[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 55 (Friday, March 24, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4598-S4599]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                         ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

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                           THE LINE-ITEM VETO

 Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, it was with the greatest of 
enthusiasm that I chose to support the line-item veto legislation.
  In just a few weeks, all of us will be asked to cast our votes to 
raise the debt ceiling for this country to more than $5 trillion. It is 
difficult to comprehend the enormity of this figure. If you took those 
5 trillion individual dollars and laid them end to end, they would span 
the vast icy distance between the Earth and Moon almost 2,000 times.
  The line-item veto represents a small but most significant first step 
toward processes to ensure greater fiscal responsibility. I believe the 
measure that we recently passed is the best workable compromise between 
various approaches and will make this legislation very effective. I am 
particularly pleased by the inclusion of a ``lockbox'' provision to 
ensure that any spending that is ``zeroed out'' is earmarked for 
deficit reduction.
  Our past experience with spending patterns here in Congress 
demonstrates why it was crucial to include this provision. I have seen 
a number of programs terminated on the Senate floor, after hours of 
spirited debate centered around the question--``can we afford it''? 
After concluding that we could not afford the program in question, we 
terminated the program, then failed to adjust the spending caps 
downward, meaning that we simply spent the money on something else. 
Such a ``loophole'' in this legislation would be a costly and 
destructive provision that would make a mockery of this measure. 
Without the lockbox provision the President could terminate a program 
with an eye toward seeing those funds reprogrammed in another 
direction. Or, Congress could simply retitle or reallocate the funding 
items which failed to pass muster. That would subvert the clear 
intention of this sharpened tool, which is to enable the President to 
assist in slowing down and reducing Government spending.
  What pleases me the most about this legislation is that its modified 
form will permit the President to confront the problem of rising 
entitlement spending. This is, as we well know, the fastest growing 
category of Federal spending, and the single greatest cause of runaway 
debt. In the past, one overused tactic used to evade the discipline of 
discretionary spending caps has been to promote new programs in the 
form of mandatory entitlements. This designation has shielded them from 
annual scrutiny through the appropriations process and creates an ever 
expanding ``black hole'' into which our Federal dollars disappear. 
Giving the President a chance to ward off future trespasses in area 
will make this legislation much more effective in controlling spending.
  Opponents of this measure have criticized the line-item veto on the 
basis of or experience with it at the State level. Sometimes they say 
that such authority is not easily applied at the Federal level, or 
worse yet, that it does not even work in the States. The latter 
contention is simply flat-out wrong. The line-item veto does work 
effectively at the State level. We heard testimony to that effect in 
the Judiciary Committee, where we learned of countless instances in 
which governors have used the power to eliminate wasteful spending from 
appropriations bills. It is one reason why no State has a fiscal crisis 
on the order of compare to our Federal deficit.
  I fully understand the sincerity of opponents of this measure when 
they voice fears that the line-item veto would give to much power to 
the President. The allegation has been made that the President could 
use this power to punish individual legislators, indeed to carry out a 
personal vendetta against a particular Congressman or Senator. I simply 
believe that due reflection on this matter will show that there is 
little to fear from such a situation occurring. First of all, these 
vetoes will not be made in secret. The press will eagerly report on the 
items 
[[Page S4599]] rescinded, and they will be
 evaluated in their own right, quite apart from any personal issues 
surrounding them. Regardless of the President's personal feelings about 
any legislator, the final test of the issue will be whether or not the 
spending is appropriate. Both the President and the Congress will have 
to make the appropriate case as to whether or not the spending should 
occur.

  I was extremely pleased when Bill Clinton, as a candidate for the 
Presidency, indicated his support for a line-item veto. We on our side 
of the aisle, have delivered such an option to him. It is a good time 
to do it--with a Republican Congress and Democratic President. It is a 
clear indication that this should not be a partisan issue. It should be 
an issue around which fiscally responsible legislators on both sides 
can rally.
  Many of my colleagues are already very familiar with a process that I 
have seen too often in my 16 years of Senate service. We send a popular 
bill down to the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue only after we have 
loaded it up with a pile of pet pork projects, knowing full well that 
the President has to swallow everything in order to get the provisions 
that are so desired by him. There might be clearly wasteful spending in 
that package, but the President must nonetheless feel compelled to sign 
the bill simply because it is the only way to preserve ``essential'' 
spending or other legislative language.
  This problem is compounded when the President is sent the 
appropriations bills at the 11th hour of the congressional session. The 
President must sign those, or else risk a temporary shutdown of vial 
Government functions.
  The veto in its current form is a terribly crude blunt instrument, 
and it does not enable the President to deal effectively with these 
situations. Passage of the line-item veto will finely make it a more 
precise and agile tool, one which can be surgically wielded effectively 
on behalf of the U.S. taxpayer.


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