[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 53 (Wednesday, March 22, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4313-S4322]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     LEGISLATIVE LINE-ITEM VETO ACT

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.


                      Unanimous Consent Agreement

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, the floor leader asked me to make this 
request.
  I ask unanimous consent that the vote on the motion to table the 
Bradley amendment occur at 2 p.m. today, to be followed immediately by 
a vote on a motion to table the Feingold amendment No. 362, to be 
followed by a motion to table the Hollings amendment No. 404.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I yield the floor.
  Mr. SARBANES addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I rise to express my opposition to the 
pending amendment, the line-item veto substitute amendment that is 
before the body, and in the course of doing that to express some 
thoughts on the line-item veto issue more broadly.
  I am very much concerned that any proposal, unless very carefully 
developed and worked out, could result in a fundamental reordering of 
the separation of powers and check and balance arrangements between the 
legislative and the executive branches.
  Unfortunately, there is a tendency to dismiss these kinds of 
questions, although they were very much at the forefront of the 
thinking of the Founding Fathers when they devised the Constitution 
that summer in Philadelphia. A Constitution which has served us well 
over two centuries of the Republic's history. A very careful balanced 
arrangement was put together then, and I think when it comes to 
changing it, we need to be very cautious and very prudent.
  It does not take a great deal of skill or vision to have a strong 
executive. Many countries throughout history 
[[Page S4314]]  have had very strong executives. In fact, if they are 
too strong, we refer to them as dictatorships. One of the hallmarks of 
a free society is having a legislative branch and a judicial branch 
with some independence and with some decisionmaking authority which can 
operate as a check and balance upon the executive. I repeat, many 
countries have had strong executives, but they have not been the 
examples that we want to follow or to emulate.
  The great achievement of the American constitutional system is to 
have established a National Government with independent branches that 
check and balance one another, to have not only an Executive but 
legislative branch with some power and authority. I think we have to be 
very careful that the proposals which come before us with respect to 
line-item veto not erode the balance and the arrangement that has 
served the Republic well for over 205 years.
  The danger, of course, is that these line-item veto proposals open up 
the opportunity for the Executive branch, for the President, to bring 
to bear enormous pressure upon Members of Congress and, therefore, 
markedly affect the dynamics between the two branches. What the various 
forms of the line-item veto would do, unless very carefully restrained, 
is enable a President to link votes on matters unrelated to the 
appropriation bill to a specific item in the appropriation measure.
  Members may well be confronted with a situation in which the 
Executive says, ``I see this item in this bill, and it is a good item; 
everyone has justified it; it makes a lot of sense; it is obviously 
very important to your State or to your district; and I certainly do 
not want to exercise my veto over it; but I am very concerned about the 
position you are taking''--and then he mentions some totally unrelated 
issue, perhaps a nomination to the Supreme Court, perhaps a foreign 
policy matter involving very important issues of war and peace, or 
other issues on the domestic front.
  Of course, the Executive then is in position to bring enormous 
pressure to bear. So the line-item veto tool becomes used not as many 
have suggested, as a way to delete spending items and address through 
that deletion the deficit problem, it becomes a tool and a legislative 
strategy by the White House and by the Executive branch to sway Members 
in terms of the positions they take on unrelated items. It becomes a 
heavy weapon of pressure.
  Now, the particular provision that is before us was not the subject 
of any committee hearings or any report. There is no report with 
respect to this provision. It was a substitute that was simply 
presented on the floor. It would require individual items in an 
appropriation bill to be separately enrolled and presented to the 
President. And as the very distinguished Senator from West Virginia, 
the former chairman of the Appropriations Committee, demonstrated 
yesterday, a single appropriations bill could end up as thousands of 
individual enrolled bills that would be sent to the President to be 
signed or vetoed.
  Senator Byrd indicated yesterday that this dramatic change in our 
system for enacting legislation raises many significant constitutional 
issues. First, you have important questions about the role of the 
enrolling clerk in carrying this forward. What will be sent to the 
President is not identical with what was passed by the Congress. It 
will be what we pass subsequently broken up by the enrolling clerk. It 
is not as though the Senate and the House were asked to pass each of 
these items and then that was sent to the President. That at least I 
think would be consistent with existing constitutional arrangements.
  With the proposal before us, you will be passing a bill, and then the 
enrollment clerk is going to divide it up into lots of little bills. I 
think Senator Byrd referred to them as ``billettes.'' And those would 
be sent to the President. In fact, I think there is a very strong 
argument that this scheme would violate the presentment clause in 
article I, section 7 of the Constitution, which provides:

       Every bill which shall have passed the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a 
     law, be presented to the President of the United States.
       If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return 
     it.

  It seems clear to me that what would be presented to the President is 
not what has passed the House and the Senate. In fact, I understand 
that the Assistant Attorney General from the Office of Legal Counsel 
has raised serious concerns about the separate enrollment approach 
contained in this substitute amendment with the observation:

       On what seems to us to be the best reading of the 
     Presentment Clause, what must be presented to the President 
     is the bill in exactly the form in which it was voted on and 
     passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate 
     rather than a measure or a series of measures that 
     subsequently have been abstracted from that bill by the clerk 
     of the relevant House.

  Obviously, this raises a serious constitutional issue, and I hope 
Members will stop and deliberate about it very carefully as we consider 
the substitute proposal that is before us.
  Under this substitute, the separate enrollment of each item would be 
the responsibility of the enrollment clerk after the larger bill has 
passed the Congress. The Congress would never actually vote on the 
individual so-called bills that would go to the President. Therefore, 
it represents a dramatic and drastic departure from our constitutional 
arrangements.
  Only this morning there was an editorial in the paper, which I ask 
unanimous consent be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my 
remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. SARBANES. This editorial said in part:

       The ``compromise'' line-item veto bill that Republicans 
     have put on the Senate floor is as bad as the bill it would 
     replace, and not a compromise at all. It is sloppily drawn, 
     would greatly complicate the legislative process, invite 
     evasions, and likely do little to accomplish its ostensible 
     purpose of reducing excess spending and the deficit. The main 
     effect would be to disturb the traditional balance of powers 
     by strengthening the President and congressional minorities 
     at the majority's expense.

  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to reflect on the history of the 
existing scheme for Presidential rescission of spending items.
  Congress enacted the Budget Impoundment and Control Act in 1974 in 
response to Executive excesses by a President who impounded funds duly 
enacted into law. I supported that act--as a Member of the House--to 
restore balance between the executive and legislative branches. And it 
is quite possible, of course, to further refine the rescissions scheme 
first put forth in the 1974 act. In fact, there has been legislation 
which Senators Domenici and Exon had been recommending to do exactly 
that. I understand that the minority leader will be making proposals 
with respect to so-called expedited rescission that would enable us to 
move forward on this issue. That would ensure the President that items 
he picked out of an appropriation bill and said should be rescinded 
would come to the Congress and would have to be voted on by the 
Congress.
  That is not now the case. The President can pick the items out for 
rescission, but a vote on them is not actually required. This proposal, 
the so-called expedited rescission proposal, would ensure that a vote 
had to be taken. And it provides, of course, that if a majority in both 
Houses does not agree that the item should be rescinded, then it would 
not be rescinded.
  But, it does provide a way to put a spotlight on the item, if that is 
what the President wishes to do, and it does require the Members of the 
Congress to address the issue and to address it directly.
  I understand, also, that the proposal that the minority leader may 
make would include within it so-called tax expenditures as an item also 
over which the President would have that particular rescission 
authority, and then would be able to require a direct vote by both 
Houses of the Congress on that item.
  That is a change in procedure, but it is one that I think is worthy 
of consideration and it does not fundamentally alter the arrangements 
between the Executive and the legislative branch that are currently 
contained in the Constitution of the United States.
  It is a more restrained and balanced approach, I think, to try to 
address this issue. It does not represent the 
[[Page S4315]]  drastic departure from past constitutional practice 
which is contained in the amendment before us, or indeed in other more 
sweeping proposals. And it does not shift the balance between the 
Executive and the legislative branches in a drastic way. It addresses 
the concerns that have been raised without creating even larger 
problems--problems which would flow from a fundamental altering of the 
basic relationship which has existed for more than two centuries 
between the Executive and legislative branches.
  Mr. President, I very much hope this amendment will be defeated when 
we finally vote on it. I am hopeful that an appropriate alternative can 
be worked out along the lines of what is called the expedited 
rescission approach.
  I yield the floor.
                               Exhibit 1

               [From the Washington Post, Mar. 22, 1995]

                         Another in the Senate

       The ``compromise'' line-item veto bill that Republicans 
     have put on the Senate floor is as bad as the bill it would 
     replace, and not a compromise at all. It is sloppily drawn, 
     would greatly complicate the legislative process, invite 
     evasions and likely do little to accomplish its ostensible 
     purpose of reducing excess spending and the deficit. The main 
     effect would be to disturb the traditional balance of powers 
     by strengthening the president and congressional minorities 
     at the majority's expense.
       The problem, if there is one, is that presidents now can't 
     pick and choose among the items in appropriations and other 
     money bills. They can only sign or veto them in their 
     entirety. In the Reagan and Bush years, the myth grew up that 
     this was one of the reasons the deficit was so large--not 
     presidential policy, but the inability of (Republican) 
     presidents to curb the (Democratic) congressional proclivity 
     to spend.
       Unfortunately, the myth has survived the election returns. 
     The Republicans remain committed to giving the president 
     greater power to single out and block line items, and 
     President Clinton has unwisely said he wants as much such 
     power as Congress is willing to confer. The House passed 
     legislation under which he could sign an appropriations bill, 
     then propose to kill or reduce any item in it. Congress would 
     then have to pass a second bill to block such a proposal, and 
     that could be vetoed, so that two-thirds votes of both houses 
     would be required to sustain even the smallest spending 
     detail to which a president might object.
       Some Senators of both parties rightly thought that was too 
     great a cession of power. They proposed instead a system in 
     which Congress would have to reaffirm its support for line 
     items to which a president objected, but majority votes would 
     be enough to prevail. But the Republicans in this group came 
     under party pressure to back off and support the present 
     ``compromise'' instead.
       Congress would pass appropriations and other money bills as 
     now, then split them into line items or other designated 
     parts--perhaps thousands per bill--and send each part to the 
     president to be signed or vetoed separately. It's a recipe 
     for writer's cramp. The president plus a minority of one-
     third plus one of either house would be enough to govern. The 
     rule would also apply to any increase in entitlements and any 
     revenue-losing tax provision ``having the practical effect of 
     providing more favorable tax treatment to a particular 
     taxpayer or limited group of taxpayers when compared with 
     other similary situated taxpayers.'' To what might that not 
     apply?
       The line-item veto has become a political symbol. The 
     members of both parties who are so blithely supporting it, 
     including Bill Clinton, need to ask themselves what it means. 
     If the next president doesn't like a particular program for 
     whatever reason--it needn't be the cost--he and a minority of 
     either house can flick it out of the budget and out of 
     existence. It could happen as easily to a new weapons system 
     as it could to the likes of the national service corps. For 
     lack of political will, the legislative branch votes to make 
     itself that much weaker. Who wins from that?

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, as all know, the Senate is debating a 
truly fundamental change to our system of Government. We have before us 
legislation which proposes to reconsider some of the most basic 
principles of our democracy. For over 200 years the Federal Government 
has maintained a careful balance between the powers of the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches. That balance has stood the test of 
time and has helped sustain our Nation's cherished liberties for 
generations. Given that remarkable record, I think we need to be very 
cautious before altering this historic balance of powers. And it is not 
something we should do lightly. It is not something we should rush 
through.
  We do, however, have to be prepared to respond to changing conditions 
and to make needed changes in the way we do business. Despite all that 
is good about our democratic system we also face some real problems and 
one of the most important is Government waste and the deep public anger 
that it provokes.
  Almost more than any time in our history, it is critical to reduce 
waste in Government. We are continuing to load debt on our children and 
grandchildren. The tax burden is heavy. Americans are losing faith in 
Government as they are repeatedly bombarded with examples of 
unnecessary spending from fraud in Government programs to the Lawrence 
Welk center.
  Taxpayers are infuriated, and they have a right to be. They also have 
a right to demand that we do something about it. And there is broad 
public support for trying some form of line-item veto. Yet we ought not 
to exaggerate what a line-item veto can accomplish. It will not 
eliminate all Government waste nor will it balance the budget. It may 
result in eliminating unnecessary pork-barrel projects and special-
interest loopholes. That is not to say that all narrowly targeted 
spending or tax provisions are wasteful. We all know that many are. And 
the most egregious examples get the most publicity and erode public 
confidence in the Congress and in our Government. Surely that is one 
reason why the public is so angry with Washington. We need to look for 
ways to address this problem and the line-item veto might help by 
giving the President power to eliminate items that are truly 
indefensible.
  Under current law, when the Congress sends the President a broad 
spending or tax bill, the President's options are pretty limited. He 
can sign the whole bill into law or he can veto the entire package. 
Once an appropriation bill is enacted, the President can propose to 
rescind specific items of spending and send Congress a rescission, a 
reduction in the original proposal--specifically eliminating one 
recommendation. But this rescission power is extremely limited.
  First of all, it does not apply to tax breaks, those breaks that are 
given to special interests that cost us money because we lose those 
revenues. And, in the case of proposed rescissions to appropriations, 
Congress presently can simply ignore them.
  It seems to me that it is worth trying to give the President of the 
United States additional powers to eliminate waste. But as we move into 
these uncharted waters, fundamentally changing our form of government, 
we should build in certain protections against abuse of Executive 
power. Restraint of Executive power has been the hallmark of our 
Constitution and has guided our Founding Fathers in its creation.
  We can strengthen the President's rescission power by making sure 
that Congress considers all Presidential rescission proposals and does 
so on an expedited basis. Once again, that Congress reviews and 
considers all Presidential rescission proposals would be a significant 
step forward in the fight against waste.
  Currently, if the President sends rescissions to us to eliminate 
wasteful spending we can simply ignore them, and we often do. Forcing 
review of wasteful projects is not something that is taken up very 
readily. And in the glare of public debate, it would be a healthy 
antidote to our current way of doing business.
  We can also build in protections against abuse of this expanded 
Executive power by retaining the democratic process of majority rule. 
The pending legislation would permit the President to kill any 
increases in spending or changes to entitlement programs if he can 
convince just one-third of one House of the Congress to support him. 
That is an enormous expansion of Executive power. It would permit the 
President to nullify what a majority of the people's representatives 
have already approved.
  Finally, we would guard against abuse of power by the executive by 
requiring the Congress to review the line-item veto of a proscribed 
trial period. Initially, I think the shorter this trial the better. If 
the line-item veto works as its authors intend, it will have a salutary 
affect on our Government, and there will be no problem in extending it.
  Unfortunately, Mr. President, the proposal before us fails to protect 
against Executive branch abuses. It 
[[Page S4316]]  also puts power in the hands of a small minority 
undermining majority rule by demanding a two-thirds vote to override 
the President's rescission recommendation. It lets one-third of 
Congress rule and the President controlling Federal policy on virtually 
all new spending and entitlement programs. Our Constitution was not 
written that way. It was not intended that way.
  Legislation could also unintentionally hurt smaller States with 
smaller congressional delegations like mine, like the State of New 
Jersey. The proposal would lower the deck in favor of bigger States 
which have a leg up on building the necessary two-thirds vote to 
override a Presidential line-item veto. In my view, it is unwise. Mr. 
President, the case for a line-item veto rests largely on the need to 
eliminate narrowly targeted pork-barrel spending. But the majority 
leader's amendment goes much further than that. It would allow the 
President to unilaterally eliminate funding for entire programs. This 
would give a single individual the power to kill major initiatives in 
education, law enforcement, health care, veterans programs, mass 
transit, immigration enforcement, housing, and you name it. All could 
be at risk.
  It would also put Medicare, veterans benefits, and other entitlement 
programs under the control of a small minority of Congress aligned with 
the President. I am not suggesting, Mr. President, that President 
Clinton or any future President would abuse this new power. But we do 
not really know and we have to guard against it. That is not a 
Democratic concern or a Republican concern. It is a nonpartisan 
concern. It is not a liberal concern. It is not a conservative concern. 
It is a democratic with a small ``d'' concern. It has nothing to do 
with party or ideology. It has everything to do with the potential for 
abuse of power and rule by a congressional minority.
  Let us take one example of a President of my own party, President 
Lyndon Baines Johnson. President Johnson was a strong leader who 
excelled at cajoling and pressing Members of Congress into voting with 
him. I never experienced it. But the Johnson treatment was something 
that is legendary. Lyndon Johnson used every tool in his arsenal to 
make his case, to win his recommendation.
  Looking to future, a President with strong leadership skills and 
strong convictions he could gain enormously in power. With just one-
third of one House of Congress he could wipe out essential benefits for 
ordinary Americans, and a majority in Congress could do nothing to stop 
him.
  Mr. President, I urge against giving a President that unbridled 
power. I am not willing to risk that. A future President would be able 
to override a majority in the Congress, and perhaps eliminate all 
school lunches, or deny middle-class students the opportunity to go to 
college, or deny working families a chance for child care, or take 
police officers off the street, or force young children to go hungry, 
or increase the number of homeless on our streets, or deny veterans the 
benefits they earned while serving our country, or deny senior citizens 
needed benefits required under Medicare.
  Mr. President, these expenditures and these benefits are not pork. 
But they would all be vulnerable to the line-item veto under the 
proposed majority leader's amendment. A President bent on eliminating 
them could wield a new tool like a meat ax against ordinary Americans. 
There needs to be some real protections against that, if we are to have 
a line-item veto.
  I am also concerned that a line-item veto could open the door to what 
some have called political extortion. I use that term to convey how a 
President would be able in effect hold the gun to the heads of the 
Members of Congress. This could happen. A President could go to a 
Member of Congress and say, ``I need support for my favorite new 
initiative, and, if you do not agree to support it, it is goodbye for 
that new highway or special program that is so important in your 
district.'' Mr. President, that kind of political pressure occurs in 
many States that have a line-item veto, and it can lead to more 
wasteful spending--not less.
  Mr. President, to limit the possibility that a line-item veto will be 
abused, it is important to keep the Executive on a relatively short 
leash. One way is to require Congress to reauthorize the line-item veto 
on a routine basis. Another is to allow a majority in the Congress to 
overrule the President.
  These protections would preserve the constitutional principle of a 
balance of power and avoid shifting power, extraordinary power, to the 
executive branch or to larger States at the expense of the medium-sized 
or smaller States. It would make it less likely that a future occupant 
of the White House would ride roughshod over the people in the 
Congress. Unfortunately, Mr. President, the pending proposal does not 
include adequate protections. It is a serious flaw in the legislation.
  I am also concerned about the provisions in the pending amendment 
related to tax instructions. Those provisions, though drafted 
ambiguously apparently are intended to provide a loophole that will 
protect many special interest tax breaks from rescission.
  Mr. President, we all know that many special tax breaks that have 
been included in tax bills over the years exist. There are special 
rules for the timber industry, for the oil and gas industry, even for 
cruise liners. In fact, a few years ago we tried to enact a special 
loophole for the tuxedo industry. Once enacted, most tax breaks enjoy a 
special status that even the most popular spending programs would 
emulate. They never have to be appropriated. They never have to be 
reauthorized. They never have to compete for scarce budgetary 
resources. Instead, they simply nestle quietly and unobtrusively in the 
nooks and the crannies of the Tax Code never to be seen nor heard from 
again. But they cost us substantial revenues, and their costs are made 
up by imposing extra burdens on ordinary taxpayers.
  Mr. President, unwarranted tax loopholes go to the heart of what 
bothers so many Americans today. Loopholes generally are provided only 
to special interests and wealthy individuals who have either special 
connections or enough money to hire a high-priced lobbyist with access 
to Members of Congress. We have seen a lot of stories on lobbying 
influence in these recent days and weeks.
 Meanwhile, ordinary Americans do not have those things. They do not 
have personal relationships with powerful Senators, and they do not 
have the lobbyists working for them. So when an ordinary American sees 
clients of lobbyists getting special treatment in the Tax Code, they 
really resent it. They resent it very, very deeply.

  Mr. President, the pending amendment of the majority leader includes 
ambiguous language on targeted tax benefits. But according to 
statements made on this floor, that language is intended to be very 
narrow. Apparently, if a tax break benefits a particular company, it 
may be subject to a rescission. But if the loophole benefits two 
companies or an entire industry, it will get special protection.
  Mr. President, that is a loophole law that I cannot support.
  In conclusion, let me again emphasize that we are talking about the 
basic structure of Government that was established over 200 years ago, 
and we ought to proceed with caution. To help eliminate waste in 
Government, it is worth trying a line-item veto. But we should not 
support proposals that are vulnerable to abuse, that fail to adequately 
protect the public interest and our constituents or that provide for 
special interest tax loopholes.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, in light of the remarks of the Senator 
from New Jersey, I think it is very interesting that in the chair we 
have a former Governor of a State and the author of the amendment that 
is under consideration. The Senator from South Carolina is also a 
former Governor. Both of them are strongly in support of the line-item 
veto. Both of them may have differing opinions on many issues because 
they are of different party affiliation, but both of them have had the 
unique experience of being responsible for governing a State and having 
to balance the budget of that State.
  The Senator from South Carolina just related how he took his State 
from a situation of near fiscal crisis to one of fiscal solvency. He 
states that with the line-item veto--and I am not trying to parrot the 
words of the Senator from South Carolina, who is far more eloquent than 
I--he was able to govern 
[[Page S4317]]  his State effectively with that very valuable tool.
  The Senator from Missouri, a former Governor of his State, who has 
spoken on the floor here on several occasions--both have talked and 
talked about the absolute criticality of the ability to exercise a 
line-item veto; not only exercise it, but having that tool in shaping 
the budget of their States.
  You know, it is interesting, I do not detect in either one of these 
individuals and other former Governors who are Members of this body 
this desire to twist arms, threaten, blackmail--and ``extortion'' I 
have heard used a couple of times--and I cannot believe that the 
American people would sit by and watch a President of the United States 
practice extortion or blackmail on Members of the Senate or Members of 
Congress.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. McCAIN. Yes, I am happy to yield for a question.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Does the Senator believe that the only ones who know 
how to manage an enterprise are Governors? Or does the Senator believe 
that business experience is of value as well, business experience that 
developed an entire industry known as the computing industry, which I 
modestly had a hand in and am a member of the Hall of Fame of 
Information and Processing. I ran a terrific company with an excellent 
record, one of the best in the country. I assume the Senator would 
yield to the fact that someone who has other experience besides 
Governors can make a contribution; is that not so?
  Mr. McCAIN. I suggest, I say to my friend from New Jersey, not only 
is it a very important and valuable credential to address any issue--
especially where the free enterprise system is concerned--I, along with 
my colleagues, share admiration for the enormous contributions the 
Senator from New Jersey made to the primary generator of business and 
employment and commerce not only nationally but throughout the world.
  But I do suggest there is some difference in that, as Governors of 
States, they were required--and I might say a fairly significant size--
to administer those States. In fact, they had oversight of the 
businesses that resided in their States, in a regulatory and other 
fashion, working in partnership with the legislature.
  I suggest that, as the head of a very successful corporation, the 
Senator from New Jersey had more than a line-item veto. The Senator 
from New Jersey had a total veto, and there was no chance of his being 
overridden, except by his board of directors or his stockholders. I 
view this situation--and I am sure, knowing how gentle the Senator from 
New Jersey is, from time to time he had to exercise that veto; 
otherwise, he would not have achieved the pinnacle of success that he 
reached.
  So I do think there is a certain comparability, and I believe that, 
if there were outrageous expenditures in his company and corporation 
and if the Senator from New Jersey, then a president and CEO, felt 
helpless to bring into check those extravagances, I think it would have 
harmed his ability to achieve the enormous and very laudable degree of 
success that he achieved.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator from New Jersey for his question. I 
also would like to again state that it is of interest that in 43 States 
in America out of 50, those Governors do exercise the line-item veto.
  Again, in response to a very legitimate question from the Senator 
from New Jersey, when there is a military issue, I try to get the 
opinion of people who are military experts. When there is an issue of 
aviation, I try to go to those experts. I try to consult with--due to 
my narrow experience and knowledge and background--those people who are 
experts and have had experience in areas where, frankly, I am not as 
well informed as others. And so it seems to me that it would be logical 
to consult the Senator from South Carolina, who was judged by many as 
the most successful Governor in the history of that State. He literally 
brought it into the 20th century in more ways than one. And there is 
the Senator from Missouri, who presently occupies the chair, as well as 
many other Senators who were Governors. Another example is the present 
Governor of California, who was a Member of this body before he became 
Governor, who has stated unequivocally, as Governor of the State of 
California, that without the capacity to exercise the line-item veto, 
he would have enormous and indeed insurmountable difficulties.
  So I have to rely on the judgment and experience of Members of this 
body and people who are not Members of this body that have actually had 
the experience of governing. And governing, I think, is a unique 
challenge and experience. I am very pleased to have the input and the 
benefit and knowledge and experience of the Senator from South 
Carolina, as well as the Senator from Missouri, as well as many other 
Senators.
  I read a few days ago, Mr. President, a survey done by the Cato 
Institute, where approximately 88 percent of the former Governors--it 
was a very large number of former Governors, of both the Democratic 
Party and Republican Party--when asked, stated that the line-item veto 
was a ``very useful tool.'' Those are the people whose judgment I think 
we not necessarily rely on, but certainly the benefit of their 
experience cannot be ignored.
  I would like to address the issue of the Hollings amendment. 
Obviously, what the Senator from South Carolina is trying to achieve 
here is laudable. I just find, however, that it is not germane. This 
bill is about process reform; it is about separate enrollment--a 
concept long advocated by the Senator from South Carolina. 
Additionally, the chairman of the Budget Committee announced that he is 
going to have a hearing on this amendment in the Budget Committee. We 
have announced that we are prepared to accept the Exon amendment which 
affects this bill. The Hollings amendment raises many valid issues, but 
I believe it would be better offered on more appropriate legislation. I 
note that the Hollings amendment was defeated in the Budget Committee 
by a 12-to-10 vote. So the Budget Committee has spoken on this issue,
 which, by the way, by no means precludes the Senator from South 
Carolina from bringing this to the floor, as we all know. But I would, 
at the proper time, make a motion to table the Hollings amendment. I 
believe that the time for a vote will be established very soon.

  Mr. President, I paid attention to the remarks of the Senator from 
Maryland and the Senator from New Jersey. Their concerns have been 
raised many times in the past and they will be raised again before we 
finally enact this bill, which I now am feeling some optimism about, 
although we have a number of wickets to go through before we reach that 
goal.
  Mr. President, in all due respect to my colleagues, I do believe that 
it is an argument for pretty much the status quo. I do not think that 
the American people are satisfied with the status quo. I do not believe 
they are satisfied with a debt that will accumulate to $5.2 trillion. I 
do not believe they will be satisfied with $200 billion-plus annual 
deficits.
  Mr. President, I do believe that it is important again to restate, as 
I have over and over and over again, that from 1801 when Thomas 
Jefferson--which is becoming a famous anecdote, probably far more 
famous than Thomas Jefferson ever envisioned--in 1801, when Thomas 
Jefferson impounded the $50,000 that Congress appropriated to purchase 
gunboats, that a practice for the next 174 years was continued by Chief 
Executives of this country and that was impounding funds that they did 
not wish to spend.
  Now we all know our history, and that is, in 1974, with a weakened 
President, who had, in the view of many, and probably accurately, 
abused the impoundment powers by impounding enormous sums of money for 
entire programs that had been authorized and appropriated by the 
Congress, the Congress repealed the Budget Impoundment Act. And we know 
what has happened since.
  I have quoted for the record before rescissions that come over from 
the President of the United States. They are either ignored or other 
rescissions are substituted for them so that basically the Chief 
Executive, the President of the United States, is at the mercy of the 
whim or the desires, which is more accurate, the desires of the 
Congress as related to a rescission. 
[[Page S4318]]  And more and more often since 1974, rescission requests 
on the part of Presidents of the United States, both Republican and 
Democrat, have been ignored by the legislative branch.
  So when my colleagues argue, as the Senator from Maryland and the 
Senator from New Jersey did, that this is an enormous shift of power, I 
will agree that it is a shift of power. I also argue that it is a much 
needed shift of power, but it is not new. It is not new. It is a 
restoration of, basically, the powers that the Executive had from 1801 
to 1974.
  (Mr. DeWINE assumed the chair.)
  Mr. McCAIN. I also know, Mr. President, that almost everything that 
we and the executive branch do is under the scrutiny of the media. The 
media pay attention and report on almost everything we do. In fact, 
there is a cottage industry now, as we all know, that describe private 
conversations that the President had with another individual, that 
describe the innermost counsels, both in the executive branch, the 
President of the United States and the White House, and in the Congress 
of the United States.
  If it became known to the people of the United States that the 
President of the United States was calling the Senator from South 
Carolina over and said, ``I want you to support my effort to provide 
housing for Russian officers or I am going to kill a project in South 
Carolina,'' it would be over. In a New York minute, it would be over. 
Because the Senator from South Carolina or the Senator from Arizona or 
the Senator from Ohio would walk out to that group of microphones and 
cameras in front of the White House and say, ``I have just been 
blackmailed by the President of the United States.''
  And if there is one thing that I think would reassure my reelection, 
if I sought reelection, it would be to go out and tell the people of 
Arizona that I stood up to a threat of blackmail by the President of 
the United States.
  So, yes, I admired in many ways the persuasive powers of President 
Lyndon Johnson, which was referred to in the remarks by the Senator 
from New Jersey. I admire the persuasive powers of President Reagan. 
But I do not believe that any President of the United States is going 
to engage in political blackmail.
  And in these 43 out of 50 States where Governors have line-item 
vetoes, I have yet to hear of a single instance where a Governor--
although it may have happened on a rare occasion or two, I just have 
not heard of it, nor have I ever read or heard it reported--has 
exercised this kind of extortion or blackmail, as it is described.
  Now, I saw a little item today that ever child born in America now 
has a $13,000 debt. I am not sure how that is computed, Mr. President. 
I would be interested in knowing how you figure that out.
  But I do know this: That with a $5.2 trillion debt, which is the 
estimate of what this Nation will carry next year, I believe that every 
child in America is now inflicted with a huge debt burden that they are 
going to have to pay off sooner or later.
  We could, Mr. President, turn down the line-item veto. We could 
continue these unending debts and annual deficits, I think, for some 
years. But there is going to come a time where the bill is going to 
become due.
  Some experts attribute the fall of the dollar to the failure of the 
balanced budget amendment. I do not know if that is the case or not. I 
do not claim to have that kind of expertise.
  But if I were a foreign investor and I was looking around the world 
where to invest my money and I saw a country that is growing more and 
more dependent upon foreign investment in order to have the Treasury 
bills, which are floated quite frequently, in order to secure funds 
because of the annual deficit we are running, I think I would be less 
than confident not only in the economy of this country but I would lose 
some confidence in the validity of its currency.
  Now maybe that is too dire a picture. Maybe the strong American 
economy and the overall strength and economic strength of this country 
would override that. But I cannot believe, at the end of the day, that 
it is attractive to invest or hold the currency of a country that 
forever, forever, which is the case now, is going to be running annual 
deficits and accumulating an ever larger and larger debt.
  And I want to add, again, Mr. President, the line-item veto does not 
balance the budget. We all admit to that. But I do not see a balanced 
budget without the line-item veto. I think that is the important part 
of this discourse.
  I have displayed a chart here on several occasions that shows that in 
1974, when the President of the United States lost the impoundment 
power, revenues and expenditures began to diverge and they have 
continued almost unendingly to diverge for a very long period of time, 
for the last 21 years, with no end in sight.
  I will say that we have had a short period--and I think it is due to 
the leadership of the President of the United States and efforts that 
were made--where we have had a temporary reduction in the annual 
deficit. That is the good news. The bad news is there is no place that 
anyone envisions where that deficit is zero or that we even begin to 
pay off the debt we have accumulated.
  Mr. President, sooner or later, we are going to have to do that. We 
are now paying nearly as much on interest on the national debt as we 
are on national defense. People born a generation ago would find that 
an incredible and bizarre situation.
  I see the Senator from South Carolina on his feet, Mr. President. I 
yield the floor.
  Mr. HOLLINGS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I thank my distinguished colleague from Arizona, and 
the distinguished Presiding Officer.
  I ask unanimous consent that Senator Kerrey of Nebraska be added as a 
cosponsor of my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I ask the sincere reconsideration by the 
distinguished Senator from Arizona on his motion to table our 
amendment.
  What happened, Mr. President, is that we brought it up dutifully 
before the Budget Committee. It was not approved, as has been pointed 
out. But, having done that, now is the time.
  If we do not do this now, which is relevant to the budget resolution, 
if we do not do it now, then what we really are going to do is avoid 
truth in budgeting because the next time we really sit down to consider 
the budget, we will be considering it under the old rules.
  So it is very appropriate and, incidentally, more so than perhaps the 
underlying amendment.
  The distinguished Senator from Arizona said, ``Wait a minute, now; he 
had his vote and he lost.'' He did not refer to the other vote I lost, 
namely, the line-item veto. The present bill under consideration is the 
substitute measure.
  On the rationale of my distinguished colleague, we ought to table the 
whole bloomin' line-item veto.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I yield.
  Mr. McCAIN. Another testimony to the incredible clairvoyance of the 
Senator from South Carolina. I thank him.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I hope he will stick with me on the line-item veto and 
not table it under that same logic.
  Now, with respect to germaneness, I happen to have a record that was 
generally respected as the presiding officer at the State level, and 
having come to the U.S. Senate, I spent my 28 going on 29 years trying 
to forget parliamentary procedure.
  I will never forget when I first presided and I got two Golden Gavel 
Awards--200 hours. We used to start the Presiding Officer about 5 
o'clock in the afternoon. The distinguished Senator from Oregon, Wayne 
Morse, would get up and characterize the President of the United 
States, who had just been lauded with respect for his muscle power in 
getting things done, President Lyndon Johnson. He would refer to him as 
a murderer, and that would go on from about 5 o'clock until about 9:30 
or 10 o'clock each evening, with respect to the war in Vietnam.
  But I immediately recognized someone who first rose to be recognized. 
That is the fundamental parliamentary rule in all bodies in the world, 
save this one. Here you recognize the majority leader. You could have 
been out here for 3 hours or 2 days, whatever it is, sitting in your 
seat, and stand to be 
[[Page S4319]]  recognized, but the majority leader at that particular 
time comes to the door, forget about you. Under the rules of the 
Senate, you recognize him.
  In that light, I had the duty of trying to forget rules, but I never 
forgot the one of germaneness. I refer specifically here to the short 
title ``The Separate Enrollment and Line-item Veto Act of 1995,'' which 
I hope to amend.
  Under the section 5 subsection (a) I refer, the term ``targeted tax 
benefit'' means any provision estimated by the Joint Committee on 
Taxation as losing revenue within the period specified in the most 
recently adopted concurrent resolution on the budget pursuant to 
section 301 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 
1974.
  Now, that is amending section 301 of the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act 1974 and specifically the title with respect to 
within the periods specified.
  So, it is a limited one with respect to the overall subject--namely, 
a line-item veto for the President--but with respect to the general 
subject of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, it is 
definitely germane. With respect to ``within the period specified in 
the most recently adopted concurrent resolution'', that is what my 
amendment is amending so that budgets hereafter will be subject to that 
10-year rule.
  So on both points, I will ask the distinguished Senator from Arizona 
to reconsider and rejoin his Republican leadership of approximately a 
year ago.
  I again read from the document ``Fiscal Year 1995 Senate Budget 
Committee Republican Alternative'', prepared by the Republican staff of 
the U.S. Senate Budget Committee and presented last year by none other 
than the distinguished chairman of the Budget Committee, Senator 
Domenici of New Mexico.
  If we turn to the second-to-last page, it has ``Miscellaneous 
provisions.'' Fiscal year 1995 Republican budget resolution, 
``miscellaneous provisions,'' description and the first bullet there, 
``Strengthens the 10-year pay-as-you-go point of order while the 10-
year pay-as-you-go point of order that was established by last year's 
budget resolution is determined does not currently apply to budget 
resolutions and could be repealed by a subsequent budget resolution. 
This proposal would make future budget resolutions subject to this 
point of order.''
  They talk about partisanship. I am delighted to get bipartisan here 
today on not only the line-item veto, which I have been trying for 10 
years. It was a bipartisan initiative back in 1985, and was rightly 
quoted as such by the distinguished majority leader said earlier this 
week. He referred to the Hollings-Mattingly line-item veto, that we had 
a pretty good healthy vote on in 1985.
  Mr. President, let me also ask that the distinguished ranking member 
of our Budget Committee, the distinguished Senator from Nebraska, 
Senator Exon, also be added as a cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, with him being a cosponsor, I go back to 
that vote.
  We had the line-item veto up in the Budget Committee. My particular 
introduction of the line-item veto already in this session is now 
resting in the Rules Committee. I have had it before in the Budget 
Committee. In fact, I had a successful vote in 1990 of the line-item 
veto out of the Budget Committee by a vote of 13 to 6.
  Now, I want to one more time elaborate so it is clearly understood 
what is happening here with respect not only to the line-item veto and 
referring to future generations as the Senator from Arizona just 
previously did, but what we have done in order to try and secure the 
Social Security of future generations.
  Along this line, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have 
printed at this point a very short title of ``Off-Budget Status of 
OASDI Trust Funds,'' section 13301(b). I want to print this in the 
Record at this particular point.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                      Subtitle C--Social Security

     SEC. 13301. OFF-BUDGET STATUS OF OASDI TRUST FUNDS.

       (a) Exclusion of Social Security From All Budgets.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the receipts and 
     disbursements of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance 
     Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund 
     shall not be counted as new budget authority, outlays, 
     receipts, or deficit or surplus for purposes of--
       (1) the budget of the United States Government as submitted 
     by the President,
       (2) the congressional budget, or
       (3) the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 
     of 1985.
       (b) Exclusion of Social Security From Congressional 
     Budget.--Section 301(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974 is amended by adding at the end the following: ``The 
     concurrent resolution shall not include the outlays and 
     revenue totals of the old age, survivors, and disability 
     insurance program established under title II of the Social 
     Security Act or the related provisions of the Internal 
     Revenue Code of 1986 in the surplus or deficit totals 
     required by this subsection or in any
      other surplus or deficit totals required by this 
     title.''.\1831\


                                footnote

       \1831\The statement of managers accompanying the conference 
     report on the Budget Enforcement Act explains generally the 
     amendments made by subtitle C:


                    vi. treatment of social security

     Current law
       Under current law, the Social Security trust funds are off-
     budget but are included in deficit estimates and calculations 
     made for purposes of the sequestration process. However, 
     Social Security benefit payments are exempt from any 
     sequestration order.
       Section 310(g) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
     prohibits the consideration of reconciliation legislation 
     ``that contains recommendations'' with respect to Social 
     Security. (A motion to waive this point of order requires 60 
     votes in the Senate and a simple majority in the House.)
     House bill
       The House bill reaffirms the off-budget status of Social 
     Security and removes the trust funds--excluding interest 
     receipts--from the deficit estimates and calculations made in 
     the sequestration process. The House bill retains the current 
     law exemption of Social Security benefit payments from any 
     sequestration order.
       The House bill creates a ``fire wall'' point of order (as 
     free-standing legislation) to prohibit the consideration of 
     legislation that would change the actuarial balance of the 
     Social Security trust funds over a 5-year or 75-year period. 
     In the case of legislation decreasing Social Security 
     revenues, the prohibition would not apply if the legislation 
     also included an equivalent increase in Medicare taxes for 
     the period covered by the legislation.
     Senate amendment
       The Senate amendment also reaffirms the off-budget status 
     of Social Security and removes the trust funds from the 
     deficit estimates and calculations made in the sequestration 
     process. However, unlike the House bill, the Senate amendment 
     removes the gross trust fund transactions--including interest 
     receipts--from the sequestration deficit calculations. The 
     Senate amendment also retains the current law exemption of 
     Social Security benefit payments from any sequestration 
     order.
       The Senate amendment also creates a procedural fire wall to 
     protect Social Security financing, but does so by expanding 
     certain budget enforcement provisions of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974. The Senate amendment expands the 
     prohibition in Section 310(g) of the Budget Act to
      specifically protect Social Security financing, prohibits 
     the consideration of a reported budget resolution calling 
     for a reduction in Social Security surplus, and includes 
     Social Security in the enforcement procedures under 
     Sections 302 and 311 of the Budget Act. The Senate 
     amendment also requires the Secretary of Health and Human 
     Services to provide an actuarial analysis of any 
     legislation affecting Social Security, and generally 
     prohibits the consideration of legislation lacking such an 
     analysis.
       For more on the budgetary treatment of Social Security 
     under current law and historically, see Senate Comm. on the 
     Budget, Social Security Preservation Act, S. Rep. No. 101-
     426, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. (1990).
     Conference agreement
       The conference agreement incorporates the Senate position 
     on the budgetary treatment of the Social Security trust 
     funds, reaffirming their offbudget status and removing all 
     their transactions from the deficit estimates and 
     calculations made in the sequestration process.
       Further, the conference agreement provides that the ``fire 
     wall'' procedure proposed by the House shall apply only to 
     the House and that the ``fire wall'' procedures proposed by 
     the Senate shall apply only to the Senate.

     H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-964, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1160-61 
     (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374, 2865-66.
       For legislative history of the effort to remove Social 
     Security from the budget, see generally 136 Cong. Rec. 
     15,777-81 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990) (Senate debate on the 
     related amendment to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
     1990); Senate Comm. on the Budget, Social Security 
     Preservation Act, S. Rep. No. 101-426, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. 
     (1990); Congressional Research Serv., Social Security, 
     Medicare, and the Unified Budget, S. Print No. 83, 99th 
     Cong., 1 Sess. (Sen. 
     [[Page S4320]]  Comm. on Budget Print 1985); Concurrent 
     Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1989: Hearings 
     Before the Senate Comm. on the Budget, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 
     85-160 (1988) (S. Hrg. No. 578, Vol. III) (hearing March 24, 
     1988, on ``Social Security, Deficits, and the Baby Boomers' 
     Retirement''); Budget Reform Proposals: Joint Hearings Before 
     the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs & Comm. on the 
     Budget, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 30-42 (S. Hrg. No. 101-560) 
     (1989) (testimony of Sen. Heinz Oct. 18, 1989, on S. 1752); 
     129 Cong. Rec. S3587-603 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1983) (Heinz 
     amendment to remove Social Security trust funds from the 
     unified budget); 135 Cong. Rec. S15,137-47 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 
     1989) (statements of Sen. Heinz, Majority Leader Mitchell, 
     and others regarding scheduling of legislation regarding 
     Social Security); 136 Cong. Rec. S7935-6, S7949-50, S7956-59, 
     S7974-79 (daily ed. June 14, 1990) (same); 136 Cong. Rec. 
     S8153-56 (daily ed. June 18, 1990) (statement of Sen. Heinz 
     on his amendment requiring Congressional action on Social 
     Security before action on the debt limit); 136 Cong. Rec. 
     S8192-210 (daily ed. June 19, 1990) (debate on the Heinz 
     amendment); S. 2211, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 Cong. Rec. 
     S3038-39 (daily ed.
      Mar. 24, 1988) (Sen. Sanford); S. 2914, 100th Cong., 2d 
     Sess., 134 Cong. Rec. S16,889-95 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) 
     (Sen. Moynihan); S. 101, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. 
     Rec. S170, S425-29 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (Sen. 
     Sanford); S. 219, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. 
     S173, S636-37 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (Sen. Moynihan); 
     S. 240, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. S173, S682-
     84 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (Sen. Heinz); S. 401, 101st 
     Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. S1413, S1421-22 (daily 
     ed. Feb. 9, 1989) (Sen. Hollings); S. 852, 101st Cong., 
     1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. S4384, S4419 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 
     1989) (Sen. Bryan); S. 1752, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 
     Cong. Rec. S13,297, S13,299-300 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1989) 
     (Sen Heinz); S. 1785, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. 
     Rec. S13,893 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1989) (Sen. Moynihan); S. 
     1795, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. S14,129, 
     S14,137-38 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1989) (Sen. Hollings).
       For a general discussion of the removal of Social Security 
     from the budget and its consequences, see David Koitz, Social 
     Security: Its Removal from the Budget and Procedures for 
     Considering Changes to the Program (Jan. 4, 1993) (Cong. Res. 
     Serv. rep. no. 93-23 EPW).
       Some have argued that section 13301 conflicts with the 
     listing of discretionary accounts set forth in the joint 
     statement of managers accompanying the conference report on 
     the Budget Enforcement Act. See supra p. 466. In a letter to 
     the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the 
     Chairman of the Budget Committee argued that the 
     congressional intent is plain:
       ``I am writing to express my concern regarding a possible 
     interpretation of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 with 
     respect to the budgetary treatment of Social Security. I 
     understand that your Office is considering whether the 
     administrative expenses of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors 
     Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance 
     Trust Fund shall be counted in the deficit and as part of the 
     domestic discretionary caps for purposes of the Balanced 
     Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-
     Rudman-Hollings). I wish to express in the strongest terms my 
     view that these administrative expenses should not be 
     included in either the deficit or the domestic discretionary 
     cap for purposes of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.
       ``Section 13301(a) of the Budget Enforcement Act states:

                           *   *   *   *   *

       ``The all-inclusive breadth of this language could not be 
     more clear. The subsection heading speaks of `exclusion . . . 
     from all budgets.' The operative language is unambiguous: 
     `the receipts and disbursements . . . shall not be counted.' 
     Paragraph (3) specifically mentions the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
     law as one of the purposes for which Social Security must be 
     excluded.
       ``The joint statement of managers accompanying the 
     conference report
      on the legislation that includes the Budget Enforcement Act 
     similarly makes clear the intent of section 13301:
       ```The conference agreement incorporates the Senate 
     position on the budgetary treatment of the Social Security 
     trust funds, reaffirming their off-budget status and removing 
     all their transactions from the deficit estimates and 
     calculations made in the sequestration process.'

     H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-964, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1161 
     (1990)[,reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2865-66] 
     (emphasis added).
       ``I understand that it may be argued that statement of 
     managers language specifically includes references to the 
     Social Security trust funds as two account items in a 39-page 
     listing of accounts incorporated by reference in the 
     definition of the term `category' for purposes of the Gramm-
     Rudman-Hollings law. It would strain credulity to argue that 
     this reference overcomes the plain language of section 
     13301(a). Although I conceded that some conflict between 
     these two provisions may exist, that conflict must be 
     resolved in favor of implementing the intent of Congress as 
     evident in section 13301(a).
       ``The legislative intent to remove Social Security 
     completely from all budgets is clear. The language of section 
     13301 indicates that it must apply `[n]otwithstanding any 
     other provisions of law.' The Senate debated the removal of 
     Social Security at length. The Senate voted 98-2 in favor of 
     the amendment--sponsored by Senators Hollings, Heinz, and 
     Moynihan, among others--that specifically took Social 
     Security out of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings process. (See 136 
     Cong. Rec. 15,777-81 (Oct. 18, 1990).) Congressional 
     examination of the 39-page listing in the statement of 
     managers is nowhere evident in the debates.
       ``I urge you to follow section 13301(a) of the Budget 
     Enforcement Act and remove the Federal Old-Age and Survivors 
     Insurance and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds 
     from the budget in their entirety. I recommend that the 
     President use his authority under section 251(b)(1)(A) of the 
     Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law to recognize any adjustments to the 
     discretionary spending limits that such a position would 
     require as a change in a concept or definition. I believe 
     that this is the approach needed to ensure that all of Social 
     Security is taken off budget.''
     Letter from Sen. Jim Sesser to Richard G. Darman (Jan. 4, 
     1991).
       The acting general counsel of the Office of Management and 
     Budget replied to Chairman Sasser as follows:
       ``You expressed the view that the administrative costs of 
     the social security
      program should be excluded from the domestic discretionary 
     spending category.
       We recognize that the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
     (OBRA) contains a provision generally excluding the social 
     security trust funds from the budget as well as the Gramm-
     Rudman-Hollings Act. Social security was previously excluded 
     from the budget, but not from the deficit calculations under 
     the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (GRH).
       However, other provisions of OBRA specifically address 
     whether social security administrative expenses are included 
     in the domestic discretionary spending category. The portion 
     of the social security trust funds that are annually 
     appropriated as administrative expenses are specifically 
     identified in the list of domestic discretionary programs 
     that is part of the Joint Statement of Managers Accompanying 
     the Conference Report on OBRA. OBRA expressly provides that 
     discretionary appropriations in each of the three categories 
     ``shall be those so designated in the joint statement of 
     managers.'' Section 250(c)(4)(A) of GRH, as amended by OBRA. 
     Because of this express designation of social security 
     administrative expenses in the list of accounts that are 
     required to be included in the domestic discretionary 
     category identified in the law, we have concluded that the 
     expenses must be so included.
       While the OBRA provision excluding Social Security (section 
     13301(1)) applies as a general matter, it does not directly 
     conflict with the specific OBRA provisions directing the 
     treatment of one element of social security only for certain 
     purposes. For example, Section 13303 of OBRA specifically 
     requires that the congressional budget include social 
     security revenue and outlays for purposes of enforcement of 
     the Senate social security firewall points of order. This 
     specific provision should not be disregarded simply because 
     the general social security exclusion provision states that 
     social security outlays and receipts ``shall not be counted'' 
     for purposes of ``the congressional budget.'' Section 13301 
     (a). The name is true of the specific provision on 
     administrative expenses. Indeed, even if there were a direct 
     conflict between the general and specific provisions, the 
     result would be the same. It is a basic principle of 
     statutory construction that ``Where there is inescapable 
     conflict between general and specific terms or provisions of 
     a statute, the specific will prevail.'' 2A Sutherland, 
     Statutory Construction Sec. 46.05 at p. 92 (4th Ed.).
       The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) included social 
     security administrative expenses within the domestic 
     discretionary category in its Final Sequestration Report for 
     Fiscal Year 1991, issued on November 6, 1990. OMB did the 
     same in its Final OMB Sequester Report To The President and 
     Congress for Fiscal Year 1991, issued on November 9, 1990. 
     The Comptroller General of the United States, in his 
     statutorily required report on the extent to which the CBO 
     and OMB reports complied with law, issued December 10, 1990, 
     did not state that OMB or CBO failed to comply with OBRA or 
     committed any error by including social security 
     administrative expenses in the domestic discretionary 
     category. General Accounting Office, The Budget for Fiscal 
     Year 1991--Compliance with the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
     Deficit Control Act of 1985'' B-221498 (December 10, 1990).
       In view of the specific direction on the subject contained 
     in OBRA, OMB will continue to classify social security 
     program administrative expenses as within the domestic 
     discretionary spending category.''
     Letter from Robert G. Damus to Sen. Jim Sasser (Jan. 24, 
     1991).

  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chair.
  I will read the opening paragraph (b) here entitled ``Exclusion of 
Social Security From Congressional Budget.'' Let me repeat that: The 
law, the law itself, three readings in the House, three readings in the 
Senate, signed into law on November 5, 1990, by President George 
Herbert Walker Bush.
   [[Page S4321]] It passed in the Senate, incidentally, by a vote of 
98 to 2. And they talk about flip-floppers. Here is the law:

       Exclusion of Social Security from congressional budget. 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by adding the 
     following: ``The concurrent resolution shall not include the 
     outlay and revenue totals of the Old Age and Survivors 
     Disability Insurance established under title XXII of the 
     Social Security Act and related provisions of the Internal 
     Revenue Code.''

  In other words, not include as part of outlays and revenues.
  Along comes the constitutional amendment for a balanced budget, voted 
on in this body just a few weeks ago, and section 7 says:

       Total receipts shall include all receipts and shall include 
     all outlays of the United States Government.

  A positive, affirmative repeal of section 13301.
  Now you go right to how this comes out in the press. In Time 
magazine, in a summary at the conclusion of a cover article--a March 20 
copy, it said:

       So long as the crisis is not about to burst next month, 
     Democrats will see political profits in portraying any 
     proposal to change Social Security as a Republican conspiracy 
     to starve the poor and elderly. Republicans will think the 
     only defense is to swear eternal fealty to the system as it 
     is.

  They treat it as demagoguery. They treat it as just a political 
thing. Here is the cover article; never once do they cite section 
13301. They never once cite the law.
  When we passed those Social Security taxes back in 1983, it was 
definitely understood that we were not just balancing the Social 
Security budget, but the affirmative intent was to provide surpluses to 
make the Social Security fund fiscally sound into the middle of the 
next century.
  At a previous time, I inserted a letter from former Chairman Ball of 
the Social Security Commission. His letter said the Social Security 
fund is not in any fiscal trouble, it has surpluses, as it appears by 
the fund. But as it appears by the political treatment by the news 
media and by Members of this particular body and by President Clinton 
and the administration, it is a political slush fund.
  I quote the distinguished majority whip, the distinguished Senator 
from Mississippi, on ``Face the Nation,'' Senator Trent Lott said on 
February 5:

       Nobody, Republican, Democrat, conservative, liberal, 
     moderate is even thinking about using Social Security to 
     balance the budget.

  Do I have to invite him into the Republican caucuses so that he can 
understand what they are thinking because those thinkings are finally 
oozing out into the Record.
  On ``Larry King Live'' around that time, Senator Gramm said, and I 
quote:

       I think we ought to balance the budget counting Social 
     Security first, and then if we want to balance it without 
     counting it, do it second.

  So they are thinking about using it either first or second, according 
to the Senator from Texas.
  I quote again the distinguished chairman of the Budget Committee, 
Senator Domenici:

       You can't leave the biggest American program off budget.

  It is off budget. The law says it is off budget. Here is the leader 
of fiscal responsibility in the U.S. Senate in contradiction to the law 
saying you cannot leave it off budget when the law requires it be off 
budget.
  And then, of course, the distinguished Senator from Iowa, Senator 
Grassley:

       The leadership of the House of Representatives and the 
     Senate have promised not to touch the Social Security 
     retirement program for at least 5 years.

  Well, 5 years; that means maybe after that then, but they are 
thinking about Social Security.
  Or the distinguished Senator from Idaho, Senator Craig, and I quote:

       Without access to the Social Security surpluses, you would 
     create a much higher hurdle in trying to balance the budget.

  Mr. President, we are not talking about hurdles, we are talking about 
truth in budgeting. I remember the saying of Mark Twain. He said that 
truth was such a precious thing it should be used very sparingly.
  Is that the credo that we are going to use in the for budget laws in 
the U.S. Senate?
  Or the distinguished majority leader on February 5, Senator Dole:

       I also believe that we can't keep Social Security off the 
     table forever.

  Now, Mr. President, they are thinking about it. And, in fact, 
yesterday, Tuesday, March 21, reported on page A4 of the Washington 
Post, Senator Packwood, the chairman of the Finance Committee said:

       ``But in considering budgets,'' nothing is sacred, 
     including Social Security and other entitlement programs.''

  How do you do it? You can do as the Speaker of the House says: If we 
cannot get what we want out of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, we will 
give it to Treasury, we will give it to Federal Reserve, we will give 
it to somebody to get it right.
  One entity they are going to give it to get it right may be the new 
Director of the Congressional Budget Office. I do not have the exact 
quote here, but I know it is accurate. She said she could be using 
dynamic scoring when she has to. Ah, now you get in a CBO Director who 
uses dynamic scoring. Added to that, instead of a CPI of, let us say of 
4 percent, you get one of 2 percent. But what we should understand, Mr. 
President, is that any savings in Social Security from changing the CPI 
should be put back into the reserves, back into the trust fund.
  People say it is going to be difficult to really meet the target of 
reducing spending $1.2 trillion by the year 2002. But that, in and of 
itself, is an inaccurate figure because they are using Social Security 
moneys. To really balance the budget you need $1.7 trillion; saying 
otherwise means that you are contemplating using the surpluses that the 
trust funds will take in over the next 7 years.
  But let me get back to my amendment. You can well see that we are 
trying to get back to truth in budgeting under this particular 
Hollings-Kerrey-Exon amendment. It was endorsed last year by the 
Republican Members of the Budget Committee under the leadership of our 
distinguished chairman of the Budget Committee, Senator Domenici, when 
they included that in their Republican alternative.
  Now, it all of a sudden becomes untimely this year? I do not know 
what committees the distinguished Senator from Indiana is on, but you 
can bet your boots whatever committee, it has a 10-year rule. If you 
are on Agriculture, if you are on Interior, if you are on Banking, if 
you are on Commerce, if you are on Indian Affairs, wherever it is. The 
Finance Committee faced up to it with the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade; we had a 10-year rule that created a 60-vote point of order 
requirement on that vote.
  But for the budget resolution, you do not have to live under the 
restrictions of the 10-year rule. I am trying to get truth in 
budgeting. I am trying to get the very custodians of fiscal 
responsibility here to come under the same rules. The very first bill 
that we passed here in January was to make Congress comply with the 
laws that everybody else has to follow.
  It was a very good initiative. Well, why not follow the same logic? 
The 10-year rule promotes fiscal responsibility. It promotes truth in 
budgeting. Nevertheless, it was voted down in the Budget Committee on a 
partisan vote of 12 to 10 and Members come to the floor now to say, 
``Let's just go along with the Budget Committee.''
  Well, Mr. President, if we are going by that logic I should point out 
another amendment that I offered in the Budget Committee. In addition 
to the 10-year rule I offered a separate enrollment line-item veto, the 
very kind of measure now under consideration, but only got 4 votes, all 
from Democrats, in the Budget Committee. Under that logic, we would not 
be voting on the underlying bill.
  Let us not table. Let us adopt this amendment. Let us send it to the 
House and to the President for his signature. The President of the 
United States favors the line-item veto. I am sure that if he were 
asked whether he favors truth in budgeting, his answer would be 
``yes.'' Then let us give it to him.
  If you want to really get it done, let us not think and hide behind 
procedure and process. Let us get the truth in budgeting and make sure 
that the 10-year rule applies to the budget resolution as it applies to 
all other legislation.
  [[Page S4322]] I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I would like to use the remainder of my 
leader time for a statement unrelated to the pending legislation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right.
  The Democratic leader is recognized.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Daschle pertaining to the introduction of S. 588 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. FORD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky is recognized.

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