[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 55 (Friday, March 24, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E691]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


          CLINTON'S FOREIGN POLICY: SENDING THE WRONG MESSAGES

                                 ______


                        HON. GERALD B.H. SOLOMON

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                         Friday, March 24, 1995
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I urge you to take note of an article which 
appeared in the Albany Times Union on March 23. It is not hard to 
understand why Russia is not taking our concerns seriously about 
Chechnya and nuclear proliferation when the Clinton administration 
publicly threatens and criticizes Russia for its actions, yet continues 
to act as if it is business as usual by celebrating the 50th 
anniversary of V-E Day in Moscow. Based on these empty threats it is no 
surprise that the Russians intensified their military operations in 
Chechnya following the President's decision to travel to Russia.
  The article follows:

                       An Untimely Trip to Moscow

       The issue: President Clinton intends to visit Boris Yeltsin 
     despite criticism.
       Our opinion: He cannot escape the need to face up to 
     Chechnya.
       The Clinton administration continues to bet its chips on 
     President Boris Yeltsin's regime in Russia, despite cautions 
     from many sides that doing so is backing a horse fading in 
     mid-race.
       In agreeing to attend the Moscow celebrations on the 50th 
     anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe, President 
     Clinton overrode earlier objections, raised within the 
     administration as well as by political opponents, to such a 
     trip. The savage campaign by President Yeltsin to crush 
     secessionists Chechnya was reason enough for the American 
     president to abstain from a summit meeting.
       Furthermore, the incompetent performance of the Russian 
     army forced Mr. Yeltsin to further distance himself from the 
     modernizing forces in Russia, which oppose the Chechnya war, 
     and become more beholden to nationalist and Communist 
     elements, who are for it.
       The loser is the momentum to democratic refor. The United 
     States' principal reason for strongly backing Mr. Yeltsin 
     through several major crises was that he was the best 
     instrument for developing democracy in Russia.
       To entice Mr. Clinton to come to Moscow, Mr. Yeltsin made a 
     couple of gestures. He permitted international rights 
     monitors into Chechnya, and he agreed to downplay the 
     military aspects of the May 9 observance in Moscow.
       Furthermore, the Clinton administration did not wish to be 
     indifferent to Moscow's argument that the Soviet people paid 
     a fearful price--some 20 million dead--to help bring about 
     the defeat of Nazi Germany.
       Those actions and arguments notwithstanding, Senate 
     Republicans Jesse Helms and Mitch McConnell outspokenly 
     oppose Mr. Clinton's journey to Moscow. They have a point.
       Specifically on Chechnya, the U.S. should have extracted 
     more concessions from President Yeltsin, providing for ways 
     to bring the civil war to an end. That would serve Boris 
     Yeltsin most of all, and buttress those in Russia laboring 
     for a more democratic society.
       Having decided to go, Mr. Clinton is obliged to try to 
     accomplish face to face what lower level diplomacy could not.
     

                          ____________________