[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 50 (Friday, March 17, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4122-S4123]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


            RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES IN BOSNIA AND CROATIA

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to thank the able Senator from 
Arizona.
  Earlier this week, the administration announced that Croatia has 
agreed to allow U.N. peacekeeping troops to remain beyond the 
expiration of the U.N. mandate on March 31. If the United Nations had 
been forced to leave, fighting would probably have broken out between 
the Croatian Government and the Croation Serbs who control the Krajina 
region of Croatia. This would have reignited the conflict in Croatia, 
and it no doubt would have spread to Bosnia and the rest of the region.
  I have often been critical of the Clinton administration's inept 
diplomacy that has produced one foreign policy debacle after another. 
But in this case the administration deserves credit for persistence in 
a very difficult situation. I agree with Vice President Gore that the 
concession by Croatia's President Tudjman is ``* * * a major step away 
from war and toward peace.''
  We have narrowly averted disaster--for the moment. But let us not 
congratulate ourselves too warmly or prematurely. If we are not 
careful, this limited and temporary success may breed a high degree of 
complacency, and blind us to the larger, impending crisis in the 
Balkans. As always, we seem to be reacting only to the crisis 
immediately at hand, instead of thinking ahead. While we still have a 
few weeks or at most 2 months, we had better start preparing for what 
may happen in Bosnia. Failure to anticipate and prepare now could lead 
to disaster later on.
  We are facing two deadlines. The most urgent deadline of course is 
the expiration of the U.N. mandate in Croatia on March 31. For the 
moment the situation in Croatia appears under control, even though the 
underlying problem that led President Tudjman to request the United 
Nations departure in the first place has not been solved. That problem 
is a de facto division of the country. The Krajina region, nearly one-
third of the country, is under Serb control. Understandably the 
Croatian Government does not want to accept a
 partition that could harden into permanence. Although the continued 
U.N. presence in Croatia gives us some breathing space, it will not end 
Serbian domination of the Krajina or guarantee the end of conflict 
between Croatian forces and the Krajina Serbs. After all, there are 
plenty of U.N. troops in Bosnia, and they have not prevented fighting 
between the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serbs.

  The second looming deadline is May 1, the end of the temporary truce 
and current contact group negotiations in Bosnia. The present 
negotiations may be the last chance for a peaceful settlement. I hope 
and pray they are successful, but I fear this contact group effort may 
prove as fruitless as all the others. Furthermore, May marks the 
arrival of warm weather and the traditional resumption of military 
campaigns. If the people of this troubled region once again choose war 
over peace, we, in the Congress and the administration, are going to be 
faced with some very difficult choices. We had better start thinking 
dispassionately about those choices now, and not wait until we are 
overwhelmed by the passions of the conflict and terrible images of 
violence.
  If a general conflict erupts again across the region, the U.N. 
peacekeeping mission--UNPROFOR--could find itself in extreme danger. 
The administration has agreed to provide military assistance, including 
U.S. combat troops, to help cover the withdrawal of UNPROFOR if it 
should prove necessary. I have always opposed a general intervention in 
Bosnia with United States ground forces. But an UNPROFOR withdrawal is 
an entirely different situation. With the deepest reluctance I will 
support U.S. participation in a NATO mission to cover the withdrawal of 
UNPROFOR.
  The United States cannot stand idly by if U.N. troops from allied 
nations find themselves in mortal danger. The damage to U.S. 
leadership, honor, prestige, and credibility would be beyond 
calculation. Some will say that honor, prestige, and credibility are 
only words, empty words; that they are not worth the lives of young 
Americans who will have to go into the Balkans. It is true that leaders 
often misuse these words to manipulate public opinion on behalf of 
questionable causes. But they do have meaning, as ``justice'' and 
``liberty'' are words that have deep meaning, and are
 words that we live by. Credibility, prestige, and national honor are 
still essential components of national security, as they have always 
been. They are especially important if we are to exercise the moral 
leadership expected of the world's only superpower.

  If we want to remain secure in today's violent and chaotic world, we 
must never permit any doubts in the minds of friends or enemies that 
our word is good, or that we can be relied upon to stand with our 
allies, or that we will keep our commitments. The credibility that 
comes from demonstrated steadfastness of purpose is a key aspect of 
deterrence. It is an essential though intangible element of global 
power and of the necessary relations between states. A great nation 
cannot remain great very long without it.
  Therefore, I will support the participation of U.S. troops in such an 
operation, but only under certain conditions.
  First, it must be a NATO operation, totally under NATO command. Once 
our troops are committed on the ground and to potential combat, we 
cannot tolerate the so-called dual-key arrangement between the United 
Nations and NATO. This violates the most basic principle of sound 
military operations--unity of command. Unless the dual-key relationship 
is completely scrapped and replaced with clear lines of command and 
control under NATO, I will vigorously oppose U.S. participation in the 
withdrawal.
  This unified command authority must be established in advance. All 
governments with forces involved, and all UNPROFOR officers and NATO 
commanders at every level, must understand before the operation begins 
that NATO will be in charge, even in zones where the withdrawal proves 
peaceful.
  Second, the rules of engagement must not place any limitations on the 
use of force to protect the withdrawal. It must be clear to all parties 
to the conflict that we will not tolerate any attacks on NATO or on 
UNPROFOR. Any attack must be met with massive, overwhelming force; and 
not merely on the attacking forces, but on the offending party's 
military and logistical capabilities wherever they may be hit.
  We must also remember that while the Serbs are the primary aggressors 
and have committed the most atrocities, none of the parties in this 
conflict have clean hands. NATO and U.S. ground commanders must be 
alert to provocations from all sides. They
 must anticipate and respond appropriately to attacks from one party 
intended to blame another, and be careful not to retaliate against the 
wrong party.

  Third, the scope and duration of the withdrawal must be limited. I do 
not advocate a date certain for ending it. It must end promptly when 
all UNPROFOR and NATO troops are safely out. We must be especially 
careful not to allow the withdrawal mission to be transformed at some 
point into peace enforcement or a broadened combat mission that results 
in a general, prolonged engagement with Serbs, Croats, or Bosnians--as 
we learned to our great cost in Somalia.
  Fourth, we need to make it abundantly clear that a U.S./NATO rescue 
mission is not a blank check to the United Nations for the future. I 
believe the United Nations and our allies have been too eager to commit 
to dubious peace operations. The Bosnian dilemma is a result of such 
ill-conceived policies. The United States cannot rush to the rescue 
every time our allies find themselves in a tight corner because they 
did not consider the consequences of a misguided peace operation in 
advance, or took our help for granted. Our diplomacy and statecraft 
must make sure we are not faced with such a terrible choice ever again.
  The diplomatic success in Croatia has bought us some time. Let us use 
it wisely, and make sure the Congress and the administration are 
working together to face whatever crisis may come in the Balkans. Above 
all, let us use it to prepare the American people 
[[Page S4123]] for the possibility that our soldiers may have to go 
into combat to rescue our allies; and that may not be without risk.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant to the unanimous-consent agreement, 
the Senator from North Dakota is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. CONRAD. I thank the Chair. I think there was actually 10 minutes 
provided for me under the order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota is recognized 
for 10 minutes.

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