[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 62 (Tuesday, April 4, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5094-S5095]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                             REGARDING IRAN

  Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise to briefly discuss Iran. While 
this administration contemplates its next move regarding Iran, the 
brutal terrorist regime in Iran is plotting its next move. Will it 
reinforce its troops on disputed islands in the Persian Gulf, or will 
it add to its weapons stocks in the region? Only the regime in Teheran 
knows.
  What we do know, is that this band of terrorists is planning an 
offensive military buildup. It is planning for the projection of its 
aggressive actions even further in the region. This administration 
should take this to heart and not appease these terrorists like it did 
with the dictators in Pyongyang. What the administration should do is 
support my legislation banning all trade with Iran and place sanctions 
on those foreign corporations that continue to trade with Iran.
  To this end, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, 
following the text of my remarks, the February 1995 edition of the 
Focus on Iran. This publication details current events in Iran, with 
this particular issue centering on Iran's ongoing efforts to obtain 
nuclear weapons.
  This is a vitally important issue and this important brief will shed 
further insight into a dangerous regime bent on violence and 
aggression.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
           Iran: Nuclear Weapons and Irresponsible Leadership

                  [From Focus on Iran, February 1995]

       Within the past year, much attention was given to Iran's 
     continuous military rebuilding effort since its disastrous 
     and costly war with Iraq. In particular, there has been great 
     emphasis on Iran as a potential regional military power, and 
     more ominously, as a potential nuclear power. The realisation 
     of Iran as both a regional and nuclear power would certainly 
     cause concern to its neighbors. The international community--
     particularly the United States--is concerned with two 
     developments. First is the growing conventional and nuclear 
     capability of Iran, and second, the increasing 
     authoritarianism of the Rafsanjani regime and its support for 
     domestic and international terrorism.
       It is a truism based on historical experience that the 
     greater the absoluteness/authoritarianism of a regime, the 
     less its confidence in dealing with the international 
     community, and the more likely it would resort to force to 
     solve problems. In this context, the current regime in Tehran 
     could hardly be considered a responsible and reliable 
     participant for ensuring regional peace, stability and 
     security.
       It is clearly recognized that all nations have fundamental 
     rights to provide for their own national security interests 
     and those of others through mutual security treaties such as 
     NATO, the former Warsaw Treaty Organization and other 
     regional security pacts. Moreover, Iran itself, prior to the 
     revolution of 1979, was a member of the former Central Treaty 
     Organization (CENTO) together with the United States, United 
     Kingdom, Turkey and Pakistan. Subsequently, the former regime 
     undertook mutual security agreements with the United States. 
     All the preceding agreements, treaties, pacts, etc., alluded 
     to above, were undertaken by governments on the basis of 
     perceived defensive security needs, with no outward 
     declaration of aggressive intent. This in contrast to the 
     bellicose rhetoric and state-sponsored terrorist and 
     subversive activities of Iran's present regime. It is no 
     wonder that a more powerful and nuclear-armed Iran, 
     controlled by the clerics, poses a great concern for future 
     regional peace and security.
       Traditionally, Iran's security defense policy has been 
     dictated by its geostrategic situation: From World War II to 
     1979, for defense against threats from the north, Iran relied 
     heavily on the US deterrence. After the clerics took over in 
     1979, and especially after the aborted rescue mission of the 
     US hostages, Iran, although its foreign policy was nominally 
     ``neither East nor West'', tacitly relied on the Soviet 
     deterrence against possible US attack.
       After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Iraqi 
     invasion of Kuwait, and consequently, the defeat of Saddam 
     Hussein, Iran decided to put its energy and resources to 
     develop weapons of mass destruction, not for defensive 
     purposes, but to give Iran leverage to lead the Muslim World. 
     In November 1991, Mr. Mohajerani, Vice-President of Iran, 
     referred to Iran's activity to develop nuclear weapons. He 
     said Moslem nations including Iran must acquire nuclear 
     capability that would make them strong. This idea was 
     probably reinforced after the Iraqi defeat in the Persian 
     Gulf War, by the Indian Defense Chief, who reportedly said in 
     an interview that one of the results of the Gulf War was ``* 
     * * never challenge the US unless you have nuclear weapons''.


                       the post war arms build-up

       Since the end of the war with Iraq (in 1988), Iran has 
     undertaken an extensive rebuilding and upgrading of its 
     greatly depleted armed forces, as might be expected, 
     especially since the threat from its recent adversary, Iraq, 
     is real, even though seemingly lessened at present. It is 
     noteworthy that much of Iran's arms purchases are best 
     described as offensive in nature and not necessarily designed 
     to counter what one might imagine to be its real concern, 
     Iraq. For example, since 1988, the arms purchases include: 10 
     fast attack missile boats, 75 SCUD-C surface-to-surface 
     missiles, an unknown number of Su-24 fighter/bombers, 12 Tu-
     22 (Backfire) bombers, 72 AS-16 (Kickback) air-to-ground 
     missiles, and three Kilo-class ocean-going submarines (two 
     already delivered and one to be delivered soon). In addition, 
     there are on order other weapons systems with both offensive 
     and defensive capabilities.
       Of particular interest in the above listing is the SCUD-C 
     procurement from North Korea, because of the potential 
     offensive threat it poses to Iran's neighbors to the South. 
     It must be noted that this missile system is capable of being 
     fitted with both conventional as well as nuclear warheads. 
     Furthermore, there is every likelihood that the clerical 
     regime in Iran will purchase the NO-DONG-1 medium-range 
     ballistic missile or its follow-on, within the next five 
     years, also from North Korea. With a range of about 600-800 
     miles and improved accuracy, the NO-DONG missile would be a 
     direct threat to Israel, more so than the SCUD-B system 
     deployed by Iraq in the Persian Gulf War of 1991.
       The acquisition of several ocean-going submarines and fast 
     attack missile boats presents a realistic threat to Persian 
     Gulf oil flow, in as much as these naval craft could easily 
     block the Straits of Hormuz by a missile or underwater 
     attack. In the hands of an unstable and irrational regime, 
     they also pose a direct danger to the U.S. and Allied naval 
     vessels needing to access the Persian Gulf in periods of 
     crises.
       The acquisition of the long range Tu-22 (Backfire) bomber 
     has no other use than extending Iran's offensive ``punch'' 
     far into the Indian Ocean (against the U.S. and Allied 
     Navies) or to the entire Middle East and beyond; a capability 
     far beyond the accepted defensive needs of the clerical 
     regime.
                       The Nuclear Weapons Issue

       The ``conventional'' arms threat is multiplied many times 
     over when nuclear weapons are added to the equation. Much has 
     been written recently concerning the activities of the 
     clerical regime in regards to its involvement in the 
     development of nuclear weaponry. The question does not seem 
     to be one of the probability of such a development, but one 
     of timing. In a recent article in The New York Times (January 
     4, 1995), Chris Hedges wrote a detailed and well-crafted 
     article indicating that in five years, Iran may be able to 
     fabricate a nuclear weapon, with the fissionable materials 
     supplied by its nuclear facilities at Bushehr. If we examine 
     the ``conventional'' weapons already purchased or on order, 
     it is apparent that most of these systems can be readily 
     adapted and modified to carry and deliver nuclear weapons.
       In order to place the potential ``nuclear threat'' in 
     proper perspective, it must be recognized that we are dealing 
     with a contingency that is at least two to five years in the 
     future. It will depend on the clerical regime's ability to 
     receive or develop the requisite technological capability, 
     and produce sufficient nuclear fuel, at which time the threat 
     does became apparent and a focal point of international 
     concern.
       Apropos the issue of Iran gaining technological competence 
     in nuclear weapons fabrication, much has been written in 
     various intelligence sources. It has been reported that Iran 
     has acquired at least two nuclear weapons (one missile and 
     one 152mm artillery round) from Kazakhstan. Some sources 
     allege that Iran may also be receiving technological 
     assistance from North Korea. In any event, it makes little 
     difference whether Iran currently has nuclear warheads; in 
     time, it will develop the capability either by virtue of its 
     native talents and/or with the help of ``scientists of 
     fortune'' from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.


            The Economic Consequences Of Nuclear Acquisition

       The more compelling question is not whether ``Iran has the 
     bomb'', but rather, 
     [[Page S5095]] why it should want a massive offensive 
     conventional and nuclear strike capability. Secondly, who or 
     what are the ostensible targets requiring such national 
     commitment of human, economic, and material resources, to say 
     nothing of the political capital expended in the 
     international community.
       The ``why'' of the clerical regime's military build-up can 
     be answered simply as a normal action in light of the recent 
     war with Iraq. More importantly, however, the up-grading of 
     offensive conventional and future nuclear strike capabilities 
     must be seen in the light of the Mullahs' determination to 
     ensure their survival in the seat of power in Tehran, and 
     more ominously for the future, perhaps to further their 
     political-religious goals elsewhere in the Middle East and 
     North Africa.
       The importance of Iran's current rearming and upgrading of 
     fire-power can be measured in terms of its economic cost to 
     the nation. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
     (ACDA) estimates that between 1987-91 the clerical regime 
     ruling Iran spent an estimated US$8-billion in hard currency 
     for weapons imports. At least a similar amount has been spent 
     since 1991 for further purchases of weapons systems. This at 
     a time when the country is experiencing significant economic 
     distress as indicated by the fact that the per capita share 
     of the GNP (i.e. the individual economic worth) has fallen to 
     around $1,000.
       From these bare economic facts, it is apparent that the 
     clerical regime in Tehran is choosing ``guns over butter'', 
     and, consequently, is perpetuating the economic misery of the 
     Iranian population. Compounding this economic situation is 
     the fact that Iran's external debt is at least US$40-billion, 
     and given the relatively modest world prices for crude oil, 
     Iran's main foreign currency earner, there is little hope for 
     debt reduction in the foreseable future. What this simply 
     means is that as the external debt burden grows, the clerics 
     will find it more difficult to acquire credit for domestic 
     needs such as imports of necessary goods and services that 
     are urgently needed to stop the nation's rapidly declining 
     living standards.
       Moreover, the great economic burden of the massive arms 
     build-up has serious long term implications for Iran's 
     development of its industrial economic base, notably, the 
     petro-chemical infrastructure. Authorities estimate that Iran 
     needs US$5-billion for repairs, replacement parts and 
     maintenance of its petroleum extraction and processing 
     equipment and facilities, and an additional US$1-billion for 
     the maintenance of attendant petro-chemical equipment. If 
     this investment in the petroleum infrastructure is delayed or 
     slowed down, it is likely that within 15 years, the entire 
     infrastructure will collapse, bringing about economic 
     catastrophe.
       The salient question is at what cost to the welfare and 
     well-being of the Iranian people, and at what cost to the 
     goodwill and economic credibility within the international 
     community is the clerical leadership willing to expend for 
     illusionary and self-destructive goals of religious 
     fanaticism and domestic and international terrorism.


           the likely targets of the clerics' nuclear policy

       The second salient question, given the above discussion 
     regarding the excessive level of rearmament effort, is, who, 
     what and where are the targets of the arms build-up. If one 
     surveys the current Middle Eastern political, relgious and 
     social environment, it becomes evident that there is an array 
     of differences that are not in accord with the clerics' 
     concept of religious ``fundamentalism'' and its attendant 
     political and social ways of life. These range from Israel's 
     inherent Judiac nature, Egptian, and Syrian political 
     secularism, Saudi Arabia's Sunni sectarianism, the economic 
     per capita wealth of the Persian Gulf States, the Turkish 
     security links to the U.S., and the overall instability of 
     the former Soviet Caucuses and Central Asian Republics and 
     Afghanistan.
       It is well within reason that the clerical leadership in 
     Tehran may perceive some, if not all, of these differences as 
     a threat to its ``way of life'' and ideology. Perhaps they 
     also see them as targets of opportunity for some future date, 
     when through armed threats and other coerive means, they look 
     forward to imposing their hegemony, and forcing them to 
     accede to their religious and political ideology.
       The clerics' support of political terrorism in Lebanon, 
     Egypt, Sudan, ALgeria and elsewhere lends credence to their 
     once far-fetched claim of converting the world of Islam to 
     Khomeinism. In light of their actions and pronouncements, 
     this indeed may be their first step on the road to achieving 
     their avowed goals.
       The nuclear strategic doctrine of the Islamic Republic was 
     formulated by ``The Strategic Islamic Research Center'' 
     headed by Hojatol Islam Khoeiniha. Following are the main 
     conclusions and goals of the Center which were reached in a 
     secret meeting in May 1991:
       1. After the collapse of communism, Islam is the only force 
     and Islamic Republic the only leader and supporter of the 
     liberation of the oppressed masses.
       2. Iran will naturally be on a collision course with the 
     U.S., and must consider the U.S. a real threat to the Islamic 
     world.
       3. Iran needs to develop nuclear power and prestige.
       The result of this meeting, which was never publicized, 
     should not be taken lightly. Nuclear weapons can be either 
     the guarantor of state, or a threat to the whole region and 
     survival of the country itself. The difference lies in the 
     responsibility, wisdom, and the sophistication of the 
     leadership, and the nuclear strategy it adopts. In the hands 
     of responsible leaders, one can assume that nuclear weapons 
     would not be used unless absolute survival of the country was 
     at stake. In the case of the current clerical leadership in 
     Tehran, it could present a real threat.
       Like the United States, Israel is seen as the ``Satan: the 
     extreme negation of all that is held religiously and 
     politically sacred to the clerics in Tehran. Moreover, the 
     Islamic shrines in Jerusalem must be ``redeemed''. The 
     clerics' success in this effort would most certainly evoke 
     the Moslem masses to respond to its cause and jihad: a tide 
     which none of the Middle Eastern States could withstand.
       It is the opinion of many specialists that Israel is the 
     lynch-pin for Iranian religious/political hegemony in the 
     Middle East. Others point to the clercs' claim of the right 
     to administer the holy shrines in Mecca and Medina. Another 
     important target is likely to be Egypt which is already 
     facing very serious challenges to its political and economic 
     infrastructure from radical Moslem fundamentalists. The long 
     arm of Khomeinism is most definitely felt in Egypt through 
     the clerics' financial, material and moral support for the 
     Egyptian religious radicals. The fall of the Egyptian 
     Government would be a world-wide political event, and would 
     pose a grave threat to the security of Israel and Saudi 
     Arabia, and, most likely, would destabilize Jordan and 
     Lebanon. The military assets of Egypt in the hands of radical 
     extremists is difficult to contemplate for the United States 
     and its Allies; for Iran, it would be a bounty worth all its 
     effort and cost.


                     comments on iranian leadership

       Finally, in our assessment, the current clerical leadership 
     in Tehran seems to be totally incapable of comprehending the 
     dangerous consequences of their course of action. The clerics 
     seem oblivious to the historic lessons of this century. All 
     those who overreached their power paid dearly. Irresponsible 
     policies and actions by irrational and despotic leaders 
     brought untold hardship and misery on the civilian 
     population. The overreaching of military power by the clerics 
     in Iran could bring about the destruction of the Iranian 
     nation. It should be made clear that the imperatives of 
     Iran's security needs are recognized, and the bravery and 
     dedication of its Armed Forces in defending the nation is 
     lauded. It is our belief that the course of military 
     expansion exceeds the requirements for defense of the 
     frontiers against any adversary for the foreseeable future. 
     The course pursued can only lead to the destruction of the 
     patriotic Armed Forces needlessly.
       In order to prevent the dangers of irresponsible military 
     expansion and adventurism, we categorically support the 
     replacement of the current regime with one dedicated to 
     democratic principles well-grounded in the realities of the 
     international security environment and balance of power 
     concept. Furthermore, we insist that a new regime must have 
     the support, respect and confidence of the Iranian people as 
     well as that of the international community.
       First and foremost on its agenda must be the well-being of 
     the people, and guarantees for individual freedom and human 
     rights. Along with economic security, it must work to ensure 
     their physical as well as national security. These can be 
     achieved by reversing the current aggression-oriented arms 
     build-up and support for terrorism. Instead, the new 
     leadership must be dedicated to, and must take an active role 
     in promoting regional and world peace.
     

                          ____________________