[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 65 (Friday, April 7, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E838-E840]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                            REPORT ON HAITI

                                 ______


                          HON. BILL RICHARDSON

                             of new mexico

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, April 6, 1995
  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Speaker, I commend to my colleagues a report 
drafted by Congressman Jack Reed. The report: ``The Situation in 
Haiti--March 1995'' is an excellent overview of what the United States 
has managed to accomplish since United States troops were introduced in 
Haiti in order to help restore democracy. The report also looks at 
Haiti's immediate future and provides insight into what can be expected 
in Haiti after the departure of many of the United States military 
personnel currently on duty there. Perhaps most important, the Reed 
report serves as an excellent primer on the security situation in 
Haiti, future United Nations involvement in Haiti, attempts to create a 
new Haitian police force, the re-creation of a justice system, the 
prospects for fair and open elections, and the outlook for economic 
development in Haiti.
  Congressman Reed wrote his remarks after a recent second visit in 
Haiti. Last year, Jack Reed and I travelled to Haiti together. At that 
time, I found his perspective there to be very helpful. As a former 
company commander in the 82d Airborne Division, Army Ranger, and West 
Point graduate, Jack Reed has the ability to look at a foreign policy 
problem from a soldier's point of view. Jack Reed also is not afraid to 
do some heavy lifting when it comes to forming his own opinions. In the 
last few years, in addition to his trips to Haiti, Congressman Reed 
traveled to Somalia twice and to Bosnia. After each trip, 
Representative Reed sits down and drafts a report on what he learned 
from his travels. I ask that a summary of his most recent report, ``The 
Situation in Haiti--March 1995'' be printed in the Congressional 
Record. Members interested in reviewing the complete text of 
Congressman Reed's report should contact the Congressman's Capitol Hill 
office.
                   The Situation in Haiti--March 1995

                       (By Congressman Jack Reed)


                              introduction

       On March 10 and 11, I travelled to Haiti with a 
     Congressional delegation led by Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman 
     of the House Committee on International Relations. The 
     particular focus of my efforts was to assess the security 
     posture of Haiti in light of the scheduled transition from 
     the American-led Multi-National Force (MNF) to the American-
     led United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). Based on this 
     assessment, a further evaluation of the prospects for 
     developing a stable, democratic government in Haiti may be 
     made.


                        american military forces

       As an initial point, the superb performance of American 
     military personnel must be recognized. The skill, discipline 
     and professionalism of the American forces are in keeping 
     with the highest standards of our Armed Forces.
       Outstanding leadership has been demonstrated by the 
     principal commanders, including, but not limited to, MG 
     George Fisher, Commanding General of the 25th LID, BG Paul 
     Hill, The Assistant Division Commander of the 25th LID, and 
     COL Charles Swannack, Commander of the 2d Brigade of the 25th 
     LID.
       The success of United States military forces is also 
     attributable to the effective working relationship with the 
     American embassy. Ambassador Swing is a consummate 
     professional who continues to provide great leadership in a 
     demanding situation.


                           security situation

       The assessment of the principal commanders and soldiers in 
     the field is that there is no organized, military threat to 
     the MNF or UNMIH. Sporadic violence exists, but it does not 
     appear to be based on political motivation, rather it stems 
     from criminal activity or domestic violence.
       MG Fisher is confident that he has effectively accounted 
     for all members of FAH'D (the former Haitian army/police). 
     These individuals are part of the Interim Police (after 
     proper vetting), employed by other ministries of the Haitian 
     Government, or involved in public works programs.
       In addition, there does not appear to be large scale stocks 
     of military weapons which potentially could arm a dissident 
     force. Shotguns and handguns are prevalent in private hands, 
     but are increasingly rare on the streets.
       Evidence of the improved security situations was obvious in 
     my nighttime patrol of Port au Prince with COL Swannack. We 
     observed several roadblocks being conducted by elements of 
     the 2d Calvary. In the course of the evening, these control 
     points stopped several hundred vehicles and no weapons were 
     found.
       The present, tranquil situation should not be allowed to 
     mask continuing and fundamental tensions within Haitian 
     society which could, in the absence of international forces 
     or a capable local police, explode into destabilizing 
     violence. Nevertheless, at this juncture, there does not seem 
     to be any potential military threat to the transition to 
     UNMIH. Although there is speculation that opponents of 
     democracy may try to test UNMIH after the departure of MNF, 
     the large and continuing presence of American personnel and 
     the continued leadership of MG Kinzer significantly 
     diminishes this potential.
       From a security standpoint, the next critical crossroad is 
     the scheduled departure of UNMIH in February of 1966. The 
     ability of UNMIH to successfully depart and, conversely, the 
     ability of the Government of Haiti to function without a 
     large, international military present is dependent upon the 
     accomplishment of several critical tasks. The major 
     challenges that must be met are: (1) the creation of a 
     professional and non-political police force, (2) the 
     successful conclusion of scheduled elections, (3) the reform 
     of the judicial and prison systems and (4) the initiation of 
     sustainable economic development.


                             police forces

       Having visited Somalia twice during the recent deployment 
     of United
      States personnel, I am particularly sensitive to the need to 
     create a credible, stable and democratically oriented 
     police force. In Somalia, the 
     [[Page E839]] failure to even begin this effort was one of 
     the major contributing factors to the overall failure of the 
     mission there.
       Efforts to date indicate that MNF and UNMIH are trying to 
     avoid this mistake. The MNF quickly stood-up an Interim 
     Police (``IPSF''). These police were culled from vetted 
     members of the FAH'D and from Haitians in Guantanamo. They 
     received six days of training. Their role is carefully 
     circumscribed so that they do not operate independently of 
     MNF forces and the International Police Monitors (``IPM'').
       The IPSF will be a bridge to a new permanent police force 
     which is currently in training. Unlike the IPSF, the 
     permanent police force has been recruited to avoid former 
     members of FAH'D.
       The MNF has established rigorous selection criteria and a 
     demanding training program for the permanent police. Contrary 
     to tradition, candidates for the permanent police were 
     selected by both physical and academic examinations. The MNF 
     specifically rejected the ``recommendations'' of local 
     political leaders. The initial pass rate was 9% for the first 
     exam (661/7,736). The pass rate is 19% for the current exam 
     (164/868).
       Although an impressive start has been made to constitute an 
     effective police force, key questions remain. Primary among 
     these questions is the command structure. Aristide has 
     indicated that he would like the police to be controlled by 
     local mayors, but with a national ``Director General'' who 
     would be charged with overall supervision of the police. 
     Since the police will emerge as the only effective armed 
     force in the country, the control of the police will be a 
     critical decision. A police solely under the control of a 
     national leader could quickly come to dominate the political 
     scene. On the other hand, local control could lead to 
     multiple power bases throughout the country with the 
     potential for conflict. Careful thought should be given to 
     the command relationships of the police.
       In a related point, Aristide has indicated that he does not 
     favor the recreation of an army. If no army is created, then 
     the permanent police will likely have to be expanded to take 
     on the tasks of border patrol, customs collections and other 
     functions that are carried out by uniformed forces.
       The decision has been made to provide strong economic 
     incentives to attract the best candidates and to ensure as 
     much as possible that the police avoid corruption. As such, 
     police are scheduled to receive compensation on the order of 
     $365 a month which is roughly the annual per capita income of 
     Haiti. This raises the possibility of creating an economic 
     elite. Nevertheless, the alternative of an inadequately paid 
     police raises the possibility of a quick reversion to the 
     corruption of the police which existed under previous 
     regimes.


                         the system of justice

       Closely related to the need for an effective police force 
     is the necessity for effective judicial and penitential 
     systems.
       The judicial system is plagued by corruption, incompetence 
     and archaic procedures. The result is a system where a 
     prisoner can languish in jail for five years before he even 
     sees a judge for a preliminary hearing.
       The penal system is equally in disarray. I visited the jail 
     adjacent to the police station in Petionville. Under the 
     direction
      of United States military police, the jail had been cleaned 
     and reorganized. On their arrival, it was filthy with 
     inadequate sanitation. There was no real accountability of 
     prisoners nor even rudimentary programs to maintain the 
     health of the prisoners. The entire penal and judicial 
     system has to be overhauled.
       Since a fundamental reform of the Haitian judicial system 
     may require a change of the Constitution, I asked President 
     Aristide if he would support such efforts. He indicated 
     strong support for such changes and spoke passionately in 
     decrying the current shortcomings of the judicial system.


                        the conduct of elections

       The credibility of the Haitian government and the 
     international community will be decisively tested by the 
     outcome of scheduled elections. At this time, parliamentary 
     elections are scheduled for June 4, with a run-off scheduled 
     for June 25. The national election to select the next 
     President to succeed President Aristide is scheduled for 
     December with the new President to assume office in February 
     of 1996. (UNMIH will depart in February, 1996 coincident with 
     the installation of the new President.)
       The elections provide a daunting political as well as 
     logistical challenge. Over 9,000 polling booths and 30,000 to 
     40,000 election officials must be organized. All of this in a 
     country where communication and transportation are severely 
     limited and the potential for violence is persistent.
       To deal with these challenges, MG Kinzer will redeploy 
     UNMIH forces to specifically prepare for the elections.
       Another good sign for the election is the presence among 
     the UN staff of Mr. Dong [phonetic] who has direct UN 
     responsibilities for the election. Dong is a veteran of the 
     Haitian elections in 1987 and 1990. Coincidentally, the 
     Nepalese contingent commander just finished providing 
     security for elections in Nepal. He brings immediate 
     experience and expertise to the UN effort.
       Successful conclusion of the parliamentary elections will 
     be a significant first step in developing a stable political 
     system. In addition, it will provide the institutional 
     framework of a functioning parliament necessary to continue 
     reforms in Haiti, particularly with regard to the judicial 
     and penal systems. Finally, it will set the stage for the 
     Presidential election in December. If the parliamentary 
     elections fail, then the Presidential elections are likely to 
     collapse also. This development could mortally wound efforts 
     to restore democracy to Haiti, embarrass international 
     efforts, and create a power vacuum which could see the 
     continuation of President Aristide beyond his Constitutional 
     term or the reemergence of anti-democratic forces.


                          economic development

       If UNMIH can stand-up a police force, help reform the 
     judicial and penal systems, and broker successful elections, 
     then Haiti can focus on the persistent and excruciatingly 
     difficult task of sustained economic development.
       Initial plans call for an international aid package of $1.2 
     Billion with the United States responsible for $200 Million.
       This package recognizes that the United States should not 
     bear the lion's share of the cost. Despite the outline of 
     this aid package, actual donations have not been readily 
     forthcoming.
       The most visible aid program in Haiti at the moment is a 
     jobs program run by USAID. This program puts Haitians to work 
     on public works projects. The program is short-term and there 
     is an ongoing debate on whether the program has reached the 
     employment goals originally outlined to the Aristide 
     government. Recently, a longer-term effort was announced by 
     the signing of an agreement to create a credit facility with 
     the Bank of Boston guaranteed by OPIC. This $68 Million 
     facility will provide credit for businesses to locate in 
     Haiti. Outside of these notable efforts, the development 
     effort continues to lag.
       Without adequate international aid and a coherent plan, 
     economic development will not occur and the ultimate goal of 
     a stable, market-oriented democracy will be frustrated. 
     However, the task of economic development cannot be 
     accomplished without effective action by the Haitians 
     themselves. At present, the Aristide government is 
     concentrating on four major issues: macroeconomic 
     stabilization, trade liberalization, privatization of state-
     owned enterprises, and decentralization of government 
     operations.
       As part of the macroeconomic stabilization, the government 
     is attempting to reform its tax policy. Present reform 
     efforts are limited to increasing the rate of collection. 
     Last year, collections represented 3.3% of GDP. The Haitian 
     government has committed to the IMF that it will raise 
     collections to 6.5% of GDP. Nevertheless, these figures are 
     well short of 12% of GDP which is accepted as an 
     international benchmark.


                           the united nations

       As the MNF departs and UNMIH assumes responsibility, it is 
     appropriate to raise some cautionary points.
       First, the presence of USAID and numerous NGO's indicate 
     the UN coordination role should be handled by a minimal 
     number of personnel. It would be a misuse of resources and a 
     potential political liability if the UN effort was portrayed 
     as an expensive and expansive operation.
       Second, the current care and comfort of the troops is of 
     the highest order.
       Third, it seems that the aviation assets for UNMIH are 
     unduly limited. Helicopter lift capacity is an extraordinary 
     multiplier of military effectiveness in a country
      like Haiti.
       Fourth, there is a huge need for basic infrastructure 
     repairs and a complementary need to put Haitians to work. 
     Both of these objectives can be served by civic action with 
     UNMIH forces.


                               conclusion

       Through the leadership and skill of the MNF, Haiti enjoys a 
     degree of public security and civic peace which is rare in 
     its tumultuous history. An opportunity exists for fundamental 
     economic and social reforms. The leading edge of these 
     reforms is the successful completion of scheduled elections 
     followed by governmental reforms of the judicial and penal 
     systems. Undergirding these efforts is the constant 
     imperative of economic development to sustain a viable 
     democratic process.
       Based on my observations, the transition from the MNF to 
     the UNMIH is likely to be uneventful. The continuing strong 
     United States presence in UNMIH is also likely to ensure a 
     stable security environment through February 1996 when the UN 
     mandate ceases.
       After February 1996, the outlook is not so clear. So much 
     depends on the confidence building steps of successful 
     elections and the effectiveness of international aid and 
     local economic reforms. I harbor a degree of skepticism that 
     a society without a strong tradition of political 
     participation and market economics can, in a short time build 
     institutions that will endure, even if the international 
     community makes good its promise of support.
       After February 1996, I would not anticipate a dramatic 
     uprising. Rather, the greatest danger would be a return to 
     the corruption that dominated previous regimes; corruption 
     that would gradually undermine reform efforts, frustrate 
     economic progress and invite an abandonment of the democratic 
     process.
       The United States, as the leader of the international 
     community, has taken a decisive stand against an illegal 
     military dictatorship in the Hemisphere. It has restored a 
     [[Page E840]] democratically elected government. It has 
     purchased time to build a stable society. But ultimately, the 
     fate of Haiti is in the hands of the Haitian people. In the 
     next few months, the international community has the 
     opportunity to give the people of Haiti a chance to forge a 
     more decent and productive future.
     

                          ____________________