[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 55 (Friday, March 24, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4585-S4597]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




     THE MERCURY-CONTAINING AND RECHARGEABLE BATTERY MANAGEMENT ACT

  MR. SMITH. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Mercury-
Containing and Rechargeable Battery Management Act. I am pleased to be 
joined by Senators Lautenberg, Faircloth, McConnell, Lieberman, Simon, 
Mack, Bond, Graham, Warner and Reid. This legislation is urgently 
needed to remove Federal barriers detrimental to much-needed State and 
local recycling programs for batteries commonly found in cordless 
products such as portable telephones, laptop computers, tools, and 
toys.
  Since 1992, Federal battery legislation has been approved in various 
congressional forums, including passage by the Senate in 1994, but it 
did not become law because the legislation to which it was attached did 
not move forward. Our bill, which is virtually identical to the Senate 
passed provisions last year, would--
  First, facilitate the efficient and cost effective collection and 
recycling or proper disposal of used nickel cadmium [Ni-Cd] and certain 
other batteries by: establishing a coherent national system of labeling 
for batteries and products; streamlining the regulatory requirements 
for battery collection programs for regulated batteries; and 
encouraging voluntary industry programs by eliminating barriers to 
funding the collection and recycling or proper disposal of used 
rechargeable batteries; and
  Second, phase out the use of mercury in batteries.
  Without this legislation, States and industry face Federal barriers 
to implementing State battery recycling programs across the country. 
Thirteen States, including New Hampshire, have enacted legislation 
requiring that Ni-Cd and small sealed lead-acid batteries be labeled 
and are easily removable from consumer products. Of these 13 States, 9 
have enacted legislation calling for the collection of Ni-Cd and small-
sealed lead-acid batteries.
  [[Page S4586]] Mr. President, although industry has developed a 
national collection program to comply with these laws, without 
enactment of a Federal bill, EPA's current regulatory requirements 
preclude industry from fully implementing this program and from 
complying with the State collection requirements. Regulatory changes 
currently under consideration, even if promulgated, will not provide 
the necessary solution. Additional lengthy rulemaking procedures would 
also be necessary to make the regulation operational on a national 
basis. Further, we would still lack a coherent national system of 
labeling, which is necessary to facilitate nationwide marketing of 
batteries and products while advancing a national battery collection 
program. Federal legislation is the only real solution to removing the 
barriers to complying with State battery recycling laws, and to 
achieving a comprehensive recycling program.
  The prompt passage of this legislation will achieve a number of 
important goals. First, by establishing uniform national standards to 
promote the recycling and reuse of rechargeable batteries, this 
legislation provides a cost effective means to promote the reuse of our 
Nation's resources. Second, our bill will further strengthen efforts to 
remove these potentially toxic heavy metals from our Nation's landfills 
and incinerators. Not only will this lower the threat of groundwater 
contamination and toxic air emissions, but it will also significantly 
reduce the threat that these materials pose to the environment. Third, 
this legislation represents an environmentally friendly policy choice 
that was developed as the result of a strong cooperative effort between 
the States, environmental groups and the affected industries. Our bill 
is strongly supported by the Electronic Industries Association [EIA], 
the Portable Rechargeable Battery Association [PRBA], and the National 
Electrical Manufacturers Association [NEMA]. For all of the reasons 
cited above, I believe that this legislation provides a substantial 
win-win from both an environmental as well as an economic standpoint.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this important 
legislation, and ask unanimous consent that a copy of the bill, a 
section-by-section outline of the bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
                                 S. 619

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION. 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Mercury-Containing and 
     Rechargeable Battery Management Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds that--
       (1) it is in the public interest to--
       (A) phase out the use of mercury in batteries and provide 
     for the efficient and cost-effective collection and recycling 
     or proper disposal of used nickel cadmium batteries, small 
     sealed lead-acid batteries, and other regulated batteries; 
     and
       (B) educate the public concerning the collection, 
     recycling, and proper disposal of such batteries;
       (2) uniform national labeling requirements for regulated 
     batteries, rechargeable consumer products, and product 
     packaging will significantly benefit programs for regulated 
     battery collection and recycling or proper disposal; and
       (3) it is in the public interest to encourage persons who 
     use rechargeable batteries to participate in collection for 
     recycling of used nickel-cadmium, small sealed lead-acid, and 
     other regulated batteries.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Administrator.--The term ``Administrator'' means the 
     Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.
       (2) Button cell.--The term ``button cell'' means a button- 
     or coin-shaped battery.
       (3) Easily removable.--The term ``easily removable'', with 
     respect to a battery, means detachable or removable at the 
     end of the life of the battery--
       (A) from a consumer product by a consumer with the use of 
     common household tools; or
       (B) by a retailer of replacements for a battery used as the 
     principal electrical power source for a vehicle.
       (4) Mercuric-oxide battery.--The term ``mercuric-oxide 
     battery'' means a battery that uses a mercuric-oxide 
     electrode.
       (5) Rechargeable battery.--The term ``rechargeable 
     battery''--
       (A) means 1 or more voltaic or galvanic cells, electrically 
     connected to produce electric energy, that is designed to be 
     recharged for repeated uses; and
       (B) includes any type of enclosed device or sealed 
     container consisting of 1 or more such cells, including what 
     is commonly called a battery pack (and in the case of a 
     battery pack, for the purposes of the requirements of easy 
     removability and labeling under section 103, means the 
     battery pack as a whole rather than each component 
     individually); but
       (C) does not include--
       (i) a lead-acid battery used to start an internal 
     combustion engine or as the principal electrical power source 
     for a vehicle, such as an automobile, a truck, construction 
     equipment, a motorcycle, a garden tractor, a golf cart, a 
     wheelchair, or a boat;
       (ii) a lead-acid battery used for load leveling or for 
     storage of electricity generated by an alternative energy 
     source, such as a solar cell or wind-driven generator;
       (iii) a battery used as a backup power source for memory or 
     program instruction storage, timekeeping, or any similar 
     purpose that requires uninterrupted electrical power in order 
     to function if the primary energy supply fails or fluctuates 
     momentarily; or
       (iv) a rechargeable alkaline battery.
       (6) Rechargeable consumer product.--The term ``rechargeable 
     consumer product''--
       (A) means a product that, when sold at retail, includes a 
     regulated battery as a primary energy supply, and that is 
     primarily intended for personal or household use; but
       (B) does not include a product that only uses a battery 
     solely as a source of backup power for memory or program 
     instruction storage, timekeeping, or any similar purpose that 
     requires uninterrupted electrical power in order to function 
     if the primary energy supply fails or fluctuates momentarily.
       (7) Regulated battery.--The term ``regulated battery'' 
     means a rechargeable battery that--
       (A) contains a cadmium or a lead electrode or any 
     combination of cadmium and lead electrodes; or
       (B) contains other electrode chemistries and is the subject 
     of a determination by the Administrator under section 103(d).
       (8) Remanufactured product.--The term ``remanufactured 
     product'' means a rechargeable consumer product that has been 
     altered by the replacement of parts, repackaged, or repaired 
     after initial sale by the original manufacturer.

     SEC. 4. INFORMATION DISSEMINATION.

       The Administrator shall, in consultation with 
     representatives of rechargeable battery manufacturers, 
     rechargeable consumer product manufacturers, and retailers, 
     establish a program to provide information to the public 
     concerning the proper handling and disposal of used regulated 
     batteries and rechargeable consumer products with 
     nonremovable batteries.

     SEC. 5. ENFORCEMENT.

       (a) Civil Penalty.--When on the basis of any information 
     the Administrator determines that a person has violated or is 
     in violation of any requirement of this Act, the 
     Administrator--
       (1) in the case of a willful violation, may issue an order 
     assessing a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each 
     violation and requiring compliance immediately or within a 
     reasonable specified time period, or both; or
       (2) in the case of any violation, may commence a civil 
     action in the United States district court in the district in 
     which the violation occurred for appropriate relief, 
     including a temporary or permanent injunction.
       (b) Contents of Order.--An order under subsection (a)(1) 
     shall state with reasonable specificity the nature of the 
     violation.
       (c) Considerations.--In assessing a civil penalty under 
     subsection (a)(1), the Administrator shall take into account 
     the seriousness of the violation and any good faith efforts 
     to comply with applicable requirements.
       (d) Finality of Order; Request for Hearing.--An order under 
     subsection (a)(1) shall become final unless, not later than 
     30 days after the order is served, a person named in the 
     order requests a hearing on the record.
       (e) Hearing.--On receiving a request under subsection (d), 
     the Administrator shall promptly conduct a hearing on the 
     record.
       (f) Subpoena Power.--In connection with any hearing on the 
     record under this section, the Administrator may issue 
     subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses and 
     for the production of relevant papers, books, and documents.
       (g) Continued Violation after Expiration of Period for 
     Compliance.--If a violator fails to take corrective action 
     within the time specified in an order under subsection 
     (a)(1), the Administrator may assess a civil penalty of not 
     more than $10,000 for the continued noncompliance with the 
     order.

     SEC. 6. INFORMATION GATHERING AND ACCESS.

       (a) Records and Reports.--A person who is required to carry 
     out the objectives of this Act, including--
       (1) a regulated battery manufacturer;
       (2) a rechargeable consumer product manufacturer;
       (3) a mercury-containing battery manufacturer; and
       (4) an authorized agent of a person described in 
     subparagraph (A), (B), or (C),

     shall establish and maintain such records and report such 
     information as the Administrator may by regulation reasonably 
     require to carry out the objectives of this Act.
       (b) Access and Copying.--The Administrator or the 
     Administrator's authorized representative, on presentation of 
     credentials of 
     [[Page S4587]] the Administrator, may at reasonable times 
     have access to and copy any records required to be maintained 
     under subsection (a).
       (c) Confidentiality.--The Administrator shall maintain the 
     confidentiality of documents and records that contain 
     proprietary information.

     SEC. 7. STATE AUTHORITY.

       Except as provided in sections 103(e) and 104, nothing in 
     this Act shall be construed to prohibit a State from enacting 
     and enforcing a standard or requirement that is more 
     stringent than a standard or requirement established or 
     promulgated under this Act.

     SEC. 8. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are 
     necessary to carry out this Act.
              TITLE I--RECHARGEABLE BATTERY RECYCLING ACT

     SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Rechargeable Battery 
     Recycling Act''.

     SEC. 102. PURPOSE.

       The purpose of this title is to facilitate the efficient 
     recycling or proper disposal of used nickel-cadmium 
     rechargeable batteries, used small sealed lead-acid 
     rechargeable batteries, other regulated batteries, and such 
     rechargeable batteries in used consumer products, by--
       (1) providing for uniform labeling requirements and 
     streamlined regulatory requirements for regulated battery 
     collection programs; and
       (2) encouraging voluntary industry programs by eliminating 
     barriers to funding the collection and recycling or proper 
     disposal of used rechargeable batteries.

     SEC. 103. RECHARGEABLE CONSUMER PRODUCTS AND LABELING.

       (a) Prohibition.--
       (1) In general.--No person shall sell for use in the United 
     States a regulated battery that is ready for retail sale or a 
     rechargeable consumer product that is ready for retail sale, 
     which was manufactured on or after the date that is 12 months 
     after the date of enactment of this Act, unless--
       (A) in the case of a regulated battery, the regulated 
     battery--
       (i) is easily removable from the rechargeable consumer 
     product; or
       (ii) is sold separately; and
       (B) in the case of a regulated battery or rechargeable 
     consumer product, the labeling requirements of subsection (b) 
     are met.
       (2) Application.--Paragraph (1) does not apply to a sale 
     of--
       (A) a remanufactured product unit unless paragraph (1) 
     applied to the sale of the unit when originally manufactured; 
     or
       (B) a product unit intended for export purposes only.
       (b) Labeling.--Each regulated battery or rechargeable 
     consumer product without an easily removable battery 
     manufactured on or after the date that is 1 year after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, whether produced domestically 
     or imported, shall be labeled with--
       (1)(A) 3 chasing arrows or a comparable recycling symbol;
       (B)(i) on each nickel-cadmium battery, the chemical name or 
     the abbreviation ``Ni-Cd''; and
       (ii) on each lead-acid battery, ``Pb'' or the words 
     ``LEAD'', ``RETURN'', and ``RECYCLE'';
       (C) on each nickel-cadmium regulated battery, the phrase 
     ``BATTERY MUST BE RECYCLED OR DISPOSED OF PROPERLY.''; and
       (D) on each sealed lead acid regulated battery, the phrase 
     ``BATTERY MUST BE RECYCLED.'';
       (2) on each rechargeable consumer product containing a 
     regulated battery that is not easily removable, the phrase 
     ``CONTAINS NICKEL-CADMIUM BATTERY. BATTERY MUST BE RECYCLED 
     OR DISPOSED OF PROPERLY.'' or ``CONTAINS SEALED LEAD BATTERY. 
     BATTERY MUST BE RECYCLED.'', as applicable; and
       (3) on the packaging of each rechargeable consumer product, 
     and the packaging of each regulated battery sold separately 
     from such a product, unless the required label is clearly 
     visible through the packaging, the phrase ``CONTAINS NICKEL-
     CADMIUM BATTERY. BATTERY MUST BE RECYCLED OR DISPOSED OF 
     PROPERLY.'' or ``CONTAINS SEALED LEAD BATTERY. BATTERY MUST 
     BE RECYCLED.'', as applicable.
       (c) Existing or Alternative Labeling.--
       (1) Initial period.--For a period of 2 years after the date 
     of enactment of this Act, regulated batteries, rechargeable 
     consumer products containing regulated batteries, and 
     rechargeable consumer product packages that are labeled in 
     substantial compliance with subsection (b) shall be deemed to 
     comply with the labeling requirements of subsection (b).
       (2) Certification.--
       (A) In general.--On application by persons subject to the 
     labeling requirements of subsection (b) or the labeling 
     requirements promulgated by the Administrator under 
     subsection (d), the Administrator shall certify that a 
     different label meets the requirements of subsection (b) or 
     (d), respectively, if the different label--
       (i) conveys the same information as the label required 
     under subsection (b) or (d), respectively; or
       (ii) conforms with a recognized international standard that 
     is consistent with the overall purposes of this title.
       (B) Constructive certification.--Failure of the 
     Administrator to object to an application under subparagraph 
     (A) on the ground that a different label does not meet either 
     of the conditions described in subparagraph (A) (i) or (ii) 
     within 120 days after the date on which the application is 
     made shall constitute certification for the purposes of this 
     Act.
       (d) Rulemaking Authority of the Administrator.--
       (1) In general.--If the Administrator determines that other 
     rechargeable batteries having electrode chemistries different 
     from regulated batteries are toxic and may cause substantial 
     harm to human health and the environment if discarded into 
     the solid waste stream for land disposal or incineration, the 
     Administrator may, with the advice and counsel of State 
     regulatory authorities and manufacturers of rechargeable 
     batteries and rechargeable consumer products, and after 
     public comment--
       (A) promulgate labeling requirements for the batteries with 
     different electrode chemistries, rechargeable consumer 
     products containing such batteries that are not easily 
     removable batteries, and packaging for the batteries and 
     products; and
       (B) promulgate requirements for easy removability of 
     regulated batteries from rechargeable consumer products 
     designed to contain such batteries.
       (2) Substantial similarity.--The regulations promulgated 
     under paragraph (1) shall be substantially similar to the 
     requirements set forth in subsections (a) and (b).
       (e) Uniformity.--After the effective dates of a requirement 
     set forth in subsection (a), (b), or (c) or a regulation 
     promulgated by the Administrator under subsection (d), no 
     Federal agency, State, or political subdivision of a State 
     may enforce any easy removability or environmental labeling 
     requirement for a rechargeable battery or rechargeable 
     consumer product that is not identical to the requirement or 
     regulation.
       (f) Exemptions.--
       (1) In general.--With respect to any rechargeable consumer 
     product, any person may submit an application to the 
     Administrator for an exemption from the requirements of 
     subsection (a) in accordance with the procedures under 
     paragraph (2). The application shall include the following 
     information:
       (A) A statement of the specific basis for the request for 
     the exemption.
       (B) The name, business address, and telephone number of the 
     applicant.
       (2) Granting of exemption.--Not later than 60 days after 
     receipt of an application under paragraph (1), the 
     Administrator shall approve or deny the application. On 
     approval of the application the Administrator shall grant an 
     exemption to the applicant. The exemption shall be issued for 
     a period of time that the Administrator determines to be 
     appropriate, except that the period shall not exceed 2 years. 
     The Administrator shall grant an exemption on the basis of 
     evidence supplied to the Administrator that the manufacturer 
     has been unable to commence manufacturing the rechargeable 
     consumer product in compliance with the requirements of this 
     section and with an equivalent level of product performance 
     without the product--
       (A) posing a threat to human health, safety, or the 
     environment; or
       (B) violating requirements for approvals from governmental 
     agencies or widely recognized private standard-setting 
     organizations (including Underwriters Laboratories).
       (3) Renewal of exemption.--A person granted an exemption 
     under paragraph (2) may apply for a renewal of the exemption 
     in accordance with the requirements and procedures described 
     in paragraphs (1) and (2). The Administrator may grant a 
     renewal of such an exemption for a period of not more than 2 
     years after the date of the granting of the renewal.

     SEC. 104. REQUIREMENTS.

       For the purposes of carrying out the collection, storage, 
     transportation, and recycling or proper disposal of used 
     rechargeable batteries, batteries described in section 
     3(3)(C) or in title II, and used rechargeable consumer 
     products containing rechargeable batteries that are not 
     easily removable rechargeable batteries, persons involved in 
     collecting, storing, or transporting such batteries or 
     products to a facility for recycling or proper disposal 
     shall, notwithstanding any other law, be regulated in the 
     same manner and with the same limitations as if the persons 
     were collecting, storing, or transporting batteries subject 
     to subpart G of part 266 of title 40, Code of Federal 
     Regulations, as in effect on January 1, 1993, except that 
     sections 264.76, 265.76, and 268.7 of that title shall not 
     apply.

     SEC. 105. COOPERATIVE EFFORTS.

       Notwithstanding any other law, if 2 or more persons who 
     participate in projects or programs to collect and properly 
     manage used rechargeable batteries or products powered by 
     rechargeable batteries advise the Administrator of their 
     intent, the persons may agree to develop jointly, or to share 
     in the costs of participating in, such a project or program 
     and to examine and rely on such cost information as is 
     collected during the project or program.
          TITLE II--MERCURY-CONTAINING BATTERY MANAGEMENT ACT

     SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Mercury-Containing Battery 
     Management Act''.

     SEC. 202. PURPOSE.

       The purpose of this title is to phase out the use of 
     batteries containing mercury.
     [[Page S4588]] SEC. 203. LIMITATIONS ON THE SALE OF ALKALINE-
                   MANGANESE BATTERIES CONTAINING MERCURY.

       No person shall sell, offer for sale, or offer for 
     promotional purposes any alkaline-manganese battery 
     manufactured on or after January 1, 1996, with a mercury 
     content that was intentionally introduced (as distinguished 
     from mercury that may be incidentally present in other 
     materials), except that the limitation on mercury content in 
     alkaline-manganese button cells shall be 25 milligrams of 
     mercury per button cell.

     SEC. 204. LIMITATIONS ON THE SALE OF ZINC-CARBON BATTERIES 
                   CONTAINING MERCURY.

       No person shall sell, offer for sale, or offer for 
     promotional purposes any zinc-carbon battery manufactured on 
     or after January 1, 1996, that contains mercury that was 
     intentionally introduced as described in section 203.

     SEC. 205. LIMITATIONS ON THE SALE OF BUTTON CELL MERCURIC-
                   OXIDE BATTERIES.

       No person shall sell, offer for sale, or offer for 
     promotional purposes any button cell mercuric-oxide battery 
     for use in the United States on or after January 1, 1996.

     SEC. 206. LIMITATIONS ON THE SALE OF OTHER MERCURIC-OXIDE 
                   BATTERIES.

       (a) Prohibition.--On or after January 1, 1996, no person 
     shall sell, offer for sale, or offer for promotional purposes 
     a mercuric oxide battery for use in the United States unless 
     the battery manufacturer--
       (1) identifies a collection site that has all required 
     Federal, State, and local government approvals, to which 
     persons may send used mercuric-oxide batteries for recycling 
     or proper disposal;
       (2) informs each of its purchasers of mercuric-oxide 
     batteries of the collection site identified under paragraph 
     (1); and
       (3) informs each of its purchasers of mercuric-oxide 
     batteries of a telephone number that the purchaser may call 
     to get information about sending mercuric-oxide batteries for 
     recycling or proper disposal.
       (b) Application of Section.--This section does not apply to 
     a sale or offer of a mercuric oxide button cell battery.

     SEC. 207. NEW PRODUCT OR USE.

       On petition of a person that proposes a new use for a 
     battery technology described in this title or the use of a 
     battery described in this title in a new product, the 
     Administrator may exempt from this title the new use of the 
     technology or use of battery in the new product on the 
     condition, if appropriate, that there exist reasonable 
     safeguards to ensure that the resulting battery or product 
     without an easily removable battery will not be disposed of 
     in an incinerator, composting facility, or landfill (other 
     than a facility regulated under subtitle C of the Solid Waste 
     Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6291 et seq.).
                                                                    ____

 The Mercury-Containing and Rechargeable Battery Management Act--Bill 
                      Summary (Section By Section)

     Sec. 1. Short Title
       The ``Mercury-Containing and Rechargeable Battery 
     Management Act.''
     Sec. 2. Congressional Findings
       This section finds that it is in the public interest to 
     phase out the use of mercury in batteries and provide for 
     efficient and cost effective collection and recycling or 
     proper disposal of certain batteries; that uniform national 
     labeling of certain batteries will significantly benefit 
     recycling programs; and that battery recycling programs are 
     to be encouraged.
     Sec. 3. Definitions
       Provides standard definitions for battery-related terms 
     such as easily removable battery, rechargeable battery, 
     rechargeable consumer product, regulated battery, and 
     remanufactured product.
     Sec. 4. Information Dissemination
       Requires the Administrator to provide information to the 
     public on proper handling and disposal of used batteries.
     Sec. 5. Enforcement
       Gives the Administrator the enforcement authority found in 
     RCRA, and provides for fines not to exceed $10,000 for 
     willful violations.
     Sec. 6. Information Gathering and Access
       Provides recordkeeping requirements for those subject to 
     the Act, and gives the Administrator information gathering 
     authority on battery collection and recycling.
     Sec. 7. State Authority
       Preserves State authority to enact and enforce standards or 
     requirements more stringent than a standard or requirement 
     established or promulgated under this Act, except as provided 
     in sections 103(e) and 104.
     Sec. 8. Authorization
       Funds necessary to implement the requirements of this Act 
     are authorized to be appropriated.


              TITLE I. RECHARGEABLE BATTERY RECYCLING ACT

     Sec. 101. Short Title
       This Title may be cited as the ``Rechargeable Battery 
     Recycling Act.''
     Sec. 102. Purpose
       The purpose of this Title is to facilitate the efficient 
     recycling of used nickel-cadmium rechargeable batteries, used 
     small sealed lead-acid rechargeable batteries, and such 
     rechargeable batteries in used consumer products, through 
     uniform labeling requirements, streamlined regulatory 
     requirements for regulated battery collection programs, and 
     voluntary industry programs by eliminating barriers to 
     funding the collection and recycling or proper disposal of 
     used rechargeable batteries.
     Sec. 103. Rechargeable Consumer Products and Labeling
       Twelve months after enactment of this Act, batteries and 
     battery packs containing nickel-cadmium or small sealed lead-
     acid batteries must be easily removable from rechargeable 
     consumer products, and must have specific labeling. The EPA 
     Administrator may promulgate similar regulations for 
     batteries with other electrode chemistries, and shall modify 
     the required labeling to conform with recognized 
     international standards (e.g., labeling standards adopted 
     under NAFTA, GATT, or international standards organizations). 
     These labeling standards would be imposed on batteries 
     nationwide. Upon petition the EPA Administrator can grant a 
     2-year exemption from the easy removability requirements.
     Sec. 104. Requirements
       Batteries collected for recycling or proper disposal under 
     the Act will be subject to the same requirements as lead-acid 
     batteries are at present.
     Sec. 105. Cooperative Efforts
       Two or more persons who participate in projects or programs 
     under this Act may inform the EPA Administrator of their 
     intent to develop jointly or share in the costs of such a 
     program, and may examine and rely upon cost information 
     collected by the program.


          TITLE II. MERCURY CONTAINING BATTERY MANAGEMENT ACT

     Sec. 201. Short Title
       This Title may be cited as the ``Mercury-Containing Battery 
     Management Act.''
     Sec. 202. Purpose
       The purpose of this Title is to phase out the use of 
     batteries containing mercury.
     Sec. 203. Limitations on the Sale of Alkaline-Manganese 
         Batteries Containing Mercury
       No person shall sell, offer for sale, or offer for 
     promotional purposes any alkaline-manganese battery 
     manufactured on or after January 1, 1996, with a mercury 
     content that was intentionally introduced (as distinguished 
     from mercury which may be incidentally present in other 
     materials), except that the limitation on mercury content in 
     alkaline-manganese button cells shall be 25 milligrams of 
     mercury per button cell.
     Sec. 204. Limitations on the Sale of Zinc Carbon Batteries 
         Containing Mercury
       No person shall sell, offer for sale, or offer for 
     promotional purposes any zinc carbon battery manufactured on 
     or after January 1, 1996, that contains any mercury that was 
     intentionally introduced.
     Sec. 205. Limitations on the Sale of Button Cell Mercuric-
         Oxide Batteries
       No person shall sell, offer for sale, or offer for 
     promotional purposes in the United States any button cell 
     mercuric-oxide battery on or after January 1, 1996.
     Sec. 206. Limitations on the Sale of Other Mercuric-Oxide 
         Batteries
       On or after January 1, 1996, no person shall sell, offer 
     for sale, or offer for promotional purposes, non-button cell 
     mercuric-oxide batteries for use in the United States unless 
     the battery manufacturer 1) identifies a collection site that 
     has all required government approvals, to which persons may 
     send used mercuric-oxide batteries for recycling or proper 
     disposal; and, 2) informs each of its purchasers of such 
     batteries of such identified collection site; and 3) informs 
     each of its purchasers of such batteries of a telephone 
     number that the purchaser may call to get information about 
     sending mercuric-oxide batteries for recycling or proper 
     disposal. This section does not apply to mercuric-oxide 
     button cell batteries.
     Sec. 207. New Product or Use
       Allows persons proposing a new use for battery technology 
     covered by this title or the use of any such battery in a new 
     product to petition the Administrator for an exemption from 
     this title. The Administrator may grant such an exemption, 
     and, if appropriate, require that reasonable safeguards exist 
     to assure that such batteries will not be disposed of in 
     incinerators, composting facilities, or landfills (other than 
     a RCRA-regulated facility).
                                 ______

      By Mr. CRAIG (for himself and Mr. Domenici):
  S. 620. A bill to direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey, 
upon request, certain property in Federal reclamation projects to 
beneficiaries of the projects and to set forth a distribution scheme 
for revenues from reclamation project lands; to the Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources.


                  RECLAMATION FACILITIES TRANSFER ACT

  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I am today introducing legislation that 
would direct the Secretary of the Interior to transfer the Federal 
interest in certain Bureau of Reclamation projects to the project 
beneficiaries. This legislation has already been introduced in the 
other body by Congressman Skeen.
  I am introducing the identical legislative language in order to frame 
what I believe will be an interesting debate. 
[[Page S4589]] The reclamation program was intended to assist in the 
settlement of the West, and it has been extraordinarily successful in 
that endeavour. There are many instances, throughout the West, where 
the objectives of individual projects have been fully accomplished. The 
project works have been constructed and the allocable repayment 
obligations have been satisfied. Operation and maintenance of the 
projects have been turned over to the project beneficiaries and the 
Federal Government simply holds bare legal title with little or no 
involvement with the project.
  Those seem to me to be classic examples of the type of projects that 
should be fully turned over to the beneficiaries. The Federal 
Government incurs annual costs and is exposed to out-year liabilities 
for no other reason than it holds title to certain works. Given the 
downsizing of the Bureau of Reclamation, it seems all the more sensible 
that the Bureau conserve its personnel and resources. Just to have one 
person available for a project on which the Federal Government does 
nothing probably costs over $100,000. Given the needs elsewhere within 
the Department, each of those personnel could be better used.
  I do not want anyone to think that this legislation is a final 
product, but it does serve to frame the debate. Many of our reclamation 
projects are multiple purpose, and we will need to be careful to ensure 
that we do not lose sight of those other objectives. Many projects 
provide important flood control and navigation benefits that are of 
national interest. That does not argue against a transfer of title, but 
it is a concern that we should be aware of. A very important 
consideration, at least to this Senator, will be the issue of the 
transfer of the water rights associated with the project. Luckily, we 
do not have to face the issue of Federal reserved water rights since 
under reclamation law, the Bureau has obtained water rights from the 
States in conformity with State water law for all its projects. We 
will, however, need to be careful to make certain that title to those 
rights is transferred to the appropriate entities or individuals and 
that the transfer is in conformity with State water law.
  There are many other considerations as well, and I do not intend to 
be exhaustive in this statement but one item deserves mention. We dealt 
with some of those issues when we considered the transfer of the Solano 
project several years ago, and our inability to fully resolve all those 
issues, including the recreational responsibilities of the Bureau at 
Lake Berryessa, was the reason why we were unable to enact legislation. 
As drafted, this legislation only applies to fully paid-out projects. 
In particular instances, I think a case could be made to permit 
prepayment of the outstanding indebtedness much as we have done for 
other reclamation loans. That is another issue we will have to closely 
examine.
  I want to congratulate Congressman Skeen and his cosponsors for 
raising this issue. All of us in the West, and some from outside the 
West, have questioned from time to time, the future of the Bureau of 
Reclamation. Congressman Skeen has proposed one answer for many 
projects. I fully expect that we may even find agreement within the 
Department of the Interior that on some projects there simply is no 
further role for the Federal Government. I do not expect that we will 
have a complete transfer of all projects, but that should not stop us 
from looking at the question. A fully paid out single purpose project 
located solely within one State will be the easy transfer. I hope we do 
not limit our vision that narrowly.
                                 ______

      By Mr. BENNETT (for himself, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Brown, Mr. 
        Jeffords, Mr. Stevens and Mr. Hatch):
  S. 621. A bill to amend the National Trails System Act to designate 
the Great Western Trail for potential addition to the National Trails 
System, and for other purposes.


                     GREAT WESTERN TRAIL STUDY ACT

  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, today I am introducing a bill which would 
direct the U.S. Forest Service, in consultation with the Department of 
the Interior, to study the Great Western Trail to determine if it 
should be included in the National Scenic Trails System.
  The Great Western Trail takes in some of the greatest outdoor and 
natural opportunities the West has to offer. The trail will be a 
continuous, multiple-use route that reaches from Mexico to Canada. It 
encompasses a series of existing trails, mostly on public lands, 
running through a corridor which extends through five States. The trail 
itself extends from the panhandle of Idaho to the southern tip of 
Arizona. Along the 2,400 mile length of the trail are numerous 
recreational opportunities for all interests, from cross-country skiers 
to backpackers, hikers, and off-road enthusiasts. The trail passes 
through areas rich in western heritage as well as some of the most 
spectacular scenery in the world.
  Prior to designating the Great Western Trail as part of the National 
Trails System, a study must be conducted to determine its feasibility. 
This bill take the first step by instructing the Secretary of 
Agriculture, in consultation with the Secretary of Interior, to conduct 
a study of the current land ownership and use along the designated 
trail route. The study would include cost estimates of any necessary 
land acquisition as well as reporting on the appropriateness of 
including motorized activity along the trail route. Since the proposed 
trail route follows roads and trails already in existence, very little 
right-of-way acquisition would be required and minimal construction 
would be necessary.
  This study will play an important role by determining land and 
resource capability, public safety needs, and the administrative 
requirements necessary to designate the trail as part of the National 
Trails System. It is also important to note that the trail takes 
advantage of and will rely heavily upon volunteer construction, 
maintenance, and management of the trail system.
  Communities throughout the West will benefit tremendously from the 
Great Western Trail. The recreational opportunities and rural economic 
development that travel and tourism will bring to the region will not 
only provide an economic boost to the local economies, but will help 
those who travel the Great Western Trail to gain a greater appreciation 
for our Nation's heritage. The Great Western Trail will provide a 
positive experience for those who use it. It will become a significant 
and vital addition to America's system of national trails.
                                 ______

      By Mr. LEVIN (for himself and Mr. Abraham):
  S. 622. A bill to amend the Clean Air Act to provide that a State 
containing an ozone nonattainment area that does not significantly 
contribute to ozone nonattainment in its own area or any other area 
shall be treated as satisfying certain requirements if the State makes 
certain submissions, and for other purposes; to the Committee on 
Environment and Public Works.


         clean air act ozone transport provisions amendment act

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the bill that Senator Abraham and I are 
introducing today is intended to help correct a significant flaw in the 
Clean Air Act. This flaw plagues communities in west Michigan, and 
affects many other areas of the country that are downwind from 
significant sources of ozone-causing emissions.
  As it is written, the act is unfair. It does not equitably distribute 
the burden of reducing ozone emissions. Some areas, like west Michigan, 
could be required to undertake vehicle inspection and maintenance 
testing programs, although these programs will not be effective in 
reducing the local concentrations of ozone because their ozone is being 
transported by wind and weather from other States and parts of the 
country.
  Let me explain the west Michigan situation, the outlook for which has 
changed significantly in recent weeks. Three west Michigan counties are 
currently designated as two separate moderate ozone nonattainment areas 
by the EPA pursuant to the Clean Air Act; Kent and Ottawa Counties are 
one, and Muskegon County is the other. Because of their classification 
as moderate ozone nonattainment areas, the State of Michigan was 
required by law to pass legislation imposing mandatory vehicle 
inspection and maintenance testing in these two areas starting in 
[[Page S4590]] January 1995. This requirement would have made sense 
were these three counties the cause of either their own nonattainment 
or the nonattainment of other areas. But they aren't. Governor Engler 
recognized this inequity and halted the I/M program in late December 
1994.
  EPA has acknowledged that the three counties ``are essentially 
overwhelmed by emissions coming from Chicago and northern Indiana.'' In 
a June 20, 1994, letter to the Michigan department of natural 
resources, EPA Administrator Carol Browner said, ``. . . the USEPA 
recognizes that ozone transport may make it very difficult, if not 
impossible, for Muskegon and Grand Rapids, themselves, to achieve the 
NAAQS (National Ambient Air Quality Standards) for ozone by deadlines 
prescribed by the CAA (Clean Air Act).''
  In a hearing held on Monday, July 25, 1994, before my Subcommittee on 
Oversight of Government Management, EPA acknowledged ``that Muskegon 
County would be in attainment but for ozone transport.'' EPA also 
confirmed that Muskegon and Grand Rapids ``are not the cause of Chicago 
and northern Indiana being in nonattainment . . .'' In fact, EPA has 
not shown that any area is in nonattainment due to west Michigan's 
emissions. The Lake Michigan ozone study director states, ``. . . that 
no matter what reductions are made in Michigan, the air quality will 
not be affected.''
  In short, these three counties are not the cause of their own or any 
other area's ozone problem and no matter what these counties do for 
themselves, it is unlikely that they will be able to achieve and stay 
in attainment. Because of ozone blown their way and their resultant 
classification as moderate nonattainment areas, they could be forced to 
implement a burdensome vehicle inspection program that would not make a 
significant difference. As stated succinctly in the Senate Environment 
Committee's report to accompany S. 1630, the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1989, ``Because ozone is not a local phenomenon but is formed and 
transported over hundreds of miles and several days, localized control 
strategies will not be effective in reducing ozone levels.'' 
Unfortunately, this sentiment did not translate into the act's 
requirements and implementation. The inflexibility and inequity of the 
localized mandate undermines public support for the Clean Air Act and 
environmental laws--in an area of the country that is generally 
supportive of both.
  Fortunately, the last 3 years of ozone monitoring data in the west 
Michigan area show no violations of the Federal ozone standard for the 
area, according to an expedited review that I requested of EPA. This 
means that Michigan can apply for redesignation to attainment, and 
Administrator Browner has indicated that that process is very 
``doable.'' But, once attainment has been achieved, it is possible that 
only one violation could force west Michigan to return to the I/M 
requirements. Though EPA has stated that the Agency would seek to avoid 
this outcome and would carefully examine the violation to determine 
whether it was caused by local or transported ozone before returning to 
those requirements, I believe that it would be best to correct the law 
before such circumstances arise. This bill is a step toward fixing it.
  At the hearing mentioned previously, I asked Mary Nichols, Assistant 
Administrator for Air, if these three counties were treated in the same 
way rural areas are treated, would they qualify for an exemption from 
the Clean Air Act requirements. Ms. Nichols replied, ``I believe that 
is correct.'' She is right. That is at the heart of the unfairness of 
the Clean Air Act. The legislation we are offering specifically 
addresses that unfairness. Whether such an area is rural or nonrural 
should not make any difference, if the area is not a significant cause 
of its own or any other area's nonattainment. It is the emissions from 
an area and not the number of people that live in an area that should 
matter.
  This bill applies that principle and eliminates the illogical 
disparate treatment between rural and nonrural areas. EPA would be 
required to treat any ozone nonattainment area as a marginal ozone 
nonattainment area, if the State demonstrates to EPA that sources of 
ozone-causing emissions in that area do not make a significant 
contribution to ozone nonattainment measured in the area or in other 
areas. So, rather than arbitrarily
 denying the regulatory relief to a metropolitan statistical area, or 
an adjacent area, which is currently available to a rural transport 
area, the act's standards would apply equally to rural and non-rural 
areas. As a result, the burden would be placed more squarely on the 
shoulders of the ``significant contributors,'' rather than the victims 
of transport. This is only fair.

  Clearly, we may need to refine this legislation further or make the 
legislative history clear so that the definition of ``significant 
contribution'' is not subject to excessively narrow interpretation by 
an EPA Administrator and so that we can ensure protection for the west 
Michigan area from the unfair burdens associated with transported 
pollution. But, we also want to make sure that other areas who need to 
be reducing their emissions because they are transporting pollution 
elsewhere don't get off the hook. I know that the State of Michigan has 
the data to prove that west Michigan deserves relief under this bill, 
but we will work with the State, EPA, and the relevant congressional 
committees to insure that this legislative effort does not have 
unintended consequences.
  After repeated urgings by myself and others, the EPA has issued a new 
ozone transport policy. Under the previous policy the west Michigan 
nonattainment areas would have been required by 1996 to meet clean air 
standards which they could not meet because of pollution carried by the 
winds from outside areas such as Chicago, areas with severe air 
pollution problems. The old policy was particularly unfair, since, 
under the law, these other more polluted areas do not need to meet the 
requirements themselves until the year 2007.
  The EPA has informed me that the states will be permitted to present 
an analysis demonstrating the problem and that EPA will consider 
granting an extension of the 1996 deadline, possibly until 2007. This 
new policy should avoid further unfairness, as additional requirements 
could have been placed, in 1996, on the west Michigan area, triggered 
by pollution which is not generated in the local area.
  While I appreciate EPA's efforts in providing this extension, the new 
policy was, according to Administrator Browner, to have held ``areas 
responsible only for that portion of the ozone problem which they 
cause.'' However, this new policy only corrects one inequity in the 
act, to wit, the fact that downwind areas suffering from significant 
ozone and other pollution transported from more severely polluted areas 
have less time to achieve attainment. The change in attainment 
deadlines does not address the problem of areas inappropriately 
designated in the first place.
  Mr. President, there appear to be a number of other States that 
contain victim of transport areas in situations similar to west 
Michigan. I am sure that my colleagues in New England, for instance, 
have been noticing a significant increase in public attention to the 
vehicle testing requirements. It will be argued that we should not 
reopen the Clean Air Act. But, we cannot permit an unfair regulatory 
burden to fall upon our constituents to correct a problem which they 
did not cause and which the regulatory requirements cannot cure. We 
should right that wrong.
  Mr. President, I support the goals of the Clean Air Act. But, it 
needs to be applied with common sense, if it is to retain the support 
of the American people. Without that support, it cannot succeed.
                                 ______

      By Mr. SPECTER (for himself and Mr. Hatch):
  S. 623. A bill to reform habeas corpus procedures, and for other 
purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.


                  THE FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REFORM ACT

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the American people want government to do 
something about violent crime. Unfortunately, the crime bill that 
passed last year in the 103d Congress did nothing about one of the most 
serious aspects of the crime problem: the interminable appeals process 
that has made the death penalty more a hollow threat than an effective 
deterrent.
  [[Page S4591]] The crime bill abandoned key provisions which would 
have limited appeals in the Federal courts by State death row inmates. 
These appeals currently average more than 9 years and last as long as 
17 years. Of all people sentenced to death since 1976, 266 have been 
executed, while over 2,900 sit in death row cells. Is it any wonder 
that in 1963, when the imposition of the death penalty was a real 
possibility that criminals had to worry about, there were 8,500 
homicides in America, a rate of 4.5 homicides per 100,000 people; while 
in 1993 there were 23,760 homicides, and a more than doubled homicide 
rate of 9.3 per 100,000. The legal system has turned the death penalty 
into a toothless saw.
  National polls continue to show fear of crime to be the No. 1 concern 
of most Americans. One survey conducted right after President Clinton's 
State of the Union Address last year found 71 percent thought more 
murders should be punishable by the death penalty. My own 12 years of 
experience in the Philadelphia District Attorney's office, first as an 
assistant district attorney and chief of the appeals division and later 
as district attorney, convinces me they are right.
  The great writ of habeas corpus has been the procedure used to 
guarantee defendants in State criminal trials their rights under the 
U.S. Constitution. It is an indispensable safeguard because of the 
documented history of State criminal-court abuses such as the 
Scottsboro case. Unfortunately, it has been applied in a crazy-quilt 
manner with virtually endless appeals that deny justice to victims and 
defendants alike, making a mockery of the judicial system.
  The best way to stop this mockery is to impose strict time limits on 
appeals. The bill I am introducing today, along with my distinguished 
colleague and the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Hatch, 
will do just that.
  Criminal justice experts agree that for any penalty to be effective 
as a deterrent, the penalty must be swift and certain. When years pass 
between the time a crime is committed and a sentence is carried out, 
the vital link between crime and punishment is stretched so thin that 
the deterrent message is lost.
  Delays leave inmates, as well as victims, in a difficult state of 
suspended animation. In a 1989 case, the British Government declined to 
extradite a defendant to Virginia on murder charges until the local 
prosecutor promised not to seek the death penalty because the European 
Court of Human Rights had ruled that confinement in a Virginia prison 
for 6 to 8 years awaiting execution would violate the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
  Similarly, for survivors of murder victims, there is an inability to 
reach a sense of resolution about their loved one's death until the 
criminal case has been resolved. The families do not understand the 
complexities of the legal process and suffer feelings of isolation, 
anger, and loss of control over the lengthy court proceedings. The 
unconscionable delays deny justice to all--society, victims, and 
defendants.
  Since upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty in 1976, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has required more clearly defined death penalty 
laws. Thirty-eight States have responded to voters' expressions of 
public outrage by enacting capital punishment statutes that meet the 
requirements of the Constitution.
  My 12 years experience in the Philadelphia District Attorney's office 
convinced me that the death penalty deters crime. I saw many cases 
where professional burglars and robbers refused to carry weapons for 
fear that a killing would occur and they would be charged with first-
degree murder, carrying the death penalty.
  One such case involved three hoodlums who planned to rob a 
Philadelphia pharmacist. Cater, 19, and Rivers, 18, saw that their 
partner Williams, 20, was carrying a revolver. The two younger men said 
they would not participate if Williams took the revolver along, so 
Williams placed the gun in a drawer and slammed it shut.
  Right as the three men were leaving the room, Williams sneaked the 
revolver back into his pocket. In the course of the robbery, Williams 
shot and killed pharmacist Jacob Viner. The details of the crime 
emerged from the confessions of the three defendants and corroborating 
evidence. All three men were sentenced to death because, under the law, 
Cater and Rivers were equally responsible for Williams's act of murder.
  Ultimately, Williams was executed and the death sentences for Cater 
and Rivers were changed to life imprisonment because of extenuating 
circumstances, because they did not know their co-conspirator was 
carrying a weapon. There are many similar cases where robbers and 
burglars avoid carrying weapons for fear a gun or knife will be used in 
a murder, subjecting them to the death penalty.
  The use of the death penalty has gradually been limited by the courts 
and legislatures to apply only to the most outrageous cases. In 1925, 
the Pennsylvania Legislature repealed the mandatory death penalty for 
first-degree murder, leaving it to the discretion of the jury or trial 
court. More recently, in 1972, the Supreme Court struck down all State 
and Federal death penalty laws and prohibited capital punishment for 
all inmates on death row, or future executions, unless thereafter they 
contained detailed procedures for considering aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.
  Prosecutors customarily refrain from asking for the death penalty for 
all but the most heinous crimes. I did that when I was a district 
attorney, personally reviewing the cases where capital punishment was 
requested.
  While the changes required by the Supreme Court help insure justice 
to defendants, there is a sense that capital punishment can be retained 
only if applied to outrageous cases. I agree with advocates who insist 
on the greatest degree of care in the use of capital punishment. I have 
voted for limitations to exclude the death penalty for the mentally 
impaired and the very young. However, I oppose those who search for 
every possible excuse to avoid the death penalty because they oppose it 
on the grounds of conscientious scruples.
  While I understand and respect that moral opposition, our system of 
government says the people of the 38 States that have capital 
punishment are entitled to have those sentences carried out where they 
have been constitutionally imposed. In those jurisdictions, the debate 
is over until the statutes are repealed or the Constitution 
reinterpreted.
  Many Federal habeas corpus appeals degenerate into virtually endless 
delays, where judges bounce capital cases like tennis balls from one 
court to another, exacerbated by repetitive petitions. Here is an 
example, Mr. President: After being convicted in California for a 
double murder in 1980, Robert Alton Harris filed 10 petitions for 
habeas corpus review in the State courts, 5 similar petitions in the 
Federal courts, and 11 applications to the U.S. Supreme Court. Many of 
those applications to invalidate the death penalty overlapped.
  Habeas corpus reform is not a new issue in the Senate. In 1984, the 
Senate first passed a habeas corpus reform measure, but the House 
failed to consider it. In 1990, during the 101st Congress, I offered my 
first legislation to speed up and simplify Federal habeas corpus 
procedures in capital cases. That year, the Senate adopted the 
amendment that Senator Thurmond and I wrote to the omnibus anticrime 
bill that would have reformed habeas corpus procedures in death penalty 
cases. Unfortunately, at the insistence of the House conferees, our 
provision was dropped from the conference report.
  Habeas corpus reform was revisited in the 102d Congress. Portions of 
my proposal, S. 19, were incorporated into the Republican habeas corpus 
reform package, which again became part of the Senate's omnibus 
anticrime legislation. This time, the conference committee on the 
Senate and House anticrime bills kept a habeas corpus reform provision 
in the conference report, but it was the House version. As reported by 
the conference committee, that version would have exacerbated the 
delay, not eased it. Despite late efforts at a compromise, habeas 
reform died with that crime bill.
  Again in the 103d Congress, I introduced habeas corpus reform 
legislation. In 1993, when the new omnibus anticrime bill was being 
debated in the 
[[Page S4592]] Senate, all habeas corpus reform provisions were 
stripped from the bill. I was dismayed. Even as the Senate was voting 
to establish a broad Federal death penalty, it was refusing to address 
the compelling need to expedite review of the death sentences once 
imposed.
  When I demanded that the issue of habeas corpus reform be addressed 
by the Senate, I was given the opportunity to bring my bill to the 
floor for debate. Unfortunately, the legislation I introduced to 
eliminate the delays in carrying out death sentences was tabled by a 
vote of 65 to 34.
  Which brings us to today, Mr. President. My new proposal, the Federal 
Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1995, sets strict time limits on the filing 
of habeas corpus petitions and severely restricts the filing of any 
successive petition. It requires that the appropriate Federal court of 
appeals approve the filing of any successive petition. It ensures 
adequate counsel in habeas corpus proceedings. It imposes time limits 
on Federal judges to decide habeas corpus petitions in capital cases. 
And it does this so that imposition of the death penalty in State cases 
will become more certain and swift, making the death penalty again a 
meaningful sanction and deterrent.
  This bill builds on some innovative strategies that I first proposed 
in 1990. Already, much of that approach has become widely accepted as 
the basic building blocks of habeas corpus reform, namely establishing 
time limits on filing habeas corpus petitions and on Federal court 
consideration of capital habeas corpus petitions, and requiring that 
the filing of any successive petition be approved by the appropriate 
court of appeals under stringent standards.
  Under this bill, a single Federal court review will resolve most 
death penalty cases in under 2 years. First, a Federal habeas corpus 
petition in a capital case must be filed within 6 months from the final 
action in State court proceedings. A final decision must be made by the 
Federal district court within 180 days from the filing of the habeas 
corpus petition. And a final decision must be made by the Federal court 
of appeals within 120 days from the filing of the final brief. No 
successive Federal court habeas corpus petition could be considered 
unless specific leave was granted by the appropriate court of appeals, 
and then only for very limited reasons.
  In addition, the proposed expedited treatment of habeas corpus 
petitions in capital cases would apply only to States which agree to 
provide free, competent legal counsel for defendants during their State 
court appeals. The bill provides that the Federal government will 
provide free legal counsel during their Federal habeas corpus 
proceedings.
  The compressed time frame is both just and practical. It would 
eliminate the lengthy delays and establish habeas corpus proceedings in 
death penalty cases as the highest priority in the Federal judicial 
system.
  Unless there are unusually complicating factors, which must be 
detailed in the district court's opinion, I know that such cases can be 
heard within a few weeks, with no more than a week or two being 
required to write an opinion. Some district courts have sat on such 
cases for as long as 12 years. Even in States with the most prisoners 
on death row, such as Florida, Texas, and California, each district 
court judge would have such a case only every 1 to 3 years. Judges 
would not be overburdened.
  Decisions on appeal to the court of appeals should be made within 120 
days of briefing. That is manageable with priority attention to these 
relatively few capital cases. The authority of Congress to establish 
such time limits was exercised in the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, which 
calls for criminal trials to begin within 70 days unless delayed by 
specified causes. The key factor in this timetable is the requirement 
that competent, free counsel be provided to defendants in capital cases 
during their State and Federal habeas corpus proceedings.
  I must stress, however, that the abbreviated timetable does not take 
effect until State court review of a sentence of death is completed. No 
time limit is placed by this legislation on the length of trial or on 
periods for consideration of post-trial motions and the State court 
appeals. During that period, most, if not all, of the complex factual 
and legal issues will be organized, analyzed and resolved by the State 
courts, so that these issues will not be novel when the case goes to 
Federal court.
  Requiring prisoners on death row to file petitions within 6 months of 
final State court action is not only reasonable, but is necessary to 
end the abuse in which petitioners and their attorneys now engage. A 
perfect example of the abuse can be seen in a recent case from my own 
State of Pennsylvania.
  Steven Duffey was convicted of a 1984 murder. His conviction and 
sentence were unanimously upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 
1988. From then on, he did nothing until after his death warrant had 
been signed in September 1994. Then, on the eve of his execution, 
Duffey's attorneys filed a habeas corpus petition and sought a stay of 
execution.
  The Federal district judge thought himself bound to enter the stay so 
that the petition could be entertained. But the judge castigated the 
game-playing of Duffey and his lawyer. In his opinion, Judge Thomas 
Vanaskie of the Middle District of Pennsylvania hit on a central 
problem with the current system when he noted that ``[t]here is an 
overwhelming incentive on the part of a death row inmate to ignore 
until the eleventh hour collateral challenges to his or her 
conviction.'' He then quoted the 1994 decision of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Steffen versus Tate, which had 
likewise found that ``it is almost always in the interest of a death 
sentenced prisoner to delay filing a [habeas corpus] petition as long 
as possible.''
  Mr. President, this bill goes a long way toward restoring the death 
penalty as an effective deterrent. But to get the rest of the way there 
we need to address the endless delays caused by requiring defendants to 
exhaust all of their claims in State court before they are allowed to 
file Federal habeas corpus petitions.
  The absurdity of this exhaustion requirement is illustrated by the 
series of decisions involving a Philadelphia criminal, Michael Peoples. 
Peoples was convicted in the State trial court in 1981 of setting his 
victim on fire during a robbery. Following this legal trail is not 
easy, but it illustrates the farcical procedures. After the 
Pennsylvania intermediate appellate court affirmed Peoples' conviction 
in 1983, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review in a decision 
that was unclear as to whether it was based on the merits or on the 
Court's procedural discretion that there was no special reason to 
consider the substantive issues.
  Peoples then filed a petition in 1986 for habeas corpus in the U.S. 
district court. That petition was denied for failure to exhaust State 
remedies, meaning the State court did not consider all his claims. The 
case was then appealed to the next higher court level, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court on the 
ground that the exhaustion rule was satisfied when the State Supreme 
Court had the opportunity to correct alleged violations of the 
prisoner's constitutional rights. Next, Peoples asked the U.S. Supreme 
Court to review his case.
  Even though the Supreme Court was too busy to hear 4,550 cases in 
1988, the Peoples case was one of 147 petitions it granted. After the 
nine justices reviewed the briefs, heard oral argument and deliberated, 
Justice Scalia wrote an opinion reversing the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit.
  The Third Circuit then undertook the extensive process of briefs and 
argument before three judges. It issued a complicated opinion 
concluding that the original petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
contained both exhausted and unexhausted claims. That ruling sent the 
case back to the district court for reconsideration.
  Had the Ddstrict court simply considered Peoples' constitutional 
claims on the substantive merits in the first instance, all those 
briefs, arguments and opinions would have been avoided. These 
complications arise from a Federal statute that requires a defendant to 
exhaust his or her remedies in the State court before coming to the 
federal court. The original purpose of giving the State a chance to 
correct any error and to limit the work of the Federal courts was 
sound. In practice, 
[[Page S4593]] however, that rule has created a hopeless maze, 
illustrated by thousands of cases like those of Peoples and Harris.
  The elimination of the statutory exhaustion requirement would mean 
that Congress, which has authority to establish Federal court 
jurisdiction, would direct U.S. district courts to decide petitions for 
writs of habeas corpus after direct appeals to the Supreme Court had 
upheld the death penalty. From my own experience, I have seen State 
trial court judges sit on such habeas corpus cases for months or years 
and then dismiss them in the most perfunctory way because the issues 
had already been decided by the State Supreme Court in its earlier 
decision.
  Obviously, Mr. President, Federal habeas corpus is a complex and 
arcane subject. Its difficult and restrictive rules simply delay 
imposition of the death penalty and render it useless as a deterrent. 
The purposes of tough law enforcement are best served by full and 
prompt hearings instead of a procedural morass that defeats the 
substantive benefits of capital punishment.
  In 1990, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist said the current system 
for handling death penalty habeas corpus cases in the Federal courts 
``verges on the chaotic.'' He was charitable. If justice delayed is 
justice denied, there's little justice left in the Federal judicial 
treatment of death sentences.
  My proposal for habeas corpus reform will bring practical 
reinstatement of the death penalty, so that meaningless procedures do 
not remain the enemy of substantive justice.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of my bill 
be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 623

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,
     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 
     1995''.

     SEC. 2. FILING DEADLINES.

       Section 2244 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an 
     application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in 
     custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 
     limitation period shall run from the latest of--
       ``(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 
     conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 
     seeking such review;
       ``(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an 
     application created by State action in violation of the 
     Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the 
     applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
       ``(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted 
     was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right 
     has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and is made 
     retroactively applicable; or
       ``(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim 
     or claims presented could have been discovered through the 
     exercise of due diligence.
       ``(2) The time during which a properly filed application 
     for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 
     respect to the pertinent judgment or claim shall not be 
     counted toward any period of limitation under this 
     subsection.

     SEC. 3. APPEAL.

       Section 2253 of title 28, United States Code, is amended to 
     read as follows:

     ``Sec. 2253. Appeal

       ``(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under 
     section 2255 before a district judge, the final order shall 
     be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for 
     the circuit in which the proceeding is held.
       ``(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order 
     in a proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to remove 
     to another district or place for commitment or trial a person 
     charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or 
     to test the validity of such person's detention pending 
     removal proceedings.
       ``(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 
     certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to 
     the court of appeals from--
       ``(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in 
     which the detention complained of arises out of process 
     issued by a State court; or
       ``(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.
       ``(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under 
     paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial 
     showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
       ``(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) 
     shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the 
     showing required by paragraph (2).''.

     SEC. 4. AMENDMENT OF FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.

       Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure is 
     amended to read as follows:
     ``Rule 22. Habeas corpus and section 2255 proceedings
       ``(a) Application for the Original Writ.--An application 
     for a writ of habeas corpus shall be made to the appropriate 
     district court. If application is made to a circuit judge, 
     the application shall be transferred to the appropriate 
     district court. If an application is made to or transferred 
     to the district court and denied, renewal of the application 
     before a circuit judge shall not be permitted. The applicant 
     may, pursuant to section 2253 of title 28, United States 
     Code, appeal to the appropriate court of appeals from the 
     order of the district court denying the writ.
       ``(b) Certificate of Appealability.--In a habeas corpus 
     proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of 
     process issued by a State court, an appeal by the applicant 
     for the writ may not proceed unless a district or a circuit 
     judge issues a certificate of appealability pursuant to 
     section 2253(c) of title 28, United States Code. If an appeal 
     is taken by the applicant, the district judge who rendered 
     the judgment shall either issue a certificate of 
     appealability or state the reasons why such a certificate 
     should not issue. The certificate or the statement shall be 
     forwarded to the court of appeals with the notice of appeal 
     and the file of the proceedings in the district court. If the 
     district judge has denied the certificate, the applicant for 
     the writ may then request issuance of the certificate by a 
     circuit judge. If such a request is addressed to the court of 
     appeals, it shall be deemed addressed to the judges thereof 
     and shall be considered by a circuit judge or judges as the 
     court deems appropriate. If no express request for a 
     certificate is filed, the notice of appeal shall be deemed to 
     constitute a request addressed to the judges of the court of 
     appeals. If an appeal is taken by a State or its 
     representative, a certificate of appealability is not 
     required.''.

     SEC. 5. SECTION 2254 AMENDMENTS.

       Section 2254 of title 28, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by amending subsection (b) to read as follows:
       ``(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on 
     behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 
     State court shall not be granted unless it appears that--
       ``(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in 
     the courts of the State; or
       ``(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective 
     process; or
       ``(ii) circumstances exist that render such process 
     ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.
       ``(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be 
     denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the 
     applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of 
     the State.
       ``(3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the 
     exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the 
     requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly 
     waives the requirement.'';
       (2) by redesignating subsections (d), (e), and (f) as 
     subsections (e), (f), and (g), respectively;
       (3) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf 
     of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 
     court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was 
     adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless 
     the adjudication of the claim--
       ``(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
     involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
     Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
     States; or
       ``(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 
     unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
     evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'';
       (4) by amending subsection (e), as redesignated by 
     paragraph (2), to read as follows:
       ``(e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a 
     writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 
     judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue 
     made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The 
     applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption 
     of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.
       ``(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual 
     basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall 
     not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the 
     applicant shows that--
       ``(A) the claim relies on--
       ``(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive by 
     the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
       ``(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been 
     previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; 
     and
       ``(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 
     establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for 
     constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have 
     found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.''; and
       (5) by adding at the end the following new subsections:
       ``(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in all 
     proceedings brought under this section, and any subsequent 
     proceedings on review, appointment of counsel for an 
     applicant who is or becomes financially unable to 
     [[Page S4594]] afford counsel shall be in the discretion of 
     the court, except as provided by a rule promulgated by the 
     Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Appointment of 
     counsel under this section shall be governed by section 3006A 
     of title 18.
       ``(i) The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during 
     Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall 
     not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under 
     section 2254.''.

     SEC. 6. SECTION 2255 AMENDMENTS.

       Section 2255 of title 28, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking the second and fifth paragraphs; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``A one-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion 
     under this section. The limitation period shall run from the 
     latest of--
       ``(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes 
     final;
       ``(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion 
     created by governmental action in violation of the 
     Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the 
     movant was prevented from making a motion by such 
     governmental action;
       ``(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially 
     recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly 
     recognized by the Supreme Court and is made retroactively 
     applicable; or
       ``(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or 
     claims presented could have been discovered through the 
     exercise of due diligence.
       ``In all proceedings brought under this section, and any 
     subsequent proceedings on review, appointment of counsel for 
     a movant who is or becomes financially unable to afford 
     counsel shall be in the discretion of the court, except as 
     provided by a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant 
     to statutory authority. Appointment of counsel under this 
     section shall be governed by section 3006A of title 18.
       ``A second or successive motion must be certified as 
     provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court 
     of appeals to contain--
       ``(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed 
     in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to 
     establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable 
     factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; 
     or
       ``(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive by 
     the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.''.

     SEC. 7. LIMITS ON SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE APPLICATIONS.

       (a) Conforming Amendment to Section 2244(a).--Section 
     2244(a) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking ``and the petition'' and all that follows through 
     ``by such inquiry.'' and inserting ``, except as provided in 
     section 2255.''.
       (b) Limits on Second or Successive Applications.--Section 
     2244(b) of title 28, United States Code, is amended to read 
     as follows:
       ``(b)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas 
     corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a 
     prior application shall be dismissed.
       ``(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas 
     corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented 
     in a prior application shall be dismissed unless--
       ``(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new 
     rule of constitutional law, made retroactive by the Supreme 
     Court, that was previously unavailable; or
       ``(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have 
     been discovered previously through the exercise of due 
     diligence; and
       ``(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed 
     in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to 
     establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 
     constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have 
     found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
       ``(3)(A) Before a second or successive application 
     permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the 
     applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for 
     an order authorizing the district court to consider the 
     application.
       ``(B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order 
     authorizing the district court to consider a second or 
     successive application shall be determined by a three-judge 
     panel of the court of appeals.
       ``(C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a 
     second or successive application only if it determines that 
     the application makes a prima facie showing that the 
     application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.
       ``(D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the 
     authorization to file a second or successive application not 
     later than 30 days after the filing of the motion.
       ``(E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of 
     appeals to file a second or success application shall not be 
     appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for 
     rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.
       ``(4) A district court shall dismiss any claim presented in 
     a second or successive application that the court of appeals 
     has authorized to be filed unless the applicant shows that 
     the claim satisfies the requirements of this section.''.

     SEC. 8. DEATH PENALTY LITIGATION PROCEDURES.

       (a) Addition of Chapter to Title 28, United States Code.--
     Title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting after 
     chapter 153 the following new chapter:

    ``CHAPTER 154--SPECIAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES IN CAPITAL CASES
``Sec.
``2261. Prisoners in State custody subject to capital sentence; 
              appointment of counsel; requirement of rule of court or 
              statute; procedures for appointment.
``2262. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on stays of 
              execution; second or abusive petitions.
``2263. Filing of habeas corpus application; time requirements; tolling 
              rules.
``2264. Scope of Federal review; district court adjudications.
``2265. Application to State unitary review procedure.
``2266. Limitation periods for determining applications and motions.
     ``Sec. 2261. Prisoners in State custody subject to capital 
       sentence; appointment of counsel; requirement of rule of 
       court or statute; procedures for appointment

       ``(a) This chapter shall apply to cases arising under 
     section 2254 brought by prisoners in State custody who are 
     subject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if the 
     provisions of subsections (b) and (c) are satisfied.
       ``(b) This chapter is applicable if a State establishes by 
     statute, rule of its court of last resort, or by another 
     agency authorized by State law, a mechanism for the 
     appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable 
     litigation expenses of competent counsel in State post-
     conviction proceedings brought by indigent prisoners whose 
     capital convictions and sentences have been upheld on direct 
     appeal to the court of last resort in the State or have 
     otherwise become final for State law purposes. The rule of 
     court or statute must provide standards of competency for the 
     appointment of such counsel.
       ``(c) Any mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and 
     reimbursement of counsel as provided in subsection (b) must 
     offer counsel to all State prisoners under capital sentence 
     and must provide for the entry of an order by a court of 
     record--
       ``(1) appointing one or more counsel to represent the 
     prisoner upon a finding that the prisoner is indigent and 
     accepted the offer or is unable competently to decide whether 
     to accept or reject the offer;
       ``(2) finding, after a hearing if necessary, that the 
     prisoner rejected the offer of counsel and made the decision 
     with an understanding of its legal consequences; or
       ``(3) denying the appointment of counsel upon a finding 
     that the prisoner is not indigent.
       ``(d) No counsel appointed pursuant to subsections (b) and 
     (c) to represent a State prisoner under capital sentence 
     shall have previously represented the prisoner at trial or on 
     direct appeal in the case for which the appointment is made 
     unless the prisoner and counsel expressly request continued 
     representation.
       ``(e) The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during 
     State or Federal post-conviction proceedings in a capital 
     case shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising 
     under section 2254. This limitation shall not preclude the 
     appointment of different counsel, on the court's own motion 
     or at the request of the prisoner, at any phase of State or 
     Federal post-conviction proceedings on the basis of the 
     ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel in such 
     proceedings.

     ``Sec. 2262. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on 
       stays of execution; successive petitions

       ``(a) Upon the entry in the appropriate State court of 
     record of an order under section 2261(c), a warrant or order 
     setting an execution date for a State prisoner shall be 
     stayed upon application to any court that would have 
     jurisdiction over any proceedings filed under section 2254. 
     The application shall recite that the State has invoked the 
     post-conviction review procedures of this chapter and that 
     the scheduled execution is subject to stay.
       ``(b) A stay of execution granted pursuant to subsection 
     (a) shall expire if--
       ``(1) a State prisoner fails to file a habeas corpus 
     application under section 2254 within the time required in 
     section 2263;
       ``(2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, in the 
     presence of counsel, unless the prisoner has competently and 
     knowingly waived such counsel, and after having been advised 
     of the consequences, a State prisoner under capital sentence 
     waives the right to pursue habeas corpus review under section 
     2254; or
       ``(3) a State prisoner files a habeas corpus petition under 
     section 2254 within the time required by section 2263 and 
     fails to make a substantial showing of the denial of a 
     Federal right or is denied relief in the district court or at 
     any subsequent stage of review.
       ``(c) If one of the conditions in subsection (b) has 
     occurred, no Federal court thereafter shall have the 
     authority to enter a stay of execution in the case, unless 
     the court of appeals approves the filing of a second or 
     successive application under section 2244(b).

     ``Sec. 2263. Filing of habeas corpus application; time 
       requirements; tolling rules

       ``(a) Any application under this chapter for habeas corpus 
     relief under section 2254 must be filed in the appropriate 
     district court not later than 180 days after final State 
     court affirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct 
     review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.
     [[Page S4595]]   ``(b) The time requirements established by 
     subsection (a) shall be tolled--
       ``(1) from the date that a petition for certiorari is filed 
     in the Supreme Court until the date of final disposition of 
     the petition if a State prisoner files the petition to secure 
     review by the Supreme Court of the affirmance of a capital 
     sentence on direct review by the court of last resort of the 
     State or other final State court decision on direct review;
       ``(2) from the date on which the first petition for post-
     conviction review or other collateral relief is filed until 
     the final State court disposition of such petition; and
       ``(3) during an additional period not to exceed 30 days, 
     if--
       ``(A) a motion for an extension of time is filed in the 
     Federal district court that would have jurisdiction over the 
     case upon the filing of a habeas corpus application under 
     section 2254; and
       ``(B) a showing of good cause is made for the failure to 
     file the habeas corpus application within the time period 
     established by this section.

     ``Sec. 2264. Scope of Federal review; district court 
       adjudications

       ``(a) Whenever a State prisoner under capital sentence 
     files a petition for habeas corpus relief to which this 
     chapter applies, the district court shall only consider a 
     claim or claims that have been raised and decided on the 
     merits in the State courts, unless the failure to raise the 
     claim properly is--
       ``(1) the result of State action in violation of the 
     Constitution or laws of the United States;
       ``(2) the result of the Supreme Court recognition of a new 
     Federal right that is made retroactively applicable; or
       ``(3) based on a factual predicate that could not have been 
     discovered through the exercise of due diligence in time to 
     present the claim for State or Federal post-conviction 
     review.
       ``(b) Following review subject to subsections (a), (d), and 
     (e) of section 2254, the court shall rule on the claims 
     properly before it.

     ``Sec. 2265. Application to State unitary review procedure

       ``(a) For purposes of this section, a `unitary review' 
     procedure means a State procedure that authorizes a person 
     under sentence of death to raise, in the course of direct 
     review of the judgment, such claims as could be raised on 
     collateral attack. This chapter shall apply, as provided in 
     this section, in relation to a State unitary review procedure 
     if the State establishes by rule of its court of last resort 
     or by statute a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, 
     and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent 
     counsel in the unitary review proceedings, including expenses 
     relating to the litigation of collateral claims in the 
     proceedings. The rule of court or statute must provide 
     standards of competency for the appointment of such counsel.
       ``(b) To qualify under this section, a unitary review 
     procedure must include an offer of counsel following trial 
     for the purpose of representation on unitary review, and 
     entry of an order, as provided in section 2261(c), concerning 
     appointment of counsel or waiver or denial of appointment of 
     counsel for that purpose. No counsel appointed to represent 
     the prisoner in the unitary review proceedings shall have 
     previously represented the prisoner at trial in the case for 
     which the appointment is made unless the prisoner and counsel 
     expressly request continued representation.
       ``(c) Sections 2262, 2263, 2264, and 2266 shall apply in 
     relation to cases involving a sentence of death from any 
     State having a unitary review procedure that qualifies under 
     this section. References to State `post-conviction review' 
     and `direct review' in such sections shall be understood as 
     referring to unitary review under the State procedure. The 
     reference in section 2262(a) to `an order under section 
     2261(c)' shall be understood as referring to the post-trial 
     order under subsection (b) concerning representation in the 
     unitary review proceedings, but if a transcript of the trial 
     proceedings is unavailable at the time of the filing of such 
     an order in the appropriate State court, then the start of 
     the 180-day limitation period under section 2263 shall be 
     deferred until a transcript is made available to the prisoner 
     or counsel of the prisoner.

     ``Sec. 2266. Limitation periods for determining applications 
       and motions

       ``(a) The adjudication of any application under section 
     2254 that is subject to this chapter, and the adjudication of 
     any motion under section 2255 by a person under sentence of 
     death, shall be given priority by the district court and by 
     the court of appeals over all noncapital matters.
       ``(b)(1)(A) A district court shall render a final 
     determination and enter a final judgment on any application 
     for a writ of habeas corpus brought under this chapter in a 
     capital case not later than 180 days after the date on which 
     the application is filed.
       ``(B) A district court shall afford the parties at least 
     120 days in which to complete all actions, including the 
     preparation of all pleadings and briefs, and if necessary, a 
     hearing, prior to the submission of the case for decision.
       ``(C)(i) A district court may delay for not more than one 
     additional 30-day period beyond the period specified in 
     subparagraph (A), the rendering of a determination of an 
     application for a writ of habeas corpus if the court issues a 
     written order making a finding, and stating the reasons for 
     the finding, that the ends of justice that would be served by 
     allowing the delay outweigh the best interests of the public 
     and the applicant in a speedy disposition of the application.
       ``(ii) The factors, among others, that a court shall 
     consider in determining whether a delay in the disposition of 
     an application is warranted are as follows:
       ``(I) Whether the failure to allow the delay would be 
     likely to result in a miscarriage of justice.
       ``(II) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to 
     the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or 
     the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is 
     unreasonable to expect adequate briefing within the time 
     limitations established by subparagraph (A).
       ``(III) Whether the failure to allow a delay in a case, 
     that, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as 
     described in subclause (II), but would otherwise deny the 
     applicant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would 
     unreasonably deny the applicant or the government continuity 
     of counsel, or would deny counsel for the applicant or the 
     government the reasonable time necessary for effective 
     preparation, taking into account the exercise of due 
     diligence.
       ``(iii) No delay in disposition shall be permissible 
     because of general congestion of the court's calendar.
       ``(iv) The court shall transmit a copy of any order issued 
     under clause (i) to the Director of the Administrative Office 
     of the United States Courts for inclusion in the report under 
     paragraph (5).
       ``(2) The time limitations under paragraph (1) shall apply 
     to--
       ``(A) an initial application for a writ of habeas corpus;
       ``(B) any second or successive application for a writ of 
     habeas corpus; and
       ``(C) any redetermination of an application for a writ of 
     habeas corpus following a remand by the court of appeals or 
     the Supreme Court for further proceedings, in which case the 
     limitation period shall run from the date the remand is 
     ordered.
       ``(3)(A) The time limitations under this section shall not 
     be construed to entitle an applicant to a stay of execution, 
     to which the applicant would otherwise not be entitled, for 
     the purpose of litigating any application or appeal.
       ``(B) No amendment to an application for a writ of habeas 
     corpus under this chapter shall be permitted after the filing 
     of the answer to the application, except on the grounds 
     specified in section 2244(b).
       ``(4)(A) The failure of a court to meet or comply with a 
     time limitation under this section shall not be a ground for 
     granting relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence.
       ``(B) The State may enforce a time limitation under this 
     section by petitioning for a writ of mandamus to the court of 
     appeals. The court of appeals shall act on the petition for a 
     writ or mandamus not later than 30 days after the filing of 
     the petition.
       ``(5)(A) The Administrative Office of United States Courts 
     shall submit to Congress an annual report on the compliance 
     by the district courts with the time limitations under this 
     section.
       ``(B) The report described in subparagraph (A) shall 
     include copies of the orders submitted by the district courts 
     under paragraph (1)(B)(iv).
       ``(c)(1)(A) A court of appeals shall hear and render a 
     final determination of any appeal of an order granting or 
     denying, in whole or in part, an application brought under 
     this chapter in a capital case not later than 120 days after 
     the date on which the reply brief is filed, or if no reply 
     brief is filed, not later than 120 days after the date on 
     which the answering brief is filed.
       ``(B)(i) A court of appeals shall decide whether to grant a 
     petition for rehearing or other request for rehearing en banc 
     not later than 30 days after the date on which the petition 
     for rehearing is filed unless a responsive pleading is 
     required, in which case the court shall decide whether to 
     grant the petition not later than 30 days after the date on 
     which the responsive pleading is filed.
       ``(ii) If a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc is 
     granted, the court of appeals shall hear and render a final 
     determination of the appeal not later than 120 days after the 
     date on which the order granting rehearing or rehearing en 
     banc is entered.
       ``(2) The time limitations under paragraph (1) shall apply 
     to--
       ``(A) an initial application for a writ of habeas corpus;
       ``(B) any second or successive application for a writ of 
     habeas corpus; and
       ``(C) any redetermination of an application for a writ of 
     habeas corpus or related appeal following a remand by the 
     court of appeals en banc or the Supreme Court for further 
     proceedings, in which case the limitation period shall run 
     from the date the remand is ordered.
       ``(3) The time limitations under this section shall not be 
     construed to entitle an applicant to a stay of execution, to 
     which the applicant would otherwise not be entitled, for the 
     purpose of litigating any application or appeal.
       ``(4)(A) The failure of a court to meet or comply with a 
     time limitation under this section shall not be a ground for 
     granting relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence.
     [[Page S4596]]   ``(B) The State may enforce a time 
     limitation under this section by applying for a writ of 
     mandamus to the Supreme Court.
       ``(5) The Administrative Office of United States Courts 
     shall submit to Congress an annual report on the compliance 
     by the courts of appeals with the time limitations under this 
     section.''.
       (b) Technical Amendment.--The part analysis for part IV of 
     title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding after the 
     item relating to chapter 153 the following new item:

``154. Special habeas corpus procedures in capital cases...2261.''.....
     SEC. 9. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.

       Section 408(q) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 
     848(q)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (4)(A), by striking ``shall'' and 
     inserting ``may'';
       (2) in paragraph (4)(B), by striking ``shall'' and 
     inserting ``may''; and
       (3) by amending paragraph (9) to read as follows:
       ``(9) Upon a finding that investigative, expert, or other 
     services are reasonably necessary for the representation of 
     the defendant, whether in connection with issues relating to 
     guilt or the sentence, the court may authorize the 
     defendant's attorneys to obtain such services on behalf of 
     the defendant and, if so authorized, shall order the payment 
     of fees and expenses therefor under paragraph (10). No ex 
     parte proceeding, communication, or request may be considered 
     pursuant to this section unless a proper showing is made 
     concerning the need for confidentiality. Any such proceeding, 
     communication, or request shall be transcribed and made a 
     part of the record available for appellate review.''.

     SEC. 10. SEVERABILITY.

       If any provision of this Act, an amendment made by this 
     Act, or the application of such provision or amendment to any 
     person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the 
     remainder of this Act, the amendments made by this Act, and 
     the application of the provisions of such to any person or 
     circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Pennsylvania, my 
distinguished colleague on the Judiciary Committee, for his kind words. 
Senator Specter, a former prosecutor, is one of the most knowledgeable 
persons on the Judiciary Committee with respect to habeas corpus 
litigation. He has long been an advocate for habeas reform. Together, 
we have worked hard to craft a consensus bill that will enact 
meaningful reform of the Federal habeas corpus process. Today, we are 
introducing as legislation the product of those labors.
  I am pleased to join with Senator Specter in introducing legislation 
to reform Federal habeas corpus procedures. This marks an important 
step in the process of ensuring that convicted criminals receive the 
punishment they justly deserve. A criminal justice system incapable of 
enforcing legally imposed sentences cannot be called just and must be 
reformed.
  The statutory writ of habeas corpus is an important means of 
guaranteeing that innocent persons will not be illegally imprisoned. 
Indeed, the Constitution guarantees the writ against suspension. 
Unfortunately, this bulwark of liberty has been perverted by those who 
would seek to frustrate the demands of justice.
  As of January 1, 1995, there were some 2,976 inmates on death row. 
Yet, only 38 prisoners were executed last year, and the States have 
executed only 263 criminals since 1973. In 1989, a committee chaired by 
then-retired Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell found, among other 
things, extraordinary delays in the discharge of sentences and an abuse 
of the litigation process. The committee reported that Federal habeas 
corpus made up approximately 40 percent of the total delay from 
sentence to execution in a random sampling of cases. At that time, the 
shortest of these proceedings lasted for 2.5 years and the longest 
nearly 15 years.
  The Powell committee concluded that the Federal collateral review 
process, with the long separation between sentence and effectuation of 
that sentence, ``hamper[ed] justice without improving the quality of 
adjudication.'' [Powell Committee Report at 4.] This abuse of habeas 
corpus litigation, particularly in those cases involving lawfully 
imposed death sentences, has taken a dreadful toll on victims' 
families, seriously eroded the public's confidence in our criminal 
justice system, and drained State criminal justice resources. This was 
not the system envisioned by the Framers of our Constitution.
  In my home State of Utah, for example, convicted murderer William 
Andrews delayed the imposition of a constitutionally imposed death 
sentence for over 18 years. The State had to put up millions of dollars 
in precious criminal justice resources to litigate his meritless 
claims. His guilt was never in question. He was not an innocent person 
seeking freedom from an illegal punishment. Rather, he simply wanted to 
frustrate the imposition of punishment his heinous crimes warranted.
  Senator Specter and I have worked to draft a consensus habeas corpus 
reform measure that will respect the traditional roles of State and 
Federal courts, secure the legitimate constitutional rights of the 
defendant, and restore balance to the criminal justice system.
  Habeas corpus reform must not discourage legitimate petitions that 
are clearly meritorious and deserve close scrutiny. Meaningful reform 
must, however, stop repeated assaults upon fair and valid State 
convictions through spurious petitions filed in Federal court.
  As a consequence, the reform proposal Senator Specter and I have 
introduced sets time limits to eliminate unnecessary delay and to 
discourage those who would use the system to prevent the imposition of 
a just sentence. Manufactured delays breed contempt for the law and 
have a profound effect on the victims of violent crime.
  Our proposed legislation limits second or successive Federal 
petitions to claims of factual innocence or in those instances in which 
the Supreme Court has created a new rule of constitutional law and 
applied that rule retroactively. Our bill also ensures that proper 
deference is given to the judgments of State courts, who have the 
primary obligation of trying criminal cases. After all, finality is a 
hallmark of a just system, and must be maintained in order to preserve 
the legitimacy of the criminal process.
  Critics of meaningful habeas reform complain that the reformers are 
seeking to destroy the Constitution's guarantees of individual liberty. 
This specious argument is simply incorrect. It misstates the original 
understanding of the habeas process. The legislation Senator Specter 
and I have introduced will uphold the constitutional guarantees of 
freedom from illegal punishment, while at the same time ensuring that 
lawfully convicted criminals will not be able to twist the criminal 
justice system to their own advantage.
  I believe that the bill we have introduced today will give the 
American people the crime control legislation they demand and deserve. 
I urge the support of my colleagues for this important legislation.
                                 ______

      By Mr. HATFIELD:
  S. 624. A bill to establish a Science and Mathematics Early Start 
Grant Program, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources.


             science and math early start grant program act

  Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I regard the eight National Education 
Goals we codified in the Goals 2000 legislation as very important 
challenges; challenges we must make every effort to meet in order to 
ensure the future of the Nation. All of these goals are interconnected. 
We cannot afford to lag behind in any and expect to attain the rest. At 
this time, it appears that U.S. students continue to lag dangerously 
behind in mathematics and science achievement.
  With the passage of Goals 2000 and the ESEA reauthorization, we hope 
to reduce that gap. Yet, there are still glaring holes in our math and 
science educational programs. The bill I am introducing today is 
designed to fill one of those holes. It is that, unfortunately, many 
currently funded Federal programs for children, especially preschool 
youngsters, such as Head Start do not usually include any special 
emphasis on math or science education. Even when math and science are 
included as part of the curriculum, they are often the weakest areas of 
emphasis.
  Ask any parent to list the character traits of preschoolers and high 
on the list will be curiosity and a desire to learn ``why.'' These 
children are naturally curious and eager to understand the world around 
them. I believe that we, as a nation of educators, are missing a 
tremendous opportunity when we 
[[Page S4597]] fail to build on this natural curiosity by failing to 
provide these rich experiences.
  Federal programs intended to provide additional support for low 
income children such as Head Start and chapter I should include 
activities rich in early math and science investigations. It is the 
very nature of science to answer the question ``why.'' Early exposure 
to age-appropriate, inquiry-based science and mathematics experiences 
will provide the foundation on which later understanding rests.
  Why, with rare exception, are educational programs rich in math and 
science missing from preschool curriculum? I believe that the major 
reason is that most preschool teachers have little experience with 
simple science and mathematics activities, feel uncomfortable with 
teaching science and mathematics, and are not prepared to teach age-
appropriate and inquiry-based science and mathematics. This is an area 
of greatest need. While I do not underestimate the importance of 
language development and social experiences that are a large part of 
preschool programs, I feel that we can no longer minimize the 
importance of early science and math investigations. This is 
particularly true of the target
 group of Head Start as preschoolers from low-income families often 
have very limited opportunities to be exposed to science activities.

  It is possible to provide these experiences to preschoolers? The 
answer is provided by a program conducted at Marylhurst College in 
Portland, OR. This wonderful program, now in its third year, is 
training Head Start teachers to use exciting, age-appropriate math and 
science activities in their classes. Picture the effect these 
activities have on disadvantaged and minority youth. In all likelihood, 
this is the first chance these children have to relate math and science 
to their lives. The teacher training program has been conducted for the 
past three years, and the results have been phenomenal.
  Consider what two teachers, Sherry Wright and Debi Coffey, from the 
Albina Head Start program in Oregon had to say. ``After two years of 
using the knowledge we gained from the Marylhurst College instructors, 
we truly feel confident in using science everyday. Our children have 
learned how to predict and discover the possible results to a problem. 
Our children will take the science experience that they learned in Head 
Start with them throughout the rest of their lives.''
  Andrey Sylvia, who had no science classes at all prior to the 
Marylhurst College Head Start Summer Institute, expressed the result 
excitedly and succinctly. ``Now I am a science whiz!''
  My legislation provides for a competitive grant program to establish 
demonstration sites to acquaint preschool teachers with the stimulating 
processes involved in the inquiry approach. The teachers themselves 
must experience the excitement of hands-on activities in order to 
communicate that excitement to children. No more than 25 percent of the 
funds can be used for the purchase of supplies necessary to carry out 
the activities.
  A second part of the legislation provides funds to enable Head Start 
teachers to participate in professional development programs in science 
and mathematics teaching methods.
  We simply cannot afford to miss the opportunity to replicate this 
concept throughout the preschool and Head Start programs nationwide. 
These programs are a positive investment in the lives of these 
disadvantaged children and will create a lifelong interest in math and 
science. That interest is critical to the future of the children and 
equally critical to the future of the Nation.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that these letters from the 
president of Marylhurst College and Sarah Greene, chief executive 
officer of National Head Start Association, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
                                           Marylhurst College,

                                   Marylhurst, OR, March 20, 1995.
     Hon. Mark O. Hatfield,
     Hart Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Hatfield: As President of Marylhurst College, 
     an accredited, private, liberal arts college dedicated to 
     making innovative post-secondary education accessible to 
     self-directed students of all ages, I am delighted to offer 
     this letter of support for the Science and Math Early Start 
     Grant Program Act.
       Despite national concern and reform efforts, science and 
     mathematics education for preschool children remains limited, 
     and ample studies demonstrate an even greater lack of science 
     and math skills among low income students. A longitudinal 
     study of disadvantaged children at the Perry Preschool in 
     Ypsilanti, Michigan, found that for every dollar invested, 
     seven dollars were returned to society in terms of higher 
     income and fewer costs related to welfare and crime. Widely 
     recognized as a successful intervention, Head Start provides 
     low income children with basic education, but it has been 
     criticized for not providing discipline-based instruction--
     especially in science--due to the teachers' lack of 
     educational preparation. In fact, the final Report of the 
     Advisory Committee on Head Start Quality and Expansion (12/
     93) recommends strengthening staff training and building 
     partnerships with the private sector.
       Marylhurst designed its Summer Science Institute to address 
     this problem by training Head Start teachers to teach science 
     and encourage their students to develop an interest in 
     science. The pilot Institute--an intensive, experiential, 
     four-week, college credit course covering basic scientific 
     principles--has been offered to 53 Albina Head Start and 
     Portland Public School teachers since 1992. Seventy-five 
     percent reported that the experience completely changed their 
     attitudes about science and their abilities to learn and 
     teach science.
       According to an independent evaluation by Northwest 
     Regional Educational Laboratory, the Institute made a major 
     contribution to science teaching in the Albina program. NWREL 
     concluded that it also had ``a positive systemic influence on 
     the level of teacher and student self-esteem, which in turn 
     has increased the effectiveness of student learning across 
     their curriculum.'' The Portland Public School evaluation is 
     currently in process. Marylhurst plans to replicate the 
     successful model through Head Start college partnerships.
       Through the Science and Math Early Start Program Act of 
     1995, Congress can provide seed money to encourage efficient 
     replication of similar programs, which can be maintained 
     without ongoing government support with funding provided by 
     foundations and corporations. This legislation not only 
     ensures that low income children are included in national 
     science and math education reform efforts, but also improves 
     Head Start teacher preparation so that they can better 
     prepare their students for a more technologically and 
     scientifically complex future.
           Sincerely,
                                                Nancy Wilgenbusch,
     President.
                                                                    ____

                              National Head Start Association,

                                  Alexandria, VA, January 9, 1995.
     Hon. Mark O. Hatfield,
     Hart Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Hatfield: The National Head Start Association 
     supports efforts to expand the Summer Science Institute and 
     make it an integral part of the education program for 
     preschoolers. Dr. Nancy Wilgenbush, President, Marylhurst 
     College, presented an overview of the Summer Science 
     Institute to over 5,000 Head Start teachers, administrators, 
     and parents during our annual conference in April 1993. She 
     also conducted a workshop during the conference, it was 
     packed. The presentation resulted in an overwhelming request 
     for more information on project implementation. Our office, 
     as well as Dr. Wilgenbush's, continue receiving such 
     inquiries.
       After receiving the absolutely positive results of the 
     project conducted in Portland with Albina Head Start 
     teachers, I am convinced of the need to implement the Summer 
     Science Institute nationwide.
       This early infusion of science for young low income 
     children is essential if we are preparing them for the 21st 
     Century.
       Thank you for introducing a bill providing funds to 
     implement this project.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Sarah M. Greene,
                                          Chief Executive Officer.
     

                          ____________________