[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 76 (Tuesday, May 9, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6318-S6322]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
COMMONSENSE PRODUCT LIABIL- ITY AND LEGAL REFORM ACT
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Mr. GORTON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.
Mr. GORTON. What is the pending business and what is the status of
the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending unfinished business is H.R. 956,
and the pending question is amendment No. 709. The Senate is operating
under cloture.
Mr. GORTON. Is that the Gorton-Rockefeller-Dole amendment to the
Coverdell-Dole amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, since we are now under cloture and without
the presence of my colleague, Senator Rockefeller, I should like, very
tentatively, to announce what I hope the course of action will be this
afternoon.
I will, unless there is objection, within a reasonable period of
time, ask unanimous consent for a minor but significant amendment to
the Gorton-Rockefeller-Dole amendment, a proposition that does require
unanimous consent to keep the undertaking that Senator Rockefeller made
with respect to the right of a new trial after a judge imposed additur.
After that, I would propose that we go forward by adopting the
Gorton-Dole-Rockefeller amendment and the underlying amendment and then
having a debate on any further amendments to the bill, some of which
will require unanimous consent in order to bring them up, as I
understand from the Parliamentarian, because of the position in which
we find ourselves.
Senator Rockefeller and I have agreed that amendments from the other
side, during the pendency of cloture, that Members opposed to this bill
want to bring up ought to be allowed to be brought up, and certainly we
will grant unanimous consent for that taking place.
Each of these will require cooperation and essentially unanimous
consent. Senator Rockefeller is not back yet. One of the opponents to
the bill is here. I am going to suggest the absence of a quorum so that
Members can digest this request, so that the leaders can get together
if they wish, and so we can proceed for the rest of the day. I hope
that we will end up being able to finish the entire bill and having our
final vote on final passage before the day is out, as the leader would
like to go on to other bills.
Mr. HEFLIN. If the Senator will withhold the quorum call, regarding
what the Senator has said about asking unanimous consent, I think
Senator Hollings should be on the floor to respond to that. I think he
has some feelings on it. However, I do realize this: It is my
information that unless that happens, then unanimous consent is going
to be necessary for each and every amendment to occur. Now, I have been
talking with various people on our side who are very knowledgeable on
parliamentary proceedings. I think it is something we will want to look
at. If we enter into a quorum call, we ought to investigate and see
exactly what the parliamentary status is and what Senator Hollings'
feelings are on that. He articulated to me earlier rather strong
feelings against it. But he may have reconsidered it since that time.
Mr. GORTON. I think the Senator from Alabama is correct about the
parliamentary situation. Certainly, given Senator Hollings' views on
the subject, I want his full knowledge and participation before we go
ahead. My announcement was just in hopes that we can get interested
people here to make those decisions. Awaiting our ability to do so, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, am I correct that we are now on the
product liability bill?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is now on that matter, H.R. 956,
the product liability bill under cloture.
Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I want to speak about this legislation that is before
the body, and I would like to talk about what I think is at stake in
the vote that we just cast and what would be at stake in some votes
that we will also be casting over the next day or day and a half.
As I see it, we started out with a bill that was unfair, which I
think tipped the scale of justice away from consumer protection and in
favor of corporate wrongdoers. Then as we went along, there was an
overreaching by some of the insurance companies and other big corporate
defendants, and yet more amendments were attached onto this bill making
it truly awful. Then as a result of several cloture votes--when it was
clear that this piece of legislation with all of the additional awful
amendments could not pass--it was stripped down to now being just
profoundly wrong for people in this country, which is not what I would
call much of an improvement.
Mr. President, I am not a lawyer. But as I understand the features of
this bill there is a tremendous amount of unfairness. I quite frankly
cannot figure out why this body went ahead and invoked cloture. First
of all, there is still a cap on punitive damages, as I understand it,
of $250,000 or twice compensatory damages. Compensatory means both the
economic and the noneconomic damages. So that, for example, if you were
not an executive of a large company but a wage earner, if you did not
make as much money, if you were a woman--women generally speaking make
less than men in the work force--or if you were a senior citizen, and
you were hurt by exactly the same behavior and received exactly the
same harm from exactly the same defendant as some CEO, there would be
differences in terms of what the award would be. The punishment would
be greater for hurting the CEO.
This is still an absurd result and still an indefensible one. When I
spoke last week I asked my colleagues to consider the faces of people
who will be hurt by this provision. LeeAnn Gryc from my State of
Minnesota was 4 years old when the pajama she was wearing ignited
leaving her with second- and third-degree burns over 20 percent of her
body. An official with the company that made the pajamas had written a
memo 14 years earlier stating that because the material they used was
so flammable the company was ``sitting on a powder keg''. This latest
proposal, the Gorton-Rockefeller substitute, would cap the punishment
the defendant receives. How would this affect LeeAnn? It is not clear.
All of that would depend upon what kind of compensatory damages the
jury awards. Are we really willing to sit here in Washington, DC, and
change that and preempt Minnesota law and make that kind of
determination?
Mr. President, this proposed improvement has new language which would
allow a judge to award higher punitive damages than the caps would
otherwise provide if the judge thinks it is necessary to serve the twin
purposes of punishment and deterrence. Again, first of all, what we do
is set this cap and it is either $250,000 or twice a combination of
economic and noneconomic damages which is discriminatory, by the way,
toward low income, moderate income, middle income in terms of how that
formula works out. Then we go on.
When you think about the case of LeeAnn Gryc, or the case of a whole
lot of other people who are hurt in this country, who is prepared to
say that the cap ought to be $250,000 or a little above? Who is
prepared to say that a defendant should be punished less because he or
she hurt a wage earner as opposed to a CEO of some of the largest
companies in this country? I do not see the Minnesota standard of
fairness.
The new language then, in what is apparently supposed to be an
improvement, allows the judge to award more punitive damages than the
caps would otherwise provide, if the judge thinks that it is necessary
to serve the twin purposes of punishment and deterrence. But what
happened to the jury? People on juries elect us to office. We have all
[[Page S6319]] the confidence in the world in the people who sit on
juries to elect us to office. But all of a sudden we do not trust them
to sit in judgment of their peers. They sit in judgment of us, do they
not? Are not they usually the finders of fact? I would think that it
would be difficult to find some standard of fairness where we
essentially remove juries from this important process.
Then I was surprised to find in what is apparently supposed to be an
improvement a provision saying that if we are worried about the backlog
of cases and paperwork reduction and all of the rest, we tell judges
that it is OK to go above the caps whenever they think it is necessary,
but we can also count on an additional court proceeding. On the bottom
of page 22 in the Gorton-Rockefeller substitute, it says that if a
defendant does not like the judge's decision to go above the caps,
``the court shall set aside the punitive damages award and order a new
trial on the issue of punitive damages only.''.
So what we get back to is essentially a meaningless provision where
we go to yet another trial if the defendant does not like the decision
the judge has made. My colleague, Senator Levin from Michigan, I
thought came out here with a lucid presentation of this problem.
Joint liability I think is the thorniest issue. Actually in the Labor
Committee, when we were talking about this question, I may or may not
have said thinking out loud that I struggled with this question. But I
do not think the substitute does anything to correct the problem. It
eliminates joint liability for noneconomic damages. Some of my
colleagues have referred to this as the ``deep pocket pays problem.''
But I think they are wrong. This is really a ``victim pays problem.''
I will tell you that it is really a difficult question. Suppose a
company is responsible for only a portion of what it would take to
restore a victim to whole, compensatory damage. Yet with joint
liability that company might have to be responsible for more than its
fair share. That does not make a lot of sense. It does not seem as if
it is fair.
But, Mr. President, now what we have is a provision which essentially
says to the consumer, to the citizen that is hurt, to the citizen that
is injured, maimed, that they will always have to assume some of those
damages, if one of the responsible parties cannot pay. I do not see the
standard of fairness. In my State of Minnesota we came up with what I
think is a reasonable compromise; that is, we set a threshold. I think
it was 15 percent. What we said was that, if you are responsible for
less than 15 percent of the overall damage, then you would not have to
be responsible for more than your fair share.
But, Mr. President, it does not make any difference what Minnesota
has done. We have struggled with the problem. We have come up with a
middle ground. But that all is preempted by this piece of legislation.
Mr. President, it just sounds like a clever political argument. But
it really is not. So many people have talked about decentralization. So
many people have talked about relying more on States and local
governments being the decisionmakers. But in this particular case, we
are preempting some of the good work that has been done in a good many
States in this country, and I would put Minnesota at the very top.
Mr. President, there are huge problems with this piece of
legislation. It is a giveaway to corporate wrongdoers. I think it is a
profound mistake. We did not really have that much debate on the whole
question of the 20-year statute of repose. But, again, let me just
simply say, that regardless of how you look at it, I think again this
is arbitrary and indefensible. What possible justification is there for
it? After all, if a product is defective and does not hurt anybody
until it is over 20 years old, is the harm to the victim any less? Is
the responsibility of the manufacturer any less?
I talked about Patty Fritz from Minnesota. She is pretty well known
in our State, and she is pretty well known in our country for her
courage. In her particular case, her daughter, Katie, was crushed to
death by a defective garage door opener.
If it had been after 20 years, if the company had produced this
product which was defective from the word go but she had only been hurt
after 20 years, does that mean the damage to that family is any less?
Does that mean the responsibility of the company is any less?
Mr. President, we are closing the courthouse door to people who are
hurt by products produced by some of the businesses--thank God, not
many of the businesses--within our country. Some of my colleagues came
out on the floor of the Senate with a bill last week. Then there were
amendments, which, as I said before, made it a truly egregious piece of
legislation. We were successful in opposing a good number of cloture
motions. Now the bill has been stripped away of some of the worst
provisions, but it is still a piece of legislation which is profoundly
anti-consumer, profoundly antiordinary citizen, and I think it tips the
scales of justice way too far in the direction of corporate wrongdoers
and really denies people some of the redress for grievances that they
currently have within our court system.
Finally, I think there is a gigantic problem with this Federal
preemption. If a State like the State of Minnesota has come up with
some reasonable middle-ground proposals to deal with the problems of
excessive litigation, to deal with some of the problems of joint
liability, to try to have some fairness between the businesses and the
consumers and the lawyers, it seems to me States ought to be able to
hold on to some of the legislation they passed and not be preempted by
this national legislation.
So, Mr. President, I hope we will have further debate on this piece
of legislation, and I hope my colleagues will oppose it.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I would like to thank my southern
neighbor, Senator Gorton from Washington, for agreeing to clarify a few
points about S. 565, the Product Liability Fairness Act. I also want to
thank Senator Gorton's staff for their willingness to work out some of
the finer points of this legislation.
Section 102(c) of S. 565 lists a number of laws that are not
superseded or affected by the act. My first question seeks to clarify
the language in section 102(c)(2). Section 102(c)(2) provides:
``Nothing in this title may be construed to * * * (2) supersede or
alter any Federal law;''
The committee report at page 28, footnote 101, gives examples of
Federal statutes that are not superseded by S. 565. The examples in the
committee report include the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990, and the Trans Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act.
My question to my friend is whether the language ``any Federal law''
in section 102(c) also includes Federal common law. I assume that it
does and, therefore, that S. 565 does not supersede any Federal
statutory or common law, such as admiralty law. Would my friend clarify
this point for me, please?
Mr GORTON. The assumption of the Senator from Alaska is correct.
Section 102(c)(2) provides that S. 565 does not supersede ``any Federal
law,'' and that includes both Federal statutory law and Federal common
law. The act, therefore, would not affect any causes of action or any
remedies, including punitive damages, determined under Federal
statutory or common law, including admiralty law.
Mr. STEVENS. I thank the Senator from Washington for that
confirmation. My second question seeks to clarify the so-called
environmental exclusion--section 102(c)(7)--which I support. Could you
elaborate on the statutory exclusion and the statement in the committee
report that provides: ``The exception for environmental cases in this
section makes clear that this act does not apply to actions for damage
to the environment.''?
Mr. GORTON. I would be happy to elaborate on this section for the
Senator from Alaska. Section 102(c)(7) reads:
[[Page S6320]] Nothing in this title may be construed to *
* * (7) supersede or modify any statutory or common law,
including any law providing for an action to abate a
nuisance, that authorizes a state or person to institute an
action for civil damages or civil penalties, cleanup costs,
injunctions, restitution, cost recovery, punitive damages, or
any other form of relief for remediation of the environment *
* * or the threat of such remediation.
As the Senator notes, the committee report explains that the
exception for environmental cases is intended to exclude from S. 565
all causes of action and remedies that are available under Federal or
State statutory or common law for damage to the environment. Therefore,
this act would not place a cap on any punitive damage award or other
remedy under any cause of action related to damage to the environment,
including an action under a product liability theory.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I would like to focus on this point for a
moment, if I may. Section 102(c)(7) excludes from coverage under the
bill any actions for ``remediation of the environment.'' The section
refers to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 for the definition of ``environment,'' which
includes the navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, the
ocean waters of the United States, and any other surface water, ground
water, drinking water supply, land surface or subsurface strata, or
ambient air within the United States. The section does not define
``relief for remediation,'' which is not a legal term of art.
It is not clear whether ``relief for remediation of the environment''
includes all other remedies to make injured parties whole, such as
relief for damage to private property and lost revenues, or whether the
exclusion is limited strictly to damage to the environment. I note that
the committee report states with respect to section 102(c)(7) that the
bill ``does apply to all product liability actions for harm'' which is
defined as ``any physical injury, illness, disease, death, or damage to
property caused by a product.'' I ask the Senator if he could please
explain how this exclusion is intended to be applied in the case of an
oilspill that causes damage to the environment and damage to private
property?
Mr. GORTON. The exclusion in section 102(c)(7) would apply to all
causes of action and remedies for damage to the environment. As the
Senator from Alaska has correctly noted, the bill would apply to
actions under State law for injury to persons or property that are
caused by a product. As mentioned earlier, this bill would not apply to
any Federal statutory or common law cause of action.
To expand on the Senator's question, in the case of an oilspill
caused by the failure of a storage tank in which the plaintiffs seek to
recover for both damage to the environment and loss of property, the
rules in the bill would establish the standard of proof and the limit
of punitive damages with respect to recovery on the basis of damage to
property under any applicable State law.
The bill would not apply to any aspect of the recovery for
environmental damages, including any recovery for cleanup costs,
remedial measures, damages or penalties for loss of wildlife, or
punitive damages that are assessed for damage to the environment,
whether under State or Federal law and even if the cause of action is
based on a product liability theory. As is noted on page 22 of the
committee report in the discussion of the definition of ``harm'' ``it
is the nature of the loss that triggers the application of the act''
with respect to State law, not the cause of action used.
Mr. STEVENS. I thank the Senator for that explanation. My final
question is whether the owner or operator of a product, such as a tank
which contains oil, who is sued following an environmental accident may
sue the manufacturer of the ship or tank under a product liability
cause of action without limitation by this bill if it was product
failure that caused the damage to the environment? My concern is that
the equipment operator will be unable to recover fully from the
manufacturer. Ultimately, the original plaintiff may only be able to
recover to the extent that the operator is able to recover.
Mr. GORTON. I appreciate the Senator's request for absolute clarity.
Further reference to the example of the ruptured oil tank may best
illustrate the answer to your question. Suppose the oil tank ruptures
as a result of a manufacturing defect. It leaks oil, causing damage to
the environment and the neighboring private property, as well as damage
to the tank owner and the tank.
The statutory construction of the environmental exemption is clear.
This bill will not alter any law under which any injured party could
recover for damage to the environment.
To the extent that the owner or manufacturer of the tank is liable
for civil damages or civil penalties, cleanup costs, restitution, cost
recovery, punitive damages or any other form of relief ordered to
restore, correct, or compensate for damage to the environment, the
rules in this bill would not apply. The bill would apply to an action
by the private property owner to recover under State law for damage to
that property based on the failure of the tank or on the basis that the
oil, which is also a product, caused the harm.
Similarly, under section 102(c)(7) this bill would not apply to third
party actions related to environmental damages. For example, the tank
owner could implead or cross-claim against the manufacturer of the tank
for damages awarded against the tank owner for remediation of the
environment under any theory, including product liability. S. 565 would
not apply as a limitation on the causes of action or remedies available
to the tank owner in an action against the manufacturer, but only to
the extent that the tank owner is seeking to recover against the
manufacturer for damages awarded against the tank owner for remediation
of the environment. Applicable Federal or State law, other than this
bill, would continue to govern the action with respect to environmental
damage.
However, this bill would apply with respect to any action under a
product liability theory by the tank owner against the manufacturer for
harm, as defined by this bill, caused by the product. In the case of a
tank owner which has been held liable under a strict liability regime
such as that found in section 1002 of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
any damages assessed against the tank owner, including damages for
injury to real or personal property caused by the product, should be
considered economic damages to the tank owner for purposes of this
bill, and an action to recover those economic damages from the
manufacturer under a product liability theory would be without
limitation under this bill.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I thank my good friend from Washington
for taking the time to clarify the scope of these two provisions. I
want to thank, again, him and his staff for assisting me and Annie
McInervey and Earl Comstock of my staff to clarify these issues which
are of vital importance to my State.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I do believe there is one other
clarification that needs to be made. The questions that have been
propounded by the Senator from Alaska refer to S. 565. Technically
speaking, S. 565 is not before us. We are dealing with a House bill and
a Senate amendment which incorporated all of the provisions of S. 565
in it. And so the questions and answers are applicable equally to that
amendment as they would be if the identical S. 565 were before the
Senate.
Mr. STEVENS. Will this still be called the Product Liability Fairness
Act?
Mr. GORTON. It will be.
Mr. STEVENS. Then our comments should be addressed, for legislative
history, to that act. I thank the Senator from Washington for
clarifying that.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, this has truly been a year of reform. Since
the outset of this Congress, the pervasive theme has been to
fundamentally change a system of government that has gone awry. Thus
far, most of these efforts at reform have been targeted at the
Congress, and rightfully so. As some have said, we must first stop the
bleeding. However, there are many very formidable tasks before us. One
of which we discuss today.
Mr. President, I rise today to dedicate my support to the effort to
reform the product liability system.
Justice in America is fundamentally rooted in the principles of the
equality,
[[Page S6321]] expedience, and accessibility. Our current system of
product liability is in conflict with all of these principles.
Where product liability cases are concerned, we certainly, cannot say
that there is equality in the system. There is a total lack of
uniformity in the current product liability system. Due to the broad
diversity of legal standards from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it is
absolutely impossible to predict what, when and how you will be
compensated for losses resulting from a faulty product. Where
businesses are concerned, this unpredictability leads to
disproportionately high risk calculations and insurance rates as
companies are forced to calculate the worst-case-scenario in assessing
liability risk.
These risk costs have, not only an adverse effect on those directly
involved in any particular case, but on all Americans.
Disproportionately high insurance costs have several negative effects
on American business. In each case, that negative impact effect all of
us.
Confronted with impossible-to-calculate liability costs, American
businesses often choose not to introduce new technologies and
innovations into the marketplace. Thus denying consumers the benefits
of enhanced products and services.
Nowhere is this more evident than the biomedical industry. In my
State of Indiana, there is a large biomedical industry. Among other
things, these companies make artificial limbs. This is an industry that
provides hope and freedom to so many people who may otherwise find
their lives limited by disability. However, due to disproportionate
liability costs, the manufacturers of the raw materials utilized in the
construction of these prosthetic device are increasingly choosing to
forego the market. The sales to the biomedical industry represent such
a small percentage of total profits that liability costs outweigh
benefits.
Furthermore, American businesses are confronted with insurance costs
20 times greater than their European competitors and 15 times greater
than those of Japanese industries. In addition to making American
products more expensive at home, this adversely effects competitiveness
in a global marketplace. That means damage to job creation.
An excellent example of this is a case in Coatesville, IN. A small
community of around 600 people, Coatesville is the home of the Magic
Circle Corp.--a company employing around 30 people from Coatesville and
Filmore, a small town next door.
Magic Circle is a small business that produces riding lawn mowers.
The engine of these mowers is manufactured to automatically shut off
when a person gets up from the mower seat. Unfortunately, in a cemetery
in a nearby State, someone decided to tape down the seat so that the
mower continued to run when that person left it unattended on a
hillside. The mower rolled forward and injured their foot.
That person, the one who taped down the seat and left the mower
unattended on the side of a hill, sued Magic Circle for $7 million.
There was no alteration or misuse defense in the State in which the
incident occurred. The amount of damages requested exceeded the total
of all Magic Circle profits and assets. In the end, they were forced to
pay $10,000 in attorney fees and its insurance company paid out $35,000
to the claimant.
There is an interesting footnote to this case. Officials of a foreign
government later contacted the owners of Magic Circle to see if they
would be interested in relocating in that country. One of the selling
points of their presentation was the country's product liability laws.
There are those who argue that the threat of large punitive damages
is what makes America's products safe. This argument is fundamentally
flawed. What makes American products the best in the world is not a
lottery-style product liability legal system. The American consumer
operating in a free market, who demands quality and excellence, is what
makes American manufactured products the most high-quality products in
the world today. However, the impact of our current product liability
system is beginning to take its toll. If we do not take action now, we
will be in danger of losing our competitive edge.
Even the most adamant defenders of our current system certainly
cannot say that it is expedient. A GAO report shows that product
liability cases take an average of 2\1/2\ years to move from filing to
verdict. One case cited took nearly 10 years to move through the
judicial process.
The cynical result of these delays is that both parties are
ultimately forced to negotiate compromises because they are overwhelmed
with legal costs. These compromises often have little to do with guilt
or innocence and much to do with predatory lawyers and a bizarre
patchwork of legal standards and procedures.
Mr. President, I am an attorney. Many of my distinguished colleagues
are attorneys. I am not here to attack lawyers. However, in the legal
industry, as in any industry, there are those who lack scruples. There
are those who will pursue personal financial interests above ethical
considerations. In civil liability cases, lawyer's fees account for 61
percent of funds expended on product liability claims. These expenses
include both defendant and plaintiff costs. The net effect of this
incredible statistic is that realistic accessibility to the legal
system and legal defense is a mere myth in most situations.
Mr. President, clearly there is a need for fundamental reform to the
product liability legal system. We have debated this issue since I came
to Washington.
Fundamental product liability reform offers the hope of removing one
of America's most destructive obstacles to job growth. When frivolous
suits are traded, when weak cases are brought, when litigation
explodes, our economy is crippled. New technology never comes to
market. Medical costs increase. The doors to factories close. Insurance
costs increase. American products are unable to compete around the
world. Perhaps most sorrily, a legal system that was once the envy of
the world, has been twisted and distorted to a point where the very
principles on which it was originally constructed cannot even be
recognized. We must turn this tide.
A Rand Corp. study found that most of the money awarded in injury
cases is taken by the legal process itself. Less than half actually
gets through to victims. According to a GAO study, 50 percent or more
of payments made by defendants in a product liability trial goes to
lawyers. Victims get less than 50 percent. This same report discovered
that when a case is appealed, defense costs can actually double.
Estimates vary, but one professor at the University of Virginia has
estimated that when all the costs are finally counted, a mere 15
percent of injury litigation awards go to a victim.
Innocent victims must find relief and the help they deserve--and this
bill preserves that obligation. But a runaway legal system must not be
allowed to make victims of us all.
The current state of product liability law does not work for victims,
it does not work for manufacturers, for consumers, for America.
Like so many of the reforms that we have already passed and stand to
take action on, product liability reform is long overdue and at a
critical stage. For the sake of our workers, for our economy, and for
the victims trapped in a legal morass, I urge my colleagues to support
this legislation.
Mr. STEVENS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Santorum). The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, by consent of all parties, I ask for
action on the Gorton-Rockefeller-Dole amendment.
Vote on Amendment No. 709, As Modified
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If
not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment No. 709, as modified.
The amendment (No. 709), as modified, was agreed to.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. KYL. I move to lay that motion on the table.
[[Page S6322]] The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed as in
morning business for the next 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DOLE. I thank the Chair.
(The remarks of Mr. Dole pertaining to the introduction of S. 770 are
located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills and
Joint Resolutions.'')
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in
order for me to offer the amendment I have in my hand which the
Democrats have also seen and it be in order notwithstanding the
provisions of rule XXII. This is the so-called additur fix amendment
requested by the White House.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Hollings, I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, during the course of debate in discussing
the breadth of the products liability bill, I mentioned that a nuclear
power plant or a component part thereof could be included within the
purview of the products liability bill. I also stated that maybe the
bill might not cover a nuclear power plant or a component part thereof.
I, in effect, raise two issues: One being the issue of pain and
suffering, and the other being the statute of repose. In regard to
these issues, I mention the Chernobyl melt-down.
Since that time, my office has been contacted by reliable and
informed individuals who feel that I misspoke on this issue.
First, they say the difference between design and operation of the
United States and Soviet plants make a Chernobyl-style accident
virtually impossible.
Second, they state that the bill would not in any way prohibit
compensation for injured parties in the event of a nuclear accident
regardless of the time of the manufacture of the plant or components.
They particularly point out that Congress has provided a sure and
certain recovery system for any member of the public injured as a
result of a nuclear power plant accident--the Price-Anderson Act--and,
further, that Congress in 1988 increased the amount of funds available
for claims to more than $6.8 billion and pledged to review the
situation in the case of an accident where more funds were needed to
compensate the injured. The nuclear power industry, I am told, has
willingly agreed to be assessed up to $63 million against each licensed
reactor in order to pay damage claims. The nuclear power industry has
met this obligation to provide a clear and reliable source of liability
compensation when it is justified.
While I have not researched this issue completely, I do find that
following the case of Klick v. Metropolitan Edison Co. (1986, CA3 Pa)
784 F2d 490, which limited certain damages to an ``extraordinary
nuclear occurrence,'' Congress did amend the Price-Anderson Act to
include a ``nuclear incident.''
In the exclusion clause of the products liability bill there is a
statement to the effect that the bill does not supersede any Federal
law.
I have great confidence in the knowledge and reliability of the
individuals who have brought this to my attention, and I would like to
put the record straight. I will continue to research this matter; and
if there is anything different from what I have been told, I will make
it known to the Senate.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be
allowed to proceed as in morning business for the next 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The remarks of Mr. Burns pertaining to the introduction of S. 768
are printed in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills
and Joint Resolutions.'')
Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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