[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 53 (Wednesday, March 22, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4342-S4358]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


             SPRING RETURNS TO THE WEST VIRGINIA MOUNTAINS

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, 2 days ago, the first day of spring 
officially came to Washington. Here in Washington, the change from one 
season to another is often dramatic. One morning, D.C. temperatures 
might be in the freezing range, while the following day might find 
young men and women out on the Mall playing volleyball in shorts and 
tee shirts. Here, tulips and magnolias burst forth from nowhere, and 
the cherry blossoms transform the city as if by overnight magic.
  But a few miles west of us--among the peaks and plateaus of the high 
Appalachians in West Virginia, spring dawns like a beautiful young 
woman awakening from a long sleep.
  If the geologists are correct, spring has awakened in the same 
fashion in West Virginia for millions of years.
  High on Alpine West Virginia ridges--once, we are told, the 
equivalent in altitude of some caps among the Himalayas today--crystal 
ice and deep-packed snow begin their melt, the runoff seeking the sea 
first as droplets, then as rivulets, next as springs and brooks, then 
as creeks and streams, and finally as flooding branches that find their 
routes either into the widening Potomac on the eastern slopes of the 
Alleghenies and the western sides of the Blue Ridge, or into the mighty 
Ohio and Mississippi farther west--dependable flows of water of that 
helped to create the shores of Tidewater Virginia and Maryland's 
Eastern Shore through the millennia, on one hand, and that has built up 
the Mississippi Delta since before the bison crossed into North 
America, on the other hand.
  But more subtle changes accompany spring's approach in West 
Virginia--changes too often observed only by the sparkling eyes of 
squirrels and of the first adventurous rabbits out of their winter 
burrows--changes such as tiny blossoms in greening meadows, minuscule 
leaves emerging on bare maple branches, cardinals, and robins 
announcing in concert the impending arrival of a new season, and 
graceful deer grazing on tender blades of new grass--and all 
proclaiming the marvels of the Creator's bounty and brilliance.
  Oh, to be a child once again in West Virginia--a child who, on his or 
her way to school in the cool of the morning air, can perhaps feast his 
or her senses on the dawning spring as most adults can no longer--a 
child who catches the first perfume of cherry blossoms on young fruit 
trees or who pauses to listen to the symphony of the songbirds or who 
savors the gentle breezes on his or her cheek, where but days before 
the cruel winter wind bit and chapped.
  And soon, Mr. President, the mountains and hills of West Virginia 
will again be enfolded in new foliage from base to summit, and the 
sunrises and sunsets will put even the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel to 
shame with their incandescent colors and shafts of spun gold streaking 
across the early morning and evening vault of the West Virginia 
firmament.
  There we may see,

     The marigold that goes to bed wi' the Sun,
     And with him rises weeping . . . daffodils,
     That come before the swallow dares, and take
     The winds of March with beauty; violets dim,
     But sweeter than the lids of Juno's eyes
     Or Cytherea's breath; pale primroses,
     That die unmarried, ere they can behold
     Bright Phoebus in his strength. . . .

  Mr. President, I invite all of our colleagues to visit West Virginia 
at any time, but particularly during this special season of rebirth 
among the mountains, down the valleys, and across the 
[[Page S4343]]  whole Appalachian Plateau. But if anybody accepts my 
invitation, I suggest that they visit West Virginia in a recapturement 
of their childhood--with the open eyes and trusting heart of a child, 
with the pure hearing of a child, and with the joy and wonder with 
which we were born--all of these things that permit children to listen, 
perceive, and relish the beauties and mysteries of life that the 
Creator shares every year with all of his offspring, but that, too 
often, as hardened and sometimes insensitive men and women, we lose the 
capacity to enjoy, much less to appreciate.

     The year's at the spring
     And day's at the morn;
     Morning's at seven;
     The hillside's dew-pearled;
     The lark's on the wing;
     The snail's on the thorn:
     God's in his heaven--
     All's right with the world.

  Madam President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, if the Senator would withhold, I would 
like to make a few remarks.
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I withhold.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I have listened with care in the last few 
days to the debate on the so-called line-item veto. I have not heard 
all of it, but I have heard, I think, enough to understand the 
parameters we are talking about. And we are now debating the proposed 
substitute--the Separate Enrollment and Line-Item Veto Act of 1995.
  The sponsors have claimed that this bill will provide the means to 
remove, among other things, a particular focus on what is known around 
the country as pork-barrel spending from appropriations bills. The 
language of the proposal, however, does not live up to the sponsors' 
claims.
  I am going to raise several questions tonight that I hope can be 
clarified or answered. Although the sponsors have aimed at certain 
expenditures, as I see it, they have missed.
  In fact, this proposal provides the President with significantly less 
authority to control pork-barrel spending than would have been provided 
under either the Domenici-Exon expedited rescission proposal or the 
McCain enhanced rescission proposal.
  Madam President, I see at least five serious problems with the 
proposed substitute. First, it contains loopholes so large that the 
proponents of pork will be able to insulate whole barrels of pork from 
a Presidential veto if they choose to do so. Second, the separate 
enrollment procedures would allow the President to veto funding 
limitations as well as funding amounts, which would inhibit the ability 
of Congress to address legitimate policy differences with the 
President.
  Third, this proposal permits the President to increase, as well as 
decrease spending, by allowing him to sign into law those portions of 
an appropriation bill that increase spending, and to veto those 
portions of an appropriation bill that rescind or reduce spending.
  So, in other words, if a President chose to, under this authority, he 
could take an appropriation bill that had been passed by the Congress 
and he could basically increase the amount in that appropriation bill 
by doing away or vetoing the rescissions in that bill that reduce 
funding.
  So just the opposite of what the sponsors have intended could occur. 
This is just saying to the President, we think you are a whole lot 
better at this than we are, so we give you the authority. You make the 
decisions--increase or decrease. You do whatever you want. I do not 
think that is what is intended, but that is what the proposal does.
  Fourth, the proposed substitute, if not undermined by the use of 
loopholes--and I do not assume that these loopholes would be used by 
people with good faith, but I think that we have to assume that at some 
point they will be--if not undermined by the loopholes, this substitute 
will lead to what Senator Roth and the Republican members of the 
Governmental Affairs Committee describe as ``undesirable rigidity'' in 
the management of the executive branch and the legislative process.
  Finally, the proposed substitute does nothing to enhance the ability 
of Congress to address the real problems here--that is, the legislative 
practices such as unauthorized appropriations, legislative earmarks, 
and adding items in conference even though they have not been approved 
by the House or the Senate.
  Those are the abuses in the process. This proposal does nothing to 
get at those abuses. Those are the problems, but the target here has 
been missed.
  Madam President, to place my concerns in context, I would like to 
briefly summarize the current appropriations process. There are two 
types of documents that are produced by Congress in the appropriation 
process, and I really do not believe a whole lot of our Members 
understand this.
  The first document is an appropriation bill which is passed by both 
Houses of Congress. It is signed into law by the President. Last year's 
defense appropriation bill, for example, was 61 pages long. The bill is 
legally binding upon the executive branch.
  The second type of document is the reports issued by the 
appropriation committees and the House-Senate conferees. The three 
reports issued in connection with last year's defense bill are 853 
pages, covering over 2,300 different line items.
  The policy directions in these reports is not binding on the 
executive branch. There is no requirement in law or Senate rule that an 
appropriation bill or report contain any specific level of detail. Most 
appropriation bills, particularly in the defense arena, set forth large 
lump-sum amounts that are not tied to specific programs, projects, or 
activities.
  Looking at an example from last year's Department of Defense 
Appropriation Act, the Act provides a specific sum for Army aircraft 
procurement, $1,063,164,000. The text of the act does not require the 
Army to spend that money on any particular type of aircraft.
  The detail is set forth in the committee and conference reports which 
specify the amounts for production or modification of a dozen different 
types of aircraft. Those report items are not legally binding on the 
Department of Defense. The Department, as a matter of law, can spend 
that $1 billion on any type of army aircraft selected by the Army or 
the Department of Defense, regardless of the types that are specified 
in the Appropriations Committee reports.
  Any restrictions, earmarks, or other special conditions that are in 
the committee report are not binding on the Department of Defense. As a 
matter of comity and custom, the Department of Defense generally, but 
not always, follows the guidance in the committee reports, but it is 
not required to do so.
  The Department of Defense routinely reprograms funds between various 
lines in the Appropriations Committee reports without any congressional 
involvement. Above certain thresholds, however, for example, operation 
and maintenance reprogrammings that exceed $20 million, there is a 
custom of obtaining prior approval for reprogrammings from the 
congressional defense committees.
  That is, when they shift funds from one account to the other. In the 
Department of Defense this happens hundreds of times in a year because 
there are certain programs that get behind schedule--they cannot be 
completed on time. Therefore, the money is not needed as originally 
anticipated. The money is needed somewhere else. They shift back and 
forth, back and forth. Over certain thresholds, they have to come back 
here for informal approval.
  There is nothing binding about reprogramming. They do not even have 
to come to us for reprogramming approval as a matter of law. That also 
is a matter of comity. Moreover, if Congress were to insist on such 
prior committee approvals, it would likely constitute an 
unconstitutional legislative veto.
  In summary, Madam President, there is no requirement for an 
appropriation bill or report to contain any specific level of detail. 
And the material in the committee and conference reports is not legally 
binding on the executive branch. Much--not all--but much of the pork, 
perhaps most, but at least much of the pork identified in the news 
media that we dwell on in here and that disturbs all members--and I 
know the Senator from Arizona has been particularly vigilant in that 
respect and I 
[[Page S4344]] think over the years I have, also--that pork, much of 
it, is not binding on the President but is spent as a matter of comity 
between the two branches.
  I am often amused when Presidents are talking about how their hands 
are bound and they can not do certain things because of Congress, and a 
whole lot of things they complain about are not binding on the 
Presidents of the United States.
  As a matter of comity, if they disregarded the reports year in and 
year out, they would be jeopardizing some of their own programs, but in 
my opinion we have had several Presidents who have basically talked 
about the line-item veto because they wanted to give the appearance 
that they had to accept things beyond their control, when they knew 
they had control, if they wanted to do something about it. Most of them 
do not want to do anything about it because they want their own pet 
projects.
 And it ends up being spent as a matter of comity between the two 
branches of Government.

  I know that is not going to change people's minds here, but that is 
the way the system works. We need to understand that we are trying to 
correct something and we are shooting at a target that is not really a 
target.
  In summary, Madam President, there is no requirement for an 
appropriation bill or report to contain any specific level of detail, 
and the material in committee and conference reports is not legally 
binding on the executive branch. Much of the pork identified in the 
media is not binding on the President but is spent as a matter of 
comity between the two branches.
  Now, committee reports that explain legislative provisions are 
legislative history, and they do have an effect. But what we are 
talking about now is committee reports that talk about expenditures and 
how that money would be spent, and that is not binding.
  Madam President, with that background, I would like to turn to the 
loopholes in the proposed substitute. The supporters of the proposed 
substitute assert that it will require pork-barrel projects to be set 
forth in the text of appropriation bills and enrolled as separate 
enactments. There is no such requirement in the proposed substitute. As 
drafted, the substitute merely provides that--I am quoting directly 
from it--``The committee on Appropriations of either the House or the 
Senate shall not report an appropriation measure that fails to contain 
such level of detail on the allocation of an item of appropriation 
proposed by that House as is set forth in the committee report 
accompanying such bill.''
  The first defect is there is no requirement in current law, Senate 
rules, or the proposed substitute that the Appropriations Committee 
provide any specific level of detail in the committee report. The 
committee report does not have to have any specific level of detail in 
it. So the very heart of this proposal ties it to details in the 
committee report, but the detail does not have to be in there. If we 
enact the proposed substitute, the Appropriations Committee, if they 
choose to, can easily avoid a line-item veto by providing lump sum 
appropriations and then setting forth the detail in separate documents 
other than the committee report. These documents could include a floor 
statement by the managers of the bill, an agreed joint statement of the 
managers of the conference which is placed in the Congressional Record 
in lieu of or in addition to the formal conference report, or a simple 
letter from the leadership of the committee to the head of an agency.
  And I assume and I believe, based on previous practice and 
observations, that within a year or two that will begin to happen.
  In other words, there is no requirement that the committee report or 
a conference report contain a specific level of detail. No line-item 
detail is required, and there is no requirement that there be anything 
for the President to veto beyond a lump sum appropriation.
  (Mr. GRAMS assumed the Chair.)
  Mr. NUNN. Using the example I discussed earlier, the appropriation 
bill could simply provide $1 billion for army aircraft procurement. It 
could set forth minimal descriptive material in the committee report 
and then provide all the details, including a pork-barrel earmark, in a 
floor statement or a letter to the Department of Defense.
  Alternatively, the committee could include all noncontroversial 
materials in the committee report and then address a pork-barrel 
earmark in a floor statement or letter to the DOD. In either case, Mr. 
President, the President of the United States under the proposed 
substitute would have nothing to veto except the big lump sum 
procurement. That is all he would have to veto. He would not have the 
detail in there.
  The substitute appears to be based on the mistaken premise that the 
only way Congress can earmark a pork-barrel project is through bill or 
report language. Mr. President, that is naive and ignores both 
legislative history and precedent. Unlike report language that 
interprets a legislative provision, a line item in a committee report 
which sets forth a committee's policy direction on expenditures has no 
legal standing. It has no more legal effect than a speech in the 
Chamber, a letter from a committee, or a phone call from a committee 
chairman. Therefore, those who want to earmark or add pork do not need 
report language. They can use any other form of communication to the 
executive branch.
  The likely effect of the substitute will be to drive the pork into 
underground shelters where it will be hidden from scrutiny. If the 
substitute is enacted, the really egregious earmarks no longer will be 
set forth in committee reports. The earmarks will be described in floor 
statements, letters from committees, or even phone calls from committee 
chairmen to the heads of agencies. The proposed substitute will not 
eliminate pork. It will drive it underground.
  A related loophole is the failure of the substitute to cover floor 
amendments. It is not unusual for an amendment to be offered in this 
Chamber to increase a lump sum appropriation by a specified amount 
without stating the purpose in legislative language. The purpose is 
often set forth in the statement of a sponsor.
  Under the proposed substitute, an amendment that increased a lump sum 
appropriation would not be enrolled as a separate bill even if the 
sponsor stated that the purpose of the increase was to earmark funds 
for a pork-barrel project. Once the amendment is adopted by the Senate, 
there is no requirement that the purpose of the amendment be discussed 
even in the conference report.
  Mr. President, let us look at how a pork-barrel earmark would fare 
under the proposed substitute as compared to how it would fare under 
the Domenici-Exon expedited rescission bill or under the original 
McCain bill.
  Under the proposed substitute, if the earmark is set forth in a floor 
statement or committee letter, there is no requirement that the item be 
set forth separately in the bill or separately enrolled. Unless the 
item is set forth in the bill, the President could not veto it.
  Under the Domenici-Exon expedited rescission proposal or under the 
McCain original proposal, however, the President would not be limited 
to items expressly set forth in the bill. The President could propose 
rescission of a specified amount of money for a specified purpose. The 
President would be guaranteed a vote in the House and the Senate in a 
specified period of time. That would not only serve as improvement in 
the current law in the case of the Domenici-Exon proposal, but it would 
also be a great improvement over the proposed substitute, which has 
enormous loopholes.
  Ironically, the proposed substitute would enable the President to 
veto items that reflect legitimate policy differences between the 
President and the Congress. When we have major disagreements on matters 
of policy, we must express our requirements in legislation in order to 
ensure that the President carries out the will of Congress.
  Let us take, for example, an item that both of my colleagues in the 
Chamber, the Senator from Nebraska and the Senator from Arizona, are 
very familiar with, the V-22 aircraft. The 3sprey, or the V-22 
aircraft, has been a controversial item for several years. The V-22 has 
had strong bipartisan support in the Congress, yet the Bush 
administration wanted to cancel it. Congress insisted on authorizing 
and appropriating funds for the V-22 because we believed the funds were 
genuinely 
[[Page S4345]] necessary for a strong national defense. We had to 
include specific legislative provisions to ensure that the program was 
not canceled.
  Under the proposed substitute, however, the President could have 
vetoed the V-22. He could have vetoed the strategic sealift program 
that Congress initiated. He could have vetoed congressional increases 
for weapons systems that had not been in the President's budget but 
which made a crucial difference in Operation Desert Storm, such as 
Stealth fighters and the Patriot missile. He could have vetoed the $1 
billion LHD-6 ship that was added by the Congress even though it was 
not in the President's budget. Many of our colleagues want to increase 
and restructure our missile defense program. That is another item ripe 
for a Presidential veto under the proposed substitute.
  The separate enrollment proposal allows the President to veto any 
paragraph of the appropriation bill. The proposal is not limited to 
provisions containing pork-barrel earmarks. In fact, it is not limited 
to funding items. The proposal applies to any numbered section or any 
unnumbered paragraph.
  That means the President can veto funding limitations as well as 
funding amounts. In doing so, he could approve the appropriation bill 
but he could veto conditions under which the appropriation was 
provided.
  The President, for example, could veto a provision such as section 
8135 of last year's appropriation bill. And I believe Senator Levin has 
been talking about that, the Senator from Michigan. That provision 
stated, ``None of the funds appropriated by this act may be used for 
the continuous presence in Somalia of United States personnel, except 
for the protection of United States personnel after September 30, 
1994.''
  That provision was strongly supported by many of those who now back 
separate enrollment. The President did not want the provision. I am 
sure he would have loved to have had the ability to veto that provision 
without affecting the underlying DOD appropriations.
  Have any of the supporters of the proposed substitute, especially 
those who opposed the operations in Somalia or Haiti, considered the 
war powers implications of the drastic new restrictions on the 
congressional power of the purse?
  The power of the purse is the only thing we have to deal with. The 
War Powers Act does not work. Everybody over here knows it. The power 
of the purse is the only way that Congress has to enforce restrictions 
on foreign troop deployments. That power under this bill as now drafted 
in my opinion will be largely gone.
  Another part of the DOD appropriation bill, section 8008, last year 
provided:

       Funds appropriated by this act may not be used to initiate 
     a special access program without prior notification 30 
     calendar days in session in advance to the Committees on 
     Appropriations and Armed Services of the Senate and House of 
     Representatives.

  Those special access programs, as other programs, are very highly 
classified programs that I will not discuss here on the floor. But I 
have no doubt the President, any President, would welcome the ability 
to veto that provision. This was a limitation on Presidential 
expenditures, saying you cannot spend this money except under certain 
limited conditions. The President could keep the money, veto the 
conditions, and off we go--more expenditure, not less, as people want 
when they say they want a line-item veto.
  Under the substitute there is just as much chance, over a period of 
years, that the President, any President, would veto a restraint on 
spending as well as an increase in spending. This is not what the 
public has in mind when they say they support a line-item veto.
  In my opinion, there is just as much chance this provision, this 
bill, will cause an increase in spending as there is a decrease. That 
does not even take into account the ability of the President under this 
new power to basically take certain provisions in a Senator's State and 
say, ``You have these five provisions and if you do not vote with me 
on, for instance, health care, my proposal on health care, I am going 
to make sure these proposals do not go into law unless you can produce 
two-thirds of the vote in both bodies to do so.''
  It is a huge power shift to the President. But I am not even dwelling 
on that in this speech today. It is a huge power shift to the 
President. And any President that has a pet project--health care, or 
whatever they want to get through--will have a very greatly enhanced 
ability to do that. Not by saving the public money, which is what they 
want, but by threatening to veto those provisions in exchange for 
Senators and Members of the House basically voting to increase spending 
on one of the President's proposals. It could be billions of dollars.
  In my opinion what we are setting up here, the way we are heading--we 
are setting up provisions which give the President of the United States 
a chance to threaten millions of dollars in exchange for getting votes 
for billions of dollars. That is not what the public intends. That is 
exactly where this proposal is headed.
  Mr. President, to take another example, the President could veto the 
so-called Hyde amendment restricting the use of Federal funds for 
abortion that has been included in the Labor-HHS appropriation bills 
over the years because it would be enrolled as a separate bill under 
the proposed substitute.
  The Hyde amendment was included as section 509 of the fiscal year 
1995 Labor-HHS appropriations bill, and reads as follows:

       Section 509. None of the funds appropriated under this act 
     shall be expended for any abortion except when it is made 
     known to the Federal entity or official to which funds are 
     appropriated under this act that such procedure is necessary 
     to save the life of the mother or that the pregnancy is the 
     result of an act of rape or incest.

  I wonder if the people who are so enthused about this amendment, and 
this proposal, have really thought through what they are doing.
  Mr. McCAIN. If the Senator will yield, I will be happy to answer that 
question.
  Mr. NUNN. I will go ahead and yield, yes, sir.
  Mr. McCAIN. Yes, we are. Fortunately, a substantial part of the 
Senator's argument against this legislation has been taken care of by 
the Levin-Murkowski-Exon amendment. I will be glad to quote it to him. 
It adds:

       * * * but shall not include a provision which does not 
     appropriate funds, direct the President to expend funds for 
     any specific project, or create an express or implied 
     obligation to expend funds and
       (i) rescinds or cancels existing budget authority;
       (ii) only limits, conditions, or otherwise restricts the 
     President's authority to spend otherwise appropriated funds; 
     or
       (iii) conditions on an item of appropriation not involving 
     a positive allocation of funds by explicitly prohibiting the 
     use of any funds.

  Basically what that does, I would say to the Senator from Georgia, it 
prohibits most of the scenarios that the Senator from Georgia just 
described about being able to separate language from funds, funds from 
language, and being able to so-called fence other areas.
  I would like to let the Senator from Georgia finish, but I did want 
to point out this amendment, which I believe is going to be accepted, 
does address some of the major concerns the Senator raised.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank my friend from Arizona. It is my understanding that 
has not yet been adopted. Has that been adopted?
  Mr. McCAIN. It is my understanding it has not been adopted. As well, 
I have no doubt it will be.
  Mr. NUNN. I am speaking of the proposal we now have before us. I 
thank my friend. I am glad the authors are considering that, because I 
can assure you, if we debate this bill another 2 or 3 days, another 3 
or 4 days, there are going to be a lot of other things that people are 
going to point out because this has not been thought through.
  I believe the original proposals, the rescission proposals, have been 
thought through by the authors. I did not agree with the McCain 
proposal because of the two-thirds vote, but I think it had been 
thought through, the rescission part. This proposal has not been 
thought through. You are going to find one problem after another with 
this.
  For it to come on the floor of the Senate of the United States with a 
cloture motion at the same time, bypassing committees, bypassing the 
rescission proposals that had come out of the 
[[Page S4346]]  Governmental Affairs Committee and Budget Committee, 
and come up as a compromise with the threat of a cloture motion--this 
proposal has not been thought through. It is riddled with loopholes.
  I am glad that particular amendment is being strongly considered, but 
it has not been adopted and of course I have no way of knowing what is 
going to be adopted so my remarks have to be addressed to the bill, the 
underlying bill as it now stands. But I thank my friend from Arizona. I 
hope there will be that clarification as well as others that take 
place.
  The rescission proposals would not have that problem. The President 
would send up rescissions on money items. He would not be sending up 
language revisions. Those are totally different animals than what we 
have here on the floor. This hybrid that has been put together as a 
compromise has injected whole new areas that were not contemplated in 
the rescission bill and present totally different problems. For us to 
pass this bill in a week or 4 or 5 days to me is very bad legislative 
procedure and will come back to haunt us if we continue to legislate 
this way on these things that are this important. It is obvious this 
matter has not been thought through.
  In short, Mr. President, the proposed substitute is likely to give us 
the worst of both worlds. It does not subject to veto the earmarks that 
are buried in floor statements, committee letters, and phone calls to 
Cabinet Members. Those could be addressed in rescission bills. They 
will not be able to be addressed in this bill.
  It does subject to veto legitimate policy disagreements between 
Congress and the executive branch that have to be addressed in statute. 
I hope my friend from Arizona is correct on that, that policy 
disagreements are going to be addressed in an amendment. I have not had 
a chance to study the amendment and I do want to study that.
  I believe the impact of the substitute proposal will be almost the 
opposite of what the Members of Congress and the American public had in 
mind when they said--and say in polls and in their letters and phone 
calls--they want a line-item veto.
  Mr. President, I think it is also important to note, as I mentioned 
earlier in my summary remarks, that the substitute we have before us 
and that we may vote on even as early as tomorrow night, permits the 
President to increase Federal spending. The proposed substitute has 
been justified as a means to decrease Federal spending. This claim 
overlooks the fact that the substitute as drafted also permits the 
President to increase Federal spending.
  As Members will recall, we acted last week on a defense supplemental 
bill to address urgent readiness problems.
  That bill not only contained increases in spending for readiness, it 
also contained rescissions--decreases in spending--to minimize the 
impact on the deficit. A number of those offsets, were strongly opposed 
by the President, such as the reductions in environmental spending and 
reductions in the Technology Reinvestment Program.
  Under the proposed substitute, each paragraph in the supplemental 
would be enrolled as a separate bill, including the rescissions. As a 
result, the President would be free to sign into law all the increases 
in spending and to veto any or all of the rescissions. In other words, 
the President could increase the deficit by hundreds of millions or 
billions of dollars without congressional approval. Only a two-thirds 
vote of both Houses could override these actions. Is it any wonder that 
any President would desire to have this power?
  Obviously, any President would want these powers because he can take 
a rescission and an appropriations bill that decreases an expenditure, 
veto the rescission, and keep the appropriations. What are we doing 
here? Do we really know what we are doing in this proposal?
  In that regard, the proposed substitute is clearly inferior to the 
Domenici-Exon expedited rescission proposal. Under an expedited 
rescission, the President could only propose decreases in spending.
  I must say I believe that is also the way the amendment of the 
Senator from Arizona would have worked.
  The President could not obtain any increases under the Domenici-Exon 
expedited rescission procedure. Why do those who support reductions in 
Federal spending want to give the President the authority, under the 
proposed substitute, to increase Federal spending instead of 
restricting his power to reductions in spending? I can only conclude 
that this proposal has not been carefully thought through.
  The proposed substitute if implemented in good faith, if none of 
these loopholes is taken advantage of by this Congress or a future 
Congress, will, in my opinion, result in rigidity, inflexibility, and 
in some cases chaos in the management of the Government's fiscal 
affairs in the executive branch.
  Mr. President, the problem with the proposed substitute is that if it 
is administered in good faith with line-item appropriations, and if no 
loopholes are used by the Appropriations Committees--and I have already 
described the gigantic loopholes that could be used--I believe it will 
cause chaos in the management of Government's fiscal affairs.
  The most telling critique of the proposed substitute comes from the 
Republican majority on the Governmental Affairs Committee.
  This was the report that came out with the rescission bill that had 
been brought out of the Governmental Affairs Committee just about 10 
days ago.
  In explaining why it was better to have lump sum appropriations 
rather than line-item appropriations. Senator Roth and the Republican 
majority on the Governmental Affairs Committee made the following 
observations in their report on S. 4, which was the original proposal 
before this substitute came in.
  Quoting from that majority report in the Governmental Affairs 
Committee:

       Congress and the executive agencies are in broad agreement 
     that lump-sum financing is an effective way to manage the 
     Federal Government. Because of lump sum appropriations, 
     federal agencies are able to shift funds within large 
     appropriations accounts and therefore adjust to changing 
     conditions during the course of a fiscal year. By making 
     these shifts inside the account, the overall dollar figure 
     for the activity is not violated and therefore there is no 
     need to seek remedial legislation from Congress. Fund 
     shifting takes place under established reprogramming 
     procedures, with agencies notifying designated committees of 
     the shifts and in some cases seeking the advance approval of 
     those committees. * * *

       This flexibility is important for the agency and for 
     Congress in its oversight capacity.
       It is possible, although not desirable, to apply the state 
     budgeting system to the Federal Government and give 
     Presidents the kind of line-item veto available to governors. 
     To maximize item-veto authority for the President, the 
     details in conference reports, agency justification 
     materials, and other nonstatutory sources could be 
     transferred to appropriations bills * * * .
  At this point I am not quoting. This majority report is describing 
the problem exactly with the substitute we have before us. Back to the 
quote:

       * * * However, placing items in appropriations bills would 
     produce an undesirable rigidity to agency operations and 
     legislative procedures. If Congress placed items in 
     appropriations bills, agencies would have to implement the 
     bill precisely as defined in the individual items. In cases 
     where the specific amounts detailed in the appropriations 
     statutes proved to be insufficient as the fiscal year 
     progressed, agencies could not spend above the specified 
     level. Doing so would violate the law. Agencies and 
     departments would have to come to Congress and request 
     supplemental funds for some items and rescissions for others, 
     or request a transfer of funds between accounts. Neither 
     Congress nor the agencies want this inflexibility and added 
     workload for the regular legislative process.

  If we want further argument against this substitute, let us turn to 
what the Republican majority on the House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight said in making similar observations in their 
report on the line-item veto legislation that they passed, which I must 
say is totally different from the substitute we have before us now.
  Quoting from the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, 
Republican majority:

       We do not itemize appropriation bills and see no reason to 
     do so. . . . The details do not appear in the law. . . . We 
     could take the details from nonstatutory sources and place 
     them in appropriations bills, but that would add an 
     undesirable rigidity to agency operations. Executive 
     officials would have to implement highly detailed bills no 
     matter the magnitude of change that occurs over the course of 
     [a] fiscal year. Their only opportunity for relief would be 
     to come to Congress and request legislation to increase 
     [[Page S4347]]  funds for some items and eliminate them for 
     others. Agencies would be forced to seek large numbers of 
     statutory amendments to the original appropriations bill. No 
     one in either branch wants that.
       Item-veto authority, as practiced at the state level, would 
     require the Federal Government to itemize appropriations 
     bills. Such a step would disrupt and undermine effective 
     agency management.

  What we have, Mr. President, is both the Republican majority on the 
Senate side in Governmental Affairs, and the Republican majority on the 
House side in Governmental Affairs, have written reports in connection 
with line-item veto that directly critiques and criticizes and 
describes as rigid and unworkable, in my words, the proposal that we 
are now about to vote on and will probably pass. It is an amazing 
legislative performance.
  I have never seen anything quite like it to have a committee report 
by the majority come out and basically to decry and criticize a later 
proposal that is on the floor as a substitute for the ones brought out 
of committee.
  Let me illustrate the problems described by the Republican majority 
on the Governmental Affairs Committee. Assuming the Appropriations 
Committee set forth all the line items for defense in the defense 
appropriations bill, this would mean that a single defense 
appropriations bill, as we now know it, would be enrolled as over 2,300 
separate public laws. Reprogrammings between these public laws would no 
longer be possible. Reprogramming could not take place because each 
item would be in a separate law. As a result, fiscal managers would no 
longer be able to move funds from a program that is in trouble to a 
program that is ahead of schedule. Overseas pay and benefits shortfalls 
caused by devaluation of the dollar could not be addressed through 
reprogramming in the defense arena.
  To the extent that Congress requires an agency to eat a pay raise--or 
absorb the cost by shifting funds from other programs--the agency would 
be unable to provide for the pay increase through reprogrammings.
  Increases in operational tempo in time of international tension could 
not be funded through a reprogramming from lower priority programs.
  Readiness shortfalls would go unaddressed because money could not be 
moved from lower priority O&M accounts into training activities.
  We know how long it takes us to get through a supplemental 
appropriations bill. We are going to have to have supplemental after 
supplemental after supplemental based on this legislation, if we pass 
it. There is going to be no end to the number of supplementals that we 
are going to have just in the Department of Defense alone.
  The legislative activity load is going to just go up astronomically 
if we pass this legislation.
  If military personnel accounts experienced temporary shortages--as 
they did last year in the Air Force Reserve just before Christmas--
funds could not be reprogrammed to meet payrolls.
  In other words, Mr. President, the executive branch would be faced 
with fiscal gridlock. Like Gulliver, they would be bound by 
Lilliputians in the form of thousands of minute appropriation bills.
  Our fiscal managers would be unable to make reasonable adjustments 
during the course of a year to spend the money wisely, and would be 
forced to delay actions needed to obtain savings or meet other critical 
military needs. Moreover, because they could not move the money between 
line items, there would be a great incentive to spend all of the funds 
appropriated to a particular line, even if the money could be used more 
wisely in another program--just exactly the opposite of the incentives 
we want to give the managers in DOD, or any other department. They 
would know that they could not move it because they could not 
reprogram. They would know if they come to the Congress, they might 
have to wait sometimes months, maybe even before the fiscal year is 
over, to be able to come up here and get another law passed so they 
could spend the money in some other category. Are they going to be 
great managers and turn it back in? We all know what happens when 
people have money to spend in agencies. It is a problem every 
government faces. They spend it or lose it. Usually, unfortunately, 
they spend it. That is what is going to happen here, multiplied by 
thousands of line items.
  In other words, Mr. President, a proposal that started out to try to 
save the taxpayers money, to try to delete waste, fraud, abuse, and 
pork out of all sorts of legislation--a worthy objective and I think 
one that could be achieved with something like the Domenici-Exon 
proposal--is now in the form of a substitute that we are about to vote 
on. That is a formula for delay, inefficiency, and waste. That is how 
this process has evolved--an amazing process.
  Mr. President, the final comment on this proposal that I will make is 
that the substitute we will probably vote on tomorrow does not address 
the main problems criticized by its supporters. I must say, these are 
legitimate criticisms of our current process. I am not a defender of 
the current process. I think for us to have rescissions come from the 
President and, by doing nothing over here, allow those rescissions to 
have no meaning at all, is unacceptable. We must change that. But the 
way to change it is not this proposed substitute. It is to require us 
to put the spotlight on and to vote again, as is provided in the 
Domenici-Exon proposal. That should be what we are really voting on 
here.
  I hope we are going to have a chance to vote on that. I hope some 
people will change their minds, because we still have a chance to pull 
this ox out of the ditch. Anybody who does not believe these are real 
problems has not studied this very seriously, in my view. The 
substitute does not address a lot of the problems that really need 
addressing in the Congress.
  Proponents of the substitute really hope the President will use it to 
correct the problems in the legislative process. I do not mind the 
President correcting problems in the legislative process under the 
right kind of proposal. Why do we not try to correct our own problems? 
Why turn it all over to the President and say, Mr. President, we have 
all these problems and we do not handle this right, we are pretty 
sloppy, we have a lot of pork in legislation, and we have unauthorized 
appropriations and earmarks, we cannot solve it. We will send it down 
for you to solve it. As a consequence, we will shift a lot of power 
from one branch to the other. I suggest we ought to address the 
problems ourselves.
  Unauthorized appropriations, for instance, are a significant problem. 
Why do we not establish an effective point of order against 
unauthorized appropriations? I know the Senator from Arizona would 
agree with that. Earmarks that avoid the competitive process are wrong. 
Why do we not establish an effective point of order against earmarks 
that avoid merit-based selection procedures?
  Adding a project in conference that was not included in either bill, 
House or Senate, is another significant problem. I think it is a 
terrible practice. Why do we not establish an effective point of order 
against projects added in conference that were not in either bill?
  Conference reports that are not available for review prior to debate 
are a further problem. This particularly happens at the end of the 
session on appropriations bills. Why do we not require conference 
reports to be available 2 or 3 days before debate? The proposed 
substitute addresses none of these problems. On the contrary, the 
substitute presumes that Congress will continue to employ procedures 
that fail to constrain unnecessary spending.
  Mr. President, we are putting the cart before the horse. Before we 
ask the President to exercise our own responsibilities, we need to make 
every reasonable effort to clean up our own act. This is not just a 
matter of congressional prerogative. If we fail to restrain ourselves, 
we can hardly expect the President to do it for us. And if we give him 
these tools, we are going to be surprised over the years--I am not 
talking about President Clinton, and I am not talking about any 
specific President, but there is going to be a tremendous 
disillusionment with the American public, because they are going to 
find over the years that we are going to convert pork that costs 
millions of dollars into strong-arm tactics by some President down the 
line that is going to cost the country billions of dollars--threatening 
to take out millions in order to get people to vote for billions. 
Believe me, it is going to happen.
  [[Page S4348]] It would be the height of cynicism for Congress to 
continue to earmark funds for pork barrel projects and then blame the 
President if he does not veto the very projects we approve.
  Mr. President, I know that many who support the proposed substitute 
do so out of strong conviction that something must be done to control 
Federal spending, and I agree. I agree with that point. But in our zeal 
to control spending, we must not lose sight of our duty to exercise our 
constitutional legislative responsibilities with care. The history of 
this legislation is not particularly edifying. The committees of 
jurisdiction, the Budget Committee and Governmental Affairs Committee, 
have marked up bills based on the use of a rescission process, not a 
separate enrollment process. I will repeat that. These bills brought 
out of committee, at least with committee deliberation, are totally 
different from what we have before us now that is a substitute.
  Mr. President, the proposed substitute may be written on tablets of 
stone in terms of the way the votes are around here, but that does not 
make it good legislation. As I have pointed out, it has enormous 
loopholes that will permit continued pork barrel earmarks--the very 
earmarks that we could capture if we use the Domenici-Exon expedited 
rescission proposal. The proposed substitute gives the President the 
authority to increase spending by vetoing rescissions, a power that he 
would not have under the Domenici-Exon expedited rescission proposal, 
or under the McCain proposal. Again, I do not favor the McCain proposal 
because of the enormous shift of power to the President. But it would 
certainly not have the defects we have out here today. This substitute 
creates the potential for chaos in Federal fiscal management, a problem 
that would not arise under the Domenici-Exon expedited rescission 
proposal. It does nothing to address the legislative problems that 
encourage earmarks such as unauthorized appropriations, additions in 
conference reports, and conference reports that are not available in 
advance of debate for examination.
  Mr. President, there are numerous other problems with the proposed 
substitute which have been pointed out by others. My friend from West 
Virginia pointed out numerous problems. These include the 
constitutionally questionable practice of delegating legislative power 
to the enrolling clerk and the enormous burden placed on the President 
of having to sign nearly 10,000 separate appropriations acts. I 
visualize in the future where we will have candidates seeing who can 
sign the most pieces of paper the fastest, because that is going to 
require an enormous amount of Presidential time. We are going to have 
thousands and thousands of signing ceremonies, I suppose, and a lot of 
pens. It is going to be good for the fountain pen industry but not for 
Government.
  Presidential time management is a serious problem. I would rather 
have a President working on correcting abuses in Government rather than 
signing 10,000 or 12,000 bills a year. Mr. President, we have a choice 
in this debate. We can give the President and the Congress the tools 
needed to effectively address wasteful spending, or we can vote for a 
bill that is an invitation for Congress to exploit loopholes as well--
if that does not happen--as an invitation to fiscal gridlock in the 
executive branch. We should reject the proposed substitute and work in 
a bipartisan fashion, which is entirely possible here in this bill. I 
think both the majority of the House, the majority of the Senate, 
Republicans as well as Democrats, really want an effective tool here. 
But, Mr. President, this is not it.
  This substitute should be rejected, and we should work together on an 
effective rescission bill that gives the President the authority to 
address wasteful appropriations and unnecessary tax expenditures but 
does not cause the kind of mess that is going to be caused by this 
legislation.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I was intrigued and somewhat amused by the 
thoughtful remarks of the Senator from Georgia. I was amused by his 
prospect that if the pork barrel spending or egregious appropriations 
were somehow brought to the attention of the Members of this body, we 
would rise up in righteous indignation and vote those down.
  Well, apparently the Senator from Georgia has not been around when I 
have come to this floor time after time after time after time with 
amendments to do away with pork that was put in in conference reports, 
with earmarks, with the most outrageous and egregious abuses of the 
system and been voted down time after time after time.
  And I will tell the Senator from Georgia why. Because there is an 
iron rice bowl around here that if you take care of your pet project, I 
will take care of mine, and we will all vote down any attempt to do 
away with these because then that might start this whole system to 
unravel.
  I can show the Senator from Georgia a record of vote after vote where 
I have come down here and clearly identified, including highway 
demonstration projects to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars, 
including earmarks for universities. I will provide him with the record 
of outrageous appropriations that have taken place, many of them 
stuffed in in conference, stuffed in in conference, which neither body 
sought, and I sought a majority vote to overturn them and could not do 
it, time after time after time.
  So if the Senator from Georgia thinks that a simple majority vote 
will be sufficient around here the way business is done, then he has 
not had the same experience that I have.
  Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator yield on that?
  Mr. McCAIN. I will be glad to yield on that.
  Mr. NUNN. I do not remember using the word the Senator attributed to 
me, because I do not think it would be easy. But I think it will be a 
lot easier if the Senate sent up a rescission bill. And I think if we 
stuck to either the Domenici-Exon bill or the McCain bill on 
rescissions, that is the way to go about it.
  I do not question what the Senator is trying to do. I agree. I do not 
question the problem you have identified. I agree.
  Mr. McCAIN. If I might reclaim the floor, the fact is, then, that the 
Senator cannot support a simple majority vote to override because that 
has been tried. I tried it specifically. I tried it specifically on 
numerous occasions and it has failed. And I can provide the Senator 
from Georgia with ample evidence of that--hundreds of millions of 
dollars in highway demonstration projects which have no relation 
whatsoever to the needs of the States, but are put in. And I showed in 
the debates the direct relation between those highway demonstration 
projects and people who happen to be on the relevant committee. We 
attempted to overturn those. We failed time after time after time.
  So then I do not understand what would lead the Senator from Georgia 
to the conclusion that if they came over here vetoed by the President a 
simple majority override would do the job. It would not. It would not.
  So even if the Senator from Georgia thinks that it would, I have 
evidence by standing on this floor hour after hour, day after day, week 
after week trying to do away with these egregious pork barrel projects 
and failing to do so, just as we would fail to do it if it was not 
brought up by me but it would be sent over by the President of the 
United States.
  So I soundly reject the thesis on the part of the Senator from 
Georgia that a simple majority vote would somehow put a brake to the 
egregious practices which the American people, at least on November 8, 
said they were sick and tired of--sick and tired of.
  As far as comparing letters and phone calls to the Pentagon from 
committee chairmen, I do not see how any legislation prevents that. I 
do not see how you stop that. I do not do it. I do not believe in it. I 
do not think it is appropriate to do so. And I am sorry to hear from 
the Senator from Georgia that it is such a common practice.
  But the fact is that the real crux of this issue, as I have said many 
times on this floor, is whether it is going to take a real veto, a real 
veto which is a two-thirds vote, as opposed to a majority vote. All the 
rest I felt was very negotiable. But I have had the experience, I have 
the experience and I will provide for the Record the actual number of 
times I came down here and sought to draw an amendment to kill 
particular projects that were put in in 
[[Page S4349]] the conference report which had no relation whatsoever 
to national security needs and lost those votes.
  I would also like to remind the Senator from Georgia that the 
Congressional Research Service identified for me--the Congressional 
Research Service--$62 billion in 5 years that was put in in defense 
appropriations bills which had nothing to do with defense; not any 
relation whatsoever.
  Now, I understand, as chairman or a senior member of the committee, 
that you have a lot of latitude and a lot of power. And I know what 
reprogramming is about, too. It is a phone call to a chairman or a 
ranking member, or both, sometimes just to one person, and millions of 
dollars are reprogrammed.
  I do not believe in that, either, I will tell the Senator from 
Georgia. I do not believe that is appropriate. And if we are going to 
do away with that, then hooray, I am all for it, because too much of 
that goes on. If we put some rigidity in how many of our departments of 
Government spend their money, then I am very happy about that.
  As far as us now encouraging people to spend money, that this 
legislation would encourage departments to not to give money back 
because they would be feel it is incumbent upon them to spend the 
money, I would ask the Senator from Georgia when is the last time the 
Department of Defense gave any money back to the Treasury under the 
present system? I am not aware of any occasion in which that was the 
case.
  Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator yield to me?
  Mr. McCAIN. I did not interrupt the Senator.
  Go ahead.
  Mr. NUNN. That is OK.
  Mr. McCAIN. Go ahead.
  Mr. NUNN. I would say it happens all the time. We have all sorts of 
programs that are either in trouble one way or the other that we go 
through reprogramming.
  Mr. McCAIN. Did any of the money ever go back to the Treasury?
  Mr. NUNN. The money is spent on other Defense Department needs.
  Mr. McCAIN. The Senator from Georgia put his finger right on it. None 
of it goes back in the Treasury, but they find a way to spend it. With 
this, they would not be able to spend it because of a veto and the 
money would go back to the taxpayers of America rather than them 
deciding to find another place to spend it, which is the case today.
  So perhaps the Senator from Georgia believes that it is a good idea 
that if a program is not worthwhile and the money is not spent that it 
go to another project without the knowledge of a majority of the 
Congress. Maybe with the knowledge of the Senator from Georgia when he 
was chairman of the Armed Services Committee, but not with the 
knowledge of this Member, who I felt had an equal voice in what the 
decision should be as the expenditure of America's tax dollars.
  So if, as the Senator from Georgia states, this would stop this 
repro- gramming, then I say I am very, very glad to hear 
that information that it would stop the reprogramming.
  Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator yield for a brief comment?
  Mr. McCAIN. I am glad to yield.
  Mr. NUNN. As the Senator knows, on reprogramming, the reprogramming 
comes up by written request. It goes to four different committees. It 
is examined by the committees. All the members of the committees have 
access to that information if they want it.
  The reprogramming is not done by telephone. And if the Senator wants 
to prevent reprogramming, the Senator is going to actually basically 
have the Department of Defense come up with one bill after another all 
year long. There will not be time for anything else.
  I do not think the Senator has thought through this proposal.
  I think the Senator has thought through the problem and I think he 
has thought through it very carefully and I admire him for his fights 
on that. I think he will find I voted with him on his amendments most 
of the time. And I think he would recall the challenge to the 
appropriations earmarks. I started that on the floor of the Senate. We 
actually won a majority vote on three different occasions. We have had 
the money taken out of the earmarks on the Senate side. In the final 
analysis, it usually gets put back in at the end of the conference.
  So I agree with the Senator's frustration. But the problem is every 
time you see a problem around here, that does not mean whatever 
solution you throw at it is going to be the answer. I am saying that 
there is a problem. The Senator is right, there is a problem. There are 
ways to address that problem. But these solutions are going to create a 
whole other set of problems that are worse than the problems that the 
Senator is describing. That is my case.
  Mr. McCAIN. I appreciate the remarks of the Senator from Georgia, and 
he would be welcome to interrupt again.
  As far as this issue not being examined sufficiently, I would remind 
the Senator from Georgia that a former colleague of his from Georgia 
brought this bill, this very same bill, with a few changes to it in 
1985 to the floor of the Senate. I know that the Senator from Georgia 
was then in the Senate. I am sorry that he did not take part in the 
debate and become illuminated on the issue at that time.
  It was passed a couple years ago as a sense-of-the-Senate resolution.
  Mr. NUNN. It was a different proposal. I examined that proposal. It 
was the Mattingly proposal. It did not have anything like the level of 
lines required in this one. It was a different proposal.
  Mr. McCAIN. It is fundamentally the same, and the Senator knows it as 
well as I do.
  The fact is the Mattingly amendment, plus a sense-of-the-Senate 
amendment that was passed not too long ago, I believe it was in 1993, 
basically said the same thing. So this is not a new issue. It is not a 
new item and it is not a new problem.
  It is not a new problem. The fact is that if we do not address this 
problem, then the American people's confidence will be far more eroded 
than it is today, if that is possible.
  I am convinced that if we adopt the so-called now Exon--since Senator 
Domenici no longer supports that proposal and supports this proposal--
that it will fail. And the Senator from Georgia probably knows that, 
too, because in the other body, the line-item veto, what he knows of as 
the Domenici-Exon, was defeated by an overwhelming number, and it was 
defeated because it only required a majority to overrule the line-item 
veto.
  Most of our colleagues on the other side, and I hope most of my 
colleagues here, understand that a simple majority does not do it. And 
it does not do it for the reasons I cited earlier to my colleague from 
Georgia.
  These items have been exposed to the light of day. Votes have been 
taken, and they have been rejected. Even though those provisions may 
have been snuck in, in a covert fashion initially, even when they were 
exposed, we still could not get a sufficient number of votes to remove 
them through the amending process, which is basically what the 
President of the United States said.
  I am amending this bill in order to take out what I find 
objectionable, and then there is a vote. I am convinced if it is a 
majority vote that overturns it, it is business as usual in this body, 
and in the Congress, and our colleagues on the other side, clearly--as 
the Senator from Nebraska has stated very accurately quite often--is 
very different from this body.
  Our Founding Fathers meant for that to be the case. But they feel 
very strongly, and perhaps it is because they have had more bitter 
experience than we have had over here, that a two-thirds majority is 
required.
  Now, Mr. President, I will not talk too much longer. I know the 
Senator from Nebraska wants to speak, and the Senator from Indiana is 
here.
  This issue is well-known. This issue is not brand new. Separate 
enrollment goes back as far as 1985. The issue of line-item veto goes 
back in the last century. There have been debates and discussions of 
different forms of line-item veto for years. I have been part of many 
of them.
  To convey the impression that this is a brand new thing that Members 
of this body have not considered, frankly, I believe, is an inaccurate 
depiction of our knowledge of this issue of the line-item veto.
  [[Page S4350]] Any members that go home, who have a town hall 
meeting, not an hour goes by without someone standing up and saying, 
``Why can't we have the line-item veto, Senator or Congressman?'' 
Obviously there is a discussion at that time because the American 
people feel that we are spending too much of their dollars that they 
send to Washington in a wasteful fashion.
  I would like to say the Senator from Georgia made an excellent point: 
Why not solve the problems ourselves? I think he made an excellent 
point there, and I have seen effort after effort after effort to solve 
the problems ourselves. We cannot. We do not show the political courage 
to do so.
  I have sought, as the Senator from Georgia has, to attempt to not 
allow appropriations to be put in conferences. I try to have criteria 
set up for military construction projects, which are one of the most 
egregious areas where pork shows up all the time. We tried to do away 
with highway demonstration projects. We tried to do away with the land 
transfers that are done--directly related to the influence of certain 
Members of this body. I tried to do away with outrageous courthouse 
costs.
  We have not been able it do it, and we have run up a $5 trillion debt 
and laid it on few generations of Americans. There are very few people 
in this body that I respect more than the Senator from Georgia. There 
are times when he and I are in disagreement. This is one of them.
  He contributes to the debate, as always. I feel that the points that 
he raised, as well as the points raised by the Senator from West 
Virginia earlier, are very important ones. I am glad we are having this 
opportunity to debate these points on the floor prior to passage of the 
bill.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I would like to compliment my friend and 
great colleague from the State of Georgia. I think that all Members who 
have known and worked with Sam Nunn know that he is historically one of 
the most thoughtful Members of our body, and I think that that 
statement would be agreed to by most people on either side of the 
aisle.
  Senator Nunn, unfortunately, brought forth his carefully thought out, 
well-researched speech tonight to a U.S. Senate where only four Members 
were on the floor. It was after it had been announced that we would 
have no more votes. Therefore, as of this moment there are many people 
outside of the U.S. Senate who know much more about the reasoned 
arguments made by the Senator from Georgia than is known by most U.S. 
Senators. For the most part, I suspect that as usual, when we announce 
there are no more votes, there are not a large number of Senators in 
their offices listening to the debate, as is frequently the case.
  I just wish that every Senator would read the statements made by the 
Senator from Georgia tonight, tomorrow. I do not know how much press we 
will pick up on the statements made by the Senator from Georgia.
  I am looking in the press gallery and I see one person, maybe 
somebody else is hiding up there. I suppose that maybe some of the 
press may be watching on television, but unfortunately the tremendously 
throughtful remarks of the Senator from Georgia which were critical of 
what we are trying to do here may fall on deaf ears.
  I have been closely associated with him for the 16 years that I have 
been here. I sit next to him on the Armed Services Committee. I simply 
know that Sam Nunn takes the time and effort to do the research as he 
has done on this measure. I hope it will give some pause and some 
consideration to those that may not have studied the proposition, 
clearly, as much as Mr. Nunn of Georgia.
  I think that the Senator from Georgia clearly was not trying to pick 
on anyone. Clearly, he was not trying to destroy anything. Clearly, as 
is his nature, Sam Nunn was saying to Members, ``Stop, look, and listen 
before you leap at the proposal offered by the majority leader, without 
hearing any discussion.''
  What Senator Nunn brought out are some shortcomings in the measure 
that I think we should take a look at. There might not be total 
agreement on every point that Senator Nunn made. But I notice that 
during his discussion, the main argument that was made, some of the 
salient points he was making, was an amendment to the Dole substitute 
that was not in the Dole substitute, probably never had been thought of 
by those who put the Dole substitute together. In fact, they were 
offered by the Senator from Michigan, Senator Levin.
  I just hope, therefore, that we would not jump to a conclusion that 
Sam Nunn does not care. I think no one could say that with any great 
understanding. No one has said that yet.
  I think that Sam Nunn has made a very excellent point. I think he 
summed it up best by saying he supported the substitute amendment that 
is basically S. 14, the Domenici-Exon proposal that has been made, and 
will be offered by the democratic leader in just a few moments. We will 
have an opportunity to vote on that.
  It has been said that Senator Domenici no longer supports the 
Domenici-Exon proposal. Well, that might be. But I believe that after 
listening to the remarks by a man whom Senator Domenici has stood with 
time after time after time on many matters, including matters to try 
and straighten out the fiscal policies of the United States of America, 
I am not sure that Senator Domenici would dismiss out of hand the 
Domenici-Exon proposal. A commitment has been made by the Republicans 
meeting in caucus and everything necessary was done to get the 
commitment of 54 solid votes--at least on cloture, and I assume 54 
votes for the measure. But perhaps my colleagues have listened to some 
of the debate that has been going on, if we would listen to Sam Nunn, 
if we would reflect on the thoughtful comments that have been made by 
Senator Byrd, whom most would recognize as a scholar and a historian 
and certainly a very well read and accepted critic and expert on the 
Constitution, we can still correct ourselves.
  I hope that at least with the actions that have taken place today we 
would take another look at the Democratic leader's proposal that is 
back to Domenici-Exon--maybe it is only the Exon amendment now, but I 
still think it is a good amendment, worthy of consideration.
  I would also add that I think it is very clear Senator Nunn was 
supportive of either Domenici-Exon, which was S. 14, and prefers S. 4, 
which was the McCain amendment to the separate enrollment substitute. I 
listened very carefully to Senator Nunn, and while Senator Nunn clearly 
favored the Domenici-Exon S. 14, he clearly indicated that the McCain 
S. 4 was far superior, far, far superior to the substitute amendment 
that was offered by the majority leader. So I think Sam Nunn, as usual, 
was trying to say let us stop and think about this.
  This new gimmick that I have criticized and Senator Byrd has 
criticized and others have criticized, known as the enrollment 
procedure, is an absolute disaster, if people will stop and take a look 
at it, they will see it is a disaster for lots of reasons. I do not 
think there is any question but that if we incorporate the enrolling 
clerk in this measure we will open ourselves up to a challenge by the 
courts that might sink a line-item veto that this Senator has been 
working on for a long, long time--as I said earlier, prior to the time 
that many people came here. I believe one of the first times that I 
remember doing anything about this was in consort with then Senator Dan 
Quayle of Indiana. Dan Quayle, of course, was later the Vice President 
of the United States.
  I simply say it is not fair, in my opinion, since I know something 
about the Mattingly amendment, to say that the Mattingly amendment was 
essentially the same thing as the enrollment today. The Mattingly 
amendment clearly called for a division by section and paragraph. In 
contrast, the Dole substitute amendment calls for a division by 
section, paragraph, allocation, or suballocation. The Dole amendment 
calls for far greater detail than the Mattingly amendment, and therein 
lies some of the concern, and I think legitimate concern, offered by 
our distinguished colleague from Georgia.
  One other point or two. It has been said that, oh, the House of 
Representatives would never go for anything like Domenici-Exon, and 
maybe now just Exon, about to become Daschle-Exon--call it what you 
will, they would never 
[[Page S4351]]  go for anything like it. I submit, Mr. President, that 
H.R. 4600 passed July 14, 1994, on a vote of 342 to 69 in the House of 
Representatives was essentially the Domenici-Exon bill, the Exon bill, 
the Daschle-Exon bill, the bill that Senator Nunn recommends that we 
take a look at. That happened last year. Now, it is true that there has 
been a change in the makeup of the House of Representatives since that 
time but not enough of a change to make that much difference in the 
vote that I have just outlined.
  I just hope that we could also understand--and I congratulate my 
friend from Arizona. It is true that he has been here time and time 
again trying to point out pork barrel spending. I salute him for that, 
and many, many times I have been with him, and I think that I have 
cosponsored some of these measures with him. And he said but he has not 
gotten anywhere, and that is why you have to have more than a majority 
vote as provided in the bill that I will refer to as S. 14 so I will 
not have to mention all those names over and over again.
  Well, I can understand his frustration and I share in that 
frustration. I would simply say to Members of the Senate that S. 14 
does not call for one Member of the Senate--and as big and as important 
as we sometimes think we are, to begin to wield the same influence and 
the spotlight as the President. We do not have the bully pulpit of the 
President of the United States. So I think I should assure all that if 
the President of the United States under S. 14 would highlight, would 
veto, call something pork and send it back over here, with that kind of 
a spotlight shining on it, rather than the spotlight of only one or two 
or three Senators spotlighting it. It would be well known around the 
United States of America, and I daresay that with the spotlight of the 
President of the United States exercising a veto as in S. 14, I do not 
think there would be the courage or lack thereof in this Chamber or the 
House of Representatives to override it as easily as they have in the 
past.
  I would simply say, Mr. President, in closing that we can still have 
a good line-item veto, but I share and have spoken previously on what 
Senator Nunn outlined again tonight. Some of the things that Senator 
Nunn outlined would be a disaster for the United States of America.
  Here a measure came forth out of a Republican caucus without any 
consultation with Democrats, without any hearings, without ever being 
discussed in the committees let alone holding hearings.
  It is brought forth, it has been draped in a mantle of gold that 
cannot be touched because, if you touch it, you scratch it, and if you 
scratch it, you destroy it.
  I do not think that is a very good way to legislate in the United 
States of America. There is a better way, and the better way that I 
hope we will take another look at is in the form of the amendment that 
the Democratic leader will be introducing tonight. I do not think the 
Democratic leader is going to say this is sacrosanct. I do not think 
the Democratic leader is going to say that there can be no changes made 
in it. I believe the Democratic leader will outline something tonight 
that I hope we will further discuss tomorrow and invite the Republicans 
in to see if we can come up with something that is more workable, that 
overcomes the constitutional objections that Senator Byrd, a 
constitutional expert, has outlined; to overcome the objections and 
concerns that have been highlighted by the Senator from Georgia. We can 
work it out.
  I think there is no pride in authorship. We are trying to pass a 
line-item veto that, as best as we can fashion it, can reduce 
unnecessary pork-barrel spending. I think that is what the Republicans 
want to do, and I think that is what the Democrats want to do. But I, 
for one, have been raising concerns about the process, concerns about 
the majority leader and his actions of bringing forth this that had 
never been discussed with the Democrats, never had any hearings held on 
it, and immediately to file a cloture petition on it. That is a 
railroading type of thing that I think does not bode well for what is 
generally considered to be the most deliberative body in the world.
  Now, rather than being accused of being too deliberative and too 
talkative, I yield the floor and hope, if there is no one seeking 
recognition, the Democratic leader could rise to introduce the bill 
that he is going to introduce, and call it what you will.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader.


                 Amendment No. 348 to Amendment No. 347

              (Purpose: To propose a substitute amendment)

  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 348 and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Daschle], for himself, 
     Mr. Exon and Mr. Glenn, proposes an amendment numbered 348 to 
     amendment No. 347.

  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       In lieu of the language proposed to be inserted, insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Legislative Line Item Veto 
     Act''.

     SEC. 2. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN PROPOSED 
                   CANCELLATIONS OF BUDGET ITEMS.

       (a) In General.--Title X of the Congressional Budget and 
     Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.) is 
     amended by adding after section 1012 the following new 
     section:


 ``expedited consideration of certain proposed cancellations of budget 
                                 items

       ``Sec. 1012A. (a) Proposed Cancellation of Budget Item.--
     The President may propose, at the time and in the manner 
     provided in subsection (b), the cancellation of any budget 
     item provided in any Act. An item proposed for cancellation 
     under this section may not be proposed for cancellation again 
     under this title.
       ``(b) Transmittal of Special Message.--
       ``(1) Special message.--
       ``(A) In general.--Subject to the time limitations provided 
     in subparagraph (B), the President may transmit to Congress a 
     special message proposing to cancel budget items contained in 
     an Act. A separate special message shall be transmitted for 
     each Act that contains budget items the President proposes to 
     cancel.
       ``(B) Time limitations.--A special message may be 
     transmitted under this section--
       ``(i) during the 20-calendar-day period (excluding 
     Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays) commencing on the day 
     after the date of enactment of the provision proposed to be 
     rescinded or repealed; or
       ``(ii) at the same time as the President's budget for any 
     provision enacted after the date the President submitted the 
     preceding budget.
       ``(2) Draft bill.--The President shall include in each 
     special message transmitted under paragraph (1) a draft bill 
     that, if enacted, would cancel those budget items as provided 
     in this section. The draft bill shall clearly identify each 
     budget item that is proposed to be canceled including, where 
     applicable, each program, project, or activity to which the 
     budget item relates.
       ``(3) Contents of special message.--Each special message 
     shall specify, with respect to the budget item proposed to be 
     canceled--
       ``(A) the amount that the President proposes be canceled;
       ``(B) any account, department, or establishment of the 
     Government to which such budget item is available for 
     obligation, and the specific project or governmental 
     functions involved;
       ``(C) the reasons why the budget item should be canceled;
       ``(D) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated 
     fiscal, economic, and budgetary effect (including the effect 
     on outlays and receipts in each fiscal year) of the proposed 
     cancellation; and
       ``(E) all facts, circumstances, and considerations relating 
     to or bearing upon the proposed cancellation and the decision 
     to effect the proposed cancellation, and to the maximum 
     extent practicable, the estimated effect of the proposed 
     cancellation upon the objects, purposes, and programs for 
     which the budget item is provided.
       ``(4) Deficit reduction.--
       ``(A) Discretionary spending limits and adjustment of 
     committee allocations.--Not later than 5 days after the date 
     of enactment of a bill containing the cancellation of budget 
     items as provided under this section, the President shall--
       ``(i) with respect to a rescission of budget authority 
     provided in an appropriations Act, reduce the discretionary 
     spending limits under section 601 of the Congressional Budget 
     Act of 1974 for the budget year and any outyear affected by 
     the rescission, to reflect such amount; and
       ``(ii) with respect to a repeal of a targeted tax benefit, 
     adjust the balances for the budget year and each outyear 
     under section 252(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
     Deficit Control Act of 1985 to reflect such amount.
       ``(B) Adjustment of committee allocations.--Not later than 
     5 days after the date 
     [[Page S4352]]  of enactment of a bill containing the 
     cancellation of budget items as provided under this section, 
     the chairs of the Committees on the Budget of the Senate and 
     the House of Representatives shall revise levels under 
     section 311(a) and adjust the committee allocations under 
     section 602(a) to reflect such amount.
       ``(c) Procedures for Expedited Consideration.--
       ``(1) In general.--
       ``(A) Introduction.--Before the close of the second day of 
     session of the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
     respectively, after the date of receipt of a special message 
     transmitted to Congress under subsection (b), the majority 
     leader or minority leader of each House shall introduce (by 
     request) the draft bill accompanying that special message. If 
     the bill is not introduced as provided in the preceding 
     sentence in either House, then, on the third day of session 
     of that House after the date of receipt of that special 
     message, any Member of that House may introduce the bill.
       ``(B) Referral and reporting.--The bill shall be referred 
     to the appropriate committee or (in the House of 
     Representatives) committees. The committee shall report the 
     bill without substantive revision and with or without 
     recommendation. The committee shall report the bill not later 
     than the seventh day of session of that House after the date 
     of receipt of that special message. If the committee fails to 
     report the bill within that period, the committee shall be 
     automatically discharged from consideration of the bill, and 
     the bill shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
       ``(C) Final passage.--A vote on final passage of the bill 
     shall be taken in the Senate and the House of Representatives 
     on or before the close of the 10th day of session of that 
     House after the date of the introduction of the bill in that 
     House. If the bill is passed, the Secretary of the Senate or 
     the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as the case may 
     be, shall cause the bill to be engrossed, certified, and 
     transmitted to the other House within one calendar day of the 
     day on which the bill is passed.
       ``(2) Consideration in the house of representatives.--
       ``(A) Motion to proceed to consideration.--A motion in the 
     House of Representatives to proceed to the consideration of a 
     bill under this subsection shall be highly privileged and not 
     debatable. An amendment to the motion shall not be in order, 
     nor shall it be in order to move to reconsider the vote by 
     which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.
       ``(B) Motion to strike.--During consideration under this 
     subsection in the House of Representatives, any Member of the 
     House of Representatives may move to strike any proposed 
     cancellation of a budget item if supported by 49 other 
     Members.
       ``(C) Limits on debate.--Debate in the House of 
     Representatives on a bill under this subsection shall not 
     exceed 4 hours, which shall be divided equally between those 
     favoring and those opposing the bill. A motion further to 
     limit debate shall not be debatable. It shall not be in order 
     to move to recommit a bill under this subsection or to move 
     to reconsider the vote by which the bill is agreed to or 
     disagreed to.
       ``(D) Appeals.--Appeals from decisions of the Chair 
     relating to the application of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives to the procedure relating to a bill under 
     this section shall be decided without debate.
       ``(E) Application of house rules.--Except to the extent 
     specifically provided in this section, consideration of a 
     bill under this section shall be governed by the Rules of the 
     House of Representatives. It shall not be in order in the 
     House of Representatives to consider any bill introduced 
     pursuant to the provisions of this section under a suspension 
     of the rules or under a special rule.
       ``(3) Consideration in the senate.--
       ``(A) Motion to proceed to consideration.--A motion to 
     proceed to the consideration of a bill under this subsection 
     in the Senate shall be nondebatable. It shall not be in order 
     to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion to proceed 
     is agreed to or disagreed to.
       ``(B) Motion to strike.--During consideration of a bill 
     under this subsection in the Senate, any Member of the Senate 
     may move to strike any proposed cancellation of a budget item 
     if supported by 11 other Members.
       ``(C) Limits on debate.--Debate in the Senate on a bill 
     under this subsection, amendments thereto, and all debatable 
     motions and appeals in connection therewith (including debate 
     pursuant to subparagraph (D)), shall not exceed 10 hours. The 
     time shall be equally divided between, and controlled by, the 
     majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.
       ``(D) Appeals.--Debate in the Senate on any debatable 
     motion or appeal in connection with a bill under this 
     subsection shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be 
     equally divided between, and controlled by, the mover and the 
     manager of the bill, except that in the event the manager of 
     the bill is in favor of any such motion or appeal, the time 
     in opposition thereto, shall be controlled by the minority 
     leader or his designee. Such leaders, or either of them, may, 
     from time under their control on the passage of a bill, allot 
     additional time to any Senator during the consideration of 
     any debatable motion or appeal.
       ``(E) Motion to limit debate.--A motion in the Senate to 
     further limit debate on a bill under this subsection is not 
     debatable.
       ``(F) Motion to recommit.--A motion to recommit a bill 
     under this subsection is not in order.
       ``(G) Placed on calendar.--Upon receipt in the Senate of 
     the companion bill for a bill that has been introduced in the 
     Senate, that companion bill shall be placed on the calendar.
       ``(H) Consideration of house companion bill.--
       ``(i) In general.--Following the vote on the Senate bill 
     required under paragraph (1)(C), when the Senate proceeds to 
     consider the companion bill received from the House of 
     Representatives, the Senate shall--

       ``(I) if the language of the companion bill is identical to 
     the Senate bill, as passed, proceed to the immediate 
     consideration of the companion bill and, without intervening 
     action, vote on the companion bill; or
       ``(II) if the language of the companion bill is not 
     identical to the Senate bill, as passed, proceed to the 
     immediate consideration of the companion bill.

       ``(ii) Amendments.--During consideration of the companion 
     bill under clause (i)(II), any Senator may move to strike all 
     after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the text 
     of the Senate bill, as passed. Debate in the Senate on such 
     companion bill, any amendment proposed under this 
     subparagraph, and all debatable motions and appeals in 
     connection therewith, shall not exceed 10 hours less such 
     time as the Senate consumed or yielded back during 
     consideration of the Senate bill.
       ``(4) Conference.--
       ``(A) Consideration of conference reports.--Debate in the 
     House of Representatives or the Senate on the conference 
     report and any amendments in disagreement on any bill 
     considered under this section shall be limited to not more 
     than 2 hours, which shall be divided equally between the 
     majority leader and the minority leader. A motion further to 
     limit debate is not debatable. A motion to recommit the 
     conference report is not in order, and it is not in order to 
     move to reconsider the vote by which the conference report is 
     agreed to or disagreed to.
       ``(B) Failure of conference to act.--If the committee on 
     conference on a bill considered under this section fails to 
     submit a conference report within 10 calendar days after the 
     conferees have been appointed by each House, any Member of 
     either House may introduce a bill containing only the text of 
     the draft bill of the President on the next day of session 
     thereafter and the bill shall be considered as provided in 
     this section except that the bill shall not be subject to any 
     amendment.
       ``(d) Amendments and Divisions Prohibited.--Except as 
     otherwise provided by this section, no amendment to a bill 
     considered under this section shall be in order in either the 
     Senate or the House of Representatives. It shall not be in 
     order to demand a division of the question in the House of 
     Representatives (or in a Committee of the Whole). No motion 
     to suspend the application of this subsection shall be in 
     order in the House of Representatives, nor shall it be in 
     order in the House of Representatives to suspend the 
     application of this subsection by unanimous consent.
       ``(e) Temporary Presidential Authority To Cancel.--At the 
     same time as the President transmits to Congress a special 
     message under subsection (b)(1)(B)(i) proposing to cancel 
     budget items, the President may direct that any budget item 
     or items proposed to be canceled in that special message 
     shall not be made available for obligation or take effect for 
     a period not to exceed 45 calendar days from the date the 
     President transmits the special message to Congress. The 
     President may make any budget item or items canceled pursuant 
     to the preceding sentence available at a time earlier than 
     the time specified by the President if the President 
     determines that continuation of the cancellation would not 
     further the purposes of this Act.
       ``(f) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       ``(1) The term `appropriation Act' means any general or 
     special appropriation Act, and any Act or joint resolution 
     making supplemental, deficiency, or continuing 
     appropriations.
       ``(2) The term `budget item' means--
       ``(A) an amount, in whole or in part, of budget authority 
     provided in an appropriation Act except to fund direct 
     spending programs and the administrative expenses social 
     security; or
       ``(B) a targeted tax benefit.
       ``(3) The term `cancellation of a budget item' means--
       ``(A) the rescission of any budget authority provided in an 
     appropriation Act; or
       ``(B) the repeal of any targeted tax benefit.
       ``(4) The term `companion bill' means, for any bill 
     introduced in either House pursuant to subsection (c)(1)(A), 
     the bill introduced in the other House as a result of the 
     same special message.
       ``(5) The term `targeted tax benefit' means any provision 
     which has the practical effect of providing a benefit in the 
     form of a different treatment to a particular taxpayer or a 
     limited class of taxpayers, whether or not such provision is 
     limited by its terms to a particular taxpayer or a class of 
     taxpayers. Such term does not include any benefit provided to 
     a class of taxpayers distinguished on the basis of general 
     demographic conditions such as income, number of dependents, 
     or marital status.''.
     [[Page S4353]]   (b) Exercise of Rulemaking Powers.--Section 
     904 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 
     note) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``and 1017'' and 
     inserting ``1012A, and 1017''; and
       (2) in subsection (d), by striking ``section 1017'' and 
     inserting ``sections 1012A and 1017''.
       (c) Clerical Amendments.--The table of sections for subpart 
     B of title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
     Control Act of 1974 is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 1012 the following:

``Sec. 1012A. Expedited consideration of certain proposed cancellations 
              of budget items.''.

       (d) Effective Period.--The amendments made by this Act 
     shall--
       (1) take effect on the date of enactment of this Act;
       (2) apply only to budget items provided in Acts enacted on 
     or after the date of enactment of this Act; and
       (3) cease to be effective on September 30, 1998.

  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, let me begin by calling it what it ought 
to be called. This is the Domenici-Exon amendment. It is on the basis 
of the expertise of the two most able budgetary leaders in this body at 
this time that we bring forth this amendment with some confidence.
  The distinguished Senator from Nebraska, our ranking member, has very 
capably and eloquently characterized the remarks made earlier by the 
distinguished Senator from Georgia. In both cases, the remarks made by 
the distinguished Senator from Nebraska and certainly those made by the 
ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, the distinguished 
Senator from Georgia, lay out precisely why this amendment is necessary 
and why we bring it forth with the best intentions this evening.
  I will have more to say about this tomorrow, but I would like to 
begin this evening by talking about our motivation and about why we 
view this to be a superior alternative to the substitute which was laid 
down by the majority leader on Monday night.
  As I have said, and as the distinguished Senator from Nebraska has 
reiterated on many occasions, the debate all week long has not been 
about a line-item veto. There is no debate among most Senators in that 
regard. Most Senators would agree that a line-item veto in concept is 
something we ought to have. Forty-three States have it. Democrats and 
Republicans have recognized for years it would be a good thing for us 
to have as well.
  The question really is, What is our most effective approach? What in 
concept would work the most effectively? It is really on the basis of 
that desire--to bring forth the most practical and the most prudent 
approach--that I am sure Senator Domenici and Senator Exon originally 
proposed S. 14.
  The chairman of the Budget Committee and the ranking member of the 
Budget Committee, who have looked at all the options, and have studied 
this issue, as the distinguished Senator from Nebraska has said, for 
years and years. On the basis of their considered judgment, and on the 
basis of their expertise, concluded some time ago that S. 14, the 
proposal that they introduced earlier this year, is by far and away the 
single most appropriate approach to something we all say we want. And 
they were so compelling in their reasons earlier this year that the 
majority leader cosponsored S. 14.
  There must have been a time at some point this year that the majority 
leader looked at the options as well and came to the conclusion that 
they were right; that, indeed, having looked at all the different 
alternatives, S. 14 made the most sense.
  There has been a good deal of discussion in recent weeks about 
Democrats who voted one way for a balanced budget amendment and then 
voted a different way this year. Obviously, going from one Congress to 
the next on an issue of some importance, changing one's position is 
understandable. It happens here all the time. But to go from a 
cosponsored measure, one which enjoyed broad-based bipartisan support, 
and in the same Congress decide even though it was cosponsored, even 
though publicly one is associated with it as the author, and then to 
vote against it would require a good deal of explanation, it would seem 
to me.
  Regardless of what may ultimately come as a result of our debate over 
the course of the next day, what S. 14 is appropriately described as is 
expedited rescission, because it forces Congress to vote on spending 
cuts proposed by the President.
  An almost identical proposal was passed in the House last year on a 
totally bipartisan basis. That vote was 342 to 69. Every one of the 169 
Republican Members of the House at that time supported it. So the 
history of S. 14 is very clear. Republicans by wide margins in the 
past--in the past Congress as well as in the past months--have 
demonstrated their conviction that this is a very appropriate way with 
which to achieve what we all say we want--line-item veto.
  The proposal gives the President authority to force Congress to vote 
on both spending and tax provisions that he considers wasteful. I will 
go into that in a little while. Under current law, Congress can ignore 
the President. We do not have to deal with rescissions the President 
sends to us. The current process is obviously very inadequate. It has 
not worked. Current law is clearly too weak.
  Overwhelmingly, I think, colleagues on both sides of the aisle would 
come to that conclusion. So our amendment requires that Congress not 
ignore the President. It creates a fast-track procedure which forces 
Congress to deal with the President's proposed cuts in a very limited 
period of time. It is not enough for the President to send something 
back. We could continue to ignore it and, in the waning days of a 
Congress, come to some conclusion about dealing with the President's 
rescission and technically, avoid having to make the tough decisions. 
But what this measure says is that within 20 days the President must 
notify the Congress, after passage of a spending or a tax bill, what he 
wants to see cut. Twenty days is all he has. Then, 2 days later, a bill 
with the President's proposals has to be introduced and 10 days later 
the Congress votes.
  So, Mr. President, within little over one month's time the entire 
process must be complete. The President has 20 days to notify the 
Congress of whatever changes he wants to make. Two days later, a 
proposal has to be made within the body to ensure that the President's 
recommendations are considered, and then Congress must act within 10 
days after that to make it happen. That is it. It is over. Within a 
month, it all has to happen.
  There are no filibusters because we limit debate, once it comes to 
the floor, to 10 hours.
  Mr. President, there is a locked-in procedure here requiring from the 
very beginning of the process all the way to the end the certainty that 
Members of Congress must take action once the President makes his 
decision. Both Houses are forced to act. Both Houses would ensure an 
open public debate to place huge pressures on Congress itself to cut 
wasteful spending.
  Mr. President, that is the process. I do not know how it can get much 
simpler than that. I do not know how it can be any less complicated, 
any more certain, and any more streamlined a process as we consider 
legislative proposals in this body.
  So our amendment, in my view, has four main advantages over the 
pending Dole substitute. I want to address those with a little more 
elaboration. But let me just articulate them first.
  It is more practical. We will not see the legislative process tied up 
in knots, as I foresee the Dole substitute doing.
  It is clearly constitutional. It would not be challenged in court. We 
know that. Senator Nunn made quite a point of talking about the 
concerns he has in that regard.
  Third, it protects majority rule, a central principle of democracy. 
It does not permit a minority in Congress, as the Dole substitute 
would, to hold the majority hostage. It protects the balance of power 
between the President and the Congress. We all want review. We all want 
the opportunity to ensure that in an expedited process we can be forced 
to deal with the proposals made by the President with regard to 
rescissions. But we also recognize how important it is that majority 
rule be maintained and protected during the legislative process.
  Finally, it clearly and unambiguously puts tax breaks on the table 
subject to Presidential review. There is no question here. I am going 
to get into that in a little more detail tomorrow. But there is no 
question with regard to the Exon proposal. Tax breaks 
[[Page S4354]]  are on the table, as spending measures are in all other 
cases.
  Let me go back to the issue of practicality. Our amendment, as I 
said, would be so much easier to administer. I have described it in as 
simple a way as I can. I do not know that anyone would have any 
difficulty understanding what happened; 20 days, 2 days, 10 days. That 
is it. It is over.
  The Appropriations Committee last year estimated that the 13 
appropriations bills would ultimately be split into nearly 10,000 
separated minibills under the Dole amendment. Let me repeat that.
  The Appropriations Committee estimates that last year's 13 
appropriations bills, which would be subject under the Exon approach to 
a simple process of reconsideration when the President sends them back, 
if he would choose to do so, would be changed from 13 bills to nearly 
10,000 separate minibills under the Dole amendment.
  I do not have the paper to adequately represent the stacks, the 
truckloads of paper we are going to need to do what the Dole substitute 
would require. But coming on the heels of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 
for the life of me, I do not understand how anybody can advocate going 
from 13 bills to 10,000. Here we are just talking about the 
appropriations process. We are still trying to determine the degree to 
which we will have scope on taxes. But on appropriations bills alone, 
that is the question, do we want to go from 13 to 10,000?
  As I indicated in an earlier speech on the Senate floor, the Energy 
and Water Development Appropriations Act is a pretty good example. That 
act was about 30 pages. The 30 pages, if we use that bill as an example 
this year, would be split into 1,746 separate bills--1,746 separate 
bills.
  So on the basis of prudence or practicality, does it make sense for 
any of us who voted for and have advocated paper reduction to take a 
simple measure, and provide the complicated extraordinary burdensome 
process of going from 13 to 10,000 or in this case 1 page to 1,700? I 
do not think so, Mr. President.
  Second, let me address the issue I raised with regard to 
constitutionality. We have not had the chance to properly evaluate the 
constitutionality of this approach because it has not been considered 
by any committee, as the distinguished Senator from Nebraska has 
indicated. But the last time a separate enrollment proposal was 
considered was 1985. It was voted out unfavorably by unanimous vote in 
the Rules Committee, then chaired by a Republican.
  Several witnesses at the hearings held by the Rules Committee in 1985 
raised serious questions as to the constitutionality of separate 
enrollment. The distinguished senior Senator from West Virginia has 
spent a good deal of time on the floor over the course of the last 
several days talking about this issue, so I will not elaborate.
  But let me just say how pleased I am that the amendment offered by 
the senior Senator from Illinois, Senator Simon, was adopted in order 
to expedite the judicial review of this bill. That is important. 
Certainly with judicial review, we will cut to the heart and go right 
to the question of constitutionality at some point in the not too 
distant future.
  While we will not know until the courts finally determine the 
constitutionality of this legislation, it would certainly be better to 
enact our amendment which raises no questions at all. On the one hand, 
we have a question of taking a chance, rolling the dice with regard to 
constitutionality. On the other hand, with this amendment, there is no 
roll of the dice. There is no question of constitutionality. We know it 
is constitutional. We have that confidence.
  So beyond the practicality of going from 13 to 10,000, then we 
question the constitutionality and say, look. On that side there is a 
doubt. On this side, there is none.
  If this legislation is struck down by the courts, what do we have? We 
go back to ground zero. We probably enact the Exon bill. But why should 
we go through that process? Why should we go back to step one?
  Mr. President, based upon that, I would say that Senators ought to 
give pause before they come to any final conclusions on the Dole 
substitute, which while it has merits, is not as good of a solution as 
the amendment we have offered. I would certainly hope that they will 
take a close look at what the chairman of the Budget Committee himself 
proposed earlier this year along with the ranking member.
  Third, I indicated that majority rule and the balance of power is a 
concern of many of us. Our amendment would require that a majority of 
Congress approve cuts that are proposed by the President using the 
principle of majority rule which has been in existence for 200 years. 
For 200 years we have said majority rule ought to be our modus 
operandi, our approach to passing laws in this country. We would not 
allow a supermajority to hold hostage legislation that otherwise 
deserves fair consideration.
  Under the alternative, the President wins, if he gets the support of 
just one more than a third of either House of Congress. It is all over 
with. A President wins if he can convince one more than one-third of 
either body of the propriety of his action.
 That is all it takes and it is over.

  Do we really want to move that much power to the White House? Do we 
want to see that kind of an imbalance between the executive and 
legislative branches? Mr. President, I do not think so. That is not a 
partisan issue. Obviously, we have a Democratic President and a 
Republican Congress. The roles could be reversed some day. But 
regardless of who dominates either branch, I really question whether we 
want to push that kind of power, that kind of an imbalance, created now 
after over 200 years. I would hope that Members, too, would give a 
great deal of careful thought to allowing the President to use that 
kind of influence.
  I can recall so many occasions over the course of the last 16 years 
where Presidents have called me to urge my vote on a specific issue. 
They have called me saying, ``It is in the national interest for you to 
do something, Senator Daschle,'' or ``Congressman Daschle, that I know 
you do not want to do.'' There have been times when I have had a 
fundamental philosophical disagreement with my own President, 
sometimes, with a Democratic President, not to mention a Republican 
President, and I have had to tell the President, ``No, I am not going 
to support you.'' But I wonder whether anybody could ever imagine--
hopefully, it will never happen, but I wonder if a President might some 
day say, ``Senator Daschle, you have some water projects in South 
Dakota that I am going to line-item veto unless * * *''--God forbid 
that it happens. I hope it will not. But putting the power of the 
President in the position it will be in, under that substitute, gives 
me pause. If I know that I can convince the majority of my colleagues 
of the appropriateness of a given line item, I am going to be safe and 
say, ``Mr. President, you can do anything you want to. I can convince 
my colleagues of the merit of this particular position, so go ahead and 
veto it.'' I will convince the majority. But if all he needs is a 
third, if that is all he needs, I am not sure I will ever get anywhere 
with issues of great importance to this Senator or to anybody else.
  Mr. President, the final issue has to do with tax breaks and the 
language that the Exon proposal provides, as opposed to the language 
provided in the Dole substitute. I must say I am very pleased that the 
Republican majority has come a long way in meeting many of our concerns 
with regard to adopting a provision which allows the President to veto 
special interest tax breaks. While I am pleased with this progress, the 
language in our amendment is much clearer and freer of ambiguity. That 
is what we really want. It says clearly and forcefully: Tax breaks are 
on the table, period; no questions asked, no doubt at all about where 
we stand with regard to putting tax breaks on the table, in the same 
way that appropriations bills are offered. That is a given.
  But I must say, I am hopeful that Republicans and Democrats can come 
to some closure on this issue of tax expenditures. It is gratifying 
that the tax expenditure language that Republicans now propose is 
similar to language that Senator Bradley has introduced and has made 
very clear is his No. 1 priority with regard to the line-item veto. I 
am very pleased that the distinguished Senator from Indiana has made 
that 
[[Page S4355]]  point in a colloquy with Senator Bradley. I will just 
read into the Record what he had to say about this issue, because I 
think it confirms what we have been hoping we can accomplish. Quoting 
now, Senator Coats on March 21, in a colloquy with Senator Bradley. He 
says:

       I say to the Senator from New Jersey, our goal, I believe, 
     is the same--to address the same items that he attempts to 
     address. I hope that as we debate through this and work 
     through this, we can clarify so that Members know exactly 
     what we are after. It is hard to get the exact words in place 
     so that we understand just exactly how this applies to tax 
     items. But I believe that the targeted tax expenditures which 
     are targeted in the Dole amendment very closely parallel what 
     the Senator from New Jersey has tried for so long to 
     accomplish.

  Mr. President, that clarification is very helpful. I commend the 
Senator from Indiana for making it. Republicans would subject a tax 
break to potential veto, and it provides more favorable tax treatment 
to a particular taxpayer or limited group of taxpayers ``when compared 
with other similarly situated taxpayers.'' The only way a tax 
expenditure would not be subject to potential veto under this language 
is if we define ``similarly situated'' as meaning identical. Our 
Republicans colleagues have assured us that that is not their intent.
  Suppose we proposed a $500 tax credit for all employees of Senate 
offices. Everyone would agree that this proposal should be subject to a 
Presidential veto. But if we define ``similarly situated'' as all 
employees of Senate offices, then we would have the ridiculous result 
that the proposal would not be subject to any line-item veto. What if 
we provided a tax deduction to all businesses in Fairfax County, VA. We 
would agree that the President should have the authority to review the 
provision for possible line-item veto. If we only compare the taxpayers 
who benefit from this deduction to businesses in Fairfax County, then 
we end up with a nonsensical result that the deduction would not be 
subject to the line-item veto.
  So, Mr. President, as these examples show, defining ``similarly 
situated taxpayers'' to mean the identical group of taxpayers leads to 
a ridiculous result. But applying common sense to the term ``similarly 
situated'' leads inevitably to a broad interpretation of that term, 
which is what I am sure our Republican colleagues have intended.
  They have confirmed and assured us that it is not their intent to 
have the line-item veto operate in the manner I just described with 
these examples. Thus, similarly situated taxpayer should be interpreted 
broadly, thereby subjecting a wide range of tax breaks to a 
Presidential veto.
  Again, Mr. President, that is the question. Why should we have to go 
through an interpretation of broad or narrow scope with regard to tax 
breaks? Why not put all tax breaks on the table? Why not recognize that 
a tax break is an expenditure, an expenditure that has to be offset, an 
expenditure that ought to be treated just like an appropriation? That 
is what the Democratic substitute does, very clearly.
  So, in closing, Mr. President, let me just say that we will have more 
of an opportunity tomorrow to talk about these issues. But we need to 
go back to the original Domenici-Exon language, cosponsored by the 
majority leader. We appreciate very much that Republicans have come 
toward our view on tax breaks. Now they should come back to their own 
language that is part of our substitute. We support giving the 
President new authority to compel consideration of cuts in spending and 
tax breaks, and the best way to do it is to adopt this amendment. It is 
workable, it is constitutional, it protects majority rule, and it 
clearly puts special interest tax breaks on the table.
  I hope that in the spirit of bipartisanship, recognizing that the 
origin of this legislation came from Republicans and Democrats, and not 
only just any Republican or Democrat, but it came from the chairman of 
the Budget Committee and the ranking member of the Budget Committee, 
people who know this issue better than the rest of us, I hope that 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle can recognize the wisdom of that 
approach and support it tomorrow when we have the rollcall vote.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, in one very real sense, I welcome the 
remarks of the minority leader and welcome the support that the 
minority leader and others have offered on this floor for the concept 
that we are attempting to advance; namely, how do we make it harder to 
spend the taxpayers' dollars? And how can we end a practice which most 
of us recognize as not a practice that brings credit to this 
institution, but one which annually causes us significant 
embarrassment?
  The disclosure of certain types of spending, certain types of tax 
benefits to the public severely undermines their confidence in us as an 
institution, severely enhances their criticism and their cynicism 
toward this institution, as they regularly see expenditures for items 
that are not considered to be in the national interest or in any sense 
of the measure a broad interest, but are targeted to just a few.
  And it is a time honored, some would say--I would say time 
dishonored--process that we have engaged in over the years to slip 
those little provisions in, sometimes in the back room, sometimes in 
conference, when there really is no chance to amend a bill that we know 
the President has to sign.
  And so we are encouraged that our colleagues from across the aisle 
have recognized that this is a practice that needs to be limited or 
stopped.
  But for the past 6 years, during my service in the Senate, I have 
been part of an effort led by Republicans to attempt to address this 
issue. And we failed each time. Really, going all the way back to 1985, 
there have been six separate efforts to address line-item veto in which 
we had votes. And in each one of those efforts, the number of Democrats 
supporting Republicans or supporting the effort in general can be 
counted generally on one hand. We have failed again and again and 
again. We have failed because we have not had support from across the 
aisle.
  Oh, it is wonderful now to hear all these statements about how 
Democrats support line-item veto; how they support enhanced rescission; 
how they are trying to work toward the same goals as we are. Well, we 
welcome their support. It is a little late, but it is not too late. And 
we hope that that translates into finally arriving at a measure which 
will get at this practice of tax pork and spending pork.
  In 1985, when the measure was offered by Senator Mattingly, 
Republican from Georgia, only seven Democrats supported the effort. And 
in 1990, when I offered not the line-item veto or a separate 
enrollment, but when I offered enhanced rescission, only four Democrats 
supported the effort and we failed, as did Senator Mattingly in 1985.
  We failed because the effort was filibustered. We failed because 
points of order were raised forcing us to achieve 60 votes to even get 
to debate. We did not even get to the debate of the issue.
  In 1990, my colleague and partner in this effort, Senator McCain, 
also offered enhanced rescission and he only got four Democrat votes. 
And in 1992, Senator McCain offered it again and this time he got 
seven. So there was some movement in our direction.
  But then a year later, in 1993, I offered it, the same bill, enhanced 
rescission--the rescission process that the Democrats are now talking 
about as the alternative and the substitute to what we are attempting 
to do--and we only got five. So I must not have been as persuasive as 
Senator McCain because we lost two Democrats.
  And even in 1993, when Senator Bradley changed his position on this 
issue from being opposed to it but recognizing that something had to be 
done, something had to be done to stop this runaway spending and this 
runaway deficit and this runaway national debt, even then Senator 
Bradley, as a Democrat, could only secure 13 Democrats and the measure 
fell once again.
  And so we have had a decade of resistance--a decade of efforts to 
block our attempts to pass rescission, enhanced rescission, separate 
enrollment, line-item veto. And every one of those efforts has been 
defeated not by the votes of Republicans but defeated by the votes of 
Democrats.
  So it is a little difficult to sit here through this debate and hear 
the protestations that, ``If Republicans would just cooperate. If they 
would just lean a little more our way and see the bill as we see it, we 
could have line-item veto or we could have enhanced rescission. And 
somehow the Republicans are 
[[Page S4356]]  blocking a measure to give the President this 
authority.'' When the fact of the matter is that it is only the 
persistence of Republicans, the persistence of those who continue to 
offer this year after year after year, that finally has translated into 
an election last November which gave us the necessary new Members to 
have a chance at succeeding on this item.
  Now a great deal has been said about why do we not take the Domenici-
Exon package; that the chairman of the Budget Committee at one time 
sponsored a provision which is being offered now as an alternative, and 
it must have been a pretty good effort in putting that bill together 
because both the chairman and the ranking member supported it.
  Well, Senator Domenici did offer that alternative to the McCain-Coats 
enhanced rescission. He offered expedited rescission. And it was 
pointed out that expedited rescission really was not a major change 
from the status quo. It was a modest improvement, but it did not really 
have the strength of fundamentally changing the way we do business in 
this body and it lacked the two-thirds vote necessary to override the 
President's decision. As such, the conclusion was the same 51 votes 
that passed the appropriation in the first place, that voted for the 
appropriation, could overturn the President's decision and retain the 
very items that raised the questions about pork-barrel spending in the 
first place.
  And so, it was Senator Domenici who said, ``Why don't we look at an 
alternative that will be even stronger, that will expand the scope?"
  In fact, Senator Domenici said, ``My problem with the McCain-Coats 
effort is that it only focuses on the appropriated items. And the 
appropriated items, once you separate out defense, amounts to less than 
20 percent of the budget.'' He thought that was unfairly targeted to a 
certain segment of spending and it would ignore other areas. That is 
the reason he crafted the alternative bill.
  And so we sat down with Senator Domenici and said, ``Well, let's 
examine some ways that we could expand this and address the question 
that you raised because that is a legitimate question.'' And Senator 
Stevens weighed in on it and he had the same concerns.
  Out of that came the product that we are now debating that has been 
offered by Senator Dole, the majority leader, as the Dole amendment, 
the product around which we have secured the support of nearly every 
Republican because it was expanded to include additional items and not 
just the appropriated items.
  And it was Senator Domenici, right after the introduction of the Dole 
amendment, the separate enrollment provision, that came to the floor 
and made a lengthy statement as to why the Dole amendment was so 
superior to his own product and why he was withdrawing his amendment 
that had been reported out of the Budget Committee, his bill, his 
product, why he was withdrawing support for that in favor of a much 
better version, a much more effective version, a much tougher version, 
a version with real teeth. He outlined that, and I want to quote from 
his remarks.
  As my colleagues have said, the alternative that they are providing 
must be a good one because it was Senator Domenici's original proposal. 
Yes, it was his original proposal, in response to a measure that he did 
not think was strong enough because it did not include enough 
categories.
  As a result of that, we met and we crafted a much stronger version, 
and Senator Domenici came down here and said, ``This is what I was 
really looking for and this is a much superior product.''
  I quote from him where he said, reading from the Congressional Record 
of March 20, 1995, Senator Domenici said ``I support the objective of 
Senator McCain's bill,'' enhanced recision, ``but I felt the McCain 
bill shifted too much power over the budget of the President and 
focused too much attention on just the appropriated accounts, which 
excluding defense, represents less than 20 percent of total spending. 
The Dole amendment provides a less cumbersome process to overturn 
Presidential rescissions.''
  The McCain-Coats bill has a two-stage process where Congress would 
have to vote two times if the President vetoed the first effort. He 
said the new Dole amendment offers a one-hurdle process, and for that 
reason it is superior to the product that he had originally sponsored.
  Second, he said, ``The Dole amendment applies to all spending. It 
applies to new spending and legislation, not just appropriations 
legislation. In addition, it applies to any new very narrow targeted 
tax benefit legislation and new entitlements.'' Third, he says, ``It 
provides for congressional review. It contained a sunset in the year 
2000.'' I quote again, ``I congratulate Senator Dole. He has found an 
approach that significantly expands the President's authority over 
spending, without unduly disrupting the delicate balance of power.''
  The minority leader suggests this evening that this is some kind of a 
surprise because it is a substitute to the previously reported bills. 
The truth of the matter is that every provision in this has either been 
voted on by the Senate or discussed thoroughly in committee. And he 
goes on to state why it is not a surprise, and I will get to that in a 
moment.
  I will conclude Senator Domenici's remarks by quoting one more time: 
``This product,'' referring to Senator Dole's amendment, ``is as close 
as we will ever get to a fair line-item veto that has a chance of 
working and that is broader than we originally conceived but fair in 
that respect. It is fair. I will suggest that if there are some who 
think that the old bill which I introduced should be revisited, and 
perhaps the President supports it, let me set that one aside.''
  Let me repeat that. Senator Domenici, the one who wrote the bill 
along with Senator Exon, that was his initial effort, came to this 
floor and said, ``I will suggest that if there are some who think that 
the old bill which I introduced should be revisited, let me set that 
one aside,'' and he withdrew that bill and signed on to the Dole bill 
because it was a much superior, much tougher, much broader, much more 
effective, and as Senator Domenici said, fairer to a line-item veto 
that has a chance of actually working.
  We have talked a lot about the practicality of this bill and it seems 
that the opposition--Democrats opposing this bill--keep using the 
question of process and mechanics, and how this is going to complicate 
the effort.
  Well, the President of the United States does not think it will 
complicate the effort. They worry about sending too many pieces of 
paper down to the White House. The President of the United States said 
in his statement released on March 20, ``I urge the Senate to pass the 
strongest possible line-item veto.'' He did not say, ``I urge the 
Senate to pass expedited rescission.'' Expedited rescission does not 
begin to resemble a line-item veto. Veto means two-thirds override. It 
does not mean majority vote. It does not mean the same votes that pass 
the appropriation in the first place are necessary to overturn what the 
President has vetoed. It means two-thirds. Give me the line-item veto, 
the President said, in his letter.
  This is about closing the door on business as usual in Washington. 
Business as usual in Washington is 51 votes to pass tax benefits, which 
I call tax pork, that go to certain individuals or specialized interest 
that do not apply to broad classes. And it is spending pork which go to 
special individuals, special interests, and do not apply to the broad, 
public interest.
  The President wants the real thing because he knows the real thing is 
the only thing that will make a difference. He knows if we will change 
the spending habits of Congress, if we are going to change the process 
of blackmail in sending him--what I should call ``legislative 
blackmail''--in sending him bills, where it is a take-it-or-leave-it 
proposition, he knows that he has to have some tool that will have some 
teeth in it, and some authority that has some clout in it. That is what 
the President understands. That is what he has asked for.
  We Republicans do not give him very much of what he asks for or do 
not like to give him very much that he asks for, but this is something 
we have been trying to support, and trying to give him for a very 
considerable amount of time.
  The fact of the matter is that the Dole substitute grants the 
President 
[[Page S4357]]  true veto authority. It requires a two-thirds vote by 
Congress to continue spending. Short of an amendment to the 
Constitution, which we are not able to secure enough votes to pass --I 
wish we could--it is the strongest tool we can grant the President. It 
is similar to the authority that 43 other Governors currently enjoy.
  The Exon expedited recision package does little to restore the 
President's authority to withhold spending that he enjoyed prior to 
1974. At that time, Congress decisively grabbed the absolute power of 
the purse. The only thing they gave the President was the power to 
propose rescissions. Most of those recissions that the President and 
subsequent Presidents proposed, never saw the light of day.
  In 1974, the President sent up recissions and Congress ignored every 
one of them. One hundred percent. They said, ``No thank you, Mr. 
President. Everything we passed, stands.'' In 1976, 86 percent of the 
President's rescissions were ignored. In 1983, 100 percent of the 
President's recissions were ignored. In 1986, 95 percent. In 1987, 97 
percent.
  Now, the Exon legislation, the expedited rescission just offered by 
the minority leader, is a modest improvement because it says that at 
least the President's rescissions are going to get a vote. But it is 
only going to get a vote of the same people who passed it in the first 
place, and it is hard to see how that will change what Congress had 
previously done.
  If we are ever going to reverse spending trends in this body, we do 
not need modest improvements. We need fundamental change. To continue 
spending under the substitute or appropriately, under the amendment 
offered by the minority leader, the only standard they are proposing is 
that Congress needs a simple majority, and if it fails to enact a bill 
within 45 days, the funds are automatically released.
  What is being offered as a poor substitute, a weak substitute, to the 
closest thing we can get to line-item veto is, simply put, too little 
too late.
  It does nothing to restore that healthy tension necessary between the 
legislative and executive branch necessary to impose fiscal discipline 
on Members of the Congress. Some have said that the veto standard, the 
two-thirds is too high a standard, that it is too difficult to muster 
the numbers to override it.
  To those, I would say that the greater challenge today is to reduce 
our Nation's debt and balance our Nation's books. In this day, it 
should be tougher. It should be a formidable challenge to continue to 
spend money. It is time for a higher standard.
  If we get the job done by the year 2000, then maybe we will want to 
revisit this. Maybe we will want to look at this and see whether or not 
it has been abused, this new authority of the President has been abused 
as some say that it might be. I do not think it will. It certainly has 
not been at the State level. There are no State legislators calling for 
repeal of the line-item veto power that their governors have.
  It sets up a healthy tension, a healthy tension, a necessary tension 
that can restore some discipline to this body.
  The Dole bill is the strongest line-item veto bill. It presumes that 
funding is rescinded unless the elimination of spending is specifically 
disapproved. It requires a two-thirds majority in the House and Senate 
to override a subsequent veto.
  Let us show the American people we are serious about fundamentally 
changing the way this Congress does business. Let us show them that we 
intend to present appropriations bills and tax bills without 
embarrassment. Let us show them that we intend to send a message to the 
taxpayers that under our guidance their dollars will not be wasted. Let 
us act boldly to eliminate the dual deficits of public funds and public 
trust and let us resist the urge to continue business as usual.
  The alternative offered by the minority leader is essentially 
business as usual. The Dole amendment is a real meaningful, fundamental 
change in the way this Congress spends taxpayers' dollars. It makes it 
tougher. It makes it a lot tougher. It ought to make it tougher because 
we have abused the privilege that we have had as Members of this body 
by being irresponsible in the way we spend those dollars, by running up 
a debt and by sending to the President items which we in our hearts 
know do not deserve to be in those appropriations or in those tax 
bills.
  So while I urge my colleagues to reject the proposal offered by the 
minority leader, we welcome their support for the concept. What they 
have offered is too little too late.
  Let us pass something that will make a difference.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thompson). The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I am going to be very brief because we have 
been at it a long time today, and I am sure that I am not going to 
score very many points at this time of the night and we will start 
again tomorrow.
  I would just like to briefly sum up if I can. Although it has not 
been mentioned in the lengthy debate tonight, I believe that any 
objective Republicans, if we can find one up in this Chamber this time 
of night, would probably concede that the Senator from Nebraska has 
been one of those with a pretty strong career of voting for line-item 
veto matters in this Chamber. So all of us cannot be accused of being 
Johnny-come-latelies.
  What has happened in the past, though, is not nearly as important as 
what we are doing here tonight. And I would simply say that Senator 
Nunn in a remarkable, well thought out speech, that could in no way 
could be considered a partisan statement at all, outlined some 
concerns.
  Regardless of the intent of the Dole amendment--and it may be 
described correctly as what came out of a meeting of the Republican 
caucus, this was the product that came out of it--that does not 
necessarily guarantee the product is not faulty and probably should 
receive some further corrections.
  I wish to thank my colleagues on that side of the aisle who on more 
than one occasion today have agreed to amendments that I thought were 
absolutely critical and essential, and we have had them to come our 
way. I hope they would agree we are trying to be constructive and not 
destructive in trying to fashion something in the form of a line-item 
veto that would be as safe as it possibly could be from a court 
challenge that I am certain will follow if we eventually pass the Dole 
substitute amendment.
  I happen to feel that with the comments again tonight about the 
constitutionality problem and the operational problems manifold 
outlined by Senator Nunn, many of which I think had obviously not been 
considered when this product was put together, we must continue to 
reason together if we can and keep this as nonpartisan as possible and 
try and pass a piece of legislation that is not going to be thrown out 
by the courts.
  If that happens, it will not be an exercise, indeed, in futility. And 
since I have indicated I have had more than my share of futility on 
this very matter time and time again before with many of the key able 
players in this line-item veto we are talking about tonight, I just 
hope we can get something done rather than one more exercise in 
futility and disappointment.
  That is why I appeal, I appeal once again to let us reason together 
and not stick by the basic principle that what came out of the 
Republican caucus--because I think the Republicans would even admit 
it--just because it came out of a Republican caucus of the majority 
party in the Senate is a guarantee it is perfect.
  Let me appeal once again, Mr. President, that on tomorrow when the 
sun comes up, as it will, when we will be back here again, let us see 
if debate and reason and sound statements on the floor of the Senate 
mean something and they are not going to be automatically shunted aside 
on a strictly party line Republican vote, 54 people marching in 
lockstep because the product which came out of their caucus is somehow 
sacrosanct and must not be tampered with.


                 Amendment No. 350 to Amendment No. 347

       (Purpose: To prohibit the use of savings achieved through 
     lowering the discretionary spending caps to offset revenue 
     decreases subject to pay-as-you-go requirements)

  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, on another matter, on behalf of the senior 
Senator 
[[Page S4358]]  from West Virginia, I call up amendment No. 350, which 
the clerk has at the desk, and ask for its report.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Exon], for Mr. Byrd, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 350 to amendment No. 347.

  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place insert the following:
     SEC.   . USE OF THE REDUCTIONS IN DISCRETIONARY SPENDING 
                   CAPS.

       (A) Congressional Budget Act.--
       (1) Budget resolutions and legislation.--Section 301 of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the 
     end the following:
       ``(j) Use of Reductions in Discretionary Spending Caps.--It 
     shall not be in order in the Senate or House of 
     Representatives to consider any concurrent resolution on the 
     budget, bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or 
     conference report that decreases the discretionary spending 
     limits unless the concurrent resolution on the budget, bill, 
     joint resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report 
     provides that such decrease may only be used for deficit 
     reduction and may not be used to offset all or part of an 
     increase in direct spending or decrease in receipts under 
     section 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
     Control Act of 1974.''.
       (2) Sixty vote point of order.--Subsections (c) and (d) of 
     section 904 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 are 
     amended by inserting ``301(j),'' after ``301(i),''.
       (b) Gramm-Rudman.--Section 252 of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended by adding at 
     the end the following:
       ``(f) Use of Reductions in Discretionary Spending Caps.--A 
     decrease in the discretionary spending limits may only be 
     used for deficit reduction and may not be used to offset all 
     or part of an increase in direct spending or decrease in 
     receipts under this section.''.

  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, this amendment would prohibit the use of 
cuts in the appropriation caps to pay for tax cuts. The Senator from 
West Virginia has asked me to call up this amendment to ensure that it 
will qualify for consideration under the unanimous consent agreement 
governing consideration of the main proposition before us.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that now that this has been 
called up, the pending amendment be temporarily set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________