[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 64 (Thursday, April 6, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5494-S5495]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



[[Page S5494]]

                THE THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE ACT OF 1995

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                 WARNER (AND OTHERS) AMENDMENT NO. 568

  (Ordered referred to the Committee on Armed Services.)
  Mr. WARNER (for himself, Mr. Dole, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Lott, Mr. Cohen, 
Mr. Nickles, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Cochran, and Mr. Smith) 
submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by them to the bill (S. 
383) to provide for the establishment of policy on the deployment by 
the United States of an antiballistic missile system and of advanced 
theater missile defense systems; as follows:

       At the end of the bill add the following:

    TITLE II--DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THEATER MISSILE DEFENSES

     SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Theater Missile Defense 
     Act of 1995''.

     SEC. 202. POLICY ON DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THEATER 
                   MISSILE DEFENSES.

       It is the policy of the United States that advanced theater 
     missile defenses should be developed and deployed as soon as 
     possible in order to provide protection for United States 
     military forces stationed or deployed in foreign theaters of 
     operation and for allied forces participating in operations 
     with those United States military forces.

     SEC. 203. POLICY ON USE OF FUNDS TO LIMIT THEATER MISSILE 
                   DEFENSES UNDER THE ABM TREATY.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that a missile defense 
     system, system upgrade, or system component capable of 
     countering modern theater ballistic missiles has not been 
     tested in an ABM mode nor been given capabilities to counter 
     strategic ballistic missiles and, therefore, is not subject 
     to any application, limitation, or obligation under the ABM 
     Treaty unless and until such missile defense system, system 
     upgrade, or system component has been field tested against a 
     ballistic missile which, in that field test, exceeded (1) a 
     range of 3,500 kilometers, or (2) a velocity of 5 kilometers 
     per second.
       (b) Prohibition.--Appropriated funds may not be obligated 
     or expended by any official of the Federal Government for the 
     purpose of--
       (1) prescribing, enforcing, or implementing any executive 
     order, regulation, or policy that would apply the ABM Treaty, 
     or any limitation or obligation under such treaty, to 
     research, development, testing, or deployment of a theater 
     missile defense system, a theater missile defense system 
     upgrade, or a theater missile defense system component; or
       (2) taking any other action to provide for the ABM Treaty, 
     or any limitation or obligation under such treaty, to be 
     applied to research, development, testing, or deployment of a 
     theater missile defense system, a theater missile defense 
     system upgrade, or a theater missile defense system 
     component.
       (c) Covered Theater Missile Defenses.--(1) Except as 
     provided in paragraph (2), subsection (b) applies with 
     respect to each missile defense system, missile defense 
     system upgrade, and missile defense system component that is 
     capable of countering modern theater ballistic missiles.
       (2) Subsection (b) ceases to apply with respect to a 
     missile defense system, missile defense system upgrade, or 
     missile defense system component when such system, system 
     upgrade, or system component has been field tested against a 
     ballistic missile which, in that test, exceeded (A) a range 
     of 3,500 kilometers, or (B) a velocity of 5 kilometers per 
     second.
       (d) ABM Treaty Defined.--In this section, the term ``ABM 
     Treaty'' means the Treaty Between the United States and the 
     Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of 
     Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on May 26, 
     1972, and includes to Protocol to that treaty, signed at 
     Moscow on July 3, 1974.

     SEC. 204. ADDITIONAL COMMITMENT.

       While the other provisions of this title specifically 
     address defenses to counter the growing threat of theater 
     ballistic missiles, Congress also hereby affirms its 
     commitment to ultimately provide the United States with the 
     capability to defend the people and territory of the United 
     States from attack by ballistic missiles.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today, in continuation of my long-
standing efforts--working with many others--in support of missile 
defenses, to introduce the Theater Missile Defense Act of 1995. I am 
please to have as original cosponsors of this legislation Senator Dole, 
Senator Thurmond, Senator Lott, Senator Cohen, Senator Nickles, Senator 
Kyl, Senator Stevens, Senator Cochran, and Senator Smith.
  Mr. President, few would argue with the compelling need we are facing 
for defenses against the growing threat of attack from theater 
ballistic missiles. Indeed, poll after poll has shown that the 
overwhelming majority of Americans believe that we already possess a 
highly effective capability to defend forward-deployed troops--and 
indeed the United States--from ballistic missile attack today are only 
slightly better than they were during the gulf war.
  Iraqi SCUD missile attacks during Desert Storm brought home to all 
Americans the vulnerability of United States forward-deployed troops to 
short-range--theater--ballistic missile attacks from third world 
nations. Although the Iraqi SCUD's were rudimentary, comparatively 
inexpensive, weapons which were not considered ``militarily 
significant,'' they wrought havoc on allied operations, alerts 
disrupted the front lines as well as the rear echelons. And on February 
25, 1991, an Iraqi SCUD missile attack that struck a United States 
military barracks in Saudi Arabia represented the largest single cause 
of American casualties during Desert Storm.
  Currently, over 30 nations have short-range ballistic missiles. And 
77 nations have cruise missiles in their inventories. The defenses 
being developed to counter theater ballistic missiles will also 
incorporate some capabilities to counter cruise missiles. In addition, 
the Department of Defense is actively pursuing a dedicated effort to 
develop defenses which are focused specifically on the growing curse 
missile threat.
  As the gulf war demonstrated, the threat such missiles pose to the 
men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces is real, immediate, and growing. 
We must accelerate the development and deployment of highly effective 
theater missile defense systems to protect our troops. We owe it to the 
brave men and women who serve in uniform to provide them with the most 
advanced defense systems which we are technically and financially 
capable of producing. Work on such defenses should not in any way be 
constrained by restrictive and erroneous interpretations of the ABM 
Treaty--a 23-year-old treaty with the former Soviet Union. I would also 
like to point out to my colleagues that the restrictions of the treaty 
currently hamper the defense efforts of only two countries--the United 
States and Russia. To the extent we allow the U.S. to be ``handcuffed'' 
by the limits of this Treaty, the U.S. fails to utilize its full 
scientific potential while other nations are free to pursue their 
defenses against ballistic missile attack unrestricted by this treaty.
  Mr. President, the ABM Treaty was never intended to limit or restrict 
theater missile defense systems. The administration concedes this 
point. In addition, I have had the opportunity to discuss this issue 
recently with two individuals who were intimately involved in the ABM 
Treaty negotiations, John Foster and former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger. They both agreed that defenses against theater missiles were 
never contemplated during the ABM Treaty negotiations. According to 
Secretary Kissinger, the focus of the negotiations was on defenses 
against intercontinental ballistic missiles because, ``Those were the 
only systems that were in existence.''
  But, unfortunately, this administration is pursuing a policy--and is 
in the process of negotiating some type of legal obligation, or 
``demarcation agreement,'' with the Russians--that would allow ABM 
Treaty limitations to restrict our theater missile defense efforts. 
Indeed, an administration delegation headed by Deputy Secretary of 
State Strobe Talbott left last evening for Moscow to discuss a number 
of issues, possibly including the demarcation talks. I note that Deputy 
secretary of Defense Deutch dropped off of this trip, in part because 
of concerns expressed by a number of Members of Congress that he 
intended to conclude a demarcation agreement wit the Russians while in 
Moscow.
  I hope that the submission of this legislation today will send a 
clear and unequivocal signal to the administration, and particularly to 
that delegation headed to Moscow, that the Senate will not sit idly by 
and allow the administration to sacrifice our theater missile defense 
capabilities in the interest of concluding a deal with the Russians. I 
hope the Russians will come to the realization that they need 
effective, advanced theater missile defenses even more desperately than 
we do. They are facing hostile nations on their borders which posses 
these short-range ballistic missile systems. [[Page S5495]] 
  Mr. President, in the Missile Defense Act of 1991, the Congress urged 
the President to pursue discussions with the parties to the ABM Treaty 
to clarify the demarcation line between theater missile defenses and 
antiballistic missile defenses for the purposes of the ABM Treaty. 
Those negotiations should have been undertaken for the sole purpose of 
making clear that theater missile defense systems were not limited by 
the ABM Treaty.
  Unfortunately, those negotiations are seriously off-track. Recently, 
I joined with a number of Senators in sending two letters to President 
Clinton expressing our concern that the administration had indicated a 
willingness to accept significant performance limitations on our 
theater missile defense systems, and urging a suspension of those 
negotiations. Despite these clear expressions of congressional concern, 
subsequent meetings that I and other Republican Senators have had with 
high level administration officials in recent weeks have confirmed that 
the administration is intent on concluding an agreement with the 
Russians that would limit the great technological potential of the 
United States to develop and deploy the most effective theater missile 
defense system we can build. Who is willing to stand up and say we owe 
less to our armed forces?
  In addition, it has become clear to be that the administration does 
not contemplate submitting any such ``demarcation agreement'' to the 
Senate for advice and consent, as required by legislation which I 
sponsored to last year's Defense authorization bill. I am troubled that 
the Senate will not be allowed a role in an international agreement 
that will impose major new limitations and obligations on the United 
States.
  It is time for the Congress to act to ensure the development of the 
most capable, cost-effective theater missile defense architecture to 
protect our forward-deployed forces.
  Therefore, I am submitting this amendment today, together with my 
cosponsors, to prohibit the obligation or expenditure of any funds by 
any official of the Federal Government for the purpose of applying the 
ABM Treaty, or any limitation or obligation under that Treaty, to the 
research, development, testing or deployment of a theater missile 
defense system, upgrade or component. The standard which we have used 
in this legislation to defined the demarcation between antiballistic 
missile defenses which are limited by the ABM Treaty, and theater 
missile defenses which are limited by the ABM Treaty, and theater 
missile defenses which are not, is similar to the one used by the 
administration at the beginning of the demarcation negotiations--that 
is, a missile defense system which is covered by the ABM Treaty is 
defined as a missile defense system which has been field-tested against 
a ballistic missile which, in that test, exceeded: First, a range of 
more than 3,500 kilometers, or second a maximum velocity of more than 5 
kilometers per second. Put simply, if a missile defense system has not 
field-tested in an ABM mode--and therefore has not demonstrated a 
field-tested capability to counter intercontinental ballistic 
missiles--it should not be limited in any by the ABM Treaty.
  In addition, this amendment declares that it is the policy of the 
United States that ``advanced theater missile defenses should be 
developed and deployed as soon as possible in order to provide 
protection for United States military forces deployed in foreign 
theaters of operation and for allied forces participating in operations 
with those United States forces.''
  I don't know of anyone who would disagree with that goal. We should 
proceed expeditiously with this important mission, and remove the 
``handcuffs''' from our theater missile defense efforts. We should not 
permit the Russians to hold a veto over theater missile defense systems 
which are vitally needed by our armed forces.
  Mr. President, I want to make clear that this amendment, narrowly 
drawn to the immediate issue of theater missile defenses, should in no 
way be interpreted as implying any lessening of the commitment of the 
co-sponsors to a national missile defense. Indeed, section 4 of the 
amendment states that,

       Congress also hereby affirms its commitment to ultimately 
     provide the United States with the capability to defend the 
     people and territory of the United States from attack by 
     ballistic missiles.

  In this amendment we have dealt in more detail with theater missile 
defense systems because it is those systems which are in a more 
advanced stage of development, and which are currently being 
jeopardized by limitations which the administration may soon sign up to 
with the Russians.
  We are also not attempting with this legislation to either reaffirm 
or reject the ABM Treaty. That is a debate for another day.
  I urge my colleagues to support this important piece of legislation.
  

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