[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 66 (Monday, April 24, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Page S5592]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


  DIMINISHING PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE BALKANS--A FOREIGN RELATIONS 
                         COMMITTEE STAFF REPORT

  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, during the recess, two members of my Foreign 
Relations Committee staff traveled to Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia to 
examine the wide range of issues related to the conflicts in the 
region, and their implications for United States policy.
  The situation in Bosnia is unraveling quickly, and with the Senate 
likely to consider legislation concerning Bosnia in the coming weeks, I 
think it is important for my colleagues to be aware of the staff's 
findings.
  Among other things, the staff found that as the situation in Bosnia 
deteriorates, the United Nations may be forced to withdraw from Bosnia 
and Croatia for any number of reasons, including: a worsening security 
situation, a shortage of world food stocks, a loss of local employees 
to the draft, or a lifting of the arms embargo.
  The United States has pledged to participate in a NATO effort to 
withdraw U.N. troops. According to the staff report, a NATO operation 
in Bosnia would be costly, would require a long lead time, and would 
likely occur under hostile circumstances. The report finds that NATO is 
not prepared to extract U.N. troops immediately should that become 
necessary.
  The report also raises some serious questions about the federation 
agreement between Bosnia's Croats and Moslems as well as about 
Croatia's intentions. It questions the prospects for peace negotiations 
regarding the Serb-held Krajina region of Croatia.
  Finally, the report finds that Serbia is continuing to fuel both the 
Krajina and Bosnian Serb war machines. Despite this fact, last Friday, 
the United Nations voted to extend sanctions relief for 75 days. The 
report recommends that the United Nations resist further sanctions 
relief until Serbia ends all assistance to the Bosnian and Krajina 
Serbs.
  Mr. President, as I mentioned, we may be asked next month to vote to 
life the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government. I believe that 
the staff report may be a useful resource as we move into the debate. 
Accordingly, I ask unanimous consent that the key findings of the 
report be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                               Committee on Foreign Relations,

                                   Washington, DC, April 24, 1995.
     Hon. Jesse Helms,
     Hon. Claiborne Pell,
     Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Helms and Senator Pell: On behalf of the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations, we travelled to Croatia, 
     Bosnia, and Serbia from April 7 through 15 to examine the 
     wide range of issues related to the conflicts in the region, 
     and their implications for U.S. policy.
       In Croatia, we visited Zagreb, Osijek, and in Sector East, 
     Vukovar, the border crossings at Batina Bridge, Lipovac, and 
     other areas. We visited Mostar, the largest city in the part 
     of Bosnia controlled by the Muslim-Croat federation. We were 
     unable to visit Sarajevo as planned due to the closing of the 
     Sarajevo airport as our plane was enroute to the city. The 
     airport remained closed throughout our visit to the region. 
     In Serbia, we visited Belgrade and the Sremska Raca border 
     with Bosnia.
       We met with Croatian and Serbian government officials, 
     opposition leaders, religious leaders, foreign and local 
     journalists, academics, local citizens, military and civilian 
     representatives of the United Nations Protection Force 
     (UNPROFOR), the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees 
     (UNHCR), NATO, and of international and local non-
     governmental organizations. We also met representatives of 
     U.S. and foreign embassies, the European Community Monitoring 
     Mission (ECMM), Sanctions Assistance Monitors (SAMs), and 
     monitors of the International Conference on former Yugoslavia 
     (ICFY).
       We are grateful to Ambassador Peter W. Galbraith and his 
     staff in Zagreb as well as to Rudolph Perina, the U.S. Chief 
     of Mission and his staff in Belgrade. Their cooperation was 
     instrumental to this report. We would particularly like to 
     thank Foreign Service officers Rick Holtzapple, Andrew 
     Hamilton, and Madeline Seidenstricker as well as Tim Knight, 
     of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), for their 
     able assistance.
       The conclusions in this report are our own, and do not 
     necessarily reflect the views of the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations or its Members.
           Sincerely,
     Edwin K. Hall,
                                           Minority Staff Director
                                                and Chief Counsel.
     Michelle Maynard,
                                       Minority Professional Staff
                                      Member for European Affairs.
                        Summary of Key Findings

       The situation in Bosnia is unraveling. The Bosnian Serbs 
     are responding to recent limited Bosnian Government military 
     gains with brutal attacks against civilians and U.N. 
     peacekeepers.
       The United Nations may be forced to withdraw from Bosnia 
     and Croatia for any number of reasons, including: a 
     deteriorating security situation, a shortage of world food 
     stocks, a loss of local employees to the draft, or a lifting 
     of the arms embargo.
       The United States has pledged to participate in a NATO 
     effort to withdraw U.N. troops. A NATO operation in Bosnia 
     would be costly, would require a long lead time, and would 
     likely occur under hostile circumstances. NATO is not 
     prepared to extract U.N. troops immediately should that 
     become necessary.
       Croatia is supporting a federation between Bosnian Croats 
     and Muslims as a means to retake Serb-controlled territory by 
     force and to annex Hercegovina.
       Croatia's military strategy, if continued, will make 
     impossible the successful conclusion of peace negotiations 
     and lead to full scale war in the Serb-held Krajina region of 
     Croatia.
       The agreement bringing an end to fighting between Bosnian 
     Muslims and Croats was a tremendous achievement for U.S. 
     diplomacy. That being said, however, Croats and Muslims have 
     made no progress in implementing a political and economic 
     alliance. Despite significant U.S. and European financial and 
     political support for the Bosnian federation, prospects for 
     such an alliance appear dim.
       Serbia is continuing to fuel both the Krajina and Bosnian 
     Serb war machines. The land border between Serbia and Bosnia 
     may be ``effectively closed'' as called for by U.N. Security 
     Council Resolutions 943 (1994) and 970 (1995) but oil, 
     military equipment, and other sensitive material pass daily 
     from Serbia through Croatia's Sector East and into other 
     parts of Serb-held Croatia and Bosnia. The United Nations 
     recently voted to extend sanctions relief for 75 days. It 
     should resist further sanctions relief until Serbia ends all 
     assistance to the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs.
       International sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro are 
     not working. Belgrade is awash in consumer goods; gasoline 
     costs less than it does in Germany; and Serbia's basic 
     infrastructure continues to function.
       Sanctions against Serbia appear to have strengthened rather 
     than weakened President Slobodan Milosevic, who effectively 
     uses the state-controlled media to blame Serbia's economic 
     conditions on the West. Even if sanctions are not having 
     their desired impact, Serbia should not be rewarded with a 
     lifting of sanctions unless it recognizes the borders of all 
     the states of the former Yugoslavia and ends its support for 
     the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs.

  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of 
a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum has been noted. The 
clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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