[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 53 (Wednesday, March 22, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4328-S4333]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                     LEGISLATIVE LINE-ITEM VETO ACT

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I have listened to the debate so far on 
the line-item veto, the proposal which is before the Senate, and I have 
read the compromise language offered by the majority leader. I would 
like to commend the majority leader and those who worked with him, 
long-time supporters of the proposal, and the sponsors. This proposal, 
as is my assessment at least, is much improved over the previous 
proposals. This improvement comes from the inclusion of new 
entitlements and targeted tax breaks along with appropriations spending 
items.
  As I have stated in the past, if the Congress is serious about 
attacking our annual deficits, it must expand its view beyond 
discretionary spending. Discretionary spending, Mr. President, accounts 
in 1995 for 36 percent of the total spending of our Government. The 
Congress cannot balance the budget, let alone reduce the national debt, 
by focusing on 36 percent of the total budget.
  The proposal before us makes great strides by also including in its 
purview new entitlements and direct spending. Entitlement spending will 
make up 49 percent of the budget in 1995.
  This proposal also includes targeted tax benefits as being subjected 
to a Presidential line-item veto. According to the Senate Budget 
Committee, it was projected that the Treasury will lose $453 billion in 
revenue through tax expenditures in 1995 alone. That number is twice 
the size of the projected budget deficit.
  At a time when our country is fast approaching the debt ceiling limit 
of $4.9 trillion, which could occur as early as August, according to 
the Treasury Department, it is important to send the message that, to 
attack the deficit, there must be a shared commitment from all sectors 
of the Federal budget including entitlement spending and tax 
preferences. I commend the authors of this proposal for this 
improvement over earlier versions.
  Now, while this proposal is greatly improved in some respects, it 
causes me grave concern in other areas. The point which causes me the 
greatest concern is the impact of the massive shift of power from the 
Congress to the executive branch which could occur under this bill.
  I might say, Mr. President, it is totally contrary to historic 
Republicanism. This is some strange new doctrine, to suggest that we 
have to abdicate responsibility to the Chief Executive of this country. 
I do not care whether he is a Democrat or a Republican.
  While many supporters of this legislation have attempted to address 
this concern during the debate, I must raise this issue again as I 
believe it should be of grave concern to all the Members of the 
Congress, the House, the Senate, Republican and Democrat.
  Mr. President, the legislation would actually allow the President of 
the United States, with the support of only one-third of either body, 
to eliminate funding for myriad Federal spending, departments, and 
programs authorized and enacted by the Congress.
  Supporters of this proposal continually highlight it as a way to get 
at the so-called pet projects of interest to individual Members or to 
individual States. I will point out, as I have done in the past, 
Members can exercise their rights under the rules to raise objections, 
offer amendments, and round up votes to defeat such proposals.
  Members should identify provisions of appropriations bills and 
reports that they find objectionable and craft amendments to resolve 
those objections. Members should also encourage the President to come 
forward with a rescission proposal pursuant to title X of the Budget 
Act to strip that funding.
  We have that power. We have those tools. It must also be highlighted 
that the line-item veto can also be used to reduce funding or even 
eliminate completely, funding for projects and agencies that I doubt 
few would call congressional pork.
  Let me remind you, a President with one-third of either Chamber--
hardly a majority--could effectively eliminate funding for an entire 
agency such as HUD, the Interior Department, the Education Department, 
the EPA--any Department. While some Members may argue in favor of such 
a move, I doubt that many of us would call these agencies pet projects. 
Do not forget, we have had Presidents offer and express a desire to 
abolish such departments. This is not a hypothetical situation-- 
entire departments. President Reagan wanted to absolutely 
eliminate the Department of Education, the Department of Energy, and 
others. And we have heard that from other Presidents. That could 
happen. With a one-third vote of the House and the Senate, the 
President would prevail to eliminate entire departments. So do not get 
this idea that somehow what has been identified as pork here or pork 
there is the only target we have to worry about.
  Now, while these examples may be extreme, a similar scenario was 
described by a Member during this debate. It was mentioned that on an 
issue such as ground-based missile defenses, a President may disagree 
on the line of funding, and this line-item veto would allow the 
President, with one-third of either Chamber, to simply line out all the 
funding for such a program.
  At a time when many Members have raised concerns about funding levels 
of the military, are those same Members willing to defer to the 
judgment of whichever President occupies the White House regarding 
defense spending levels? The same point can be made regarding housing 
policy, nutrition programs, or spending to combat crime.
  That is an awesome shift of power which some may be willing to 
relinquish to the executive branch of Government, but I am not. I am 
not as willing to bestow that type of power on the executive branch. 
The Framers of the Constitution were very concerned about the abuses of 
an Executive which possesses too much power. That is why the power to 
spend was placed in the branch of Government which is most accountable 
to and representative of each citizen, the Congress of the United 
States. The purse strings are placed here. In my opinion, the Framers 
were right on target. There are no sound reasons why the legislative 
branch should shift such an important constitutionally created 
responsibility to the Chief Executive.
  Perhaps I am burdened by history, either by generation or by being a 
history buff, but I recall when a President of the United States wanted 
to usurp the power of the Supreme Court, a third coequal branch of 
Government. It was not just a little line item in an appropriations 
bill or a tax bill. He wanted to dominate the Supreme Court. That was 
called the Court-packing plan of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Thank God, 
there were enough Democrats at that time to join with the corpus guard 
of 17 Republicans to block that.
  Nevertheless, it is illustrative of the kind of power that is a 
desire of the Chief Executive that has taken place in our history. Now 
we are going to say the President of the United States and one-third of 
the membership of this Congress, you make these vital, and important 
decisions.
  And let us not forget when you had 17 Republicans here at one time in 
the Senate, and they called it the Cherokee Strip because the Democrats 
could not all sit on that side. They had a whole row, two rows of 
Democrats on this side, and the Republicans were huddled down here 
under Senator Charles McNary from Oregon trying to survive. You can 
imagine the kind of domination that Franklin Roosevelt had of the 
Congress that first term and part of the second term. Thank God, we had 
a Supreme Court. It was the only check and balance we had in our 
governmental system. That is just history, but it also makes me a 
little leery about ever handing too much power to any branch of 
Government.
  I would also like to take a moment to explain what separate 
enrollments of bills would entail. While I understand that many 
Americans support the concept of a line-item veto, I think it is 
important to explain what that means in the context of separate 
enrollment.
  Separate enrollment would take individual appropriations bills, as 
passed 
[[Page S4329]]  by the House and the Senate, and separate these bills 
into thousands of individual bills for the President to sign or to 
veto. Apart from a reference to a bill number, these new individual 
bills would bear no resemblance to the original bill which was voted on 
by the Congress. I question the soundness of this approach based on 
practical as well as on constitutional grounds. According to the 
Constitution, article I, section 7:

       Every Bill which shall have passed the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a 
     Law, be presented to the President of the United States; if 
     he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, 
     with his Objections to that House in which it shall have 
     originated. . . .

  I assume that the supporters of separate enrollment are confident 
that the courts will uphold the constitutionality of this approach, I 
however have not yet been convinced that will be the courts' 
conclusion.
  I would also like to mention that while the vast majority of States 
do have some version of a line-item veto, none of the versions include 
the separate enrollment language contained in the bill before us. 
Passage of this bill will send the Federal Government into uncharted 
legislative waters.
  Mr. President, I shall vote ``no'' on the final passage of the line-
item veto.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I commend the senior Senator from Oregon, 
my good friend, for his statement. I, too, have a number of serious 
concerns and questions about the majority leader's substitute line-item 
veto amendment, the Separate Enrollment and Item Veto Act of 1995.
  I have the same question as has just been stated here on the floor 
about the constitutional aspects of it, whether it passes 
constitutional muster. The presentment clause of the Constitution is 
very clear. The distinguished Senator from Oregon read it into the 
Record, but it is clause 2 of article I section 7. It says:

       Every Bill which shall have passed the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate shall, before it become a Law, 
     be presented to the President of the United States; if he 
     approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it with 
     his Objections to that House in which it shall have 
     originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their 
     Journal and proceed to reconsider it.

  Walter Dellinger, the very well respected constitutional scholar, and 
Assistant Attorney General, says:

       This language mandates a fairly straightforward procedure. 
     After both Houses of Congress have passed a ``Bill'' they 
     must present it to the President, who can either ``approve'' 
     . . . it . . . or ``not . . . .'' In either event, the bill 
     is treated as a single unit; nothing in the text permits the 
     President to approve and sign one portion while disapproving 
     and returning another portion.

  I might ask, Madam President, if we have something that raises on its 
face such a constitutional issue, where is the congressional testimony 
that explains why this legislative separate enrollment version of a 
line-item veto is constitutional? I am a member of the Judiciary 
Committee, as is the distinguished Presiding Officer. There has not 
been a word of testimony in our committee on that. I think if we 
adopted something like this, Congress will spend too much time in the 
court trying to defend separate enrollments, instead of concentrating 
on reducing the deficit.
  Even if it was not unconstitutional, which I am convinced it is, it 
is, I suspect, unworkable. The enrollment clerk would have to enroll 
each item in an appropriations or revenue measure as a separate bill. 
Then the President can either veto or sign it. But this would require 
the enrollment clerk to enroll hundreds, if not thousands, of separate 
bills. I thought the new majority wanted to reduce Government 
paperwork.
  (Mrs. HUTCHISON assumed the Chair.)
  Mr. LEAHY. I would suggest, Madam President, that we call this 
amendment the Tree Cutting and Paperwork Promotion Act. As a tree farm 
owner myself, I should probably vote for it because of all the extra 
paper and paperwork we will have around here. We do sell trees to make 
paper on my farm.
  But then I might ask, how is the clerk going to decide what is an 
item to be enrolled as a separate bill? The amendment defines an item 
as ``any numbered section, any unnumbered paragraph, or any allocation 
or suballocation * * * contained in a numbered section or unnumbered 
para- 
graph .'' What if you write an appropriations bill that is just one 
paragraph? It may be 38 pages long, but it could be written as one.
  Or I can see Members taking items, a popular and an unpopular item, 
and put them into a single numbered section or unnumbered paragraph so 
they would be enrolled together as one item. That protects it from a 
Presidential veto.
  And what is an allocation or suballocation? There is no definition in 
the amendment. Is that up to the discretion of the clerk? If so, then 
the unelected enrollment clerk becomes far more powerful than a lot of 
Members of Congress.
  There is no clear answer to this. We have never had hearings on it. 
The so-called compromise agreement was dug up from the past to break a 
deadlock that the majority has over two different line-item veto bills, 
S. 4 and S. 14.
  These two bills were debated. They were marked up. They were reported 
by two different committees--the Budget Committee and the Government 
Affairs Committee. It would have been helpful if at least one of these 
two committees had seen this substitute before it hit the floor.
  And, like S. 4, the so-called compromise amendment encourages 
minority rule. It allows a Presidential item veto to stand with the 
support of only 34 Senators, or 146 Representatives.
  If you are from a State that only has a few representatives, like 
mine, only 1, I do not know how you could possibly vote for something 
like this. Basically it says your State becomes immaterial--immaterial 
in any determination. It is not majority rule. We are back to anti-
Democratic supermajority requirements. I thought that was dismissed 
during the balanced budget amendment debate.
  By imposing a two-thirds supermajority vote to override a 
Presidential item veto, the Dole amendment undermines the fundamental 
principle of majority rule. Our Founders rejected such supermajority 
voting and I oppose this. I do not care whether we have a Democratic 
President, as we do right now, or a Republican President. I am sure 
President Clinton would probably be delighted to have this. I can think 
of some times when I would probably be delighted as a Democrat that he 
would have it. But as a principle, I do not want any President to have 
this. The Congress might as well just pack up and go home.
  Maybe some might like that, but I do not think that, as powerful a 
country as ours is, we want to see a situation where one of the three 
independent branches of Government is put in a position where they can 
basically override the other two branches of Government. That is not 
how we stayed a democracy after we gained that power.
  Alexander Hamilton talked of the supermajority requirements as a 
``poison'' that serves ``* * * to destroy the energy of the government, 
and to substitute the pleasure, caprice or artifices of an 
insignificant, turbulent or corrupt junto to the regular deliberations 
and decisions of a respectable majority.''
  Such a supermajority requirement not only shows a distrust of the 
Congress but the electorate. As an American, as one who believes in our 
majority rule in our country--one who believes in our democracy and 
that our democracy exists because of our three branches of Government, 
I reject this notion and this basic distrust.
  I think it is overkill. Over the course of our history, in 200 years, 
something we overlook in this--the President has vetoed 2,513 bills.
  Congress overrode 104 times out of 2,513. The supermajority veto is 
an extraordinarily effective executive power. It is not needed to 
strike wasteful line items. Majority votes are enough to kill any 
wasteful line item.
  In fact, if someone were to hear a number of the Members who stand up 
here and say how much they want this line-item veto when so many of 
those same Members have made sure that they have line items in 
appropriations bills or authorizing bills to help them with their 
constituents or their State, you would think that a Senator could not 
require separate votes on items in a bill. But they can. All they have 
to 
[[Page S4330]] do is object to committee amendments to be considered en 
bloc and then vote on them one by one and have a rollcall vote on them. 
But some of the same Senators who talk about such wasteful spending do 
not do that. They do not want to call up these particular items.
  Let us not say we are going to muddy up our constitutional form of 
government by tossing the buck to the President if we are unable to do 
it, unwilling to do it, ourselves.
  Then, of course, we have tax breaks. Now the rubber hits the road. If 
it is an item that may actually help your State, we could take that 
out. But if it is an item that might help some wealthy special interest 
and we do not want the President to ever touch that, the amendment only 
allows the President to veto a targeted tax benefit.
  A ``targeted tax benefit'' is defined as any provision that is 
estimated to lose any revenue and has ``the practical effect of 
providing more favorable tax treatment to a particular taxpayer or 
limited group of taxpayers when compared with other similarly situated 
taxpayers.''
  I am a lawyer. I have looked at that. I have looked at it about 10 
different ways. I have asked other lawyers to look at it. Nobody seems 
to know what this means other than to say they would love to be 
involved in litigation on it. They could keep the clock running forever 
on that. It would produce endless litigation over what is a ``practical 
effect'' and who is a ``similarly situated taxpayer.'' These terms, of 
course, are not defined in the bill. In fact, the definition of 
``targeted tax benefit'' sounds like a tax loophole itself.
  Would the President also have a line-item veto authority over the 
capital gains tax cut described in the House Republican Contract With 
America? It is going to lose revenue. The bipartisan Joint Committee on 
Taxation has estimated that the Contract With America's capital gains 
tax cut would lose almost $32 billion from 1995 to 2000.
  I have a feeling that is not intended to be touched by the line-item 
veto. Why not quit this shell game? Just state in plain language that 
the President has line-item authority over all tax expenditures.
  So I have too many problems about this substitute. I think it is just 
a fix to pick up a vote or two. We saw that during the balanced budget 
amendment debate. We would pull things out on Social Security, or 
whatnot, to try to get a vote here or there--no hearings, no discussion 
of the final effect of it.
  I cast a procedural vote for cloture in 1985 to allow an up-or-down 
vote on a separate-enrollment line-item-veto bill. But that was because 
there had been hearings on a bill. There was a report on it, and we 
knew when we were going to vote on it. There have been a lot of changes 
since then.
  There is no need to gamble on a questionable version of a line-item-
veto bill. Thanks to the bipartisan leadership of Senators Domenici and 
Exon, we have a better line-item veto--the original S. 14 bill.
  I have already said publicly on national television that I find this 
very appealing. I believe I could vote for it. But we ought to, if we 
are going to pass a line-item-veto bill, base it on the original 
bipartisan expedited rescission measure, one that has been carefully 
studied.
  That I am willing to take a chance on. I am willing to take a chance 
on it with a sunset provision, but also because most of the questions 
that have been asked have been answered. I am not willing to take a 
plunge in faith on an amendment that is out here basically just to pick 
up a few extra votes.
  Madam President, I see no one else seeking recognition. So I suggest 
the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
                 Amendment No. 401 to Amendment No. 347

  Mr. ABRAHAM. I ask unanimous consent that we return to the 
consideration of my amendment No. 401, which I submitted yesterday.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Abraham] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 401 to amendment No. 347.

  The amendment is as follows:

       On p. 3, line 17, strike everything after word ``measure'' 
     through the word ``generally'' on p. 4, line 14 and insert 
     the following in its place: first passes both Houses of 
     Congress in the same form, the Secretary of the Senate (in 
     the case of a measure originating in the Senate) or the Clerk 
     of the House of Representatives (in the case of a measure 
     originating in the House of Representatives) shall 
     disaggregate the bill into items and assign each item a new 
     bill number. Henceforth each item shall be treated as a 
     separate bill to be considered under the following 
     subsections.
       (2) A bill that is required to be disaggregated into 
     separate bills pursuant to subsection (a)--
       (A) shall be disaggregated without substantive revision, 
     and
       (B) shall bear the designation of the measure of which it 
     was an item prior to such disaggregation, together with such 
     other designation as may be necessary to distinguish such 
     measure from other measures disaggregated pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) with respect to the same measure.
       (b) The new bills resulting from the disaggregation 
     described in paragraph 1 of subsection (a) shall be 
     immediately placed on the calendar of both Houses. They shall 
     be the next order of business in each House and they shall be 
     considered en bloc and shall not be subject to amendment. A 
     motion to proceed to the bills shall be nondebatable. Debate 
     in the House of Representatives or the Senate on the bills 
     shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, which shall be 
     divided equally between the majority leader and the minority 
     leader. A motion further to limit debate is not debatable. A 
     motion to recommit the bills is not in order, and it is not 
     in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the bills 
     are agreed to or disagreed to.
                     amendment no. 401, as modified

  Mr. ABRAHAM. Madam President, I send a modification to amendment No. 
401 to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified.
  The amendment (No. 401), as modified, is as follows:

       On p. 3, line 17, strike everything after word ``measure'' 
     through the word ``generally'' on p. 4, line 14 and insert 
     the following in its place: first passes both Houses of 
     Congress in the same form, the Secretary of the Senate (in 
     the case of a measure originating in the Senate) or the Clerk 
     of the House of Representatives (in the case of a measure 
     originating in the House of Representatives) shall 
     disaggregate the bill into items and assign each item a new 
     bill number. Henceforth each item shall be treated as a 
     separate bill to be considered under the following 
     subsections.
       (2) A bill that is required to be disaggregated into 
     separate bills pursuant to subsection (a)--
       (A) shall be disaggregated without substantive revision, 
     and
       (B) shall bear the designation of the measure of which it 
     was an item prior to such disaggregation, together with such 
     other designation as may be necessary to distinguish such 
     measure from other measures disaggregated pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) with respect to the same measure.
       (b) The new bills resulting from the disaggregation 
     described in paragraph 1 of subsection (a) shall be 
     immediately placed on the appropriate calendar in the House 
     of origination, and upon passage, placed on the appropriate 
     calendar in the other House. They shall be the next order of 
     business in each House and they shall be considered en bloc 
     and shall not be subject to amendment. A motion to proceed to 
     the bills shall be nondebatable. Debate in the House of 
     Representatives or the Senate on the bills shall be limited 
     to not more than 1 hour, which shall be divided equally 
     between the majority leader and the minority leader. A motion 
     further to limit debate is not debatable. A motion to 
     recommit the bills is not in order, and it is not in order to 
     move to reconsider the vote by which the bills are agreed to 
     or disagreed to.

  Mr. ABRAHAM. Madam President, the purpose of this amendment is 
straightforward. Rather than deeming the work product of the Clerk of 
the House or the Secretary of the Senate to be separate bills and 
transmitting them to the President directly, my amendment calls for one 
last single vote on the entire package of bills by both Houses of 
Congress after the bills have been disaggregated.
  This will not appreciably slow the work of the Congress, since it 
will only require one vote on the whole package. In addition, the 
amendment provides for highly expedited procedures that would allow 
only one hour of debate on the entire package with no other business 
being in order.
  On the other hand, in my view this amendment greatly strengthens the 
likelihood that this legislation will be upheld by the Supreme Court. 
Indeed, although I did not know this at the 
[[Page S4331]]  time I was preparing this amendment, that is the view 
that the Department of Justice's Assistant Attorney General for the 
Office of Legal Counsel, Walter Dellinger, expressed in advising 
President Clinton regarding the constitutionality of S. 137, an earlier 
proposal containing enrollment procedures similar to those in the 
substitute. His letter states:

       Furthermore, there appear to be ways to refine S. 137 so as 
     to avoid the objection that what must be presented to the 
     President is the ``bill'' in exactly the form voted on by 
     each House. So long as the Houses of Congress have treated 
     each bill subsequently presented to the President as a bill 
     at the time of each of their respective final votes, this 
     objection would not arise. Thus, for example,
      internal House and Senate procedures that provided for 
     disaggregating an appropriations bill into separate bills 
     and then voting en bloc on those bills would result in the 
     President's being presented with exactly [what was] voted 
     on by each House. The chances of S. 137's being sustained 
     would be improved were the bill amended to incorporate 
     such refinements.

  In short, in my view, we stand a much better chance of all the hard 
work that has been done by our colleagues over the years on this matter 
not being undone by the courts if my amendment is adopted.
  I believe it would directly address, and satisfactorily address, the 
concerns that were earlier expressed by several Senators on the floor 
today as to the constitutionality of this legislation with respect to 
its presentment to the President.
  For these reasons, I urge my colleagues who support this legislation 
to support this amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. COATS. I thank my friend and colleague from Michigan for offering 
this amendment. While I do not believe this amendment is necessary, I 
believe it does address a concern that was raised yesterday relative to 
the constitutionality of a process which would deem an appropriations 
bill which was enrolled separately to incorporate all of the provisions 
of the original bill.
  For reasons that I outlined at length yesterday, and on the basis of 
some respected constitutional scholars, as well as others who have 
researched this area, we strongly feel and believe that our conclusions 
that the constitutionality of the Dole substitute, as originally 
presented, meet constitutional muster, that those provisions are 
adhered to and that no constitutional question exists.
  Nevertheless, the amendment of the Senator from Michigan is 
acceptable to this Senator and to the proponents of the Dole 
substitute, in that it clarifies any ambiguity that might exist or 
concerns that might exist among some Members who have questioned the 
constitutionality of that procedure.
  For that reason, I think the amendment of the Senator from Michigan 
is appropriate and I trust and hope that it will be adopted by this 
body.
  Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. EXON. Madam President, I am pleased that the Senator from 
Michigan has brought up this particular amendment, which we would like 
to take a further look at. Senator Byrd is a recognized constitutional 
scholar, as he demonstrated, I think, very vividly yesterday, and I am 
sure he will have some questions or comments on this.
  I would simply like to say, though, that I am particularly happy that 
this has been brought up, because it allows me to raise some questions 
as to why in the world, with all of the other problems that we have had 
over the years in enacting some kind of an enhanced rescission or 
expedited rescission or line-item veto--call it what you will, we all 
know what we are talking about--why in the world are we bringing up 
matters that I think are extraneous, that I think are not necessary.
  I think this whole enrollment proposition is ludicrous from the 
standpoint that I believe, as much as anything else, it could cause us 
a great deal of difficulty with regard to the courts.
  I still do not understand why, all of the sudden, after S. 4 and S. 
14, the two mainline bills in this regard were considered and 
introduced in the Senate, hearings held on them in the Budget 
Committee, in the Governmental Affairs Committee, and talk back and 
forth about which should be advanced and which should not be and in 
what form--at least in the Budget Committee a number of amendments were 
offered on a whole series of issues--but never once to my knowledge in 
any of the committees of the Congress of the United States this year 
did we ever touch on or think about this enrollment mechanism that has 
come out of nowhere to be one of the central parts of the bill finally 
introduced by the majority leader and, as near as I can tell, endorsed 
and backed by all 54 Members of the Senate on the Republican side of 
the aisle.
  I would simply also point out that this enrollment mechanism, 
regardless of its merits or lack thereof, can be agreed by all to be 
cumbersome, to be laborious, and I do not see the need for it. 
Certainly, the House of Representatives did not think this was 
important. We, in the U.S. Senate, did not think it was important when 
we introduced S. 4 and S. 14 and had all those hearings. It was not in 
the Contract With America, as far as I know. And those who wrote and 
signed the Contract With America, of which the line-item veto or 
enhanced rescissions or expedited rescissions, call it what you will, 
they did not think it was important.
  It comes over to the U.S. Senate and out of the blue comes this very 
difficult system that I thought that my friend from Indiana did a 
pretty good job of trying to explain yesterday. He went to the 
enrolling clerk. And he said he can do this with computers and it is 
going to be very easy to do.
  Basically, again, I am not a constitutional scholar, I am not even a 
lawyer, but I listened with great interest to the presentation of one 
who is, Senator Byrd. When I was listening to Senator Byrd yesterday, I 
thought, you know, thank God for the people of West Virginia sending us 
a man of the talent and the intellect with regard to the constitutional 
problems that might come up.
  Basically, it seems to me, if you pass a bill in the U.S. Senate and 
then you present that to the President of the United States in a 
different form, at least you are asking for some problems from the 
courts. It might well be that the amendment offered by the 
distinguished Senator from Michigan might clarify that somewhat. I 
would be very much interested in what Senator Byrd and others that have 
studied this from a constitutional standpoint might feel about it.
  Suffice it to say, it seems to me, Madam President, that the fact 
that we seem to be somewhat concerned about this, at least some on that 
side of the aisle must be somewhat concerned because they have talked 
about it a great deal, and now we have an amendment offered by the 
Senator from Michigan that tries to clarify it a little bit more, why 
clarify it? Why do we not pass the measure before us, which is termed 
the majority leader's bill or the revision of S. 4? Why do we not pass 
it and go back to the simple, direct, and understandable form that we 
had in this regard in S. 4, in S. 14, and in the measure that came over 
from the House of Representatives? Why do we not go back to that which 
I do not believe anybody has any objection to if they are for this?
  I would think that Senator McCain, the original proponent of S. 4, 
would feel that he had thought this through quite carefully. I suspect 
that Senator Domenici and this Senator, who combined as original 
cosponsors of S. 14 and thought about it, we thought that the more 
simple form with regard to how this was presented to the President 
would be in the line-item form that Senator Thurmond talked about that 
he used as Governor, as this Senator has talked about from the time 
that I have served as Governor of Nebraska. I do not know why that kind 
of a form and process is not good if we are going to pass some kind of 
a line-item veto or, once again, call it what you will.
  So I simply say that I thank my distinguished friend from Michigan 
for advancing this thought. But it gave this Senator an opportunity to 
say, why are we going through all these exercises in futility, when it 
would seem to me that the main sponsors of the amendment that was 
offered by the majority leader should recognize it would be to the good 
of all of us who would like to see some type of a line-item veto passed 
to go back to a sounder footing that I think we would have both from 
the standpoint of expediting the process 
[[Page S4332]]  and from the standpoint of probably not being 
challenged constitutionally on this particular item, and go back to the 
way line-item vetoes have generally been handled in the past without 
some of these special, complicated enrollment procedures that have been 
thrown into this measure at the last minute for reasons that I do not 
begin to understand?
  With that, I yield the floor.
  Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. COATS. Madam President, I would just point out to my colleague 
and friend from Nebraska that the separate enrollment procedure is not 
something that is new. In fact, it is a procedure which has enjoyed 
support not only from Republicans but also from Democrats.
  Senator Hollings, more than a decade ago, suggested, discussed, 
proposed the separate enrollment procedure. Senator Biden, then 
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, spoke very articulately in favor 
of the separate enrollment procedure and its constitutionality.
  It is a means by which we attempt to accomplish the end that I think 
most now are admitting needs to be accomplished. That is, to provide a 
means by which we can check the unnecessary pork-barrel spending that 
has come out of this Chamber and the House Chamber and sent to the 
desk, to the President, in increasing amounts ever since the adoption 
of the Budget Act of 1974.
  It is a practice that Members have used, and I suggest many have 
abused, of attaching to otherwise necessary legislation that the 
President needs to sign items that are designed to favor a few or favor 
a parochial, narrow interest.
  So as we have struggled to define the vehicle that will achieve the 
necessary number of votes to grant a check and balance against this 
practice of Congress, we have looked at various forms--enhanced 
rescission is one; constitutional amendment is another; separate 
enrollment is the third.
  Modern technology has allowed us to accomplish separate enrollment in 
a means and way in which we could not a few years ago. Five or six 
years ago, it was a valid complaint and a valid objection to say that 
it would lead to an incredibly difficult and complex process which 
would require the enrolling clerk to go through all kinds of 
machinations and additional work in order to accomplish the breakdown 
of a particular piece of legislation into individual items which could 
then be enrolled and sent to the President.
  Today, computer programs allow that to be accomplished in a matter of 
hours, if not minutes--depending on the size of the bill. What used to 
be described as a nightmare of a procedure now is a routine procedure, 
accomplished both in the Senate and in the House.
  Separate enrollment has the advantage of allowing the President to 
know exactly what is laid on his or her desk, what item constitutes 
additional spending for a particular purpose.
  Rather than the obfuscation and rather than the confusion over how 
taxpayers' money is going to be spent we now, under separate 
enrollment, pick up a piece of paper which contains a single item, 
incorporated in a form which the President can either accept or reject.
  No longer will we have the excuse of saying, ``I didn't know what was 
in that massive bill. I thought we were voting on an emergency 
appropriation. I thought we were voting on something of national 
interest. It was only later I discovered, to my horror, that it 
included all kinds of special tax benefits for single individuals, for 
limited interests, special breaks for special interests.''
  Or, ``I didn't know that the appropriations that went forward 
provided what is often characterized as embarrassing expenditures of 
something that can only be described as pork-barrel spending.
  ``Even had I known it, I'm afraid I would have had to vote for the 
bill, because it provided emergency funding for our national defense; 
it provided emergency funding for hurting Americans as a consequence of 
a hurricane or floods or an earthquake, or necessary spending for 
essential functions of Government.''
  Or, ``I didn't want to shut the whole Government down. We were right 
up against the deadline.''
  Yes, those rascals always slip a few things in there at the end, but 
we were up against the deadline and we had a massive bill that we had 
to pass or send to the President.
  The President is faced with the choice of either accepting the entire 
bill or rejecting the entire bill. The President--each President in 
this century with one exception--has formally asked the Congress, ``Let 
me have line-item veto authority so that I am not''--as Harry Truman 
said--``blackmailed by the legislature into either accepting the bill 
with all of its extraneous, nonrelevant spending, or rejecting the bill 
and sending it back.''
  By the way, you send a lot of these major appropriations up at the 
very end of the fiscal year with hours to go, sometimes, before the 
fiscal year runs out, and then you put me in a position of saying if I 
do not like something in that legislation, I have to send the entire 
bill back and close every office, and all the horror stories about the 
essential functions of Government are then raised. That is, as Harry 
Truman said, legislative blackmail.
  Madam President, what we are attempting to do is to fashion a 
procedure, a process which will allow the President to say ``I'll 
accept 99 percent of that bill or 94 percent of that bill, but I can't 
accept it with these dozen items in there that do not have anything to 
do with the bill, that do not go toward any national interest, that are 
simply attached because Members knew that this is the way to get their 
pork-barrel spending through, that I had to accept the bill.''
  By the same token, this is a process which will change the way 
Members behave, the way Members act. Because now, knowing that the 
President would have the power under line-item veto to single out their 
particular item, to single it out on one page of paper for everyone to 
see, and knowing that the only way that item could become law is if 
this Congress brought it back up and that Member were forced to come to 
the floor, debate, and explain what was in the bill, what the spending 
was for, and turn to his colleagues and say, ``I need your support but, 
by the way, you will have to put your `yes' or your `no' on public 
record so that your constituents understand how you feel about that 
particular item,'' knowing that, I predict most Members will say, ``I 
don't think that particular spending item is so important that I want 
to risk having to debate that or putting other Members on notice.'' Or, 
``I don't think I can get the necessary votes to achieve that 
particular purpose.''
  Separate enrollment brings forward into the light of public scrutiny 
the particular item of expenditure, and no longer will we be able to 
hide that item.
  Madam President, I note that the Senator from West Virginia has 
arrived on the floor, and I am more than happy to yield.
  Mr. EXON. Madam President, I just remind my colleague that the 
Presiding Officer still has the right to decide the floor.
  Madam President, I have been listening with great interest to my 
friend and colleague from Indiana. I would remind him that before he 
and many other people came to the Senate, former Senator Quayle, former 
Vice President Quayle, and this Senator, were up appealing on the floor 
of the U.S. Senate along the same identical lines that the Senator from 
Indiana just mentioned.
  I listened very much to his remarks in response to the suggestion 
that I had made, but maybe he did not understand what I was talking 
about. There is nothing wrong in using computers to try to ferret out 
so that all--including Members of the House, Members of the Senate, the 
President pro tempore of the Senate, who has to sign each one of these 
measures, the Speaker of the House--so that he or she is fully 
informed, and the President of the United States, so that they are 
fully informed.
  So we are not against the use of computers to furnish information and 
break down the figure.
 There is nothing wrong with that.

  Much of the excellent remarks that were just made by my colleague 
from Indiana emphasized the need for a line- 
[[Page S4333]] item veto, enhanced rescission, expedited rescission--
call it what you will. So I do not think that is the debate that I was 
trying to enter into, nor do I believe that is the intent of the 
amendment offered, that we are now on, by the Senator from Michigan.
  What we are talking about is whether or not it is wise to use the 
enrollment procedure that has come out of the blue. I agree with my 
friend from Indiana. This is new. It has not been talked about before. 
It has been suggested by Senator Hollings, it has been suggested by 
Senator Biden, as I understand it, and possibly others. But it was just 
one suggestion that was made somewhere down the line.
  I happen to believe that the House of Representatives, which studied 
this matter, did not feel that the bill was unworkable unless we used 
the enrollment process that suddenly has been instigated here as a key 
part. I do not believe that the Budget Committee or the other committee 
of jurisdiction that considered this matter felt that the measures that 
were advanced were inoperative or had not been thought through because 
we did not come through this magical enrollment procedure.
  I will simply say that most of the remarks that the Senator from 
Indiana made were with regard to the merits and why we need a line-item 
veto of some type. He did not, I think, adequately address the concerns 
that I was trying to bring up with regard to this enrollment process 
that I think could cause us some serious constitutional problems, those 
of us who are now for and have been for a line-item veto of some type 
for a long, long time.
  So I simply want to focus, if it was not understood, on the concerns 
of this Senator with regard to this cumbersome procedure to carry out 
the line-item veto.
  For the life of me, I have not been able to understand yet how the 
President pro tempore and the Speaker and the President can carry out 
their duties by signing something that is on a computer. There is 
nothing wrong with using a computer to make sure that everybody knows 
what every item is from 1 cent to trillions of dollars. But I do not 
believe that that particular enrollment process is the key to success 
at all. In fact, I think that kind of a process, as I say once again, 
could cause us some considerable difficulties in the courts. No one 
knows how they would decide that.
  I simply wanted to make it clear, Madam President, that I was not in 
conflict with what the Senator from Indiana said with regard to the 
necessity for a line-item veto. I am trying to focus on the fact that I 
believe that the enrollment process is also causing some concern to 
Senators on that side of the aisle, as evidenced by the fact that the 
Senator from Michigan must have some concerns about it or he would not 
be in here offering his amendment.
  So I simply warn and would like to have some consideration given to 
why can we not pass a cleaner, simpler, more direct line-item veto, a 
la what was sent to us by the House, a la what was incorporated in S. 
4, what was incorporated in S. 14? I do not believe that all of the 
people that touched those different propositions had not thought 
through the process to the point that all is forsaken unless somehow we 
accept this concept that has been brought into this body for the first 
time, as I know it, under the present consideration of a line-item veto 
or something akin to it in this current session of the Congress.
  I happen to think that it is ill-advised to go that far, but the 
majority has a right to work its will.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition? The Chair in her 
capacity as a Senator from Texas suggests the absence of a quorum. The 
clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brown). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed as 
in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mrs. Hutchison pertaining to the introduction of S. 
592 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced 
Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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