[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 53 (Wednesday, March 22, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4333-S4342]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     LEGISLATIVE LINE-ITEM VETO ACT

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.


          Amendment No. 401, as Modified, to Amendment No. 347

  Mr. McCAIN. Now may I ask what the parliamentary situation is?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending amendment at the present time is 
the amendment of the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Abraham].
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, if there is no further debate on the 
amendment, I move the amendment.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, there is no such motion under the Senate 
rules.
  There is no such motion in the Senate rules, moving adoption of an 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does someone seek recognition?
  Mr. McCAIN. I move adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, there is no such motion under Senate rules.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does someone seek recognition?
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the majority leader has made it quite 
clear, as has the Democratic leader, that we want to finish this bill 
tomorrow. We have now 14 amendments pending on the bill. We have spent 
a long time on the bill. We would like to have debate on this 
amendment. Any Member of this body can put the Senate into a quorum 
call if they wish.
  I would like to go ahead and debate the Abraham amendment and be able 
to move on to other amendments, if that is possible. If it is not 
possible, then obviously we may have to inconvenience Members by 
staying here very late tonight so that we can keep consonance with the 
desires of the majority leader and the rest of the Members of the body 
to finish this legislation tomorrow and not spend 3 and 4 weeks on a 
single piece of legislation as we did with the balanced budget 
amendment and other amendments since we have gone into session here.
  So, Mr. President, I hope that we can move forward with this 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
  Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am not ready at this moment to debate the 
amendment, so I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum has been suggested. 
The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I again advise my colleagues that we have 
14 amendments pending. We would like to get those done. An amendment is 
before the Senate. I would like to move forward with it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does someone seek recognition for debate on 
the Abraham amendment?
  [[Page S4334]] If not, all those in favor of the amendment----
  Mr. BYRD addressed the chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I do not seek to delay action on the 
amendment, nor do I seek to delay action on the bill. But this is an 
amendment that has just been called up and the author of the amendment 
is not in the Chamber. I was hoping to ask the author of the amendment 
some questions. If Senators want me to begin, I can talk at length, but 
I do not seek to do that. That is not my purpose. I wanted to ask some 
questions about the amendment. I wanted to ask some questions of the 
author.
  Now, the Senator from Arizona, of course, is seeking to convey the 
impression that I am trying to delay the bill. I am not doing that. I 
am not quite ready yet to discuss this amendment, but I am also not 
ready yet to allow a vote on it, until I have an opportunity to ask a 
few questions.
  So I will suggest if Senators wish to get on with the amendment, get 
the author of the amendment over to the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I say to my colleague from West Virginia, 
the Senator from Michigan, who is the author of the amendment, is on 
the floor now if the Senator chooses to proceed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have noted the amendment by Mr. Abraham to 
the substitute offered by Mr. Dole.
  I ask unanimous consent that I may be able to ask questions of other 
Senators, notwithstanding that I have the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. My first question to the distinguished Senator would be, 
why does the Senator feel that it is necessary to offer this amendment 
to the Dole substitute?
  Mr. ABRAHAM. I have watched the debate as it has proceeded here. And 
certainly during the period of time after the compromise version of 
this legislation was developed, I have heard various Members of the 
Senate express concerns about its constitutionality and it struck me 
that the area in which the concerns were primarily focused was, as 
earlier expressed, I think, by Senator Leahy, the presentment issues 
that I have tried to address here.
  My feelings were, although I believe as drafted the legislation could 
sustain a constitutional test, that it was in our interests to make the 
changes I am proposing in this amendment to try to further address any 
concerns people might have.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, on yesterday I spoke at some length with 
respect to what I consider to be some constitutional flaws in the Dole 
substitute. One area which I discussed at some length was that which 
pertained to the presentation clause; the fact that under the 
legislation that is before the Senate, each of the bills or joint 
resolutions that will have been enrolled by the enrolling clerk of the 
House of origination will not have had action by either House, 
specifically, on that particular enrolled bill. Consequently, I felt 
that the legislation was constitutionally vulnerable. The pending 
legislation deems that each such bill has passed both Houses, when in 
reality, each such bill would not have passed either House, to say 
nothing of both Houses.
  So I take it that it is that perception of the unconstitutionality of 
the legislation by Mr. Dole that has led the distinguished Senator to 
offer the amendment which is presently before the Senate?
  Mr. ABRAHAM. As I said, the concerns that had been expressed in the 
period of time during which this compromise was worked out and were 
expressed, I think by you yesterday and by others here today, were 
concerns I felt could be adequately addressed and resolved in this 
fashion. So I thought in developing this amendment we could effectively 
handle the concerns that had been raised, although, as I say, I do not 
necessarily accept the notion that the legislation would not pass 
constitutional muster as is. But I thought this would allay fears and 
concerns that had been brought up.
  Mr. BYRD. But I think, Mr. President, that the amendment by the 
distinguished Senator will have certainly improved the legislation if 
the amendment is agreed to, and I have no doubt that it will be.
  Let me ask the Senator a further question. His amendment reads as 
follows:

       On p. 3, line 17, strike everything after the word 
     ``measure'' through the word ``generally'' on p. 4, line 14 
     and insert the following in its place:

  This is the language, now, that would be inserted by Mr. Abraham:

     first passes both Houses of Congress in the same form, the 
     Secretary of the Senate (in the case of a measure originating 
     in the Senate) or the Clerk of the House of Representatives 
     (in the case of a measure originating in the House of 
     Representatives) shall disaggregate the bill into items and 
     assign each item a new bill number. Henceforth each item 
     shall be treated as a separate bill to be considered under 
     the following subsections.

  And so on.
  The amendment of the Senator speaks not only with reference to 
appropriations bills but also with reference to authorization measures, 
does it not?
  Mr. ABRAHAM. Yes, it does.
  Mr. BYRD. And on page 5 of the substitute offered by Mr. Dole and 
other Senators, under the section on definitions:

       For purposes of this Act:
       (2) The term ``authorization measure'' means any measure, 
     other than an appropriations measure, that contains a 
     provision providing direct spending or targeted tax benefits.

  Now, would that include a reconciliation bill?
  Mr. ABRAHAM. I am sorry?
  Mr. BYRD. The definition of authorization measure, on page 5 of the 
Dole substitute, under section 5 titled ``Definitions,'' paragraph (2):

       The term ``authorization measure'' means any measure other 
     than an appropriations measure that contains a provision 
     providing direct spending or targeted tax benefits.

  Does that language include a reconciliation bill?
  Mr. ABRAHAM. I would defer that interpretation to the manager.
  Mr. BYRD. What does the Senator think it means, the Senator who 
offered the amendment? Does he believe the term ``authorization 
measure'' includes a reconciliation bill?
  Mr. President, I am left alone on the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia has the floor. 
As I understand it, he is waiting for a response from the Senator from 
Michigan.
  Mr. BYRD. That is the first question I have ever asked in the Senate 
that caused the whole Senate to vanish, other than the Presiding 
Officer and myself.
  What am I to do?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator, you have my complete attention.
  Mr. BYRD. There was all this great hurry to get on with this bill and 
I have asked a question, but all Senators have left the floor.
  Oh, they are returning now.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia has the floor 
and continues to have unanimous consent to proceed with questions to 
another Senator.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. After consultation with the manager of the bill, it is 
our interpretation that, yes, it would include reconciliation.
  Mr. BYRD. It would include a reconciliation bill.
  Then, I will read the amendment of the Senator further. According to 
the amendment of the distinguished Senator, ``the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives''--in most instances these measures would originate in 
the House.
  The Clerk of the House of Representatives then would disaggregate the 
bill, meaning a reconciliation bill, would disaggregate the bill into 
items and assign each item a new bill number. In reconciliation bills 
there is almost always direct spending. There are targeted tax 
benefits. With the Senator's 
[[Page S4335]]  amendment then, I take it that a reconciliation bill 
that has in it provisions providing direct spending or targeted tax 
benefits--such bills would have to be disaggregated. Am I correct?
  Mr. ABRAHAM. Yes.
  Mr. BYRD. Meaning the whole bill has to be disaggregated. So, if 
there are direct spending items in the bill, if there are targeted tax 
benefits, the entire reconciliation bill under the Senator's amendment 
has to be broken down, disaggregated for all of the items, assigned new 
bill numbers, and enrolled as separate bills. Am I correct?
  Mr. ABRAHAM. Yes. It would have to be disaggregated.
  Mr. BYRD. Is not the purpose of a reconciliation bill the bringing 
into proper balance spending and the raising of revenues in such a way 
as to moderate or to reduce the deficit? Am I correct?
  Mr. ABRAHAM. That is correct. As I interpret the question, our 
amendment is designed in a mechanical sense to call for a yes-no vote 
on the question of all those separately disaggregated portions whether 
it is a reconciliation bill or other.
  Mr. BYRD. Yes. So each of the items in the reconciliation bill would 
be enrolled separately and be sent to the President. If the President 
chooses to veto certain items in the reconciliation bill, would this 
not then have the undesired result of bringing into imbalance the 
reconciliation bill, rather than balancing the effects of revenue 
increases and direct spending costs?
  Mr. ABRAHAM. I defer on this to the Senator from Arizona. I yield to 
him at this time.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator from Michigan.
  I would say to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia that this 
bill effects new spending, new taxes, or new entitlements. If the 
intention of reconciliation bills are to bring the deficit down, then 
we should find another vehicle because the deficit has not come down. 
The deficit has gone up. The deficit has gone up.
  So I suggest that we invent a new vehicle. But a reconciliation bill, 
like any other bill that has new spending, new taxes, or new 
entitlements associated with it, would be subject to a line-item veto.
  Mr. BYRD. But the term ``authorization measure'' under section 5, 
entitled ``definitions,'' does not confine it to new spending or new 
targeted tax benefits. The term ``authorization'' means any measure 
other than an appropriations measure that contains a provision 
providing direct spending or targeted tax benefits. It does not say 
anything about new direct spending.
  Mr. McCAIN. If the Senator will turn to the next page, where it says 
the term ``item'' means with respect to an appropriations measure, any 
numbered section, any numbered paragraph, any allocation or 
suballocation of an appropriation made in compliance with section 
(2)(a) containing a numbered section and an unnumbered paragraph, and 
with respect to an authorization measure, any numbered or unnumbered 
paragraph that contains new direct spending or a new direct tax benefit 
presented and identified in a conformance with (2)(b).
  So I ask the distinguished Senator from West Virginia to look at next 
page for the explanation which seems to have eluded him.
  Mr. BYRD. But the Senator's amendment said that the bill shall be 
disaggregated. That means broken down. A reconciliation bill shall be 
separated into all of its distinct parts and enrolled as separate bills 
and sent to the President.
  Mr. McCAIN. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. BYRD. Whether there is ``new direct spending'' or just ``direct 
spending.''
  Mr. McCAIN. Only those items in the reconciliation bill which would 
contain new direct spending or new targeted tax benefits identified in 
conformance with section (2)(b).
  In addition to that, I do not see in light of a reconciliation bill 
any new entitlement or expansion of existing entitlement would also be 
covered.
  Mr. BYRD. What about a defense authorization bill? Would the entire 
bill have to be broken down?
  Mr. McCAIN. I would say no.
  Mr. BYRD. Only if it contained new direct spending or a new targeted 
tax benefit or an expansion or new entitlement. Defense authorization 
bills do include direct spending for retirement.
  What I am really trying to get at is that it seems to me that this 
amendment certainly has as its good purpose, the effort to cure what 
appears to be a constitutional vulnerability. But in the attempt, it 
raises as many questions as it answers.
  Mr. McCAIN. Could I respond to that? If I may ask the indulgence of 
the Senator from West Virginia to try to respond very briefly to that?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. McCAIN. I say to the Senator from West Virginia that we received 
from the Congressional Research Service from Mr. Johnny Killian, Senior 
Specialist in American Constitutional Law, who I know that the 
distinguished Senator from West Virginia is familiar with, and I will 
not read the entire opinion. I would like to read the last paragraph 
which I think pretty much sums up the situation in my view.

       In conclusion, we have argued that the deeming procedure--

  We know what the deeming procedure is.

     may present a political question unsuited for judicial 
     review, and, thus, that Congress would not be subject to 
     judicial review.

  I will not read the whole thing because there is some ambiguity here, 
I say to my colleague from West Virginia.

       We have considered, on the other hand, that the courts may 
     find they are not precluded from exercising authority to 
     review this proposal. If the proposal is reviewed by the 
     courts, and, even, if it is not, we have presented an 
     argument leading to sustaining the deeming procedure as not 
     in violation of a principle that bill, in order to become 
     law, must be passed in identical version by the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate. Because of the lack of 
     available precedent, we cannot argue that any of the three 
     versions of the argument is indisputably correct. Indeed, 
     there are questions about all three.

  I repeat--questions about all three. The arguments concerning the 
separate enrollment. He concludes by saying: ``In the end, Congress 
must exercise a constitutional judgment when deciding on passage of a 
proposal.''
  The Senator from Michigan felt, as he stated, that there might be 
some ambiguities in judging this, and he felt that although it may or 
may not--the language of the legislation is probably constitutional as 
presently framed. By his amendment, he could remove some of the 
ambiguities associated with the constitutional question.
  I do understand, and I paid attention yesterday to the very learned 
exposition of the Senator from West Virginia, about the 
constitutionality of this issue. I suggest that perhaps one of the 
conclusions we might reach in this debate would be the final sentence 
of Mr. Killian's opinion which says: ``In the end, Congress must 
exercise a constitutional judgment when deciding on passage of the 
proposal,'' because as the Senator from West Virginia well knows, 
according to article I, what the Congress deems as a bill has always 
been taken by the courts as a bill.
  Mr. BYRD. Well, Mr. President, I appreciate what the distinguished 
Senator has just stated. But I think we are missing something; what we 
are saying is going by one another. I do not think the Senator's 
response goes to the point I raised. I agree that the distinguished 
Senator, Mr. Abraham, is seeking to cure the vulnerability of the 
language from a constitutional standpoint in the Dole substitute, 
especially as it referred to the presentation clause. He is seeking to 
get around the deeming feature of that language. That is not what I am 
questioning here. On that point, I am saying that I think his amendment 
is an improvement to the legislation.
  But what I am trying to find out is whether or not this language 
contemplates a reconciliation bill. And in one instance under the 
section 5 definition, it reads: ``The term `authorization measure'''--
which includes a reconciliation bill--``means any measure other than an 
appropriations measure that contains a provision providing direct 
spending or targeted tax benefits.'' That would indeed include a 
reconciliation bill.
  I think Senators ought to be aware of that when they vote on this 
substitute. It is not just talking about appropriations bills. It is 
talking about reconciliation bills as well. And Senators need to 
understand that the language 
[[Page S4336]]  of the amendment by Mr. Abraham instructs that the 
bill--the whole reconciliation bill--must be disaggregated if there is 
one item in it, one provision, that provides for direct spending or 
targeted tax benefits. The whole bill then must be broken down into 
several hundred, or perhaps thousands of separate ``billettes.''
  Mr. McCAIN. I ask the Senator from West Virginia if he will yield.
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. McCAIN. I apologize if I did not directly respond to his 
question. On March 22, there was a letter sent in to the Honorable Tom 
Daschle, James Exon, and John Glenn in response to a letter that was 
sent to the majority leader and it had a series of 11 questions. The 
last question, I say to my colleague from West Virginia, stated:

       Finally, would the veto authority provided in the amendment 
     extend to reconciliation measures? The current Byrd rule 
     formulation appears to protect reconciliation titles that 
     meet the Budget Committee's savings instruction, even if the 
     titles contain the deficit increasing measures. Would this 
     bill change that approach?

  Does that get to the question that the Senator from West Virginia is 
asking?
  Mr. BYRD. I am not sure that it does. Will the Senator be kind enough 
to read that again?
  Mr. McCAIN. It says,

       Would the veto authority provided in the amendment extend 
     to reconciliation measures? The current Byrd rule formulation 
     appears to protect reconciliation titles that meet the Budget 
     Committee's savings instruction, even if the titles contain 
     the deficit increasing measures. Would this bill change that 
     approach?

  I believe that might be the question. Fundamentally, the amendment of 
the Senator from Michigan basically calls for just an added step in the 
procedure. But it would not change the fundamental question about a 
reconciliation bill. Is that an accurate description of what is in the 
mind of the Senator from West Virginia as to the impact of the 
amendment from the Senator from Michigan?
  Mr. BYRD. I am not sure it is. My next question was, if the Senator 
sees any impact, what impact does this legislation have on the Byrd 
rule?
  Mr. McCAIN. ``The pending line-item veto bill applies to 
reconciliation bills only if the reconciliation bill includes new 
direct spending for a new targeted tax benefit provisions,'' as I have 
stated before. It goes on to say,

       The line-item veto bill is independent of the Budget Act 
     and does not change the application of section 313 of the 
     Budget Act the Byrd rule to reconciliation bills. Compliance 
     with the Byrd rule, section 313 of the Budget Act, or the 
     budget resolutions reconciliation instructions, do not 
     protect the reconciliation bill from separate enrollment. 
     Just as appropriations bills are subject to the line-item 
     veto procedures, even if they comply with the Budget Act, 
     statutory caps, and the budget resolution's budget 
     allocations, reconciliation bills are subject to the line-
     item veto procedures even if they comply with the budget 
     resolution's reconciliation directives and the Byrd rule.

  In other words, what I think the Senator from West Virginia is 
getting at--and I am hesitant, obviously, to try to articulate what he 
does far better than I do--is that a reconciliation bill is an attempt 
by the Congress to balance certain competing priorities.
  What the Senator from West Virginia is concerned about is, if you 
take out part of that, then it destroys the intent of the 
reconciliation process. I do believe that that would probably be one of 
the impacts if the line-item veto were misused by a President of the 
United States.
  But I would find it very difficult to believe that Congress would not 
override a President who would abuse his authority in that fashion. But 
if that is the point the Senator is trying to make, I think that 
answers it.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the distinguished Senator. I believe that we are 
focusing on one and the same object now. I would not, however, have 
that much faith in any President, that he might not veto items that 
would result in an imbalance of the reconciliation measure.
  Another question that I have: I note that the distinguished Senator's 
amendment provides for 1 hour of debate--not to exceed 1 hour--and 
that, of course, can be further limited. Suppose that it is discovered 
after the enrolling clerk has disaggregated the entire bill--remember, 
it must be disaggregated, and each item is to be assigned a new bill 
number. Suppose it is found that the enrolling clerk has made some 
errors,
 and that is certainly not entirely out of the question. We all make 
errors.

  I note that there could be no motion to recommit, it is not in order 
to reconsider the vote, and there must be an up or down vote then on 
the matter; is that correct?
  Mr. McCAIN. That is correct.
  Mr. BYRD. What do we do in instances where the enrolling clerk has 
made errors in the enrolling of the billettes? Will we have any way to 
make the corrections or are we left with no choice?
  Mr. McCAIN. If I might respond to the Senator, as the Senator from 
West Virginia well knows, at the beginning of every session, there is 
an authorization passed for the enrolling clerk to make ``technical 
corrections.'' Those technical corrections many times, as the Senator 
from West Virginia well knows, are pretty interesting. Sometimes we 
have amendments that are written on the back of an envelope and the 
instructions to the enrolling clerk are, ``At the proper place shall be 
inserted.'' It is very standard at the end of the passage of a bill 
that staff and others will make technical corrections to bring the bill 
into proper legislative language.
  I believe that if the enrolling clerk had made a mistake and it came 
to light that he or she did that, then that would fall under the 
technical corrections aspect of the rules of the Senate that are 
adopted each session.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, it seems to me that the Senate ought to have 
the opportunity to make corrections or to order corrections if such are 
found in the many hundreds of bills that result from the enrolling 
clerk's action, yet, the Senate would be deprived of the ability to do 
so. Which all goes to the point that this is a measure that has been 
brought to the Senate in a hurry.
  The legislation was introduced in the Senate on Monday of this week 
by the distinguished majority leader. As far as I know, there was no 
input into it by the minority--none--and immediately a cloture motion 
was offered.
  There was no committee report. There had been no committee hearings. 
If there were committee hearings, I know of none. They certainly have 
not been printed and placed on the desks.
  But here is a wide-ranging, far-reaching piece of legislation that is 
being rammed through the Senate without enough time to carefully 
explore and probe and scrutinize and study and debate and question the 
various provisions that are in the bill.
  I think it is fortunate that the distinguished Senator from Michigan, 
who has offered this amendment, has had an opportunity to at least get 
the amendment in before we finally vote on the bill. It certainly, as I 
have already indicated, is an improvement over the legislation that was 
ordered.
  Now, there may be other improvements needed. But we are going to be 
expected to vote on this legislation by no later than Friday.
  I do not know what will happen to this measure in conference. It will 
certainly undergo or can undergo many changes in conference. The House 
may hold out for the version of the bill that passed that body. What we 
get back from conference may be a blending of the two measures, or it 
may be one or the other, or it may not have a great resemblance to 
either.
  I think it is unfortunate that the situation has developed whereby we 
cannot take more time and study and amend. This is an instance in which 
there is an effort to clarify and treat one of the rather glaring flaws 
in the legislation. I compliment the Senator on his offering of the 
amendment. I think that much has to be said for taking some time to 
examine the measure and debate it. But I still think that the 
legislation has many problems.
  I hope that Senators will take a look at the Record and questions 
that have been raised today about this amendment. And there may be 
other questions that will occur to other Senators. I doubt that I have 
explored this matter to its fullest extent. But I hope it will cause 
other Senators to at least have a better understanding of what we are 
about to pass here.
   [[Page S4337]] This is going to be a first-class mess, where we 
break down the bill into hundreds of little bills and have them 
enrolled by the clerk of the originating body. They do not go through 
the usual procedures of having each bill or joint resolution read three 
times. We do not, indeed, debate each of the bills or have an 
opportunity to amend each of the little billettes.
  And when they are vetoed by the President, as many as may be vetoed 
by the President, is it the opinion of those who are managing the bill 
that the several billettes that are vetoed by the President, will they 
come back to the Congress all at once within a 10-day period, or will 
some come the first day, some the second day, some the third day? And 
if there are three or four appropriations bills that happen to hit the 
Senate and the House for passage and are sent to the President about 
the same time, will the originating body be expected to vote on each of 
these little vetoed measures, or will the originating body have an 
opportunity to collect them, put them into one package to be overridden 
or not?
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I would say to the Senator from West 
Virginia that, first of all, as to how those bills might come over, as 
the Senator knows, the President has a certain number of days in order 
to consider a veto, so it would be strictly up to the President as to 
how he would want to do that. He might want to send some over early and 
some over later on. Of course, as the Senator knows, since each, as he 
calls them, ``billettes'' are viewed as a separate bill, they would be 
considered separately by the originating body.
  I would like to make one additional comment about the problem if the 
enrolling clerk made a mistake. I would remind the Senator, as he well 
knows, it happens from time to time around here that the enrolling 
clerk makes an error. By concurrent resolution we correct those 
technical errors in both Houses, and I envision we could do that.
  I think, again--and I hesitate to put words into the mouth of the 
most knowledgeable person in the Senate on these issues--I think the 
argument of the Senator from West Virginia is that if they came over in 
certain ways, separate or staggered, then perhaps the body that has to 
consider them would be deprived of the ability of considering them as a 
whole, as they did on the initial passage of the bill.
  I think that, again, is a valid concern. But I would also hope that 
in coordination with the President of the United States, he would 
inform those bodies as to which bills he was going to veto and in what 
context. I think the communications are good between here and 1600 
Pennsylvania Avenue.
  Again, as the Senator from West Virginia did yesterday, those are 
valid concerns that I think need to be addressed, and I also believe 
that this kind of exposition of these aspects of the bill is very 
important for the record as far as the illumination of our colleagues.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Arizona. I like to believe, too, that this kind of debate is 
informative and illuminating and helpful. I think it does generate 
additional thinking, which in turn may generate some additional 
amendments if such could be offered. I suppose the list has now been 
completed.
  But in any event, it seems to me it is going to be a massive 
undertaking for the enrolling clerks. They have not been accustomed to 
anything like this, I do not believe. The idea of breaking down, for 
example, the bill that I mentioned yesterday, energy-water bill, 
breaking that down into 2,000 pieces, and each of the other 12 
appropriations bills--which include the legislative branch, I assume, 
so the President could have an opportunity to line item out some parts 
of the legislative appropriation bill that either or both bodies might 
jealously want to guard. This is quite a load to put on the enrolling 
clerks. In all of the 13 appropriation bills, as I indicated yesterday, 
my staff estimated something like 10,000 little billettes that would 
accrue from the disaggregation of the 13 fiscal year 1995 
appropriations bills. Now, that is quite an additional burden over and 
above what the enrolling clerks, I think, usually have to contend with.
  Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator allow me to make a response to that, 
even if it is not totally adequate?
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, yes.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, first of all, I went down to see the 
enrolling clerk here in the Senate, who is equipped with a computer 
system which basically cranks these things out about every 30 seconds. 
The computer can be programmed in such fashion.
  I do agree with the Senator from West Virginia that this does 
increase the legislative load considerably. From my perspective--and I 
know it is not the perspective of the Senator from West Virginia--what 
I am exactly seeking is separate bills that can be examined separately 
so that there is no doubt as to what the Congress of the United States 
has passed.
  Again, I know that the Senator from West Virginia does not agree with 
this viewpoint because we have had many hours of debate on this very 
issue. I believe that one of the problems is that we pass these massive 
bills which perhaps only the Senator from West Virginia is thoroughly 
familiar with and the rest of the body is not.
  What happens is, we find--all too often, in my opinion--that we pass 
an appropriations bill, especially, and many times an authorization 
bill or even a reconciliation bill, and tucked away somewhere in there 
is--or a tax bill. I think the Senator from West Virginia would agree 
that some of the most egregious offenses as far as special interests 
are concerned occur in the consideration and passage of tax bills 
around here. There are items that are tucked in there that we do not 
know about, and weeks, months or years may pass by before the American 
people and we as a body who have passed this legislation are aware of 
it.
  I certainly understand what the Senator is saying about the large 
amount of paperwork, but at the same time, we are also trying to cure 
what many Americans believe is an unhealthy habit of putting things 
into bills--though they be authorization, or in the case of new 
entitlements, et cetera, or appropriations bills or tax bills--that are 
not for the good of all Americans but are for the good of special 
interests.
  Now, whether that is actually true or not, the opinion of the Senator 
from West Virginia is obviously different from mine.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I think there is undoubtedly a great deal of 
truth in what the Senator is saying. No question of that.
  I personally favor the approach that is envisioned in the substitute 
that is being offered by Mr. Daschle, the distinguished minority 
leader. I intend to vote for something along that line.
  I do not see in the original Domenici-Exon approach a shifting of 
power from the legislative branch to the executive branch. I do see in 
the Domenici-Exon approach which has been built upon by the 
distinguished majority leader in his substitute, I do see an 
opportunity for the President to register his opinion by rescinding 
certain items in appropriation and having a vote up or down on those 
items that he proposes to rescind.
  It is a majority vote, that is true, and I am sure the distinguished 
Senator from Arizona prefers a two-thirds supermajority. But I favor 
that approach. I have no problem with giving the President another 
opportunity to select from appropriation bills certain items which he 
feels, for his reasons, whatever they may be, they may be political or 
for whatever reasons, I have no problem with his sending them to the 
two Houses and our giving him a vote.
  I see in this, I say to the Senator, I see a shifting of the 
legislative power to the Executive. I think that power over the purse 
is so clearly vested in the legislative branch by the Constitution that 
we ought to be hesitant to enact legislation the effect of which will 
be to expand the President's powers. There is no question but the 
President's powers are somewhat expanded. To that extent, whatever the 
expansion of the President's powers are, the powers of the legislative 
branch are thereby decreased.
  I also, as I said yesterday, am concerned about the breaking down of 
the balance between the two Houses under any of these measures which we 
are likely to pass.
   [[Page S4338]] I hope the measure that the distinguished minority 
leader introduces will be the one that will pass, but that remains to 
be seen. I kind of have my doubts. But under the other measures, it 
seems to me that the Senate, to a considerable extent, loses. It no 
longer remains an equal partner in the decision.
  The Senator well knows that the Senate adds a lot of amendments to 
appropriation bills, and those amendments, when they are enrolled 
separately, they go to the President. The President vetoes them. They 
actually originated in this body. But if they are vetoed, they are 
going to be sent back to the other body, and the other body will have 
the option of trying to override or not trying to override. If the 
other body chooses not to attempt to override, then the Senate has no 
voice at all. So to that extent I think the Senate is subordinated to 
the other body.
  Mr. McCAIN. May I respond without interrupting?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes; I will be glad to yield.
  Mr. McCAIN. I am sure the Senator from West Virginia will let me know 
when I am interrupting.
  On the first point that the Senator from West Virginia makes about 
the majority versus two-thirds, I, first of all, have engaged in that 
debate with the Senator from West Virginia. But I also think that if we 
are going to call it, if it is going to be a veto by the President, 
that the Constitution is clear on what a veto is--a two-thirds 
majority. So I would even have a constitutional problem with the 
majority override.
  My second response is that it only took a majority of both Houses to 
put the measure into one of these bills, so it seems to me it would not 
be very difficult to get a majority of both Houses to override that 
veto.
  Now, I understand the argument that if a bill were given, under this 
scenario, the light of day and it was improper, then a majority of both 
bodies would probably not support such a thing, if it were wasteful or 
irrelevant. But I am not so sure of that. I think that it would be much 
more appropriate for a two-thirds override.
  When the distinguished Senator from West Virginia talks about a shift 
in power, which was what he spoke about initially, I know that the 
Senator from West Virginia knows, because he was one of the few who was 
around here when the President of the United States had basically 
impoundment authority, when the President of the United States 
basically could say, ``I don't care what the Congress of the United 
States appropriates. I'm not going to spend that money.''
  That, as the Senator well knows, goes back to Thomas Jefferson, in 
1801, who impounded $50,000 that was appropriated for gunboats.
  So it is my view, as I have stated to the Senator from West Virginia 
many times in the past, that when that impoundment act power 
disappeared, there was that shift, a significant shift from the 
executive to the legislative branch and consequently, in my opinion--
and I know it is not shared by the Senator from West Virginia--the 
revenues and expenditures began to grow apart in a rather dramatic 
fashion.
  Mr. BYRD. When was this?
  Mr. McCAIN. In 1974.
  Mr. BYRD. They actually started the big increase in 1981 after the 
election of Mr. Reagan. That is when the precipitous increases began.
  Mr. McCAIN. I do have a chart I think that shows a very steady 
increase. And I can bring it out. I think it is a valid chart.
  Mr. BYRD. I have seen it. I think it is an excellent chart. I think 
he very adroitly and expertly----
  Mr. McCAIN. Yes.
  Mr. BYRD. Describes it.
  Mr. McCAIN. May I just finally respond to the aspect as far as which 
House might have some advantage.
  Again, I think there is some validity to that argument. I think our 
Founding Fathers said that all revenue bills would begin with the other 
body. And although we are obviously allowed to amend those bills, the 
primary responsibility was placed in the other body, as responsibility 
for approval of treaties, confirmation of nominees, et cetera, was 
different. So the responsibility in the view of our Founding Fathers 
did lie in the other body, in my view.
  And also, if there are amendments that are passed on this side and 
attached to the bill, they are accepted in conference, I believe that 
that acceptance in conference puts the stamp of approval on both 
bodies.
  Now, in reality would a vote in the other body be as fervent or as 
committed to an amendment that originated in this body? Perhaps not. 
But I would also suggest that it would be a quick way of retaliation if 
they started doing that in the other body. Even though it originated 
there, it would still have to come here, and there might be less 
enthusiasm for overriding the President's veto when those that 
originated in that body got over here. So it is my view that it would 
probably balance out in the long run.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator. I am not so sure progress is always 
the end result when retaliation is taken by one body against another. 
That works both ways. And the first thing we know the other body 
retaliates.
  With respect to the approach that is being utilized by Mr. Daschle 
and which was envisioned in S. 14, I believe it was, that did not 
contemplate a veto. That contemplated the rescissions of items by the 
President, and it was not a matter of overriding rescissions by two-
thirds vote. It was a matter of rejecting the proposed rescissions by a 
majority vote.
  On an override of the veto, I agree, that should be a two-thirds 
vote.
  Mr. BROWN. Will the Senator from West Virginia yield?
  Mr. BYRD. One final point and then I am going to yield because 
Senator Glenn is waiting.
  The other point I wish to make here is that under this proposal, 
under this substitute whereby each subsection, paragraph, item, 
allocation, suballocation, and all these things are enrolled 
separately, will it not be possible for the President to strike a 
section or a paragraph that imposes a condition on the expenditure of 
certain sums?
  Suppose we appropriate certain amounts of money to the Department of 
Defense with a condition that it not send troops to Somalia, or that if 
troops are sent to Somalia the Senate and House decide that there 
should be a condition included that they be withdrawn no later than 60 
days. Would it not be possible for the President simply to strike the 
condition and leave in the amounts, thereby deciding policy which would 
not have as its purpose the saving of moneys or the reduction of the 
deficit? Would we not be handing the President a policymaking tool 
which would be exceedingly difficult for us to correct if he chose to 
line item out that condition?
  Mr. McCAIN. I say to my colleague from West Virginia that that would 
not be possible. What the Senator is referring to is what we normally 
call fencing language, which is commonplace. The money would stay with 
the fencing language. He could not veto out the money and leave the 
language in, or vice versa. They would be attached to one another. And 
that will be clarified.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator for his response. I feel I must 
disagree with him. I am sure the Congress could so provide the language 
that they would stay together, but Congress could also provide the 
language in such a way that would make it possible for the President to 
strike out the conditioning, the conditioning proviso, I believe. And 
that gives me cause for concern.
  I have no desire to keep the floor any longer. I thank the Senator 
from Arizona. I thank the Senator who is the author of the amendment.
  I thank all Senators and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Snowe). The Chair recognizes the Senator 
from Ohio.
  Mr. GLENN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside the 
pending amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                 Amendment No. 405 to Amendment No. 347

(Purpose: To provide for the evaluation and sunset of tax expenditures)

  Mr. GLENN. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       [[Page S4339]] The Senator from Ohio [Mr. Glenn] proposes 
     an amendment numbered 405 to amendment No. 347.

  Mr. GLENN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the appropriate place insert the following:

     SEC.   . EVALUATION AND SUNSET OF TAX EXPENDITURES

       (a) Legislation for Sunsetting Tax Expenditures.--The 
     President shall submit legislation for the periodic review, 
     reauthorization, and sunset of tax expenditures with his 
     fiscal year 1997 budget.
       (b) Budget Contents and Submission to Congress.--Section 
     1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding 
     at the end the following paragraph:
       ``(30) beginning with fiscal year 1999, a Federal 
     Government performance plan for measuring the overall 
     effectiveness of tax expenditures, including a schedule for 
     periodically assessing the effects of specific tax 
     expenditures in achieving performance goals.''.
       (c) Pilot Projects.--Section 1118(c) of title 31, United 
     States Code, is amended by--
       (1) striking ``and'' after the semicolon in paragraph (2);
       (2) redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
       (3) adding after paragraph (2) the following:
       ``(3) describe the framework to be utilized by the director 
     of the Office of Management and Budget, after consultation 
     with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Comptroller General 
     of the United States, and the Joint Committee on Taxation, 
     for undertaking periodic analyses of the effects of tax 
     expenditures in achieving performance goals and the 
     relationship between tax expenditures and spending programs; 
     and''.
       (d) Congressional Budget Act.--Title IV of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the 
     end thereof the following:


                           ``TAX EXPENDITURES

       ``Sec. 409. It shall not be in order in the House of 
     Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill, joint 
     resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report that 
     contains a tax expenditure unless the bill, joint resolution, 
     amendment, motion, or conference report provides that the tax 
     expenditure will terminate not later than 10 years after the 
     date of enactment of the tax expenditure.''.

  Mr. GLENN. Madam President, I believe this amendment has been 
accepted, cleared on both sides. It has three major parts. It requires 
the President in next year's budget to submit legislation for an 
orderly sunset or reconsideration of existing tax expenditures; No. 2, 
it requires the administration to conduct performance reviews of tax 
expenditures just as they do now with regular discretionary spending; 
and three, it makes it out of order to consider a new tax expenditure 
if it does not consider a sunset or reconsideration, of course before 
that sunset time.
  The amendment will increase scrutiny of tax expenditures and help 
make the line-item veto more effective.
  I am happy that the Dole substitute to S. 4 provides the President 
with the authority to item veto some new tax breaks. There seems to be 
some disagreement about the scope of authority under the current 
language. I believe that it should be interpreted quite broadly.
  However, regardless of how broadly you read the language, it still 
does not include the $453 billion in existing tax expenditures which 
still remain off limits. Now if you divide up the budget pie, tax 
expenditures are a huge slice.
  Tax expenditures are growing at a rate six times faster than 
discretionary spending. And unlike discretionary spending, these tax 
expenditures generally do not receive regular scrutiny. Since the first 
corporate tax law of 1909, special provisions have been placed in the 
Code and generally forgotten. In fact, many would be surprised to learn 
that nearly half of the revenue losses from these expenditures stem 
from provisions placed in the Code before 1920.
  I do not believe that all of these expenditures are unnecessary. In 
fact, I support many of them. But I believe that--after some of them 
have been in the Code for the better part of a century--it is time we 
set up a review process to determine whether budget savings and program 
improvements are achievable.
  My amendment utilizes a concept that we have mandated for 
discretionary spending--performance review. It would require the 
President to determine just how well these programs are achieving their 
goals. Are we getting our money's worth? We have spent a lot of time 
talking about instituting cost-benefit analyses for Federal 
regulations. Would it not make sense to have a similar process for 
programs that cost $453 billion this year.
  This was first suggested in Governmental Affairs Committee report 
language that accompanied the Government Performance and Results Act of 
1993. the distinguished chairman of the Governmental Affairs, the 
senior Senator from Delaware, was the father of that important law 
which for the first time established measurable objectives for agency 
programs. My amendment codifies report language of that bill to include 
expenditures.
  While providing a better understanding of the effectiveness of 
current tax expenditures, it will also help the President to determine 
when it may be advisable to item veto new tax expenditures and even new 
spending. Under performance review, the President will be able to 
better identify where current tax expenditures overlap or duplicate 
newly proposed tax expenditures. And it will help him to identify 
whether new spending programs are unnecessary because existing tax 
expenditures are adequately achieving the same policy goals.
  My amendment also requires the President to submit legislation to 
Congress which lays out an orderly schedule for the sunset and 
reauthorization of current tax expenditures. Just because something was 
placed in the code at the beginning of the century does not mean that 
it should be exempt from any congressional review. We might be 
surprised with what we find if we are forced to sit down and 
reauthorize many of these programs.
  The President would not have to propose the sunset off all tax 
expenditures. There may be some that he will suggest remain permanent. 
But it will provide us with a roadmap for more comprehensive 
congressional review of tax expenditures. The tax expenditures that the 
Congress determines should come under a reauthorization process, will 
also be subject to the President's veto pen in the future.
  In addition, under my amendment, it would be out of order to consider 
new tax expenditures that did not include a sunset date at least within 
10 years. I don't think we should go through another century before the 
taxes we enact today are reviewed.
  I think this merely sets forth a good Government approach on tax 
expenditures. It is high time we shed some light on this area of the 
budget. I understand that my amendment has been cleared by both the 
minority and majority leaders and I hope my colleagues will join me in 
support of this amendment.
  Madam President, I think it has been accepted on the other side. I 
ask my distinguished colleague, the Senator from Arizona, if he has any 
comments? I would be prepared to urge the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, we are prepared to accept the amendment 
on this side. I think it is a good amendment and one which I think will 
be very helpful.
  Madam President, may I say for the information of all Senators, I 
have been asked by the majority leader to state there will be no 
further votes today. However, I hope Members who have amendments will 
remain this evening to offer them.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. EXON. Madam President, I congratulate the Senator from Ohio for 
offering the amendment. The amendment provides for a process for 
periodically assessing the effects of tax loopholes and requires that 
all new loopholes have sunset provisions.
  As I understand it, the language of his amendment has been 
negotiated, it has been agreed to on both sides. I urge its adoption at 
this time.
  Mr. GLENN. Madam President, I urge the amendment.
  THE PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 405) was agreed to.
  Mr. GLENN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. EXON. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  [[Page S4340]] Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent 
the record show that the pending Abraham amendment was set aside in 
order to consider the Glenn amendment, and I ask unanimous consent that 
the Abraham amendment be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                 Amendment No. 406 to Amendment No. 347

    (Purpose: To clarify the definition of items of appropriations)

  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for himself, Mr. 
     Murkowski and Mr. Exon, proposes an amendment numbered 406 to 
     amendment No. 347.

  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of section 5(4)(A), strike ``; and'' and add the 
     following: ``but shall not include a provision which does not 
     appropriate funds, direct the President to expend funds for 
     any specific project, or create an express or implied 
     obligation to expend funds and--
       ``(i) rescinds or cancels existing budget authority;
       ``(ii) only limits, conditions, or otherwise restricts the 
     President's authority to spend otherwise appropriated funds; 
     or
       ``(iii) conditions on an item of appropriation not 
     involving a positive allocation of funds by explicitly 
     prohibiting the use of any funds; and''.

  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, under the substitute before us, the line-
item veto authority is not limited to appropriations. That may come as 
a surprise to many of us, but that is the way the substitute is now 
worded. The line-item authority in the substitute, which is effectively 
given to the President, is not limited to appropriations. That is 
because a line item in an appropriations bill would be separately 
enrolled and would be subject to a veto. That would include not only 
the appropriations themselves but also all limits on appropriations, 
conditions on appropriations, rescissions of appropriations. They would 
all be treated in the same way as appropriations themselves. The 
purpose of this bill is to try to reduce the add-ons of Congress that 
cannot in some minds be justified. The purpose of the bill is to reduce 
spending, not to increase spending. But if we treat limits on 
appropriations and rescissions of appropriations in the same way as we 
treat appropriations which are added by the Congress, we are 
effectively going to be increasing spending and not reducing spending.
  The rescissions that the Congress adds and puts into an 
appropriations bill, the limitations on appropriations that we put in 
appropriations bills, the conditions that we place on appropriations 
are all going to be treated as separate items from the appropriations 
themselves. This process in the substitute is going to splinter the 
condition on an appropriation into a separate bill. It will not be in 
the same bill as the appropriations. So the President would be able to 
veto the limit on the appropriation and leave the appropriation itself 
thereby saving no money, indeed quite the opposite frequently, and 
giving himself more authority in the process.
  If the President can veto the limitations and the conditions placed 
on appropriations without vetoing the appropriations itself, we have 
had the exact opposite effect, I believe, of what was intended by this 
bill,
 and we have ceded great power to the President, without any gain, in 
terms of cutting spending. He can veto a rescission that we add to a 
bill and spend the money. He can veto a limitation on spending that we 
put in the bill and spend all the money.

  Why should we give this special veto authority to the President when 
the provisions of the bill that he would be vetoing cut spending 
instead of adding to spending?
  Let me give some examples. Suppose we put in a provision, as we have, 
which states that none of the funds appropriated shall be spent to keep 
American troops in a particular country after a specified date? The 
President can veto that provision and then continue to spend the 
appropriated funds for the purpose that Congress voted to prohibit. 
Suppose we put a provision into a bill, as we have, which says none of 
the funds in the foregoing paragraph shall be available to promote the 
sale of tobacco or tobacco products? The President could veto that 
restriction and limitation and spend the money as he pleases, for the 
prohibited purpose. We would not have saved any money, but the 
President would be given the power to spend money for a purpose that we 
explicitly prohibited--no savings to the Treasury and loss of 
congressional authority at the same time. Suppose we put a provision 
into a bill, as we have, stating that none of the funds appropriated 
shall be spent to provide an incentive for the purpose of inducing a 
company to relocate outside the United States? The President could veto 
the provision and continue to spend money on the program that Congress 
intended to prohibit.
  Say we put a provision into a bill, as we have, which says that of 
the large appropriation, no more than x-million dollars can be spent on 
consultants? We put a lot of provisions in like that. The Senator from 
Arkansas, Senator Pryor, has been a leader to limit appropriated funds 
spent on consultants. The way the bill is currently written, without 
this amendment, the President could veto that limit on spending for 
consultants and then use the larger amount for any purpose he wanted, 
including all the money, if he wanted, for consultants. We will not 
have saved any money. We will have lost the power to restrict the 
spending of money, with no gain to the Treasury.
  We have put restrictions on entertainment. We have put restrictions 
on travel, first-class travel. And if, again, those restrictions are 
put in separate bills, as they are under the current version of this 
substitute, and the President can veto those restrictions, the Treasury 
gains nothing, the taxpayers are out money that we did not want them to 
be out, for instance, for first-class travel, and we will have lost the 
power of the purse, for no gain to the Treasury.
  As I said, Madam President, almost more remarkable than the power 
that would be yielded to the President under the version before us, 
without this amendment, is the fact that there would be no purpose 
served in terms of saving money. And in the many cases I have given, 
and in many other cases, as a matter of fact, we would be losing and 
spending money that otherwise would not be spent.
  Last night on the floor, I gave a few examples from a real 
appropriations bill--State, Commerce, and Justice. I want to give one 
of those examples again to show how this would work since I did bring 
this up on the floor last night.
  We had a provision in last year's appropriation bill for State, 
Commerce, Justice, that no more than $11 million would be spent on 
furniture and furnishings related to new space alteration and 
construction projects. That is a limitation on spending. That says the 
President cannot spend more than that. That is part of a larger 
appropriations bill, a $2.3 billion appropriations bill. But it says 
that out of that $2.3 billion, the maximum that can be spent for that 
new furniture is $11 million. I had a chart up here on the floor last 
night. If the President could veto the ``not to exceed $11 million,'' 
which would be in a separate enrolled bill, he would have then vetoed 
the restriction on the spending, leaving himself the $2.3 billion 
appropriation of which he could spend all he wanted on furniture, 
without any limit. We would not have saved the money. It would have 
been spent on something we did not want it to be spent on. The Treasury 
does not gain a dime, but instead, something that we did not want 
because we did not think it was a high enough priority, would happen.
  The Defense supplemental appropriations bill that we passed just last 
week contained 20 separate paragraphs of Defense rescissions and 18 
paragraphs of rescissions of nondefense funds, for a total of roughly 
$3 billion in spending cuts. This was in an appropriations bill, but 
these are spending cuts, rescissions. For instance, the bill contained 
provisions that would cut spending for 
[[Page S4341]]  FAA facilities by $35 million. It cut spending for 
highway projects by $140 million. But under the substitute before us, 
unless this amendment is adopted, each of these provisions would be 
enrolled as a separate bill and sent to the President for signature. 
Each could be vetoed by the President, and if he exercised that 
authority given to him by the substitute, the result would be more 
Government spending rather than less.
  Madam President, the amendment which I have sent to the desk on 
behalf of myself, and Senators Murkowski and Exon, addresses this issue 
the best that we can in this bill. In my opinion, it can be addressed 
far better in an expedited or enhanced rescission bill. But that is not 
the issue before us. The issue before us is this substitute which, in 
all likelihood, is going to pass. We should avoid having in this 
substitute language which I believe has the unintended consequence of 
eliminating all of the restrictions and the limits on spending, and the 
rescissions of spending that we put in appropriations bills.
  So while I do not think that all of the problems I see in the 
substitute are cured, at least this would prevent the President from 
using this separate enrollment power to increase spending, or to avoid 
congressional restrictions and limitations on spending. And it is my 
hope that this amendment will be adopted because, again, I think it 
does address some of the unintended consequences of this substitute.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. HATCH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                 Amendment No. 407 to Amendment No. 347

 (Purpose: To exempt items of appropriation provided for the judicial 
    branch from enrollment in separate bills for presentment to the 
                               President)

  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Utah [Mr. Hatch] for himself, Mr. Roth, 
     Mr. Heflin, and Mr. Abraham, proposes an amendment numbered 
     407 to amendment No. 347.

  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 3, line 21, after ``separately'' insert ``, except 
     for items of appropriation provided for the judicial branch, 
     which shall be enrolled together in a single measure. For 
     purposes of this paragraph, the term `items of appropriation 
     provided for the judicial branch' means only those functions 
     and expenditures that are currently included in the 
     appropriations accounts of the judiciary, as those accounts 
     are listed and described in the Department of Commerce, 
     Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
     Appropriations Act, 1995 (Public Law 104-317).

  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, as I understand it, I now have that 
amendment pending, and it can be set-aside and we will vote on it 
tomorrow sometime?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. HATCH. I yield the floor.


                 Amendment No. 406 to Amendment No. 347

  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I want to congratulate the Senator from 
Michigan, Senator Levin, and the Senator from Alaska, Senator 
Murkowski, on working out this, I think, very important agreement. It 
is well thought out. The amendment reaffirms that any and all provisos 
or fencing language, including all limitations on spending, such as 
caps, be tied to dollar amounts and not be enrolled freestanding.
  The bill, as currently drafted, would not cause policy provisos to be 
separately enrolled. However, if the Congress were to place caps on 
spending within an allocation, such language might be separately 
enrolled. This amendment clarifies that it would not. It is a good 
amendment and we are prepared to accept it on this side.
  I understand from my friend from Michigan that there may be concern 
by a Member or Members on his side of the aisle. So we will not seek 
its adoption until such time as it is either resolved or those who are 
in disagreement call for further debate and ensuing vote.
  But again, I want to say to the Senator from Michigan--this is 
probably not the appropriate time--whenever there is an issue, the 
Senator from Michigan goes into it in depth. He understands the 
legislation. He find areas that need to be improved, and he is willing 
to reach accommodation with those who have similar but sometimes 
slightly differing views, as has just happened between Senator Levin 
and Senator Murkowski.
  That is one of the reasons why it is a pleasure to work with him in 
this body, as I have for many years on the Armed Services Committee and 
on the Governmental Affairs Committee.
  I believe there may be additional amendments by the distinguished 
Democratic leader coming up, so I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, let me thank the Senator for his 
comments, which are very reciprocal on my part in terms of working with 
him over the years on the Armed Services Committee. We have had a very 
good relationship. I thank him for the support of the amendment.
  There is, indeed, as I mentioned, perhaps a Member on this side who 
may oppose the amendment. We are not sure. We want to clarify that. It 
would be better, therefore, that any vote on this be delayed until we 
can ascertain whether there is objection on this side or not.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Madam President, I am pleased to join Senator Levin in 
offering this amendment that would clarify the extent and scope of the 
President's ability to veto items in appropriations bills. This 
amendments ensures that when Congress imposes a condition that prevents 
spending in a particular area, or imposes conditions on such spending, 
such a restriction will not be considered an item that can be 
separately vetoed.
  All of us recognize that approval of the Dole substitute line-item 
veto amendment or any other line-item veto proposal including S. 4, 
represents an historic shift of authority from Congress to the 
President. We are providing the President with very broad authority to 
pick and choose which individual items in appropriations bills he deems 
an improper use of taxpayer funds. He will have the authority to veto 
those items of spending that he disapproves of.
  The substitute also gives the President authority to item veto 
authority in spending authorization bills and in tax bills. However, 
the only tax items that the President can item veto are a narrow range 
of provisions that affect only a limited group of taxpayers. More 
importantly, the tax-item veto can only be used if the provision loses 
revenue. A tax increase that targets a narrow class of taxpayers cannot 
be item vetoed.
  I believe the tax item veto represents an appropriate restrictions on 
the President's ability to item veto because it is restricted to 
measures that lose revenue. The reason that I support the whole concept 
of the item-veto is that Congress has demonstrated an inability to 
control spending both through the Tax Code and the appropriations 
process. Today we are more than $4.8 trillion in debt. Unless we take 
drastic action, our national debt will double in the next 10 years.
  Part of the reason our debt is nearly $5 trillion is because 
appropriators in both the House and Senate have devised ingenious ways 
to bury wasteful pork barrel spending in legislation designed to 
maintain the operations of Government. Weeks and months after the 
President has signed an appropriations bill we learn that buried in the 
bill are tens of millions of dollars of wasteful spending programs. My 
colleague from Arizona has already identified many of these wasteful 
spending programs. And under the current Presidential veto power, the 
President must approve these wasteful programs if he is to keep the 
Government running.
  So the predicate, Madam President, for the line-item veto is to give 
the President the authority to veto spending programs that waste the 
taxpayers' money.
  However, just as the President only should be able to veto tax 
provisions 
[[Page S4342]]  that lose revenue, I believe the President should not 
be
 permitted to item-veto congressional prohibitions on appropriations 
spending. As all Senators know, Congress routinely includes 
prohibitions on particular spending as a check on unrestricted and 
arbitrary spending by the President. Most often, such prohibitions 
represent a conscious policy choice by Congress explicitly restricting 
the President's discretion.

  For example, last year's foreign operations appropriations bill 
contains more than a dozen such restrictions. These restrictions 
prevent the President from providing money to an international 
organization that supports programs for ``coercive abortion or 
involuntary sterilization.'' Another provision prevents funds from 
being used for assistance to a country that is not in compliance with 
the U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iraq.
  These are just two of hundreds of examples of the legitimate power of 
the Congress to prevent the President from spending money on programs 
and policies that the Congress disapproves of. These restrictions do 
not increase the deficit. They do not represent pork barrel politics. 
They are legitimate congressional checks on the President that are 
consistent with the intent of the Founding Fathers when they created 
our constitutional system of separated powers and checks and balances.
  Madam President, our amendment is intended to make clear that when 
Congress imposes a condition that prevents spending in a particular 
area, or conditions spending, that restriction will not be considered 
an item that can be separately vetoed. It ensures that a condition 
restricting or prohibiting the use of funds must be enrolled with the 
item of appropriation to which the condition applies.
  Madam President, this amendment preserves congressional power to 
restrict the President from acting contrary to the wishes of the 
majority of Congress on important policy issues. I believe it is 
fundamentally necessary that we retain this authority and I hope my 
colleagues will vote for this amendment.
  Mr. EXON. Madam President, I rise in support of the amendment offered 
by the senior Senator from Michigan. This amendment only makes good 
sense.
  It would keep rescissions and cancellations of spending from being 
transmitted to the Presidents as separate items. Thus it would make it 
more difficult for the President to veto items that help to reduce the 
deficit.
  As well, the amendment would ensure that limitations on spending stay 
together with the spending provisions that they limit. To do otherwise 
would allow the kind of nonsensical divisions of items that the Senator 
from Michigan so eloquently described yesterday evening.
  I support the amendment and urge my colleagues to join in voting for 
it when it does come to a vote.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, on behalf of the Senator from Utah, I 
ask unanimous consent that he be added as an original cosponsor of the 
Abraham amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I also ask unanimous consent that the 
pending Levin amendment be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Hatch amendment will be 
set aside.
  Mr. McCAIN. The Levin amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, both amendments will be set 
aside.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, the Hatch amendment, for purposes of 
complying with the unanimous-consent agreement, was presented and the 
debate and vote will be held on it probably tomorrow.
  Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator will yield, our friend from Alaska has 
additional materials which I would like to ask unanimous consent be 
printed in the Record, if available, tonight. If not, we will make that 
same unanimous-consent request tomorrow.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, if that is available tonight, it would 
be inserted in the Record immediately following the remarks of the 
Senator from Michigan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. I yield the floor.
  Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. EXON. Madam President, I wish to make some brief remarks with 
regard to support of the amendment offered by the Senator from 
Michigan, but at this time I yield the floor because I believe Senator 
Byrd would like to make some remarks not on the matter at hand.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair and I thank the distinguished Senator 
from Nebraska, Mr. Exon.


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