[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 77 (Wednesday, May 10, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E983]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[[Page E983]]
                       REFORMING U.S. INTELLIGENCE

                                 ______


                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                         Wednesday, May 10, 1995
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to insert my Washington 
Report for Wednesday, May 10, 1995 into the Congressional Record.
                      Reforming U.S. Intelligence

       Many efforts are currently underway to reform and 
     streamline the federal government. Few parts are better 
     candidates for reform than the multi-billion dollar agencies 
     that make up the intelligence community. With aggressive 
     growth but no master plan for several decades, the 
     intelligence community has become a bloated, poorly-managed 
     bureaucracy whose mission has yet to be redefined for the 
     post-Cold War world.
       The Intelligence Community. Intelligence is information on 
     foreign events, intentions, capabilities, and personalities 
     that could affect our security. The Pentagon uses 
     intelligence to design weapons, make deployment decisions, 
     and fight wars. The President and other foreign policy 
     officials use intelligence to prepare for negotiations and 
     predict foreign developments that could threaten U.S. 
     interests.
       Thirteen civilian and military agencies--not just the CIA--
     collect and analyze intelligence. Each of our four military 
     services has its own intelligence unit, and the Pentagon has 
     another. U.S. intelligence agencies employ tens of thousands 
     of people and produce dozens of different daily or weekly 
     reports.
       Need for Reform. The U.S. needs an intelligence community 
     that gives government officials information that is accurate, 
     relevant, timely, and cost efficient. To meet that challenge 
     in a world far different from the one for which it was 
     created, the intelligence community will require a new 
     mission and substantial organizational change.
       From the end of World War II until the early 1990s, U.S. 
     intelligence had one overriding objective: winning the Cold 
     War. By the end of the Cold War, roughly half of all 
     intelligence resources were focused on Soviet bloc military 
     forces. The world has changed dramatically in the past few 
     years, but the mission of U.S. intelligence has been slow to 
     adjust.
       Winning the Cold War was so important an objective that 
     almost any intelligence expenditure could be justified. 
     Intelligence programs and spending grew steadily. The number 
     of CIA employees nearly doubled during the 1980s alone.
       Our massive intelligence bureaucracy is not well-
     coordinated. It is a ship without a captain. Agencies often 
     needlessly cover the same topic, wasting money. Sometimes 
     agencies fail to collaborate effectively. That generates 
     intelligence that is lower in quality and less timely than 
     our national security demands.
       What Should Be Done? With the President's backing, John 
     Deutch, the incoming director of the CIA, has promised 
     dramatic reforms in U.S. intelligence. The intelligence 
     community is also being carefully examined by a bipartisan 
     commission established by law last year. Several key reforms 
     are needed.
       First, we need to redefine the mission of U.S. 
     intelligence--to decide what we want our intelligence 
     agencies to focus on, and in what order of priority. Nearly 
     everyone agrees that intelligence on weapons proliferation, 
     terrorism, and regional wars should be the highest priority 
     after the Cold War. But some officials also want U.S. 
     intelligence agencies to monitor economic, environmental, and 
     other non-military developments. The lack of consensus has 
     permitted the number of intelligence targets to grow in 
     recent years. That complicates coordination and risks 
     spreading resources too thin.
       Second, once we have figured out what our intelligence 
     community needs to focus on, we must decide what combination 
     of agencies and resources it needs to do the job. For 
     example, paramilitary covert action should be assigned to the 
     Department of Defense. To ensure that we get all the 
     intelligence we need at a price we can afford, we should 
     subject the intelligence community to a top-to-bottom 
     management review. We must eliminate redundant programs and 
     improve coordination. In general, the intelligence community 
     should be smaller and more focussed on the central issues of 
     national security.
       Third, since effective management will require stronger 
     leadership, we should create a new post, the Director of 
     National Intelligence, with authority over key appointments 
     and the entire intelligence budget, which the head of the CIA 
     now lacks. The Director should be in charge of the 
     intelligence community. Our current management system is a 
     recipe for inefficiency. No one person is in charge of the 
     thirteen intelligence agencies.
       Fourth, we need to address the politicization of 
     intelligence. Policy officials sometimes misuse intelligence 
     to promote favored policies, and intelligence officials 
     sometimes tell policy makers what they think they want to 
     hear. President Clinton's decision to make the new CIA 
     director a member of his cabinet threatens the necessary 
     separation between intelligence and policy, and should be 
     reconsidered. The CIA director should not be a policy maker, 
     and should scrupulously keep his assessments free of policy 
     considerations.
       Fifth, we need to improve counter-espionage efforts. The 
     case of Aldrich Ames, the convicted CIA agent who spied for 
     Russia without detection for nine years, highlighted stunning 
     weaknesses in our counter-espionage system. Congress has 
     approved legislation that makes it easier to monitor the 
     personal lives and finances of intelligence employees, but 
     additional steps may be necessary.
       Finally, I have come to the view that fundamentally the 
     culture of the CIA needs to be changed. Within the 
     intelligence community today is an attitude that they know 
     better than the policymakers--including the President and 
     Congress--about what to do to protect national security. 
     Decisive steps must be taken to ensure that intelligence 
     officials are fully accountable to policymakers. The 
     intelligence community must rigorously respect the law, move 
     toward greater openness, and work closely and cooperatively 
     with Congress.
       Conclusion: The U.S. must engage the post-Cold War world 
     with a smaller, better, more cost-efficient intelligence 
     community. The challenges that bedevil us today require that 
     our policymakers have the very best information upon which to 
     make the decisions necessary to preserve the national 
     security of the country.
     

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