. arms deliveries accounted for 31% of 
     Somalia's arms imports from 1985 to 1989, making the United 
     States Somalia's top weapons supplier during the period 
     leading up to the overthrow of the Barre regime and the 
     outbreak of clan warfare in Somalia.[84]
       The rationale for U.S. arms aid to Somalia was pure Cold 
     War geopolitics. The Carter Administration decided that 
     Somali ports and airfields would be useful as stepping stones 
     for a potential military intervention in the Middle East by 
     the new U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (since renamed and 
     reorganized as the Central Command). The Carter and Reagan 
     Administrations justified this new arms relationship with 
     Somalia (which was a Soviet arms client during the 1970s) as 
     a straight quid pro quo: U.S. arms were swapped for access to 
     Somalia military facilities such as the port of Berbera. An 
     added argument for supplying the Somalia regime was the fact 
     the Somalia's larger neighbor, Ethiopia, had recently fallen 
     out of the U.S. orbit and allied itself with the Soviet 
     Union. A run through the executive branch's justifications to 
     Congress from the 1980s for shipping weaponry to Somalia 
     provides a virtual catalog of wishful thinking regarding how 
     U.S. arms supplies might somehow turn [[Page H5512]] around 
     what was obviously a rapidly deteriorating security 
     situation. Time and again, despite mounting human rights 
     abuses and an emerging civil war, Pentagon and State 
     Department officials justified the arms flow to Siad Barre's 
     regime on the grounds that it would ``foster stability.''[85] 
     the most unintentionally ironic statement of the U.S. policy 
     of ignoring instability in Somalia and pressing ahead with 
     military-related assistance was offered by the Bush 
     Administration in a 1991 presentation to Congress:
       ``Prior to the civil war, ended by a January 1991 coup, we 
     urged the Siad Barre government to improve human rights, 
     undertake real political reform and promote national 
     reconciliation. * * * Despite the adverse impact of the civil 
     war and the coup of U.S.-Somali relations, our interests in 
     the region remain the same. The new Somali government has 
     expressed an interest in resuming bilateral relations, and 
     may be willing to undertake several democratic reforms which 
     we support''.[86]
       This analysis was offered in support of offering U.S. 
     military training to the new Somali government.
      A new round of fighting within Somalia ensured shortly 
     thereafter, and a year and one-half later President Bush 
     sent U.S. troops to Somalia as part of a United Nations 
     force charged with imposing some semblance of order upon 
     rival armed factions that were threatening the delivery of 
     humanitarian relief to a beleaguered and malnourished 
     Somali populace. From 1991 to 1993, the United States has 
     supplied 100% of all new weaponry imported by Somalia's 
     governing coalition.
       When Siad Barre was overthrown in January of 1991, much of 
     the weaponry that the United States had so diligently 
     supplied to his government during the 1980s fell into the 
     hands of the rival factions that carried on the civil war 
     that served as the rationale for the dispatch of U.S. troops 
     to that nation in December of 1992. Despite the usual 
     assertions that U.S. weapons deliveries to Somalia were 
     largely ``defensive'' or ``nonlethal'' equipment, the U.S. 
     provided significant quantities of small arms, including 
     4,800 M-16 rifles, 84 106mm recoilless rifles, two dozen 
     machine guns, 75 81mm mortars, and an unspecified quantity of 
     land mines. Larger weaponry included 24 M-113 armored 
     personnel carriers, 18 155mm towed howitzers, and 448 TOW 
     anti-tank missiles. The smaller items on this list, including 
     the M-16s, machine guns, recoilless rifles, and land mines, 
     were precisely the kinds of weaponry that were utilized by 
     the forces of the warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed and other 
     Somali factions in their fighting with U.S. and United 
     Nations troops posted to Somalia. While the U.S. was far from 
     the only supplier to add to the atmosphere of armed chaos 
     that took hold of Somali society, U.S. weapons delivered 
     during the 1980s played a significant role, first in 
     supporting the regime of Siad Barre in its campaign of terror 
     against his own population, and then in supporting the 
     warfighting capabilities of the Somali factions involved in 
     the civil war that carried on after Barre was overthrown.[87]
       Haiti: When President Clinton decided to dispatch U.S. 
     troops to Haiti in late 1994 to clear the way for the 
     restoration to power of Haiti's elected leader, Jean Bertrand 
     Aristide, most of the media attention was focused on the last 
     minute shuttle diplomacy carried out by former President 
     Jimmy Carter retired Gen. Colin Powell, and Senator San Nunn. 
     There was very little discussion of the historic U.S. role in 
     arming and training the Haitian military and intelligence 
     forces that United States troops were sent to keep in check. 
     From F.Y. 1984 to F.Y. 1993, the United States delivered $2.6 
     million worth of weaponry to Haiti under the FMS and 
     commercial sales programs. This seemingly modest amount was 
     significant by the standards of Haiti, which maintains 7,000 
     personnel in its armed forces and spends on average only 
     about $50 million per year on its military budget. Of equal 
     importance, during the past ten years the United States has 
     trained 164 members of the Haitian officer corps. In 
     addition, from 1986 through 1991, U.S. intelligence agencies 
     were secretly arming and training key military and 
     intelligence
      officials in Haiti at a cost of up to $1 million per year, 
     allegedly for the purpose of assisting in the interdiction 
     of illegal narcotics. Taking into account these secret 
     weapons shipments, total U.S. arms deliveries to Haiti 
     during the period from 1987 through 1991 exceeded 25% of 
     total Haitian arms imports. Key U.S.-designed equipment in 
     the Haitian military's inventory include six Cadillac Gage 
     V-150 Commando armored personnel carriers (a vehicle 
     specially tailored for ``riot control''), two Cessna 337 
     aircraft armed with rockets, and a variety of naval 
     equipment and small arms. [88]
       While the Haitian mission proceeded remarkably smoothly, 
     with minimal U.S. casualties, the question remains whether 
     past U.S. supplies of arms, training, and intelligence 
     resources to a series of military-dominated regimes in Haiti 
     may have unnecessarily complicated Haiti's transition to 
     democracy, calling forth an intervention that might have been 
     prevented if sounder arms transfer decisions had been made by 
     the United States during the 1970s and 1980s.

 IV. Taking Control: Reforming the Arms Transfer Decisionmaking Process

       Contrary to recent claims of the Clinton Administration and 
     other key participants in the arms export debate, U.S. 
     weapons are decidedly not limited to responsible suppliers 
     who are using them strictly for legitimate defensive 
     purposes. When 90% of the world's ongoing conflicts involve 
     parties that have received U.S. weaponry; when the last four 
     major U.S. troop deployments have been against adversaries 
     that received arms, training, or military technology from the 
     United States; and when U.S. weapons are utilized to kill 
     innocent civilians and abuse human rights in Indonesia, 
     Turkey, Angola, and Guatemala, something is clearly wrong 
     with the arms transfer decisionmaking process. This section 
     makes specific recommendations for promoting greater 
     accountability in arms transfer decisions, in the hopes of 
     preventing a repetition of the disastrous arms deals that 
     have been documented in this report.
     Recommendation 1: Pass the arms transfer Code of Conduct bill
       In February of 1995, Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) and 
     Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) reintroduced 
     legislation calling for the establishment of a Code of 
     Conduct for U.S. weapons transfers (bill number H.R. 772 in 
     the House and bill number S. 326 in the Senate). Under the 
     Code, governments that engage in aggression against their 
     neighbors, violate the human rights of their own citizens, 
     come to power through undemocratic means, or refuse to 
     participate in the United Nations arms register would not be 
     eligible to receive weaponry from the United States. If the 
     President wanted to make an exception for a specific country 
     on national security grounds, he would have to ask Congress 
     to
      pass a bill providing an exemption for that nation.
       The benefits of the Code of Conduct would be twofold. 
     First, it would place considerations and the character of a 
     given arms receipt and how that nation might use U.S. 
     weaponry up front in the arms transfer decisonmaking process, 
     preventing sales to unstable regimes in the process. Second, 
     even in cases where the President sought an exemption, 
     members of Congress would be forced to go on the record for 
     or against, providing a measure of public accountability that 
     rarely occurs that rarely occurs under current law.
       Under current procedures, if a major arms sale does not 
     involve the provision of U.S. assistance, Congress can choose 
     whether or not to vote on the deal; failure to vote signals 
     acquiescence in the sale. Of the 50 to 100 major arms sales 
     notified to Congress each year, the vast majority of them are 
     not subjected to a vote, scrutizined in hearings, or debated 
     on the floor of the Congress. And in the more than twenty 
     years since Congress first acquired the power to vote down 
     arms sales, it has never successfully done so. There have 
     been a few ``close calls'' such as the 1981 Saudi AWACS sale. 
     There have also been a few cases where the executive branch 
     has withdrawn a deal or reduced it in size to avoid a battle 
     with the Congress, such as the 1986 decision by the Reason 
     Administration to forgo additional sales of F-15 aircraft to 
     Saudi Arabia (a decision which was reversed by the Bush 
     Administration when it offered the Saudis 72 F-15s in 1992). 
     But on the whole, the current system has allowed tens of 
     billions of dollars in arms sales to be made every year with 
     very little in the way of congressional scrunity or public 
     input. The Code of Conduit bill would correct this deficiency 
     by stimulating the kind of vigorous public debate that should 
     be a fundamental requirement for making decisions on 
     transfers of weaponry that can have dangerous and unforeseen 
     consequences for United States and international 
     security.[89]
     Recommendation 2: Provide more detailed reporting on U.S. 
         transfers of arms and military technology, and press for 
         other nations to do the same.
       Although the United States generally discloses more 
     information on sales of arms and military technology than any 
     other major weapons supplying nation, there are still a 
     number of significant gaps in reporting that to make it 
     difficult (and in some cases impossible) to assess the 
     potential impacts of U.S. transfers to a given regime.
       At the high end of the trade, prospective sales of fighter 
     planes, tanks, and advanced attack helicopters, and other 
     sophisticated systems are routinely reported to the Congress 
     for its approval or disapproval. However, this information is 
     not always made readily available to the public in a timely 
     fashion. During the 1970s, the unclassified portions of all 
     major proposed arms sales were routinely
      reprinted in the Congressional Record, thereby allowing 
     interested members of the public to inform themselves 
     about prospective weapons exports and make their voices 
     heard to the Congress when it would still make a 
     difference (Congress currently has thirty calendar days to 
     disapprove or acquiesce in a given sale). This practice 
     was discontinued in the early 1980s, allegedly because of 
     Pentagon concerns that releasing this data would reveal 
     too much information about the ``order of battle'' of U.S. 
     weapons clients. In the interests of stimulating an 
     informed debate, Congress should return to the practice of 
     printing the details of all major arms sales proposals in 
     the Congressional Record.[90]
       At the mid-to-low end of the trade, there is no longer any 
     regular U.S. government reporting on the trade in small arms 
     or ``light weaponry''--the rifles, mortars, light vehicles, 
     land mines, and ammunition that are frequently the weapons of 
     choice in today's ethnic conflicts and civil wars. This was 
     not always the case. Up through fiscal year 1980, the State 
     Department issued an annual report under Section 657 of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act that listed every item of military 
     [[Page H5513]] equipment delivered from the United States to 
     any foreign country in the prior fiscal year, ranging from 
     rifles and bullets on up to advanced combat aircraft. The 
     report was discontinued during the Reagan Administration, but 
     the information upon which it was based is still regularly 
     collected by the Pentagon's Defense Security Assistance 
     Agency and the State Department's Office of Defense Trade 
     Controls. The section 657 report should be reinstituted as an 
     annual publication, to provide a tool for keeping track of 
     potential abuses of U.S.-supplied weaponry by undemocratic 
     regimes or nations at war with their neighbors. The report 
     should be widely disseminated in the Congress, the media, and 
     among interested members of the general public.[91]
       Finally, a full accounting of U.S. arms transfer policy 
     must include regular, detailed reporting on U.S. transfers of 
     so-called ``dual use'' equipment--items such as advanced 
     machine tools and computers, measuring instruments, or 
     unarmed light helicopters and aircraft. These items can 
     either be adapted for military use, or, more importantly, 
     utilized to build advanced weapons systems. If Congress and 
     the public had been aware of the particulars of the nearly 
     $1.5 billion in dual use export licenses that the Commerce 
     Department granted to companies seeking to sell equipment to 
     Iraq during 1985 through 1990, some of the more dangerous 
     items on the list might not have been approved for sale. In 
     keeping with the findings of a 1991 Congressional review of 
     U.S. export procedures in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, 
     legislation should be passed requiring the Commerce 
     Department to make public the details of its dual use 
     licensing decisions, including the type of equipment and 
     company involved, the value of the proposed sale, and the 
     institution within the recipient country slated to receive 
     that equipment.[92]
       If these steps toward greater transparency regarding U.S. 
     transfer of weapons and militarily useful technology are 
     implemented, the United States will be in a much stronger 
     position to press for increased reporting by other major 
     suppliers.
       The United Nations arms register currently excludes 
     reporting on important categories such as small arms and dual 
     use technologies. The Clinton Administration should press to 
     have small arms added to the UN arms register, so that the 
     weapons of choice in today's ongoing wars are covered by this 
     important international monitoring mechanism. For dual use 
     items, in addition to pressing for consultation on sale of 
     major items in the context of developing a successor regime 
     to the Cold War-era Coordination Committee on Multilateral 
     Export Controls (Cocom), the administration should press for 
     some form of international, public reporting system on dual 
     use sales. This might take the form of an annual report by 
     the members of a Cocom successor regime detailing major dual 
     use licenses granted during the previous year, or a voluntary 
     reporting mechanism that could run in parallel to the United 
     Nations arms register.
     Recommendation 3: The Pentagon and the intelligence community 
         should publish regular reports on the use of U.S.-
         supplied weaponry in ongoing conflicts
       All too often, U.S. weapons are supplied on a ``fire `em 
     and forget `em'' basis: the decision to sell is made basis on 
     short-term political, strategic, or economic considerations, 
     with little thought given to how these arms might be used a 
     few years down the road. The classic cases of this syndrome 
     are the ``runaway weapons'' that U.S.-backed Afghan rebel 
     forces have been putting up for sale on the world market 
     during the 1990s and U.S. arms supplies that fell into the 
     hands of eventual U.S. adversaries in Panama, Iraq, Somalia 
     and Haiti (see sections III and IV, above). In an attempt to 
     prevent this ``boomerang effect'' from repeating itself in 
     the future, Representative Cynthia McKinney sponsored a 
     successful amendment to the Fiscal Year 1995 Department of 
     Defense Authorization bill requiring the Pentagon to report 
     annually on how proposed arms transfers might create 
     ``increased capabilities'' on the part of potential 
     adversaries, and how they might ``pose an increased threat'' 
     to U.S. forces in some future conflict. The amendment also 
     requires the Pentagon to ``present alternative strategies for 
     regional security based on mutual reductions in the size, 
     spending, and capabilities of forces and among agreements 
     among arms supplying nations to join the United States in 
     reducing or halting military cooperation activities.''[93] 
     Representative McKinney's amendment represents an important 
     first step
      toward shifting the terms of the debate over U.S. arms 
     transfers toward consideration of the long-term dangers of 
     unrestrained weapons trading rather than the apparent 
     short-term political and economic payoffs of a given arms 
     deal.
       As a further step in the right direction, the Pentagon and 
     the Central Intelligence Agency should be required to file 
     annual reports on how U.S.-supplied weaponry is being put to 
     use in current conflicts, either by the original recipients, 
     or as the result of unauthorized transfers to third parties. 
     These reports could serve as a running record of the 
     consequences of past U.S. weapons trading activities, and 
     they would hopefully inject a note of caution into 
     Congressional debates over new proposed transfers. The 
     institution of this reporting mechanism would mark a sharp 
     break from past practice, which indicates that in some 
     instances the intelligence community hasn't even been keeping 
     close tabs on its own covert weapons shipments, much less 
     reporting them to the Congress or the public. For example, 
     the Justice Department's final report of its investigation of 
     the U.S. role in arming Iraq contained the following 
     troubling description of the CIA's handling of information on 
     its arms sales activities: ``Is one instance, it took the CIA 
     two months to identify the intended recipient of weapons 
     shipped at the CIA's request.''[94]
     Recommendation 4: Outlaw covert weapons shipments
       From Iran/contra to the arming of Iraq to the ongoing 
     proliferation of weapons originally intended for Afghan rebel 
     movements, covert weapons trafficking has been the driving 
     force behind a series of unmitigated foreign policy fiascoes.
       Whatever rationale there may have been for covert weapons 
     trading during the Cold War, it is no longer a viable policy 
     instrument in today's unpredictable international security 
     environment. The cases of covert weapons trading gone awry 
     that have been documented in this report--Afghanistan, Iran/
     contra, Iraq, Guatemala, and Haiti--provide ample indication 
     that secret wheeling and dealing in weapons does more harm 
     than good, both by subverting the democratic conduct of U.S. 
     foreign policy and by damaging U.S. credibility and standing 
     in the international community. As part of his restructuring 
     of the CIA, President Clinton should shut down its covert 
     operations directorate and press for legislation outlawing 
     all forms of secret weapons trading by any U.S. government 
     agency.[95]
     Recommendation 5: The Clinton Administration (or its 
         successor) should vigorously pursue a policy of 
         multilateral arms transfer restraint designed to limit 
         sales of conventional weaponry to regions of conflict or 
         repressive regimes
       Contrary to the findings of the Clinton Administration's 
     new conventional arms transfer policy, Presidential Directive 
     41, limiting the spread of weaponry to regions of conflict 
     should be the paramount priority governing U.S. arms transfer 
     decisions in the post-Cold War era. Economic and defense 
     industrial base concerns should take a back seat to efforts 
     to construct a multilateral arms export control regime that 
     can serve as a tool for preventing conflicts, and for 
     limiting their duration and severity once they break out. At 
     a time when the United States controls 72% of new arms sales 
     agreements with the developing world, U.S. leadership remains 
     an essential prerequisite for any meaningful multilateral 
     arrangement for limiting the flow of conventional 
     armaments.[96]
                               footnotes

     1. On this point see Lora Lumpe, ``Arms and No Influence,'' 
     Arms Sales Monitor, No. 27, Washington, DC, Federation of 
     American Scientists, November 30, 1994; and Dr. Louis J. 
     Samuelson, editor, The Management of Security Assistance 
     (Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio: April 1991), 
     p. 51.
     2. Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the 
     Third World, 1986-1993, (Washington, DC: Congressional 
     Research Service, July 1994).
     3. The list of fifty conflicts was compiled by the author, 
     drawing upon the following sources: Ted Robert Gurr, 
     ``Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the 
     Changing World System,'' International Studies Quarterly, 
     Vol. 38, No. 3, September 1994, pp. 347-377; Peter 
     Wallensteen and Karen Axell, ``Mayor Armed Conflicts,'' in 
     SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
     1994), pp. 81-95; and David Binder and Barbara Crossette, 
     ``As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for a Policy,'' New 
     York Times, February 7, 1993. The list utilized in this study 
     includes all ``major conflicts,'' defined by SIPRI as 
     ``prolonged combat between military forces of two or more 
     governments, or of one government and an organized armed 
     group, and incurring the battle-related deaths of at least 
     1,000 people during the entire conflict. This study also 
     covers all but a handful of the smallest wars covered in 
     Gurr's list of ``Serious and Emerging Ethnopolitical 
     Conflicts in 1993-94.'' Gurr's list uses a more inclusive 
     standard, namely deaths incurred ``directly through fighting 
     or massacres or indirectly through starvation, disease, and 
     displacement, from the beginning of its current phase through 
     mid-1993.''
     4. Wallensteen and Axell, op. cit., p. 80.
     5. Because the Peru-Ecuador border war erupted in January of 
     1995, it is not covered in the statistical appendix, but it 
     is discussed in the text (see section II, below).
     6. Outside of the major producers in the developed world--the 
     United States, Russia, Germany, France, Italy and the United 
     Kingdom--there are only a handful of nations that can be 
     considered self-sufficient (or nearly so) in armaments 
     production. If one considers only smaller, less sophisticated 
     systems such as rifles, mortars, and light military vehicles, 
     the number of countries with significant indigenous 
     production capabilities increases to perhaps two to three 
     dozen. But even in these cases it is clear that arms imports 
     have a substantial impact on the levels at which violent 
     conflicts can be sustained. Unfortunately, trade in small 
     arms (also referred to as ``light weapons'' by some analysts) 
     is the least well documented aspect of the international arms 
     trade, even though it probably accounts for the bulk of the 
     weapons systems that are actually utilized in current ethnic 
     conflicts. For two recent accounts of the state of the small 
     arms trade, see Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura 
     Reed, editors, Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small 
     Arms and Light Weapons (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of 
     Arts and Sciences, 1995); and Swadesh Rana, Small Arms and 
     Intrastate Conflicts (New York: United Nations Centre for 
     Disarmament Affairs, February 1995). In addition, the Arms 
     Project at Human Rights Watch has done pathbreaking case 
     studies on the trade in small arms that have been used in 
     massacres and systematic human rights violations, most 
     notably Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses 
     in the Rwandan [[Page H5514]] War (New York: Human Rights 
     Watch Arms Project, January 1994).
     7. This narrow emphasis on preventing transfers to ``rogue 
     states'' is at the heart of the Clinton Administration's 
     approach to arms sales, as embodied in Presidential Directive 
     41, which was released in February of 1994; in addition, the 
     Clinton foreign policy team has maintained the Bush 
     Administration double standard of denouncing Russia and China 
     for particular weapons deals they have entered into the 
     Middle East and Asia at the same time that the United States 
     dominates the overall arms market in each of these regions. 
     For a critical analysis of the ``rogue state'' strategy, see 
     Michael T. Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's 
     Search for a New Foreign Policy (New York: Hill and Wang, 
     1995).
     8. It is a commonplace in discussions with representatives of 
     U.S. industry and arms sales policymakers in Washington to 
     hear the refrain that ``the French will sell to anybody,'' or 
     words to that effect. While criticism of French arms transfer 
     policy is certainly justified by France's recent record of 
     providing arms that were used in devastating wars such as the 
     1991 Gulf conflict and the slaughter in Rwanda, Paris is 
     hardly the only world power that needs to reexamine its 
     weapons export practices.
     9. Richard M. Nixon, The Real War (New York: Random House, 
     1980), p. 197.
     10. On aggression by U.S. arms clients during the Nixon era 
     see William D. Hartung, And Weapons for All, (New York: 
     HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 25-26.
     11. Steven R. Weisman, ``Reagan Lifts Ban on Sending Israel 
     16 Jet War Planes,'' New York Times, August 18, 1981; and Lee 
     Lescaze, ``Reagan Lifts Ban on Delivery of 16 Jets to 
     Israel,'' Washington Post, August 18, 1981.
     12. On this point see Chapter 13, ``Clinton Policy: Arms 
     Control or Business As Usual?'' in William D. Hartung, And 
     Weapons for All (New York: HarperCollins, paperback edition, 
     1995).
     13. Statement of Lt. Gen. Teddy G. Allen, Director, Defense 
     Security Assistance Agency, before the Subcommittee on 
     International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans, and Environment 
     of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 
     June 16, 1993.
     14. Wording of the administration's policy goals is taken 
     verbatim from ``Fact Sheet: Conventional Arms Transfer 
     Policy,'' White House Press Office, Washington, DC, February 
     17, 1995.
     15. Ibid. See also Thomas E. Ricks, ``Arms Sales to Take Into 
     Account Effect on Industry,'' The Wall Street Journal, 
     November 16, 1994.
     16. Don Fuqua, President, Aerospace Industries Association, 
     ``Merchants of Peace,'' Aerospace Industries Association 
     Newsletter, Volume 7, Number 5, November 1994, p. 3.
     17. Ethan Kapstein, ``America's Arms Trade Monopoly,'' 
     Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3, May/June 1994, p. 18.
     18. See appendix A, Table I for details on U.S. transfers to 
     fifty current conflicts. Data used for this analysis is drawn 
     from two principal sources: U.S. Department of Defense, 
     Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales, 
     Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance 
     Facts as of September 30, 1993 (Washington, DC: DSAA, 1994), 
     tables 2 and 6; and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
     World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1991-92 
     (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1994), Table III. For further 
     details on sources, see the footnotes to Table I in Appendix 
     A, below.
     19. See Appendix A, Table I.
     20. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, U.S. Cluster Bombs for 
     Turkey?, (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1994), p. 9.
     21. Ibid., p. 11; see also British American Security 
     Information Council, Fueling Balkan Fires: The West's Arming 
     of Greece and Turkey, Project on the Arms Trade Report 93.3, 
     (Washington, DC: BASIC, 1993), and British American Security 
     Information Council, ``US-German Arms Exports and Greece at a 
     Record High,'' May 20, 1994.
     22. For an overview of Turkey's military industrialization 
     drive and the role of U.S. and other foreign firms in helping 
     to sustain it through coproduction and licensing deals, see 
     Gulay Gunluk-Senesen, ``An Overview of the Arms Industry 
     Modernization Program in Turkey,'' in SIPRI Yearbook 1993: 
     World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University 
     Press, 1993), pp. 521-532.
     23. For the best review of the evidence on the Turkish armed 
     forces use of U.S.-supplied systems against the PKK, see U.S. 
     Cluster Bombs for Turkey?, op. cit., pp. 4-6.
     24. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Turkey: Forced Displacement 
     of Ethnic Kurds from Southeastern Turkey (Washington, DC: 
     Human Rights Watch, October 1994), p. 4.
     25. ``Turkey Unleashes a Massive Raid on Kurdish Bases in 
     Turkey,'' International Herald Tribune, March 21, 1995.
     26. Ibid.
     27. Department of Defense News Briefing by Dennis Boxx, March 
     21, 1995, official DoD transcript.
     28. ``Turkey Unleashes,'' op. cit., note 25; ``Turkish Army 
     Readies Final Assault on Kurd Pockets,'' International Herald 
     Tribune, March 25-26, 1995; and John Barham, ``Turkish Army 
     Invades Iraq to Strike at Turkish Bases,'' Financial Times 
     (London), March 21, 1995.
     29. John Pomfret, ``Turkey's Hunt for the Kurds: The Making 
     of a Quagmire?'', Washington Post, April 2, 1995.
     30. Ibid.
     31. ``UN Evacuates Kurds from Path of Turkey's Offensive,'' 
     International Herald Tribune, March 27, 1995; ``Turkey Plays 
     Down Criticism of Assault,'' International Herald Tribune, 
     March 29, 1995; and Pomfret, ``Turkey's Hunt,'' op. cit.
     32. Suna Erdem, ``Iraqi Kurds Say Turkey Torched Their 
     Town,'' Washington Post, March 30, 1995.
     33. ``Turkey Unleashes,'' op. cit.
     34. ``Germany Withholds Materiel Over Drive on Kurds,'' 
     International Herald Tribune, March 30, 1995.
     35. David Morrison, ``Turkish War Concern for America,'' 
     National Journal, April 15, 1995.
     36. U.S. Cluster Bombs for Turkey, op. cit., pp .9-10; and 
     Thomas W. Lippman, ``Rights Group Seeks to Block Proposed 
     Cluster-Bomb Sale to Turkey,'' Washington Post, December 28, 
     1995.
     37. ``Turkish Aid Says Troops Have Left Iraq,'' New York 
     Times, May 5, 1995. The article actually cites conflicting 
     reports from two different Turkish officials--Turkish Defense 
     Minister Mehmet Golhan is quoted as saying ``We have no one 
     there . . . We have withdrawn them all and we only have 
     security measures on the border.'' However, the article goes 
     on to indicate that ``Deputy Prime Minister Hikmet Cetin said 
     . . . that a few troops still remain in Northern Iraq, but he 
     did not give details.''
     38. John Pomfret, ``Turkish Premier Assails Kurdish Attack's 
     Critics,'' Washington Post, April 5, 1995.
     39. Kenneth Katzman, ``Afghanistan: U.S. Policy Options,'' 
     Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, November 29, 
     1993, p. 15.
     40. Ted Galen Carpenter, ``The Consequences of Afghanistan,'' 
     World Policy Journal, Vol XI, No. 1, Spring 1994, p. 77.
     41. Jim Hoagland, ``No More Frankensteins,'' Washington Post, 
     July 13, 1993.
     42. Tim Weiner, ``U.S. Will Try to Buy Antiaircraft Missiles 
     Back From Afghans,'' New York Times, July 24, 1993; on the 
     ties of the World Trade Center suspects to Afghan weapons 
     training camps, see Caryle Murphy, ``U.S. Policies Trouble 
     Egypt,'' Washington Post, August 1, 1993 and Tim Weiner, 
     ``Blowback from the Afghan Battlefield,'' New York Times 
     Magazine, March 13, 1994.
     43. William D. Hartung, ``Proliferation's Profiteers,'' CEO/
     International Strategies, February/March 1993.
     44. Molly Moore, ``Missile Buyback Stumbles,'' Washington 
     Post, March 7, 1994; and Tim Weiner, ``U.S. Will Try to Buy 
     Back Antiaircraft Missiles from Afghans,'' op. cit.
     45. David Rogers, ``U.S. to Buy Back Some of Missiles Held by 
     Afghans,'' Wall Street Journal, January 15, 1993.
     46. Weiner, ``U.S. Will Try to Buy Back . . .,'' op. cit.
     47. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, India: Arms and Abuses 
     in Indian Punjab and Kashmir, (Washington: Human Rights 
     Watch, September 1994), pp. 5-11.
     48. Christopher Smith, ``Light Weapons: The Forgotten 
     Dimension of the International Arms Trade,'' in Brassey's 
     Defence Yearbook 1994 (London: Center for Defence Studies, 
     1994), pp. 280; and Human Rights Watch, India: Arms and 
     Abuses, op. cit., pp. 12-13; and Kenneth Katzman, 
     ``Afghanistan: U.S. Policy Options,'' op. cit., p. 8.
     49. Human Rights Watch, India: Arms and Abuses, op. cit., p. 
     5.
     50. Matthew Jardine, ``Weapons for Genocide in East Timor,'' 
     San Francisco Examiner, May 31, 1993; and Allan Nairn, ``A 
     Narrow Escape from East Timor,'' USA Today, 11/21/91.
     51. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1995 
     (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1994), p. 157.
     52. Ibid., p. 162; and Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch 
     World Report 1993 (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 
     1992), pp. 177-178.
     53. For the sources of the statistics cited in this 
     paragraph, see appendix, Table I; for the quote on the 
     potential sale of F-16s to Indonesia see ``F-16 Sale to 
     Indonesia Gains Wider Support,'' Defense News, May 1-7, 1995.
     54. R. Jeffrey Smith and Dana Priest, ``In Washington: Covert 
     Aid Undermined Public Outrage,'' Washington Post, April 2, 
     1995.
     55. Tim Weiner, ``Guatemalan Agent of CIA Tied to Killing of 
     American,'' New York Times, March 23, 1995; Tim Weiner, 
     ``CIA's Workaday Cloak,'' New York Times, April 5, 1995; and 
     Tim Weiner, ``Retracting Words, White House Halts CIA Money 
     to Guatemala,'' New York Times, April 5, 1995.
     56. Alan Nairn, ``CIA Death Squad,'' The Nation, April 17, 
     1995.
     57. The Warren Rudman quote is cited in Michael T. Klare and 
     Peter Kornbluh, Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, 
     Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the 1980s (New York: Hill 
     and Wang, 1988), p. 19.
     58. ``Mexico: The Uprising in Chiapas and Democratization in 
     Mexico,'' Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Western 
     Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of 
     Representatives, February 2, 1994 (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 
     1994), p. 103.
     59. John MacCormack and Carmina Danini, ``Mexico Importing 
     Riot Control Vehicles,'' San Antonio Express-News, April 27, 
     1994.
     60. Ray Sanchez, ``Mexican Army Maneuvers In--Crackdown 
     Overshadows Elections,'' New York Newsday, February 13, 1995; 
     see also Appendix Table I.
     61. Washington Office on Latin America, Clear and Present 
     Dangers: The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes, 
     (Washington, DC: WOLA, October 1991), p. 1.
     62. Testimony of Alexander Wilde, Executive Director, 
     Washington Office on Latin America, to the Subcommittee on 
     Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
     U.S. House of Representatives, June 6, 1990; Daniel Williams, 
     ``Colombia Remains Ally in Drug Fight,'' Washington Post, 
     March 2, 1995; and ``No Hail to Colombia,'' (unsigned 
     editorial), Washington Post, March 6, 1995.
     63. Data on U.S. aid and arms transfers to Ecuador is from 
     U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance 
     Agency, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction 
     Sales, and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1993 
     (Washington, DC: DSAA, 1994); and U.S. Arms Control and 
     Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms 
     Transfers, 1991-92 (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1994), Table 
     III.
     64. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, 
     Congressional Presentation on Security Assistance, F.Y. 1993, 
     (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State/Department of 
     Defense, 1992), p. 156.
     65. Information on U.S. military assistance and arms 
     transfers to Peru is taken from appendix Table I; data on 
     assistance under the Economic Support Fund program is taken 
     from U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, 
     Congressional Presentation, op. cit., editions for F.Y. 1990 
     through F.Y. 1994.
     66. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, 
     Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance, F.Y. 1992 
     (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State/Department of 
     Defense, 1991), p. 252.
     67. James Brooke, ``Ecuador and Peru Trade Air Strikes Along 
     the Border,'' New York Times, February 12, 1995.
     68. See appendix Table I.
     69. United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Report of 
     the Secretary General (New York: United Nations General 
     Assembly, October 11, 1993), pages 83 and 111.
     70. ``Philippine Planes Bomb Guerrillas,'' International 
     Herald Tribune, April 21, 1995.
     71. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Angola: Arms Trade and 
     Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections (New 
     York: Human Rights Watch, November 1994), p. 47.
     72. Philip Finnegan, ``Yemen's Iraqi Use Irks U.S., Defense 
     News, December 5-11, 1994.
     73. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance 
     Agency, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction 
     Sales, and Foreign Military Assistance Facts as of September 
     30, 1990 (Washington, DC: DSAA, 1991); and United States Arms 
     Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures 
     and Arms Transfers, 1990 (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1991), 
     Table III.
     74. See statements by Joel Johnson and Don Fuqua of the 
     Aerospace Industries Association (referenced in footnotes 16 
     and 17, above).
     75. John M. Hogan, BNL Task Force Final Report--Report to the 
     Attorney General, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
     Justice, October 21, 1994--released to the public in January 
     of 1995); Neil Lewis, ``Inquiry Finds No U.S. Involvement in 
     the Iraqi Buildup,'' New York Times, January 24, 1995; and 
     Serge F. Kovaleski and R. Jeffrey Smith, ``Justice Department 
     Find No BNL Conspiracy,'' Washington Post, January 24, 1995.
      [[Page H5515]] 76. Michael Wines, ``U.S. Tells of Prewar 
     Technology Sales to Iraq Worth $500 Million,'' New York 
     Times, March 12, 1991.
     77. U.S. Department of Commerce, ``Fact Sheet on Export 
     Licensing for Iraq,'' with attached computer printout, March 
     1991.
     78. Statement of Henry Gonzalez, Chairman, Committee on 
     Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of 
     Representatives, at Hearings Before the Committee on the 
     Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, on the Issue of 
     Appointing a Special Counsel on Matters Relating to Iraq, 
     June 2, 1992, p. 7; and Congressional Record, March 16, 1992, 
     pp. H1274-H1282.
     79. Andy Pasztor, ``Investigators Say Chilean Dealer Smuggled 
     U.S. Weapons to Iraq,'' Wall Street Journal, November 20, 
     1991; ABC News Nightline, show 2609, transcript, May 23, 
     1991; Kenneth Timmerman, The Death Lobby: How the West Armed 
     Iraq, (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), pp. 167-170 and 
     250; and ABC News 20/20, ``Made in the U.S.A.,'' February 1, 
     1991.
     80. Dean Baquet, ``U.S. Supplied Arms to Iraq, Ex-Aide 
     Says,'' New York Times, February 5, 1995.
     81. For a capsule history of Gerald Bull's arms trafficking 
     activities and his relationships with various U.S. government 
     agencies, see William D. Hartung, And Weapons for All (New 
     York: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 195-197 and 235-236.
     82. Hartung, op. cit., pp. 189-90 and 236-237.
     83. ``The Man Who Made the Supergun,'' Frontline transcript, 
     (Boston, MA: WGBH-TV, February 12, 1991).
     84. William D. Hartung, ``Somalia and the Cycle of Arms 
     Sales,'' Christian Science Monitor, February 22, 1993; U.S. 
     Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military 
     Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1990, op. cit.; and Richard 
     F. Grimmett, ``Somalia: Arms Deliveries,'' Congressional 
     Research Service Report for Congress, October 28, 1993.
     85. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, 
     Congressional Presentation on security assistance programs, 
     op. cit., editions for F.Y. 1980 through 1992.
     86. Congressional Presentation, op. cit., F.Y. 1992 edition, 
     p. 273.
     87. See Appendix A, Table 1; and Grimmett, ``Somalia: Arms 
     Deliveries,'' op. cit.
     88. See Appendix Table I; Tim Weiner, Stephen Engelberg, and 
     Howard French, ``CIA Formed Haitian Unit Later Tied to 
     Narcotics Trade,'' New York Times, November 14, 1993; and 
     Jane's Defense Weekly Global Update: Flashpoints and 
     Conflicts, August 1994, pp. 21-24.
     89. For a brief history of Congressional procedures for 
     reviewing arms sales, see Chapter 3, ``Congress Steps In,'' 
     in William D. Hartung, And Weapons for All, op. cit. pp. 45-
     62; and Richard Grimmett, Executive-Legislative Consultation 
     on U.S. Arms Sales (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
     Service, 1982).
     90. As of the early 1980s, it was still possible to construct 
     a list of major U.S. arms sales proposals by tracking the 
     announcements of new letters of offer that were reprinted in 
     the Congressional Record; for an example of an analysis 
     conducted using this data, see William D. Hartung ``Weapons 
     for the World Update--1982,'' New York, Council on Economic 
     Priorities, 1982, it is still possible to track major U.S. 
     arms sales through a combination of Pentagon press releases 
     and notices in the industry press, but this method can result 
     in time lags that limit the ability of the public to learn 
     about major sales proposals and make their views known to 
     Congress before the 30 day period within which Congress can 
     vote down a sale has passed. For current efforts to track 
     major arms sales, wee the ``Deals in the Works'' section in 
     Lora Lumpe, ed., Arms Sales Monitor (Washington, DC: 
     Federation of American Scientists, published 8 to 10 times 
     per year); and Sarah Walkling. ACA Register of U.S., U.S. 
     Arms Transfers, (Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, 
     February 1995).
     91. The idea of reinstituting the section 657 reports has 
     been put forward in recent years by a number of non-
     governmental organizations, including Human Rights Watch, the 
     British American Security Information Council (BASIC), and 
     the Project on Demilitarization and Democracy, See Natalie J. 
     Goldring and Ottfried Nassauer, ``Available Sources and Data: 
     The Trade in Light Weapons,'' paper prepared for the American 
     Academy of Arts and Sciences Conference, ``International 
     Trade in Light Weapons,'' February 24-25, 1994; and Stephen 
     D. Goose and Frank Smyth, ``Arming Genocide in Rwanda,'' 
     Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, no. 5, September/October 1994, pp. 
     86-96.
     92. Strengthening the Export Licensing System: First Report 
     by the Committee on Government Operations (Washington, DC: 
     U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 40-53.
     93. Lora Lumpe, editor, Arms Sales Monitor, No. 27, 
     (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, November 
     30, 1994), p. 9.
     94. John M. Hogan, ``Addendum to the BNL Task Force--Final 
     Report,'' (Washington, DC: United States Department of 
     Justice, 1995), p. 3.
     95. Caleb Rossiter of the Project on Demilitarization and 
     Democracy suggested prohibiting covert arms supplies and 
     training in his February 22, 1994 testimony before the Senate 
     Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on International 
     Economic Policy, noting that ``[C]overt aid programs corrupt 
     the recipient precisely because they are covert and have no 
     leverage . . . If we are to engage in aiding foreign forces, 
     we should do so openly.'' A summary of Rossiter's testimony 
     appears in Lora Lumpe, editor, Arms Sales Monitor, No 24, 
     (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, March 15, 
     1994), pp. 4-5.
     96. See White House Press Office, ``Fact Sheet: Conventional 
     Arms Sales Policy,'' and ``Fact Sheet--Criteria for 
     Decisionmaking on U.S. Arms Exports,'' February 17, 1995; and 
     Richard Grimmett, Conventional Arms Sales to the Third World, 
     F.Y. 1986-F.Y. 1993, op. cit.

                                            APPENDIX A: U.S. ARMS DELIVERIES TO AREAS OF CONFLICT, 1984-1993                                            
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                      Percent of imports                                
    Region/Conflict (Major conflicts in      U.S. deliveries, 1984-1993     Last year U.S. Arms     provided by U.S. 1987-       Other suppliers\5\     
                 bold)\1\                          ($ millions)\2\              delivered\3\            91/1991-93\4\                                   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Europe:                                                                                                                                                 
    1. Former Yugoslavia (Conflicts in      $163.4......................                     1991                     13/0  Russia, Germany, Slovakia,  
     Croatia and Bosnia/Herzegovina).                                                                                        Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia. 
    2. Spain (Govt. vs. Basque              4,003.6.....................                  \6\1993                    85/86  France.                     
     Separatists).                                                                                                                                      
    3. United Kingdom (British forces and   6,318.5.....................                     1993                   100/95  ............................
     protestant paramilitary groups vs.                                                                                                                 
     IRA).                                                                                                                                              
    4. Russia\7\ (Conflicts in Chechnya     None........................  .......................  .......................  NA.                         
     and North Ossetia).                                                                                                                                
    5. Moldova (Conflicts in Dniester       None........................  .......................  .......................  NA.                         
     region).                                                                                                                                           
    6. Georgia (Conflicts in Abkhazia and   None........................  .......................  .......................  NA.                         
     Southern Ossetia).                                                                                                                                 
    7. Turkey (Govt. vs. Kurdish            6,302.8.....................                     1993                    76/80  Germany.                    
     separatists).                                                                                                                                      
Middle East/North Africa:                                                                                                                               
    8. Azerbaijan (Conflict with Armenia    None........................  .......................  .......................  NA.                         
     over Nagorno/Karabakh).                                                                                                                            
    9. Iraq (Conflicts with Kurdish groups  4.4\8\......................                     1989            <1/0 (see\8\)  Former Soviet Union, China, 
     in the North and Shiite Muslim groups                                                                                   France.                    
     in the South).                                                                                                                                     
    10. Israel (Vs. Palestine intifada      9,544.1.....................                     1993                    99/91  ............................
     through mid-1993 and vs. Hamas).                                                                                                                   
    11. Algeria (Govt. vs. Islamic          105.2.......................                     1993                      1/0  Former Soviet Union, Egypt, 
     militants).                                                                                                             China.                     
    12. Morocco (Moroccan govt. vs.         404.0.......................                     1993                    26/76  France, other West European 
     Western Sahara independence movement;                                                                                   suppliers.                 
     UN referendum to be held).                                                                                                                         
    13. Egypt (Govt. vs. Islamic            7,227.9.....................                     1993                    61/89  France.                     
     militants).                                                                                                                                        
    14. Sudan (Govt. vs. Sudanese People's  155.6.......................                     1989                      9/0  China, Middle Eastern       
     Liberation Army).                                                                                                       suppliers, Italy.          
    15. Yemen (Civil war, North vs. South)  50.6........................                     1991                   1/0\9\  Former Soviet Union, China. 
    16. Iran (Govt. vs. Kurdish             Covert sales, value                                NA                     NA/0  Russia, China, European     
     separatists, Mujahaddin guerillas).     undisclosed\10\.                                                                suppliers.                 
Sub-Saharan Africa:                                                                                                                                     
    17. Mauritania (Govt. vs. black         1.5.........................                     1992                     <1/0  Former Soviet Union.        
     minority).                                                                                                                                         
    18. Mali (Govt. vs. Tuareg ethnic       .2..........................                     1993                     <1/0  Former Soviet Union, Middle 
     group).                                                                                                                 Eastern sources.           
    19. Chad (Ongoing civil war between     50.3........................                     1993                    27/25  France.                     
     Anakaza and Bideyet ethnic groups).                                                                                                                
    20. Somalia (Multi-sided clan warfare)  109.3.......................                     1991                   44/100  Italy.                      
    21. Senegal (Govt. vs. Diola tribe)...  13.6........................                     1993                   11/100  France, other European      
                                                                                                                             suppliers.                 
    22. Liberia (Govt. & West African       33.4........................                     1990                     40/0  Former Warsaw Pact, Middle  
     peacekeeping forces vs. rebels led by                                                                                   Eastern sources.           
     Col. Charles Taylor).                                                                                                                              
    23. Togo (Govt. vs. opposition forces,  1.9.........................                     1993                     <1/0  Latin American sources.     
     including members of Ewe tribe).                                                                                                                   
    24. Nigeria (Military-dominated govt.   82.4........................                     1993                      9/2  Italy, Czechoslovakia,      
     vs. pro-democracy forces; Hausa vs.                                                                                     Former Soviet Union,       
     Yoruba ethnic conflict).                                                                                                France.                    
    25. Uganda (Govt. vs. rebels based in   10.6........................                     1993                    5/100  Former Soviet Union, Italy. 
     Northern Uganda).                                                                                                                                  
    26. Rwanda (Hutu-dominated govt. vs.    1.4.........................                     1993                     <5/0  China, France, Egypt,       
     Tutsi minority; govt. overthrown by                                                                                     Uganda, South Africa.      
     Rwandan Patriotic Front in 1994).                                                                                                                  
    27. Burundi (Ethnic conflicts between   .6..........................                     1993                     <1/0  Former Soviet Union.        
     Hutu & Tutsi ethnic groups).                                                                                                                       
    28. Kenya (Ethnic conflicts in Rift     100.2.......................                     1993                   25/100  U.K., France.               
     Valley region sparked by supporters                                                                                                                
     of President Moi).                                                                                                                                 
    29. Zaire (Multiple rebellions vs.      55.9........................                 \11\1990                     17/0  China, France.              
     regime of President Mobutu).                                                                                                                       
    30. Angola (Govt. vs. UNITA rebels)...  250-300.....................                       NA                     NA/0  Former Soviet Union (to     
                                                                                                                             Angolan govt.).            
    31. South Africa (Govt. & Inkatha       8.3\13\.....................                     1988                    NA/NA  See\13\.                    
     Party supporters vs. ANC, through mid-                                                                                                             
     1993; radical white ultra-                                                                                                                         
     nationalists vs. ANC govt.).                                                                                                                       
Asia:                                                                                                                                                   
    32. Tajikistan (Govt. vs. Islamic       Rebels have rec'vd U.S.                            NA                     NA/0  NA.                         
     opposition).                            weapons that were                                                                                          
                                             originally supplied to                                                                                     
                                             Afghan rebels by the                                                                                       
                                             CIA\14\.                                                                                                   
    33. Afghanistan (Civil war among        $2B in covert military                           1991                     NA/0  Former Soviet Union, Saudi  
     competing ethnic factions).             assistance provided by U.S.                                                     Arabia (financier).        
                                             to Afghan rebel factions,                                                                                  
                                             1980-1991.                                                                                                 
    34. Pakistan (Govt. vs. secessionist    1,801.7.....................                     1993                     44/3  China.                      
     movements in Sindh and NW Frontier                                                                                                                 
     Province; conflict with India over                                                                                                                 
     Kashmir).                                                                                                                                          
    35. India (Govt. vs. secessionist       316.6.......................                     1993                      1/0  Russia, U.K., West European 
     forces in Kashmir; govt. vs. Sikh                                                                                       suppliers.                 
     militants in Punjab; govt. vs.                                                                                                                     
     secessionists in Assam; Hindu-Muslim                                                                                                               
     conflict in state of Uttar Pradesh).                                                                                                               
    36. Bhutan (Govt. vs. ethnic Nepalese   0.2.........................                     1992                     <1/0  NA.                         
     rebels).                                                                                                                                           
    37. Sri Lanka (Govt. vs. Tamil          8.6.........................                     1993                      7/0  China.                      
     insurgents; Sinhalese militants).                                                                                                                  
    38. Bangladesh (Govt. vs. Chittagong    16.7........................                     1993                      4/5  Former Soviet Union, China. 
     Hill People's Coordination                                                                                                                         
     Association).                                                                                                                                      
    39. Myanmar (Burma) (Govt. vs. Karen    6.2.........................                     1989                      1/0  China.                      
     separatists, Islamic opposition).                                                                                                                  
    40. China (Govt. vs. Tibetan            423.9\15\...................                     1993                      8/1  Russia.                     
     independence movement; govt. vs.                                                                                                                   
     Muslim secessionists in Xinjiang                                                                                                                   
     province).                                                                                                                                         
[[Page H5516]]
                                                                                                                                                        
    41. Philippines (Govt. vs. New          619.3.......................                     1993                    93/75  Italy.                      
     People's Army).                                                                                                                                    
    42. Cambodia (Govt. vs. Khmer Rouge)..  Covert assistance to rebel                         NA                     NA/0  Former Soviet Union, China. 
                                             factions during 1980's;                                                                                    
                                             reports of U.S.-supplied                                                                                   
                                             Thai army transferring                                                                                     
                                             weaponry to Khmer Rouge\16\.                                                                               
    43. Indonesia (Govt. vs. independence   583.3.......................                     1993                    38/33  Germany, Netherlands, U.K., 
     forces in East Timor; govt. vs.                                                                                         other European suppliers.  
     separatist movement in Northern                                                                                                                    
     Sumatra).                                                                                                                                          
    44. Papua New Guinea (Govt.             None........................  .......................  .......................  Former Soviet Union.        
     independence movement on Bougainville                                                                                                              
     island).                                                                                                                                           
Latin America:                                                                                                                                          
    45. Guatemala (Govt. vs. Guatemala      35.8........................                 \17\1993                     86/0  Israel.                     
     National Revolutionary Unity).                                                                                                                     
    46. Haiti (Govt. and paramilitary       2.6\18\.....................                     1992                \19\>25/0  Latin American sources.     
     forces vs. democracy movement,                                                                                                                     
     through mid-1994; new govt. and UN                                                                                                                 
     forces vs. paramilitary groups 1994                                                                                                                
     on).                                                                                                                                               
    47. Colombia (Govt. vs. Revolutionary   647.........................                     1993                    28/19  Brazil.                     
     Armed Forces of Colombia; govt. vs.                                                                                                                
     National Liberation Army).                                                                                                                         
    48. Peru (Govt. vs. Shining Path        136.........................                 \21\1993                      6/8  France, Former Soviet Union.
     guerrillas; govt. vs. Tupac Amaru                                                                                                                  
     revolutionary movement).                                                                                                                           
    49. Brazil (Govt. vs. indigenous        528.8.......................                     1993                    35/40  Germany, France.            
     peoples of Amazon region).                                                                                                                         
    50. Mexico (Govt. vs. rebel movement    301.2.......................                     1993                    77/64  ............................
     in Chiapas).                                                                                                                                       
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\This table reviews U.S. arms transfers to a list of fifty significant ethnic and territorial conflicts that were under way during 1993 or 1994. The  
  informed reader will note that some of the conflicts listed here have since been resolved and/or reduced in intensity (for example, in South Africa   
  and Angola), while other, new conflicts are not covered (such as the January/February 1995 Peru-Ecuador border war). For an explanation of how the    
  list of conflicts was arrived at and the sources used in making that determination, see footnote 2 in the text, above. Countries listed in bold print 
  represent major conflicts that have resulted in 1,000 or more battle-related deaths since the outbreak of the war.                                    
\2\Unless otherwise noted, figures in this column are based on U.S. deliveries under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and the        
  commercial arms sales program (which involves items on the U.S. Munitions List and requires a license from the State Department); the source of the   
  data is U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency, ``Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military   
  Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1993'' (Washington, DC: DSAA, 1994). One of the main limitations of this data source (a limitation common to all 
  other major compilations of data on the arms trade) is that it does not include covert arms sales or sales to non-government recipients such as       
  militias, guerrilla movements, and rebel organizations that are major players in the majority of today's ethnic and civil conflicts.                  
\3\The figures on the last year U.S. arms were delivered is based on data on deliveries under the FMS and commercial sales programs in ``Foreign        
  Military Sales . . . Facts,'' op. cit. In many cases commercial arms sales are allowed to continue even after the U.S. government has cut off military
  aid and/or sales under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales programs.                                                                                
\4\Data on the percentage of a nation's imports provided by the United States is drawn from United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ``World  
  Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers,'' 1991-92 and 1993-94 editions (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1994 and 1995), Table III. The column on % of     
  deliveries provided by the U.S. is divided into two time segments (1987-91 and 1991-93) separated by a slash. The one year overlap (1991 is covered in
  both series) is a function of ACDA reports the data in its 1991-92 and 1993-94 reports. The ACDA data are not directly comparable to the data on      
  deliveries listed in column 2, because they cover a different range of equipment. The Pentagon's delivery figures include items considered to be      
  weapons by virtue of their inclusion on the U.S. Munitions List. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) report uses a broader definition that 
  includes ``weapons of war, parts thereof, ammunition, support equipment and other commodities designed for military use . . . Dual use equipment,     
  which can have application in both military and civilian sectors, is included when its primary mission is identified as military.'' Dual use equipment
  is by definition ``not'' included in the Pentagon's figures on deliveries under the FMS and CS programs. The time lag between the currency of the data
  on U.S. deliveries listed in column 2 and the ACDA data on the U.S. proportion of deliveries to each of the governments involved is a function of the 
  slower schedule for the release of the ACDA data, which is no doubt in part a function of the greater difficulty of compiling information on arms     
  deliveries and purchases by every nation in the world. As noted in note 2, above, the percentages listed here represent the proportion of weapons     
  imported by the governments involved in each conflict that came from U.S. sources; there are no comparably reliable figures on supplies to non-state  
  actors such as rebel movements and private militias. Listings of 0%* are marked with an asterisk to denote the fact that according to ACDA's figures  
  the country in question received no arms imports from any governmental source during the period covered--this does not mean that there were no weapons
  deliveries at all, but rather that there are no known deliveries by governments (i.e., weapons may have flowed through covert or private channels).   
\5\Unless otherwise noted, identifications of other major suppliers are drawn from two sources: U.S. ACDA, ``World Military Expenditures and Arms       
  Transfers,'' Table III, op. cit., and Ian Anthony, Paul Claesson, Elisabeth Skons, and Siemon T. Wezeman, ``Arms Production and Arms Trade,'' in      
  ``SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament'' (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), Table 10B.3. Countries listed as other suppliers  
  provided approximately 10% or more of a recipient government's imported weaponry in the most recent multi-year period covered by one or both of these 
  sources. Since the periods covered begin before the breakup of the Soviet Union, all transfers involving constituent states of the former Soviet Union
  are identified as ``former Soviet Union.'' In the case of ongoing arms transfer relationships, Russia is by far the most active arms exporting nation 
  amongst the former Soviet Republics, although its total deliveries in recent years have been only a fraction of the levels achieved by the Soviet     
  Union during the 1970s and 1980s.                                                                                                                     
\6\Since the main data source for this table only goes up through 1993, an indication that the last U.S. delivery was in 1993 does ``not'' mean that    
  U.S. arms shipments have been halted, but rather that as of the end of 1993 the nation in question was an active, ongoing weapons client of the United
  States.                                                                                                                                               
\7\Human rights monitors have reported war-related deaths in Russia's intervention in Chechnya at levels as high as 20,000 to 25,000; although some     
  observers have argued that these figures are an overstatement, there seems to be no question that this qualifies as a major conflict (based on a      
  standard of 1,000 or more battle-related deaths).                                                                                                     
\8\This figure for U.S. arms deliveries to Iraq does not include the $500 million in dual use items shipped to Iraq from the United States between 1985 
  and 1990, nor does it encompass covert shipments or sales of U.S. equipment via third parties. For a summary of these U.S. contributions to the Iraqi 
  war machine, see the discussion of Iraq in section IV of the text, above.                                                                             
\9\U.S. arms supplies to North Yemen from as early as 1978-79 made their way into the government arsenal of the combined state of Yemen formed by the   
  merger of North and South Yemen; these shipments are not reflected in this table. For further discussion of this point, see section III, above.       
\10\According to the final report of Iran/Contra special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh, the Oliver North/Richard Secord ``enterprise'' that ran the Iran/   
  Contra arms operations for the Reagan Administration took in over $47 million and delivered substantial quantities of military equipment to Iran,     
  including over 1,000 TOW anti-tank missiles; on this point, see Lawrence E. Walsh, ``Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, 
  Volume I: Investigations and Prosecutions'' (Washington, DC: Office of the Independent Counsel, August 4, 1993). In addition, according to a 1986     
  report in ``Aviation Week and Space Technology,'' (Paul Mann and James K. Gordon, ``Iran Secures Operational Gains from U.S.-backed Military Aid,''   
  ``AW&ST,'' November 17, 1986), a Reagan Administration official involved in Middle East affairs asserted that ``at U.S. instigation Iranians bought   
  critical radar and landing gear components that at times . . . enabled Iran to double the number of sorties flown by its McDonnell Douglas F-4        
  aircraft against Iraq.''                                                                                                                              
\11\For many years Zaire served as a conduit for U.S. covert arms supplies to rebel forces fighting against the Angolan government. It is not known     
  precisely how much of this U.S. assistance may have been siphoned off to bolster the military forces of the Mobutu regime in Zaire. For a discussion  
  of the role of Zaire in the Angolan arms pipeline, see Lucy Mathiak, ``Light Weapons and Internal Conflict in Angola,'' in Boutwell, Klare, and Reed, 
  editors, ``Lethal Commerce,'' op. cit., pp. 89-90.                                                                                                    
\12\The range of values cited for U.S. covert arms shipments to Angola in the 1980s is based on Human Rights Watch Arms Project, ``Angola; Trade and    
  Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections,'' op. cit., p. 47 (for the $250 million estimate); and Mathiak, op. cit., p. 89 (for the $300 
  million estimate).                                                                                                                                    
\13\This figure does includes only officially sanctioned exports licensed by the U.S. government. There is considerable anecdotal evidence to indicate  
  that a number of U.S.-based firms made shipments of weaponry and weapons components to South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s in violation of the    
  United Nations arms embargo on the apartheid regime.                                                                                                  
\14\On this point see Katzman, op. cit., ``Afghanistan: U.S. Policy Options,'' note 28 in the text.                                                     
\15\U.S. arms deliveries to China were suspended by the Bush Administration in response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, but the Clinton          
  Administration has been flirting with the idea of reopening military exports to China, beginning with dual use items.                                 
\16\There have been recent reports to indicate that the flow of weapons to the Khmer Rouge from Thailand and China has been cut off, starting some time 
  in 1994 (cite new Human Rights Watch report).                                                                                                         
\17\Although U.S. military aid and commercial arms sales to Guatemala were cut off in December of 1990 because of the Guatemalan government's record of 
  human rights abuses, modest commercial deliveries continued through 1993, as did military-related aid under the ``international narcotics control''   
  segment of U.S. security assistance. See ``Human Rights Watch World Report 1993,'' op. cit., p. 117-118.                                              
\18\Deliveries to Haiti listed here exclude $500,000 to $1 million per year in covert military aid supplied to Haitian military and intelligence forces 
  between 1986 and 1991.                                                                                                                                
\19\This figure takes into account the provision of $3 to $6 million in military-related assistance justified as anti-narcotics aid (see note 18).      

   Dear Code of Conduct Supporter:
       I would like to thank those who voted for the ``Code of 
     Conduct'' during the markup of HR 1561 on May 11. The close 
     vote (18-17) and the 101 cosponsors demonstrate the 
     commitment and support for the ``Code.'' It is one of the 
     most important reforms of the arms export process in two 
     decades.
       I will be offering the ``Code'' as a floor amendment to HR 
     1561 on May 24. I urge your support as we move this 
     legislation forward.
       Let's end the ``Boomerang Effect'' on our armed forces and 
     take a serious step toward underscoring America's leadership 
     role in the new world order and ending our role as the 
     world's number one gun dealer.
       We must live up to our claim to protect human rights, 
     foster democracies and promote peace and stability. The arms 
     sales of today are the ``Boomerangs'' of tomorrow. Vote for 
     the ``Code of Conduct'' Amendment and end our role as the 
     client for tyrants!
           Sincerely,
                                                 Cynthia McKinney,
     Member of Congress.
                                                                    ____


           [From the Christian Science Monitor, May 23, 1995]

 It's Time the U.S. Stopped ``Boomerang'' Arms Sales--An Amendment to 
            Foreign Aid Bill Would Ban Weapons for Dictators

                (By Cynthia McKinney and Caleb Rossiter)

       A defining moment in post-cold-war foreign policy will come 
     today when the House of Representatives takes up the ``Code 
     of Conduct'' amendment to the foreign aid bill. The Code of 
     Conduct would ban US arms sales to dictators, human rights 
     abusers, and governments not participating in the United 
     Nations arms trade register.
       On May 11, the code was narrowly defeated in the House 
     International Relations Committee by an 18-to-17 vote after a 
     heated debate. The vote on the House floor will be the first 
     time in 19 years that Congress debates which countries should 
     be permitted to receive our weaponry.
       The code's surprisingly strong showing came despite the 
     opposition of the Aerospace Industries Association, which 
     represents arms-exporters whose political-action committees 
     gave $7.5 million to candidates in the last election cycle. 
     The Clinton administration also weighed in heavily against 
     the amendment, with Assistant Secretary of State Wendy 
     Sherman appearing before the committee and distributing a 
     letter ``firmly opposing'' passage of the code while 
     supporting its principles.
       Congress is getting involved in arms restraint for the 
     simple reason that successive administrations have failed to 
     show leadership. In 1993, the administration approved a 
     record $12.9 billion in arms sales to developing countries, 
     three times the sales to all other countries combined. More 
     than 90 percent of those weapons went to dictators. Then in 
     February, 1995, the president issued a directive that, for 
     the first time, makes corporations' financial health a factor 
     in arms sales decisions.
       As the Pentagon buys less, arms-makers pressure the 
     government to keep production lines open by approving 
     strategically questionable sales abroad. In fact, arms sales 
     to developing countries have doubled since the fall of the 
     Berlin Wall.
       The arms industry claims that the increase in sales saves 
     jobs. As defense industry profits and CEO salaries rise, 
     however, layoffs of [[Page H5517]] line workers have 
     increased almost in direct relation. Even worse for the 
     American economy, one-third of all sales are paid for by the 
     taxpayer through foreign aid. ``Offset'' agreements that help 
     purchasing countries co-produce weapons and sell commercial 
     products in America displace as many workers as the arms 
     sales save.
       Hence, we are giving bullies bigger sticks, even though in 
     the past they have used them against their own people and the 
     United States. We have already seen this ``boomerang effect'' 
     from past sales to armed forces that oppressed their 
     citizens. In the last four overseas US engagements--Panama, 
     Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti--our troops faced the very weapons 
     we sold to those dictators who were once our friends. In 
     Somalia, we spent $2 billion and two dozen American lives 
     trying to clean up the mess that flowed from our $200 million 
     in arms sales.
       Who among today's favored customers are tomorrow's Somalias 
     and Iraqs?
       If the House passes the Code of Conduct, maybe we will not 
     have to find out. Until then, arms transfer policy will be 
     business as usual--big business as usual.
       Cynthia McKinney (D) of Georgia is the primary House 
     sponsor of the McKinney/Hatfield Code of Conduct Bill. Caleb 
     Rossiter is the former deputy director of the Congressional 
     Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus.
                                                                    ____

         House of Representatives, Committee on International 
           Relations,
                                     Washington, DC, May 10, 1995.
       Dear Colleague: During the full International Relations 
     Committee mark-up of the foreign aid authorization, my 
     colleague on the Committee, Cynthia McKinney, will be 
     offering as an amendment her ``Code of Conduct on Arms 
     Transfers'' bill (H.R. 772). I urge your support for this 
     important reform of the arms sales process.
       The amendment establishes a Code of Conduct for recipients 
     of U.S. military exports and training. The President would 
     decide which countries meet the specific language of the four 
     criteria: promotes democracy, protects human rights, not 
     engaged in aggression, and participates in the U.N. arms 
     trade register. Countries not meeting the criteria would 
     require a waiver agreed to by both the President and 
     Congress.
       At present, the decision on whether a country should be 
     eligible to receive U.S. weapons is made by the executive 
     branch alone. The Code of Conduct is really a congressional 
     responsibility act that restores the balance that existed in 
     the original Arms Export Control Act before a Supreme Court 
     decision on an unrelated case invalidated its review 
     procedures.
       Arms transfers to undemocratic countries have been the 
     Achilles heel of U.S. foreign policy. Many times we have 
     spent scarce foreign aid cleaning up after conflicts fueled 
     by our own arms transfers; many times we have seen our own 
     troops face weapons we sold to once-friendly dictators. This 
     bill creates a presumption against such transfers while 
     providing a channel for a joint decision to approve them if 
     national security requires.
       I have attached for your review a description of the bill, 
     which includes answers to questions about it. Thank you for 
     your consideration of the McKinney amendment.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Howard L. Berman,
     Member of Congress.
                                                                    ____



                                   Amnesty International, USA,

                                     Washington, DC, May 10, 1995.
     Dear Member of the House International Relations Committee:
       As a member of both the House International Relations 
     Committee (HIRC) and the Congressional Human Rights Caucus 
     you are in a strategic position to help stem the flow of U.S. 
     weapons to countries who violate the human rights of its 
     citizens. The ``Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers Act'' 
     sponsored by Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), will be 
     presented to the HIRC as an amendment to ``Division C'' of 
     the Foreign Aid Reorganization bill (H.R. 1561) as early as 
     tomorrow. I urge you to vote in favor of this provision.
       As an ally in exposing and stemming human rights 
     violations, you recognize the importance of governments 
     accepting accountability. Under this legislation, recipients 
     of U.S. weapons and security assistance would have to 
     vigorously investigate, discipline, and prosecute those 
     responsible for violations, as well as take other positive 
     measures to combat gross violation of internationally 
     recognized rights.
       The Code of Conduct would require the President to make an 
     annual certification of countries eligible to receive U.S. 
     weapons. Arms would be prevented from going to countries that 
     are undemocratic, violators of human rights, engaged in armed 
     aggression, not full participants in the U.N. Register of 
     Conventional Arms. If a country does not meet the criteria, 
     transfers can still be made if it is found to be in the 
     interest of U.S. national security.
       Amnesty International continues to investigate countries 
     known to have committed human rights violations and their 
     receipt of U.S. security assistance. The Code of Conduct 
     offers another avenue to make violators of human rights 
     accountable for their actions. We urge your support on this 
     important legislation.
           Sincerely,
                                                      James O'Dea,
     Director, Washington Office.
                                                                    ____

                                     House of Representatives,

                                      Washington, DC, May 9, 1995.
     Dear International Relations Committee member:
       As you may be aware, our colleague, Rep. Cynthia McKinney, 
     will offer an amendment to attach the Code of Conduct for 
     international arms sales to the Foreign Aid bill later this 
     week. It is my hope that you will join Rep. McKinney, myself, 
     and almost 100 of our colleagues in supporting this timely 
     and reasonable legislation.
       Often times, international terrorists acquire U.S.-supplied 
     weapons through pro-American dictators, aggressors, and human 
     rights abusers. A prime example of this was the supplying of 
     Afghani rebels through Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, 
     the arms we supplied to the Shah of Iran eventually ended up 
     in the hands of Khomeini and his global terror network. We 
     must stop the boomerang effect which ends up placing U.S. 
     troops, and even U.S. civilians, at the risk of being 
     attacked by our own weapons.
       The guiding principle of the Code is that U.S. arms should 
     not be provided to countries that are undemocratic, violate 
     human rights, or are engaged in acts of aggression. However, 
     the United States currently provides 73 percent of all arms 
     to the third world, many of which have not yet held a free 
     and fair election or do not adhere to internationally 
     accepted standards of human rights.
       Congress owes it to the American people to play a stronger 
     role in reaching decisions over the transfer and sale of 
     weapons to rogue nations. While the Code is not a ban on arms 
     sales, it will increase congressional oversight and public 
     scrutiny of arms sales.
       Once again, I urge you to support Rep. McKinney's Code of 
     Conduct amendment in the International Relations Committee.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Eliot L. Engel,
     Member of Congress.
                                                                    ____

         Department of Social Development and World Peace,
                                     Washington, DC, May 10, 1995.
     Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman,
     Chairman, International Relations Committee,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Gilman: I write to express our concerns about 
     H.R. 1561. I enclose a letter, which the U.S. Catholic 
     Conference has co-signed, which opposes proposals to cut 
     drastically development assistance and U.N. peacekeeping, and 
     questions the wisdom of restructuring that could weaken 
     development and human rights programs.
       The enclosed letter does not address our strong support for 
     continued U.S. funding for overseas assistance and protection 
     for refugees, the main provisions for which are contained in 
     a separate State Department Authorization Bill, H.R. 1564. It 
     is our understanding that the International Relations 
     Committee plans to vote on consolidated H.R. 1561, which 
     incorporates these other provisions, rather than allowing 
     them to be considered separately. We regret this decision as 
     it leaves us in the uncomfortable position of opposing a 
     consolidated bill that, in our view, is still fundamentally 
     flawed but which contains provisions we would wholeheartedly 
     endorse were they to be considered on their own merits.
       In addition to these concerns, I would like to raise two 
     additional matters related to this legislation. First, I 
     encourage you to support the Code of Conduct on Arms 
     Transfers, an amendment that will be offered to H.R. 1561. In 
     his recent encyclical, The Gospel of Life, Pope John Paul II 
     condemned the arms trade as ``scandalous.'' That weapons of 
     war are bought and sold almost as if they were simply another 
     commodity like appliances or industrial machinery is a 
     serious moral disorder in today's world. The predominant role 
     of our country in sustaining and even promoting the arms 
     trade, sometimes for economic reasons, is a moral challenge 
     for our nation. The foreign aid cuts in H.R. 1561 are another 
     example of our country's increasing reluctance to share its 
     economic resources in support of sustainable economic 
     development, while we remain the dominant supplier of weapons 
     to the developing world.
       The Code of Conduct is important for two reasons. It 
     imposes appropriate conditions for arms transfers: respect 
     for democracy and human rights, non-aggression, and 
     participation in the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms. And 
     it would bring greater openness and public accountability to 
     decisions to transfer arms by forcing these decisions to be 
     more openly debated in Congress. The Code could thereby 
     improve prospects that the United States would more strictly 
     enforce and strengthen controls on arms transfers and would 
     reduce substantially its role in this deadly trade.
       Third, we are concerned about proposals to absorb the Arms 
     Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) into the State 
     Department. While we do not normally comment on matters of 
     government reorganization, we are concerned that placing ACDA 
     within the State Department will reduce the prominence of 
     critical arms control and disarmament issues at a time when 
     they are already receiving less attention than they have in 
     the past. There is an urgent need to implement existing arms 
     control agreements, to move toward deeper reductions in 
     [[Page H5518]] nuclear weapons, to stem nuclear 
     proliferation, and to control conventional weapons, such as 
     landmines. Maintaining ACDA's independent voice in foreign 
     policy making is more likely to ensure that this important 
     arms control agenda receives the attention it needs.
       Thank you for considering these various concerns about the 
     legislation currently before the International Relations 
     Committee.
           Sincerely,
                                                Drew Christiansen,
     Director, Office of International Justice & Peace.
                                                                    ____



                                     House of Representatives,

                                      Washington, DC, May 8, 1995.
       Dear House International Relations Committee Member: The 
     ``Code of Conduct Arms Transfer Act,'' restricts arms exports 
     to countries that are undemocratic, do not abide by basic 
     international human rights standard, and are engaged in acts 
     of armed aggression.
       Today--given the new world order--it is in the best 
     interest of the United States to encourage the development of 
     stable, democratic, and economically viable allies that 
     respect the fundamental human rights of its citizens.
       While there are current restrictions on exports of U.S. 
     arms to countries that demonstrate a ``gross and consistent'' 
     pattern of human rights abuses, these restrictions are seldom 
     enforced. In fiscal year 1994, the State Departments' annual 
     ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,'' showed that 
     the U.S. sold weapons to at least four nations that had 
     significant human rights abuses. These four nations purchased 
     $6.2 billion in arms--nearly half of the total $12.9 billion 
     sold. Additionally, $2 billion in U.S. grant money or 
     subsidized U.S. loans to these nations was used to purchase 
     arms.
       It is time for Congress to become more pro-active in 
     protecting international human rights. We need to end arms 
     exports to those nations that fail to respect the dignity and 
     fundamental well-being of their citizens.
       Your vote on May 11 for the Code of Conduct is a vote for 
     the protection of basic human rights.
           Sincerely yours,
                                                  Donald M. Payne,
     Member of Congress.
                                                                    ____

         Project on Demilitarization and Democracy
                                      Washington, DC, May 5, 1995.

  The McKinney-Hatfield Code of Conduct on Arms Trade: Restoring the 
            Congressional Role in the Arms Transfer Process

       This is the first major reform of the arms export process 
     in two decades. Prior to enactment of the Arms Export Control 
     Act in 1976, there were virtually no restrictions on the 
     executive branch's arms transfers. Congress, led by Sen. 
     Hubert Humphrey, enacted the Arms Export Control Act in 
     response to record transfers of arms by Secretary of State 
     Henry Kissinger. The Shah of Iran and President Marcos of the 
     Philippines were among the leading recipients. Today's record 
     U.S. transfers to undemocratic and unstable governments 
     similarly threaten our interests in democracy and development 
     abroad.
       The Arms Export Control Act originally gave Congress a 
     major role in reviewing proposed arms transfers, but the 
     Supreme Court's decision in the unrelated ``Chadha'' case in 
     1983 eliminated that role. The AECA gave each House of 
     Congress the ability to block a proposed transfer by passing 
     a resolution. The Supreme Court ruled such ``one-House 
     vetoes'' unconstitutional, declaring that Congress can only 
     change policy by enacting laws, not by taking such partial 
     steps as passing one-House resolutions. As a result, for the 
     past 12 years, Congress could only block a sale by passing a 
     resolution in both Houses and enacting it over a presidential 
     veto, all within 30 days. In terms of time alone, this is 
     nearly impossible. Congress has never enacted such a 
     resolution, and rarely even takes up a resolution opposing an 
     arms transfer, because there is no meaningful chance to 
     succeed.
       The Code of Conduct legislation would restore Congress to 
     its earlier role as an equal partner in arms transfer 
     decisions, by requiring congressional approval for sales to 
     countries not meeting the Code's standards. Under the Code 
     legislation, the President would certify countries for 
     eligibility each year. The President could request a one-year 
     waiver for a country not meeting the Code's standards (for 
     democracy, human rights, aggression, and the U.N. arms trade 
     register). Both Houses of Congress would have to approve the 
     waiver, either by enacting a foreign aid bill containing the 
     waivers, or by enacting a separate law. The Congressional 
     Research Service has studied the Code of Conduct process, and 
     declared it constitutional.
                                                   Caleb Rossiter,
     Director.
                                                                    ____

                                                      May 9, 1995.
       Dear Member of the House International Relations Committee: 
     The undersigned arms control, development, religious, human 
     rights and veterans organizations are writing to voice 
     support for the ``Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers'' bill 
     sponsored by Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) and close 
     to 100 other members. A full committee vote on the Code, as 
     an amendment to the Foreign Aid bill, is expected this week. 
     We urge you to vote in favor of this provision.
       The Code of Conduct would require the President to make an 
     annual certification of which countries are eligible, under 
     four criteria, to receive U.S. weapons. To be eligible to 
     receive U.S. weaponry a country cannot: grossly abuse human 
     rights; deny democratic rights; or attack a neighbor or its 
     own people. Also, countries must participate in the U.N. 
     Register of Conventional Arms to be eligible. By creating 
     these criteria weapons will be kept from countries that are 
     bad risks and, it is hoped, the Code will induce undemocratic 
     and aggressor nations to improve their current practices.
       This bill is neither a ban nor a moratorium on arms sales. 
     If, for national security reasons, the President wants to 
     sell weapons to countries that are not certified, a majority 
     of Congress must vote to approve the arms transfer. Under the 
     current system, Congress can only vote to stop an arms sale. 
     Under the Code of Conduct Congress can, after careful 
     scrutiny, determine which countries are vital to U.S. 
     security interests and should therefore be eligible to 
     receive arms. The Code also underscores Congress' 
     Constitutional power to regulate trade with foreign nations.
       History has shown that sometimes American weapons last 
     longer than U.S. friendships with foreign governments. In 
     Panama, Somalia and Haiti, U.S. troops faced forces that has 
     been equipped with American weapons. The Code of Conduct is 
     an attempt to reduce the likelihood that the men and women of 
     the armed forces will be affected by this ``boomerang 
     effect'' of the arms trade. Only by closely examining the 
     circumstances surrounding a pending arms sale can Congress 
     hope to minimize the chance of an American soldier being 
     injured by an American weapon.
       Furthermore, in a time of tough budgetary decisions, 
     continuing to spend billions of dollars each year in foreign 
     aid to support arms transfers flies in the face of budget 
     cutting measures. Reducing arms transfers would be a prudent 
     way to cut federal spending while contributing to our 
     national defense by keeping advanced weapons out of the hands 
     of future potential adversaries.
       As the world's leading arms supplier, the U.S. must 
     demonstrate restraint and international leadership regarding 
     weapons sales to undemocratic nations. The Code of Conduct 
     provides the President and Congress an opportunity to take 
     the first step to reduce the potential for conflict and to 
     prevent harm being done to lives and livelihoods. We urge you 
     to contact Representative McKinney's office to be listed as a 
     co-sponsor of the Code and to vote in favor of this amendment 
     when it comes before the full committee later this week.
           Sincerely,
         John Isaacs, President, Council For a Livable World; 
           Howard Hallman, Director, Methodists United for Peace 
           With Justice; Peter J. Davies, U.S. Representative, 
           Saferworld; Steve Goose, Program Director-Arms Project, 
           Human Rights Watch; Deborah Walden, Director of Policy 
           and Programs, Women's Action For New Directions; Edith 
           Villastrigo, National Legislative Director, Women 
           Strike for Peace; Tim McElwee, Director, Church of the 
           Brethren; John B. Anderson, President, World Federalist 
           Association; Robin Caiola, Co-Director, 20/20 Vision; 
           James Matlack, Director-Washington Office, American 
           Friends Service Committee; Lora Lumpe, Director-Arms 
           Sales Monitoring Project, Federation of American 
           Scientists; Joe Volk, Executive Secretary, Friends 
           Committee on National Legislation; Caleb Rossiter, 
           Director, Project on Demilitarization and Democracy; 
           Monica Green, Executive Director, Peace Action; Mark B. 
           Brown, Acting Director-Lutheran Office for Governmental 
           Affairs, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America; Vice 
           Admiral John Shanahan, Director, Center for Defense 
           Information; Maurice Paprin, President, Fund for New 
           Priorities in America; Darryl Fagin, Legislative 
           Director, Americans for Democratic Action; Jerry 
           Genesio, Chairman/Executive Director, Veterans for 
           Peace; Greg Bischak, Executive Director, National 
           Commission for Economic Conversion and Disarmament.
                                                                    ____

                                                      May 8, 1995.
     Committee on International Relations,
     House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Member: The officers, directors and members of 
     Veterans for Peace urge you to support passage of the 
     McKinney-Hatfield Code of Conduct on Arms Trade (H.R. 772). 
     We understand the bill may be offered as an amendment to the 
     Foreign Aid Authorization bill later this week.
       Veterans for Peace (VFP) is a national membership 
     organization of U.S. military veterans, including decorated 
     veterans of both World Wars, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and 
     many other conflicts and skirmishes. Our members include 
     retired officers and enlisted men, some of whom served twenty 
     or more years. Many are graduates of military academies, a 
     number are former POWs. One, a pilot during the Vietnam War, 
     languished in the Hanoi Hilton for eight years. Two are 
     recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor, dozens 
     received Silver and Bronze Stars for valor, and hundreds were 
     awarded the Purple Heart for combat [[Page H5519]] wounds. 
     The work of VFP is primarily educational: to raise awareness 
     of the great costs of preparing for war and of war itself in 
     comparison to the alternatives of international behavior.
       The Code of Conduct legislation should have universal 
     support, if for no other reason than the increasing 
     phenomenon of U.S.-made arms returning to threaten our own 
     U.S. forces. There are other reasons to support the bill. For 
     example, it would substantially help:
       Keep arms from dictators and countries using weapons in 
     aggression against neighbors or even their own people;
       Restore needed Congressional power and responsibility in 
     the area of arms trade and control;
       Protect the U.S. jobs currently being destroyed by the 
     application of so-called ``offset'' agreements, by which 
     defense contractors promote foreign goods in order to secure 
     arms sales.
       Thank you for your consideration of these important issues, 
     and, hopefully, for your support of H.R. 772.
           Sincerely yours,

                                                 Jerry Genesio

                               Chairman and Executive Director

     (USMC/1956-62).
                                                                    ____

                               Center for Defense Information,

                                                      May 8, 1995.
   The McKinney-Hatfield Code of Conduct on Arms Trade: Ensuring the 
                     Safety of U.S. Military Forces

       The Clinton Administration's recent arms sales policy 
     states that the impact on defense jobs must be taken into 
     account when exports are considered. One wishes that the same 
     consideration was extended to the impact on the lives and 
     wellbeing of American service personnel. The current laissez-
     faire status quo in the international arms trade, where 
     increasingly any conventional weapons sale is deemed 
     permissible as long as it purports to make a profit for its 
     manufacturer, is creating a self-generated danger--the 
     possibility that our service men and women will someday be 
     fighting nations or groups who obtained U.S. weapons and 
     technology.
       Many of our former current and arms customers--Panama, 
     Iran, Iraq, Israel, numerous Arab countries, Taiwan, South 
     Korea, Pakistan, and India are in highly volatile parts of 
     the world or have undemocratic governments. Thus our arms and 
     technology sales potentially create--as in the Gulf--the very 
     threat our own forces may someday confront. Furthermore, the 
     threat we are building by our arms sales also justified the 
     continued inflated military spending for even newer equipment 
     to counter the items we have sold others.
       Even the Pentagon now officially acknowledges that it faces 
     the prospect of American weapons being used against U.S. 
     military personnel. In the latest Annual Report of the 
     Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress Secretary 
     William Perry writes, ``In general, threats encountered in 
     MRCs [Major Regional Conflicts] would be standing armies of 
     foreign powers, armed with mixes of old and modern weapons 
     systems. . . Thus, U.S. forces must be prepared to face a 
     wide variety of systems, including some previously produced 
     in the United States.'' [author's emphasis, p. 170]
       A comparison of the Pentagon's own data on deliveries of 
     weapons through the U.S. FMS and commercial sales programs 
     over the past decade with a list of fifty significant wars 
     that were under way during 1993-94 indicates that U.S. 
     weapons exports have played a major role in fueling the 
     ethnic and territorial conflicts that have become the primary 
     post-war security challenge as indicated by the Pentagon's 
     own Bottom-Up Review and National Military Strategy. These 
     are the same types of conflicts U.S. forces are most likely 
     to be deployed to in the future.
       Parties to 45 current conflicts have taken delivery of over 
     $42 billion worth of US weapons in the past decade.
       Out of the fifty significant ethnic and territorial 
     conflicts going on during 1993-94, 90% (45 out of 50) of them 
     involved one or more parties that had received some US 
     weapons or military technology in the period leading up to 
     the conflict.
       In more than half of the fifty current conflicts (26 out of 
     the 50), the United States has been a significant arms 
     supplier, accounting for at least 5% of the weapons delivered 
     to one party to the dispute over a five year period.
       Areas where U.S. weapons are most likely to be utilized in 
     current or future conflicts include southern Europe; the 
     Middle East and North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; Southwest 
     and Southeast Asia; and Central and Latin America.
       This data raises serious questions about the claim that US 
     weapons are only used for defensive purposes. As a weapons 
     supplier to fully 90% of the areas where wars are now going 
     on and a major supplier to more than one-third of these 
     areas, it is clear that the US is bolstering the warfighting 
     capabilities of a substantial number of the parties to the 
     world's current conflicts. It does not take a stroke of 
     genius to realize that these capabilities can just as easily 
     be used against U.S. soldiers, sailors, and airmen. It is a 
     sad irony that the current U.S. arms trade policy confirms 
     the words of cartoonist Walt Kelly's character Pogo when he 
     said, ``We have met the enemy and he is us.''
                                                                    ____

                                    Congress of the United States,


                                     House of Representatives,

                                      Washington, DC, May 8, 1995.
       Dear Colleague: The House International Relations Committee 
     will mark up HR 1561, the Foreign Aid and Reorganization Bill 
     this week. I will offer HR 772, the Code of Conduct Arms 
     Transfer Act as an amendment to Title 31 of Division C. The 
     ``Code'' now has 99 cosponsors in the House and would provide 
     guidelines for arms exports--prohibiting transfers to 
     governments that are undemocratic, violate human rights, or 
     are engaged in acts of armed aggression.
       The ``Code'' would not ban all arms sales. Sales and 
     transfers would continue in the national interest of the 
     United States and to those nations which meet the ``Code's 
     criteria.'' Today's exports could be tomorrow's nightmare for 
     American forces. In the last four US deployments--Panama, 
     Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti--American troops faced armies 
     strengthened by US materiel and technology. In 1993, of the 
     14.8 billion in US arms sales, 90 percent were purchased by 
     nations that do not meet the Code's guidelines.
       Americans throughout the nation support the ``Code''--with 
     more than 227 citizen's organizations endorsing its 
     principles and 96 percent of Americans demanding an end to 
     arms sales to dictators.
       Let's stop the ``Boomerang effect.'' Vote for the ``Code of 
     Conduct on May 11!''
       Please contact Robin Sanders at 51605 with questions or 
     concerns.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Cynthia McKinney,
     Member of Congress.
                                                                    ____

                                              Friends Committee on
                                         National Legislation,

                                                     May 10, 1995.
     House International Relations Committee,
     U.S. House of Representatives Washington, DC
       Dear Representative: Does the United States need a Code of 
     Conduct on Arms Trade? Who answers Yes to that question?
       Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation; Amnesty 
     International; Human Rights Watch; Lutheran Office for 
     Governmental Affairs; Maryknoll Justice & Peace Office; 
     Federation of American Scientists; Bread for the World; 
     Committee for National Security.
       Institute for Food & Development (Food First); United 
     Methodist Church, General Board of Church & Society, Peace 
     with Justice Program; American Baptist Churches, USA; Center 
     for Defense Information; Physicians for Social 
     Responsibility.
       More than 250 other national and regional organizations 
     have endorsed the principles for a Code of Conduct on Arms 
     trade.
       Humanitarisn aid, human rights, arms control, economic 
     development, women's religious, and veterans' agendas, all 
     would benefit from a Code of Conduct on Arms Trade. That is 
     why the Code is popular with a growing grassroots movement 
     for nonproliferation of conventional weapons.
       The Friends Committee on National Legislation urges you to 
     vote for the Code of Conduct on Arms Trade when the House 
     International Relations Committee considers the amendment by 
     Representative McKinney on the Foreign Aid Authorization 
     bill.
           Sincerely,
     Joe Volk.
                                                                    ____

                                     British American Security

                                              Information Council.
     To: Members of the House International Relations Committee.
     From: Bronwyn Brady and Susannah Dyer, BASIC.
     Re: Arms Transfer Amendment to Foreign Aid Bill.
     Date: 10 May 1995.
       It has come to our attention that the Committee is 
     scheduled to vote on the Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers as 
     an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill. Your consideration of 
     this legislation coincides with a parallel initiative being 
     pursued in the European Union.
       Congress now has the opportunity to join its partners in 
     the European Union as they seek to implement similar 
     controls. According to the US Arms Control and Disarmament 
     Agency, Europe and the United States together sell over 90% 
     of the world's weapons. Focusing narrowly on maintaining 
     market share, no country has been willing to take unilateral 
     steps toward control, fearing it will lose export markets to 
     competitors. Therefore, it is vital that as the world's 
     leading suppliers, the EU and the United States work together 
     to implement restraint. Cooperation will prevent either US or 
     European companies from undercutting one another in pursuit 
     of sales.
       Tomorrow in Brussels, the European Code of Conduct will be 
     launched, calling on the EU to adopt stricter controls on 
     weapons exports. This Code builds on the eight existing 
     criteria on arms exports already agreed by member states in 
     1991-92. These criteria stress that weapons exports should 
     take into consideration: the purchasing country's human 
     rights record; the internal and regional stability of 
     recipient states; and the effects of weapons purchases on the 
     recipient country's economy.
       A number of members of the European Parliament have 
     declared their support for this initiative, highlighting the 
     need for a coherent and controlled approach to European 
     weapons exports, and encouraging the Parliament to press for 
     the Code. In addition, [[Page H5520]] the proposed Code has 
     already been endorsed by almost 50 NGOs across Europe, 
     including Save the Children and Medico International. In the 
     lead-up to the review of the Maastricht Treaty in 1996, it is 
     critical that an effective EU arms export control regime be 
     an integral part of an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.
       In addition to the US and European Code of Conduct 
     Initiatives, similar measures have also been pursued in other 
     international fora. In November 1994, a proposal was tabled 
     at the United Nations, calling for a Code of Conduct for 
     international conventional arms transfers with a view to 
     promoting restraint. These efforts will continue in both 
     working groups and the General Assembly. In addition, the 
     Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
     agreed a series of ``Principles Governing Conventional Arms 
     Transfers'' in December 1993, requiring member states to 
     consider human rights, and reiterating ``their strong belief 
     that excessive and destabilizing arms build-ups pose a threat 
     to national, regional, and international peace and 
     security''. It is clear that there is growing international 
     consensus regarding the urgent need to restrain the 
     international weapons trade.
       In its position as the world's leading exporter of 
     weaponry, the United States has a special responsibility to 
     provide a global leadership in the area of restraint. Passage 
     of the Code will encourage the United States to work in 
     concert with its allies to control the spread of weapons to 
     rogue regimes and regions of conflict. This will prevent 
     scenarios such as the one which unfolded in the Gulf War, 
     where US troops faced weapons supplied to Iraq by both the 
     United States and its European allies.
       As your European counterparts begin developing a harmonized 
     EU arms export policy, we urge you to support the Code of 
     Conduct amendment and demonstrate US leadership in promoting 
     unified international restraint of the global weapons trade. 
     Please feel free to contact our office in London or 
     Washington for further details on the European initiatives 
     described above.
                                                                    ____

                                            Unitarian Universalist


                                 Association of Congregations,

                                         Washington, May 10, 1995.
       Dear Representative: Unitarian Universalist Association of 
     Congregations, strongly supports the Code of Conduct on Arms 
     Transfers bill introduced by Rep. Cynthia McKinney and 
     Senator Mark Hatfield that would place restrictions on the 
     sale and transfer of conventional weapons by the United 
     States to dictators.
       We think that the present U.S. arms sales policy which 
     permits the sale of arms to governments which abuse 
     internationally recognized human rights; engage in aggression 
     against their own people or other nations; and do not 
     participate in international efforts to control arms is not 
     in our national interest, fuels regional and local conflicts 
     and aids and abets undemocratic governments.
       The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA) gave Congress 
     the power to review proposed U.S. arms exports using a human 
     rights standard. Unfortunately, the AECA has not stopped a 
     single arms transfer since it became law. The Supreme Court 
     in 1983 found the Congressional mechanism whereby either 
     House could block such sales to be unconstitutional. The 
     McKinney-Hatfield Code of Conduct bill would return to 
     Congress a mechanism for participating in the decision making 
     process on U.S. arms transfers.
       We respectfully urge you to support the McKinney measure 
     when it comes before the Committee. The Code of Conduct on 
     Arms Transfers has gained more support among the Unitarian 
     Universalist grassroots than any other legislation we have 
     worked on.
       The time has come for charting a new U.S. arms sales policy 
     that puts our country on the high ground and sets an example 
     for the international community to match.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Robert Z. Alpern,
                                                         Director.

  Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  (Ms. WOOLSEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the code of 
conduct amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Georgia, and I would 
like to commend her for her tireless work on this important issue.
  As written, our current arms transfer policy is reckless and 
dangerous. Over the past decade, we have sent weapons to countries who 
have turned around and used them against our sons and daughters in the 
Armed Forces. We have provided ammunition for governments who oppress 
their people and commit acts of aggression against the international 
community. U.S. arms transfer policy must be more responsible.
  In the debate over military spending and foreign policy, we continue 
to hear that ``the cold war is over, but the world is still a dangerous 
place.'' Mr. Chairman, our current arms transfer policy is making the 
world an even more dangerous place. I thought we fought the cold war in 
order to make the world safe for democracy and human rights, not 
dangerous for U.S. soldiers and innocent citizens worldwide.
  Opponents of this measure argue that the United States should not 
restrict itself to selling arms only to countries who promote democracy 
and protect human rights. They suggest that we should be allowed to 
sell weapons to countries which may not fit these categories, but who 
are friendly to the United States.
  Mr. Chairman, Members of the House, Manuel Noriega used to be 
friendly. Iraq used to be friendly. Why do we refuse to learn that even 
the Devil can be friendly if he wants to make a deal?
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the McKinney amendment 
and reject the current reckless arms transfer policy.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. WOOLSEY. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to add my support for what the 
gentlewoman said for the McKinney amendment. This is a restrained and 
sensible set of guidelines which reinvolve the Congress in the way that 
it used to be in the process of arms transfers before the Supreme Court 
decision knocked that process out and made us essentially irrelevant.
  This provides waiver authority. There may be times when a country 
that is bad on human rights or a country that is not democratic should 
get some of our assistance for other, larger kinds of considerations.

                              {time}  1245

  There is waiver authority here. Come to Congress, let us go through 
that process. I think it is a sensible, restrained approach to try and 
deal with the causes of regional instability in so much of the world 
and the fueling of an arms race.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to express my support for the amendment 
offered by my colleague, the gentlewoman from Georgia, [Ms. McKinney].
  This amendment establishes a code of conduct for recipients of U.S. 
military exports and training. It gives the President the authority to 
decide which countries meet the four responsible criteria: promote 
democracy, protect human rights, not engaged in acts of aggression, and 
participants in the U.N. arms trade register. Those countries which do 
not meet the criteria would require a waiver agreed to by both the 
President and the Congress.
  As we apply conditions on our military aid to other countries, so 
should we apply conditions to our weapons exports. It is outrageous 
that in our last four overseas United States engagements--Panama, Iraq, 
Somalia, and Haiti--our troops were threatened by weaponry that we sold 
to various dictators who were once our friends, and later our enemies.
  As the only superpower in the world, it is imperative that the United 
States set the standard for responsible leadership. Congresswoman 
McKinney's amendment would ensure our moral leadership by prohibiting 
the sale of arms to those countries that are undemocratic, violate 
human rights, or
 are engaged in acts of armed aggression.

  Arms transfers to undemocratic countries which past administrations 
have courted for a variety of reasons, have often come to haunt us. We 
have spent precious human and financial resources cleaning up after 
conflicts which were fueled by our own arms transfers. Our own children 
have been endangered by the very same weaponry that we sold because of 
short-term foreign policy interests. This legislation will protect our 
children in the future by creating a presumption against such 
transfers, but does establish a thorough, responsible review process 
for those sales that are in our best interest.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask the Members to support the McKinney amendment.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I find myself in a kind of an uncomfortable position 
because I do not particularly like some of the ways that the President 
has conducted [[Page H5521]] foreign policy, and I did not particularly 
like the invasion of Haiti or the way he conducted our operations in 
Somalia and lost a bunch of American lives, but here is one case where 
I do agree with the President. The President has to have some leverage 
and be able to conduct foreign policy, and many times his ability to 
negotiate with countries that are buying U.S. arms is one way that he 
can get the job done.
  So the President of the United States, Mr. Clinton, is against this 
particular amendment. In this particular case, I concur with him 
because I think it hamstrings him in one respect, as far as his ability 
to conduct foreign policy is concerned.
  But, in addition to that, there is another economic issue that needs 
to be taken into consideration. If anybody believes that a country that 
wants to buy weaponry is going to not buy it simply because they cannot 
buy them from the United States, they are just barking up the wrong 
tree. France sells weapons, Great Britain sells weapons, a number of 
countries sell sophisticated weaponry. If they do not buy them from the 
United States of America, then certainly they are going to buy them 
from some place else.
  It will have an adverse economic impact on many segments of our 
society. If you go out to California and take a look at the aircraft 
industry, it is in a depressed state. It is starting to come out of it 
now because of the commercial sales. The fact of the matter is if you 
put these kinds of constraints on the sales of these kinds of 
materials, you are going to have an impact on industry in this country, 
and there are going to be a lot of people lose their jobs and those 
jobs will go overseas to manufacturers of this equipment in foreign 
countries.
  Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the 
sentiments that the gentleman from Indiana is showing in terms building 
up our own economic base here at home. It is a legitimate concern.
  This amendment does not say that we cannot sell arms to Third World 
countries, nor does it say we cannot sell arms to other countries 
throughout the world. All it says is that when there are human rights 
abuses, when there are gross inequities in terms of how the country 
that is trying to purchase arms treats its neighbors, is overly 
aggressive in those issues, in terms of spending far too much money on 
its own arms industry rather than looking out after its own people, 
that the United States ought to take those issues into account.
  It gives the President the flexibility of overruling these on a 
national security basis, and in any given year. So I think it does 
provide the kind of flexibility that is necessary to address the 
concerns the gentleman from Indiana has articulated, but it does put us 
into the immoral position that we are currently in where we are actual 
selling arms to our neighbors that end up using those arms, or to our 
friends that end up using those arms against us when we get into 
conflict.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I thank the gentleman for his contribution. I 
disagree simply because the President of the United States has the 
ability right now to put pressure on those countries by not allowing 
arms sales to them. As a matter of act, the President has exercised 
that authority already in a number of countries. If you followed what 
has been going on in the past several years, you will find there are a 
number of countries that even purchased equipment from the United 
States and the President has not allowed those purchases to go forward.
  So he does have some latitude. It is a Democrat President. He is 
asking for this authority to be maintained. Whether it is a Republican 
or Democrat, I would support it.
  The fact of the matter is there is an inconsistency as far as our 
foreign policy is concerned. There are many pieces of legislation which 
I have sponsored, regarding human rights abuses in India, for instance, 
that have not passed this House because the minority now, then the 
majority, would not support them.
  So I find it kind of interesting that here is the President of the 
United States wanting to protect his ability to conduct foreign policy 
and, because of human rights issues, his party is trying to stop it, 
while at other times in our history when we were fighting for human 
rights abuses to be removed on other pieces of legislation, we could 
not get that support.
  Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. If the gentleman would yield further, 
maybe this kind of legislation would actually improve and get the kind 
of result that you were looking for in terms of your amendment with 
regard to Pakistan.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Not Pakistan. India.
  Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. With regard to India in times past. The 
fact of the matter is, if we had a uniform policy instead of the 
hodgepodge policy that we have today, I think we would get the moral 
leadership of the rest of the world to support us, as we have seen 
today in the European Parliament, which is taking up legislation very 
similar to this.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I appreciate the gentleman's contribution. In 
a perfect world we might
 have a consistent foreign policy worldwide. But as the gentleman well 
knows, we do not have a perfect world; we have an inconsistency in 
foreign policy. That is why the President, whether Republican or 
Democrat, has to have latitude in conducting that foreign policy that 
includes the ability to stop arms sales or allow those arms sales to go 
forward.

  I am very sympathetic to the human rights abuses issue being raised 
here.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Burton of Indiana was allowed to proceed 
for 1 additional minute.)
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I am very sympathetic to the human rights 
issue being raised here. This is a very, very complex world. It is a 
dangerous world. Even though the so-called cold war is over, we still 
have to have a foreign policy that will allow us to be able to deal 
with friends to make sure that they have the ability to defend 
themselves.
  I might add one more time, if we do not sell them these weapons, we 
will make sure that they will buy them someplace else. Let us allow 
that the President of the United States will be able to make these 
determinations where necessary and at the same time protect American 
jobs by not letting them go overseas.
  Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. If the gentleman will yield further, 
the fact is that I have worked very closely with Members of the 
Republican side in the Committee on Banking and Financial Services to 
structure amendments that are very similar to this dealing with funding 
for the World Bank and the IMF, which have received bipartisan support. 
The question is whether or not Members of this body want to provide 
this authority in the Presidency or whether or not we want to establish 
this as a national policy for this country.
  We have gotten bipartisan support for such a policy in times past, 
and I would hope we would gain support on the Republican side for this 
well-thought-through amendment that the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. 
McKinney] is offering.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] has 
again expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Burton of Indiana was allowed to proceed 
for 30 additional seconds.)
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I thank the gentleman for his contribution.
  Let me just end up by saying that we have asked time and time again 
that there be a stronger voice by the Congress in the conducting of 
foreign policy, and the Administration has found that they do not want 
that to be accomplished. They wanted to keep that power in the 
executive branch, and I understand that. And we have not been 
successful in making those changes.
  In this particular case, I think the President's arguments are well 
founded, and I, as a Republican, find myself once again in a difficult 
position, but I am supporting the President in this particular case.
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  [[Page H5522]]
  
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from 
California.
  Mr. MILLER of California. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  I rise in strong support of this amendment. I think it is very 
important that we consider it. I would hope we would pass it.
  The gentleman is right. It is not a perfect world, but we have got to 
strive to make it a better world.
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the 
amendment offered by my colleague, the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. 
McKinney].
  The United States has long been an arms merchant to the world, Mr. 
Chairman, but this amendment is not about the quantity of arms sales. 
This amendment is about who we sell arms to and who makes these 
decisions.
  At the present time, except in rare circumstances, the executive 
branch alone decides what countries are eligible to receive weapons. 
This process has resulted in arms transfers to undemocratic countries 
that use our arms to maintain their own control and to oppress their 
own people, and in recent United States military operations overseas, 
in Panama, Iraq, and Somalia, our troops had to fight against hostiles 
armed with the very weapons we previously sold to them.
  We sold $200 million in weapons to Somalia. We spent $2 billion 
fighting soldiers armed with these weapons, many times at the 
destruction of the U.S. soldiers and citizens.
  This amendment brings Congress into the arms sales process without 
tying the hands of the President. This amendment sets reasonable 
criteria that have to be met before arms can be transferred, including 
promoting democracy, protecting human rights, participating in the U.N. 
arms trade register, and refraining from aggression. A waiver is 
provided for countries that do not meet this criteria if the national 
security requires.
  Mr. Chairman, the McKinney amendment is a very sound amendment. It is 
reasonable and responsible reform. It restores the balance of power in 
arms sales between the legislative and the executive branches. It helps 
secure responsible decisions in this important policy area.
  Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. McKinney] 
for bringing forth this wonderful amendment, and I strongly urge its 
passage.
  Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  Let me commend the sponsor of the code of conduct amendment, and let 
me try to be as brief as possible, Mr. Chairman.
  I rise in support of this amendment. I think that we cannot divorce 
American ideals from American foreign policy, and in the area of arms 
sales, I do not think we would want our contribution and our legacy to 
the world to be that we have sold arms to everyone and allowed for the 
continuation of the practice of war as almost a permanent vocation in 
this world.
  So I would hope that we would support the McKinney amendment and the 
companion effort in the Senate because I think it moves us in the right 
direction, and even though it may be a debatable matter in some 
people's minds, I think that for all of us, if we want to be on the 
right side of history on this issue, that we should, in the final 
analysis, find ourselves voting favorably for the McKinney amendment.
  Mr. SALMON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment is offered in good faith. But it is 
slightly misnamed. This amendment is not about human rights, and this 
amendment is not about foreign policy. This amendment instead is about 
a philosophical difference that exists within the Congress.
  Some in this body simply believe that all arms sales to our allies 
are wrong in all cases. They believe that helping our allies defend 
themselves and helping them defend our vital interests amounts to 
exporting violence.

                              {time}  1300

  I disagree. Often selling arms to our allies may mean we do not have 
to send U.S. troops, and that makes sense for Americans.
  Moreover, responsible arms sales have for many years played an 
important role in our Nation's foreign policy.
  Obviously, opponents of arms sales to our allies could not hope to 
enact a complete ban on the practice, so they have come up with this 
lesser amendment.
  But we should not artificially restrict our arms sales to our allies, 
or hold them hostage to interpretations of vague definitions contained 
in this amendment.
  I welcome continued debate on whether we should ban all arms sales to 
other nations. But this back door effort at beginning such a ban today, 
should be defeated.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Mica].
  Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman and my colleague, I just want to make a couple 
of points and rise in opposition to the amendment that has been offered 
here this afternoon.
  First of all, this does address the human rights violation question, 
and none of us favor any type of human rights violations anywhere in 
the world or by any of our allies, but the matter of fact is that this 
amendment is not a realistic amendment, and it is not a needed 
amendment. I say to my colleagues: First of all, if you want to look at 
human rights violations, just refer to--and I invite all my colleagues 
to do this, and other folks that are listening--read the Amnesty 
International human rights violation reports. You find actually one of 
the countries that is cited is the United States. Not only is the 
United States cited, but you also have Israel, Egypt, Turkey, and, if 
this amendment passed, I think you really would jeopardize the status 
of peace efforts in the Middle East if this was properly applied 
according to the language in the amendment, and again I think it serves 
no purpose. We must work against human rights violations wherever they 
occur, and human rights violations are not condoned by this Congress.
  Let me also point out that a major flaw in this amendment is the 
President already has the authority. Maybe the other side of the aisle 
or the sponsor does not trust the President of the United States, but 
in fact under current law the President of the United States is 
required to even notify Congress before there is an arms sale in the 
appropriate committee of Congress.
  So first of all, it is not a realistic amendment, and it is not an 
amendment that recognizes that there are human rights violations, 
whether it is in the United States or with our allies that are sometime 
recipients of these arms; and, second, the amendment has no purpose 
because the President really already has the authority, and the 
Congress is, in fact, notified when there are these arms sales pending. 
So it is not a needed amendment, and it is not a useful amendment, and 
I urge its defeat.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of this amendment authored by the 
gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. McKinney].
  This amendment is about the new world order. The United States has 
emerged as the undisputed political, economic, and military leader of 
the world.
  With the end of the cold war, the old ways of doing international 
business--especially military business--are no longer adequate. This is 
a time to re-evaluate. It is a time for America to live up to the 
promise of its creed--across our borders as well as within them.
  This Nation must not support dictators. It must stand strongly 
against human rights abuses. We have the capacity--through diplomatic 
pressure, business opportunity, and military arms relationships--to 
make the world safer for its citizens. The United States should 
exercise that power. This, Mr. Chairman, is what the McKinney amendment 
is all about.
  We only need to look at the recent past to find examples of good 
intentions gone bad in the U.S. arms sales.
  Many people have heard about the recent, gross violations of human 
rights in Turkey. Turkey happens to be one of the largest recipients of 
United States military aid. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Lawrence Korb testified yesterday that Turkey's rulers 
[[Page H5523]] have used United States-supplied F-16's, Black Hawk 
helicopters and M-60 tanks against its own Kurdish population.
  The United States also militarily supplies human rights abusers in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Unfortunately, we are considering more aid to
 the Government of Indonesia--despite widely reported human rights 
abuses by the Indonesian military against East Timor.

  In the not quite so recent past, this country felt forced to stop a 
military exercise by Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein. We had a major war--
risking the lives of thousands of soldiers--against Iraq, a country 
which had always been a human rights abuser, and which had been the 
recipient of U.S. aid, including military aid.
  Too many times in this country's history, we have been short-sighted 
policy in our arms export policy. Too many times, short-term military 
alliances have led to long-term human rights disasters, or worse.
  The McKinney amendment does not preclude military assistance to any 
country. If the President and Congress agree that an arms sale is in 
the national security interest, that sale would be allowed.
  However, the McKinney amendment would establish basic, humane, and 
appropriate standards for the conduct of U.S. military export policy. 
These standards are common sense standards such as requiring our 
military exports to go to countries which hold free and fair elections; 
such as being sure our sales go to countries which do not engage in 
gross violations of human rights, and making sure that our arms exports 
do not go to countries which engage in illegal acts of armed 
aggression.
  If there was ever a time when this country could justify working with 
human rights abusers to further some longer-term strategic objective, 
that time is surely past. This country, without any serious military 
threat to our security, now must face its responsibility, and act as 
the world's moral leader. The McKinney amendment would apply a moral 
test to U.S. foreign policy.
  Let us assert our role as a moral leader in the world. Support the 
McKinney amendment.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the McKinney 
amendment. I agree with some of her concerns, but not the solutions 
embodied in the amendment.
  Certainly, Mr. Chairman, during the cold war the two superpowers did 
transfer billions of dollars of weapons to the developing world every 
year as a part of their strategic competition. With the dissolution of 
the former Soviet Union and excess conventional military equipment 
flooding global markets, I believe it is essential to find a way to 
stop the spiral of militarization. An overarmed developing world not 
only has a terrible human cost, it is also contrary to American 
interests in fostering democracy, building political stability, and 
enhancing growing global economy, and I think those are some of the 
gentlewoman's concerns, and I certainly agree with them.
  In my mind the solution to the problem of militarization in arms 
transfer must be a multilateral one. It would do us, nor the developing 
world, any good if we reduce exports only to find the gap filled by 
other suppliers. Yet it is also clear that multi-lateral solutions 
require U.S. leadership both by the President and by the Congress.
  Congress has already begun to address the need for arms restraint, 
enacting several measures which I support, including, No. 1, 
encouraging the President to establish a multilateral arms restraint 
regime; No. 2, imposing a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel 
land mines and calling on the administration to negotiate a worldwide 
ban on their deployment; and, No. 3, calling on the administration to 
oppose multilateral lending to countries who refuse to reduce military 
spending in concert with their neighbors.
  That brings me to the amendment at hand.
  Mr. Chairman, I am in strong agreement with the sentiments, as I 
said, which were expressed in the amendment which express the view that 
we should not sell arms to countries that are democratic, that do not 
respect human rights, and that do not promote peace and stability. 
Where I have problems with this amendment is that it mandates, at least 
as I read it, that human rights, democracy, and participation of the 
U.N. arms registry of conventional arms be the only criteria that 
should govern our arms transfers. To say that these criteria should be 
paramount in evaluating a particular transfer is, I think, going too 
far. This is too restrictive in my view. Arms transfers serve important 
foreign policy and national security objectives. That can contribute to 
regional stability and help deter aggression. They can even foster 
interoperability should U.S. Assistance ever be required as in the 
Desert Storm operation.
  Human rights and the democratic make up of recipient governments 
ought to be among the criteria in making a final decision on a proposed 
transfer. In some cases they may be the primary criterion, but not in 
all cases. The President must be able to weigh all relevant criteria to 
reach sensible, sound decisions on the merit of each proposed transfer.
  Moreover, the amendment would require the President to certify 
annually those nations that qualify for arms transfer according to 
these criteria. Transfer to other countries could only be made if the 
President certifies to Congress that such a transfer is in the national 
security interests of the United States and the Congress enacts a law 
approving such an exception or if the President determines that an 
emergency exists under which it is vital to the interests of the United 
States to provide the transfer. If the President cannot meet this very 
high standard, quote, that an emergency exists, end of
 quote, then this amendment would force the Congress to enact a 
resolution of approval for arms sale. This, of course, turns the 
current system of congressional review of arms transfer on its head, a 
system that I, for one, do not think to be broken.

  Now, I do believe the author of this amendment has made a very 
serious effort to modify the language to address concerns of limiting 
Presidential flexibility by inserting new language under which 
countries could receive arms if they were violating the criteria in the 
bill if the President determines that an emergency exists, so there is 
that flexibility for the President. I would only point out this is a 
very high standard and one that I think cannot be met, at least not in 
very many instances. The President's room to maneuver is largely 
circumscribed, so in my view the modification does not fix one of the 
fundamental flaws of the amendment.
  I want to correct the conclusion here that I think supporters of the 
amendment may be making. The Congress, contrary to what the 
supporters----
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Bereuter was allowed to proceed for 3 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. The Congress, contrary to what the supporters of the 
amendment are seeming to be saying, currently has a very important role 
in determining which sales are made. In many ways, tangible or not so 
tangible, the Congress influences the sales about which the 
administration ends up notifying the Hill. There is an elaborate 
consultation procedure which we will not find in the formal statutory 
law whereby the administration vets possible sales with the appropriate 
committees. Members and staff briefings are convened on proposed sales 
that are controversial, and, contrary to what some may think, the 
administration backs off and drops proposed sales, not just this 
administration, but that has been the trend and the practice.
  So, it is incorrect, I think, to argue that we have no role under the 
current process. The administration and the Congress are in constant 
dialogue about arms transfers which are conducted in accordance with 
the Arms Export Control Act. The Congress significantly influences arms 
transfers in direct and practical ways through the years beginning with 
consultation on the Javits report. Critics of arms transfer point to 
the fact that Congress [[Page H5524]] has never enacted a resolution of 
disapproval on arms sales. That is not a correct measure. In fact, 
congressional passage of such a resolution would represent a breakdown 
of the existing process, not a measure of its success. The fact that we 
have not passed a resolution then is evidence that in fact the 
consultation process is working.
                              {time}  1315

  Now, I have gone on at length here because I think this is a serious 
amendment with much merit. But the author of this amendment is 
committed to the issue, and I commend her. But for the reasons I 
stated, I cannot support it in its current form, and I would urge a 
``no'' vote for all of my colleagues.
  Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge a ``no'' vote.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  Mr. Chairman, will wonders never cease, where my colleague from 
Georgia and I are standing together on an issue in this body?
  Let me note that the cold war is over. I would not have supported 
this amendment if it had been 10 years ago. I believe that now is the 
time for us as a Nation to seriously consider what our policies are 
around the world in a different light than what we did 10 years ago 
during the cold war.
  This amendment puts Congress squarely in the decisionmaking process. 
My good friend, the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], just 
suggested there is a process that is taking place right now, but it is 
just not codified. It is not set down solid in legislation.
  Well, I believe that now that the cold war is over we can afford to 
take this decisionmaking process about what kind of countries that we 
will be dealing with, especially arming to the teeth, what kind of 
countries we will be selling our sophisticated weaponry to, is a 
decision in which the Congress can play a legitimate and verifiable 
role, and that we can be held accountable to our own people for the 
moral basis of the decisions that are being made by our Government in 
this area.
  When the cold war was on, we left these decisions up to the President 
of the United States, and I supported that, because we were up against 
an enemy that wanted to destroy our country. I was, as many of you 
know, a member of President Reagan's staff for 7 years. I felt it 
appropriate that the President had the right to counter Soviet moves 
that were aimed at putting us in a vulnerable situation to a military 
threat, without necessarily having to come to Congress and have the 
issue debated on for weeks.
  We are not in that situation today. In fact, during the cold war, 
human rights were secondary in many of the cases in our dealings with 
foreign countries. In many cases, if we were not dealing with such a 
hostile and horrible enemy as the communists, we should have been 
ashamed of ourselves in dealing with the tyrants we were dealing with. 
But just like in the Second World War when we allied ourselves with 
Stalin, we allied ourselves in the cold war against the communists with 
some unsavory characters.
  That is no longer the case. The cold war is over,
   and today human rights should play a more important role in our 
decisionmaking process than it did when we were under attack. If a 
country is crucial to our national security, even besides the fact we 
are not in the cold war, this amendment provides us the ability to say 
well, you may not be up to our democratic standards, and indeed we want 
you to be more democratic and respect human rights, but we will put you 
on an exception list. You are acceptable because you are crucial to the 
national security interests of the United States.

  I would imagine we might debate countries like Saudi Arabia, who I 
believe is crucial to the security of the United States, and other 
kingdoms where people in those countries are more inclined toward 
having a kingdom than a democracy. That would be a legitimate decision 
we could make. I have no doubt this Congress is capable to working with 
the President to determine which nondemocratic countries are crucial to 
our national security.
  This gives the President in fact leverage even in those countries to 
secure more human rights for their people, when now the President 
cannot just say well, the Congress is forcing me and thus have a dialog 
with these countries.
  Now, I may, as I say, disagree with the proponents of this amendment 
on many issues in terms of what countries we are dealing with, but the 
principle is sound. Let me say this in terms of the practicality. When 
Ronald Reagan became President of the United States, we decided we were 
no longer going to be just anti-Communist and support anti-Communist 
regimes. I believe that was the turning point in the cold war.
  When Ronald Reagan made human rights and democracy the issue against 
the Communists, when he turned away from just supporting dictators who 
are anti-Communist but instead went to the people of then the Soviet 
Union and other countries under Communist domination and said we in the 
West do believe in democracy and we are willing to support those people 
who are struggling for freedom, and we established the National 
Endowment for Democracy, that is when the cold war turned around.
  In the long run, that proved the downfall of communism. It was the 
practical thing to do. In the short run, it gave us some problems, 
because there were some anti-Communist dictatorships which basically 
were on our side. This too will be practical if we have guts enough to 
stand for our principles.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Rohrabacher] has expired.
  (On request of Mr. Burton of Indiana and by unanimous consent, Mr. 
Rohrabacher was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman made one salient 
point in his comments. He said during the Reagan administration, in 
which he served, that the felt the President should have this latitude, 
because of the critical time problems that the President should not 
have to mess around with Congress for 3 or 4 weeks when he might have 
to make a quick decision.
  What makes the gentleman think that will not happen at some point in 
the future with some future President?
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, the cold war is 
over. The fact is that today we should not be operating under the same 
rules as when our country was targeted by a very powerful enemy that 
meant to destroy us. We now can afford to bring the moral questions 
into play, and we should, the human rights questions, the democracy 
questions. This is what America can stand for, and if we do, we will 
have the allegiance of young people around the world, rather than the 
fear of those young people of their own regimes that might be armed by 
our people. That is the way America should be. That is the strength. 
Abraham Lincoln said, ``Right makes might.''
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the gentlewoman from 
Georgia's amendment to H.R. 1561, the McKinney Arms Code of Conduct. 
The Arms Code of Conduct is a rational approach. It implements a 
coherent and comprehensive arms control policy. This legislation would 
prohibit U.S. military assistance and arms transfers to foreign 
governments, unless the President certifies that the foreign government 
adheres to a national code of conduct.
  In order to be eligible for military assistance, the gentlewoman's 
amendment specifically requires that the foreign government head be 
elected through a fair and free elections process; that the country 
respect human rights and not be engaged in any aggression which 
violates international law; and must fully participate in the U.N. 
Register of Conventional Arms.
  The United States is the sole superpower in the world and the world's 
undisputed leader in arms exports. Today, U.S. firms dominate more than 
70 percent of the international arms sale market, up from 57 percent in 
1991. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's 1993-
94 report, World
 Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, the United States sold $10.3 
[[Page H5525]] billion in arms exports worldwide, compared to our 
closest competitor, which is Great Britain, which racked up $4.3 
billion in sales. In 1994 alone, the U.S. taxpayer paid more to 
subsidize weapons sales than we paid for the Federal elementary and 
secondary education programs.

  Ninety percent of the significant ethnic and territorial conflicts in 
the world in the last 2 years involve one or more parties which had 
received some type of U.S. weaponry or military technology in a period 
leading up to the conflict. Additionally, in the war with Iraq there 
were countless documented and verified instances where U.S. troops 
faced the enemy who was armed with U.S. based technology and weaponry.
  Mr. Chairman, as the world's leading exporter of weaponry, the United 
States has an implicit responsibility to provide global leadership on 
this issue by formulating a policy of restraint. While the world's arms 
market is a lucrative venture, no country has been willing to take up 
unilateral steps toward control, fearing loss of exports to market 
competitors. Therefore, it is vital as the world's leading supplier, 
that the United States take responsibility for initiating a 
comprehensive and a rational approach to controlling arms sales, which 
will prevent repeat scenarios, such as those that occurred in Iraq 
where United States forces faced weapons supplied by the United States.
  I urge my colleagues to support the adoption of the McKinney Arms 
Code of Conduct amendment. This amendment is supported by 103 
cosponsors, Democrats and Republicans alike, including the chair of the 
Senate Committee on Appropriations. Approving this legislation will be 
one of the most significant steps this body takes to enhance our 
national foreign policy.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Wynn].
  Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the gentleman for 
yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I also rise in support of the McKinney amendment. I 
think it is a very responsible amendment. I comment her for introducing 
it. Quite simply, it seems to me in the absence of the cold war we have 
lost our way in terms of foreign policy. Foreign policy is supposed to 
advance our interests, our long-term interests, in the global 
community. To do this, however, we cannot be passive. We have to have 
some standards and objectives to pursue.
  It seems to me our objective ought to be encouraging diplomatic 
solutions around the world and discouraging warfare and the use of 
weapons around the world. The McKinney amendment represents sound 
policy advancing our foreign policy interests, because it sets a 
specific criteria on which we can evaluate arms sales. Democracy, 
adherence to human rights, the absence of aggression, and participation 
in the U.N. Registry of Conventional Arms, all give us a sound basis on 
which to evaluate who we ought to be selling arms to. It is correct 
policy because it gives us leverage. It enables us to leverage those 
people who are buying our arms in the direction that we wish them to 
go.
  It is also good policy because it imposes moral values. People throw 
that around. We ought to have moral values in U.S. policy. Well, 
opposing human rights violations, promoting democracy, and opposing 
aggression represents the best of moral values.
  I am not naive. There are certainly circumstances that are exigent 
that will require changes in this policy. The bill addresses that. It 
has a national security exception which the President can utilize. It 
also has an emergency waiver which the President can utilize. But it 
seems to me we have got to quit being passive and reactionary and 
understand what advancing our interests really means. I urge adoption 
of the McKinney amendment.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, today I rise in support of the code of conduct 
amendment that is offered by my friend and colleague, the gentlewoman 
from Georgia [Ms. McKinney]. The code of conduct will be the first 
major reform of U.S. arms transfer policy in almost two decades.
  The code of conduct highlights guiding principles on human rights and 
democracy which I believe are important to America's leadership role in 
the post-cold-war era. This amendment would help stem the flow of U.S. 
weapons to countries that violate human rights of its citizenry and 
fail to respect international human rights standards. The code of 
conduct offers an avenue for America to make violators of human rights 
accountable for their actions if they wish to continue to receive U.S. 
arms sales.
  Mr. Chairman, two-thirds of all the foreign military sales went to 
countries described by the State Department Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices as human rights violators, with undemocratic 
governments. The code of conduct is supported by some 275 national 
organizations who believe that human rights should play a key role in 
our arms export policy.
  Mr. Chairman, I will never forget some years back when I made a trip 
to Croatia when it was under siege. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. 
Wolf] and I got into a place by the name of Vukovar. Vukovar was 
surrounded by Serb artillery and tanks. We went there to try to bear 
witness to peace and to try to encourage the people there. We followed 
it up with meetings with President Milosevic and others. But I remember 
looking at shell casings and bomb casings that littered the streets, 
dozens of bomb casings, and they were U.S. made.
  Now, some people can say ``Oh, big deal. That doesn't really matter. 
We sell it to them and how they use it is their business.'' But it 
greatly distressed me to know that people, innocent civilians, were 
being destroyed by the dropping of these 500-pound bombs. I remember 
bringing that issue to the attenetion of our National Security Adviser, 
Brent Scowcroft. He surely agreed. He said, ``Yeah, we sold those 
bombs, and other kinds of military hardware to the former Yugoslavia,'' 
which had a disgusting human rights record.
  Now, I think we need to be more serious about who we are willing to 
sell arms to. This code of conduct may not be perfect. It may be liable 
to additional change as it makes its way through conference, should it 
pass. There are reasonable objections by reasonable people about what 
ought to be a part of this, whether or not the national security 
exemption is the best and most properly drawn way of proceeding. But I 
think it makes a clear statement that it will not be business as usual. 
Arms sales ought to be conditioned and human rights ought to matter.
  Unfortunately, we have had hearings in the Committee on Human Rights, 
the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights which I 
chair, two human rights hearings. Amnesty International came forward 
and told us in this administration, the Clinton administration, human 
rights is an island, disconnected from policy considerations.
                              {time}  1330

  We have seen it in a myriad of other issues like the most-favored-
nation status for China and other kinds of human rights considerations. 
There is a disconnect. This tries to, at least in the selling of arms, 
which kill people, we try to make sure, the gentlewoman from Georgia 
[Ms. McKinney] tries to make sure that, if we are going to sell arms, 
that human rights is a significant factor.
  I thank the gentlewoman for offering the amendment.
  Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  I rise to offer my strong support of the amendment offered by my 
colleague and good friend the gentlewoman from Georgia, [Ms. McKinney].
  Mr. Chairman, I recall one of the fundamental concerns raised by one 
of our great Presidents in our time--the late President Dwight 
Eisenhower. Before leaving the White House and in one of his speeches--
President Eisenhower warned our nation of the everincreasing power and 
influence of the industrial military interests in our country.
  Now don't get me wrong--I want our military industry complex to 
produce weapons and military equipment that meet our national security 
interest too--but the question is how much and to whom should we sell 
these weapons?
  Mr. Chairman, everyone here in this Chamber knows that our Nation is 
the [[Page H5526]] largest producer and exporter of military equipment 
and weapons of war. It is time that our national leaders need to be 
more sensitive about exporting and selling of weapons of war to kill 
and maim other human beings.
  Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentlewoman for introducing this 
amendment, and I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record the following article:

                [From the Washington Post, May 24, 1995]

Arms Sales `Conduct Code' Opposed--State Department Says Proposal Could 
                 Impinge on Policy and Friendly Nations

                         (By R. Jeffrey Smith)

       The Clinton administration declared yesterday that it 
     opposes a ``code of conduct'' drafted by some members of 
     Congress to block U.S. arms sales to countries that commit 
     human rights abuses or are not democratic.
       At a Senate hearing, Undersecretary of State Lynn E. Davis 
     criticized the proposed code on grounds that its rigid 
     criteria for arms sales would impinge on the administration's 
     authority to decide foreign policy and could force a cutoff 
     of military aid to friendly nations in regions important to 
     U.S. interests.
       The code, which is scheduled to come up for a vote on the 
     House floor today, was crafted by Sen. Mark O. Hatfield (R-
     Ore.) and Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-Ga.) to stanch estimated 
     annual sales or gifts of billions of dollars worth of U.S. 
     arms to countries that the sponsors claim are not upholding 
     important U.S. values. At the hearing, Hatfield particularly 
     criticized recent U.S. arms sales to Malaysia, Indonesia and 
     Turkey, which he said had each engaged in recent human rights 
     abuses.
       The proposed code states that U.S. military assistance and 
     arms transfers should be provided only to nations with 
     governments chosen by free elections that protect basic 
     freedoms and are not engaged in ``gross violations of 
     internationally recognized human rights.''
       It also bars aid to nations engaged in illegal acts of 
     armed aggression and to nations that do not register their 
     arms transactions with the United Nations. The president 
     could waive these restrictions for any country, but only with 
     congressional approval.
       The code has collected 102 sponsors in the House, but last 
     week it missed gaining the International Relations 
     Committee's endorsement by a one-vote margin. Hatfield has 
     vowed to try to attach it to a foreign aid or defense 
     appropriations bill this year.
       Davis told a Senate Appropriations subcommittee that while 
     the administration supports the ``principles'' expressed by 
     the code, it ``simply cannot agree to this weighting of 
     criteria'' for deciding on individual arms sales.
       Instead, she said, the administration prefers its own 
     policy of selling arms based on ``national security,'' as 
     spelled out in flexible language approved by President 
     Clinton in February.
       Under this policy, Davis said, no single criterion such as 
     respect for human rights ``takes precedence over another.'' 
     Arms transfers can be made to nondemocratic nations if they 
     promote regional stability or help prop up failing U.S. 
     defense companies that produce key military technologies.
       Although McKinney has charged that 90 percent of the $12.9 
     billion in U.S. arms sales approved last year went to 
     countries that Washington classifies as nondemocratic, Davis 
     said the ``vast majority [went to] . . . allies, major 
     coalition partners, and European neutrals.''
       Davis confirmed that the administration is considering 
     offering F-16 jet fighters to Indonesia, despite recent 
     evidence of fresh abuses by Indonesian military forces in 
     East Timor.
       Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John 
     Shattuck, who appeared with Davis, said ``we are paying close 
     attention to Indonesia's human rights situation and will take 
     this into consideration'' in deciding on such sales.
       With regard to Turkey, he said ``we are, as you know, 
     gravely concerned about the use of [U.S.-made] military 
     material, particularly cluster bombs'' during Turkey's 
     military assaults on Kurds in southeastern Turkey and 
     northern Iraq.
       But Shattuck did not say whether the use of these arms 
     would affect future sales to Turkey, which he described as 
     ``a crucial NATO ally.''
       Lawrence J. Korb, an assistant secretary of defense in the 
     Reagan administration who is now at the Brookings 
     Institution, testified later that Turkey's use of F-16s, 
     Black Hawk helicopters and M-60 tanks against the Kurds 
     indicated that many U.S. arms transferred overseas ``are used 
     not against the foreign enemies of the U.S., but against the 
     indigenous populations.''

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton].
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I will not take the whole 5 
minutes. I would just like to put some facts on the table.
  Right now under the Export Control Act, the Congress of the United 
States can stop sales. In the past when the President, any President, 
has started to go ahead with arms sales and he found opposition was 
rising under the Export Control Act that was passed by the Congress of 
the United States, they have pulled in their horns and they have 
renegotiated those sales deals with these foreign countries. So we 
already have the authority in law to do what is being talked about 
today. The only difference is we are turning the process around. That 
hamstrings the President of the United States in his conducting of 
foreign policy. That is a mistake
  Ten years ago, the United States controlled only 15 percent of the 
arms sales. My colleagues who spoke on the other side are absolutely 
right; we do control a large part of arms sales today, but that is 
because the Soviet Union has disintegrated. Ten years ago, they 
controlled 50 percent of the arms sales worldwide, and they sold to 
countries like Iraq, Iran, and Libya. We are not selling to those 
pariah countries, but they did.
  Now that they have fallen apart, our percentage of the market has 
gone up, but we are still below, way below, where we were 10 years ago. 
So while our percentage is higher, our actual sales are lower. So the 
bottom line is this. Simply put, we have the control in the Congress to 
stop any arms sales that we want to under the Export Control Act. We do 
not need this legislation.
  Second, we should not hamstring the President of the United States in 
his conducting of foreign policy. And third, the economic concerns that 
I talked about awhile ago are real, because there are other countries 
who will sell this equipment to foreign governments if we do not. Along 
with those sales will go American jobs.
  I think those points should be considered by my colleagues. We have 
the authority to deal with this problem already. We do not need this 
amendment. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from Georgia. I can tell you that in the course of my 
service in Congress, too often we have seen instances where we have 
taken the scarce resources of the United States, bought military 
weaponry, sent it to corners of the world and then find not too much 
later that it has been turned either on our country or on our allies.
  These so-called boomerang sales are addressed directly by the 
amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Georgia. I think her 
amendment is a step in the right direction. I rise in strong support.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentlewoman from Georgia.
  Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to correct for the 
record some misstatements and misrepresentations that have been made 
about this amendment.
  First of all, this amendment does not ban arms sales to any country. 
Second, if there is a problem with this amendment in terms of human 
rights, it is not that this amendment will fail because it does not 
address human rights well enough; it will fail for other reasons.
  Let me just begin to say what some of those reasons are.
  One is that we are spending millions of dollars to quell regional 
strife that we, in turn, are the fomenters of. First of all, we are 
fomenting murder and rampage around the world by fueling conflict, by 
arming potential adversaries, that is the boomerang effect that my 
colleague just spoke about, by promoting territorial expansion and 
crossborder aggression and also by facilitating terrorism and 
repression. And, in fact, as we learned recently, the CIA funded Jihad 
school over in Afghanistan trained two of the suspects in the World 
Trade Center bombing.
  Second, we are violating our own law. The law states that it shall be 
the policy of the United States to exert leadership in the world 
community to bring about an arrangement for reducing the international 
trade in implements of war. We are violating our own policy.
  And then finally, why is that the case? It is the case because in the 
Washington Post story by Jeffrey [[Page H5527]] Smith in today's 
newspaper, it says that the present administration takes the tack that 
arms transfers can be made to nondemocratic nations if they help to 
prop up failing U.S. defense companies.
  So the bottom line, once again, is the amount of money that is being 
spent in failing U.S. defense industries.
  Finally, I would just like to compliment and thank those people who 
have worked so hard on behalf of this amendment. They are the over 200 
grassroots organizations that have gone around the country in support 
of this amendment, the strong support of our colleagues who have spoken 
here this afternoon and who have cosponsored this amendment, and 
finally the strong staff work of Robin Sanders who put it all together.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman. I want to echo her 
comments. It is a false economy for us to believe that we are 
encouraging exports and creating American jobs by these arms transfers 
and in questionable situations, because, as the gentlewoman alludes to, 
many times we find in the future even greater expenditures are 
necessary because of this so-called boomerang effect. We send guns to 
the wrong people. They turn on us. They shoot at us and they shoot at 
our friends.
  What the gentlewoman is trying to do is to minimize that possibility. 
She has the strong support of so many organizations, including the U.S. 
Catholic Conference and others, and I hope my colleagues will take her 
amendment very seriously and join me in supporting it.
  Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Arms Trade Code of 
Conduct.
  The House International Relations Committee nearly passed this 
historic piece of legislation in its markup last week, where it failed 
by a margin of just 18 to 17. A Gallup Poll released in February found 
that only 15 percent of those queried supported our Government selling 
military equipment to other countries.
  The European Union and the United States together sell 90 percent of 
the world's weapons. No country has been willing to take unilateral 
steps toward control, fearing it will lose export markets to 
competitors. Therefore, it is vital that as the world's leading 
suppliers, the European Union, and the United States work together to 
implement restraint.
  Fortunately, the European Parliament has started that process 
already. In January of this year, the European Parliament passed a 
resolution calling on the European Union to immediately implement a 
coherent and comprehensive arms export control policy at the Union 
level. A measure similar to this amendment before us today is being 
considered by the European Union at this time.
  As the world's leading exporter of weaponry, the United States has a 
special responsibility to provide global leadership in the area of 
restraint.
  As to the issue of jobs in the United States, we must weigh the 
limited economic benefits of expanding arms exports against the larger 
costs to the economy as a whole. Arms exports do nothing to address the 
fundamental problems of lagging U.S. competitiveness in nonmilitary 
industries. Furthermore, arms exports undermine peaceful conflict 
resolution upon which world trade, economic growth, and long-term job 
creation are based.
  Administration policy states that the impact on defense jobs must be 
taken into account when exports are considered. Well, Mr. Chairman, I 
wish we would extend the same consideration to the impact on the lives 
and well-being of American service personnel. Our laissez-faire 
approach to arms sales creates a self-generated danger--the possibility 
that our service men and women will someday be fightings nations or 
groups who obtained U.S. weapons and technology.
  Even the Pentagon now officially acknowledges that it faces the 
prospect of American weapons being used against U.S. military 
personnel. In his latest Annual Report to the President and Congress, 
Secretary of Defense Perry writes that ``threats encountered in major 
regional conflicts would be standing armies of foreign powers, armed 
with mixes of old and modern weapons systems. * * * Thus, U.S. forces 
must be prepared to face a wide variety of systems, including some 
previously produced in the United States.''
  With its current policy, the United States is bolstering the 
warfighting capabilities of a substantial number of those fighting 
today's conflicts. It does not take a stroke of genius to realize that 
these capabilities can just as easily be used against U.S. soldiers, 
sailors, and airmen.
  It is a sad irony that the current U.S. arms trade policy confirms 
the words of cartoonist Walt Kelly's character, Pogo, when he said, 
``We have met the enemy and it is us.''
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the Code 
of Conduct on Arms Transfers and commend my colleague from Georgia, 
Representative Cynthia McKinney, for bringing this important 
legislation to the floor today.
  Since 1990, the United States has been the top-selling merchant in 
the international arms bazaar. We have dominated the global arms market 
by sending billions and billions of dollars worth of all types of 
weaponry to some of the world's worst human rights abusers and most 
corrupt and repressive regimes. Sophisticated combat weapons exported 
from the United States, such as armored personnel carriers, antitank 
missiles, and specialized rifles, have found their way into the hands 
of notorious international troublemakers and fueled conflicts raging 
throughout the world.
  Placing short-term economic interests above crucial security concerns 
and fundamental human rights principles has serious consequences, both 
for our stature as a world leader and for the safety of U.S. military 
personnel engaged around the world. By cashing in on profits from arms 
sales abroad without closely scrutinizing potential customers according 
to criteria like the ones outlined by Representative McKinney, we risk 
incurring substantial security and human costs. During the Gulf war and 
in Somalia, for example, the safety of many of our men and women in the 
Armed Forces was threatened by weaponry sold by our own Government. 
Moreover, skyrocketing arms sales have contributed to regional arms 
races, which in turn force us to increase spending to deal with greater 
threats to our national security.
  As we continue to adjust to the realities of the post-cold-war world, 
we need to revise our philosophies concerning foreign military sales. 
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many of the principles which 
guided our arms export policies in the past no longer are relevant. The 
provisions of the Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers will establish a 
sensible, much-needed framework for making decisions about what we send 
abroad and to whom. The United States should take a leadership role in 
forging new policies and encouraging new thinking in this area.
  Being the world's No. 1 weapons supplier is a very dubious 
distinction. As we approach the start of the 21st century, we should 
re-evaluate the priorities which have placed us in this category and 
look to the Code of Conduct as a model.
  Again, I would like to thank Representative McKinney for all her hard 
work on behalf of this important issue. I strongly support this 
initiative and urge my colleagues to vote for the McKinney amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. McKinney].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 157, 
noes 262, not voting 15, as follows:
                             [Roll No. 351]

                               AYES--157

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Berman
     Bishop
     Boehlert
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant (TX)
     Cardin
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Danner
     DeFazio
     Dellums
     Diaz-Balart
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Dornan
     Durbin
     Ehlers
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Furse
     Gephardt
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Lantos
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lincoln
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Morella
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Orton
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Poshard
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Rivers
     Rohrabacher
     Rose
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schiff
     Schroeder
     Scott
     Serrano
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Stark
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Thompson
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Tucker
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Volkmer
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Williams
     Wise [[Page H5528]] 
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates
     Zimmer

                               NOES--262

     Allard
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brown (FL)
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clinger
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Cooley
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cunningham
     Davis
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Frost
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Hostettler
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kelly
     Kennelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     Lofgren
     Longley
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     Martini
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Murtha
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Portman
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Riggs
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schumer
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff

                             NOT VOTING--15

     Andrews
     Bateman
     Calvert
     Cubin
     Fazio
     Hansen
     Kleczka
     McDade
     Meyers
     Miller (FL)
     Moran
     Olver
     Peterson (FL)
     Scarborough
     Sisisky

                              {time}  1358

  Mr. COX and Mr. DICKS changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Messrs. REYNOLDS, DOOLEY, and EHLERS changed their vote from ``no'' 
to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
                   amendment offered by mr. bereuter

  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment, amendment No. 26.
  The Clerk read as follows:

        Amendment offered by Bereuter: At the end of the bill, add 
     the following:

                   DIVISION D--ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

                       TITLE XLI--PUBLIC LAW 480

     SEC. 4001. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR TITLE III.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding section 3242 of this Act, 
     there are authorized to be appropriated $25,000,000 for each 
     of the fiscal years 1996 and 1997 for the provision of 
     agricultural commodities under title III of the Agricultural 
     Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (7 U.S.C. 1727 
     et seq.).
       (b) Authority To Transfer Amounts.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law, amounts authorized to be appropriated 
     by subsection (a) may be used to carry out title II of the 
     Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (7 
     U.S.C. 1721 et seq.).

     SEC. 4002. REDUCTION IN AUTHORIZATIONS FOR CERTAIN UNITED 
                   STATES INFORMATIONAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND CULTURAL 
                   PROGRAMS.

       Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (3)(F) of section 2106 
     of this Act, the following amounts are authorized to be 
     appropriated to carry out international information 
     activities and educational and cultural exchange programs 
     under the United States Information and Educational Exchange 
     Act of 1948, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act 
     of 1961, Reorganization Plan Number 2 of 1977, the United 
     States International Broadcasting Act of 1994, the Radio 
     Broadcasting to Cuba Act, the Television Broadcasting to Cuba 
     Act, the Board for International Broadcasting Act, the 
     Inspector General Act of 1978, the North/South Center Act of 
     1991, the national Endowment for Democracy Act, and to carry 
     out other countries in law consistent with such purposes:
       (1) Salaries and expenses.--For ``Salaries and Expenses'', 
     $445,645,000 for the fiscal year 1996 and $423,080,000 for 
     the fiscal year 1997.
       (3) Educational and cultural exchange programs.--For 
     ``Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Program'', ``Edmund S. Muskie 
     Fellowship Program'', ``International Visitors Program'', and 
     ``Mike Mansfield Fellowship Program'', ``Claude and Mildred 
     Pepper Scholarship Program of the Washington Workshops 
     Foundation'', ``Citizen Exchange Programs'', ``Congress-
     Bundestag Exchange Program'', ``Newly Independent States and 
     Eastern Europe Training'', ``Institute for Representative 
     Government'', and ``Arts America'', $67,265,800 for the 
     fiscal year 1996 and $67,341,400 for the fiscal year 1997.

  Mr. BEREUTER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Nebraska?
  There was no objection.

                              {time}  1400

  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, the budget neutral Bereuter amendment 
restores the $25,160,000 to the current funding level of the Food for 
Development United States food assistance program for fiscal year 1996 
and 1997. This is the Food for Peace Program, title III.
  The current funding is $157 million. The legislation before us cuts 
it to zero. What I am attempting to do is to take $25 million from the 
USIA, the U.S. Information Agency's education and cultural exchange 
programs, and restore at least $25 million to the title III program.
  The Bereuter amendment helps ensure that U.S. foreign assistance is 
directed to the world's most deserving aid recipients, starving people 
in famine- and war-stricken countries.
  Mr. Chairman, the U.S. food assistance has been reduced by 24 percent 
in the last 2 years. In March the United States told other food donor 
countries that we would decrease our minimum commitment of food aid 
from 4.47 to 2.5 million metric tons. Over the past decade, the United 
States has provided between 6.5 and 8 million metric tons. The Bereuter 
amendment, through authorizing $25 million for the Food for Peace 
Program, still represents a 50-percent cut in the President's fiscal 
year 1996 budget request.
  U.S. food assistance funds are spent here in the United States on 
agricultural commodities, processing, bagging, enrichment, internal 
transportation, port facilities and shipping. My amendment is supported 
by the merchant marine organizations.
  I am pulling the $25 million in this amendment from USIA's education 
and cultural exchange programs and administrative accounts. The 
Congressional Quarterly May 6, 1995, article pointed out a $2 billion 
international exchange program, ``They have exploded into a hodgepodge 
of seemingly duplicative and overlapping overseas activities.''
  Mr. Chairman, I think it is an appropriate place for us to move $25 
million to the Title III Food for Peace Program so it is not completely 
zeroed out. It is important for humanitarian reasons. It is important 
for our domestic purposes, as well, and it keeps a commitment we have 
made. It still cuts the President's request by 50 percent. I think that 
is too much, but $25 million seems to me at least to be a start back up 
the hill.
  I urge my colleagues to strongly support the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Kansas [Mr. 
Roberts], the chairman of the Committee on Agriculture.
  (Mr. ROBERTS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the gentleman's amendment to 
restore the $25 million in funding for title III of the Food for Peace 
Program.
  I think it is essential, as the gentleman has pointed out, that we 
fund [[Page H5529]] all titles of the Food for Peace Program. The 
amendment does not increase spending. Let me emphasize that to all of 
my colleagues. It cuts spending responsibly without really gutting the 
program.
  Last year marked the 40th anniversary of the Food for Peace Program. 
It started in the Eisenhower years. It started with a gentleman who 
formerly represented the district I have the privilege of representing 
now, Mr. Cliff Hope, Sr.
  We on the Committee on Agriculture have a very keen interest in 
making the Food for Peace Program as sound and as effective as 
possible. We are going to work very closely with the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Gilman], the chairman, and the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. 
Bereuter], and the rest of the committee to see that the Food for Peace 
Program effectively and efficiently meets its goals.
  The gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Emerson], chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Department Operations, Nutrition, and Foreign 
Agriculture, intends to hold hearings on this program. We intend to 
address any concerns with the program as a whole in the 1995 farm bill.
  I urge support in regards to the Bereuter amendment. I thank the 
gentleman for his leadership in this regard.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Emerson].
  Mr. EMERSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Nebraska for 
yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I, too, rise in strong support of his amendment. I 
wonder if we could have a brief colloquy here.
  I am concerned that the most basic fundamental humanitarian 
assistance, food and medical assistance, be maintained in the posture 
that it currently sits; that is to say, immune from politics and the 
whims of the State Department. I would like some assurance that it will 
remain a tool of the PVO's who are so committed in the administration 
of the most fundamental humanitarian assistance.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman, we have 
done our best to assure that in fact we have an increase in the title 
II program which is most important. Sometimes, as the gentleman knows, 
however, we have to take from the title III program for those title II-
related humanitarian programs. This amendment I am offering will 
continue to provide us that flexibility.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Bereuter was allowed to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I will come back to the gentleman from 
Missouri in a second, but I yield to the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Gilman], the chairman.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I just want to join with the gentleman from Missouri 
[Mr. Emerson] and the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Roberts] with regard 
to their concern on the Public Law 480 proposal. We want to make 
certain that we keep that at reasonable levels. It is an important 
program. I want to assure the gentleman we will do our best to make 
certain it is going to be effectively administered.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for that assurance, 
and I yield back to the gentleman from Missouri.
  Mr. EMERSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding 
further.
  Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important to point out that what we 
are talking about here is fundamental humanitarian assistance, food 
that goes to people when they are starving to death. We are not talking 
about pouring money down a rat hole here, or giving some Ambassador the 
opportunity with the use of taxpayer dollars to build the Taj Mahal.
  We are talking about keeping starving people alive. I think that 
point needs to be made, and I think an understanding of the fact that 
the Food for Peace Program is part of the foreign assistance program is 
a fact with which most Americans are unfamiliar.
  I mean, most Americans, I believe, would think that we are just 
throwing money willy-nilly around the world for no good purposes, and I 
happen to be one who believes that most Americans think that when there 
are people who are starving, they ought to be fed.
  I thank the gentleman for his contribution to this cause, and I look 
forward to continuing to work with him to pursue our mutual interests 
in this subject area.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his strong 
statement. He is exactly right. This is the program that ends up 
putting food in people's mouths across the world, in the most terrible 
situations that we have seen so much in our electronic media.
  The gentleman is a former ranking member of the Hunger Committee, he 
knows well how directly this food assistance has been provided in 
Ethiopia and Somalia and other places. I thank the gentleman for his 
comments.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge a strong ``aye'' vote.


  amendment offered by Mr. brownback to the amendment offered by mr. 
                                bereuter

  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Brownback to the amendment offered 
     by Mr. Bereuter: Strike section 4002 of the Bereuter 
     Amendment and insert the following:

     SEC. 4002. REDUCTION IN AUTHORIZATIONS FOR CERTAIN UNITED 
                   STATES INFORMATIONAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND CULTURAL 
                   PROGRAMS.

       Notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (3)(F), (4)(A), and (5) of 
     section 2106 of this Act, the following amounts are 
     authorized to be appropriated to carry out international 
     information activities and educational and cultural exchange 
     programs under the United States Information and Educational 
     Exchange Act of 1948, the Mutual Educational and Cultural 
     Exchange Act of 1961, Reorganization Plan Number 2 of 1977, 
     the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1944, the 
     Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, the Television Broadcasting 
     to Cuba Act, the Board for International Broadcasting Act, 
     the Inspector General Act of 1978, the North/South Center Act 
     of 1991, the National Endowment for Democracy Act, and to 
     carry out other authorities in law consistent with such 
     purposes:
       (1) Salaries and expenses.--For ``Salaries and Expenses'', 
     $445,645,000 for the fiscal year 1996 and $402,080,000 for 
     the fiscal year 1997.
     (2) Educational and cultural exchange programs.--For ``Hubert 
     H. Humphrey Fellowship Program'', ``Edmund S. Muskie 
     Fellowship Program'', ``International Visitors Program'', 
     ``Mike Mansfield Fellowship Program'', ``Claude and Mildred 
     Pepper Scholarship Program of the Washington Workshops 
     Foundation'', ``Citizen Exchange Programs'', ``Congress-
     Bundestag Exchange Program'', ``Newly Independent States and 
     Eastern Europe Training'', ``Institute for Representative 
     Government'', and ``Arts America'', $82,265,800 for the 
     fiscal year 1996 and $62,341,400 for the fiscal year 1997.
     (3) Radio construction.--For ``Radio Construction'', 
     $70,164,000 for the fiscal year 1996 and $52,647,000 for the 
     fiscal year 1997.
     (4) International broadcasting activities.--For 
     ``International Broadcasting Activities'', $311,191,000 for 
     the fiscal year 1996 and $246,191,000 for the fiscal year 
     1997.

  Mr. BROWNBACK (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Kansas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, my amendment has been agreed to by the 
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] and a copy of it has been shared 
with the minority.
  What my amendment simply does is it spreads the $25 million in cuts 
around a little bit further than what the Bereuter proposal has. The 
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] suggests cuts to USIA salaries 
and exchanges, and my amendment would lighten those cuts in the 
salaries and exchanges areas and broaden the reductions to radio 
construction and broadcasting.
  What we are attempting to do by this is to support what the gentleman 
from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] is doing to put this money into the hunger 
programs, to be able to feed those who are starving, but spreading 
around a little bit more the cuts in the USIA program. That is what my 
amendment to the Bereuter amendment would do. I would ask for it to be 
considered.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  [[Page H5530]]
  
  Mr. BROWNBACK. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman my colleague and my 
neighbor for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I have no objections to the additional flexibility he 
provides to USIA and where those cuts must come to make this basic 
amendment budget neutral. I thank him for his initiative.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, with that, I would hope that we could 
vote on this because I think it does do what most people would like, 
let the USIA agency be able to take care of this within its own, and 
that would be then supportive of the Bereuter amendment to put $25 
million in additional food aid program.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BROWNBACK. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the proposed amendment 
by the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Brownback] that has been accepted by 
the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], the proponent of the 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Brownback] to the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter].
  The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], as amended.
  The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.
                     amendment offered by mr. wynn

  Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Wynn: In section 3414 of the bill 
     (in subsection (e) of section 711 of the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961)--
       (1) in paragraph (1) of such subsection (e), strike 
     ``$3,000,000'' and insert ``$15,000,000'';
       (2) redesignate paragraph (2) of such subsection as 
     paragraph (3); and
       (3) insert after paragraph (1) of such subsection the 
     following new paragraph:
       ``(2) Use of amounts for latin america and the caribbean.--
     Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under paragraph 
     (1) for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, $12,000,000 for each such 
     fiscal year shall be made available for the sale, reduction, 
     and cancellation of loans, or portions thereof, for countries 
     in Latin America and the Caribbean.

  Mr. WYNN (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent 
that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Maryland?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, the amendment I am proposing today is a very 
straightforward one that addresses our economic interest in Latin 
America. This amendment would put $12 million into a debt relief 
program for Latin America and the Caribbean.
  Yesterday in the course of our debates, we cut money out of a fund 
called International Organizations, which is dues-assessed, 
International Organizations. I wan to take a portion of that money, $12 
million, and put it toward debt relief.
  I believe in so doing we can advance our economic interests. One of 
the things I said a little earlier today was this: that in a post-cold 
war era, we have to understand that our foreign policy ought to advance 
our interests. We have specific interests in the Western Hemisphere in 
terms of encouraging and expanding trade opportunities.
  Why? Because these trade opportunities in our own backyard can create 
jobs in the United States. But unfortunately the debt burden in many of 
our neighboring countries in Latin America and the Caribbean is a major 
factor in inhibiting economic growth and decreases the absorptive 
capacity. In other words, they cannot trade with us because they are 
paying off these very old debts. A debt relief program would help 
address this concern.
  To be eligible for this program, these countries would have to meet 
specific economic and political criteria included in existing 
legislation for the region.
  These requirements include an IMF program, a World Bank program, 
significant investment reform and normalized relations with commercial 
creditors. In addition, eligible countries must have governments which 
have been democratically elected, are not in gross violation of human 
rights, and have supported our efforts to combat narcotics and 
terrorism. In other words, we want to deal with friendly, democratic 
countries that are working with us and have normalized economic 
conditions.
  Why are we doing this? Debt reduction provides a catalyst for 
Caribbean and Latin American countries undertaking economic reforms and 
liberation programs.
                              {time}  1415
  Debt reduction is specifically important for small countries in the 
Caribbean, where most debt is bilateral. In Jamaica, for example, debt 
service continues to consume more than 49 percent of the government's 
budget. Debt relief will accelerate trade links by freeing vital 
foreign exchange reserves that otherwise would have be used for debt 
service. These reserves can now be used to import products from the 
United States.
  For example, with 70 cents of each dollar buying U.S. goods and 
services in the Caribbean, debt reduction in the region can stimulate 
significant U.S. exports. Think about that, 70 cents of every dollar in 
that region is spent on our goods and services. We need to do business 
with them.
  After a decade of economic adjustment and reform, many countries in 
Latin American and in the Caribbean are enjoying their best economic 
prospects. Policy reforms in these countries and the resulting economic 
stability encouraged will help our economic ties with these countries. 
Total trade between the United States and Latin America and the 
Caribbean has grown since 1987. There has been a steady growth in terms 
of both imports and exports.
  Latin America is the fastest-growing U.S. export market in the world, 
and the only region where the United States now enjoys a trade surplus.
  Open markets also promote economic development in poor Latin American 
countries. This will help them stem the flow of illegal immigration to 
the United States. My colleagues are going to hear my colleagues from 
across the aisle say well, perhaps these are laudable goals, but we 
just cannot afford it, but I think that argument misses the boat.
  In the business of economic trade and foreign policy we have to 
promote our long-term interests. It is terribly shortsighted not to 
spend this small amount of money, only $12 million from our own 
backyard to ultimately create jobs for our own people.
  They can either spend the money on debt service or they can spend the 
money buying U.S. products. Debt reduction, especially for heavily 
indebted countries of the Caribbean basin, will send an important 
signal of U.S. commitment to democratically elected governments in the 
region.
  I would like to urge all Members of the House to consider the 
importance of our regional neighbors, to consider the importance of 
trade in terms of our long-term economic picture, and begin to think of 
foreign policy as a proactive endeavor and not just a reactive endeavor 
and not just an area where we can find some savings here.
  I think in that context Members will find this amendment is certainly 
reasonable, modest in the amount of money involved, but the long-term 
investment will certainly serve America's economic interests.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, this is a budget-breaking amendment. It 
simply adds money to the bill without reducing funding elsewhere.
  The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] gave us clear direction to cut 
this bill, and we did so yesterday under the Brownback amendment by 
reducing our spending by an additional over $400 million. This 
amendment earmarks funds. The distinguished chairman of the Committee 
on Appropriations, Mr. Livingston, has made it clear to all of us that 
the Committee on Appropriations would oppose such earmarks.
  Furthermore, the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Wynn] is seeking to add 
[[Page H5531]] funds to a new and untested program. And I would like to 
note that already in the bill we authorized $3 million for fiscal year 
1996, and $3 million for fiscal year 1997, to do what the gentleman is 
suggesting. It is a total of $6 million for an initial start on this 
program to begin operations in a limited way.
  Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to oppose the Wynn amendment even 
though it has a worthy endeavor as its objective.
  Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
  Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Let me 
emphasize first to my colleagues the amount of money that I am 
proposing to expend is less that the amount of money that was in the 
bill when it came out of committee. There is not one nickel more than 
came out of the committee in its original form.
  Had I gone ahead of the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Brownback] 
yesterday, I would have proposed moving $12 million out of the 
international organizations account. Unfortunately, because he moved 
ahead of me, he took $400 million out across the board. I am only 
suggesting that of that $400 million he would remove that we preserve 
$12 million to advance our economic interests in the region. But 
clearly this is not a budget-buster in any form or fashion.
  I would have to reiterate to the chairman that I believe that this is 
also an opportune time to advance our interests in that region.
  It seems to me that all of our foreign policy positions to date have 
been reactive. Nothing has been done to advance or leverage the 
direction in which we want to go. Nothing has been done to create new 
jobs or new trade markets.
  Mr. GILMAN. If I may reclaim my time from the gentleman, the 
gentleman I think is incorrect in that he does specifically add $6 
million to this proposal, without any offsets. So that creates a 
budgetary problem for us, and it is for that reason that we are 
opposing the gentleman's amendment.
  Mr. WYNN. If the gentleman will yield further, I would say that all 
of the money I am proposing to spend comes out of the money that the 
gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Brownback] has already cut, so it is not any 
additional money added on. The money has already been cut. I am just 
suggesting it be moved into a second area.
  Let me make one comment about appropriations. I feel very strongly 
about this. This is an authorization bill. We are the Committee on 
International Relations. We are the ones who ought to set foreign 
policy that we recommend to our colleagues in the Congress. We should 
not let the appropriators dictate to us what direction this money 
should be spent. The purpose of the authorizing bill is just the 
opposite, to give direction in terms of our priorities. We studied this 
issue. We need markets in Latin America and the Caribbean. It seems to 
me our directive to appropriators ought to be this is a worthwhile 
purpose. It does not bust the budget. It does not exceed what we came 
out of committee with.
  Mr. GILMAN. If I may reclaim my time, once again I would like to 
submit that the gentleman has a worthy purpose, but he has not provided 
any offset. Mr. Brownback's measure put us in conformance with the 
budget so we would not meet a budgetary problem.
  Moreover we are trying to work very closely with the Committee on 
Appropriations so we are not spinning our wheels here and so our 
authorization measure will be finally met with approval by the 
Committee on Appropriations.
  So, I think since this is a new program, I will be pleased to work 
with the gentleman in the future to see if we can work out a better 
method of funding for the gentleman's worthy objective.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment. I think the 
gentleman from Maryland is making a very worthy initiative here. What 
you have in the context of the total bill is very, very sharp 
reductions for all of Latin America. There is very little in this bill 
which sends a favorable signal to Latin America. The gentleman from 
Maryland is merely requesting $12 million, as he has requested.
  This is a terribly important amendment from the standpoint of the 
Caribbean. Our economic interests in that region are growing very, very 
rapidly and the gentleman from Maryland has called that to our 
attention again and again, and that is one of the fastest-growing 
markets for us in the world. So the $12 million is a very modest move, 
it is an important signal to countries that are much neglected in this 
bill, and I commend him for it and I support the amendment.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I would just like to follow up on Chairman Gilman's 
remark that this may well be a worthy purpose, but I want the people of 
this House to know that we already have $3 million authorized for 1996 
and 1997 for this program. What this amendment would do is to add 
another $12 million to this bill, and that is going in the wrong 
direction. We need to go in the opposite direction.
  I will soon be offering an amendment to make some additional cuts, 
but while this may be a worthy purpose, it would earmark some $12 
million additional for Latin America. And as I mentioned, we already 
have authorized in 1996 and 1997 $3 million to authorize this program. 
So we are going along with the Treasury initiative. That is why we 
authorized the program.
  There are many, many good programs, but we have to draw fine lines, 
and the fine line we drew was to start this program and authorize it at 
1996 and 1997 levels at $3 million, and what the gentleman wants to do 
in this amendment is add $12 million onto that. This is in the wrong 
direction, so I would have to be constrained to ask the House to vote 
against this particular amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Wynn].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 125, 
noes 297, not voting 12, as follows:
                             [Roll No. 352]

                               AYES--125

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bishop
     Bonior
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant (TX)
     Cardin
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Coyne
     de la Garza
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Edwards
     Engel
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamilton
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoyer
     Jackson-Lee
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Maloney
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     McKinney
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moran
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Pelosi
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Rose
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sawyer
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Stark
     Stokes
     Studds
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Tucker
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wynn
     Yates

                               NOES--297

     Allard
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clinger
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooley
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dingell [[Page H5532]] 
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Durbin
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Eshoo
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (LA)
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Furse
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hancock
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jacobs
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Lincoln
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lucas
     Luther
     Manzullo
     Martini
     Mascara
     McCarthy
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Meehan
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Minge
     Molinari
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Morella
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Obey
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Riggs
     Rivers
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanders
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Schroeder
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stump
     Stupak
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thornton
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Traficant
     Upton
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Ward
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wolf
     Wyden
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--12

     Calvert
     Conyers
     Cubin
     Fazio
     Green
     Hansen
     Kleczka
     McDade
     McDermott
     McNulty
     Meyers
     Peterson (FL)

                                   1445

  The Clerk announced the following pairs: On this vote:

       Mr. Conyers for, Mr. Calvert against.
       Mr. Gene Green of Texas for, Mrs. Cubin against.

  Ms. ESHOO changed her vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Messrs. MARTINEZ, HILLIARD, and PALLONE, Ms. DeLAURO, Mrs. MINK of 
Hawaii, and Messrs. WILSON, ORTIZ, BARRETT of Wisconsin, and DOGGETT 
changed their vote from ``no to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
                          personal explanation

  Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I was unavoidably detained and 
was not able to vote on the Wynn amendment, rollcall No. 352. Had I 
been present, I would have voted ``yes''.

                              {time}  1445


                   amendment offered by mr. bereuter

  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Bereuter: In section 2104(a)(1)(A) 
     (relating to authorizations of appropriations for migration 
     and refugee assistance) strike ``$560,000,000'' and insert 
     ``$590,000,000''.
       In section 2104 strike subsection (a)(4), subsection (b), 
     and subsection (d).
       In section 2104 redesignate subsection (c) as subsection 
     (b).

  Mr. BEREUTER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Nebraska?
  There was no objection.
  (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, this Member rises to offer an amendment 
to section 2104 of H.R. 1561, along with my colleagues, Mr. Lamar Smith 
and Mr. Obey, which would restore common sense to the bill's handling 
of the 47,000 Indochinese asylum seekers in refugee camps in Southeast 
Asia. While the issues here are, in one sense, emotional and complex, 
the justification for our amendment can be boiled down to one short 
sentence. Economic migrants have no claim to resettlement in the United 
States as political refugees and should return to their home countries.
  The Bereuter-Obey-Lamar Smith amendment would allow the repatriation 
of Indochinese in Southeast Asian camps who have been determined by the 
U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees to have no, I repeat no, claim to 
refugee status. These migrants--at least 12,000 of whom are North 
Vietnamese--have been screened out by the UNHCR, i.e., they have been 
declared economic migrants, not political refugees.
  Let me make one crucial point so there is no misunderstanding about 
the intent of this amendment. Since our departure from Vietnam in 1975 
the United States has resettled more than 1 million Indochinese 
refugees. This Member has always supported that effort and continues to 
believe the United States must offer refuge to bona fide political 
refugees who have a well founded fear of persecution in Indochina, as 
elsewhere. This Member will work with others concerned about fair 
treatment of legitimate refugees, but this Member cannot support a 
program to give non-refugees the rights and privileges of bona-fide 
political refugees.
  The language in this section appears to be doing just that by calling 
for the bulk of the 47,000 Indochinese in the camps to be, and I quote, 
``offered resettlement outside of their countries or origin.'' Another 
fundamental issue in this debate is the role of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees. The legislation suggests that UNHCR can no 
longer be
 trusted to make fair and objective refugee determinations. If that is 
what the drafters intended, then I would ask them who should take over 
this international refugee determination role, the United States? 
Clearly, we cannot fill the breach. This is a very dangerous precedent, 
which could undermine future refugee efforts worldwide.

  Let me take a minute to point out the problems I see with the 
existing language in the bill. Section 2104 calls for the resettlement 
of tens of thousands of Indochinese economic migrants to the United 
States. While the language does not name the United States explicitly 
as the resettlement country, there should be no misunderstanding about 
it--no other country would take them. The Governments of Canada and 
Australia, also home to thousands of Indochinese refugees, have told my 
office that they and the other resettlement countries would not be 
willing to take any of the screened out from the camps.
  In addition to the immigration problems that this language would 
cause us, there are some real dangers in this legislation for the 
asylum seekers themselves. I must say that I have been somewhat 
surprised at the breadth and depth of concern about the legislation 
among the non-government organizations which advocate refugee rights 
and interests. Not only the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, but 
also the U.S. Committee on Refugees, Save and Children, World Vision, 
World Education, World Learning, and the Southeast Asian Resource 
Action Center have all make issued statements opposing major elements 
of this section. Many other groups have raised similar concerns with us 
orally. These NGO's with many years of direct experience working with 
Indochinese asylum seekers, have convinced me that the bill as written 
holds the following dangers.
  This provision could prompt a new exodus of Indochinese seeking entry 
into the United States, putting them at risk on the high seas and 
swelling the refugee camp populations. My colleagues, you should be 
aware that last year, as reported in the New York
 Times, more than a thousand Vietnamese took to the sea when a false 
rumor was spread that Japan was offering employment opportunities. The 
bill's message of hope for resettlement in the [[Page H5533]] United 
States would likely have a similar effect on large numbers of 
Vietnamese.

  The UNHCR and the refugee groups have expressed fears that the 
provision would increase the chance for violence in refugee camps by 
giving the 47,000 asylum seekers false hope for resettlement in the 
United States when the countries where the camps are located are 
unlikely to give us access to them and, even if they did, many of the 
asylum seekers would not be eligible for resettlement.
  The bill would cause the absolute collapse of voluntary repatriation 
through which 72,000 Indochinese have already returned home without 
evidence of persecution. Now asylum seekers who can demonstrate that 
the negative screening decision of the UNHCR was mistaken can request 
reconsideration from U.S. officials or other resettlement countries in 
Vietnam.
  Finally, for my colleagues who have an interest in refugee issues in 
other parts of the world, you should understand that this section would 
reduce the funds available for other refugee programs, such as for bona 
fide refugees from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, by 
earmarking $30 million dollars to resettle economic migrants from 
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Moreover, by conditioning use of these 
funds on unmeetable conditions, it is likely that the funding would 
disappear completely and not be available for any refugee programs.
  In closing, let me reiterate what the Bereuter-Obey-Lamar Smith 
Amendment would do. It would:
  Stop the resettlement of Indochinese economic migrants in the United 
States.
  Make full refugee funding available for bona fide political refugees, 
for example from the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
  Prevent a new outflow of boat people from
   Indochina seeking entry into the United States.

  Allow the international voluntary repatriation program to proceed 
with U.S. assistance and under close U.S. monitoring.
  Assist U.S. nongovernment agencies monitoring the migrants who have 
returned home to ensure that they are not persecuted.
  Maintain U.S. refugee policy that only bona fide political refugees 
enter as refugees.
  Support an international consensus on refugee determination and 
processing that prevents the United States from having to bear the full 
brunt of refugee programs all over the world.
  Stop yet another example of refugee decisions being made without 
regard to costs for local communities to educate, train and assist the 
refugees.
  I request your support for the Bereuter-Obey-Lamar Smith amendment to 
the refugee provisions of H.R. 1561


 amendment offered by mr. smith of new jersey to the amendment offered 
                            by mr. bereuter

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the 
amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey to the 
     amendment offered by Mr. Bereuter: Strike everything after 
     ``$590,000,000'', and insert the following:
       In section 2104(a)(4) (relating to authorizations of 
     appropriations for the resettlement of Vietnamese, Laotians, 
     and Cambodians) strike ``There'' and all that follows through 
     ``who--'' and insert ``Of the amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated for fiscal year 1996 under paragraph (1) there 
     are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as are 
     necessary for the admission and resettle-
     ment, within numerical limitations provided 
     by law for refugee admissions, of persons 
     who--''
       At the end of section 2104 add the following new 
     subsection:
       (e) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this section may be 
     construed to require or permit an increase in the number of 
     refugee admissions for fiscal year 1996 from the numerical 
     limitation for refugee admissions for fiscal year 1995.

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, this amendment perfects the 
language of section 2104, which protects certain high-risk refugees 
from forced repatriation to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. This bill, as 
it currently stands, contains important language that will prevent 
United States tax dollars from being spent for the forcible 
repatriation to Vietnam and Laos of people who fought side by side with 
American forces.
  Under current U.S. law, these people are refugees, and they are also 
our friends. They should not be forced back to the places where they 
were persecuted, but, at the very least, U.S. tax dollars should not be 
spent to force them back. Thousands of people who served on our side in 
the war and were later persecuted by the Communists on account of such 
service are now being detained in camps throughout Southeast Asia. The 
camps also hold Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists punished for 
religious observance, and others who served time in reeducation camps 
or new economic zones for their anti-communist views or activities.
  Despite the strength of their claim to refugee status, almost all of 
these people are scheduled for repatriation to Vietnam and Laos within 
the next few months under a scheme known as the comprehensive plan of 
action. I suppose the comprehensive plan of action [CPA] was intended 
as a sincere effort to deal humanely with the Vietnamese boat people. 
Unfortunately, it has turned out to be just the opposite. First, the 
responsibility for deciding who is and who is not a refugee, which used 
to be done by United States and U.N. refugee interviewers, was 
transferred to local immigration officials who had no real experience 
or training. Big mistake. Some of the interviewers were not only 
incompetent but also corrupt. There are well-documented instances of 
local officials demanding money and sexual favors from refugees as a 
condition of favorable screening. And to the surprise of no one, almost 
nobody now is a refugee.
  The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights visited and did in-depth 
analysis of the refugee process in Hong Kong. Their conclusion, after 
looking over several hundred cases, was the following: The entire 
screening process and review procedures remain seriously flawed. The 
process remains hostile to genuine refugees. Several international 
standards were ignored. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Vietnamese 
refugees have been wrongly rejected.
  Because of unfair screening and defective screening, Mr. Chairman, 
our tax dollars are about to pay to send back soldiers who served for 
years in reeducation camps. They are going to send back anti-
Communists, writers and poets, members of the underground resistance 
movement, and even people who work for the CIA.

                              {time}  1500

  They are going to send back Buddhist monks whose temples were shut 
down because they would not join the official church and Catholic nuns 
whose convents were violated. That is what U.S. taxpayers will pay for 
if the underlying amendment is adopted.
  Mr. Chairman, a core provision of the CPA, the comprehensive plan of 
action, that has been deep-sixed, was that repatriation to Vietnam and 
Laos was to be strictly voluntary. The idea was that the United Nations 
would work with governments of these countries to make sure that it was 
safe, and then would work to convince the people in the camps that it 
was safe for them to return. Unfortunately, some of the people who 
returned were persecuted. In Laos some were even killed.
  The U.N. monitoring program consists of only eight monitors for all 
of Vietnam and two for the country of Laos, along with support staff 
that has been hired through the Communist governments of these 
countries. So they have been unable to check up on most of the people 
who were returned.
  Wonders of wonders, with government people interacting as translators 
and being there as part of
 this process, they never seemed to have discovered a single instance 
of persecution. I would ask my friends if you were in the situation of 
having been sent back against your will, and a so-called observer comes 
in, or repatriation monitor, to talk to you, and with that person 
happens to be a translator hired by the government, are you going to 
talk about harassment, knowing when they walk out the door you are 
going to be probably mistreated?

  It reminds me of the visits to the POW camps during the Vietnam war 
when people would go over there to Vietnam, Hanoi, and elsewhere, and 
would meet with our prisoners. They would be told stories that there is 
no torture. Of course, those prisoners, our [[Page H5534]] POW's would 
not talk of torture. They would only go back to even more torture had 
they spoken the truth.
  One of our POW's, you might recall, ingenuously with his eyes flashed 
out ``torture'' in Morse Code, getting the word out that indeed they 
were using torture against these people.
  Mr. Chairman, somehow the people in the camp with this situation just 
do not believe there has not been a single instance of persecution.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith] 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Smith of New Jersey was allowed to proceed 
for 4 additional minutes.)
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, so the CPA soon ran out of 
volunteers. They then began selecting people to volunteer and 
imprisoning them when they refused. Sometimes they just dragged them 
into airplanes, sometimes literally kicking and screaming. If they know 
someone is going to resist, they may tranquilize him or her before 
putting them on the plane.
  So the CPA has become a looking glass world in which refugees are not 
refugees and voluntary repatriation is not voluntary. Yet the United 
States has given over $150 million during the last 6 years. The 
language now in section 2104 that has been put there by myself and my 
good friend, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], the chairman of 
our committee, and other members of our subcommittee, would cut further 
funding to the CPA unless the United Nations and other countries 
involved agree to fix the program, to provide resettlement 
opportunities for a limited number of high-risk refugees, again the old 
soldiers, the nuns and others with compelling cases, within existing 
refugee allotments.
  Mr. Chairman, the amendment I am offering today is a perfecting 
amendment to meet the objections raised by some, making it absolutely 
clear that this language in the bill would not mean the admission of 
large numbers of immigrants or even refugees. It provides explicitly 
that the provision should not be construed either to require or to 
permit an expansion of the numerical limitation on refugees beyond the 
number that it was allocated for 1995. It gives the State Department 
more flexibility in its refugee budget by eliminating separate 
authorization of funds for resettlement of people.
  The State Department has been lobbying very hard against this 
provision. But after my perfecting amendment, the only thing to say to 
the State Department is take a hard look at these people in high-risk 
categories. If they are refugees under U.S. law, we should not hide 
behind an inadequate third country screening to pay for them to be 
forced back to persecution; second, no more money for the repatriation 
program until you can certify that it has been fixed and everyone has 
been given a fair screening and everyone that should be resettled has 
been resettled.
  Mr. Chairman, I do hope that Members will support the Smith amendment 
to the Bereuter amendment. It has the support of a number of 
organizations in the refugee communities who are adamantly opposed to 
the Bereuter amendment and have come out as such within the last couple 
of days, the list of which I will talk about further.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith perfecting 
amendment.
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. This is not a simple 
problem, but I think one of the darkest chapters in our country's 
history in this century was called Operation Keelhaul. It occurred in 
Europe after World War II when defecting Russians who were amassed in 
camps were forcibly repatriated in boxcars back, to return and never to 
be seen again. Our troops and our soldiers at gunpoint forced these 
people, who had fled from the tyranny of the Soviet Union, back into 
these boxcars. As I say, they were never seen again.
  Forcibly repatriating people who have fled from their own homeland is 
an atrocious act. We ought not to countenance it. We ought to help 
people who have risked the seas and pirates and risked their lives to 
flee to what they thought was a safe haven, and then finding that we 
are participating in forcibly repatriating them.
  These people deserve better. It is a matter of honor. They worked 
with us, they fought with us, they moved where we are, the land of 
liberty and freedom. We are not asking that they be repatriated to 
America. We are asking only that they not be forcibly returned to the 
places from which they fled.
  A person born in a faraway country loves their homeland. If they 
could return, they would. But these people face all sort of dangers. 
They lived in reeducation camps. They have finally escaped. Now we are 
going to forcibly repatriate them? I hope my country never does that. 
If people want to leave tyranny and leave abuse and move towards the 
light of freedom, we should facilitate that, not inhibit it.
  So I strongly support, and I do not criticize Mr. Bereuter or Mr. 
Obey or Mr. Smith, they are as well-intentioned as anybody can be. But 
I just think they are dead wrong. We ought never at the point of a gun 
or barbed wire or anything else force people to go back from whence 
they have fled in terror.
  So I hope the Smith amendment is adopted.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Smith perfecting 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I take a back seat to no one in this institution in 
terms of my concern about decent treatment for refugees. I think all 
who know me know that. But the fact is that section 2104 of this bill, 
in the original bill, sets aside $30 million specifically for the 
purpose of admitting for resettlement in the United States thousands of 
Southeast Asian refugees who do not qualify for legitimate refugee 
status. It also creates artificial incentives for those people to come 
to the United States rather than return to their homeland, because it 
in effect cuts off any aid to Southeast Asians who want to return to 
their homeland and need tiny amounts of help to do so.
  In my view, that is wrong-headed. The amendment that Mr. Bereuter and 
Mr. Smith and I are trying to offer would eliminate that section of the 
bill.
  Now, I am supporting and offering this amendment with these other two 
gentlemen for two reasons: First of all, I think the committee 
provision really breaks an international agreement which was made by 
the United States with 78 other countries. It makes no distinction 
between legitimate political refugees and persons who simply want to 
come to the United States for economic reasons. It also, I would point 
out, leaves local communities holding the bag for the cost of educating 
and training refugees who can often be very difficult to resettle and 
train, because some of them, for instance, do not even have a written 
language.
  I want to get into the case of the Hmong, for instance. The United 
States Government has allowed more than 120,000 of the 400,000 Hmong 
who were living in Laos in 1975 to enter this country. There was a very 
good reason for the United States doing that. The Hmong had done our 
dirty work in Laos during the Vietnam War. When the government 
collapsed, we allowed many of them to come into this country because of 
the service they had provided to the United States during the war.
  I understand that. But I would point out that the obligation that the 
United States has to recognize what people like the Hmong did for us is 
an obligation of the Federal Government. It is not an obligation of the 
county government, it is not an obligation of the municipal government. 
In fact, what we have now is
 the Federal Government in effect posing for political holy pictures by 
allowing into this country all of the refugees that we can allow in, 
but then transferring the responsibility to pay for the cost of those 
refugees to the States and local government. I do not believe that is 
an equitable arrangement.

  It seems to me that if this committee wants to create the impression 
that it is allowing any and all refugees under this amendment to enter 
this country, then they ought to be guaranteeing that the Federal 
Government in fact is going to meet its responsibility by sharing the 
costs of educating and training those refugees. If it does not, the 
Federal Government is welching on [[Page H5535]] its commitment not 
only to those refugees, but to local communities as well.
  I would also point out that if you adopt the Smith amendment to the 
Bereuter-Obey-Smith amendment, what you are doing in effect is creating 
false expectations and making a shambles of what an orderly refugee 
process is supposed to be.
  I do not favor forcing a single refugee back into their original 
country if they do not want to go. I believe even in the case of 
refugees who have initially determined they want to go back to their 
country of origin, that in the case of the Hmong, which is the one case 
I know pretty intimately, it seems to me they ought to be given a 
chance to change their minds so that there can be no doubt that the 
United States is not forcibly repatriating a single refugee.
  I did my graduate thesis on Operation Keelhaul. I am very familiar 
with it. It was an outrageous chapter in American history. I do not 
want to see us repeat that chapter. But neither do I want to see us in 
a soft-headed way simply appear to be doing a favor for refugees, when 
in fact what you will be doing is causing more turmoil in those refugee 
camps, causing more confusion, causing them to believe that the refugee 
program is now blown away and that they will therefore all have an 
opportunity to enter the United States.
  I would point out or simply ask why we should be creating an 
artificial incentive so that not only do we make available resources to 
bring refugees to this country, but we also shut off, in effect, the 
resources necessary to allow refugees who want to return to their 
original country to do so.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Obey was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, it just seems to me in this instance the 
opponents of the Bereuter amendment are well meaning, but I think in my 
heart they are misguided. I would urge Members to reject the Smith 
amendment because it will simply leave a false impression out there, 
which will cause great additional turmoil in those refugee camps.
  What we ought to be doing is saying to the Thai Government and other 
governments in the area, we ought to be asking them to help us in the 
process by which we give every refugee an opportunity to determine for 
themselves whether they want to be repatriated or whether they want to 
come to this country. We ought not be creating artificial incentives so 
that in the end they have no financial alternative to coming to the 
United States, unless this committee is willing to guarantee that it is 
the Federal Government that will then bear the financial burden of that 
decision. I do not think this committee is going to do that. Absent 
that guarantee, I think we ought to support the Bereuter amendment.
  Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  (Mr. DAVIS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, many of the Vietnamese boat people and Hmong asylum 
seekers in Southeast Asia are facing imminent deportation to communist 
Vietnam and Laos. Many of them have been severely persecuted because of 
their U.S. ties during the war or because of their political or 
religious beliefs. However, many of them have been unfairly denied 
refugee status by local governments under a screening program 
established by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and 
heavily funded by the U.S. Government. This screening program is rife 
with corruption and other fundamental flaws. Among those already denied 
refugee status, there are some 100 religious leaders, thousands of 
former political prisoners and officers of South Vietnam, and many 
human rights activists and dissident intellectuals.
                              {time}  1515

  Classified as nonrefugees, they now face deportation to Vietnam. Many 
of them have taken their own lives to protest the injustices in 
screening to avoid deportation.
  Thousands of Hmongs already recognized as refugees are also facing 
deportation to Laos. In my judgment, no U.S. contribution to the UNHCR 
should be used to finance such refoulement of refugees. Any use of 
United States money for the repatriation of Vietnamese boat people or 
Hmong asylum seekers must be conditioned on a fair review of their 
refugee claims.
  I would like to review with the House who some of these individuals 
are, because you need to look sometimes beyond the numbers and the 
rhetoric to look at who are the individuals we are talking about that 
would be protected under the Smith amendment.
  One of the people comprehensive plan of action would force back to 
Vietnam is a lady, a Sister K, a Catholic nun. Her father served as a 
counterintelligence officer for the Republic of Vietnam of Vietnam. 
After 1975, he was sent to a reeducation camp for more than 6 years.
  In 1988, the communists raided Sister K's convent. They arrested her 
and the mother superior, who was accused of plotting against the 
government. The seminary was confiscated. Sister K was sentenced to 6 
months at hard labor. She then went to live with her family, but in 
1991 her father and other Catholics were arrested for planning to build 
a church. Sister K went into hiding and escaped from Vietnam. Sister K 
has been labeled an economic migrant by the Thai immigration inspector 
who was in charge or her interview under the comprehensive plan of 
action. She is scheduled to be forced back to Vietnam. Her story of 
persecution has been corroborated by her mother superior, who also 
eventually escaped to the United States and is hospitalized through the 
effects of the torture she underwent while in prison.
  Another individual called Captain Tran was an officer in the Army of 
the Republic of South Vietnam. He served side by side with American 
troops. After 1975, he managed to evade capture and joined an 
underground anti-Communist resistance movement. Eventually the movement 
was uncovered by the Communist authorities. Many of its members were 
tracked down, viciously tortured, and executed.
  The members of the movement who managed to escape then plotted the 
assassination of the Communist officer who had ordered the torture and 
extrajudicial killings. Captain Tran eventually escaped from Vietnam. 
But the Hong Kong authorities found him to be credible. They agreed 
that he had reason to fear punishment by the Communists upon return, 
but held that his participation in the counterrevolutionary plot was a 
nonpolitical crime and that made him ineligible for asylum.
  Captain Tran is scheduled to be forced back to Vietnam this year 
under the comprehensive plan of action. Staff members of the House 
Committee on International Relations interviewed him and found him 
highly credible. He said he will commit suicide before returning to 
Vietnam.
  Mr. Chairman, as a nation, I think we have to take steps that will 
bring about a fair, humane, and dignified solution to the Indo-Chinese 
refugee problem once and for all within United States laws and without 
any increase in quota or budget. So, Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of 
the Smith amendment and ask my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Bereuter amendment regarding 
Southeast Asian refugees. I have visited refugee camps in Thailand and 
Hong Kong over the last 20 years, most recently just
 last summer in Hong Kong. It is my observation that while the early 
refugees were certainly tied in with U.S. interests and support of our 
war efforts, the present refugees do not reflect this early perception 
by the American people and veteran organizations.

  Most of the refugee population in the Hong Kong camps have been 
through a screening process and have been classified as economic 
migrants, or to put it explicitly many are northern Vietnamese 
fishermen who had nothing to do with supporting our war efforts.
  The United States was a signature to the Comprehensive Plan of Action 
in 1989 which strengthened the principles of first asylum in Southeast 
Asia. For [[Page H5536]] example this program enabled the repatriation 
of Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotians back to their country of origin 
if not classified as a refugee. By this action countries like Thailand 
that had become weary of holding refugees were able to see the end of 
the tunnel, and stopped pushing back potential refugees into the sea. 
We all remember the terrible piracy and raping of women on boats that 
occurred. This new program helped to reduce such incidents. It also 
worked out agreements with countries that were the source of the 
migration like Vietnam to take back these people and encourage them to 
utilize internationally accepted immigration programs like the
 Orderly Departure Program that has allowed 500,000 to start new lives 
in the United States and other countries. While there may be some 
refugees who have been improperly classified, these cases could be 
reviewed with U.S. intervention under the flexibility of the present 
agreement.

  Moreover, the root cause of the migration is the poor economic 
conditions in these countries, especially Vietnam. By continuing our 
agreement we encourage additional cooperation with Vietnam which will 
lead to increased cooperation on the POW issue and complete the 
normalization of relationships between our two countries.
  The Bereuter amendment will also maintain funding to continue the 
Comprehensive Plan of Action. It will also send a signal that the 
United States remains a partner in this well-thought-out plan.
  This will discourage those still detained in the Hong Kong camps from 
rioting. Over 200 were wounded yesterday in Hong Kong fighting with 
hand-made metal spears according to this morning's edition of the New 
York Times. It is downright cruel for us to build expectancies that the 
United States will take these migrants as refugees. Support the 
Bereuter amendment and help to stop the bloodshed in Hong Kong.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, what is even worse is to send them back to possible 
death and torture at the hands of the Communist Vietnamese Government. 
Some of those people have been disappearing.
  Mr. Chairman, I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. 
Wolf].
  Mr. WOLF. Mr. Chairman, I will be brief. I urge every Member to read 
the letter of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] before they 
vote on this. The gentleman is going to speak, so I will not reiterate 
his letter. But his letter probably sums it up better than anything. In 
his letter he points out in the PS that the important provision in H.R. 
1561 has been endorsed by the American Legion. This is what the 
American Legion says. They said:

       These former members of the South Vietnamese armed forces 
     who escaped certainly have great reason to fear being 
     forcefully repatriated. All one needs to do is review the 
     latest State Department report on human rights in Vietnam to 
     realize that little has changed with respect to what happens.

  We have talked to families in my area who have talked about their 
family members who have literally committed suicide. I think the 
gentleman is right, and I strongly support the Smith amendment. I think 
it will be very good for the country.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. 
Smith].
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding to me.
  I think it needs to be reiterated that human rights groups have 
reported several instances of people being hurt upon their return, 
jailing, interrogation about anticommunist political activities in the 
camps, discrimination in employment and housing, and in Loas the 
disappearance and the probable killing of Hmong leader Vue Mai.
  The American Legion again, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Wolf], 
brought the American Legion, relying on their own contacts with former 
Vietnamese comrades in arms who corroborate these accounts. One reason 
that the United Nations cannot find any persecution is that they have 
only eight monitors for all of Vietnam and only two for Laos.
  I wanted to remind the membership we are talking about people that 
are going out with a support staff that has been hired through the 
Vietnamese and the Laotion Government. This is a situation where the 
person that is with the repatriation monitor is reporting to a 
government, and the government is hostile in many instances to these 
individuals. Who can blame them for not speaking openly after being
 forcibly repatriated in the first place? I do think there is 
underreporting as well.

  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, let me just end up by saying 
that there is an anti-illegal-immigration attitude in America today 
with justification. We have millions of people coming across the 
Mexican-American border for economic reasons, and that has caused a 
real problem with our economy in many States. But the fact of the 
matter is there are still people in this world who are fleeing 
Communist dictatorships, and to send them back to death or worse is a 
horrible thought. It is analogous to taking people who came across the 
Berlin Wall. It is a wrong-headed move. I hope my colleagues will 
support the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith].

                              {time}  1530

  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] has 
expired.
  (At the request of Mr. Obey and by unanimous consent, Mr. Burton of 
Indiana was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from yielding to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I very much respect the gentleman's concern about the 
refugees in question, but I would simply ask this: Why should we engage 
in a legislative process which in fact cuts off the assistance to 
refugees who do, on a voluntary basis want to go back to their own 
country? Why should we eliminate the financial assistance provided to 
those people?
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, because, with all due respect, I would say 
to the gentleman from Wisconsin, the process has been corrupted by 
money and sexual abuse, so some of these people are volunteering to go 
back out of coercion.
  Mr. OBEY. If the gentleman will continue to yield, the fact is that 
under the process for Hmong refugees, each refugee will have to again 
resign a statement indicating that he or she is engaging in voluntary 
repatriation, and if they do not sign a statement, they are not 
repatriated. It seems to me the gentleman's statement is off base.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, this is part of the problem. 
If they do not sign the voluntary agreement, they are put in jail, in 
many instances. In Thailand six Hmong leaders, all of whom were 
screened in as refugees, but scheduled for voluntary repatriation to 
Laos anyway, were jailed because they were actively resisting voluntary 
repatriation.
  Mr. OBEY. Tell the whole story.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. This is the whole story, if the gentleman 
will yield further. These people, we wonder why there may be people who 
may react, and I do not condone the violence, but when people come in 
in riot gear to tell these people ``It is time for you to be 
voluntarily repatriated,'' they react with an attitude.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] has 
expired.
  (At the request of Mr. Obey and by unanimous consent, Mr. Burton of 
Indiana was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, let me simply ask the gentleman, why do we 
not also explain the fact that the same organization which is peddling 
those stories in fact is also raising funds by selling military, 
police, and civilian titles in their resistance army? Why do we not 
talk about the intimidation [[Page H5537]] from them that is going on 
within the Hmong community? There is intimidation going on on both 
sides.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, let me make clear to the 
gentleman that our embassy confirmed this story. I want to go back to 
something I said earlier on. The Refugee Committee of Lawyers for Human 
Rights has so blasted the process of screening they have changed 
international standards. The credibility is one where they are viewed 
with unbelievable skepticism before they even open their mouths. It is 
a flawed process.
  We are saying that the President should certify, and if it is not a 
flawed process, then the money is okay, but if he can certify these 
people are being voluntarily repatriated, that is a different story.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Burton of Indiana was allowed to proceed 
for 30 additional seconds.)
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, let me just end real briefly by 
saying this. If there is any doubt about these people being sent back 
to possible death, or worse, at the hands of the Vietnamese Communists, 
then we should err on the side of safety. That is the reasonable and 
humanitarian thing to do.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Smith amendment. We 
should not support the shameful forced repatriation of our allies who 
fought by our side during the Vietnam war. The gentleman's amendment 
would permit our Nation to end that period with honor and dignity.
  The American Overseas Interest Act does not require one extra penny 
to be spent nor would it increase the number of refugees admitted to 
the United States. It merely disassociates the United States with 
sending people back to Vietnam and Laos who have genuine refugee claims 
because they fought with us during the war.
  It is not accurate to speculate that it is safe for our allies to 
return to Vietnam and Laos. The U.N. repatriation monitoring process in 
place in Vietnam and Laos are run by Vietnamese and Laotian citizens 
hired in coordination with those Governments. In Laos 14 of the 18 
UNHCR repatriation monitoring personnel are citizens of Laos hired by 
UNHCR with the coordination of the Laotian Government. In Vietnam 30 of 
the 38 UNHCR repatriation monitoring personnel are Vietnamese citizens 
hired by UNHCR with the coordination of the Vietnamese Government. It 
is no small wonder that it is claimed that there have been no cases of 
retribution. The Governments of those two repressive governments are 
investigating themselves. This is clearly a case of allowing the fox to 
guard the hen house.
  It is for this reason that the American Legion and other veteran 
organizations support Mr. Smith's amendment and fully support the 
provision in the bill. Our military men and women who fought in Vietnam 
and in Laos are unanimously opposed to any effort to abandon our 
allies.
  Permit me to read from a letter dated May 23 sent to me by John 
Summer, the executive director of the American Legion.

       The American Legion supports the initiative . . . which 
     would provide for a reexamination of the refugee status of 
     thousands of Vietnamese who fled their homeland out of fear 
     of political reprisal, up to and including death.
       The American Legion considers it a debt of honor to 
     strongly support your efforts to authorize the proper 
     screening of those individuals who continue to be held in 
     refugee camps in Asia, and to allow for the resettlement of 
     those refugees who fought side-by-side with the American 
     forces during the Vietnam war, as well as their families.

  The United Nations will not allow our Hmong allies living in camps in 
Thailand and eligible under United States law to immigrate here, to 
leave the camps. Instead the Thai Government and the U.N. are using our 
funds to forcefully send our Hmong allies back to a dangerous fate in 
Laos.
  The screening process of refugees administered by the comprehensive 
plan of action must be broadly reviewed in order to remedy unfair and 
otherwise defective status determination. The use of U.S. funds must be 
conditioned on a thorough review of this process. The American Overseas 
Interests Act would allow for such a review.
  Accordingly, I strongly support the Smith amendment, and oppose the 
Bereuter amendment. Let us end this sad period of history in Vietnam 
and Laos with honor and dignity.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentleman, does he really believe that 
Save the Children would be participating in forced repatriation? Does 
the gentleman really believe that? That is one agency we have provided 
the $1.5 million to to assist people who want to return to their own 
country.
  Does the gentleman really believe Save the Children Foundation is in 
the business of forcing people to be repatriated?
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, we are not talking about Save the Children 
now, we are talking about the Vietnamese UNHCR personnel, the Laotian 
UNHCR personnel, who are apparently not doing an effective job.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I 
would simply say that I sent two of my staffers into the region to try 
to determine what the facts were. They came back with many indications 
that the voluntary agencies involved do not support the elimination of 
the ability to assist people who want to go back to their own country.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentleman, does he believe 
there has not been one single case of retribution? We sent our own 
staff people over to look into the refugee camps, and they were refused 
entrance and examination.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman continue to yield so I 
could answer his question?
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] 
has expired.
  (At the request of Mr. Obey and by unanimous consent, Mr. Gilman was 
allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I would, frankly, be surprised if there had 
not been any cases of retribution, because, after all, this is not 
heaven. However, the fact is that I do not oppose anybody's efforts to 
try to see to it that each and every refugee has an honest choice about 
where they want to go, but I do think it is softheaded for this 
Congress or for the American Legion or any other organization in this 
country to say ``Oh, yes, we will accept the system which will in fact 
bring financial incentives for all of them to come to the United 
States, and by the way, we will not provide the funds for it, and we 
will let the local units of government get stuck with having to support 
them.'' That is not good.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, it does not help this debate 
one iota for the gentleman to call it softheaded to say that the 
screening process was influenced. The overwhelming consensus by the 
human rights groups is that it is flawed.
  Let me just, again, remind the gentleman, and this is not a 
conservative human rights organization, the Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights Refugee Project concluded, and I quote, ``The entire screening 
process and review procedures remain seriously flawed.'' They went on 
to state: ``The process remains hostile to genuine refugees, and 
thousands may have been wrongly rejected.''
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment to the 
Bereuter amendment.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  [[Page H5538]]
  
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, before I make any comments, I yield to my 
colleague, the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  I also support the Smith amendment, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to 
say how proud I am to be involved with a movement that would allow boat 
people to be treated as the refugees that they really are. There are 
thousands of these refugees lingering in miserable camps throughout 
Southeast Asia, waiting for freedom. I think we need to stand by our 
former allies and make sure that they are treated as the refugees they 
are.
  Mr. Chairman, I remember a few years back refugees were forced out of 
the camps in Hong Kong, and a number of refugees committed suicide 
rather than return to the Communist regimes from which they fled. Mere 
economic refugees do not commit suicide when faced with repatriation.
  Mr. Chairman, I know lawyers who have been involved in the Lawyers 
Committee on Human Rights. They tell me what the gentleman has said, 
that the process has been flawed. We need to stand by our former 
allies. I remember when Vietnam fell 20 years ago, the efforts I made 
to save those who were escaping from communism. We must not forget them 
today.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me, and I 
strongly urge support of the Smith amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Berman] 
has expired.
  (At the request of Mr. Vento and by unanimous consent, Mr. Berman was 
allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)
  Mr. VENTO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BERMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.
  (Mr. VENTO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. VENTO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment and 
the underlying intent of the bill.
  It is really a difficult one. I understand the good intentions, but I 
think there has been a shadow over this process. The increased interest 
of the governments in camps, the Thai Government, to close refugee 
camps has, I think, rushed the process greatly. There has been repeated 
reports, and I mean extensive reports, even in the Minnesota papers, 
concerning mistreatment and abuse of individuals in these areas.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment to the 
Bereuter amendment which would rewrite a provisions in the legislation. 
Specifically, I am very concerned that the Hmong currently in refugee 
camps in Thailand, first, that they are voluntarily returning, and 
second, that they receive whatever funding has been promised if they do 
repatriate. These people are returning to very difficult conditions in 
Laos and are in dire need of the minimal assistance being provided to 
them in order to survive. They are often sent to locations where they 
must glean a living from lands and communities with few resources. It 
is, however, vital that we support the non governmental organization 
and a truly objective UNHCR presence in Laos and Vietnam, because of 
the necessary monitoring to ensure the safety of those repatriated. 
There has been a great deal of trouble getting credible information out 
of Laos with regards to the Hmong.
  The Hmong are in a special situation. It is my understanding that 
most of the Hmong have refugee status and therefore are already 
eligible for resettlement in the United States or another country. 
There are now reported less than 500 Hmong who have been determined to 
be ineligible for resettlement. Other reports indicate a much higher 
number. This legislation and initiative should be viewed as ensuring 
that the process is credible and that the resettlement decisions are 
voluntary.
  Hopefully with the modifications now presented the Smith language 
will more precisely resolve the questions raised.
  Certainly some groups opposed to funding repatriation assistance 
because of the possibility of persecution of the Hmong by the Laotian 
Government. Unfortunately, our own State Department has done a poor job 
of laying these fears to rest. The Hmong in the United States and those 
still in the refugee camps hear from the State Department that there is 
no need to worry about those who return to Laos at the same time they 
hear stories of Hmong who have disappeared or been shot. It has been 
extremely difficult to get satisfactory information or answers to 
specific circumstances hence this legislative language attempts to 
ensure certification of the circumstance, a common practice to verify 
or qualify support that Congress has written into law, certainly we can 
assume that the Clinton administration will proceed with dispatch and a 
good faith effort.
  The Hmong are special because the large majority of them already have 
refugee status and are eligible for resettlement in the United States 
or another country. What the United States Government needs to ensure 
is that the Thai Government and other camp governments and the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees is making a proper determination of the 
Hmong who are requesting resettlement. The Hmong are under considerable 
pressure from the Thai to repatriate because the Thai want to close the 
refugee camps and be done with this 20-year-old problem. We and 
certainly the Clinton administration
 and most in Congress don't want anyone to be forced to repatriate nor 
do we want to cut off aid for those who choose to return, who do not 
want to resettle in the United States or elsewhere.

  Clearly, the situation of Hmong refugees in Thai refugee camps is an 
ugly and sad one which we would all gladly see resolved. It is crucial 
that these people be treated fairly, that they not be denied the 
opportunity to resettle in the United States or elsewhere because they 
have not previously chosen this option. Many of these people, although 
they suffered persecution by the Government in Laos, many in fact some 
would say most, hoped one day to be able to return to their native 
land. They stayed in the refugee camps, a bad place to live, because 
they dreamed that one day they would be able to return to life in their 
country. Now these people are being faced with a choice they must make 
now and they should be allowed to make the choice for which they are 
eligible.
  The United States cannot neglect its obligation to the Hmong people 
who sacrificed lives and homeland to fight on the side of the United 
States in the Vietnam war. They cannot be allowed to forget those who 
are still suffering as a result of the Vietnam war. This amendment 
maintains the fragile status quo, a situation that much concerns the 
Hmong-Americans in Minnesota. Certainly, reports of serious human 
rights violations need to be fully resolved and rectified. Often the 
choice of Hmong within a refugee camp is being questioned as to whether 
such a person made a voluntary choice to return to Laos. That must be 
resolved. There can be no misunderstanding that when a refugee returns 
to his or her homeland that there basic rights and personal safety are 
secure. That funding and assistance provided for reintegration is 
necessary should be obvious. The certification process in this measure 
is viewed by my Hmong-American constituents as the last hope to rectify 
this situation that affects their family members. The hearings held in 
Congress and the letters written too often have left more questions 
than answers, therefore I oppose stripping the language from the bill, 
and am in support of the rewritten Smith amendment and the Hmong 
refugees.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BERMAN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  (Mr. NADLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment. I 
want to simply state that I differ from my friend, the gentleman from 
Tennessee [Mr. Duncan], in that we ought to protect refugees, whether 
they are refugees from communistic dictatorships or from any other 
dictatorships. They have the same human rights, and we ought to protect 
them.
  Clearly in this instance the Smith amendment ought to be adopted, and 
the Bereuter amendment replaced, because we should protect these 
refugees, and because the so-called screening over there, most human 
rights observers and organizations have said is not adequate.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment to the 
Bereuter amendment. If adopted without the Smith amendment the Bereuter 
amendment will make the United States complicit in the persecution of 
thousands of Southeast Asian refugees.
  Forget the rhetoric of the nativism demagogues, the Bereuter 
amendment would not close any loophole in our immigration law, because 
none exists. In fact, it would shatter what is best and most balanced 
in our refugee policy.
  Without Smith, the Bereuter amendment would eliminate language in the 
bill requiring that no one can be returned to Vietnam with the 
assistance of American taxpayer money until they receive a fair and 
impartial screening to determine if they are genuine 
refugees. [[Page H5539]] 
  Is there something wrong with that?
  The language of the bill is straightforward:
  It provides up to $30 million for the relocation of Vietnamese, 
Laotian, or Cambodian refugees.
  It prohibits the use of U.S. funds to repatriate those refugees 
unless the President can certify that bona fide refugees, and only bona 
fide refugees, have been offered, not even placed in but offered 
resettlement outside their countries of nationality. That means 
relocation anywhere else, not only to the United States.
  It also requires the President to certify that the process of 
determining refugee status conforms to our basic commitment to 
fairness, honesty, and due process.
  The bill does not, as you may have heard, require that all these 
refugees come to the United States. Read the bill, it's on pages 102-
103.
  The bill does not steal money away from refugees from the former 
Soviet Union. Eighty million dollars is set aside for that purpose on 
page 101.
  So what is all the excitement about?
  These refugees are not on U.S. soil; our Government is not running 
these refugee camps. Is it too much to suggest that we should not pay 
for their forced repatriation until we can be assured that they will 
not face persecution?
  For those refugees who will come to the United States, this bill does 
not create any new refugee slots. In fact it does not even use all of 
the slots available. These are refugees who quality for resettlement, 
that is, refugees who are persecuted for their past affiliation with 
the United State or who have been persecuted on the basis of religion 
or ethnicity.
  We must not abandon our commitment to honesty, fairness, and decency.
  I know money for refugee programs is politically unpopular these 
days. At the very least we should agree that those scarce dollars that 
are available should not be used to move refugees involuntarily to 
their countries of origin to face persecution.
  Mr. Speaker, I opposed the war in Vietnam. Many of our colleagues 
here supported that war, and some even fought there. Those differences 
still have the power to divide this Nation. The mere suggestion that 
some may come from the northern part of Vietnam sill seems to have the 
power to suggest to some Members that these refugees will make war on 
us when they arrive here. I think that, regardless of the stand you 
took 25 years ago, if you ever cared about the people of Southeast 
Asia, of if you were moved to take a stand on either side because the 
preservation of fundamental American values was important to you, then 
you must help adopt the Smith amendment. I urge a yes vote on Smith and 
no vote on Bereuter.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, this is a very complicated and important 
issue. There is a lot of right on both sides. The fact is the Orderly 
Departure Program and CPA have dealt with the problem of boat people, 
dealt with a way to allow people who are in fear of political 
persecution to leave Vietnam directly to resettle in countries, and 
have set up a process which, unfortunately, has been too flawed in the 
camps on the countries of first asylum to resettle in other countries.
  The gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith], by his amendment, has 
taken a major step toward ameliorating concerns earlier expressed 
during committee debate on the language which is in the bill. He has 
softened the earmark, he has made it clear that the intention of his 
amendment is not to increase the number of refugees admitted to the 
United States above those currently permitted.
  The gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] and the gentleman from 
Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] are pointing out the potential problems with some 
of the restrictions in the language of the gentleman from New Jersey 
[Mr. Smith], or some of the requirements in the language. However, I, 
at least at this particular point in time, want to focus on energizing 
our State Department to get the UNHCR and the people in charge of that 
screening process to take a look at a number of cases where it is clear 
that people with a well-founded fear of persecution, if they were to be 
repatriated back to Vietnam, should have a chance to prevent what could 
be a catastrophe for them.

                              {time}  1545

  Between now and the conference committee, we can look at how to do 
this. I do not think every candidate should be rescreened. I do not 
think we want to end voluntary repatriation. I do not think we want to 
give the people in the camps false hopes about things that are going to 
happen.
  I do not want them to think we want to embark on something which 
would become politically unsustainable in the United States, but the 
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] and others were right. When you are 
talking about people who fought on our side, who were imprisoned for 10 
years for political acts and now are talked about being sent back, you 
want to make sure that that is not being done in a fashion that is 
going to put their lives and their liberty in jeopardy.
  I think the Smith language in the bill as modified now helps to send 
the message to the State Department, to the international community 
about our concerns about the flaws in the rescreening process and in 
the repatriation process and that between now--I actually hope this 
bill does not get to a conference committee, but if it were to get to a 
conference committee, we can deal with some of the problems that people 
have correctly pointed out.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 
of the Committee on International Relations, I rise in strong 
opposition to the Smith amendment. It is well-intended but it is a 
disastrously bad approach.
  The gentleman from California has said the section of the bill is 
made slightly better, by the amendment of the gentleman from New Jersey 
[Mr. Smith]. The gentleman, Mr. Berman, was the person that raised the 
initial concerns about this section in the committee. I say this 
section of the bill is a disastrously bad approach. I do not use that 
language very often. I know that the intention of the gentleman from 
New Jersey is to be highly respected, and I respect it, too, but the 
results, the bloodshed, the tragedies that will result from this 
reversal of policy are just going to be extraordinary.
  If we make this change in the refugee program in Southeast Asia the 
blood is going to be on our hands for the additional boats of refugees 
that are going to be launched. This section of the bill and the Smith 
amendment completely devastates the UNHCR-multinational Comprehensive 
Plan for Action which is being implemented.
  Why is it that most of the refugee groups that have spoken out on the 
issue have spoken against the language in the bill and would speak, if 
they have not done so already, against the language offered by the 
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith] as an amendment to my amendment? 
It is because they understand that what you are unleashing here by 
approving the Smith amendment is a tragedy.
  Mr. Chairman, we have heard many comments about forced repatriation. 
Of course no one is in favor of forced repatriation. We have accepted 
over 1 million Indochinese refugees into this country because we have a 
responsibility as our former allies to do so. We have done that 
generously. Now we have the UNHCR trying to get a reasonable hold on 
this economic refugee and boat people process. We have 47,000 refugees 
waiting there at this moment, which are categorized by the UNHCR as 
economic refugees.
  I want to see any Member stand up in front of their local VFW chapter 
and American Legion chapter and say, ``We granted refugee status to 
economic refugees from North Vietnam, our former enemies.'' That is 
what I want to see you do. If you vote in favor of this amendment which 
guts my amendment offered for myself and for the gentleman from 
Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] and for the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Smith], you 
are devastating the Comprehensive Plan for Action.
  What about UNHCR? Is it a corrupt process? Well, no, it is not. Are 
there corruptive elements in it? Absolutely, there are.
  Take a look at this. Since the screening process began in 1989, about 
125,000 Indochinese have been screened under close supervision of the 
UNHCR. One-quarter of those screened, representing more than 31,000 
asylum seekers, have been found to be bona fide refugees and have been 
resettled in the West. The screening process included the right to 
appeal directly to UNHCR, which did not hesitate to overturn bad 
screening decisions. In fact, it overturned 1,500 initial 
refusals. [[Page H5540]] 
  While there are undoubtedly examples of error in such a massive 
screening process, the bulk of informed opinion, both government and 
NGO, disputes the assertion of mass fraud and corruption in the 
process. If you destroy this process by the Smith language in the bill, 
you have left the United States holding all of the responsibilities for 
the tide of refugees that you are about to launch. I ask you to think 
seriously about that.
  What about the egregious cases that are mentioned and identified by 
the NGO's? I will work with my colleagues and the NGO's to press UNHCR 
and the State Department to be more active in seeking redress. I 
understand that at least 48 cases from the list have been successfully 
overturned, and more perhaps should be. But I caution my colleagues in 
the House, do not launch this wave of refugees.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BEREUTER. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a specific question with 
respect to a specific group of refugees.
  Right now, there are a lot of Hmong refugees trapped in Thailand. 
Some of them want to go back to Laos. A lot of them want to come to the 
United States. And a lot of them, if given the opportunity, would 
prefer to stay in Thailand.
  I would simply ask this question of those who are supporting the 
Smith amendment. If this country today unilaterally takes this action, 
and sends a message to refugees around the world that we are about to 
absorb all of the refugees discussed under this amendment, and if under 
those circumstances the Thailand Government then decides against 
allowing those Hmong refugees to resettle in Thailand, are we really 
doing those Hmong refugees any good?
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] 
has expired.
  (On request of Mr. Obey, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Bereuter was 
allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I continue to yield to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin [Mr. Obey].
  Mr. OBEY. Are we not in fact by this action today going to make it 
highly unlikely that the Thai Government would in fact make that third 
option available to those Hmong refugees? And does that not in fact 
mean, just as the gentleman says, that the United States is going to 
unilaterally assume onto its own shoulders all of the burden for the 
turmoil that will result and all of the financial burden that will 
result as well?
  It just seems to me that if we want to change the screening process, 
we ought to focus on demands to change the screening process. We should 
not in the process blow up an international agreement unilaterally, 
which this language does.
  Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman. That is exactly what it would 
mean with respect to the Hmong refugees. About 2 months ago, I wrote to 
the State Department in support of the Hmong. I now understand an 
agreement is being worked out with the Thai Government to grant us 
access to the Hmong in the camps later this year. But if we blow it up 
by this action today, that is gone.
  Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], the committee 
chairman, asked me in his absence to make a unanimous-consent request. 
I do that in concluding my remarks.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that debate on the pending 
amendments and any amendments thereto be limited to 30 minutes, to be 
controlled by the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith] for 15 minutes, 
the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] for 7\1/2\ minutes, and myself, 
the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], for 7\1/2\ minutes.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Nebraska?
  Mr. GUNDERSON. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, there are 
a number of us who have been patiently waiting to engage in this debate 
and we are not about, when we have constituents and their families 
whose fate is at the mercy of the outcome of this, to agree to that 
kind of a unanimous-consent request when we have had no time, when 
certain Members have continued to ask for more time, more time and more 
time so they can conduct their discussions at our expense. At this 
point, I object, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I have heard a lot of emotional debate today and I 
would just like to try to put this in some perspective. I do not serve 
on this particular committee, but I have served on the Immigration and 
Refugee Subcommittee for over 14 years. I personally have visited the 
Hmong camps, I have personally visited Hong Kong, I have been there 
more than once, and I think I have some feel for the history of this 
matter since about 1980.
  The story that I would like to tell a little bit of to put it in 
perspective is the story of the way in which the decisions were being 
made back in the 1980's with regard to how we screened people in and 
out among these groups of boat people and the Hmong and so on. In the 
very early 1980's, there was a very strict screening. President Reagan 
when he came into office, was in office a couple of years, and some of 
us reported to him from our visits over there that this was a major 
problem, that indeed the standards being used to screen in were not 
allowing those to come in who had been those who had assisted us during 
the war, who were truly people who have credible fears of persecution, 
and so on and so forth.
  So in light of that, in 1983 President Reagan adopted a command 
performance, if you will, from our Immigration and Naturalization 
Service and the State Department, for how we were going to handle the 
screenings of refugees to come in from over in that part of the world. 
That series of standard criteria, if you will, were later adopted into 
statute in what is known as the Lautenberg amendment.
  It is those criteria which the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith] 
has offered and put in the bill which is underlying this today and 
which we are trying to defend on this side, and I must reluctantly 
oppose my good friend, the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], 
because he wants to strike that more liberal standard, if you will.
  That standard prevailed, this standard I am talking about, for nearly 
6 years, until 1989, when this comprehensive plan was adopted. It is 
only since the comprehensive plan has been adopted that the U.S. 
screeners are out of the picture pretty much, and all of the UNHCR 
folks are doing the screening we are hearing the complaints about.
  We do not want to let everybody in. The standard that Ronald Reagan 
promoted and adopted and we operated under for 6 years is the standard 
that we simply want, those of us supporting the Smith and the 
underlying bill position want to have adopted at least for 1 year, to 
look at the group that we are talking about forcibly repatriating in 
many cases. Let's screen them under that standard.
  Let me tell you what the preferences are to that standard, the 
presumption almost that they still have to prove credible fear:
  Former officials of the government in the south existing prior to the 
takeover in 1975, and we are talking about Vietnam, national and local 
officials.
  Former members of the military of the government in the south 
existing prior to the takeover in 1975.
  Catholics and Buddhist monks. Now, there might be some of them, a 
very tiny few of them, from the north. I think they are going to be the 
only ones you hear today who could be even under this list.
  Persons formerly or presently employed by the United States or 
Western institutions, or persons educated in the West.
  Persons required after the takeover in 1975 to undergo reeducation in 
reeducation or labor camps, or
 who were imprisoned or sent involuntarily to new economic zones 
because they were considered politically or socially undesirable.

  Ethnic Chinese.
  Montagnards.
  Chams.
  Accompanying members of households or persons falling into any of the 
preceding categories.
  The same type of list, I am not going to read it, is there for the 
Laotian and the Cambodian situation. [[Page H5541]] 
  We are not talking about just letting everybody in who is an economic 
refugee. With all due respect to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. 
Bereuter], that is not what this whole debate is about.
  What those of us who believe in the underlying bill and believe in 
the modest amendment that the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith] is 
offering today want to see happen is that for at least a year, maybe 
two if it takes it, that we take a look at the boat people from Hong 
Kong, the Hmong who are over in Thailand, the others in the camps in 
Malaysia, and judge them and have them judged by the standards that 
were on that list in 1983 to 1989, so that we can be satisfied in our 
consciences as American people that we have indeed allowed those to 
come out who really should and not be sending those back that would be 
sent back in harm's way.
  A lot of us just do not have confidence in the current process. We 
have seen too many examples where it is not working. I do not see the 
harm in it. I personally do not see the draw of the boat people, that 
we are going to draw a whole bunch more people out with this.
  The standard is pretty darn clear and it is pretty narrow. It is not 
economic refugees, again, with all due respect. It is substantially 
below the 40,000 figure some have used that would ever be allowed in 
under this standard. I suspect a very small number, comparatively 
speaking, would actually qualify under this Lautenberg or this Ronald 
Reagan standard, which is really what it is. It would be a modest 
number of people who would be ultimately screened out.
  Again, we are not actually going to accomplish this necessarily 
because the underlying proposal simply says we are not going to provide 
money for the comprehensive plan anymore. We are not going to be a 
party to what we think is wrong unless these standards are adopted and 
used in the screening process. That is all it does.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] 
has expired.
  (On request of Mr. Bereuter, and by unanimous consent, Mr. McCollum 
was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I 
appreciate his expertise and his experience.
  Mr. Chairman, I have two questions for the gentleman. I will ask them 
both first and let the gentleman respond.
  First of all, the gentleman said we may need a year, perhaps two 
years. What happens when the country of first asylum begins to fail to 
cooperate, an action which I fully expect to take place immediately?
  The second question: In light of the fact that even a small rumor 
floated that there were jobs available in Japan caused a boat flotilla 
of over 1,000 people to leave. They had to be rescued from the sea. 
Given that example, why does the gentleman think we are not about to 
launch a major exodus of boat people?
  Mr. McCOLLUM. First of all, I do not personally believe we are going 
to launch any major exodus, because the amount involved in this as far 
as what the changes are concerned is modest. They are not comprehensive 
like the gentleman I know in all due respect believes; I understand he 
does.
  Second, I believe, yes, there is a chance that Thailand and some of 
the other countries, Hong Kong perhaps, will not accept this standard 
that we would say we will impose. If we do not provide them the money, 
they may very well forcibly send a lot of these folks on back, anyway, 
and I think that that may very well continue to happen. I do not know.
  But I do not want my name and the name of this Congress and the money 
of the American people being spent for the kind of forcible 
repatriation that I believe is going on with a substantial number, not 
all, but a substantial number of these folks.

                              {time}  1600

  I in good conscience, and I think most of the Members who are on our 
side of this issue are really voting with that in mind, and we believe 
the downside is not as great as the upside of what we are doing. There 
is some risk, but I think it is a modest risk.
  Mr. BEREUTER. If the gentleman will yield one more time, the UNHCR I 
believe the gentleman understands, has screened in 125,000 Indochinese. 
And then when we had the appeals process for those screened out at 
least 1,500 were screened in. So in fact it is not a totally corrupt 
process and it isn't a hopeless process for legitimate political 
refugees.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Reclaiming my time, I realize they have done a modestly 
good job, maybe a good job in some cases, but there have been enough 
reports to this Member and experienced staff, including one sitting 
beside me in the gentleman's committee that have not been able to get 
the answers to satisfy this Member that convinces me there is a 
corruption in its process and there is something going on I cannot 
condone. While some may have been good, all of it has not been good. It 
is my personal belief, with all due respect to the gentleman, if we 
need to give it a second look, we will give it, and if it does not 
work, so be it. But we owe it to the people involved and all those who 
came out in the past and that have been allies of us in the process and 
in the long since Vietnam period to do this, in my judgment, and that 
is why I feel as passionate about it as I do.
  I think we need to give them the one more chance. I urge an aye vote 
for the Smith amendment as a major alteration and as the gentleman 
said, it will change your amendment. It restores the basic bill to what 
it should be, allowing all of the refugees to come in under the 
existing ceiling now so we would not be taking in any additional, and 
at no additional cost, I submit.
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I have friends on all sides of this debate. But I rise 
in strong support of the Smith amendment and sadly against the Bereuter 
amendment, and I do so not only as a matter of intellect but with some 
measure of heart.
  It was in the Central Highlands 27 years ago this summer when the 
village chieftain of a Hmong tribe, the Montagnard mountain people, 
wound a small piece of cheap silver around my wrist, and I have not had 
it off in 27 years. And I promised him I would not take it off until, 
as he put it, the Communists stopped kidnaping, killing, and abusing 
his people.
  Now we have finally gotten around to treating native Americans with 
respect simply because they were here first by 10,000 to 20,000 years. 
The Hmong people are perfectly analogous to our American native Indian 
tribes in this country. And they have been terribly abused.
  And it is not only for them but for the Vietnamese, and all of the 
other various backgrounds in that small abused country for almost two 
centuries of Laos that I speak.
  Once about every 10 years, Mr. Chairman, so this may be the last time 
I will be sitting in the front bench, I will look at these Roman 
letters that are cut into the front bench of our clerks and our 
leadership. It reads union on the eastern end and peace on the western 
side, but these three words I think are apropos to this debate--
justice, tolerance and liberty. Most of them, even the economic 
refugees, are yearning for freedom and for liberty so badly that it 
enables them to be horribly abused.
  I have been fascinated that all sides here agree there is abuse. We 
are arguing over how much abuse. To ask a man to give you his daughter 
for sexual abuse, a type of coercive rape over seeking liberty, is 
probably the most offensive sex crime that you could possibly imagine. 
To keep upping the ante from a few hundred dollars to thousands of 
dollars. I have gotten names of people here that I will not put in the 
Record, because we have a defense mechanism in this well where we can 
name people, and I am not prepared to do it outside of this Chamber so 
I will not use their names. But they are colonels, higher ranking men, 
hired by the United Nations refugee people to operate in this screening 
process. Some of these high-ranking men will make families in the camps 
put together their money and fly a leader all the way down to the 
capital of Indonesia, to then be told that half his family will get 
refugee status but the other half, [[Page H5542]] generally including 
wives and daughters, will have to submit to more bribes if not to this 
form of coercive rape.
  I think it is terrible that screening officials have charged as low 
as $400 U.S. dollars, demanding U.S. currency, up to $4,000 and there 
have been substantiated cases as high as $10,000 or $12,000.
  I have been to Southeast Asia eight times while the war for freedom 
was going on, twice to Hanoi as a Congressman and several times to go 
back to those camps. My oldest of my five children, my daughter Robin, 
spent a year in those camps in 1980 and 1981. She saw abuses then, 
Mercedes Benz cars arriving from Bangkok, air-conditioned cars 
extorting money from those people. This corruption has been going on 
for 14 years. I do not care if it is 3 percent, 5 percent, or 10 
percent. My evidence shows me it is
 even more than that. We have got to come to a screeching halt here.

  Of course we do not like to see people fashioning spears and stakes. 
God forbid they get hold of guns to fight for their liberty as this 
country has done. There are excesses and innocent people in Hong Kong 
who are law enforcement authorities that have been terribly wounded, 
but the whole process, we must step back from it and look at it. The 
Smith amendment is the best way to do it.
  As the gentleman from Florida, Mr. McCollum, did not point out in his 
letter, but the gentleman from Virginia, Frank Wolf, who is an 
absolutely sterling person in this Chamber in either party on these 
human rights issues, pointed out that the American Legion is asking us 
to step back from this process. I have never found people in any 
American Legion hall, with all due respect to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin, Mr. Obey, to be soft-headed. Far from it. I think what we 
have got to do is give these people the benefit of the doubt that they 
have put their lives at stake, on the road and more often at sea, have 
fielded Thai raping, pirates. They have fielded shark attack, 
dehydration and at least 700,000 or 800,000 people drowned on the high 
seas.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DORNAN. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I want to 
make clear when I used the term soft-headed I was referring to Members 
of Congress, not members of the American Legion.
  Mr. DORNAN. I will try not to take that personally. As a member of 
the American Legion I guess I have a pass on that. I would urge to 
rarely vote ``no'' on my good friend the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. 
Bereuter, and ``yes'' for my friend, the gentleman from New Jersey, 
Christopher Smith.
               [From the Washington Times, May 22, 1995]

                  U.S. Bankrolls Corrupt U.N. Program

       Since 1989, the United States has contributed roughly 150 
     million dollars to a United Nations program that screens 
     refugees for resettlement and non-refugees for repatriation. 
     This screening program is, however, seriously corrupt and has 
     placed numerous refugees at risk. It affects thousands of 
     U.S. citizens whose tax dollars have gone into financing it, 
     ironically.
       In Indonesia, for instance, screening officials have 
     charged asylum seekers 500-4,000 U.S. dollars for refugee 
     status at the initial screening stage. At the final appeal 
     stage, the price goes as high as $10,000-12,000.
       The head of the corruption racket is none other than 
     Colonel Wim Roesdi, Chairman of the Indonesian Task Force, in 
     charge of Vietnamese asylum seekers. He has even opened a 
     bank account under the name of Obrien Sitepu, his right-hand 
     man, at Chemical Bank, New York to collect cash directly from 
     U.S. relatives of the asylum seekers.
       Several lawyers working for the U.N. High Commissioner for 
     Refugees (UNHCR) to oversee the screening process also took 
     part in the racket. Rahmad Irwan, representing UNHCR on the 
     Refugee Status Appeal Board, is known to have demanded both 
     money and sexual favors from asylum seekers in exchange for 
     refugee status. He then shared the proceeds with his 
     Indonesian counterparts on the Appeal Board.
       In a number of instances, the boat people had to offer 
     their wives and daughters for several nights or longer, 
     sometimes for weeks, as part of the deal. Many refugees with 
     strong persecution claims have been denied refugee status 
     because they could not afford the bribes or because they 
     refused to offer their wives or daughters.
       In some cases, U.S. relatives were required to travel to 
     Jakarta to pay cash directly to Colonel Roesdi. Some female 
     relatives had to satisfy his sexual demands in addition to 
     the cash.
       A number of officials affiliated with U.S. consular offices 
     are also involved. For instance, Sumarno, an Office Manager 
     of the Joint Voluntary Agency--a U.S. agency funded by the 
     State Department and operating out of U.S. consular offices--
     routinely proposed deals to U.S. citizens who came to visit 
     their relatives in Galang Camp. Several U.S. citizens have 
     denounced his criminal activities to U.S. consular officials 
     but were met with bureaucratic indifference. Meanwhile, their 
     relatives in Galang Camp suffered retaliation by the 
     Indonesian authorities. They have become victims of threats 
     and physical abuses, and their correspondences have been 
     intercepted and confiscated.
       As a consequence of corruption, those with cash as well as 
     collaborators, operators, and mistresses of screening 
     officials are recognized as refugees and resettled. On the 
     other hand, genuine refugees with compelling claims but 
     without money to pay, or who refuse to offer their wives or 
     daughters to screening officials, have often been denied 
     refugee status and now face deportation.
       Many religious leaders severely persecuted in Vietnam, have 
     been ``screened out'' because they have nothing to offer. For 
     instance, Ven. Thich Thanh Lien, Chief Representative of the 
     Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam in Galang Camp was denied 
     refugee status despite his strong refugee claims. In 1993, 
     his disciples and colleagues in the United States and other 
     countries had to pool money to pay Colonel Roesdi $7000 to 
     get the screening decision reversed. Similarly, Ven. Thich 
     Minh Hau, another Buddhist monk, was granted refugee status 
     only after his disciples paid $5000 to the screening 
     authorities so as to prevent his deportation to Vietnam. 
     Several other monks are less fortunate. They have spent the 
     past seven months in prison awaiting eventual deportation to 
     Vietnam, where their Church had been outlawed.
       Thousands of former political prisoners, human rights 
     activists, resistance fighters, who had been imprisoned for 
     their U.S. ties during the war or because of their political 
     beliefs have also been denied refugee status.
       In a number of instances, screening officials intentionally 
     screen in only have of the family. Once resettled, they must 
     pay to get the rest of their family out. Those who do not 
     have the means to pay have to accept indefinite separation 
     from their loved ones,
       Many boat people recently resettled have offered to 
     testify. A number of former UNHCR lawyers have gone public. 
     In late 1993, Simon Jeans, formerly with UNHCR in Indonesia, 
     publicly denounced the flawed screening system. In his words, 
     ``several refugees whose status had been accepted by UNHCR 
     officials were turned down by Indonesian officials after 
     failing to come up with the cash.''
       Another lawyer, who established the screening program in 
     Indonesia but who later resigned, reported that ``the reason 
     why corruption was possible to such an extent in Indonesia 
     was that the UNHCR leadership in that country was never 
     interested in enforcing qualitative standards in screening.
       Despite the many appeals by asylum seekers and refugee 
     advocates and the many undeniable evidences, UNHCR has 
     steadfastly denied any wrongdoing by its own officials or 
     local screening officials. Instead, the agency has invested 
     considerable resources into silencing protesters and into 
     explaining away the egregious screening decisions.
       The United States ends up bank rolling a corrupt U.N. 
     program, which victimizes not only victims of persecution in 
     Vietnam but also thousands of U.S. citizens who have been 
     coerced into paying bribes to screening officials. Those who 
     refuse to cooperate have seen their relatives abused and 
     threatened by camp officials. Some of their relatives have 
     committed suicide to protest the injustice or to escape 
     deportation to Communist Vietnam.
       It is time to stop the tragedy and save lives.

  Mr. GUNDERSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  (Mr. GUNDERSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. GUNDERSON. Mr. Chairman, I think I am as much of an establishment 
guy or at least accused of that as any of my colleagues, and I come 
here today with the highest respect for the gentleman from Nebraska 
[Mr. Bereuter] and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey], and 
frankly, I think they are partially right. But it is the part where 
they may not be right that drives me to this particular debate and why 
I rise in such strong support for the Smith amendment.
  The fact is that we are dealing with either an intentional or an 
unintentional misinformation game, and people's lives are at stake as 
this game goes on.
  I want Members to know that last fall the gentleman from New York 
[Mr. Gilman], the distinguished chairman of this committee, the 
gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Leach], and myself wrote a letter to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. We wrote that letter 
because six members of the Hmong community who were in the 
[[Page H5543]] Ban Napho camp had tried to provide a petition to Mr. 
Gilman's staff raising their concerns about the repatriation process. 
Those six gentlemen were as a result of that effort arrested, and they 
were taken to a prison or an immigration detention center at Suan Phlu.
  Now we wrote asking about them, and we received a letter back on 
December 7 which said: ``Their well-being, like that of other persons 
of concern to UNHCR, are monitored by full-time UNHCR personnel. You 
might be interested to know that the persons concerned are in good 
health and are receiving preferential treatment, including English 
classes. They are only complaining of boredom.''
  Why do I tell Members that? I tell them that because between 
Christmas and New Year's of this past year a member of my staff and 
five other staff people gave up of their holidays to go over to 
Thailand and to try to investigate the circumstances. They were able to 
get in during visitation hours to that detention center, and while they 
were there they were able to talk to these six individuals. Do you know 
what these six individuals told them? They told them that there had 
only been one visit over the entire 4-month detention process by anyone 
from the U.N. High Command on Refugees. They had only been out of their 
cell once, and that was when a friend from the Ministry of Interior 
came to visit them. No one from the United States Embassy, despite our 
requests, had been there to visit them, and the U.S. Embassy was
 only 2\1/2\ blocks away. They were quarantined in a small cell of 18 
people. They were required to sleep on concrete floors with only a 
towel as their bedding. They were given only two meals a day of bamboo 
and rice. They were given no medical care at all. Two people complained 
of fevers and two others complained of ulcers.

  Now, I tell you all of that because as this debate was emerging last 
week, our State Department sent a new letter regarding this same 
situation at which they said, ``Although the six were taken to Suan 
Phlu, they were still considered refugees by the Thai Government and 
UNHCR. They were well treated and their welfare was monitored by the 
UNHCR.''
  I do not enjoy calling people like our State Department or the UNHCR 
liars, but I have to tell my colleagues when we are talking about 
truth, when we are talking about justice, when we are talking about 
people's lives, both of these agencies are misrepresenting the truth.
  I do not doubt for 1 second that what the gentleman from Nebraska 
[Mr. Bereuter] and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] are 
suggesting is that there is some room for some problems that need to be 
resolved. But let us not kid ourselves about this debate this 
afternoon. This is a debate that is going to be heard around the world, 
because this is a debate about whether the United States Congress 
approves of the forced repatriation procedures as they are ongoing at 
this very moment, and if we reject the Smith amendment, Members will 
reject the hopes and the lives of many people of the Hmong community to 
torture and in many cases eventual death.
  I would suggest that since we voted on the Desert Storm resolution 
and the vote to send our troops into hostility and harm's way, it is 
this vote this afternoon on the Smith amendment which will affect more 
lives of more individuals than any vote since that time.
  I plead with Members for the sake of these people who stood with us 
as our friends, support the Smith amendment.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I think that we have had a good debate on this 
amendment this afternoon, and I compliment the previous speaker from 
Wisconsin. I think that his heart is in the right place, and like him 
and many of you I have been contacted by our Hmong community, and our 
hearts go out to them. But we also have an obligation to our own people 
and our own taxpayers.
  We are being flooded with legal and illegal immigrants in this 
country. Now we are going to open up the borders. In fact we do not 
have borders over our own country anymore. We are going to take in tens 
of thousands of economic refugees again.
  Yes, we should help these people in the camps. We should look out for 
them. They did stand with us. But the war was 20 years ago. How many 
more are we going to bring into this country? Yes, we would like to 
bring everybody into America, but that is not possible.
  This is well-intentioned, but we cannot allow a new outflow of boat 
people. Is that fair to these people, to give them hope to bring them 
on the high seas again? This would not be in their best interests.
  Yes, we also have to consider our own people. You know who is going 
to pay for this. We had unfunded mandates we passed in the first 100 
days. These people coming into local communities, who is going to 
educate them, who is going to train them? This is going to cost a lot 
of money. I heard here in debate before that we have 1 million that we 
have brought into the country. How many more can we absorb?

                              {time}  1615

  Yes, the Hmong are good citizens. We have a million here now. How 
many more can we absorb? How many more can we assimilate?
  We have an obligation to our own people, too, and we have to draw 
fine lines, our own people, your taxpayers and mine. The American 
people are a people with a great heart, but we must also have a level 
head, and that is why this is a good amendment. It is an amendment with 
a heart, but it is also an amendment with reason, and that is why I am 
for the Bereuter-Obey amendment.
  Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
last words.
  I rise in support of the Bereuter-Obey amendment and against the 
amendment by my friend, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith].
  Mr. Chairman, there are two very fine Vietnamese restaurants in 
Arlington, Cafe Saigon and Nam Viet. They are owned by a Vietnamese 
gentleman who served South Vietnam in the army. In fact, he was 
imprisoned afterward, tortured.
  I met with him in my office, as he is a constituent, on Friday. He 
showed me dozens of pictures. One of those pictures was of the chief of 
intelligence for the South Vietnamese army, who is a very wealthy man 
now. He is a consultant to the Vietnamese Government. He showed me any 
number of other pictures of people who had been very active in high-
ranking positions for the South Vietnamese army who had been considered 
enemies of the people on the fall of Saigon but are now very much a 
part of society and the economy. He showed me pictures of him standing 
in Hanoi, pictures of him standing in every place that we would have 
thought was off limits.
  He explained that he was able to travel anyplace. He went over there 
because he has helped to set up an orphanage for Vietnamese children, 
particularly the Amerasian children, the children of American GIs, who 
had been orphaned who are left in Vietnam, and he told me, Mr. 
Chairman, that the real need is for American involvement, not for us to 
turn our backs and continue trying to punish Vietnam. He felt his 
country and his people had been punished enough, that it is now time 
for healing, it is time for people like him and others like him to 
participate in Vietnam's economy.
  He feels very strongly that the people who are living in very 
difficult conditions in refugee camps ought to be repatriated back to 
Vietnam to see, as he did, the changes that have occurred in Vietnam, 
to realize that time marches on, that the Vietnamese people now are far 
more focused on the future, a fairly bright economic future, than they 
are obsessed in the past.
  There seem to be more people in this country who are looking upon 
Vietnam with the blinders of the past than there are in Vietnam itself. 
This body time and again has made wrong decisions with regard to that 
country. That country has suffered a great deal. I do not want that 
country to be a Communist nation, but when you trace the history, we 
were in many ways complicit with what occurred.
  I am not going to go through a whole history at this point, but I 
think we would be far better off taking a constructive role, helping 
Vietnam develop a free enterprise economy, develop a democracy at some 
point, [[Page H5544]] which I think is possible, and work with them to 
show them how important protection of human rights is to us and should 
be to them. We can only do that when we have face-to-face contact with 
the Vietnamese people.
  That is why the Bereuter-Obey amendment is the appropriate, 
constructive one, and I think the Smith amendment, with all due 
deference to my friend from New Jersey, is focused too much in the past 
and past bigotries and does not take into consideration the enormous 
progress that has been made in the last few years.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith] to the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 266, 
noes 156, not voting 12, as follows:
                             [Roll No. 353]

                               AYES--266

     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Camp
     Canady
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Condit
     Cooley
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cunningham
     Davis
     de la Garza
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Evans
     Everett
     Farr
     Fawell
     Fields (LA)
     Flake
     Flanagan
     Foglietta
     Forbes
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilman
     Goodling
     Graham
     Gunderson
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hancock
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hinchey
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Hostettler
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Lantos
     Largent
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lincoln
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Longley
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     Martini
     Mascara
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McKinney
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Mineta
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Murtha
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pastor
     Paxon
     Peterson (MN)
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Schumer
     Scott
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stupak
     Talent
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thornton
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Waters
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zimmer

                               NOES--156

     Abercrombie
     Archer
     Baldacci
     Barrett (WI)
     Barton
     Bass
     Beilenson
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant (TX)
     Cardin
     Castle
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clinger
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Combest
     Costello
     Coyne
     Danner
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Duncan
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Eshoo
     Ewing
     Fattah
     Fields (TX)
     Filner
     Foley
     Ford
     Fowler
     Frank (MA)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Furse
     Gallegly
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Goss
     Green
     Greenwood
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Horn
     Houghton
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnston
     Jones
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Klug
     LaFalce
     Latham
     Laughlin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lightfoot
     Lipinski
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     Meehan
     Meek
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Miller (FL)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Moran
     Morella
     Neal
     Obey
     Olver
     Pallone
     Parker
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Petri
     Pickett
     Ramstad
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Riggs
     Rivers
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rose
     Roth
     Roukema
     Rush
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (TX)
     Stearns
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stump
     Tanner
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thornberry
     Thurman
     Torres
     Traficant
     Tucker
     Visclosky
     Ward
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates
     Zeliff

                             NOT VOTING--12

     Calvert
     Conyers
     Cubin
     Fazio
     Hansen
     Kleczka
     McDade
     McNulty
     Meyers
     Peterson (FL)
     Quinn
     Watt (NC)

                              {time}  1649

  Messrs. EWING, MANTON, THORNBERRY, STEARNS, BARRETT of Wisconsin, 
JACOBS, MATSUI, and MEEHAN, and Ms. WOOLSEY changed their vote from 
``aye'' to ``no''.
  Messrs. ALLARD, LAZIO of New York, BONO, JOHNSON of South Dakota, 
UPTON, MARTINI, BACHUS, HOYER, NETHERCUTT, PETERSON of Minnesota, 
BROWDER, HALL of Texas, STENHOLM, MONTGOMERY, CRAMER, CONDIT, BEVILL, 
McHALE, TAUZIN, BISHOP, TOWNS, CHAPMAN, SPRATT, HOLDEN, KILDEE, PASTOR, 
THORNTON, TORKILDSEN, WILLIAMS, POMEROY, WISE, de la GARZA, PORTER, and 
EDWARDS, and Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas changed their vote from 
``no'' to ``aye''.
  So the amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], as amended.
  The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.


              amendment offered by mr. hastings of florida

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Hastings:
       At the end of the bill add the following new title:

                   TITLE XXXVI--ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 3601. ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT FUND 
                   FOR AFRICA.

       Notwithstanding section 3221(a)(2) of this Act, 
     $802,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated for each of the 
     fiscal years 1996 and 1997 to carry out chapter 10 of part I 
     of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2293 et 
     seq.).

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask 
unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed 
in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment today to 
increase by $173 million the Development Fund for Africa account. This 
additional $173 million will restore this account to the current 
funding level.
  The Development Fund for Africa was established by a bipartisan 
majority in 1987. Why? Because development aid is clearly in our long-
term interest. Development assistance ensures that underdeveloped 
economies become stable friends and future trading and business 
partners.
  The Development Fund for Africa has been critical to supporting the 
transition in South Africa, crucial in turning around Africa's economic 
decline, has helped bring about market liberalization efforts in some 
20 countries, and has addressed basic issues such as girls education, 
vaccinations against curable diseases, and halting the spread of 
AIDS. [[Page H5545]] 
  The Development Fund for Africa helps develop the physical 
infrastructure, the human resource base, and the rule of law structures 
which provide a safe and hospitable locale for American businesses to 
operate successfully. The Development Fund for Africa
 was specifically created to target development resources efficiently 
in countries that both need the assistance and have the potential to 
become self-sufficient economies which can later buy our products.

  Cuts in the Development Fund for Africa account would undercut our 
efforts to strengthen export markets and fledgling democracies in 
southern Africa; undermine our ability to prevent Somalia-like crises 
and famine; and diminish support for democracy building to countries in 
political transition, allowing countries like Mozambique and Angola 
(which are on the cusp of recovery) to slip into chaos and crises 
similar to Rwanda.
  Those who would dismiss Africa as being unimportant are taking a 
narrow, shortsighted view of American interests. We are making a long-
term investment in Africa, and we know from our own experience that the 
United States benefits directly from the development which foreign aid 
helps fuel.
  We hear a lot of talk about Africa being a sinkhole for foreign aid 
and that the U.S. has no reason to remain engaged in Africa.
  But I am not sure that many Members are aware that South Africa 
played a key role in the recent indefinite extension of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  U.S. engagement, and U.S. assistance, has played an important part in 
the emergence of South Africa as a democratic partner for the United 
States.
  South Africa's role in the NPT conference shows that our support is 
already bringing dividends.
  Nor are many Members aware that American exports to Africa are 
growing faster than U.S. exports to Europe and that U.S. trade with 
Africa exceeds our trade with the former Soviet Union.
  It is in our national interest to prevent crises like we have 
witnessed in Rwanda and Somalia, which together cost us $2.25 billion 
in emergency assistance funds. Preventive diplomacy will help us avoid 
these crises.
  Aid to Africa is not only in our self-interest, it is consonant with 
our national values. We have a long and proud tradition in this great 
country of helping the needy both home and abroad. Emergency aid is 
invaluable for relieving human suffering, but sustainable development 
assistance is critical to breaking the cycle of dependency and despair 
by addressing the root causes of poverty.
  We have unavoidable responsibilities around the world. Some of the 
problems around the world which currently demand our attention are 
problems of our own making. Our foreign policy goal for the past 40 
years was the dissolution of the communist system. We have been largely 
successful in achieving this goal, but the repercussions of the breakup 
mean that there is both a political and financial vacuum in many 
troubled spots. Now that we have forced so many countries to abandon 
either their type of government or their support system, do we now say, 
``Sorry, you're on your own? We can't help?'' I don't think so.
  Senator Claude Pepper of Florida was the only Member of Congress to 
criticize the isolationist mood in the U.S. Congress when Hitler began 
toppling nations in 1939. Senator Pepper argued that it was the 
responsibility of all mankind to intervene in the face of evil. Senator 
Pepper said, ``when a few men are wronged and the force of brutality 
and the jungle are let loose, when civilization is denied and godliness 
and goodness scorned, that is no private war, that is a war against 
man. Hence, to vindicate those things for which good men stand, good 
men everywhere must stand together against wrong, not only wrong to a 
chosen few, but wrong to any man, woman or child.''
  To ignore our responsibilities to nations less fortunate, to refuse 
to share our bounty, to silence our teachers, to shut out friends who 
cry for our help, these are crimes against humanity. The American 
people are not that cruel, nor should we be. I beg my colleagues, 
support the Hastings amendment.
                              {time}  1700

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, it is with great reluctance that I rise to oppose this 
amendment to increase the funding level for aid to Africa.
  If we had an unlimited amount of money to allocate to foreign aid, I 
would join Mr. Hastings in supporting $802 million for the Development 
Fund for Africa.
  Mr. Hastings has been a good friend, both as a fellow member of the 
Florida delegation, and, as one of the most active members of the 
Subcommittee on Africa.
  Whenever we have a subcommittee meeting--not just at the hearings or 
formal briefings, but in the many informal, private activities we have, 
such as meetings with foreign officials or the local members of the 
African diplomatic corps--I can always count on Mr. Hastings to be 
there and to be a very active participant.
  And, as someone who is new to the assignment on the Africa 
Subcommittee, I have found that Mr. Hastings is a very valuable 
resource as I study the issues of American policy toward Africa.
  But we don't live in an age of unlimited resources.
  We live in a time of fiscal austerity and we have to make the hard 
decisions on how to allocate limited resources among the various 
spending priorities.
  It was in that context of competing priorities that the committee, 
while considering the bill at our mark up sessions, gave a great deal 
of attention to the funding of the Development Fund for Africa.
  While the budget climate required that all programs contribute their 
fair share to the deficit reduction effort, we cut aid to Africa less 
than other development assistance programs.
  Aid for Latin America and the Caribbean, areas of the world also of 
great concern to every member of the Florida delegation, has not been 
protected with funds destined as a separate line item in this bill.
  What will happen is that by raising the aid for Africa without 
specifying the source of the funds, eventually it could hurt the poor 
nations of the Caribbean and Latin America whose development assistance 
programs will be cut or perhaps other areas will be cut.
  This has been the history of the aid program over the last few 
years--as other regions of the world have received increased 
development assistance funding, at least some part of the money to 
provide that assistance has been taken from the aid programs in Latin 
America and the Caribbean or other areas of the globe.
  I think this would be a mistake.
  We are trying to help countries in the Caribbean to improve their 
standard of living, just as we are trying to help Africa, Latin 
America, Europe and on and on.
  Economic development programs in Latin America are an important part 
of our overall efforts to control the illegal immigration and drug 
trafficking that has had an impact on the people of Florida and other 
southern States.
  There was an intensive debate in Committee, and the bill's funding 
level of $629 million for the Development Fund for Africa is one that 
was given great care.
  We had to find other programs in the bill and forced them to accept 
disproportionately large cuts in order to provide this level of aid to 
Africa.
  I should note that the Development Fund for Africa is not the only 
source of funding for aid programs in Africa.
  It is important to keep this in mind.
  President Clinton has the authority to take funds from the PL-480 
program and channel PL-480 resources to Africa.
  He also has the authority to allocate general development assistance 
funds and apply them to projects and programs in Africa.
  In addition to the DFA funding, Africa projects are funded by A.I.D., 
through its Global Programs Bureau and out of regular Development 
Assistance funding.
  About $60 million a year in Peace Corps programs, and a quarter 
billion dollars of PL-480 programs, are also provided to Africa each 
year. [[Page H5546]] 
  One should, in the current climate of cutbacks in all programs, allow 
the administration some flexibility in managing these program cuts.
  Increasing the funding for Africa will actually deprive President 
Clinton, and his Secretary of State, of the flexibility they need to 
manage the program cutbacks in accord with their foreign policy needs 
and priorities.
  I therefore urge Members to vote against this amendment.
  Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I ask most respectfully, is the 
gentlewoman aware that the accounts that she identified are all being 
cut as well?
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, absolutely, we agreed. That is part 
of the basis of my speech. All of the programs are being cut.
  In fact, the Africa program, in relation to the other programs that 
are being cut, is not nearly cut as much. I think that is the point 
that I was making; all of the programs are cut, just as we are cutting 
domestic programs, so we should cut foreign programs.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I yield to the gentlewoman from Texas [Ms. Jackson-Lee].
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support restoring the 
development fund for Africa to its current funding levels which is good 
for people and for business and for all of America.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the 
Development Fund for Africa. The DFA protects some of the most 
vulnerable people on earth. And efforts to slash it by $173 million are 
simply unacceptable.
  As you know, Mr. Chairman, the African continent represents one of 
the last untapped markets in the world. And the continent has seen 
tremendous progress, with new democracies taking root throughout:--
South Africa being the most shining example.
  If the DFA is cut by $173 million, not only will ordinary people 
suffer, but the U.S. image as a world leader will be seriously damaged:
  The aid program to South Africa--a role model of evolutionary change 
with respect for market economics--will be undermined. Should the 
United States cut and run after campaigning against apartheid for so 
long?
  The AIDS epidemic will worsen--an estimated two million additional 
people will become infected with HIV due to cutbacks in U.S.-supported 
programs.
  Programs that help prevent hunger by investing in sustainable farming 
will be decimated.
  And the expansion of United States exports to the African continent, 
which now amount to over $4.4 billion, will be hindered.
  Mr. Chairman, U.S. aid is not a give away; it's an investment that 
brings about exports to the developing world--exports which amount to 
40 percent of all U.S. exports.
  But for there to be a market there needs to be healthy, educated and 
economically productive societies. Slashing the DFA to bits will not 
accomplish that goal. Not at all.
  That is why I am cosponsoring this amendment, along with some of my 
distinguished colleagues on the International Relations Committee, to 
raise the DFA to the fiscal year 1995 level of $802 million.
  Strangely enough, while this bill slashes lifesaving programs like 
the DFA, we are finding room to increase our military sales program.
  Unlike the DFA, this is not a program geared to help people that are 
starving, or are in the midst of democracy building. Maintaining aid to 
Africa is within our responsibility as a world leader and it is the 
least that we can do for people who are deserving of our assistance. I 
strongly urge your support for this amendment.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, as a member of this subcommittee, the Subcommittee on 
Africa, I know how heartfelt this amendment is. I congratulate the 
author of this amendment. I agree that the people of Africa need help. 
I would like to support my friend from Florida in his efforts to help 
deserving people in Africa. Like everyone else, I have a question, 
however. Where is the money going to come from?
  If my colleague could offer a corresponding cut and make his 
amendment budget neutral, then possibly we could all support his 
amendment. But just to come in with a blank amendment is not going to 
get the job done. It is only a wish list.
  If instead the money must come from the taxpayers packets, then I 
must oppose the amendment. I cannot agree to add $173 million to the 
budget deficit. It is clear as a bell that there are many worthwhile 
programs, but that is how we got into this budget mess that cries out 
today for a solution. So let me reiterate; the goals here are laudable, 
but the ladder to the goal is missing.
  If the 167 million can be found in other programs, if we can find the 
money in other projects, then I think this would be an amendment that 
we should go with. But this Congress cannot abide and adhere to every 
Member's wish list.
  On my way into the Capitol this afternoon I was looking again. Is 
there any money growing on the trees? And to everybody's surprise, I 
must say I did not find any money growing on trees. Until that happens, 
i.e., money grows on trees, we must find money from sources in this 
bill. Reallocate or find new funds.
  Again, the goals of this amendment are laudable. I appreciate what 
the gentleman is trying to do. But the question remains, the $173 
million, where will it come from?
  Therefore, without the funding, I must be opposed to this amendment.
  Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, at the markup of the full committee, I made probably 
the improprietous observation that this bill is racist. And I want to 
point out that it is not racist through malice, it is racist through 
ignorance. The fact is that I do not think that many of the Members of 
the full committee have any idea about Africa.
  For the last 2 years, I chaired the Subcommittee on Africa of the 
Committee on International Relations. I toured 26 countries during that 
period of time. Each time I went, I asked Members of the minority 
party, then Republicans, to accompany me. In fact, I begged them to 
come with me to Africa, and in that 2-year period not one ventured to 
travel.
  In the majority report to this bill, they refer to ``Africa did 
this'' and ``Africa did that.'' You would think that Africa was a 
country in itself. I made the flip remark in the committee that someday 
I am going to expect a Republican to come up to me and ask me where the 
capital of Africa is. But would we say the same thing about Asia? Would 
we say Asia did this and Asia did that and, therefore, let us cut off 
relief to this entire continent?
  My colleagues, this is Africa. This is a continent four times larger 
than the United States. It is a continent that has over 56 countries in 
there, and it is a continent which is exploding with democracies.
  Let me go around there. Let us start out with South Africa, the jewel 
of the crown. South Africa now is an emerging democracy. It has $100 
billion in GNP. You can just go around the continent. Botswana. 
Botswana has surplus now in its treasury. Malawi just ended up having 
its elections and is a democracy.
  Zimbabwe. Mozambique is coming out of a depression there. Uganda, Idi 
Amin's country, is now a democracy there and is trading with the United 
States.
  Tanzania. Look at the French francophone countries, Chad, Niger, 
Benin, Carte de Vois, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali, all of these 
countries want to have better relationships with the United States and 
are breaking away from the French codes there and will be great trading 
partners.
  Look at Ghana. Jerry Rawlings now in Ghana is trying to settle the 
dispute in Liberia, a great ally there and a great trading partner.
                              {time}  1715

  Namibia down here, free elections, and a democracy. Seychelles, 
Mauritius, Eritrea, such a new country it is not even on my map here. 
Eritrea is a democracy which we will trade with. Next year, see Angola 
come around. Angola can feed this entire continent. Zambia, Central 
African Republic, the [[Page H5547]] Congo and even Kenya. Look at 
1997, where Liberia, our colony in this continent and our 
responsibility, will probably be a democracy, along with Ethiopia and 
Nigeria.
  My friend, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Roth], at the committee 
meeting said ``Gee, Egypt is in Africa.'' Of course it is in Africa. 
Egypt gets about $1.5 billion. I might point out, though, that Egypt is 
not sub-Saharan Africa. Egypt is not black Africa, which I came up with 
the phrase, this being racist. Egypt is not in the jurisdiction of the 
subcommittee on Africa. Egypt is not under the Assistant Secretary of 
State for Africa. Egypt is now considered the Middle East. Let us talk 
about sub-Saharan Africa.
  We now have the development fund for Africa. The development fund for 
Africa is $600 million for 600 million people. There is where I think 
it is immoral. That is why I feel this bill is immoral.
  If we want to get the funds for this, last night the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Burton], said ``We can cut the State Department by 5 
percent and nobody will be harmed.'' Why not cut the Defense Department 
by 5 percent, that is $12 billion 5 million, and it can underwrite the 
entire foreign affairs bill that we are stripping to pieces here today.
  Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the Hastings amendment. I think 
these funds should be restored, or we are going to lose Africa. We are 
going to lose a great trading partner. We are going to lose 28 emerging 
democracies, which we have pumped money into, and we are seeing results 
for the first time.
                      announcement by the chairman

  The CHAIRMAN. Our visitors in the gallery are admonished not to 
applaud during the debate.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  First of all, Mr. Chairman, I am very sympathetic to the remarks made 
by my colleague, the gentleman from Florida. I do not believe anybody 
in this Chamber is racist, but I do believe there are problems in 
Africa that should be addressed. We are trying our best to do that. We 
are sending $629 million there this year, and $614 million next year. 
This amendment would, over a 2-year period, increase by $360 million 
the amount of money that is going over there.
  I notice we have a lot of young people visiting with us today. Many 
of them applauded. Many of us in this Chamber are very concerned about 
their futures, because we know if we do not get control of Government 
spending in this country, that at one point, some point in the future, 
we are going to have a debt so great that the interest on the debt 
alone is going to gobble up a lot of our tax dollars, and their quality 
of life will start to deteriorate. We have to get control of Federal 
spending, so we have to make hard choices.
  Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? I would like to 
know why he is cutting student loans.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. The school lunch program was increased 4 
percent per year. We are just sending it back in block grants, we are 
not cutting it. We are cutting the rate of growth. However, that is 
another subject.
  The fact of the matter is we have to control spending. That means we 
have to make hard choices. I am very concerned about the people in the 
Sudan. My colleague, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Wolf], has been 
down here on the floor talking about that.
  We have met with some of the people from the Sudan about the horrible 
atrocities that are taking place, and the people starving to death over 
there. We worked very hard to get food aid in there. We did the same 
thing in Somalia. However, we cannot cut the defense budget to take 
care of those problems. The fact of the matter is the defense budget 
has been used in large part for a lot of the new military forays and 
objectives in Somalia and in Haiti, and we have used an awful lot of 
our military money in those areas.
  The budget is so strapped in that area that we have a lot of people 
who are in the military whose quality of life is already suffering. We 
all know that. In fact, some of those people have been on food stamps, 
people in our own military. We have to be careful when we start talking 
about cutting the defense of this Nation.
  Mr. Chairman, let me just get back to the case at hand. We need to 
set priorities. Make no mistake about it, Africa is a priority. Maybe 
it should be a higher priority, but as my colleague, the gentleman from 
Wisconsin, said a while ago, let us find the money someplace else. If 
we can find it someplace else and we can do it, then I do not have any 
problem with doing that in conference committee.
  The fact of the matter is that at this point, $629 million, plus $5 
million for the Africa regional peacekeeping force, $1.1 million for 
the Organization of African Unity, $10 million for Angola, or $5 
million, and some other funds from other areas of government, is about 
all we can afford.
  I would just like to say to my colleagues, we are doing what we can. 
This is a lean, mean foreign affairs budget, foreign aid package, but 
it is one that I think is realistic and one that deals with the 
problem.
  I would like to end up by saying one other thing. I think the last 
speaker that spoke on the Democrat side alluded to the fact that Angola 
in a few short years could take care of the whole continent. There are 
a number of countries in Africa that are mineral-rich. They have large 
resources. They have diamond mines, all kinds of minerals. As a matter 
of fact, during the cold war, 11 minerals that we had to have to 
survive as a Nation only came from two sources, the Soviet Union, and 
the southern part of Africa. Yet, because of the wars and because of 
lack of democracy over there and because of the problems, those 
minerals and those things that would make them self-sufficient have not 
been mined.
  Therefore, rather than just throwing money at the problem, we as a 
Nation need to be working with those governments to bring about the 
democracy that my colleagues have talked about, so they can start 
taking care of themselves, so we can wean them away from the United 
States foreign aid program. We cannot take care of the entire world 
indefinitely. We are the only superpower left, we do have 
responsibilities, but the amount of money we have in this budget is 
realistic. I think this amendment, therefore, should be defeated.
  Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this important amendment 
which would restore funding for the Development Fund for Africa.
  The African continent is in a state of transition. This transition 
holds great promise as well as peril for the people of Africa and the 
community of nations. In South Africa, we have witnessed the peaceful 
transition to a multiracial democracy. In Rwanda, untold innocents have 
been killed in the struggle between rival Hutus and Tutsis.
  Despite the challenges, I believe that Africa's future can be one of 
peace and economic prosperity.
  However, they will need our help.
  The Development Fund for Africa has proven to be a successful 
economic development tool which has enabled many nations to begin the 
transition to free market economies and stable democratic institutions. 
This proven program has made valuable investments which have greatly 
improved health care services, expanded educational opportunities and 
boosted small business development.
  Several years ago, Mozambique was embroiled in a vicious civil war. 
Last year, with the help of American assistance, free and fair 
elections were held and ninety percent of registered voters went to the 
polls.
  In Guinea, American assistance and training programs have helped to 
increase elementary school attendence by 43 percent. In the country of 
Mali, agricultural production has doubled since 1981 with the help of 
American technical assistance.
  These are the building blocks of a stable continent--a community of 
nations which can help advance American interests in the world and can 
become an important trading partner.
  Working in partnership with the people of Africa we have made great 
progress. With a relatively small investment--representing roughly 0.05 
percent of our 1.5 trillion budget, we can continue this work and build 
a bright future.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the people of Africa 
and [[Page H5548]] American interests in this important part of the 
world by supporting this amendment.
  Mrs. CLAYTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by my 
colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Hastings] and others. I 
believe it is short-sighted to think that we can promote democracy, 
encourage world peace and expand trade opportunities in America, while 
pursuing a policy of isolation. That is particularly true when it comes 
to developing nations--nations that may hang in the balance--when it 
comes to their tilt towards democracy. I have been encouraged, in 
recent years, by the growing number of African nations that have 
converted to democracy, and, I believe, foreign aid has been a vital 
element in those conversions.
  I also believe that foreign aid is particularly critical to the 
expansion of trade opportunities. Although, I believe that the policies 
we pursue to encourage the expansion of trade should be evaluated, an 
across-the-board budget cutting is an unwise position. Unfortunately, 
the House-passed budget resolution and the Senate committee budget 
resolution propose the elimination or major reduction of the 
International Trade Administration, the Trade Development Agency, the 
Eximbank and agricultural export promotion programs. The Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation [OPIC] would be privatized. On top of 
that restructuring, the bill we are now considering, H.R. 1561, would 
reduce the amount of foreign aid authorized by $1 billion, and would 
eliminate three agencies--The Agency for International Development, the 
U.S. Information Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 
The functions of those agencies would be moved to the Department of 
State. The Senate version of the bill had proposed moving the functions 
of the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service to the Department of State 
and combining the Eximbank, the Trade Development Agency and OPIC into 
one quasi-independent agency. Those provisions, however, did not 
survive committee consideration last week and are not now included in 
the Senate bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I do not think we should lose sight of the fact that, 
compared to other, major industrialized nations, the United States 
ranks last in terms of the percentage of gross national product [GNP] 
devoted to exports. There seems, therefore, to be little wonder that we 
have a growing balance of trade deficit when Britain, France, Canada, 
Italy, Germany, and Japan, spend more per thousand dollars of gross 
national product than we do. The irony of these proposals is that this 
radical change comes at a time when our export promotion programs and, 
presumably, our foreign aid programs, are helping to produce 
unprecedented gains in peace and commerce. In the area of agriculture, 
for example, we now export about one-third of the products we produce. 
Last year, farm and farm-related exports generated more than $100 
billion in economic activity for America, producing nearly 1 million 
jobs here. With respect to merchandise trade, farm
 production actually generates a trade surplus which, this year, is 
expected to be some $20 billion. In North Carolina, farm and farm-
related jobs constitute at least one-fifth of the employment and, on 
average, 25 to 30 percent of the revenue. It, therefore, greatly 
concerns me when I see proposals to impose deep cuts in foreign 
development for Africa programs which provide opportunity for trade. We 
should not blindly cut programs in our march toward a balanced budget 
by the year 2002. We should pass a budget bill that aims at a balanced 
budget. I support that goal.

  We must be certain that our actions do not further weaken the United 
States as we seek to compete in an increasingly competitive global 
marketplace. This is not 1946, Mr. Chairman. America no longer 
maintains the dominant position we once held in the world marketplace. 
We are being dramatically outspent by other nations whose goal is to 
promote their products and replace us whenever they can. Perhaps, even 
more importantly, Mr. Chairman, I believe we can best achieve security 
in this Nation by interacting economically with other nations. Foreign 
aid and economic interaction with other nations is not a giveaway, it 
is a sound and prudent investment in our own security. The best way to 
avoid war is to promote peace. An effective way of promoting peace is 
to engage in commerce and finance with the World community. The 
Hastings amendment focuses on mineral rich and strategically important 
Africa--a continent where democracy can flourish. By investing in 
Africa now, we can assure that we will continue and expand trade with 
them in the future. And, by investing in Africa now, we establish 
relationships that will be vital if the security of the United States 
is threatened. Support the Hastings amendment.
  Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  (Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the 
Hastings amendment to restore the $802 million level for the 
Development Fund for Africa.
  In order to put this subject in perspective it would be helpful to 
look at the three periods in recent Africa history that have bearing on 
changing the course of events for Africa. First, the independence era 
in the early 1960's when the continent was freed of their colonial 
masters, and leaving them without adequate resources and preparation 
for their new freedom.
  Second, during the cold war, when Africa was used and abused. Used by 
both the Soviet Union and the United States to fight hot wars on 
African soil. The most symbolic were in Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and 
Somalia, and you know there were others.
  Abused, because we ignored humanitarian principles, and turned our 
eyes away from corruption and human rights abuses when it seemed in the 
interest of winning.
  It now would seem fair that preferential rehabilitation assistance is 
needed to right the wrongs of the past, even though they may have been 
justified in winning the cold war.
  We really were not very good teachers in preparing Africa for our 
grand plans of multi-party democracies and free markets economies to be 
operated free of corruption.
  Measures of the quality of life in Africa have spiralled down in the 
last two decades, at the same time going up in other parts of the 
developing world. Many, like Vice President Gore, who read the Kaplan 
article in Atlantic Monthly were appalled at the condition of Africa, 
and determined to assist the continent. Unfortunately, others doubted 
Africa was even salvageable.
  We are now a few years into the third period, which I would call the 
post cold war period. Armed conflict continues to afflict sub-Saharan 
Africa where fighting persists in Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and 
we have our fingers crossed on Angola, despite the cease fire 
agreement. The potential for renewed outbreaks in Rwanda, Burundi, and 
Somalia is high, and other countries like Zaire and Nigeria are at 
risk. Human rights problems have been accelerated due to overpopulation 
and lack of sustainable development. However, all is not gloom and 
doom. There have been historic advances. In South Africa, Namibia, 
Botswana, Ghana, and other countries we could name.
  I would also like to relate the historic Congressional Black Caucus 
efforts to reverse the inequalities of the past lead by former 
Congressmen Diggs, Dymally, and Gray, not to mention the contribution 
of Ron Dellums in sponsoring the Anti-Apartheid Act which mobilized 
Americans against racial discrimination in South Africa. And, remember 
the late Mickey Leland, who gave his very life in pursuit of increasing 
the awareness of all Americans to the plight of our Africa.
  I do not feel aid to Africa should be considered a partisan issue. 
Both the Republicans and Democrats have been most cooperative in 
preserving the Subcommittee on Africa when Congress was requested to 
scale down the number of committees. Africa, which usually comes last, 
was considered important by both parties. Members like former Chairman 
Hamilton, Chairman Gilman, Speaker Gingrich, and Henry Hyde were most 
helpful.
  There are many Republicans on the Senate side like Nancy Kassebaum, 
Chair of the Senate Africa Affairs Committee, James Jeffords, Paul 
[[Page H5549]] Coverdell. All have Africa's interest at heart.
  Just think, Africa has almost 60 countries with a population over 600 
million. If we do not adopt the Hastings Amendment this will leave us 
providing less than $1 per person in the neediest of all continents.
  In closing I would like to quote Tony Lake, the President's national 
security advisor in a recent speech he made on May 3. He said:

       If the United States cuts aid to Russia, the pace of 
     economic reform will be slowed and important American 
     interests will be harmed. If the United States cuts Aid to 
     Africa, while our interests are less effected, people will 
     die.

  I ask you--is an African life not worth the investment of a few more 
pennies per person to come back to the $802 million level for the 
Development Fund for Africa. Support the Hastings amendment and save 
African children.
                              {time}  1730

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have been informed that we have 5 
speakers on the other side remaining and that we have several on this 
side.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this 
amendment be concluded by 6 p.m. with the time to be equally divided on 
both sides.
  The CHAIRMAN. On this amendment and all amendments thereto?
  Mr. GILMAN. On this amendment and all amendments thereto, Mr. 
Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. With 12 minutes on each side and the time to be managed 
by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] and the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Hastings].
  Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, preserving the right to 
object, if I could engage the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], the 
chairman, in dialogue further, I misunderstood the gentleman.
  Did the gentleman say 12 minutes for each side total?
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, the total 
would be concluded by 6 p.m., with the time remaining to be equally 
divided.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, further reserving the right to 
object, I most respectfully will have to object because I do have a 
number of speakers that have been waiting, and I recognize that they, 
too, deserve an opportunity to be heard.
  Mr. GILMAN. How many speakers does the gentleman have?
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Probably there are 6 additional speakers. I 
could ask them to curtail some of their remarks and doubtless they will 
be able to do that.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased to reduce our time to 10 
minutes and give the remainder of the time to the gentleman as long as 
we conclude by 6 p.m.
  Would the gentleman find that acceptable?
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Further reserving the right to object, I 
would still need an additional 15 minutes, Mr. Chairman. If we could 
conclude by 6:15, then that would be acceptable.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, we will accept the 6:15 deadline, with the 
time to be equally divided.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of 
objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Gilman] will be recognized for 20 minutes, and the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Hastings] will be recognized for 20 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Gilman].
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think since they have more speakers on 
the other side, I would reserve my time and allow the other side to 
proceed.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
Hastings].
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Wynn].
  Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the amendment of the 
gentleman from Florida to restore full funding to the Development Fund 
for Africa.
  You have heard a lot of talk about how we cannot afford it. Let me 
set the record straight. For anyone who is under a misconception, 
foreign aid amounts to 1 percent of the United States budget.
  I think we can afford it, because it is consistent with our long-term 
objectives. Someone said, ``Well, money doesn't grow on trees. Where 
are we going to get the money?''
  I suggest that there are a lot of Republican pork projects laying 
around from which we can get the money. I suggest there are a lot of 
tax breaks for the wealthy from which we can get the money. At any 
rate, when you are only talking about a fraction, 1 percent, of the 
budget, it seems to me the money ought to be found.
  I would like to talk today about some of the success stories involved 
in the Development Fund for Africa because I think they illustrate the 
point. Our foreign aid program ought to advance our interests. Our 
interests are reflected in these successes.
  American exports to Ghana expanded by 73 percent between 1992 and 
1993 as a result of U.S. programs that helped revise the investment 
code, remove regulatory bottlenecks and improve infrastructures.
  In Zimbabwe, U.S. programs to strengthen the business climate have 
helped to formulate antitrust laws, lowered interest barriers for U.S. 
exporters, and investors.
  Forty years ago we had a very different situation. Nine out of ten 
African countries were still under colonial rule. That is not true 
today. Today nearly two-thirds of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
have or are in the transition to democratically elected governments.
  In some of the poorest regions of Africa, U.S. support for childhood 
immunization and oral rehydration therapy has resulted in saving 
800,000 children per year. We have had great successes.
  But the important point today is we can have far greater successes if 
we make a very small investment. An investment has two benefits: First, 
it helps us avoid humanitarian crises which we may ultimately be called 
on to address. Second and most importantly, though, it opens new 
markets for U.S. goods. What does that mean? It means jobs for American 
workers.
  I think we have an opportunity to advance our long-term interests, 
provide assistance with infrastructure in Africa, and create new open 
markets receptive to U.S. exports. We have got examples of our export 
situation improving dramatically in Africa. We need to take advantage 
of it. The money is there. It may not grow on trees but it is certainly 
available in this budget. I hope the House will concur and support the 
Hastings amendment.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my 
friend, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Engel].
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend, the gentleman from 
Florida, for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Chairman, last November he was my colleague, along with the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Johnston] and the gentleman from Louisiana 
[Mr. Jefferson] on a trip to West Africa. We visited five countries in 
West Africa, and it was just unbelievable.
  These countries, many of which were leaning toward the Soviet bloc 
during the 1960's, are now looking to the United States for aid and 
help. I said it the other day. I will say it again now. My colleagues, 
did we win the cold war to just throw it all away?
  A little bit of U.S. money goes such a long way, No. 1, in helping 
democracy take root in these countries; No. 2, in making these 
countries effective as a trading partner with the United States; No. 3, 
in ensuring that these countries will continue to have friendly 
relations with the United States; and, No. 4, in ensuring that the 
United States will have influence in these countries.
  The other side talks a lot about free market economies and business 
and whatever. I can think of no better way to spend our money than in 
these emerging African nations which will develop free market economies 
which will be good trading partners with the United States with just a 
little bit of help from us.
  It makes no sense for me, and that is why I have problems with this 
bill. This is essentially an isolationist bill. We are retreating from 
our traditional role in the world. I know some people 
[[Page H5550]] say, well, America cannot be the policeman of the world. 
I do not think we can, either, but we certainly can help with 
technology. We certainly can help democracy take root.
  My colleagues, it is to our benefit, it is to America's benefit. 
Seventy-five percent of all foreign aid moneys are spent right back in 
this country, stimulating our economy, helping us by creating jobs. One 
percent of our budget, that is all foreign aid is, and all we hear is 
cut, cut. It makes no sense whatsoever.
  I am on the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International 
Relations. I want to be on that subcommittee because I want to be part 
of a generation of Americans that does something for this continent, 
that shows a partnership with the countries of Africa. I can think of 
no more important place whereby America can establish democracy in 
these emerging republics.
  Mr. Chairman, I support the gentleman's amendment to restore funding 
for the Development Fund for Africa to current levels. If I had my 
druthers, we would do even more. I hope my colleagues support this 
amendment.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my 
colleague and neighbor in service, the distinguished gentlewoman from 
Florida [Mrs. Meek].
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I have the greatest 
amount of respect and admiration for my colleague, the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Hastings] who has conducted himself so notably in his 
pursuit of fairness for Africa
  Today we keep talking about cuts and reductions in the Development 
Fund for Africa. We all know that there must be cuts. The cuts are too 
deep, Mr. Chairman, for the development funds in Africa, because these 
deep reductions could prove to be penny wise and pound foolish, and we 
will need to respond to humanitarian emergencies, and it will be more 
costly than our investment that we make in development activities.
  For example, Mr. Chairman, we have spent $2 in humanitarian aid for 
every $1 in development aid in the greater Horn of Africa in recent 
years. The record is already there. It has already been spent. We need 
to address some of the root causes and not the symptoms, and I am 
hoping that you are willing to do that for Africa as you have some 
other developing countries.
  It is very, very important that you think of the image of providing 
lesser funds for Africa now when they were not even even in the very 
beginning. We did not have a Development Fund for Africa until the 
1980's, and now that they are at the bottom of the list, it would show 
a greater strength if this Congress were to bring them up to par so 
then they could take a cut that would not ostensibly take away 
everything.
  Foreign aid for Africa has never received full funding. That is 
really not an argument here.
  It is not hard to imagine reductions severely compromising the many 
gains that you have made in helping create strong economies, reduce 
population growth and protect the environment in Africa. Deep cuts 
could also lead to the rapid destabilization of these early 
democracies, possibly resulting in untenable and costly human crises 
and conflicts.
  This is not a situation in which the United States would want to find 
itself. It is very, very important that we protect our interests in 
Africa. Three of them. We want to help them develop the economies which 
will create exports, which we have heard before, and jobs here in the 
United States. We do not want to have any more Somalias or Rwandas 
which had a terrible cost in terms of human suffering and social 
significance.
  The Development Fund for Africa is our main policy instrument in 
developing these interests. I think we should just be fair and be sure 
that the Development Fund for Africa does not keep the deep, deep cuts 
which you have done to them already.

                              {time}  1745

  Remember that to support the Hastings amendment; it is a good 
amendment.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the 
distinguished gentlewoman from Michigan [Miss Collins].
  Miss COLLINS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from 
Florida for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Hastings]. This amendment will restore 
funding for the Development Fund for Africa. Maintaining effective aid 
programs for Africa is in our national interests. The amount of 
development assistance we provide to Africa is so small, even a slight 
reduction in the Development Fund will have a drastic consequence that 
far outweigh any short-term savings.
  Cuts of funding will prevent us from providing African countries with 
the resources needed to promote educational and economic opportunities 
for its people.
  Africa is a potentially significant partner in world trade, thus it 
is in our national interest to assist African nations.
  To the gentleman from Indiana who said that we must start getting 
African nations to wean off of aid from America so they can develop 
their own resources, I would like to say that two countries in this 
entire world get one-half the foreign aid; Israel gets $3 billion, and 
they have been getting that for the past 9 years or 10 years; Egypt 
gets $2 billion. I do not want that money cut, I want Israel and Egypt 
to get that money.
  But we are talking about merely $802 million for 56 countries, a mere 
$802 million for 56 countries. Gentleman, $629 million is simply too 
little.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Hastings amendment. The 
Development Fund for Africa must not be singled out to carry a 
disproportionate share of cutbacks simply to meet my colleagues' 
commitment to reduce the budget.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, how much time is remaining?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Hastings] has 8 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Does my distinguished chairman have any 
additional speakers?
  Mr. GILMAN. We have one more speaker on this side, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Do I have the right to close, Mr. Chairman?
  The CHAIRMAN. The manager of the bill has the right to close. The 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] has the right to close.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. That being the case, Mr. Chairman, I yield 
myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, to close the debate on our side, nowhere is the 
justification for foreign aid clearer and more compelling in terms of 
our national values than Africa. Africa is the final frontier for 
development. The great global challenges of tomorrow can be seen in the 
challenges facing Africa today, and even if I were to turn to the 
tragedy of disease which obviously foments within the confines of the 
rain forests in that great country, there are also many discoveries yet 
to be made in that same rain forest for medicinal purposes for the rest 
of the world.
  If we give up Africa, the continent could well slide into chaos, we 
could find ourselves in a world of two distinct communities where the 
difference between the rich and poor become unbearably extreme, and 
that is not a world which we want for our children.
  A lot of times my colleagues in this body need to have for them 
language couched in business terms. Let me see if I can do that 
briefly. In 1993 the United States exported more to sub-Saharan Africa, 
$4.8 billion precisely, than to Eastern Europe, which was $2.3 billion, 
or to the NIS, which was $4 billion, including Russia, where the United 
States exports a total $3 billion.
  The current 1992 figures for sub-Saharan international markets, 
excluding South Africa, is $28.5 billion. If that market were to grow 
at a nominal rate of 3 percent a year in constant terms, it would 
double every 21 years, reaching a level of $83.2 billion in the year 
2025. That market would exceed the size of Korea's market today.
  I make those points for the reason that foreign aid is often thought 
of by the American people as a giveaway. But there is something else 
that is given away with foreign aid, and that is stability for American 
companies to do business. [[Page H5551]] 
  In my district alone, there is one company that does $20 million a 
year of exports to the continent of Africa. There are numerous 
countries from Africa that provide immense resources ranging from crude 
oil to other minerals for this country. I ask my colleagues to stop 
looking at this continent as a battleground and to start looking at it 
as marketplace as rightly we should.
  I have asked not that there be money taken from any account. I have 
asked merely that we restore to an account an amount for the 
Development Fund of Africa that was already in existence and is meager 
by comparison to the multiplier effect of the good that it does.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as she may consume to the 
gentlewoman from Florida [Ms. Ros-Lehtinen], our ranking chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Africa.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, we have heard a number of Members 
come forward in support of this amendment. Unfortunately, I must remain 
opposed to the Hastings amendment. It is a budget buster. Without 
making corresponding cuts in other accounts, this amendment deviates 
from our plan to balance our Federal budget by the year 2002.
  Many Members have talked about the importance of development in 
Africa. I agree. Chairman Gilman agrees. That is why, in this bill, aid 
to Africa is cut less than any other region.
  Those who say that the majority in this body do not care about Africa 
are wrong. As my good friend Mr. Payne noted, the majority kept the 
Subcommittee on Africa despite a reduction from seven subcommittees to 
five.
  The Development Fund for Africa, the DFA, is maintained in this bill.
  Mr. Chairman, the American Overseas Interests Act is an excellent 
bill. It keeps the United States engaged throughout the world, 
including the continent of Africa. It does so while complying with our 
plan to balance the Federal budget by the year 2002. Chairman Gilman 
deserves great credit for this accomplishment.
  I regret very much that I cannot support this amendment, but I firmly 
believe that this bill maintains our United States commitment to 
Africa.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I must oppose the Hastings amendment.
  This amendment busts the budget, simply adds hundreds of billions of 
dollars back into the bill.
  I support aid to Africa, and we added money for Africa above the 
level in the introduced bill because of our concerns, and the concerns 
of the gentleman. Our committee supported the Houghton amendment and 
added back even more funding for Africa. In the end we added $100 
million back for aid to Africa above the amount introduced in the bill 
initially.
  Therefore, reluctantly, while I support the proposals of the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Hastings], I oppose his amendment.
  We are underbudgeted because we did make those cuts. Under the bill, 
Africa was cut far less than all other development assistance. This 
amendment, offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Hastings], while 
well-intended, would add over a period of 2 years some $360 million in 
foreign assistance in this bill. In addition to all of the aid that the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] mentioned such as peacekeeping, 
economic support, et cetera, we also provide funds for many U.N. 
programs, and we also provide food aid under title II of Public Law 
480.
  Our bill is within the constraints of our budget resolution, and will 
help to cut the deficit. But if we adopt the Hastings amendment, it 
will add substantially to deficit spending, forcing us to borrow even 
more.
  Accordingly, I am urging my colleagues to oppose the Hastings 
amendment.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the unanimous-consent agreement, all time on this 
amendment has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Hastings].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 141, 
noes 278, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 14, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 354]

                               AYES--141

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bishop
     Bonior
     Borski
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant (TX)
     Cardin
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Coyne
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Durbin
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (CT)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gonzalez
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamilton
     Hastings (FL)
     Hayes
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoyer
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     LaFalce
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Maloney
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     McKinney
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moran
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Pelosi
     Pomeroy
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Rivers
     Rose
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Stark
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stupak
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Tucker
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Ward
     Waters
     Waxman
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                               NOES--278

     Allard
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clinger
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooley
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dingell
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hancock
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Lincoln
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lucas
     Luther
     Manzullo
     Martini
     Mascara
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Meehan
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Minge
     Molinari
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Morella
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Obey
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Riggs
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry [[Page H5552]] 
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Traficant
     Upton
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Williams
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                        ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--1

       
     Fields (LA)
       

                             NOT VOTING--14

     Calvert
     Conyers
     Cubin
     Fazio
     Hansen
     Harman
     Kleczka
     Lantos
     McDade
     McNulty
     Meyers
     Peterson (FL)
     Quinn
     Watt (NC)

                              {time}  1819

  Mr. EHLERS changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas changed her vote from ``no'' to 
``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my strong opposition to 
H.R. 1561, the American Overseas Interest Act, and the proposal to 
eliminate the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). This agency 
performs a unique advocacy role in formulating our nation's foreign 
policy. Under this legislation, ACDA's strong and knowledgeable voice 
on arms control and non-proliferation issues will be muted by a new 
State Department ``super-bureaucracy.''
  The State Department performs the necessarily broad mission of 
advancing and protecting the global interests of the United States and 
its citizens. To accomplish its responsibilities, the State Department 
must consider many different issues as it formulates our Nation's 
foreign policy. On the other hand, ACDA's mission if sharply focused on 
strengthening our national security by advocating, formulating, 
negotiating, implementing, and verifying sound arms control, 
nonproliferation, and disarmament policies and agreements. As a result, 
ACDA is staffed with physicists, chemists, engineers, and other 
specialists who spend their entire careers dealing with one issue--arms 
control. To fold ACDA into the State Department would be a serious 
mistake. This nation needs ACDA to maintain a strong, independent voice 
for arms control.
  Even if the State Department could match ACDA's arms control 
expertise, the goals of arms control and non-proliferation are 
sometimes at odds with the broader objectives of the State Department. 
In fact, if this bill had been enacted thirty years ago, we would not 
have a nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]. In the 1960's, it was 
ACDA that pressed for the NPT. The State Department had opposed the 
original negotiations out of deference to friendly countries that 
wanted to explore the nuclear option.
  I have listened to the arguments that, because the cold war is over, 
an independent voice for arms control is no longer needed. One only 
needs to look at the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran or the 
recent gas attacks in Japan to understand the continued importance of 
battling the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of 
mass destruction. Some have also claimed that the reorganization 
proposed in this bill will save the taxpayers money. However, no study 
has identified any savings from eliminating ACDA. In fact, a recent 
Congressional Research Service study has found that merging ACDA into 
the State Department could actually cost $10 million.
  Clearly, this legislation doesn't take into account the importance of 
having a strong and independent arms control and non-proliferation 
viewpoint within the United States government. Instead, it appears to 
me that organizational boxes are simply being moved in an arbitrary 
manner. I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill, ACDA must be 
protected.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to support a provision in the 
American Overseas Interests Act, which modifies section 36(b)(1) of the 
Arms Export and Control Act to require greater congressional oversight 
and scrutiny of arms sales to the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia until such time as the Secretary of State certifies and reports 
to Congress that the unpaid claims of American companies described in 
the June 30, 1993 report by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to 
section 9140(c) of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1993 
(Public Law 102-396; 106 Stat 1939), including the additional claims 
noticed by the Department of Commerce as page 2 of the report, have 
been resolved satisfactorily.
  The $43.4 million claim of Gibbs & Hill, Inc. is one of the claims as 
yet unresolved. Gibbs & Hill was decimated by financial losses incurred 
in the design of the desalination and related facilities for the Yanbu 
Industrial City in Saudi Arabia in the late 1970's and early 1980's as 
a result of the Kingdom's failure to honor its contractual obligations 
and pay for additional work required of the company.
  My involvement in this matter dates back almost 2 years. The company, 
which is a large employer in my district, approached me for assistance 
in having its claim paid through the Special Claims Process established 
for the resolution of claims of American companies which had not 
received fair treatment in their commercial dealing with the Government 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This Special Claims Process was 
established between our Government and the Government of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, following congressional hearings on the unfair commercial 
practices of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia first held in the House 
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East in May 1992. In response to 
my letter to Saudi Ambassador Bandar bin Sultan Abdulaziz of April 29, 
1993, the Ambassador promised to spare ``no efforts in resolving this 
claim in an expeditious and fair manner.'' Since this date, the 
company, the Congress and the past and present administrations have 
received a series of promises and commitments from the Government of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to resolve the claim favorably for Gibbs & 
Hill. The most recent commitment coming on October 6, 1994, one day 
prior to our country once again coming to the defense of the Kingdom 
when threatened by invasion from Iraq, in fulfillment of our commitment 
to our bilateral relationship.
  I should note that I am not alone in my support of the full and 
prompt resolution of the Gibbs & Hill claim. More than 3 dozen Senators 
and Members of Congress, the President, the National Security Council, 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senate Armed Services 
Committee, the Department of Defense, State and Commerce have all 
expressed their desire to see this claim resolved so as to successfully 
conclude the Special Claims Process.
  On January 23, 1995, I expressed my growing frustration with the 
delaying tactics of the Saudi Embassy in fulfilling its commitment to 
the company, the Congress and our Government. I also noted that the 
failure of the Saudi Embassy to resolve this claim, under the mandate 
established by its own Government, was beginning to grow into a 
significant strain on the United States-Saudi relations. Again, this 
was a sentiment shared by numerous of my colleagues in the Congress, 
who wrote and communicated with the Department of State, and the Saudi 
Embassy in January of this year. In these communications, it was made 
clear that the delaying tactics of the Saudi Embassy would no longer be 
tolerated, and unless serious discussions were held between the company 
and the Kingdom leading to the full and prompt resolution of the claim, 
legislative alternatives would be considered to bring this matter to a 
close.
  Despite several attempts to resolve the claim successfully, the 
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has shown no signs of 
cooperation. Therefore, I introduced H.R. 1243, which would focus its 
attention on resolving all the unresolved claims with the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. Under the leadership of Congressman Chris Smith, this 
bill was made part of the American Overseas Interest Act. I hope in the 
long run we will focus on other remedies in our bilateral relationship 
with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to ensure the prevention of unfair 
treatment of any other United States company doing business with the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Fox 
of Pennsylvania) having assumed the chair, Mr. Goodlatte, Chairman of 
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported 
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 
1561) to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies of the United States; 
to authorize appropriations for the Department of State and related 
agencies for fiscal years 1996 and 1997; to responsibly reduce the 
authorizations of appropriations for United States foreign assistance 
programs for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, and for other purposes, had 
come to no resolution thereon.

                          ____________________