[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 79 (Friday, May 12, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E1021]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[[Page E1021]]
                    THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF V-E DAY

                                 ______


                          HON. MARTIN R. HOKE

                                of ohio

                    in the house of representatives

                          Friday, May 12, 1995
  Mr. HOKE. Mr. Speaker, just a few days ago we celebrated the 50th 
anniversary of V-E Day, signifying the defeat of Nazi 
Germany. But as we celebrate the end of the Second World War we must 
remember that we are approaching another milestone, the 50th 
anniversary of the birth of the nuclear age.
  On July 16, 1945, at Alamogordo, NM, a small group of scientists and 
soldiers witnessed the detonation of a primitive implosion ``Fat Man'' 
type bomb. This was the Trinity test, the first nuclear weapons test 
ever conducted.
  In the decades since the Trinity test we have seen the other great 
powers--the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, and France--develop and 
deploy nuclear weapons. During the cold war the Soviet Union, with its 
ability to turn America into a nuclear wasteland, was the singular 
threat to the United States.
  However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war 
has not seen the end of the nuclear threat against the United States. 
Indeed, although the threat of a massive nuclear attack on the United 
States has receded, the possibility of one or more nuclear weapons 
being used against American military forces overseas or even on an 
American city has grown significantly.
  We as a nation have only a limited number of recourses to stem the 
growing worldwide nuclear threat. First, we must act aggressively to 
stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile 
technology. This entails not only seeking the extension of passive 
international agreements such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
but for the negotiation and rigid enforcement of international nuclear 
and missile technology control regimes.
  Further, we must act to isolate and defang those nations that through 
their possession of or attempts to gain nuclear and missile technology 
pose serious threats to international peace.
  We absolutely must develop and deploy a ballistic missile defense 
system that will not only protect American troops overseas but that 
will also protect the American people in their homes and at their 
workplaces from the threat of a nuclear attack with ballistic missiles. 
Indeed, I have personally urged Secretary of Defense William Perry to 
make ballistic missile defense the highest priority within the defense 
budget.
  But most importantly, the United States must maintain its nuclear 
deterrent. To date, no nation has been able to ignore the possibility 
of its destruction by an American retaliation triggered by the use of 
nuclear weapons against the United States or its allies.
  Of course, the size of America's nuclear deterrent can and will 
shrink as the strategic arms reduction treaties are fully complied 
with. But while the START treaties have called for significantly lower 
nuclear arsenals for the United States and Russia, they cannot and do 
not pretend to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle.
  Even with fewer nuclear weapons the United States must 
maintain the integrity of its nuclear deterrent and must 
maintain the ability to modernize and replace its existing 
nuclear weapons systems as they age. Since 1977 the Department of 
Energy has been responsible for safeguarding these capabilities, but 
under the current
 administration it has failed to adequately meet the minimum 
requirements of maintaining the operational readiness of our nuclear 
weapons stockpile.

  Nuclear testing has been instrumental to the United States' nuclear 
deterrent by: first, testing or verifying new scientific principals and 
theoretical calculations; second, proving the engineering, fabrication 
and integration of components; and third, obtaining information on the 
effects of weapons for scientific and military purposes. The Clinton 
administration has unilaterally extended a moratorium on nuclear 
weapons testing and ceased nuclear weapons research and development, 
thus allowing a level of uncertainty to creep into the safety, 
reliability, and performance of our nuclear weapons.
  The administration established the Stockpile Stewardship Program to 
explore means other than nuclear testing--such as by computer 
modeling--to maintain confidence in the safety, reliability, and 
performance of nuclear weapons, and to ensure that the United States' 
capability to produce nuclear weapons will not disappear. While the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program may eventually produce useful results, it 
is a highly risky strategy because much of the program is based upon 
the development of advanced computer and other technologies that may 
not be achieved.
  Furthermore, according to senior officials within the Energy and 
Defense Departments, the research conducted under the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program is underfunded by at least $400 million annually. 
This funding deficiency is seriously eroding the United States' ability 
to maintain the complex scientific and industrial base necessary to 
maintain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent. The lack of new design 
work means that no new systems will be available to replace older 
weapons systems, and that maintaining the irreplaceable base of 
specialized scientists and technicians which make up the weapon design 
team will become difficult, if not impossible.
  Thus, I am introducing legislation today that calls for the 
termination of the Department of Energy's oversight of the United 
States' defense-related nuclear infrastructure and establishes a 
civilian-controlled Department of Defense associated agency--the 
Defense Nuclear Programs Agency [DNPA].
  The DNPA will assume responsibility for all national security 
functions of the Department of Energy, including defense, 
nonproliferation, and defense-related environmental management 
programs. The DNPA will also assume direct oversight of the defense and 
nondefense functions and budgets of the Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, 
and Sandia National Laboratories. In addition, several Defense 
Department functions will be transferred to the DNPA.
  The Administrator of the DNPA, who must be a civilian, will function 
under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, and will also serve as 
the principal advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense on 
defense nuclear programs matters. This structure will ensure continued 
civilian control and management of the nuclear weapons infrastructure, 
and will also ensure that this infrastructure and the armed services 
have a more efficient and responsive relationship.
  This legislation fully conforms with the 104th Congress' desire to 
eliminate the Department of Energy by terminating DOE's management of 
defense nuclear programs and establishing an organization that will 
ensure that the United States' nuclear deterrent remains effective.


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