[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 59 (Thursday, March 30, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4932-S4934]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


         SENATE RESOLUTION 97--RELATIVE TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

  Mr. THOMAS (for himself and Mr. Robb) submitted the following 
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

                               S. Res. 97

       Whereas the South China Sea is a strategically important 
     waterway through which transits approximately 25 percent of 
     the World's ocean freight, including almost 70 percent of 
     Japan's oil supply;
       Whereas the South China Sea serves as a crucial sea lane 
     for naval vessels of the United States and other countries, 
     especially in times of emergency;
       Whereas the People's Republic of China, the Republic of the 
     Philippines, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Republic 
     of China on Taiwan, the State of Brunei Darussalam, and 
     Malaysia have overlapping and mutually exclusive claims to 
     portions of the South China Sea, especially in the Spratly 
     Island group;
       Whereas these competing claims have led to armed conflicts 
     between several of the claimants;
       Whereas these conflicts threaten the peace and stability of 
     all of East Asia; and
       Whereas the 1992 Manila Declaration of the Association of 
     South East Asian Nations, also recognized by the Socialist 
     Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of China, calls 
     on the claimants to exercise restraint and seek a peaceful 
     negotiated solution to the conflicts: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved, That the Senate--
       (1) urges the executive branch to reiterate to the 
     claimants in the South China Sea that the United States does 
     not take a position on any individual claim;
       (2) calls upon all of the claimants to refrain from using 
     military force to assert or expand territorial claims in the 
     South China Sea;
       (3) urges the executive branch to declare the active 
     support of the United States for the 1992 Manila Declaration 
     of the Association of South East Asian Nations, and calls 
     upon all the claimants to observe faithfully its provisions; 
     and
       (4) calls upon the claimants to scrupulously observe the 
     January, 1995 status quo ante pending any negotiations or 
     resolution of the conflicts between such claimants over such 
     claims.

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, as the chairman of the Senate Subcommittee 
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, I would like to take this 
opportunity to call my colleagues' attention to an issue that, while 
somewhat obscure, has the potential to escalate into a dangerous 
regional conflict with serious repercussions for the United States: 
competing jurisdictional claims to the Spratly Islands.
  The Spratlys comprise 21 islands and atolls, 50 submerged land spits, 
and 28 partly submerged rock groups and reefs. Totaling less than 5 
square kilometers in area, these islets are spread out over 340,000 
square miles in the southern third of the South China Sea, one of the 
world's largest marginal seas. The largest island, Itu Aba, is only 
four-tenths of a square mile in area; Spratly Island, after which the 
group is named, measures only 0.15 square miles. Portions of the area 
are claimed by most of the sea's littoral states; the People's Republic 
of China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Brunei. All, 
with the exception of Brunei, maintain a military presence on the 
islands.
  Their interest is based on more than mere fishing rights or 
territorial aggrandizement. It is thought--although not yet known 
conclusively--that the islands overlie vast reserves of oil and natural 
gas. The South China Sea in general is one of the most productive 
offshore petroleum areas in the world; since 1950, 29 oil fields and 4 
gas fields have been developed there. This makes possession of the 
Spratlys quite attractive to the area's developing economies.
  What many view as China's increasingly hegemonistic interest in the 
area seems to be the principal cause of tension among the claimants. As 
we all well know, China is clearly the emerging power in Asia. As the 
PRC has initiated limited free-market reforms and its economy expands, 
it has been able to devote more resources away from purely domestic 
concerns and to assert itself--flex its muscle--more often in regional 
affairs. The PRC's growing visibility is unnerving to many of its 
neighbors. This is due in large measure to the fact that because the 
PRC's greater presence is increasingly exhibited in a buildup of its 
military forces, it has increased the opportunity for armed conflicts 
with those neighbors.
  The PRC--and consequently the Republic of China on Taiwan--and 
Vietnam both assert the oldest claims to the area. The PRC contends 
that it has a long history of presence in the area, including: a 
purported naval discovery in the Western Han Dynasty around the year 
111 B.C., a 1292 Yuan Dynasty visitation by the Java-bound fleet of 
Kublai Khan, and a Ming Dynasty survey of the islands by Cheng He, who 
is said to have visited the islands seven times between the years 1405 
and 1433. While there is some evidence of intermittent visitation of 
some of the Spratlys and surrounding waters by Chinese fishermen, 
records are sparse, incomplete, conflicting, and in the opinion of many 
scholars do not necessarily demonstrate a pattern of routine 
occupation, administration, or assertion of sovereign control 
sufficient to establish on airtight claim. For example, an official 
report by the Chinese Government issued in 1928 set forth that 
country's southernmost delineation of its territory as the Parcel 
Islands and makes no mention of the Spratlys.
  Vietnam's claim is based on historical arguments premised on events 
from before, during, and after occupation by its former colonial 
overlord, France. Recent Vietnamese pronouncements claim that its 
involvement with the Spratlys can be traced back to 1650-53, although I 
have not yet seen a credible substantiation of that assertion. A 
further contact is claimed during the reign of Emperor Gialong in 1816, 
and an inaccurate Vietnamese map dated 1838 identifies the Spratlys 
under the name Van Ly Truong Sa as a part of Vietnamese territory. 
Interest in the islands appears to have lapsed over the early- and mid-
French occupation period, although the French Government sent a naval 
expedition to the islands in 1933 and laid claim to seven groups of 
islets.
  These conflicting Chinese and Vietnamese claims have in the not-
distant past resulted in verbal, and sometimes military, clashes. In 
1974, for example, the PRC occupied the South Vietnamese-claimed Parcel 
Islands--the Xisha Qundao--about 350 miles north of the Spratlys. The 
Vietnamese forces lost and withdrew from the islands. A few days later, 
though, 120 South Vietnamese soldiers landed on one of the Spratlys; 
the PRC responded with a protest and a warning against any such future 
action. In March 1988, the PLA-N sank three Vietnamese naval transports 
in the Spratlys, killing 72 Vietnamese soldiers.
  Beginning in the late 1970's, a growing economic dimension began to 
appear in the Sino-Vietnamese dynamic. When the PRC began open-door 
economic reforms in 1978, the development of an offshore petroleum 
industry was at the forefront. The PRC opened its continental shelf 
from the Bohai to Beibu Gulfs in 1979, and announced a series of Sino-
foreign seismic survey agreements. Vietnam, in response, protested the 
surveys as brazen violations ``of the territorial integrity of Vietnam 
[[Page S4933]] and its sovereignty over its natural resources.''
  This verbal sparring over the competing claims continued until the 
early 1990's, when the two countries began to swipe at each other using 
oil concessions as their weapon. On May 8, 1992, the PRC's China 
National Offshore Oil Co. granted an oil concession to Crestone Energy 
Co., a small American firm, for a 25,155 km\2\ area near the Vanguard 
Bank (the Wanan Tan) which crossed over into Vietnamese-claimed areas. 
Consequently, Vietnam granted a concession to Mobil Corp. which 
encroached on Chinese claims, and in September 1992, Petrovietnam 
signed a contract with Nopec, a Norwegian company, to do seismic 
surveys. These competing claims threatened to precipitate another armed 
conflict last year when Vietnam began drilling in a concession that 
China had previously granted to a United States company. Chinese ships 
blocked the drilling rig, but the matter was defused short of a martial 
clash and has become an ongoing topic of negotiation between the two.
  The PRC did not help calm matters when, in February 1992, the 
National People's Congress passed legislation--the Law of the People's 
Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone--
laying sole claim to the entire South China Sea and mentioning the 
Spratlys by name in article 2. The move to turn the South China Sea 
into a Chinese lake is especially worrisome to many countries--even 
those outside the region. The reason: the islands sit astride shipping 
lanes through which passes approximately 25 percent of the worlds trade 
goods, including almost 70 percent of Japan's oil supplies.
  The Sino-Vietnamese imbroglios are not the only point of bilateral 
friction in the Spratlys; the most recent flare-ups involved the 
Philippines. The Filipino claim is based on geographic contiguity, 
historical rights, and an assertion that the other countries involved 
in the area have previously abandoned their rights to the islands. In 
1947, a Filipino businessman named Tomas Cloma discovered a group of 
unoccupied islands in the Spratly chain which he named Kalayaan. The 
Philippines' Government remained somewhat noncommittal about the claim; 
in 1955, the government set baselines around the Philippine archipelago 
and made no mention of Kalayaan. However, when in 1971 an ROK artillery 
battery on Itu Aba fired on a Filipino fishing boat, in its official 
protest the Philippines stated that it had legal title to the island 
group as a result of Cloma's occupation and because the islands were 
within the archipelagic territory of the Philippines. In 1974, Cloma 
transferred Kalayaan to his Government, and in 1978 President Marcos 
officially declared the islands to be part of the Philippines. Also in 
that year, the Philippines' claims became more choate when it 
discovered oil and gas resources beneath the seabed.
  Since then, Sino-Filipino competition for the islands has increased. 
Recently, China asserted claims to Jackson Atoll and Half Moon Reef--
which are claimed by the Philippines--contending that ``they are part 
of China's Nanasha [Spratly] Islands and have always have been Chinese 
territory.'' Intelligence reports indicate that the PRC has placed 
perimeter markers on both. Similarly, China has laid claim to the 
appropriately named Mischief (Panganiban) Reef. It was recently 
revealed that the PRC has built a series of structures on the reef. The 
reef submerges at high tide, and the four concrete buildings are build 
on pilings. I have seen pictures of them supplied by the Philippine 
Government.
  The problem with this Chinese move is that the reef lies well within 
the Philippines' 200-mile exclusive economic zone; it is only 135 
nautical miles from Palawan, one of the Philippines' principal islands. 
By contrast, it is more than 620 miles from the Chinese coast. In 
addition, the PRC has dispatched several naval vessels to the immediate 
area of the reef--two Yukan-class supply vessels and a Dazhi-class 
submarine-support ship. The presence of the latter begs the question as 
to whether there are not also Chinese submarines operating nearby. The 
PRC claims that the outpost in only meant to serve as a shelter for 
Chinese fishermen. However, the addition of several parabolic antennae 
to the structures, the presence of the navy ships, and the PRC's 
demonstrated keen interest in the islands, seem to militate against the 
veracity of such a statement. Moreover, in a move tinged with 
jurisdictional overtones, the Chinese arrested several Filipino 
fishermen in the vicinity of the reef and held them for several days.
  The Government of the Philippines has indicated that as a result of 
the PRC's actions, it has felt pressured into increasing its military 
presence in the islands. Just this last weekend, in apparent 
retaliation for the Chinese arrests, the Philippine navy seized four 
Chinese fishing vessels in the region of Alicia Annie which is in the 
Filipino Claim area.
  Similarly, the Vietnamese are reported by Japan's Kyodo News Agency 
to have increased their military presence in the area by 50 percent as 
a counter to the Chinese buildup. Clearly, the growing militarization 
of the region can only increase the probability that another skirmish 
will break out.
  The region's countries have not sat idly by while this problem has 
escalated. In July 1992, the members of ASEAN, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nation's issued what has been called the Manila 
Declaration on the south China Sea. The document--also acknowledged by
 Vietnam and the PRC--called on the parties to the dispute to exercise 
restraint and settle the issue without resort to military force. 
ASEAN's nonclaimants--Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand--were urged to 
appoint an ``eminent persons group'' to build support for a complete 
freeze on economic and military activity in disputed areas. The 
declaration also called on the United States to actively back the 
initiative, and to support Indonesia's efforts to transform its 
informal South China Sea workshops into an official negotiating forum 
under the auspices of either the ASEAN regional forum or the U.N. 
Security Council. Talks would be based on accepting the Chinese 
position of deferring claims to sovereignty and jointly developing any 
available resources.

  The response of the United States to this entire issue has been, in 
my view, less than adequate. The strongest statements that I have seen 
from the administration so far are a lukewarm statement on February 14 
of this year from a State Department spokeswoman, and a series of 
statements by Adm. Richard Macke, head of the U.S. Pacific Command. 
Most recently the admiral stated, ``It is well known that we do not 
support any territorial claims with regard to [the] Spratlys. We 
certainly encourage dialogue between the nations involved to solve the 
differences that exist over the Spratlys. Again, we support no 
individual claim * * *.''
  I generally agree with Admiral Macke. As long as the claimants do 
nothing to interfere with the rights of the world community to free 
passage through the South China Sea, it is my position that the United 
States should not presently take sides among the claimants. Rather, we 
should support the Manila Declaration and a rational, negotiated 
settlement to the problem. In addition, while we should make clear to 
the claimants that we are willing to make ourselves available to them 
to facilitate the provisions of the declaration, we should avoid 
unnecessary intrusion into what is a regional affair best settled by 
the parties involved. In addition, pending any talks or resolution of 
the conflict, I believe we need to make clear to the parties that any 
move seeking to disturb the present status quo is unacceptable. It 
makes no sense to try to get the parties to sit down and negotiate an 
end to the problem if, at the same time, they continue their jockeying 
for military and territorial advantage.
  Although I find myself generally in agreement with the U.S. position, 
I am not sure that the administration has been as forceful and 
unequivocal as it should be in getting our viewpoint across to the 
claimants. While I understand from certain sources that our position is 
being made clear to each of the claimant states through our respective 
embassies, I would like to see a more public vociferous pronouncement 
of our stand. Mr. President, I have seen some indications from the 
State Department that it is presently 
[[Page S4934]] considering following this course. I applaud that move.
  In the interim, however, I rise today--on behalf of myself and the 
distinguished ranking minority member of the subcommittee, Senator 
Robb--to submit Senate Resolution 97, expressing the sense of the 
Senate with respect to peace and stability in the South China Sea. This 
resolution reaffirms the Senate's support of the view that the United 
States takes no sides in the dispute. Moreover, it calls for a 
cessation of hostilities in the region, as well as a strict adherence 
to the provisions of the Manila declaration. Finally, it calls on the 
claimants to observe the January 1995 status quo ante pending any 
negotiations or resolution of the dispute. Mr. President, I hope that 
this resolution will prod the administration into action, and will make 
the views of the Senate clear to the claimant nations. I look forward 
to its swift adoption.


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