[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 67 (Tuesday, April 25, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5678-S5681]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


          JAMES R. SCHLESINGER: PAUL H. NITZE AWARD RECIPIENT

 Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, the Center for Naval Analyses in 
Alexandria, VA, annually presents the Paul H. Nitze Award in 
recognition of important contributions to national and international 
security affairs. This year's recipient of the Nitze Award is the 
Honorable James R. Schlesinger, who received the award on April 6, 
1995.
  Dr. James Schlesinger is of course one of the most experienced and 
able public servants of our time. A distinguished economist, he served 
during the Nixon administration in several prominent capacities in the 
Bureau of the Budget, ascending to Assistant Director in 1970, when the 
Bureau became the Office of Management and Budget. And, as Senators are 
well aware, he went on to become Director of Central Intelligence and 
Secretary of Defense in the Nixon and Ford administrations, and 
Secretary of Energy under President Carter. Dr. Schlesinger has also 
served for many years as senior advisor at Lehman Brothers, and he is 
widely respected for his scholarship arising out of his long 
association with the Center for Strategic and International Studies at 
Georgetown University.
  On receiving the Paul H. Nitze Award, Jim Schlesinger delivered an 
outstanding lecture on ``American Leadership, Isolationism, and 
Unilateralism'' in which he points out the need for close attention to 
the leadership role of the United States in international affairs in 
the post-cold-war era.
  Mr. President, when a scholar and public eminence of James 
Schlesinger's wisdom and stature addresses himself to an issue of such 
significance to world affairs, I believe it is incumbent on all of us 
to take notice. Every Senator will benefit from a careful reading of 
Dr. Schlesinger's speech, and I therefore ask that it be printed in the 
Record.
  The speech follows:

[[Page S5679]]

      Some Reflections on American Leadership, Isolationism, and 
                             Unilateralism

       Ladies and Gentlemen: It is a special pleasure as well as 
     an honor to have been chosen to receive the Paul H. Nitze 
     Award. It is a special pleasure because Paul and I have been 
     collaborating directly for almost a quarter of a century--and 
     indirectly for even longer. I started working for Paul in the 
     early 60's, when I was at the RAND Corporation, and he was 
     head of International Security Affairs at the Pentagon. Years 
     later when I was Secretary of Defense, Paul also worked for 
     me. That clearly was the way it read on the organization 
     chart, though, for those of you who may not be aware of this, 
     such charts do not necessarily convey the whole of reality.
       Of course, it is also a great honor for reasons that must 
     be obvious--Paul's many contributions to this nation, his 
     keenness of intellect (not the most common characteristic 
     among high officials), his abiding role as a senior 
     statesman. But perhaps one of Paul's most remarkable 
     strengths is the cool and detached view that habitually he 
     has taken with regard to national security affairs--rising 
     above the hubbub of controversy. That characteristic has been 
     displayed most prominently in matters such as the Palestine 
     crisis of 1947, the Watergate crisis, and a ``walk in the 
     woods''. Paul has displayed not only staying power, but (to 
     avert to an issue that first brought us together) great 
     throwweight in national security affairs. So it is a distinct 
     honor as well as a personal pleasure to have been selected 
     for this year's Nitze Award.
       As most of us will recall, Paul Nitze was one of the 
     principal authors of NSC-68, which, in the aftermath of World 
     War II, charted that transformed role for the United States 
     in international affairs--of leadership and continuous 
     engagement. In a sense, the intellectual underpinnings of 
     NSC-68 guided American policy for more than 40 years. But we 
     all realize the era of NSC-68 is now over. It ended, rather 
     abruptly, with the demise of the Soviet Union. Of course, it 
     was Soviet misbehavior in the postwar world that formed the 
     national consensus which gave sustenance to the design that 
     underlay NSC-68. It manifested itself in the Greek-Turkish 
     aid program, the Marshall Plan, the NATO Alliance--and, 
     shortly later, the response to aggression in the Korean 
     peninsula and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
       Yet, with the fall of the Soviet Union, this nation has 
     been stripped both of guideposts to our foreign policy and of 
     the national consensus that underpins that policy. Both the 
     uncertainties and the challenges are substantial. This nation 
     is deeply enmeshed in world affairs. For better or worse, it 
     is the leading world power. No longer is it free, as it felt 
     itself to be through much of its history, to stand aloof, to 
     isolate itself from political events abroad. Yet, the clear 
     guidelines that marked those past period of engagement are 
     now lacking.
       For this reason I want to spend some time this evening 
     reflecting on American leadership, on isolationism, and on 
     unilateralism. In his inaugural Nitze Award lecture, Sir 
     Michael Howard looked back in time to review lessons from the 
     Cold War Period. I seek to look forward--to what comes next. 
     Of late, one may have noticed the demands for ``American 
     leadership'' and the charges of ``isolationist'' that have 
     reverberated across the political landscape. That the charge 
     of ``isolationist'' is so widely used as a political epithet 
     reveals that the notion that America can stand aloof has 
     little resonance with the American public. The public fully 
     accepts that its economic ties, its political interests, even 
     its
      residual vulnerability in an era of nuclear weapons, 
     preclude a wholesale American withdrawal from 
     international affairs. Moreover, even if we could stand 
     aside, the voice of conscience insists that it would not 
     be right for America to be indifferent to political 
     travail, particularly when it affects long-time allies of 
     the United States.
       By contrast to these rejected charges of isolationism, the 
     image of American leadership has a grand resonance. Unhappy 
     events overseas, whether or not there is any serious American 
     interest, are regularly blamed on the ``failure of American 
     leadership''. Everybody seems to urge American leadership. 
     Americans like to flatter themselves with the notion that 
     this country is the ``sole surviving superpower''--and expect 
     action to make those unhappy events go away--so long as it 
     does not cost us very much. Our European allies--sometimes 
     rightly, sometimes wrongly--have demanded: Where is American 
     leadership? (Of late that cry has diminished in intensity, as 
     European expectations regarding American leadership have 
     faded.) Our Asian associates have resented our continuous 
     preaching, yet all are concerned that an erosion over time of 
     American power in the Pacific will allow an instability from 
     which until now they have been protected. Preachers, 
     teachers, editorial writers, if not little children in the 
     street, seem to presuppose American leadership--but 
     fundamentally treat it as a panacea--as a ready antidote for 
     most, if not all, of the world's problems.
       Thus, the real issue comes down, not to withdrawal or 
     isolation--those are epithets--but to when, where, and how we 
     choose to intervene. In part the charge of isolation really 
     comes down to a suspicion of unilateral moves by the United 
     States on the international scene. For those who embrace 
     multilateralism and who prefer to work through international 
     bodies, the charge of isolationist comes readily as a riposte 
     to those who do not agree with them. But multilateralism can 
     readily be a cover for inaction. It can also be, and 
     frequently is, a vehicle for ineffective action. Of course, 
     those who
      instinctively prefer to work through international bodies 
     are frequently right that their opponents are short 
     sighted or even blindly chauvinistic. But their actions 
     are scarcely isolationist. Rightly or wrongly, they are 
     regularly intended to achieve international objectives. 
     But such unilateralist impulses may be equally flawed or 
     ineffective.
       The Clinton Administration has chided its foes for being 
     isolationists. It is perhaps merely the most recent assertion 
     of ``assertive multilaterialism''. Their critics, in turn, 
     have responded in kind. The Administration may fervently 
     believe in the collaboration among nations, yet it has shown 
     a distinct proclivity to become embroiled in quarrels with 
     individual nations, sometimes including old allies, over 
     issues which are either only remotely our business or over 
     which our influence is modest. Endangering ties with those 
     that have been reliable allies, along with ineffectual, if 
     irritating, advocacy of policies over which our influence is 
     slight runs the risk of weakening the ties between ourselves 
     and other nations--in effect isolating the United States. In 
     terms of its accolades to international engagement, the 
     Administration is clearly beyond criticism. It is only those 
     specific actions that the Administration takes, which 
     properly comes out and which understandably alarms its 
     critics. Irrespective of the good intentions, such actions 
     may weaken the international position of the United States.
       Thus, the question is not one of isolation or withdrawal. 
     The question is where, when, and on what terms does the 
     United States become engaged. What is our foreign policy to 
     be--now that the conceptually easy task of containment has 
     come to an end. It is perhaps unnecessary to remind this 
     audience that such questions are antecedent to the issue of 
     shaping our military forces. The shaping of those forces 
     depends upon the role that the United States wishes to play 
     in the world--and the circumstances under which those forces 
     may become engaged.
                                   ii

       Thus, we seek a new paradigm for an effective foreign 
     policy. We seek, in effect, a successor to NSC-68. But it is 
     not easy to come by. Some of the difficulty in finding that 
     new paradigm is inherent. It is probably unavoidable that we 
     flounder to some degree at historic turning points. We did so 
     after World War II. It was not until 1947-1948 that we began 
     to find our bearings--and to do that we had the indispensable 
     help of Joseph Stalin. Now the international scene is vastly 
     more complex and yet there is much less direct danger to the 
     United States. Though there are numerous eruptions on the 
     international scene, there is little to concentrate the mind.
       In every such eruption, somewhere someone will call on the 
     United States to do something. ``Concentrating the mind'' is 
     indispensable to some degree. It is better that we recognize 
     that simple fact rather than having reality thrust upon us. 
     No nation can do everything; we would be wise not to aspire 
     to do so.
       I can recall over 40 years ago listening to a debate at 
     Harvard regarding the resolution of one of our seemingly 
     perennial steel strikes--during which John Dunlop, later 
     Secretary of Labor, commented: ``It is important for a 
     democracy not too frequently to demonstrate its own 
     ineffectiveness''. I have never forgotten that injunction. 
     But what is true for domestic policy is even more true for 
     foreign policy. Becoming engaged in numerous disputes, 
     particularly if one lacks public backing, is the high road to 
     ineffectiveness.
       Perhaps it is obvious to say that the problem is especially 
     difficult for the United States, which, as a world power, 
     might find its attention drawn in any one of many
      directions--and for which public backing is a sometime thing 
     and must be carefully fostered.
       In the past and for other great powers, the choice of 
     foreign policy tendered to be far simpler. For most it was 
     geographically determined. There likely would be an historic 
     enemy. For, say, France or Germany, there was little 
     uncertainty as to who one's foe might be and where one must 
     be prepared to fight. To be sure, for Britain, whose imperial 
     interests were more far-flung, the problem was broader: to 
     protect communications with the empire and to prevent any 
     single power from dominating the Continent. Yet for the 
     United States today, our interests are even more diverse, and 
     the challenge of being a world power has grown since the era 
     of European dominance.
       Moreover, the task was far easier in another respect. Given 
     what was seen as clear national interests, the unquestioned 
     rule for the European powers stressed the priority to be 
     assigned to foreign policy. The phrase from Bismarckian 
     German puts it simply: das Primat der Aussenpolitik--the 
     primacy of foreign policy. Yet, the primacy was far easier to 
     establish in a dynastic regime. Even in the case of England, 
     the problem was not insuperable--in light of its clearly 
     defined foreign policy, the preservation of the balance of 
     power, and a continued willingness of the British public to 
     defer to a strong governing class.
       But here in the United States we now show signs of turning 
     das Primat der 
     [[Page S5680]] Aussenpolitik on its head and allowing foreign 
     policy to be determined by domestic politics. In any 
     democracy that is a continuing temptation; it is particularly 
     a problem in the United States where the vicissitudes of 
     public opinion can so easily determine public policy. And, 
     particularly is this so in the absence of an overriding fear 
     (as with the Soviet Union) or an overriding anger as with 
     Japan or Spain in an earlier era (Remember Pearl
      Harbor, Remember the Maine). In sustaining public support, 
     it is frequently helpful if the anger has focused on a 
     weak foe (Mexico, Spain, or Grenada) for then one can 
     count on public exultation in a ``glorious little war''.
       When, however, there is no clear and formidable foe and 
     when only a few Middle Eastern countries seem to generate 
     public anger, it is difficult to sustain a priority in 
     foreign policy (as George Bush belatedly discovered). It is 
     thus seductively easy to accept the primary of domestic 
     politics.
       In addition to the absence of a clear focus and the 
     existence of diverse areas of potential responsibility for 
     the United States, which alone is a world power, there is a 
     further problem. There are too many distractions, most of 
     them transitory in nature. It is difficult to concentrate on 
     those issues that might represent ``permanent interests'', 
     given the worldwide domain of television with a power, if not 
     an agenda, that exceeds that of ``yellow journalism'' in the 
     past. Rather than permanent interests, we experience sudden 
     passionate interest in the Bosnians, the Kurds, the Rwandans, 
     the flight of Haitian or Cuban refugees, then the Kurds again 
     that lasts a few weeks or months at most--until the story 
     pales, the public tires of it, and then moves on. Surely that 
     complicates the task of selecting those interests and issues 
     to which we should adhere. It makes the challenge of 
     sustaining support for long term interests, as opposed to 
     momentary distractions, immensely difficult.
       Need I add that these factors also make immensely difficult 
     the task of force planning. There is uncertainty as to what 
     our foreign policy may be. Consequently, there is an 
     uncertainty as to where we might fight. Choosing two major 
     regional conflicts as ``representative'' is hardly an ideal 
     solution--reminding us of the locale of past conflicts rather 
     than of the likely future conflicts. Moreover, under these 
     circumstances there are
      genuine conflicts regarding specific foreign objectives. 
     With respect to our Asian policies, for example, the DOD's 
     International Security Affairs opines: ``the United States 
     remains dedicated to strengthening alliances and 
     friendships''. Yet, this scarcely describes the motives 
     that guide the actions of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
     who is predisposed to confrontations with the same Asian 
     states--by implicitly, if not explicitly, threatening to 
     weaken those alliances and friendships. In U.S. policy 
     there is a growing mixture of economic rivalry and 
     alliance reassurance. Perhaps this is unavoidable, yet 
     clearly it undercuts any joint planning with those allies 
     on whom we should be able to count.


                                  iii

       I have now devoted some time to explaining why in this 
     postwar world the inherent difficulties for this nation 
     shaping its foreign policy have grown. Now let me turn to 
     analyzing how our own actions have been compounding those 
     difficulties inherent in this altered world--and have seemed 
     to undercut that role of world leader which we ostensibly 
     cherish. But first I must portray the general behavior and 
     the style necessary to sustain the role of world leader. One 
     does not require any special knowledge or erudition to 
     understand these requirements; they should be obvious to any 
     long time observer of politics.
       First, to be accepted as a leader, a nation must be seen 
     not to be acting primarily for its own account. It must 
     understand and take into account the interests of its 
     followers. It must also be seen to be genuinely interested in 
     international affairs--rather than blindly follow the 
     dictates of its own domestic politics. AND it must focus on 
     matters of real consequence.
       Second, it must be reasonably consistent. Changes in policy 
     should be few in number--and taken for what are seen as valid 
     reasons. One must be steadfast. A great power does not 
     lightly enter into commitments, but when it does so it must 
     be with the serious intent of carrying them out. In brief 
     those who wish to retain a position of leadership must avoid 
     capriciousness. Otherwise one's credibility rapidly 
     diminishes, and one's influence fades with almost equal 
     rapidity.
       Of late the United States has failed to observe these 
     obvious rules. While we flatter ourselves as the world's sole 
     remaining superpower, we seem to be amazed that our influence 
     seems to be shrinking. To be sure, some such shrinkage is 
     inherent in the change of circumstances. With the demise of 
     the Soviet threat, other nations, previously dependent upon 
     the United States for protection, are now less dependent and 
     so less inclined to defer to our wishes. But the erosion of 
     our influence proceeds more rapidly than required by the 
     circumstances. If we are to arrest that decline, we must 
     understand the causes.
       If a nation is to lead, it must seem to be genuinely 
     concerned about international affairs--and not driven 
     primarily by domestic pressures. Nonetheless, in recent years 
     our policies being driven by domestic constituencies appear 
     to be the rule rather than the exception. In Northern 
     Ireland, in Haiti, in respect to Cuba or Haitian refugees, in 
     much of the Middle East, our policies seem to be driven by 
     domestic pressures--and we appear largely indifferent 
     regarding the international repercussions. A hungerstrike and 
     pressures from the Black Caucus brought a shift in our 
     policies toward Haiti. A senior official backgrounds to the 
     press that: ``No one will get to the right of us on Iran''. 
     The President's National Security Advisor reveals that the 
     United States will attempt once again to tighten sanctions on 
     Libya by persuading our European partners to cease buying 
     Libyan oil. This
      revelation occurs, not in a regular diplomatic forum, but in 
     a meeting with the families of the victims of Pan Am 108.
       Disappointed as they may have been, Europeans were not 
     really surprised that the United States did not regard Bosnia 
     as primarily our business. (Especially was this so in light 
     of the European Union's having previously told us that Europe 
     would handle Bosnia, and there was no need for our 
     intervention.) They were, however, non-plussed that we would 
     regard the affairs of Northern Ireland as primarily our 
     business. Northern Ireland is, after all, a province of the 
     United Kingdom, part of its sovereign territory. For us to 
     butt in (no other expression seems suitable!) for domestic 
     political reasons appeared both ignorant and bumptious. Such 
     behavior is scarcely consistent with the solidarity of NATO, 
     let alone the ``special relationship''. I cannot overstate 
     the dismay of other Europeans regarding our treatment of the 
     British. The general reaction is: If the Americans will 
     behave this way to their most intimate partner, what can the 
     rest of us expect? The diplomat's word for this episode is: 
     ``disappointment''.
       This Administration is explicitly vulnerable to the 
     conservative charge that it is soft--most notably soft on 
     Saddam Hussein. For this reason it seeks, with ever lessening 
     support and growing desperation to maintain the sanctions on 
     Iraq that were adopted in 1990. Three of the five permanent 
     members of the Security Council have now introduced a 
     resolution to terminate those sanctions. Even Iraq's 
     neighbors regard our policy as no longer productive, though 
     they are reluctant to say so to our highest officials. If the 
     United States is seen primarily for domestic political 
     reasons to be stretching out sanctions believed to be 
     unproductive, if not unjust, how ready will others again be 
     to follow American leadership in imposing sanctions? The 
     answer is clear. A willingness to put domestic pressures in 
     front of international considerations will undermine the very 
     multilateral mechanisms that the Administration believes 
     ideal for abiding international
      stability. Indeed, with respect to Libya, Iran, and Iraq, 
     rather than achieving its declared goal isolating those 
     countries, our diplomacy tends to isolate the United 
     States itself.
       The effect of these altogether too many cases of putting 
     domestic politics first is to obscure those instances in 
     which the Administration has rightly focused our policies on 
     the longer term interests both of this nation and of 
     international stability--most notably our relations with 
     Russia and the spread of nuclear weapons. Other nations doubt 
     that we understand their interests, let alone take them into 
     adequate account. When the United States proclaims that 
     providing (6000 thermal megawatts of) light water reactors to 
     North Korea is the best remedy for curbing North Korea's 
     drive to acquire nuclear weapons, it makes it somewhat 
     difficult, to say the least, to persuade the Russians that 
     providing light water reactors in Iran creates an open road 
     to nuclear spread. To be effective, even with respect to 
     common long-term interests, a leader needs to maintain its 
     credibility.
       The problem goes well beyond the Administration. One can 
     think of many advantages of divided government--invetting 
     domestic proposals. However, I myself can think of virtually 
     no advantages in divided government with respect to 
     international affairs. It weakens the voice of any 
     Administration--and it undermines the credibility of American 
     diplomacy. This Congress now seems inclined to inflict on the 
     Clinton Administration's policies regarding Bosnia and 
     regarding Russian aid the same kind of cavalier treatment 
     with which its Democratic predecessor treated President 
     Bush's policies toward China after Tiananmen Square. Whatever 
     the merits or defects of our policy on the so-called Mexican 
     bail out or toward Iran, Congressional intervention does not 
     seem likely to improve them.
       Our policies have been changeable rather than consistent. 
     Our commitments do not appear to be reliable. Our policies 
     appear excessively driven by domestic constituencies.
      The result is that the call for American leadership is 
     diminishing in strength. Increasingly American leadership 
     appears to be a problem rather than a solution.
       We are tempting fate. Some years ago Paul Nitze suggested 
     that ``other nations can be expected to coalesce to cut us 
     down to size''. Unless we are prepared to deflect our own 
     domestic pressures, to take international considerations 
     primarily into account, to understand the differing interests 
     of other nations, and to pursue worthy long-term, common 
     interests, we shall regrettably accelerate that process. 
     Writing in 1950 in his splendid work, ``American Diplomacy,'' 
     George Kennan observed: ``history does not forgive us our 
     national mistakes because they are explicable in terms of our 
     domestic politics''. He also states: ``A nation which excuses 
     its own failures by the same sacred untouchableness of 
     [[Page S5681]] its own habits can excuse itself into complete 
     disaster''.
       With the end of the totalitarian threat, with the 
     remarkably changed international circumstances, the danger to 
     the United States has visibly receded, and there is little 
     likelihood of a ``complete disaster''. Nonetheless, despite 
     the lessened danger, the possibility remains of cumulative 
     small setbacks and the erosion of our position. We may ignore 
     such possibilities--and it is unlikely to be fatal. Still the 
     rules are quite simple. To be a leader, a nation must sustain 
     its credibility.
       Ladies and Gentlemen, you have been more than patient. I 
     must draw to a close--and must also offer a few conclusions.
       During the Cold War the stakes were immense: the 
     preservation of the Western democracies and, if I may say so, 
     the substantial preservation of Western Civilization itself 
     of which the United States was the security mainstay. (I say 
     this despite the probable assault of the multiculturalists.) 
     But with the end of the cohesion and menace of the Soviet
      empire, the stakes have now shrunken. The United States, the 
     world's most powerful nation, is in a sense free to be 
     capricious, to be irresponsible. Yet, it will not soon 
     fall into direct and serious danger. Nonetheless, there 
     are restraints--and there are prospective consequences of 
     our actions. The price of capriciousness will inevitably 
     be a loss of credibility--and of our position of 
     leadership.
       While the United States is a powerful country, it is not 
     all-powerful. At the close of the Nineteenth Century, 
     Secretary of State Richard Olney could declaim during the 
     Venezuelan dispute with Great Britain that the United States' 
     ``word was fiat on this continent''. Whatever we may wish, it 
     is not fiat around the world. To pretend otherwise will make 
     us look foolish. The focus of our foreign policy concern, as 
     Paul Nitze has said, should be ``what kind of relations among 
     the leading powers''. We must be cautious about involving 
     ourselves in matters of lesser consequences. We should be 
     restrained in word as well as deed. The United States is not 
     obliged to comment on everything. Meddling in issues in which 
     our interests are only tangentially involved, nagging others 
     about their defects, real or imaginary, may make us feel good 
     for the moment. It is not the road to successful or long-term 
     leadership.
       To provide long-term leadership, other nations must 
     understand that we do not speak casually or loosely. When we 
     do choose to make a commitment, other nations need to know 
     that we can and probably will live up to it. Always remember: 
     leadership is not an inheritance; it must be earned anew, 
     each decade, each year.
     

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