[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 49 (Thursday, March 16, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4050-S4074]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


       EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS AND RESCISSIONS ACT

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.


                           Amendment No. 340

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. PELL. I think the arguments have been pretty well outlined here. 
I am prepared to vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 340) was agreed to.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. D'AMATO. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. D'AMATO. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DOLE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.


                   Agreed Framework with North Korea

  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, during the first hearing of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, which I chair, back on January 10 of this year, 
I expressed a concern about what was happening with the arrangements 
between the United States and North Korea on the deal where North Korea 
would have a 5-year window without inspection of used fuel rods, which 
is the best way on an inspection line of determining what is happening 
with respect to the potential for North Korea to build a nuclear 
weapon.
  During the course of the next several weeks, and in discussions with 
a number of my colleagues, it seemed to me preferable to have that so-
called agreement, the United States-North Korea agreed framework for 
resolving the nuclear issue, submitted to the United States Senate for 
ratification, because it really was, in effect, a treaty even though 
the administration had denominated it as an agreed framework, not even, 
according to the administration, rising to the level of an executive 
agreement which would activate certain congressional review.
  On February 24, I prepared a letter, which was submitted under the 
signatures of Senator Helms, in his capacity as chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee; Senator Murkowski, in his capacity as the chairman 
of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee; and myself, as chairman 
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to Senator Dole setting 
forth our request that the Senate handle as a treaty under the 
constitutional ratification process the United States-Democratic 
Peoples Republic of Korea Agreed Framework for Resolving the Nuclear 
Issue.
  The letter set forth that the Clinton administration was seeking to 
proceed under this so-called agreed framework without submitting it as 
a treaty, which it really was, for Senate ratification.
  We submitted at that time to Senator Dole a legal memorandum prepared 
by the Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, dated 
February 8, 1995, which set forth the criteria for considering whether 
an arrangement was a treaty.
  In our letter, we noted that, while the memorandum specifies that 
``there are no `hard and fast rules,' we believe the underlying 
rationale suggests that the agreement should be handled as a treaty 
because it is a matter of great importance (involving North Korea's 
potential for developing nuclear weapons),'' that the document 
``constitutes a substantial commitment of funds extending beyond a 
fiscal year and is of substantial political significance,'' all of 
which were criteria for an evaluation as to whether the arrangement was 
in fact a treaty.
  We concluded our letter to Senator Dole noting that ``The formal 
treaty ratification process will enable us''--that is, the Senate--``to 
undertake a detailed factual analysis to determine whether this 
agreement is in the national interest.''
   [[Page S4051]] Madam President, it is my view that, on both 
substantive grounds and constitutional grounds, this matter ought to be 
handled as a treaty.
  The Constitution of the United States provides for ratification by 
the Senate on treaties. There are a whole series of criteria, some of 
which I have just referred to, which indicate, suggest, provide 
evidence for the conclusion that this agreed framework is in fact a 
treaty.
  If you take a look at some of the items which we have handled as 
treaties in the Senate through the treaty ratification process, you 
will note the great difference between the importance of this United 
States-North Korean arrangement, contrasted with other matters which 
have been submitted to the full Senate ratification process. For 
example, Treaty 102-7, which is a Convention for the Prohibition of 
Fishing with Long Drift Nets in the South Pacific; or Treaty Document 
Exhibit EE 96-1, an International Convention on Standards of Training 
Certification and Watch Keeping for Seafarers; or Treaty Document 100-
7, Agreement for Medium Frequency Broadcasting Service in Region Number 
II; or Treaty Document No. 101-15, Amendments to the 1928 Convention 
Concerning International Expositions, as Amended.
  On some occasions, as is well known, in the Senate, we handle as many 
as six treaties at one time in a single vote, with notification being 
given to Senators that if they miss that one vote, it will be counted 
as a half dozen absences, because the treaties do not rise to the level 
of any individual identification or individual voting, but are very, 
very much pro forma.
  So that it is indeed surprising, when a matter comes before the 
international forum and is the subject of a document between North 
Korea and the United States, that it is denominated only as an agreed 
framework for resolving the nuclear issues.
  Following receipt of our letter, Senator Dole, by letter dated March 
10, wrote to Secretary of State Christopher asking a series of specific 
questions which set out the criteria for determining whether or not 
such a matter is or is not a treaty.
  It had been my intention to offer a sense-of-the-Senate resolution 
early on as soon as a legislative vehicle arose. I had notified the 
managers of this legislation that I would be offering that sense-of-
the-Senate resolution at this time. But I have decided to defer doing 
that because Senator Dole's letter, dated March 10, 1995, is now 
outstanding and, as of this date, March 16, there has not been an 
adequate opportunity for the Secretary of State to respond to the 
majority leader's letter.
  I make the statement at this time to put the administration on notice 
that it is my intention--and there are a number of cosponsors who are 
prepared to join with me on this important matter, including the 
distinguished Senator from Texas who is the Presiding Officer, was 
asked a series of questions in closed session before the Intelligence 
Committee on this matter. I state for the Record because the camera may 
have been on me rather than her, and might have missed her acquiescing 
nods.
  There are a number of colleagues who agree with the seriousness of 
this matter. In dealing with North Korea, while it is my hope that they 
will abide by the international commitments, there is good reason for 
concern as to whether they will abide by their commitments.
  Nobody said it better than President Reagan when he made the comment 
about trust but verify. There is a chronology on North Korea's 
activities which raises very, very, considerable grounds for concern as 
to whether North Korea will, in fact, comply with their commitments 
under this statement of agreed principles.
  Madam President, at this time I ask unanimous consent that the text 
of the United States-North Korea Agreed Framework for Resolving the 
Nuclear Issue be printed in the Record except as to a confidential part 
which cannot be disclosed publicly at this time; that a copy of the 
legal memorandum from the Congressional Research Service, dated 
February 8, 1995, be printed in the Record; that a copy of the joint 
letter submitted by Senators Helms, Murkowski, and myself, be printed 
in the Record; as well as an unclassified document prepared by the 
State Department on the North Korea nuclear timeline, showing many 
actions by the North Koreans which raise real issue as to whether there 
has been compliance by North Korea, and raising real issues as to what 
might be expected in the future.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework for Resolving the Nuclear Issue

       The attached package includes: (1) the Agreed Framework 
     between the U.S. and the DPRK, signed October 21, 1994, in 
     Geneva; (2) a Confidential Minute, signed the same day, which 
     should be treated as confidential for classification 
     purposes; and (3) a letter of assurance from President 
     Clinton to the DPRK's Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-II, which was 
     delivered in Geneva in connection with the signing. These 
     documents create a framework of political decisions and 
     practical actions to be taken by each side in order to 
     resolve the nuclear issue in North Korea.
                                                                    ____

     Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the 
    Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Geneva, October 21, 1995

       Delegations of the Governments of the United States of 
     America (U.S.) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
     (DPRK) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 21, 
     1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue 
     on the Korean Peninsula.
       Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the 
     objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 Agreed Statement 
     between the U.S. and the DPRK and upholding the principles of 
     the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the U.S. and the DPRK to 
     achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean 
     peninsula. The U.S. and the DPRK decided to take the 
     following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:
       I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's 
     graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with 
     light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.
       (1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of 
     assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S. will undertake to 
     make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR 
     project with a total generating capacity of approximately 
     2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 2003.
       The U.S. will organize under its leadership an 
     international consortium to finance and supply the LWR 
     project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing 
     the international consortium, will serve as the principal 
     point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.
       The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best 
     efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with 
     the DPRK within six months of the date of this Document for 
     the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin 
     as soon as possible after the date of this Document.
       As necessary, the U.S. and the DPRK will conclude a 
     bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful 
     uses of nuclear energy.
       (2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of 
     assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S., representing the 
     consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy 
     foregone due to the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated 
     reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the 
     first LWR unit.
       Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy 
     oil for heating and electricity production.
       Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of 
     the date of this Document and will reach a rate of 500,000 
     tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of 
     deliveries.
       (3) Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of 
     LWR's and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, 
     the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and 
     related facilities and will eventually dismantle these 
     reactors and related facilities.
       The freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and 
     related facilities will be fully implemented within one month 
     of the date of this Document. During this one-month period, 
     and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the 
     DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this 
     purpose.
       Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and 
     related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is 
     completed.
       The U.S. and the DPRK will cooperate in finding a method to 
     store safely the spend fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental 
     reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to 
     dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve 
     reprocessing in the DPRK.
       (4) As soon as possible after the date of this document 
     U.S. and DPRK experts will hold two sets of experts talks.
       At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to 
     alternative energy and the replacement of the graphite-
     moderated reactor program with the LWR project.
       At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific 
     arrangements for spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.
       [[Page S4052]] II. The two sides will move toward full 
     normalization of political and economic relations.
       (1) Within three months of the date of this Document, both 
     sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including 
     restrictions on telecommunications services and financial 
     transactions.
       (2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's 
     capital following resolution of consular and other technical 
     issues through expert level discussions.
       (3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, 
     the U.S. and the DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the 
     Ambassadorial level.
       III. Both sides will work together for peace and security 
     on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
       (1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, 
     against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.
       (2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the 
     North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the 
     Korean Peninsula.
       (3) The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this 
     Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes 
     such dialogue.
       IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the 
     international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
       (1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow 
     implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.
       (2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the 
     provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections 
     will resume under the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the 
     IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the 
     freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, 
     inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of 
     safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the 
     freeze.
       (3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is 
     completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the 
     DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards 
     agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all 
     steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following 
     consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the 
     accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all 
     nuclear material in the DPRK.
     Robert L. Gallucci,
         Head of the Delegation of the United States of America, 
           Ambassador at Large of the United States of America.
     Kang Sok Ju,
         Head of the Delegation of the Democratic People's 
           Republic of Korea, First Vice-Minister of Foreign 
           Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
                                                                    ____

                                              The White House,

                                     Washington, October 20, 1994.
     His Excellency Kim Jong Il,
     Supreme Leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
         Pyongyang.
       Excellency: I wish to confirm to you that I will use the 
     full powers of my office to facilitate arrangements for the 
     financing and construction of a light-water nuclear power 
     reactor project within the DPRK, and the funding and 
     implementation of interim energy alternatives for the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea pending completion of 
     the first reactor unit of the light-water reactor project. In 
     addition, in the event that this reactor project is not 
     completed for reasons beyond the control of the DPRK, I will 
     use the full powers of my office to provide, to the extent 
     necessary, such a project from the United States, subject to 
     approval of the U.S. Congress. Similarly, in the event that 
     the interim energy alternatives are not provided for reasons 
     beyond the control of the DPRK, I will use the full powers of 
     my office to provide, to the extent necessary, such interim 
     energy alternatives from the United States, subject to the 
     approval of the U.S. Congress.
       I will follow this course of action so long as the DPRK 
     continues to implement the policies described in the Agreed 
     Framework Between the United States of America and the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
           Sincerely,
     Bill Clinton.
                                                                    ____

                                   Congressional Research Service,


                                      The Library of Congress,

                                 Washington, DC, February 8, 1995.
     To: Charles Battaglia, staff director, Senate Select 
         Committee on Intelligence.
     From: Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist in Separation of 
         Powers.
     Subject: Agreed Framework with North Korea.
       This memorandum responds to your request for an analysis of 
     certain issues that have surfaced in the U.S.-DPRK Agreed 
     Framework for Resolving the Nuclear Issue. Among the issues: 
     (1) this agreement was entered into as a ``political 
     agreement'' rather than an ``executive agreement,'' which 
     would have to be reported to Congress under the Case Act; 
     what are the precedents for this type of political 
     agreement?; (2) should this agreement have been entered into 
     as a treaty rather than as a political agreement?; (3) what 
     is the legally binding effect of the economic commitments in 
     this agreement?; (4) does the current funding of this 
     commitment, especially through the reprogramming process, 
     encroach upon congressional prerogatives over the purse?; (5) 
     what are possible legislative responses by Congress to this 
     agreement?


            executive reports to congress under the case act

       Hearings by the Symington Subcommittee (of the Senate 
     Foreign Relations Committee) in 1969 and 1970 uncovered a 
     number of secret executive agreements that administrations 
     had made with South Korea, Thailand, Laos, Ethiopia, and 
     Spain, among others. In response, Congress passed legislation 
     in 1972 to keep itself informed about such agreements. The 
     statute, known as the Case Act, requires the Secretary of 
     State to transmit to Congress within sixty days the text of 
     ``any international agreement, other than a treaty,'' to 
     which the United States is a party. If the President decides 
     that publication of an agreement would be prejudicial to 
     national security, he may transmit it to the Senate Foreign 
     Relations Committee and the House International Relations 
     Committee under an injunction of secrecy removable only by 
     the President. 86 Stat. 619 (1972), 1 U.S.C. 112b (1988). 
     Although the Case Act was broadly written to capture all 
     international agreements, State Department regulations and 
     subsequent administration practices have created a number of 
     exceptions to the general requirement to report executive 
     agreements to Congress.
                       exceptions to the case act

       During consideration of the Case Act, executive officials 
     in the Nixon administration suggested that ``certain kinds of 
     agreements'' might not be transmitted under the Act. Senator 
     Clifford Case sought a written statement from the State 
     Department as to whether there were any categories of 
     agreements that might not be covered by the statute. The 
     State Department's Acting Legal Adviser, Charles N. Brower, 
     prepared a memo stating that the Case Act is intended to 
     include ``every international agreement, other than a treaty, 
     brought into force with respect to the United States after 
     August 22, 1972 [enactment date for Case Act], regardless of 
     its form, name or designation, or subject matter.''\1\
       In subsequent years, however, certain types of 
     international agreements were not submitted to Congress under 
     the Case Act. In 1976, the Legal Adviser to the State 
     Department wrote to Senator John Sparkman, chairman of the 
     Foreign Relations Committee, recommending that only the 
     international agreements entered into by the Agency for 
     International Development at a level of at least $1 million 
     would be submitted under the Case Act. AID agreements less 
     than $1 million would be reported under the Case Act if they 
     were ``significant for reasons other than level of funding.'' 
     The dollar threshold was later raised to $25 million.\2\
       Moreover, agreements concluded in a ``non-binding'' form 
     and determined by the executive branch to be legally non-
     binding on the United States are not referred to Congress 
     under the Case Act, although the executive branch may 
     voluntarily provide information about them to Congress. Non-
     binding international agreements are viewed as involving 
     political or moral obligations but not legal obligations. One 
     example is the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security 
     and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), known as the Helsinki 
     Agreement.\3\
       Regulations issued by the State Department to implement the 
     Case Act identify political agreements as outside the 
     reporting requirements of the statute. Parties to an 
     international agreement ``must intend their undertaking to be 
     legally binding, and not merely of political or personal 
     effect. Documents intended to have political or moral weight, 
     but not intended to be legally binding, are not international 
     agreements.'' 22 CFR Sec. 181.2 (1994). However,
      these regulations also state that examples of arrangements 
     that ``may constitute international agreements'' are 
     agreements that:
       (i) Are of political significance;
       (ii) involve substantial grants of funds or loans by the 
     United States or credits payable to the United States;
       (iii) constitute a substantial commitment of funds that 
     extends beyond a fiscal year or would be a basis for 
     requesting new appropriations;
       (iv) involve continuing and/or substantial cooperation in 
     the conduct of a particular program or activity, such as 
     scientific, technical, or other cooperation, including the 
     exchange or receipt of information and its treatment, or the 
     pooling of data. 22 CFR Sec. 181.2(2).
       Another group of international agreements not reported 
     under the Case Act are those that the State Department views 
     as contracts--usually commercial in nature and involving 
     sales or loans. As a result of the State Department's 
     interpretation of a provision in the Food, Agriculture, 
     Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, international agreements 
     entered into by the Secretary of Agriculture for financing 
     the sale and exportation of agricultural commodities are not 
     reported under the Case Act either.\4\


          should this agreement have been submitted as treaty?

       Although the State Department provides guidelines on what 
     should be transmitted to Congress as an executive agreement, 
     a bill, or a treaty, there are no hard and fast rules. This 
     issue arose last year with the GATT bill.\5\ Constitutional 
     scholars offered different views on whether that should have 
     been submitted as a bill or a treaty. On October 18, 1994, 
     hearings were held by the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
     Science, and 
     [[Page S4053]] Transportation, with Professor Bruce Ackerman 
     testifying in favor of Congress acting on the bill through 
     the regular legislative process, and Professor Laurence Tribe 
     testifying in favor of the Senate acting through the treaty 
     process. Professor Tribe later wrote that he could not say 
     ``with certainty that my prior conclusions should necessarily 
     be adopted by others or are ones to which I will adhere in 
     the end after giving the matter the further thought that it 
     deserves.''
       No clear guidelines are available from parliamentary 
     practice or federal court decisions on the issue of whether 
     to submit international matters in bill form or as a treaty. 
     The enclosed CRS report, ``GATT and Other Trade Agreements: 
     Congressional Action by Statute or by Treaty?, by Louis 
     Fisher, November 17, 1994, summarizes the basic issues. Also 
     included in this report are criteria offered by the State 
     Department to distinguish between what should be submitted as 
     a bill or as a treaty. The decision to submit a matter in 
     treaty form depends on the President's judgment. Congress can 
     apply political pressure and retaliate in other ways, but the 
     basic call remains presidential.
       In his statement on December 1, 1994, to the Senate Foreign 
     Relations Committee, Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci said that 
     the administration did not submit the Agreed Framework as a 
     treaty because ``we would not have been able to bind 
     ourselves legally to the delivery of that $4 billion project 
     [for light water reactors].'' That is not a full answer. If 
     an administration decides that it cannot make a unilateral 
     commitment and must depend on Congress, there is no reason 
     why it cannot submit a treaty that makes clear that the 
     extent of the assistance promised depends on Congress through 
     its authorization and appropriation processes. That 
     understanding has been incorporated in previous treaties.


              economic commitments in the agreed framework

       The Agreed Framework, signed October 21, 1994, offers 
     assistance in replacing the DPRK's graphite-moderated 
     reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor 
     (LWR) power plants. The United States will organize an 
     international consortium to finance and supply the LWR 
     project and provide alternative energy in the form of heavy 
     oil for heating and electricity production. Delivery of heavy 
     oil is scheduled to begin within three months of the date of 
     the document and reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually. Upon 
     receipt of ``U.S. assurances'' (emphasis supplied) for the 
     provision of LWR's and for arrangement for interim energy 
     alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated 
     reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle 
     these reactors and related facilities. The Framework also 
     provides that the United States and the DPRK will cooperate 
     in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 
     graphite-moderated reactors. Although some of the financial 
     commitments depend on organizing an international consortium 
     and securing financial support from other governments, 
     several of the key commitments--including U.S. assurances to 
     provide for LWR's and for arranging interim energy 
     alternatives, as well as disposing of spent fuel--fall 
     exclusively on the United States. The United States expects 
     to fully bear the cost of storing and disposing of spent 
     fuel.
       In his letter of October 20, 1994, to DPRK President Kim 
     Jong II, President Clinton confirmed that he would use ``the 
     full powers of my office'' to facilitate arrangements for the 
     financing and construction of a light-water nuclear power 
     reactor project within the DPRK and the funding and
      implementation of interim energy alternatives pending 
     completion of the first reactor unit of the light-water 
     reactor project. In addition, if the reactor project was 
     not completed for reasons beyond the control of the DPRK, 
     President Clinton would use ``the full powers of my 
     office'' to provide, to the extent necessary, such a 
     project from the United States, ``subject to approval of 
     the U.S. Congress. Furthermore, in the event the interim 
     energy alternatives are not provided, for reasons beyond 
     the control of the DPRK, President Clinton promised to use 
     ``the full powers of my office'' to provide, to the extent 
     necessary, such interim energy alternatives from the 
     United States, ``subject to the approval of the U.S. 
     Congress.''
       As explained in President Clinton's message, the effect of 
     the Agreed Framework is to make political and moral, not 
     legal, commitments. In his statement to the Senate Foreign 
     Relations Committee, Ambassador Gallucci explained that the 
     administration decided to call the agreement an ``Agreed 
     Framework'' because it ``did not want to take on the 
     obligation of providing a light water reactor or two light 
     water reactors, to be precise.'' To the extent that 
     completion of the light-water nuclear reactor project or 
     supplying interim energy alternatives depend on congressional 
     action, Congress must provide approval through its 
     authorization and appropriation processes. Absent statutory 
     authority, President Clinton has no independent 
     constitutional power to provide that assistance, although his 
     political and moral commitment puts pressure on Congress to 
     act in a supportive manner through the statutory process.


      does the framework encroach upon congressional prerogatives?

       According to the statement by Ambassador Gallucci to the 
     Senate Foreign Relations Committee, initial implementation of 
     the Agreed Framework resulted in the United States in the 
     first three months providing 50,000 tons of heavy oil at a 
     cost of between $5 million and $6 million, and there ``will 
     be heavy oil shipments, up to 100,000 tons, by the end of 
     October 21, 1995.'' Ambassador Gallucci testified that the 
     Defense Department can provide the initial assistance of $5 
     million to $6 million ``under existing authorities.'' We do 
     not have the specific legal authorities referred to by 
     Ambassador Gallucci, but legislation governing DOD activities 
     and funding expenditures does not include restrictions 
     regarding North Korea. Section 127 of Title 10, however, 
     authorizes the Secretary of Defense, secretaries of a 
     military department, and the DOD Inspector General, to 
     ``provide for any emergency or extraordinary expense which 
     cannot be anticipated or classified.'' The amounts available 
     for expenditure are subject to limitations in appropriations 
     acts and must be reported to Congress quarterly. The Defense 
     Department Appropriation, 1995 (P.L. 103-335), includes the 
     following amounts out of operation and maintenance accounts 
     for such emergencies: Secretary of Defense, $23.768 million 
     Army, $14.437 million; Navy/Marines, $4.301 million; and Air 
     Force, $8.762 million.
       With regard to the need to clarify the water in which spent 
     fuel is placed, Ambassador Gallucci testified that the 
     Department of Energy estimates the cost to be a ``couple of 
     hundred thousand dollars [and] is something they can do 
     before the end of this year and really ought to for safety 
     reasons.'' Again, we have no information regarding the legal 
     authorities available to the Energy Department to perform 
     this work. Ambassador Gallucci discussed other activities by 
     the Energy Department, including the recontainment or 
     recanning of the fuel, which ``could take some millions of 
     dollars, less than $10 million, maybe more than $5 million--
     in that range. This would involve a reprogramming and they 
     would follow the normal practice of coming to the Congress 
     for confirmation of reprogramming authority. This would 
     happen after January 1.''
       It is unclear from this statement whether the 
     administration would simply be notifying designated 
     committees about the reprogramming or seeking their prior 
     approval. Nor is it clear whether the administration's 
     initial funding commitments are authorized by law. At this 
     point we have no citations to examine that issue. There are 
     other questions about the statutory authorities that might be 
     invoked to fulfill the initial funding commitment. If the 
     administration tapped a general contingency fund to provide 
     this initial assistance to North Korea, there may be adequate 
     authority in allocating emergency funds to do so. But if it 
     is a case of Congress appropriating funds with the 
     expectation that they will be used for a specific purpose, as 
     justified in agency budget requests, there is a substantial 
     issue of the administration reallocating those funds to a 
     purpose never justified to Congress. Ambassador Gallucci 
     testified that the administration expects ``the $4 billion 
     burden [for light water reactors] to be borne centrally by 
     South Korea, and this we understand.''


             Legislative responses to the agreed framework

       The Senate could respond to the Agreed Framework by 
     insisting, either through political pressure or a Senate 
     resolution, that it be submitted as a treaty and made subject 
     to full legislative debate. Whether Senators want to be in a 
     position of having to approve, reject, or amend the 
     administration's agreement is a question they need to decide 
     individually. Some Senators may decide that it is better for 
     the President to make non-binding promises, with the 
     understanding by all nations that under our constitutional 
     system it is Congress, not the President, that has the power 
     of the purse. To the extent that the President has acted 
     unilaterally and finds himself politically isolated, that 
     presently is the administration's problem, not Congress's. In 
     any case, the decision to submit the matter by treaty is in 
     the hands of the President.
       Because of the funding implications and the need to obtain 
     appropriations from both chambers, if legislative action is 
     required it may be more appropriate to act by bill or joint 
     resolution. If Congress decides that it does not want to act 
     at this time by treaty or by bill, it could adopt non-binding 
     simple or concurrent resolutions to enunciate the policy and 
     constitutional concerns at stake for Congress as an 
     institution, many of which have been identified above.
       I trust that this memorandum is helpful to you. If I can be 
     of any further assistance, please contact me at 7-8676.


                               footnotes

     \1\Treaties and Other International Agreements. The Role of 
     the United States Senate, a Study Prepared for the Senate 
     Committee on Foreign Relations by the Congressional Research 
     Service, S. Prt. 103-53, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (November 
     1993)
     \2\Id. at 181.
     \3\Id. at 190.
     \4\Id. at 192.
     \5\The GATT bill differs from the dispute over the Agreed 
     Framework. In the case of GATT, Congress had authorized the 
     use of the regular legislative process (action by both Houses 
     on a bill) and had extended this authority for completion of 
     the Uruguay Round.
                                   [[Page S4054]] U.S. Senate,

                                Washington, DC, February 24, 1995.
     Hon. Robert Dole,
     Majority Leader,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Bob: We request that the Senate handle as a treaty 
     under the constitutional ratification process the U.S.-
     Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea Agreed Framework for 
     Resolving the Nuclear Issue.
       The Clinton Administration is seeking to proceed on this 
     agreement without submitting it for Senate ratification.
       For your review, we enclose a memorandum from the 
     Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 
     dated February 8, 1995.
       While the memorandum notes that there are ``no hard and 
     fast rules,'' we believe the underlying rationale suggests 
     that the agreement should be handled as a treaty because it 
     is a matter of great importance (involving North Korea's 
     potential for developing nuclear weapons), constitutes a 
     substantial commitment of funds extending beyond a fiscal 
     year and is of substantial political significance.
       The formal treaty ratification process will enable us to 
     undertake a detailed factual analysis to determine whether 
     this agreement is in the national interest.
           Sincerely,
     Arlen Specter,
                                                         Chairman,
                                 Select Committee On Intelligence.
     Frank H. Murkowski,
                                                         Chairman,
                           Energy and Natural Resources Committee.
     Jesse Helms,
                                                         Chairman,
                                      Foreign Relations Committee.
       Enclosure
                      North Korea Nuclear Timeline


                              early 1980's

       North Korea begins construction of 5 MW reactor in 
     Yongbyon.


                                  1985

       Dec.--North Korea signs the NPT.


                                  1986

       Jan.--5 MW reactor begins operations.


                                  1988

       Dec.--First U.S.-DPRK official contacts in Beijing.


                                  1989

       Spring--Extended outage of 5 MW reactor.


                                  1991

       May--North Korea joins the United Nations.
       Sept.--U.S. announces intention to redeploy tactical 
     nuclear weapons worldwide.
       Dec.--North-South finalize non-aggression agreement and 
     North-South Denuclear- 
     ization Declaration.


                                  1992

       Jan.--ROK announces suspension of Team Spirit '92.
       North Korea signs IAEA fullscope safeguards agreement.
       U.S.-DPRK high-level talks (U/S Kanter in New York).
       Mar.--North-South set up Joint Nuclear Control Committee 
     for implementing the Denuclearization Declaration.
       Apr. 10--North Korea Supreme People's Assembly ratifies 
     IAEA safeguards agreement.
       May 4--DPRK submits initial inventory of nuclear material.
       First IAEA ad hoc inspection.
       July--Second IAEA ad hoc inspection; first evidence of 
     ``inconsistencies.''
       Sept.--Third IAEA ad hoc inspection.
       Oct.--U.S. and ROK announce Team Spirit.
       Nov.--Fourth IAEA ad hoc inspection.
       High-level IAEA-DPRK consultations in Vienna on 
     discrepancies; IAEA requests ``visits to two suspect waste 
     sites.''
       Dec.--Fifth IAEA ad hoc inspection.


                                  1993

       Jan.--IAEA team travels to Pyongyang to discuss 
     discrepancies in DPRK declaration.
       Sixth IAEA ad hoc inspection.
       Feb. 9--IAEA requests special inspection of the two suspect 
     sites.
       Feb. 20--Further DPRK-IAEA consultations, DPRK rejects 
     special inspections.
       Feb. 25--IAEA Board of Governors passes resolution calling 
     for the DPRK to accept special inspections within one month.
       Mar. 12--North Korea announces its intention to withdraw 
     from the NPT.
       Mar. 18--Special Board meeting passes a second resolution 
     calling on the DPRK to accept special inspections by March 
     31.
       Apr. 1--IAEA Board of Governors adopts resolution finding 
     the DPRK in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations; 
     reports to UNSC.
       May 11--United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 
     825. It calls upon the DPRK to comply with its safeguards 
     agreement as specified in the February 25 IAEA resolution, 
     requests the Director General to continue to consult with the 
     DPRK, and urges Member States to encourage a resolution.
       May--IAEA inspectors allowed into Yongbyon to perform the 
     necessary work relating to safeguards monitoring equipment.
       June 11--U.S.-DPRK high-level talks in New York; in a joint 
     statement, the DPRK agrees to suspend its withdrawal from the 
     NPT and agrees to the principle of ``impartial application'' 
     of IAEA safeguards. We told the DPRK that if our dialogue was 
     to
      continue they must accept IAEA inspections to ensure the 
     continuity of safeguards, forego reprocessing, and allow 
     IAEA presence when refueling the 5MW reactor.
       July--U.S.-DPRK high-level talks in Geneva; DPRK agrees to 
     resume discussion with the ROK and the IAEA on the nuclear 
     issue, U.S. agrees to in principle to support DPRK conversion 
     to Light Water Reactors.
       Aug.--IAEA inspectors allowed into Yongbyon to service 
     safeguards monitoring equipment but, incomplete access to 
     reprocessing plant.
       U.S.-DPRK working-level talks in NY begin.
       Sept. 1-3--IAEA consultations with DPRK in North Korea on 
     impartial application of safeguards.
       Oct. 1--IAEA Geneva Conference meeting adopts resolution 
     urging the DPRK to fully implement safeguards.
       Nov. 1--United Nations General Assembly adopts a resolution 
     expressing grave concern that the DPRK has failed to 
     discharge its safeguards obligations and has widened the area 
     of non-compliance. It also urges the DPRK to cooperate 
     immediately with the IAEA in the full implementation of its 
     safeguards agreement.
       Nov. 14--DPRK withdrawal suspends North-South talks.
       Dec.--U.S. Commander in Chief, U.S. forces Korea, General 
     Luck, requests Patriot Missile Battalion to counter North 
     Korean Scud threat.
       Dec. 5--IAEA Board of Governors Meeting. Blix states that 
     he can not give meaningful assurances about continuity of 
     safeguards, and that the possibility that nuclear material 
     has been diverted cannot be excluded.
       Dec. 29--U.S.-DPRK agree in NY talks on an arrangement for 
     a third round. The North agreed to accept IAEA inspections 
     needed to maintain continuity of safeguards at seven declared 
     sites, and to resume North-South working-level talks in 
     Panmunjon. In exchange, U.S. agrees to concur in a ROK
      announcement to suspend Team Spirit '94 and set a date for a 
     third round of U.S.-DPRK talks, which would be held only 
     after DPRK steps are completed.


                                  1994

       Jan.--North Korea begins talks with the IAEA in Vienna to 
     discuss the scope of inspections necessary to provide 
     continuity of safeguards.
       Jan. 26--White House announces plans to send Patriot 
     Missile Battalion to South Korea.
       Jan. 31--DPRK Foreign Ministry Statement accuses the U.S. 
     of overturning the December 29 understanding; threatens to 
     ``unfreeze'' its nuclear program.
       Feb. 15--IAEA-DPRK reach an understanding on a 
     comprehensive list of safeguards measures which are to be 
     performed to verify that no diversion of nuclear material has 
     occurred in the seven declared nuclear installations since 
     earlier inspections.
       Feb. 21--IAEA Board of Governors meeting.
       Feb. 25--U.S.-DPRK Joint statement outlining terms of 
     December agreement.
       Feb. 26--DPRK authorities issue two week visas to the IAEA 
     inspection team.
       Mar. 1--IAEA inspectors arrive in DPRK.
       Mar. 3--Official ``Super Tuesday'' announcement--IAEA 
     inspections begin, N-S talks begin, suspension of TS '94, and 
     set date for a third round of U.S.-DPRK talks.
       Mar. 9--2nd North-South meeting.
       Mar. 12--3rd North-South meeting; DPRK and ROK reach an 
     agreement in principle on an exchange of envoys.
       Mar. 15--IAEA inspection team leaves Pyongyang having 
     proceeded with inspections without difficulty at all 
     facilities except the Radiochemical Lab.
       Mar. 16--IAEA DG Blix calls a special session of the Board 
     of Governors to informally report on the March 3-14 
     safeguards inspections in the DPRK.
      Blix announces that the IAEA inspection team was unable to 
     implement the DPRK-IAEA Feb. 15 agreement, and as a result 
     the Agency is unable to draw conclusions as to whether 
     there has been diversion of nuclear material or 
     reprocessing since earlier inspections.
       4th North-South meeting.
       Mar. 19--5th North-South meeting; DPRK walks out of 
     meeting, threatens to turn Seoul into a sea of fire; Team 
     Spirit '94 back on.
       Mar. 21--IAEA Board of Governors pass a DPRK resolution 
     finding the DPRK in further non-compliance and referring the 
     issue to the UNSC with 25 approvals, 1 rejection, and 5 
     abstentions, including China.
       Mar. 21--Administration announces Patriot Missile Battalion 
     will be sent to ROK.
       Mar. 31--UNSC unanimous Presidential Statement calling on 
     the DPRK to allow the IAEA to complete inspection activities 
     per the Feb. 15 agreement, and inviting IAEA DG Blix to 
     report back to the Council within six weeks.
       Apr. 4--President Clinton directs the establishment of a 
     Senior Policy Steering Group (SSK) on Korea with 
     responsibility for coordinating all aspects of U.S. policy 
     dealing with the current nuclear issue on the Korean 
     Peninsula. A/S Gallucci is asked to Chair the group.
       ROK announces Team Spirit '94 will be held during the 
     November time frame.
       ROK drops North-South special envoys as a precondition to 
     the Third Round.
       Apr. 18--Patriot Missile Battalion arrives in ROK.
       Apr. 28--DPRK claims the 1953 Armistice Agreement is 
     invalid and announces its intent to withdraw from the MAC.
       [[Page S4055]] May 4--DPRK begins reactor discharge 
     campaign.
       May 18-23--IAEA inspectors complete March inspections and 
     maintenance activities for the continuity of safeguards 
     knowledge.
       May 20--IAEA reports to the UNSC that the DPRK decision to 
     discharge fuel from the 5 MW reactor without prior IAEA 
     agreement for future measurement ``constitutes a serious 
     safeguards violation.''
       May 25-27--IAEA-DPRK consultations in Pyongyang re: fuel 
     monitoring.
       May 27--IAEA Director General Blix sends a letter to UNSC 
     Syg Boutros-Ghali stating the IAEA-DPRK talks have failed, 
     DPRK fuel discharge is proceeding at a faster rate, and the 
     IAEA's opportunity to measure the spent fuel in the future 
     will be lost within days if the fuel discharge continues at 
     this rate.
       May 30--UNSC issues a Presidential Statement ``strongly 
     urging the DPRK only to proceed with the discharge operations 
     at the 5 MW reactor in a manner which preserves the technical 
     possibility of fuel measurements, in accordance with the 
     IAEA's requirements in this regard.''
       June 3--IAEA Director General Blix reports to the UNSC on 
     failed IAEA efforts to preserve the technical possibility of 
     measuring discharged fuel from the DPRK 5 MW reactor.
       June 9--IAEA BOG resolution is passed calling for immediate 
     DPRK cooperation by providing access to all safeguards-
     related information and locations and suspends non-medical 
     IAEA assistance to the DPRK. 28 for, 1 opposed (Libya), 2 
     absent (Saudia Arabia, Cuba) and 4 abstentions (China, India, 
     Lebanon, Syria.)
       June 13--North Korea officially withdraws from the IAEA.
       June 15-18--Former President Carter visits North Korea and 
     receives assurances that the DPRK is willing to freeze the 
     major elements of the nuclear program (no reprocessing, no 
     refueling, and no construction) in order to continue dialogue 
     with the U.S.
       June 20-22--The DPRK's intention to reestablish the basis 
     for dialogue by freezing the major elements of its nuclear 
     program was confirmed in an exchange of letters between FM 
     Kang and A/S Gallucci.
       June 27--Agreement reached to hold the third round starting 
     July 8.
       June 28--North-South Korean summit between DPRK President 
     Kim Il-Sung and ROK President Kim Young-Sam announced for 
     July 25-27.
       July 8--Third Round of U.S.-DPRK talks in Geneva begins in 
     a businesslike atmosphere and confirms the DPRK's desire to 
     convert to light water reactor technology.
       July 9--President Kim Il-Sung's death was announced and 
     accordingly, the third round was postponed until after the 
     mourning period and the planned July 25-27 North-South summit 
     was postponed indefinitely.
       July 21--U.S.-DPRK agree on the resumption of the third 
     round on August 5.
       July 19-28--A/S Gallucci-led delegation visits capitals 
     (Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing, Moscow) to discuss the provision of 
     and solicit support for the conversion of DPRK's graphite-
     moderated reactors to light water reactors (LWR) that are 
     more proliferation resistant.
       Aug. 5-12--Resumed third round in Geneva and signed an 
     agreement between the U.S. and the DPRK showing substantial 
     progress towards an overall settlement. As part of the final 
     resolution of the nuclear issue: the U.S. will provide LWRs 
     to the DPRK, make arrangements for interim energy 
     alternatives, and provide an assurance against the threat or 
     use of nuclear weapons;
       the DPRK will remain a party to the NPT, allow 
     implementation of its safeguards agreement, and implement the 
     Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the 
     Korean Peninsula; the U.S. and DPRK will begin to establish 
     diplomatic representation, hold expert-level on the technical 
     issues in the coming weeks, and recess the talks with 
     resumption scheduled for Sept. to resolve the remaining 
     differences.
       Sept. 23--Third round, Session two begins in Geneva
       Oct. 21--U.S. and DPRK sign an Agreed Framework (a final 
     settlement to the North Korean Nuclear issue) based on the 
     Aug. 12 agreement.
       U.S. hands over Presidential Letter of Assurance and U.S. 
     and DPRK sign a Confidential Minute to the Agreed Framework.
       Nov. 14-18--U.S. team of experts visits North Korea to 
     discuss safe storage and disposition of spent fuel.
       Nov. 23-28--IAEA team of experts visits North Korea to 
     discuss details related to the monitoring and verification of 
     the freeze on DPRK nuclear facilities.
       Nov. 30--Experts from the U.S. and DPRK meet in Beijing for 
     preliminary discussions on the LWR project.
       Dec. 6-10--DPRK team of experts visits Washington, D.C. to 
     discuss technical and consular issues related to the planned 
     exchange of liaison offices.
       Jan. 9--DPRK announces lifting of restrictions on imports 
     of U.S. products into the DPRK and restrictions on portcalls 
     by U.S. vessels into DPRK ports.
       Jan. 17-24--U.S.-DPRK spent fuel talks in Pyongyang--Second 
     Session.
       Jan. 19--First shipment of 50,000 metric tons of heavy fuel 
     oil is delivered to the DPRK.
       Jan. 20--U.S. announces sanctions easing measures against 
     the DPRK in four areas: telecommunications and information, 
     financial transactions, imports of DPRK magnesite, 
     transactions related to the future opening of liaison offices 
     and other energy related projects.
       Jan. 23-28--IAEA-DPRK discussion continue in Pyongyang on 
     implementation and verification of the freeze on DPRK nuclear 
     facilities.
       Jan. 28--U.S.-DPRK LWR Supply Agreement Talks in Beijing--
     Second Session.
       Jan. 29--U.S. experts arrive in Pyongyang to survey 
     property sites for the future opening of a U.S. liaison 
     office.
       Feb. 15--Australia publicly announces its contribution of 
     $5 million USD to KEDO.
       Feb. 28--New Zealand publicly announces its contribution of 
     $300,000 USD to KEDO.
       March 7-9--DPRK Preparatory Conference in New York.
       Mar. 8--KEDO is formally established as an international 
     organization under international law--Canada, New Zealand, 
     Australia join.
       Mar. 27-29--U.S.-DPRK LWR Supply Agreement Discussions in 
     Berlin continue--Third Session.
       Apr. 4-8--DPRK experts arrive in Washington, DC, to survey 
     property for the future opening of a DPRK liaison office.

  Mr. SPECTER. Finally, Madam President, I would like to ask unanimous 
consent to print in the Record the proposed amendment that I had 
intended to offer with a number of cosponsors, as I say, including the 
distinguishing Senator from Texas who is presiding, so that all of that 
will be part of the Record and available for review in anticipation of 
the response by Secretary of State Christopher, to Senator Dole's 
leadership.
  There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC. --. TREATMENT OF AGREED FRAMEWORK WITH NORTH KOREA AS 
                   TREATY.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (1) Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, of the Constitution 
     requires that treaties may only be made by the President, by 
     and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       (2) The Case Act (1 U.S.C. 112b) requires that the text of 
     international agreements other than treaties shall be 
     transmitted to Congress.
       (3) The President does not consider the Agreed Framework 
     Between the United States of America and the Democratic 
     People's Republic of Korea to be a treaty, for purposes of 
     seeking the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, 
     or even to be any other type of international agreement, for 
     purposes of compliance with the Case Act (1 U.S.C. 112b).
       (4) The Agreed Framework involves reciprocal binding 
     commitments by both the United States and North Korea on 
     resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and 
     is an international agreement.
       (5) The commitments made by the United States under the 
     Agreed Framework, including undertakings that will involve 
     appropriations, are as substantial and ongoing as commitments 
     that customarily have been made by the United States through 
     treaties.
       (6) Such commitments should be subject to Senate review and 
     approval.
       (b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that 
     the President should have submitted, and should now submit, 
     the Agreed Framework as a treaty to the Senate for its advice 
     and consent to ratification pursuant to Article II, Section 
     2, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States.
       (c) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``Agreed 
     Framework'' means the document entitled ``Agreed Framework 
     Between the United States of America and the Democratic 
     People's Republic of Korea'', signed October 21, 1994, at 
     Geneva, and the attached Confidential Minute.

  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, this is an issue of really enormous 
importance, as we have reviewed the work of the Intelligence Committee.
  It has been my conclusion that the problems of international 
terrorism and the problems of weapons of mass destruction are problems 
of overwhelming importance, posing a security threat to the United 
States.
  When we have a document which has as much practical importance as 
this so-called agreed framework does, it is simply inappropriate to not 
have it subjected to Senate scrutiny. It may well be that this Senate 
will ratify this treaty, the document that I consider to be a treaty.
  It is certainly necessary, in my judgment, that matters of this sort 
be elevated to a level where there is very, very, considerable public 
scrutiny and scrutiny by the Senate under the constitutional doctrine 
of checks and balances.
  So awaiting the reply by Secretary of State Christopher, it is my 
intention at the appropriate time to bring this matter to the Senate 
for ratification because of its importance on the merits 
[[Page S4056]] and on the substance, and because of its importance in 
compliance with the U.S. Constitution. I thank the Chair.
  I yield the floor.
  Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. INOUYE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii is recognized.
  Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
                Amendments Nos. 342 through 346, En Bloc

  Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I am about to send to the desk several 
amendments on behalf of several Senators on both sides of the aisle. I 
am pleased to advise you, Madam President, that these amendments have 
been reviewed and cleared by the managers of the measure before us and 
all of the appropriate Senators from committees of jurisdiction.
  I send the amendments to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendments.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye] proposes amendments 
     numbered 342 through 346.

  Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendments be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments are as follows:


                           Amendment No. 342

  Mr. INOUYE offered amendment No. 342 for Mr. McConnell, for himself, 
Mr. Leahy, Mr. Dole, Mr. Daschle, Mr. Specter, Mr. Inouye, Mr. 
Jeffords, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. Harkin, Ms. Mikulski, Mrs. Murray, and 
Mrs. Feinstein.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 16, between lines 18 and 19 insert the following:

                               CHAPTER I

       On page 25, between lines 4 and 5, insert the following:

                               CHAPTER II


       foreign operations, export financing and related programs

                     bilateral economic assistance

                  funds appropriated to the president

                           debt restructuring

                         debt relief for jordan

       For the cost, as defined in section 502 of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974, of modifying direct loans 
     to Jordan issued by the Export-Import Bank or by the Agency 
     for International Development or by the Department of 
     Defense, or for the cost of modifying: (1) concessional loans 
     authorized under Title I of the Agricultural Trade 
     Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, and (2) 
     credits owed by Jordan to the Commodity Credit Corporation, 
     as a result of the Corporation's status as a guarantor of 
     credits in connection with export sales to Jordan; as 
     authorized under subsection (a) under the heading, ``Debt 
     Relief for Jordan'', in Title VI of Public Law 103-306, 
     $275,000,000, to remain available until September 30, 1996: 
     Provided, That not more than $50,000,000 of the funds 
     appropriated by this paragraph may be obligated prior to 
     October 1, 1995.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, last July, Israel's Prime Minister 
Rabin and Jordan's King Hussein appeared before a joint session of 
Congress to declare the end of a 46-year state of war.
  Their remarks were inspiring, particularly Prime Minister Rabin's 
reminder that he served 27 years as a soldier, and in his words, ``sent 
regiments into fire and soldiers to their death * * * and today we are 
embarking on battle which has no dead and wounded, no blood no anguish. 
This is the only battle which is a pleasure to wage, the battle for 
peace.''
  In turn, King Hussein declared Jordan ``ready to open a new era in 
relations with Israel'' calling upon each of us for help and 
cooperation in security a final peace settlement for the Middle East.
  Later in the day at the White House the President affirmed the 
American commitment to continue our role in securing a comprehensive 
peace. The next important step in that process followed in October with 
a peace treaty between the two nations.
  This agreement was not an easy decision for Jordan. Given the radical 
opponents to peace in the area, particularly terrorist groups 
threatening retaliation against any country or leaders moving forward 
in normalizing relations with Israel, the King demonstrated remarkable 
courage.
  In direct response to this significant breakthrough, President 
Clinton pledged our support in relieving Jordan of its crippling debt 
burden. In the foreign operations appropriations bill last year we 
provided the first installment of that debt relief. Several weeks ago, 
the President submitted a supplemental request and asked us to finish 
the job.
  That is the amendment before the Senate. At the President's request, 
we are providing the balance of that debt relief. The funds will be 
drawn from the foreign operations subcommittee allocation scheduled to 
be released over fiscal year 1995 and fiscal year 1996 from existing 
foreign operations resources.
  But not exceeding our subcommittee allocation, should not suggest 
this bill is free of costs. There are very painful tradeoffs that we 
will be forced to make in the upcoming foreign operations 
appropriations bill. By providing this relief for Jordan other programs 
will have to be reduced. But, that is a choice that I am willing to 
make and that is the clear choice of the Clinton administration.
  Let me quote from the letter the President sent regarding this 
request. Dated March 8, he says failure to provide the debt relief 
``would threaten our ability to continue our leadership in the Middle 
East Peace process. It undercuts those who are willing to take risks 
for peace and it directly threatens the security of Israel and the 
Israel-Jordan peace treaty.''
  Those are the stakes. President Clinton's assessment is echoed by 
every leader in the region committed to stability, security and peace. 
In fact, the only critics of debt relief in the region seem to be those 
few cynical opponents still consumed by the drive to destroy Israel.
  Syria's President Assad already is challenging American credibility 
and our national commitment to our friends in the region. His purposes 
would be served if he could point out that the Congress failed to live 
up to an American commitment to Jordan and other prospective the risk 
takers.
  It will be nothing less than a victory for Saddam Hussein if we 
renege on the President's promise, if we abandon an obligation assumed 
by Secretary Christopher and the administration.
  Madam President, it has not been an easy process to bring this 
legislation to the floor. Even with Secretary Christopher and his 
negotiating team in the region attempting to inch the process forward, 
there has been some reluctance by Members on both sides of the aisles 
to support this legislation. I know my colleague Senator Leahy has some 
reservations about the outlay consequences of providing this support, 
but there have also been concerns raised about the administration's 
management of this request.
  Last year, during conference on the fiscal year 1995 Foreign 
Operations bill, we received a late night request to add the first 
tranche of aid to our conference report. We did so with the clear 
understanding that the balance would be requested and provided in two 
additional installments over the next fiscal years. Instead, once 
again, we were presented with an emergency, last minute request.
  The fact that Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty factored into 
the decision to consolidate the second and third installments and I 
believe was the reason why most of my colleagues have been prepared to 
respond to the President's request, but I should point out that the 
administration has not made it easy to vote for this commitment. In 
fact, there have been several points when administration officials have 
actually jeopardized prospects for providing the assistance.
  When the House Appropriations Committee decided to provide part of 
the funding while making the commitment to appropriate the balance in 
the next fiscal year, the White House spokesman accused members of 
contributing to the renewal of war between Israel and Jordan. Insult 
was added to injury when other administration officials suggested 
Republican isolationism would compromise our national commitment.
  I think these charges are irresponsible, inaccurate and introduced a 
mean spirited, unnecessary partisan 
[[Page S4057]] element to an otherwise serious, important deliberation. 
Frankly, the remarks were costly in building support for this 
undertaking.
  Nonetheless, many of us believe this is a commitment worth making and 
keeping. My colleagues who joined in introducing this amendment share 
the view that the cause of peace is at a critical point. Our partners 
in this process must know we will not retreat.
  I ask unanimous consent that the letter I referenced from President 
Clinton be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                              The White House,

                                        Washington, March 8, 1995.
     Hon. Mitch McConnell,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator McConnell: A comprehensive and lasting peace 
     in the Middle East that ensures the security of Israel has 
     been a bipartisan goal which every administration and 
     Congress has endorsed and pursued for nearly fifty years. 
     This goal was significantly advanced through the bold 
     leadership and courage displayed by King Hussein of Jordan 
     and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, which made possible the 
     signing last October of a treaty of peace between their 
     countries. The United States played a critical role in making 
     this possible, through our diplomacy and our commitment to 
     stand by those who worked for peace.
       I told Prime Minister Rabin and King Hussein last July, as 
     they met at the White House and set out their vision for a 
     future of peace and cooperation, that the United States would 
     support Jordan--as we support Israel--to minimize the risks 
     it was taking for peace. The Congress expressed its own 
     support for the King's leadership in the peace process in the 
     extraordinary reception accorded the King and Prime Minister 
     when they appeared together before a Joint Session. This 
     expression of U.S. support was essential to King Hussein's 
     ability to move forward to conclude and implement a peace 
     with Israel which could serve as a model for regional 
     cooperation.
       Accordingly, last year I proposed to Congress that we 
     forgive all of Jordan's official direct debt to the United 
     States. This was authorized by the Congress last August and 
     $99 million was appropriated as an initial tranche. I 
     proposed in the FY 1995 supplemental an appropriation of $275 
     million to complete debt forgiveness. I want to encourage 
     Congress to take immediate action to fulfill this commitment.
       Failure to do so would threaten our ability to continue our 
     leadership in the Middle East peace process. It undercuts 
     those who are willing to take risks for peace and it directly 
     threatens the security of Israel and the Israel-Jordan peace 
     treaty. Prime Minister Rabin called me to express personally 
     his grave concern regarding the negative consequences for 
     both Israel and Jordan, as well as the broader peace process, 
     of failure to fully implement the proposed debt forgiveness.
       The cause of peace in the Middle East is at a critical 
     point. We must not withdraw the support we have pledged to 
     those who face very real threats from terror and violence. 
     The people of Jordan must see that the United States stands 
     by its commitments. Israel must know that our leadership in 
     the Middle East remains a constant of bipartisan policy. And 
     those in the region who have not yet made peace must 
     recognize that we will not retreat from engagement in the 
     quest for an enduring settlement.
       The price the United States and our friends in the Middle 
     East will pay for failure is high. I need your support to 
     ensure that our commitment is fulfilled and the full $275 
     million of debt forgiveness for Jordan is provided.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.

  Mr. PELL. Madam President, this is an extraordinarily delicate moment 
in the Middle East peace process. Israel's agreement with the 
Palestinians is hanging precariously in the balance between success and 
failure, and one more act of terrorism against Israel could cause the 
agreement to unravel completely. At the same time, Israel's 
negotiations with Syria are moving slowly, and could be eclipsed by the 
pending Israeli electoral cycle.
  While Secretary of State Christopher's recent trip to the Middle East 
appeared to yield some progress on the Palestinian and Syrian tracks, 
the truth is that we cannot be assured of the establishment of a 
comprehensive peace in the coming year. One element of the peace 
process, however, that has been an unqualified success is Jordan's 
peace treaty with Israel. By all accounts, the pace and scope of the 
agreement's implementation have exceeded expectations, and the accord 
shows real promise of bringing about a peaceful, normal relationship 
between Israel and Jordan. The Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty is a true 
milestone in U.S. diplomatic efforts in the Middle East.
  We cannot lose sight of how well the peace treaty serves our national 
security and foreign policy concerns. Much like the Egypt-Israel peace 
treaty that arose from the Camp David agreements, the Israel-Jordan 
treaty resolves a major component of one of the most intractable 
conflicts in history. As a result, it should make a significant 
contribution to advancing our interests in the Middle East, namely, 
ensuring the safety and security of Israel, promoting regional 
stability, and preserving our access to--and the free flow of--oil.
  That being the case, it is completely reasonable to provide full debt 
relief to Jordan as compensation for implementing its peace treaty with 
Israel. To me, a $275 million appropriation--when viewed in the context 
of this historic peace treaty--is a fair price to pay in support of 
peace. Moreover, if the United States leads by example in forgiving its 
debt, then we might be able to use that as leverage over other donor 
countries to enter into similar debt relief arrangements.
  Madam President, I can think of many occasions in the past 30-some 
years when I have stood in this very spot to commend King Hussein for 
promoting peace in the Middle East. Now that the King has taken the 
final step in signing and implementing a treaty--with, I might add, no 
small amount of prodding from the Congress and successive U.S. 
administrations--I believe we should send a signal of our appreciation. 
That is why I support full debt forgiveness for Jordan.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I am pleased to join Chairman McConnell 
in sponsoring the Jordan debt relief amendment. This amendment 
concludes an effort that he and I began last summer when I was still 
chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee and he was the ranking 
member. My colleagues will recall the excitement that enveloped this 
body at that time: Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and Jordanian King 
Hussein paid a joint visit to Capitol Hill and confirmed that they were 
making peace. I will never forget the shivers that ran down my spine as 
I listened to them speak and realized that the day that we had so long 
wished for had finally arrived. It was with enormous pride that I 
worked late at night with Senator McConnell and Congressman Obey in a 
last-minute drive to incorporate in our fiscal year 1995 appropriations 
bill a downpayment on debt relief for Jordan as a token of United 
States support for this wonderful, historic development.
  That was just the beginning, however. In the space of just 2 months, 
far more quickly than anyone had predicted, the governments of Jordan 
and Israel completed negotiation of the formal peace agreement between 
their two countries. Come the end of October, I found myself with 
President Clinton witnessing the signing of that agreement on the 
Jordan-Israel border north of the Gulf of Aqaba. Once again, I found 
myself moved beyond words.
  With the memories of that trip to the Middle East still fresh in my 
mind, I was pleased last month to see included in the administration's 
fiscal year 1996 budget request a proposal for a supplemental fiscal 
year 1995 appropriation to fund the remainder of the Jordan debt 
restructuring program that Congress authorized last summer. I was 
further pleased 10 days ago to receive a call from Secretary of State 
Christopher requesting my support for including $275 million for this 
effort in the defense supplemental appropriations bill now before the 
Senate. With the peace agreement signed and implementation proceeding 
vigorously, it is imperative that the United States move quickly to 
fulfill its promise and appropriate the funds required to complete the 
debt relief effort. I told Secretary Christopher that I would support 
this proposal enthusiastically.
  Later that day, however, I received the details of the proposal and 
realized that there was one serious drawback to it: it would require 
that the bulk of the money--$225 million--for this effort come out of 
the funds that will be available in fiscal year 1996 for our other 
foreign assistance activities. In other words, in order to pay for our 
aid to Jordan, we would have to cut back significantly our aid to other 
countries and organizations. Mr. President, I worked all last week 
trying to find a 
[[Page S4058]] way to appropriate in full the $275 million for Jordan 
debt relief that is essential at this critical stage in the Middle East 
peace process, and at the same time avoid threatening serious harm to 
the rest of our foreign assistance programs. Unfortunately, the State 
Department advised me that any modification of the proposal would be 
interpreted in the Middle East as a retreat by the United States from 
its commitment to Jordan and its support for the peace process.
  They also told me, however, that the administration will work hard in 
the coming months to find ways to mitigate the prospective harm to 
other programs. Given these assurances, and my strong commitment to 
supporting the Middle East peace process, I am cosponsoring this 
amendment with Chairman McConnell. Chairman McConnell has worked hard 
on this amendment, and I have appreciated the chance to work with him 
on it.
  With this action, we make an important contribution to advancing the 
peace process and we demonstrate to King Hussein the appreciation of 
the United States for the heroic steps he has taken in support of the 
peace process.
  As we proceed through the fiscal year 1996 appropriations cycle, I 
will work hard with the administration, Chairman McConnell, and my 
other fellow Senators to minimize cuts to other essential foreign 
assistance programs.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Madam President, I am joining with other members of 
the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee in sponsoring the pending 
amendment to relieve the remainder of Jordan's debt to the United 
States. I do so because this initiative is integral to the ongoing 
peace process in the Middle East.
  This action will make good on the promise President Clinton and the 
American people made to King Hussein--that the United States would 
support Jordan as it took risks for peace.
  In line with this commitment, last summer, President Clinton told 
King Hussein that he would ask the Congress to relieve Jordan's debt to 
the United States if Jordan took a bold step toward peace.
  As the first step on the road to peace, Jordan and Israel signed the 
Washington Declaration and King Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin 
appeared for the first time together in public last July.
  It was a historic moment. Many of us sat in the Capitol and marveled 
as King Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin--two former enemies--stood 
together before the Congress and spoke publicly about strengthening 
ties between their nations, about moving toward a comprehensive peace 
treaty.
  We were inspired by their courage. We were moved that the two leaders 
were taking concrete steps to bring their nations together. That they 
were committing themselves publicly to waging a battle for peace.
  In response, and consistent with the President's commitment, the 
Congress forgave a portion--$220 million--of Jordan's debt to the 
United States. to relieve all of the debt at that time would have been 
premature. It was, after all, important to measure progress and to give 
the King an additional incentive to sign a formal peace treaty with 
Israel.
  Now, Mr. President, Jordan has signed a formal peace agreement with 
Israel. Jordan did not wait for other countries in the region to reach 
an agreement with Israel. It boldly moved forward and signed a 
comprehensive peace agreement with Israel on its own.
  Now that Jordan has done its part, the United States needs to make 
good on the President's commitment to relieve the remainder of its debt 
to our country. The Jordanian Government has exposed itself to those 
who would choose war rather than peace with Israel.
  The Government and the people of Jordan need to believe that they are 
being supported by the United States. They need to see that the fruits 
of peace are tangible.
  Madam President, the administration supports this amendment. 
Secretary of State Christopher believes it is important to build the 
confidence of promoters of peace in Jordan and throughout the Middle 
East.
  Last week, I spoke to Dennis Ross, the State Department's Middle East 
negotiator, who was in the Middle East with Secretary Christopher. He 
conveyed to me his strong belief that approving the remainder of 
Jordan's debt relief at this time was necessary to build momentum in 
the peace process and continue to strengthen American credibility in 
the region.
  Admittedly, this is a less than ideal solution. Approving this 
amendment will put additional pressure on our foreign aid spending 
bill. However, as we review spending cuts, we have to keep in mind 
long-term American foreign policy and security interests, and reflect 
on expenses that might be incurred, and lives that might be lost, if 
the peace process does not move forward in the Middle East.
  I hope this new commitment will be reflected in the Foreign 
Operations Appropriations Subcommittee allocation for fiscal year 1996.
  Relieving Jordan's debt is important for the peace process. A 
successful conclusion to the peace process after decades of strife is 
important to U.S. security interests and, hopefully, will avoid the 
need for large defense expenditures or military involvement down the 
road. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
                            amendment no 343

  Mr. INOUYE offered amendment No. 343 for Mr. McConnell.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 26, at the end of line 23 add the following:
       Of the funds appropriated in Public Law 103-316, $3,000,000 
     is hereby authorized for appropriation to the Corps of 
     Engineers to initiate and complete remedial measures to 
     prevent slope instability at Hickman Bluff, Kentucky.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I have proposed an amendment that is 
essential to the continued survival of Hickman, KY. This town sits on 
an eroding bluff on the bank of the Mississippi River. If the erosion 
of the bluff is not halted the city of Hickman risks losing two 
500,000-gallon water tanks, the police, fire, and ambulance stations, 
the county health department, and the community library buildings. As 
recently as 2 weeks ago the Fulton County School Board was evacuated 
after engineers indicated that bluff erosion had made the building 
unsafe.
  Over the last several years, I have worked to find a solution to this 
problem. In 1992, I obtained funds to direct the Corps of Engineers to 
study the bluff's instability and determine the least costly 
alternative to address the erosion problem. Last year I was able to get 
additional funds included in the Energy and Water Development 
Appropriations, subject to authorization. Unfortunately, the Water 
Resources Development Act never passed the Senate, leaving the Corps of 
Engineers without the authorization to initiate their plan to stabilize 
the bluff. This amendment merely authorizes the expenditure of already 
appropriated funds.
  This year I am concerned that time may run out on the residents of 
Hickman. Since the erosion does not conveniently conform to the 
Senate's schedule, I simply can not stand by and wait to see if the 
Water Resources Development Act will be passed this year. The city of 
Hickman is counting on this funding to prevent any further loss of 
their community.


                           amendment no. 344

       (Purpose: To restore local rail freight assistance funds)

  Mr. INOUYE offered amendment No. 344 for Mr. Pressler, for himself, 
Mr. Harkin, Mr. Conrad, and Mr. Daschle.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 30, line 8, strike the dollar figure 
     ``$120,000,000'' and insert in lieu thereof the dollar figure 
     ``$126,608,000''.
       On page 30, strike line 14 through line 18.
                           amendment no. 345

  (Purpose: Sense of the Senate concerning the National Test Facility)

  Mr. INOUYE offered amendment No. 345 for Mr. Brown.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, add the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC.  . NATIONAL TEST FACILITY.

       It is the sense of the Senate that the National Test 
     Facility provides important support to strategic and theater 
     missile defense in the following areas: (a) United States-
     United Kingdom defense planning; (b) the PATRIOT and THAAD 
     programs; (c) computer support for the Advanced Research 
     [[Page S4059]] Center; and (d) technical assistance to 
     theater missile defense, and fiscal year 1995 funding should 
     be maintained to ensure retention of these priority 
     functions.


                           amendment no. 346

    (Purpose: To provide that the rescission from the environmental 
     restoration defense account shall not affect expenditures for 
  environmental restoration at installations proposed for closure or 
       realignment in the 1995 round of the base closure process)

  Mr. INOUYE offered amendment No. 346 for Mrs. Feinstein.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 25, between lines 4 and 5, insert the following new 
     section:
       Sec. 110. (a) In determining the amount of funds available 
     for obligation from the Environmental Restoration, Defense, 
     account in fiscal year 1995 for environmental restoration at 
     the military installations described in subsection (b), the 
     Secretary of Defense shall not take into account the 
     rescission from the account set forth in section 106.
       (b) Subsection (a) applies to military installations that 
     the Secretary recommends for closure or realignment in 1995 
     under section 2903(c) of the Defense Base Closure and 
     Realignment Act of 1990 (subtitle A of title XXIX of Public 
     Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).
                  amendment to protect military bases

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, I rise today to offer an amendment 
that would protect military bases recommended for closure or 
realignment in 1995 from the proposed rescission in the Defense 
Environmental Restoration Account [DERA]. I urge my colleagues to 
support this important amendment.
  As many of my colleagues know, DERA funds are used to clean up 
environmental contamination at open military bases. Because, the 
military is subject to Federal and State environmental laws and 
regulations just like private parties, the Department of Defense has an 
obligation to clean up its military bases, whether the bases will 
remain open or will close due to the base realignment and closure 
process.
  I strongly support DERA efforts and am concerned about the proposed 
$300 million rescission in this appropriation bill. But, I understand 
that the supplemental funding is extremely important to ensure the 
readiness of our Armed Forces and protect U.S. national security. 
Because the Appropriations Committee has decided to fully offset the 
increase in funding with spending cuts, difficult decisions need to be 
made. I remain hopeful, however, that the severe cut in DERA funds can 
be mitigated in conference.
  I am particularly concerned about the impact of the DERA rescission 
on bases that have been recommended for closure or realignment in the 
current base closure round. Normally, cleanup at closing military bases 
is funded out of the base realignment and closure [BRAC] account. 
However, in the first year of a closure--before BRAC cleanup funds are 
available--environmental cleanup at closing military bases is funded 
from DERA.
  Military bases slated for closure must be closed within 6 years of 
the closure decision, therefore, it is important that environmental 
cleanup not be delayed to ensure the timely and effective reuse of 
bases. Environmental cleanup is vital to assisting impacted communities 
with economic redevelopment efforts.
  This amendment would protect bases recommended for closure or 
realignment in 1995 from any funding cuts in DERA. The rescission would 
still take place, but at least for the first year until BRAC funding 
kicks in, closing bases would not be impacted. This amendment would 
simply ensure that the timetable for cleaning up and closing a military 
base is not adversely impacted.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
amendments be considered and agreed to, en bloc; that the motions to 
reconsider be laid upon the table, en bloc; and that statements 
relative to the amendments be printed in the Record as though read.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  So the amendments (Nos. 342 through 346) were agreed to.


                    dod mail order pharmacy program

  Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, I would like to bring to Senator 
Stevens' attention an issue regarding improved options for access to 
DOD health services.
  Mr. STEVENS. I welcome my friend and colleague's input.
  Mr. DOMENICI. The fiscal year 1993 Defense Authorization and 
Appropriations Acts required the DOD to conduct mail service pharmacy 
demonstration projects. The fiscal year 1994 Appropriations Act 
included language requiring DOD to expand the mail service benefit to 
include all base realignment and closure sites not supported by an at-
risk managed care support contract.
  DOD has moved forward to implement at-risk managed care support 
contracts; however, residents within the BRAC sites are still adversely 
affected because the managed care contracts will not be fully 
implemented in some areas for up to 27 months. This denies these 
individuals the access and convenience they previously had in going to 
medical treatment facility pharmacies.
  By acting to extend the mail service pharmacy program now rather than 
waiting for full implementation of the managed care at-risk contracts, 
the Government can achieve the following objectives.
  First, during the interim period, eligible residents will have access 
and convenience to a benefit that is comparable to what they had before 
by being able to go to the pharmacy at the medical treatment facility 
before it closed.
  Second, the existing mail service pharmacy benefit uses government 
acquired pharmaceuticals, where as currently, beneficiaries are 
reimbursed based on what they pay for medications on the commercial 
market, which are considerably higher.
  Third, expansion of this benefit now is consistent with previous 
congressional mandates to provide access and interim coverage to 
individuals affected by BRAC.
  For these and other reasons, it is my hope that you will lend your 
support to try to address this gap in coverage during the conference.
  Mr. STEVENS. The Senator from New Mexico has my support for trying to 
assist him in addressing this issue during the conference.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator. I very much appreciate his 
support.
                    AIR FORCE SPACE PROGRAM FUNDING

  Mr. STEVENS. Madam President, in discussions with the Air Force early 
this month, the Defense Subcommittee learned about a potentially 
serious problem with the financing mechanisms governing Air Force 
support of the Cassini mission to Saturn sponsored by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA].
  In addition, potential problems have been identified with the funding 
of on-orbit incentives for several Air Force satellite programs.
  The Cassini-related issue centers on the question of how much of the 
funds reimbursed to the service by NASA, can the Air Force use to 
finance the Titan IV/Centaur heavy-lift expendable launch vehicle 
programs. There is no problem with the amount of reimbursement, or with 
NASA's willingness to pay these funds. The problem apparently arises 
due to legal interpretation of the statute governing interagency 
exchanges of goods and services.
  The subcommittee has been informed that resolution of this problem 
should occur early this year to avoid significant impacts on the Titan 
IV/Centaur space programs.
  Similarly, early resolution may be needed for the on-orbit incentives 
dilemma the Air Force faces. In this case, a change in guidelines for 
budgeting for on-orbit incentives may have caused financial shortfalls 
for important satellite programs. The Air Force states that these 
financing changes may cause serious problems for the Defense Support 
Program for early warning satellites, the Global Positioning System 
navigation satellites, the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, 
and the Defense Satellite Communications System.
  The subcommittee understands that possible solutions to the Cassini 
and on-orbit incentives problems raise several legislative issues which 
must be addressed. Because of these issues, I have asked the Secretary 
of the Air Force to provide the subcommittee with her views on these 
matters, as well as the views of other organizations within the 
Department of Defense and NASA which may have an interest in solving 
these problems expeditiously.
  [[Page S4060]] I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record my 
letter to Air Force Secretary Sheila E. Widnall on these matters at the 
end of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. STEVENS. It is my objective to be able to address these problems 
during our joint conference with our House counterparts. I am hopeful 
that the additional information we are seeking will assist us during 
this conference.
                               Exhibit 1

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                  Committee on Appropriations,

                                   Washington, DC, March 16, 1995.
     Hon. Sheila E. Widnall,
     Secretary of the Air Force, The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
       Dear Madam Secretary: In discussions with the Air Force, 
     the Defense Subcommittee has learned about a potentially 
     serious problem with the financing mechanisms governing Air 
     Force support for the Cassini mission to Saturn sponsored by 
     the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In 
     addition, problems have been identified with the funding of 
     on-orbit incentives for several Air Force satellite programs. 
     The Subcommittee has been informed that resolution of these 
     problems would occur early this year to avoid significant 
     impacts on Air Force space programs.
       The Subcommittee understands that possible solutions to 
     these problems raise several legislative issues which must be 
     addressed. Because of these issues, I would appreciate it 
     greatly if you would share with us your personal views on 
     these matters, as well as the views of other organizations 
     within the Department of Defense and NASA which may have an 
     interest in solving these problems expeditiously.
       As I know you recognize, the Subcommittee stands ready to 
     assist the Air Force in meeting its national security 
     missions.
       With best wishes,
           Cordially,
                                                      Ted Stevens,
                                                         Chairman.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, I would like to review with the 
distinguished chairman of the Defense Subcommittee the status of an Air 
Force program to investigate new air defense surveillance technologies. 
This program, called HAVE GAZE, has been managed for many years by the 
Air Force's Phillips Laboratory in New Mexico. Last year, Congress 
appropriated $8 million for fiscal year 1995 efforts. The same amount 
was appropriated for fiscal year 1994.
  Phillips Laboratory has developed this promising new radar technology 
to the point where actual field experiments are necessary. These 
experiments are designed to gather the hard data needed to determine 
HAVE GAZE's operational potential and to determine whether the next 
development steps are justified.
  Unfortunately, the Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD] has 
released only about $2.5 million of the fiscal year 1994 funds and has 
withheld approval to spend the remaining $5.5 million for fiscal year 
1994 and all of the fiscal year 1995 funds. Despite Congress' support 
for the program, OSD initially tried to terminate HAVE GAZE and now 
proposes more delays and more study before the Air Force can obligate 
funds.
  I would like to ask the distinguished Defense Subcommittee chairman 
whether he shares my concerns about the Defense Department's latest 
actions regarding HAVE GAZE.
  Mr. STEVENS. I say to my colleague from New Mexico that I do, indeed, 
share his concerns about HAVE GAZE. I am sorry to say the Department 
has not acted expeditiously as we intended when we appropriated funds 
in fiscal years 1994 and 1995. It is important that these previously 
appropriated funds be released so that the technical data needed to 
fully evaluate HAVE GAZE's potential is available to the Pentagon and 
to the Congress.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Is the chairman aware of the support from the military 
for obtaining this HAVE GAZE data through the field experiments?
  Mr. STEVENS. I am well aware of the fact that these HAVE GAZE 
experiments are supported by both the U.S. Space Command and the Air 
Force.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I believe there is still an opportunity for the 
appropriate and timely resolution of this difficulty. Does the 
distinguished chairman agree?
  Mr. STEVENS. I agree that there is need for the quick resolution of 
the situation.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Will the chairman be willing to continue to work with 
me during the joint conference with our House counterparts to encourage 
the Defense Department to release the HAVE GAZE funds without further 
delay?
  Mr. STEVENS. Let me assure my colleague on the Defense Subcommittee 
that, should these delays continue, we will need to consider this topic 
in our deliberations during conference with the House on this bill. I 
will work closely with him on this important matter.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator. I greatly appreciate the support 
of the distinguished chairman of the Defense Subcommittee in obtaining 
an expeditious resolution of this HAVE GAZE issue.
                      military school maintenance

  Mrs. MURRAY. Madam President, I rise to engage the chairman of the 
Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee in a colloquy on the issue 
of military school maintenance.
  As the chairman may know, local education agencies [LEA's] which 
serve the dependents on active military personnel have a unique and 
very difficult challenge in meeting the needs of these students. Not 
the least of these challenges is maintaining a safe and productive 
learning environment in those educational facilities which are owned by 
the Federal Government and located on military installations.
  This situation is particularly acute in several LEA's which were 
identified in the joint Department of Defense/Department of Education 
report, the Dole Commission report mandated by Public Law 99-661, as 
having the most severe problems while serving at least two major 
military installations. In fact, some of these facilities would not 
even meet local fire and safety regulations were they not located on 
Federal property.
  Congress has addressed this problem several times in the past. In 
fiscal year 1994 Congress appropriated $10 million to initiate repair 
problems at the above mentioned installations. This allowed the 
Department to begin correcting the most severe building deficiencies in 
advance of ownership transfer to the involved LEA's. In fiscal year 
1995 Congress appropriated an additional $20 million to continue and 
hopefully complete this work and transfer ownership.
  Though the funds for fiscal year 1995 military school maintenance 
programs were appropriated almost 6 months ago, I am advised that the 
Department of Defense has yet to disburse these funds to the 
appropriate schools.
  Mr. STEVENS. I share the Senator's concern about DOD failing to 
promptly disburse these funds. As the Senator from Washington knows, 
the Department was directed--in the Senate report accompanying last 
year's Defense appropriations bill--to allocate these funds to school 
districts identified in the joint DOD/DOEd study as having the most 
severe problems. As such, school districts in our two States are in 
line for receiving some of these funds. One of the reasons for the 
Department's delay, I am told, is that statutory language approved in 
the 1995 Defense Appropriations Act does not allow funds for repairing 
federally owned schools to be used to replace facilities. I believe 
this problem faces both the Alaska and Washington schools. Is that the 
Senator's understanding as well?
  Mrs. MURRAY. I believe that to be the case. It is my hope that a 
remedy to this situation will be considered in the conference on this 
supplemental appropriations bill.
  Mr. STEVENS. I look forward to working with the Senator from 
Washington on this issue and will ask my staff to work closely with 
your office to craft an appropriate remedy. I can assure the Senator 
that this issue will be dealt with promptly.
                           apache helicopters

  Mr. BOND. Madam President, there is one issue I would like to bring 
to the attention of the chairman of our Defense Subcommittee--the 
proposed rescission of $77.6 million from the Apache A procurement 
program. Although this funding is no longer needed to prevent a gap in 
the Apache production line, the Army claims that it is needed to 
prevent a delay in the Apache Longbow modernization program, which is 
one of the U.S. Army's priority programs.
  I have been informed that the Army currently faces a significant 
funding shortfall for long lead procurement 
[[Page S4061]] items and for research and development in the Longbow 
program. These funding shortfalls may cause significant downsizing and 
delay in both efforts. A delay in exercising the long lead contract 
options and in providing the RDT&E funding, may result in key suppliers 
ceasing work and may cause delays in production planning, tooling 
acquisition, and component production. Technical publications may be 
placed at risk, and total program costs may increase.
  I ask the chairman whether he would be willing to address this issue 
in conference and to work with me to find some kind of accommodation to 
avoid shortfalls in this critical program.
  Mr. STEVENS. I recognize the concerns of the Senator from Missouri in 
this matter, and I can assure him that I will be happy to work with him 
within the fiscal limitations which constrain all of our decisions 
during this time of austerity.
  I want to extend to my colleague and fellow member of the Defense 
Subcommittee my personal commitment to support the Apache Longbow 
program as a centerpiece of the Army's aviation modernization plan. I 
also recognize the significance of continuity in the Apache Longbow 
procurement and development efforts to the consideration of Apache 
helicopters for purchase by our NATO allies.
  Let me add, for the benefit of my colleague, that I have directed the 
Defense Subcommittee staff to begin discussions immediately with the 
Army to determine the supplemental funding requirements for fiscal year 
1995. The subcommittee is seeking this additional information so that 
it can assure that adequate resources are available for the program and 
that fiscal year 1995 funds support the efficient execution of the 
fiscal year 1996 budget request for Apache Longbow.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Hawaii be willing to 
engage in a short colloquy with the Senators from North Dakota?
  Mr. INOUYE. I will be glad to engage in a colloquy with the Senators 
from North Dakota.
  Mr. CONRAD. According to my understanding, Congress appropriated $10 
million in fiscal year 1994 and $10 million in fiscal year 1995 for the 
U.S. Army to upgrade and procure the M149A2 water trailer.
  Would the Senator from Hawaii tell me if my understanding is correct?
  Mr. INOUYE. The Senator is correct. The Senator from North Dakota is 
aware that, as Chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I 
strongly supported procurement of the M149A2 because it provided the 
Army with a modern water trailer which it sorely needed.
  Mr. CONRAD. I recognize the key role the Senator has played in 
procurement of the water trailer, and I am grateful for his support. As 
the Senator from Hawaii is aware, the M149A2 is manufactured by the 
Turtle Mountain Manufacturing Co., located on the Turtle Mountain 
Indian Reservation in North Dakota.
  Turtle Mountain Manufacturing Co. began manufacturing the water 
trailer when the company was part of the Small Disadvantaged Business 
8(a) set-aside program, and the company continued manufacturing the 
trailer after it graduated from the 8(a) program. Procurement of the 
M149A2 provided the Army with a vital piece of equipment. The 
procurement also brought job opportunities to the Turtle Mountain 
Indian Reservation.
  However, I have recently learned that the Army has procured enough of 
the water trailers to meet its new inventory objective. Due to planned 
force structure changes, the Army does not need as many water trailers 
as it previously anticipated.
  Would the Senator tell me if I am correct?
  Mr. INOUYE. The Senator is correct. The Army reports that it has 
9,926 M149A2 water trailers on hand, and no longer needs more of the 
water trailers. As the Senator has indicated, the Army still has $15 
million of the funds Congress appropriated for the water trailers in 
fiscal year 1994 and fiscal year 1995.
  The Army does, however, need another trailer, the M105A3 cargo 
trailer. The average age of the M105 cargo trailer is 16 years, while 
the trailer's economic life is 20 years. Nearly one-quarter of the 
Army's fleet of M105 cargo trailers is older than twenty years, and 
many of these overage trailers are assigned to fight units. The overage 
trailers can impair unit mobility and readiness.
  Mr. CONRAD. As I understand it then, the Army has $15 million 
remaining from procurement of the M149A2 water trailer. Although the 
Army does not need additional water trailers, it does need the M105A3 
cargo trailer.
  Would the Senator support the Army's using this remaining $15 million 
to procure the M105A3 cargo trailer?
  Mr. INOUYE. I indeed support such action by the Army. The funds were 
appropriated for trailer procurement, and the Army needs the M105A3. I 
urge the Army to use the funds to procure the M105A3.
  Mr. DORGAN. I echo the sentiments expressed by my colleague from 
North Dakota. I thank the Senator from Hawaii for his support of 
funding for the M149A2 water trailer. The Senator's support has been 
vital to its inclusion in the defense appropriations bill.
  Regarding the purchase of the M105A3 cargo trailer, I appreciate the 
Senator's confirmation that the Army needs the trailer. Since 
procurement of the M105A3 would essentially replace procurement of the 
M149A2, which was originally procured under the small disadvantaged 
8(a) program, would the Senator from Hawaii indicate whether he thinks 
the M105A3 should be procured under a set-aside program?
  Specifically, does the Senator from Hawaii think it would be 
appropriate for the M105A3 contract to be set aside for small 
disadvantaged businesses?
  Mr. INOUYE. I do think it would be appropriate for the Army to set 
aside the M105A3 contract for small disadvantaged businesses, and I 
urge the Army to do so.
  Senator Stevens, the chairman of the subcommittee, is on the floor. 
Would the chairman of the subcommittee be willing to share his views on 
this subject?
  Mr. STEVENS. I am pleased to tell the Senator from Hawaii that I 
share his opinion. The Army needs the M105A3 and, since the Army has 
funds which were appropriated for trailer procurement, the Army should 
use the $15 million in unused funds from procurement of the M149A2 to 
procure the M105A3 cargo trailer.
  Mr. CONRAD. I thank the Senator from Hawaii and the Senator from 
Alaska.


             funding for enterprise development in the nis

  Mr. STEVENS. Madam President, I would like to express to the Senator 
from Kentucky, the chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, my 
concern as to whether the rescission in this bill to the Agency for 
International Development [AID] budget might affect the fiscal year 
1995 funding level for the Enterprise Development Program. The projects 
funded in this program are some of the most successful in the former 
Soviet Union. I have personal experience with the American Russian 
Center [ARC] in Alaska, which receives its funding through this 
program. As you may be aware, during its exit briefing for their 
assessment of AID's programs in the Newly Independent States [NIS] the 
General Accounting Office [GAO] stated that the ARC was one of the two 
best programs in Russia. Mr. Tom Dine, the AID assistant administrator 
for Eastern Europe and Russia, is quoted as saying ``I use it [ARC] as 
an example to other Universities of how to get involved in the whole 
economic transition effort taking place in the former Soviet Union.'' 
ARC is the only AID privatization program in the Russian Far East 
Region, and in its first year provided training and technical 
assistance to over 1,000 Russians. Does the committee support the 
privatization programs, such as the ARC, in the NIS?
  Mr. McCONNELL. Yes, it does.
  Mr. STEVENS. The Enterprise Development Program in AID is funding the 
development of private enterprises in Russia, not the Russian 
Government. This is consistent with the goal of strengthening the 
developing entrepreneur class in Russia. This entrepreneur class will 
be the backbone of democracy in that country. Because of the 
outstanding performance of the ARC and other programs like it, and 
[[Page S4062]] their critical mission of supporting privatization in 
Russia, I believe this program merits continued full funding. Is it the 
intention of the chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee that 
no reduction be applied to the highly rated projects in the Enterprise 
Development Program such as the ARC?
  Mr. McCONNELL. Yes, that is correct. AID should maintain full funding 
for these programs.
  Mr. STEVENS. Does the distinguished Senator support the original 
fiscal year 1995 funding level for the Enterprise Development Program.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Yes.
  Mr. STEVENS. Madam President, I want to thank my colleague for 
clarifying that point.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, I rise in my capacity as chairman of 
the Budget Committee, to comment on H.R. 889, the defense supplemental 
appropriations and rescission bill for the fiscal year ending September 
30, 1995, as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee.
  The bill provides for a net decrease in fiscal year 1995 budget 
authority and outlays of $1.3 billion and $91 million, respectively. 
These are real cuts to the deficit.
  I ask unanimous consent that tables showing the relationship of the 
pending bill to the Appropriations Committee 602 allocations and to the 
overall spending ceilings under the fiscal year 1995 budget resolution 
be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, and material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               STATUS OF H.R. 889 DEFENSE EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL AND RESCISSIONS--SENATE-REPORTED               
                             [Fiscal year 1995, in millions of dollars, CBO scoring]                            
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Senate    Total comp
                   Subcommittee                       Current     H.R. 889    Subcmte       602(b)        to    
                                                     status\1\                 total      allocation  allocation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture-RD:                                                                                                 
    Budget authority..............................       58,117         --       58,117       58,118          -1
    Outlays.......................................       50,330         --       50,330       50,330          -0
Commerce-Justice:                                                                                               
    Budget authority..............................       26,873       -177       26,696       26,903        -207
    Outlays.......................................       25,429        -20       25,409       25,429         -20
Defense:                                                                                                        
    Budget authority..............................      243,628         -0      243,628      243,630          -2
    Outlays.......................................      250,661         -0      250,661      250,713         -52
District of Columbia:                                                                                           
    Budget authority..............................          712         --          712          720          -8
    Outlays.......................................          714         --          714          722          -8
Energy-Water:                                                                                                   
    Budget authority..............................       20,493       -100       20,393       20,493        -100
    Outlays.......................................       20,884        -50       20,834       20,888         -54
Foreign Operations:                                                                                             
    Budget authority..............................       13,679       -172       13,507       13,830        -323
    Outlays.......................................       13,780         -6       13,775       13,780          -5
Interior:                                                                                                       
    Budget authority..............................       13,578         --       13,578       13,582          -4
    Outlays.......................................       13,970         --       13,970       13,970          -0
Labor-HHS:\2\                                                                                                   
    Budget authority..............................      266,170       -300      265,870      266,170        -300
    Outlays.......................................      265,730         -4      265,726      265,731          -5
Legislative Branch:                                                                                             
    Budget authority..............................        2,459         --        2,459        2,460          -1
    Outlays.......................................        2,472         --        2,472        2,472          -0
Military Construction:                                                                                          
    Budget authority..............................        8,836         --        8,836        8,837          -1
    Outlays.......................................        8,525         --        8,525        8,554         -29
Transportation:                                                                                                 
    Budget authority..............................       14,265       -187       14,078       14,275        -197
    Outlays.......................................       37,087        -11       37,075       37,087         -12
Treasury-Postal:\3\                                                                                             
    Budget authority..............................       23,589         --       23,589       23,757        -168
    Outlays.......................................       24,221         --       24,221       24,261         -40
VA-HUD:                                                                                                         
    Budget authority..............................       90,256       -400       89,856       90,257        -401
    Outlays.......................................       92,438         --       92,438       92,439          -1
Reserve:                                                                                                        
    Budget authority..............................           --         --           --        2,311      -2,311
    Outlays.......................................           --         --           --            1          -1
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Appropriations:\4\                                                                                    
        Budget authority..........................      782,655     -1,336      781,319      785,343      -4,024
        Outlays...................................      806,241        -91      806,150      806,377        -227
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\In accordance with the Budget Enforcement Act, these totals do not include $1,394 million in budget authority
  and $6,466 million in outlays in funding for emergencies that have been designated as such by the President   
  and the Congress, and $877 million in budget authority and $935 million in outlays for emergencies that would 
  be available only upon an official budget request from the President designating the entire amount as an      
  emergency requirement.                                                                                        
\2\Of the amounts remaining under the Labor-HHS Subcommittee's 602(b) allocation, $1.3 million in outlays is    
  available only for appropriations from the Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund.                                
\3\Of the amounts remaining under the Treasury-Postal Subcommittee's 602(b) allocation, $1.3 million in budget  
  authority and $0.1 million in outlays is available only for appropriations for the Violent Crime Reduction    
  Trust Fund.                                                                                                   
\4\Of the amounts remaining under the Appropriations Committee's 602(a) allocation, $1.3 million in budget      
  authority and $1.4 million in outlays is available only for appropriations from the Violent Crime Reduction   
  Trust Fund.                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                
Note.--Details may not add to totals due to rounding.                                                           
                                                                                                                
Source: Prepared by SBC majority staff, March 7, 1995.                                                          


   FISCAL YEAR 1995 CURRENT LEVEL--H.R. 889, DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTAL AND   
                            RESCISSIONS BILL                            
                        [In billions of dollars]                        
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Budget            
                                                    authority   Outlays 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current level (as of February 25, 1995)\1\........    1,236.5    1,217.2
H.R. 889, Defense Supplemental and Rescissions, as                      
 reported by the Senate...........................       -1.3       -0.1
                                                   ---------------------
      Total current level.........................    1,235.2    1,217.1
                                                   =====================
Revised on-budget aggregates\2\...................    1,238.7    1,217.6
Amount over (+) / under (-) budget aggregates.....       -3.6       -0.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\In accordance with the Budget Enforcement Act, the total does not    
  include $1,394 million in budget authority and $6,466 million in      
  outlays in funding for emergencies that have been designated as such  
  by the President and the Congress, and $877 million in budget         
  authority and $935 million in outlays for emergencies that would be   
  available only upon an official budget request from the President     
  designating the entire amount requested as an emergency requirement.  
\2\Reflects revised allocation under section 9(g) of H. Con. Res. 64 for
  the Deficit-Neutral reserve fund.                                     
                                                                        
Note: Details may not add to total due to rounding.                     
                                                                        
Source: Prepared by SBC majority staff, March 7, 1995.                  

                     north korea--amendment no. 328

  Mr. HATFIELD. Madam President, I wonder is my friend from Alaska will 
allow me to respond to his final point about the necessity of having 
this same language included in the rest of the 1996 appropriation 
bills.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I welcome the chairman's comment on this point.
  Mr. HATFIELD. I appreciate Senator Murkowski's willingness to modify 
the language of the amendment to delete the reference to ``any other 
act.'' As the Senator knows, it is my policy as chairman to pass 
appropriation bills that do not contain amendments that attempt to 
apply to other appropriation bills that have not yet come before us.
  However, I want to give my assurances to the Senator from Alaska and 
to the majority leader that I support the intent of this amendment and 
will work with you in your efforts to include it in the remainder of 
the 1996 appropriation bills.
  The Murkowski/Dole amendment brings much needed discipline to the 
administration's tactics for diverting money to the projects associated 
with the United States DPRK agreed framework. As the Senator mentioned 
in his remarks, in fiscal year 1995 the administration relied 
exclusively on emergency and reprogrammed funds for this purpose. As 
the chairman of the Appropriation Committee, I strongly support 
[[Page S4063]] the Murkowski/Dole amendment for requiring the 
administration to take an upfront approach from here on out. The 
administration must specifically request that funds be set aside for 
use in implementing the agreed framework. This will bring greater 
accountability to the process, and perhaps decrease the necessity for 
emergency supplementals such as the one we have before us today.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the chairman for his remarks, and also thank 
the Senior Senator from Alaska for his support of this amendment. I 
will look forward to working with you to see that the Murkowski/Dole 
language is adopted in subsequent appropriation bills.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Madam President, I had planned to offer an amendment 
today but I will withhold in order to explain an agreement I have 
reached with the Chairman and manager of this bill, Senator Hatfield. 
My amendment would have prohibited the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development [HUD] from expending further Community Development Block 
Grant [CDBG] nonemergency monies until funds appropriated last August 
for Tropical Storm Alberto were fully released.
  Madam President, the State of Georgia this summer endured the worst 
disaster in its history, Tropical Storm Alberto. Alberto has left in 
its wake flooding unparalleled in the Southeast and damage estimates 
nearing $1 billion. In the aftermath of this disaster, Georgia embarked 
on a unified effort to build back its communities. This effort was 
appropriately called ``Operation Buildback.'' During these efforts, 
State officials with the assistance of their Federal representatives, 
catalogued the damages and recommended priority projects for the 
Federal agencies for whom emergency appropriations were made during our 
appropriations process.
  During the 1995 budget cycle, $180 million were made available for 
this flood through the Housing and Urban Development [HUD] CDBG 
program. Let me remind my colleagues that this process took place last 
August. It has been a full 8 months since and HUD has not released over 
one-third of the disaster aid. In addition, my three inquiries to 
Office of Management and Budget [OMB] and HUD as to when the remaining 
funds would be released were ignored until it was learned that I would 
offer this amendment. There is $57 million outstanding and I would like 
to know why. Eight months is entirely enough time to get these funds 
released. The State of Georgia has done their part in submitting 
project requests in December that were well in excess of the $180 
million that was appropriated for the entire disaster. It is high time 
for the Federal Government to do their part.
  I submit that this is not way to treat disaster victims and their 
communities. We have a responsibility to get that money back to those 
who need it most instead of on a bureaucrat's desk in Washington. I 
will not offer my amendment with the assurances of Committee Chairman 
Hatfield that he will support my efforts to add such an amendment to 
the second supplemental appropriations bill we consider if the 
administration has not rectified this situation.
  Mr. HATFIELD. The Senator from Georgia is correct in regard to our 
agreement. If this situation has not been resolved by the time the 
Senate considers the next supplemental appropriations bill, I will 
support the amendment of the Senator of Georgia.
  Mr. COVERDELL. I commend the chairman for his willingness to assist 
me in this endeavor. It is of utmost importance to my State. I look 
forward to working with him in the coming weeks to rectify this matter 
and thank him for his leadership in this regard.
  Mr. HATFIELD. I thank the Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. DOLE. Madam President, before we vote on the supplemental 
appropriation bill before us, I want to thank Chairman Hatfield, 
Senator Byrd, Chairman Stevens, and Senator Inouye for their hard work 
in hammering out a bill which will restore $1.9 billion needed for 
training and readiness of our Armed Forces.
  I am pleased that this bill is fully off-set in both budget authority 
and outlays. Additionally, in my view, the committee has done a good 
job in identifying the defense programs which should fund this 
supplemental appropriation. However, I am concerned by the fact that 
the operations and maintenance accounts of our Armed Forces are 
continually being raided to fund unbudgeted contingencies that have 
little if anything to do with our national security. The administration 
requested this supplemental because it diverted 4th quarter O&M funding 
to pay for operations in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Kuwait, Korea, and 
Bosnia. Now, let me be clear, I am not saying that all of these 
operations do not relate to U.S. interests. Certainly some, such as the 
deployment to Kuwait and the increased operations in and around the 
Korean peninsula, were in line with our national security interests. 
That is the way it is supposed to be. The deployment of U.S. troops 
should only be considered when the vital interests of the United States 
are at stake. We simply cannot continue to raid our O&M accounts to pay 
for every peace-keeping or peace-making operation dreamed up by the 
United Nations.
  Even as the drawdown continues, our fighting men and women are asked 
to take on more missions in
 hostile environments. They face greater dangers with fewer numbers and 
less resources. In fact, since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the 
Army has seen operational deployments increase by 300 percent. Last 
year, the Army twice set a new record for soldiers operationally 
deployed to other countries--with U.S. troops in more than 91 countries 
around the world. Despite all of the administration's rhetoric, they 
have provided neither an adequate force structure nor an adequate 
defense budget for the challenges that face us in this new era.

  Now, we in the Congress find ourselves in the position of voting on a 
measure which essentially funds peace-keeping operations on which this 
Chamber has not expressed its position. Certainly, the President should 
have the flexibility to act in defense of our Nation and its interests. 
But we have been put in a position where we are asked to reimburse the 
Department of Defense for these operations, and if we do not, the 
readiness of our forces will be irreversibly harmed. Earlier, my 
colleague, Senator Stevens, laid out for us what it would mean to not 
provide these funds. No doubt about it, the readiness of our forces 
would be downgraded from their current level, which in my view is 
precarious at best.
  So, let me be clear, because I am concerned about the readiness of 
our forces and because I support the men and women who put their lives 
on the line whenever this Government asks them to, I will vote for this 
bill. But that should not be interpreted as a stamp of approval of all 
of the operations which made this supplemental necessary.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I want to start by commending the Senator 
from Alaska and the Senator from Hawaii for their hard work on this 
bill. I know there are no two members of the Senate more concerned 
about our national security than Senator Stevens and Senator Inouye. 
They have been given the difficult task of balancing our national 
security needs with the need for deficit reduction, and I can certainly 
appreciate the pressures they are under.
  The Appropriations Committee has moved quickly on this supplemental, 
which the administration says must be enacted by the end of this month. 
I think the Senate has improved on the House bill in some respects. I 
particularly want to commend the managers for rejecting the reduction 
proposed by the House to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. That 
is a program the Secretary of Defense feels very strongly about, as do 
I.
  I also think the managers were wise to reject the addition of $670 
million in unrequested funds contained in the House bill. Some of those 
additional funds do address must-pay bills, which I will come back to 
in a moment, but they are not programs that belong in an emergency 
supplemental.
  Madam President, the Defense Department needs a supplemental, and I 
think the leadership of the Defense Department is doing what they feel 
they need to do to get a supplemental enacted in a timely fashion to 
avoid a repeat of the disruptions in training that caused readiness 
problems in fiscal year 1994. However, I have several concerns with the 
approach the Senate is 
[[Page S4064]] being asked to take in this legislation. I question 
whether this supplemental is a good deal for the Defense Department on 
balance.
  First, it does not provide the net increase in defense spending for 
readiness that was requested by the administration, despite the 
concerns many of my colleagues have expressed about readiness. The 
costs of the contingencies are covered, but only by making cuts 
elsewhere in the defense budget. Unlike the administration request and 
the House-passed bill, there is no net increase in funding for the 
Department of Defense in this supplemental.
  Because this bill is not designated as an emergency, it requires all 
increases to be fully offset in both budget authority and outlays--
otherwise enactment of a supplemental could cause a sequester. As this 
bill demonstrates, it is necessary to cut more budget authority than 
you add in order to achieve that goal when the supplemental 
requirements fall in the faster spending accounts, which is usually the 
case. In the future, I fear that we will find that attempting to offset 
fast-spending operation and maintenance outlays on a one-for-one basis 
will be extremely difficult and overly restrictive.
  DOD is willing to make some of the cuts in this bill, such as 
termination of the TSSAM Program, which was anticipated in the budget, 
but they had planned to use these cuts to offset the cost of other 
must-pay bills later on this year. I might add that I regret that the 
TSSAM Program was not able to overcome its problems, because it is a 
technology we very much need, in my view. I am not quarreling with the 
administration's decision to terminate the program, although I am 
concerned that the amount of money rescinded in this bill will not 
allow sufficient funds to pay the Government's termination costs. I 
appreciate the comments of the Senator from Alaska that he is aware of 
that issue and plans to review it in conference.
  According to Deputy Secretary Deutch, DOD already has $800 million in 
must-pay bills unrelated to these specific contingencies which will 
require reprogrammings, which is a process by which funds are 
transferred from one defense program to another during a fiscal year. 
By taking the easier cuts for this bill, we are just making it harder 
to deal with those other must-pay bills later.
  Yet this bill also reduces DOD's 1995 reprogramming authority, 
thereby reducing their flexibility later in the year if more problems 
come up. There are other cuts in this bill that the Department of 
Defense does not agree with, such as the reductions to the Technology 
Reinvestment Program.
  In addition to the concerns I have regarding specific programs in 
this supplemental, I am troubled by the impact on the defense budget 
and on defense management that the approach this bill takes of making 
DOD absorb the full cost of these contingencies could have if it is 
viewed as a precedent for funding future contingencies, which I hope it 
will not be. It largely defeats the purpose of having a supplemental.
  I am not sure we have really thought through the impact of what we 
may be doing to the military with this 100 percent offset approach. 
Last week, Gen. Gordon Sullivan, the Chief of Staff of the Army, told 
the Armed Services Committee that if the Congress adopts a policy of 
forcing the military to completely offset the costs of any contingency 
operation:

       . . . it is just going to destroy our training programs, 
     our quality of life programs, and it is going to be difficult 
     to manage the readiness of the force . . . It is going to 
     come out of reducing real property maintenance. We may have 
     to furlough civilians, terminate temporary employees, curtail 
     supply requests, park vehicles, reduce environmental 
     compliance. It is going to have a major impact.

  General Sullivan said that in the event the military is told to 
assist a large-scale evacuation of U.N. personnel from Croatia:

       I just have to stop training, and I will have to move money 
     around from elsewhere to keep that operation going since 
     obviously what you expect me to do is to fight and win your 
     wars. So, I will have to get the money from people who are 
     not doing that to support it.

  Now that may sound like an exaggeration to some, but if you 
understand the laws that govern the defense budget, you will see why 
General Sullivan's comments are right on target. The cost of an 
operation, such as paying for the airlift to get there, the fuel, spare 
parts, and so on, must come out of the operating budget. The military 
does not have the authority to divert funds from the procurement of 
weapons, or from research or military construction or military 
personnel accounts, even if they wanted to.
  And even within the operating budget, there are further constraints. 
A large portion of the operating account is civilian pay, so you cannot 
save money there without firing civilians. And you cannot cut really 
cut the money to operate the bases--you have to pay the light bill. So 
the areas General Sullivan is talking about--training, maintenance and 
repair of the buildings on our military bases--are the only areas where 
the military has the flexibility to change its plans halfway through 
the year. And in fact that is exactly what happened last year--money 
had to be diverted from training.
  In the past we have paid for contingencies and natural disasters such 
as the Midwest floods, the Los Angeles riots, the California 
earthquake, and the cost of the Somalia and Rwanda operations last 
year, as emergencies under the agreement reached in 1990 as part of the 
Budget Enforcement Act that set up discretionary caps. What we have 
done, at least in defense, was make a good faith effort to offset these 
supplementals as best we could. About 70 percent of the cost of the 
1994 Somalia supplemental was offset by defense rescissions, for 
example, while all of the costs of the Rwanda mission, which was about 
$125 million, were emergency funds. So in the past we have been 
consistent about calling an emergency an emergency, but sometimes we 
have fully or partially tried to offset those costs and sometimes we 
have not.
  That is basically the approach the House is taking. They provided 
emergency supplemental appropriations for the Department of Defense and 
then tried to offset those appropriations, in budget authority but not 
in outlays, using savings from both defense and domestic programs. It 
is my hope that the House position would prevail on this fundamental 
point, that is, the question of whether we are going to treat the costs 
of contingency operations that cannot be anticipated in advance as 
emergencies for budget purposes.
  If we start dropping the emergency designation, we could end up 
tieing our hands in responding to future emergencies while we wait to 
find 100 percent offsets. Strong consideration must be given to 
budgeting for unanticipated contingencies in advance in the DOD budget, 
but this inevitably runs into the issue of implicit congressional 
approval for military operations and war powers considerations.
  In addition to my concerns about the financial impact on the Defense 
Department if this bill is viewed as a precedent, I also share the 
concerns expressed by the Senator from Hawaii about the long term 
policy implications of telling the military any future contingency they 
are involved in is going to come out of their budget dollar for dollar. 
This is going to have an impact on their ability and their willingness 
to respond to situations like Haiti or Cuba, or especially a much more 
expensive operation like peace enforcement in Bosnia, in the future. It 
could have the effect of dictating our policy on the use of force 
through the appropriations process.
  I hope the policy of making the Defense Department absorb the costs 
of these operations is viewed as a one-shot proposition, not as a 
precedent for future supplementals, because if we are telling the 
Department of Defense that any time there is an emergency that comes up 
and they come over and request supplemental funds that they are going 
to have to provide a 100-percent offset, then we are going to change 
the nature of the responsiveness of the Department of Defense itself to 
the missions that may, indeed, be crucial to our Nation's security.
  If the Department of Defense is told that any unanticipated operation 
they undertake, either unilaterally or with NATO or the United Nations, 
is going to have to be completely offset within the defense budget, 
which means they are going to have to basically kill or substantially 
alter crucial defense programs in order to absorb those costs, 
[[Page S4065]] then the result is going to be a very strong signal that 
the United States is not going to be as involved as we have been in 
world affairs, including commitments to our allies and commitments that 
we have voted for at the U.N. Security Council.
  This complete offset policy sounds good in speeches but it has very 
serious implications for the Department of Defense. Make no mistake 
about it, this complete offset policy means the long-term capability of 
the Department of Defense is going to go down. It does not mean that 
the immediate readiness is going down because that can be protected.
  But future readiness, future capability, requires
   modernization and it requires research and development, and those 
are the programs being cut by this complete offset policy. So 5 or 10 
years from now, people will have a very serious problem with readiness 
if we continue to declare there is no emergency even when our forces 
are responding to the unanticipated events that we all know will take 
place somewhere in the world from time to time.

  Madam President, I also want to note that this bill contains domestic 
rescissions of about $1.5 billion. I understand that the defense 
portion of this supplemental is outlay neutral in 1995 without the 
domestic rescissions, but that over the 5-year period the domestic 
rescissions are necessary to make the whole bill outlay neutral over 
the long run.
  Many of my colleagues do not support the idea of using domestic 
rescissions to offset the cost of a defense supplemental. My view is 
either we have firewalls or we do not. The Congress has cut defense to 
pay for domestic supplementals in the past, so I do not see any reason 
why we should not look to domestic programs to offset the cost of 
defense supplementals, especially if we are going to start adopting the 
policy of offsetting both the budget authority and outlays of 
supplementals.
  I hope we decide to reinstate defense firewalls, Madam President. But 
until we do, I believe domestic programs should be on the table to fund 
defense supplementals, just as defense programs have been put on the 
table to fund domestic supplementals.
  In 1990, for example, $2 billion in defense funds were rescinded to 
substantially offset the cost of a supplemental providing economic aid 
to the new democratic governments of Panama and Nicaragua as well as 
funds for food stamps, fighting forest fires, veterans programs, and 
many other programs.
  That same fiscal year, discretionary spending was reduced across the 
board to fund antidrug programs. So once again there was a net transfer 
of funds from the defense budget to the non-defense discretionary part 
of the budget.
  I should also point out that previously the defense budget has been 
held to a higher standard than the domestic budget. As I have already 
pointed out, 70 percent of the defense funds provided in last year's 
emergency supplemental for Somalia were offset by defense rescissions. 
But only about 25 percent of the non-defense funds provided in that 
supplemental were offset by rescissions. If the Congress is 
contemplating setting out a new policy for offsetting supplementals, or 
not offsetting supplementals, I think that policy has to be fair in its 
treatment of defense and domestic emergencies.


                      Haiti Reporting Requirement

  Madam President, I am also concerned that the requirement for a 
Presidential report on the cost and source of funds for military 
activities in Haiti is linked to a cutoff of funds for those activities 
if the report is not submitted within 60 days after enactment of this 
act.
  I generally oppose linking a cutoff of funds for any military 
operation to anything other than the accomplishment of the mission. If 
the Senate opposes a military activity or operation, it should vote to 
cut off the funding. In the case of the Haiti operation, however, the 
Senate voted several times in the last session not to prohibit the 
President from ordering the deployment of United States forces to 
Haiti. I do not think that the Senate would be prepared to vote to 
terminate the funding for the Haiti mission now that it has been 
carried out with such professionalism by United States forces and is in 
the process of being turned over to a U.N. operation that will be 
commanded by a United States general officer.
  In this case, moreover, virtually all of the information that the 
President would have to provide in his report to Congress was mandated 
last session by Public Law 103-423, a joint resolution regarding United 
States policy toward Haiti, that was signed into law by the President 
on October 25, 1994. President Clinton has now submitted four reports 
pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of that legislation that call for monthly 
reports until the mission is over. Those reports were submitted to 
Congress on November 1, December 6, and December 31, 1994, and on 
February 8, 1995.
  If the President had refused to submit those reports, then perhaps it 
would make sense to condition the continued availability of funding on 
the submission of such reports in the future. But the President has 
been submitting those reports and there are no indications that he 
plans to stop submitting them.
  I do not plan to offer an amendment to this bill to delete the cutoff 
of funding provision. I base my decision on the urgent need of the 
Department of Defense for this supplemental funding and my realization 
that there will be a difficult conference with the House on this bill. 
I therefore want to avoid any action that could delay this legislation. 
The fact that President Clinton will be able to submit the report 
required by this bill has minimized my concern over the funding cutoff 
provision. But I did want to note my concern over this provision and to 
signal my determination that this provision not serve as a precedent 
for this type of action.
                ef-111 system improvement program [sip]

  Mr. D'AMATO. Madam President, I would like to commend my good 
friends, the distinguished chairman and ranking minority member of the 
Defense Subcommittee, for not including EF-111A System Improvement 
Program [SIP] funds in the defense rescission package of the 
supplemental funding measure now before the Senate.
  I believe the House Committee on Appropriations acted prematurely by 
including EF-111A SIP funds in its version of the supplemental. As my 
colleagues know, the EF-111A SIP has been under siege since fiscal year 
1993 when some in Congress suggested that the program duplicated the 
Navy's EA-6B Advanced Capability [ADVCAP] Program.
  At the time, the Pentagon sharply challenged the notion that the EF-
111 and EA-6B were duplicative. Then-Air Force Secretary Don Rice was 
quoted as saying: ``The F-111 does escort jamming as well as local area 
jamming; it has the capability to keep up with the F-15E's and F-111F's 
and F-16's when they're doing interdiction missions. The EA-6B does 
not.'' The Pentagon appeal to the fiscal year 1993 Defense 
Appropriations Conference was even more detailed:

       The elimination of the EF-111 would significantly 
     compromise the U.S. ability to provide standoff jamming in 
     support of tactical air operations for two reasons. First, 
     the EF-111 and the EA-6B each have capabilities not possessed 
     by the other. Although the two jamming systems will be 
     roughly comparable following modernization, the EF-111 is, 
     and will continue to be, more capable than the EA-6B in 
     supporting deep strike missions. This is due to the EF-111's 
     significant advantage over the EA-6B in speed, range, and 
     time on station.
       Second, even if the two platforms were comparable in all 
     respects, there is an insufficient number of EA-6B's in the 
     Navy inventory to support the mission requirements of both 
     Services. To procure additional EA-6B's to compensate for the 
     loss of the EF-111's would be much more expensive than to 
     retain and modernize the existing EF-111 inventory.

  In the end, the Department of Defense was successful in reversing the 
proposed elimination of EF-111A funding. Soon thereafter, in February 
1993, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff report on the roles, 
missions, and functions of the Armed Forces of the United States 
endorsed the retention and modernization of both the EA-6B and the EF-
111A.
  In retrospect, the roles and missions report was the high water mark 
of Pentagon support for the EF-111A. As my distinguished colleagues 
know, the fiscal year 1996 defense budget request calls for the 
termination of the EF-111A SIP program in fiscal year 1996 and 
retirement of the EF-111A fleet in fiscal year 1997. Navy EA-6B's, 
according to the Air Force, will fill the gap 
[[Page S4066]] left by the retirement of the EF-111A fleet.
  This plan is fatally flawed. The EA-6B ADVCAP program was canceled in 
February, 1994, and the future of Navy electronic warfare has been in 
turmoil ever since. In the wake of this cancellation, the Pentagon 
commissioned the Joint Tactical Air Electronic Warfare Study to examine 
the relationship between the EA-6B and EF-111A and to review overall 
electronic combat requirements.
  I would like to ask the distinguished Defense Subcommittee chairman 
whether the results of the joint tactical air electronic warfare study 
have been delivered to the Congress.
  Mr. STEVENS. I will answer my colleague by saying that the results of 
this study are long overdue and may not be available until June, 1995.
  Mr. D'AMATO. Will the distinguished chairman also agree that, until 
the Congress has had a full opportunity to evaluate the results of this 
study, any proposal to eliminate EF-111 SIP funds and to retire the 
entire EF-111 fleet is extremely premature?
  Mr. STEVENS. I certainly agree with my colleague from New York.
  Mr. D'AMATO. In my opinion, the bottom line is that we are being 
asked by the House to lay waste to the Air Force's support jammer 
capability without sufficient analysis or debate. We know the Navy 
option is woefully inadequate.
  We should ask ourselves several critical questions before we even 
decide what to do about Air Force and Navy support jamming 
requirements. First, what are the alternatives to the EF-111A SIP? 
Second, if there are none, how will the termination of the SIP, and the 
retirement of the EF-111A's, affect the efficiency and survivability of 
our strike forces?
  Does the distinguished Defense Subcommittee chairman agree that, 
until we can answer these questions, any suggestion of rescinding EF-
111A SIP funds is fraught with too many risks for our national 
security.
  Mr. STEVENS. I agree with my colleague that terminating the EF-111 
SIP program and planning for the retirement of the EF-111 fleet at this 
time would be an unwise and risky course of action.
  Mr. D'AMATO. Is my colleague willing to work with me and do what he 
can to prevail over the House in the upcoming joint conference on the 
supplemental?
  Mr. STEVENS. Recognizing that we have a difficult conference before 
us, and that funds are desperately short, let me assure the Senator 
from New York that we will do what we can in joint conference to hold 
the Senate position and to protect his interests to the greatest extent 
possible.
  Mr. GLENN. Madam President, I would like to raise my concerns related 
to the pending supplemental appropriations bill.
  I certainly understand the difficulty under which the Appropriations 
Committee must work, particularly when the budget deficit looms as 
large as it does.
  But, I am concerned, Madam President, about the precedent set in this 
bill by requiring that emergency supplemental spending be fully offset.
  In the past, Congress and the administration have agreed to allow for 
emergency spending without requiring offsets, but taking offsets in a 
more benign manner, usually in cases where programs have been canceled 
or where contract funds were available because they could not be 
obligated during the fiscal year for which they were provided.
  The supplemental before us takes a much different approach that bears 
dramatic consequences.
  By requiring complete offsets from prior year funding, we really are 
not cutting lower priority programs as a result of tight fiscal 
constraints. We are victimizing programs basically because they are in 
slower spending accounts and their funds are still available to raid. I 
know a number of my colleagues have expressed similar concerns and I am 
hopeful that we can craft a new method of funding future emergency 
spending.
  I also note, Madam President, that this approach may be more easily 
accomplished in the earlier quarters of a fiscal year, but what happens 
later in the year after we have exhausted the resources of these slower 
spending accounts?
  Will we bring our normal planned operations, maintenance, and 
training to a screeching halt? Will we stop paying our troops? This is 
what will happen when we require the cost of contingency operations to 
be paid from the current operating budget for operations in places like 
Iraq, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti. Shortfalls in training 
and maintenance are the very kinds of actions for which the 
administration has been criticized and which the President's 
supplemental request is intended to avoid.
  I appreciate the committee's desire and attempt to impose fiscal 
responsibility and I appreciate the committee's efforts to keep the 
technology reinvestment project, the so-called TRP, alive, but I don't 
believe we should fool ourselves that requiring complete offsets does 
not have important implications for the overall readiness of our Armed 
Forces.
  The effect of this bill, Madam President, is to reduce current 
defense spending by $1.9 billion. This is particularly curious, Madam 
President, at a time when the majority, in its Contract With America, 
calls for additional spending to ensure readiness.
  Today's supplemental eats our seed corn in a number of important 
areas. This bill will cut over $500 million from defense research and 
development programs. To me, research and development ensures the 
Nation's future readiness. Make no mistake, yesterday's investment in 
R&D is what is winning today's battles. It is short sighted, in my 
view, to downplay or overlook the critical research and development 
plays in our overall readiness.
  I would like to take a moment, to direct my comments to two programs 
that have been embroiled in the debate over how to fund this 
supplemental request. They are the TRP Program and the Department of 
Commerce's Advanced Technology Program. I am very much relieved that 
the committee did not take the same kind of draconian cuts the House 
made and I urge the committee to maintain its position on these 
programs in conference with the House.
  I, like virtually every other Member of this body, have been a strong 
supporter of the technology reinvestment project [TRP]. When Congress 
first crafted this program in 1992, incorporating the recommendations 
of both the Democratic and the Republican task forces on defense 
conversion, the program received virtually universal support.
  Several Members on both sides of the aisle came to the floor to 
express their support for the program and the amendment providing 
funding for the program was adopted by a vote of 91 to 2. To suggest 
now that TRP funding is not a high priority is to forget the level of 
support this program has enjoyed.
  It is not surprising either because the TRP is an innovative, and I 
might add a more cost effective, way for the Department of Defense to 
meet its research and development requirements. The Defense Department 
has always spent a portion of its R&D funds on dual-use technologies, 
notwithstanding recent claims that funding for dual-use technologies is 
some sort of a handout.
  The truth of the matter is that DOD will continue to be involved in 
developing dual-use technologies, because one of the uses in any given 
dual-use technology is its military use.
  The operative question becomes how do we go about developing this 
dual-use technology that the military needs. The military can pay the 
full freight and develop it on its own as it has in the past. Or, the 
military can try to get the private sector to pay for half of it, since 
the dual-use technology also will have a commercial application.
  It seems simple to me. Do we want to pay full price or half price? I 
prefer to take advantage of the discount. TRP is not a subsidy or grant 
program for contractors. If anything, it is like a reverse subsidy for 
DOD, Mr. President.
  Just one example bears this out. The uncooled infrared rifle sight 
technology under development through TRP funding will help soldiers 
locate and engage the enemy in bad weather. In the private sector, it 
can be used by industry to detect energy losses in houses and 
buildings.
  Under a TRP funded, dual use approach the military's goal is to 
reduce 
[[Page S4067]] the unit price from about $100,000 to less than $10,000 
per unit, by tapping into the potential commercial market which is 10 
times larger than the military requirement. Without TRP, the military 
could pay 10 times more for the same technology.
  TRP funding is a small investment, accounting for less than two-
tenths of 1 percent of this year's Defense budget request. Yet, it 
leverages those defense dollars through industry cost-sharing and it 
could yield significant benefits to long-term military readiness. To 
kill the technology reinvestment project, as the House bill would do, 
would be like killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. It just does 
not make sense.
  Madam President, my concern about efforts to erode government-
industry joint efforts to develop next-generation technology extends to 
the House-passed $107 million rescission of funds for the Advanced 
Technology Program [ATP].
  ATP is cost-shared, industry-led, competitively awarded R&D which 
pursues cutting edge technologies with strong potential for later 
commercial success but technology that presently is too risky or too 
long term to be pursued by industry alone.
  Like TRP, ATP was developed with strong bipartisan support in the 
Congress. ATP is intended to capitalize on America's strength in 
research and development to create jobs and economic growth, and 
increase our competitiveness in the global economy. While I believe any 
cut in these critical technology programs is extraordinarily short-
sighted, at least the Senate has reduced the amount of the rescission 
to $32 million; I urge my colleagues on the Appropriations Committee to 
do everything they can to maintain the Senate position in conference.
  Finally, Madam President, I cannot yield the floor without expressing 
my concern over the cuts taken in both the Defense Environmental 
Restoration Account and the Department of Energy's Environmental 
Management Program. A number of my colleagues have identified 
environmental cleanup as lower priority spending that could be used for 
other programs. This is terribly wrong headed Mr. President. I hope 
that the cuts taken in this supplemental do not signal the beginning of 
a full scale assault on these important programs in the future.
  Both DOD and DOE have legal obligations to clean up their facilities. 
We already know that failure to meet cleanup milestones will result in 
fines and penalties. In addition, for DOE, the cost to cleanup will 
increase substantially simply by virtue of the delay. I intend to 
address this issue at greater length in a separate statement. Like the 
mechanic in the transmission commercial, you can either pay me now or 
you can pay me later. But, it will cost more later.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Madam President, I want to comment on an important 
aspect of the debates that took place to develop the legislation 
approved today, and which I believe is directly related to the kind of 
military security, growing economy, and strong job base that Americans 
should be able to count on.
  I am referring to the work of the programs within the Department of 
Commerce, the Department of Defense, and other parts of the Federal 
Government that serve as partners with industry to spur advances in 
technology. My belief in these programs is very basic. Knowing what the 
investment in technology that our foreign competitors are making and 
the role that technology plays in expanding industries and high-wage 
jobs in our own country, I view these programs as an essential key to 
the economic security that West Virginians and the rest of the American 
people should expect Congress to work toward.
  For awhile, it appeared that this appropriations package would be 
used to cripple some of the most important technology programs in our 
public arsenal. But thanks to the efforts of many of my colleagues, and 
I am privileged to work closely with a group of them, we were fairly 
successful in reminding the Senate that a retreat from technology 
investments is a dangerous course in military and economic terms.
  In fact, I was pleased to see the Senate approve the Sense of the 
Senate resolution, offered by Senators Bingaman and Nunn and which I 
cosponsored, that expresses a continued commitment to the development 
of dual-use technologies to be used by both the military and the 
private sector.
  These kinds of private-public partnerships, including the Technology 
Reinvestment Project [TRP] and the Advanced Technology Program [ATP], 
chart the course we should be taking for a strong military and economic 
future. This concept is at the heart of the President's technology 
policy, and is the most cost effective way to employ the ever-shrinking 
Federal dollar in a way that maximizes our Federal dollars to the 
benefit of both the public and the private sector.
  To understand these kinds of partnerships, and the value of the TRP 
and the ATP, we need to look first at the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency [ARPA], which was set up nearly 40 years ago by President 
Eisenhower. I think we can all agree that ARPA is one of the big 
success stories to come out of the military-industrial complex over the 
years. Aside from technologies it helped develop that our armed 
services rely on today, things like stealth, the Global Positioning 
System and smart weapons, it is also one of the parents to some of the 
technologies that the people of America take for granted in their daily 
lives, things as varied as a desktop computer is from the laser in a CD 
player.
  I want to also remind my colleagues that the Internet, which is at 
the heart of the information super highway America is discovering, was 
originally known as ARPAnet. All of these technological breakthroughs 
were developed for the military, but have now been spun off into our 
daily lives. That is what the TRP, and the ATP, are about.
  It is about something even greater. We do not spend taxpayers' hard-
earned dollars on the TRP just because of what it does for the economy. 
It is housed in the Department of Defense because of its direct role in 
military readiness and the strength of our defense. Increasingly, 
cutting edge technology is not being developed in the military 
industrial complex, it is coming out of the private sector. The TRP 
program, and other public-private partnership give the Federal 
Government, and in the case of the TRP, the Department of Defense, 
access to the brain power and resources of our best civilian 
technologists. It is becoming less an issue of spin-offs and more an 
issue of spin-ons.
  We all know that great advances in computing came as spin-offs from 
DOD programs, but today the leading minds, the human and material 
resources, are in the private sector. Programs like the TRP give the 
military the chance to work with those minds and develop software and 
applications in conjunction with the private sector, where most of the 
innovation is happening. Then we can spin those technologies invented 
in partnership with the private sector on to military applications.
  And let me be clear, this is not about industrial policy; picking 
winners and losers. The private sector, in conjunction with the 
Department of Defense, are picking the winners. Where a program only 
has defense applications, such as a submarine, the private sector will 
not be interested in participating in a joint R&D project with the DOD. 
But when we are developing something that will have commercial and 
military applications, then the TRP can and should play a part.
  It is a ridiculous waste of our country's private and public capital 
to duplicate our investments in research and development where the 
military needs something that the private sector may be developing on 
their own. Frankly, we cannot afford it on either end. If last month's 
balanced budget debate illuminated anything for the American people, it
 is that we are going to have to squeeze every last dollar we can out 
of the Federal budget. I support the deficit reduction portion of this 
bill. I do not like every line-item in the rescissions package, but 
overall, it is something we simply have to do. Likewise, the government 
cannot afford to do all the research and development on leading edge 
technologies that they will need to maintain the kind of fighting force 
we all envision. But if we pool our Federal resources with the private 
sector's, then we all benefit.
  [[Page S4068]] I want to point out just one example that demonstrates 
the usefulness of the TRP to both the armed services and America's 
consumers. Right now, DOD, in conjunction with private industry is 
developing something called multi-chip module [MCM] technology. This 
will allow electronic systems to work faster and more reliably while 
using less power. DOD needs MCM's for things like precision-guidance of 
advanced weapons and real-time signaling for intelligence activities. 
Likewise, the private sector is itching to put MCM's to use in a 
variety of consumer products, from cars to digital signals in audio and 
video telecommunications. Certainly we can fund this out of our defense 
budget, but when there is a clear private sector interest in doing this 
jointly, why go it alone?
  And this should not be a political issue. Many of my colleagues on 
the other side of the aisle have supported technology programs such as 
this in the past. As has been noted by others, the basis of this sense-
of-the-Senate amendment is former Senator Rudman's task force report of 
1992, which was endorsed by many of my current distinguished 
colleagues, Senators Stevens, McCain, Warner, and Thurmond among them.
  I should note, that the defense supplemental portion of this package 
is breaking new ground here. This bill was submitted to the Congress 
for emergency consideration. That is because the costs that we are 
trying to cover were unforseen. They were unplanned activities that 
were undertaken in our national interest.
  Madam President, we must be fiscally responsible. But we should 
resist the fool's game of trying to outfox or out-cut one another. We 
were elected to set priorities, to deal with current national needs and 
plan for the future. Because of the size of the Federal deficit, that 
must include an intense effort to get our books in order. But it should 
not be a political contest or done blindly. If we abandon the programs 
and investments designed to maintain a military and economic foundation 
for all Americans, we will see the pain from a crumbling manufacturing 
base and defenses after it is too late.
  We cannot compromise our future, be it in technology, education, or 
child nutrition, for the sake of today's political brinkmanship. We 
must fight for what we know must be national priorities, and I will 
fight for West Virginia's. The winners will be our soldiers in the 
field, our children and their ability to learn, the workforce needed to 
keep this country strong. And in the case of the technology programs 
discussed in this statement, we want to make sure the winners include 
our indusries--and our workers--who are on the frontline of the global 
economic battlefield.
  Mrs. BOXER. Madam President, after much thought and analysis, I have 
decided to oppose this bill. I have made this decision for one simple 
reason: on balance, I believe this bill is bad for California and bad 
for the Nation.
  I support the supplemental appropriations contained in this bill, 
which cover the costs of unbudgeted contingencies in Somalia, Bosnia, 
and Haiti. However, I believe that these unplanned operations should 
have been treated by the committee as emergency requirements, as 
requested by the Department of Defense.
  Having elected to recommend supplemental funding without the 
emergency designation, the committee was obligated to find offsetting 
rescissions. Regrettably, the committee has recommended for rescission 
in this bill programs that are vital to the defense of our country and 
to the economic security of the State of California. The cuts made in 
environmental cleanup programs and in research and development programs 
like the Technology Reinvestment Project, or TRP, are wrong for this 
country and wrong for California. I cannot support these reckless cuts, 
Madam President, and I will not.
  This bill contains a $300 million rescission for DERA, the Defense 
Environmental Restoration Account--twice the cut passed by the House.
  What would this rescission mean for the State of California?
  At the Marine Corps Logistics Base in Barstow, efforts to clean 
contaminated groundwater could be delayed. Soil contaminated with heavy 
metals, petroleum hydrocarbons, pesticides, and herbicides may not be 
removed.
  At the Concord Naval Weapons Station in the bay area, cutting DERA 
means delaying cleanup on polluted tidal and inland areas. If this 
rescission is enacted, contaminated water and soil may sit idle so we 
can say we did the responsible thing by ensuring that every dollar in 
this bill was offset by a rescission somewhere else in the Pentagon 
budget. But that's not really the responsible thing. The responsible 
thing to do is not create an environmental hazard in the first place, 
but if you do, you clean it up, and you clean it up fast.
  I want to make a final point on this DERA rescission. Earlier this 
month, the Department of Defense announced which military bases it 
wants to close in the 1995 BRAC round. California was hit again. One 
major base was recommended for closure and several other installations 
face realignment. I will fight hard for those bases and get their 
positive stories out. But if those
 installations stay on the list, I want the contaminated sites at those 
bases cleaned up as fast as possible so the communities can do 
something productive with that land.

  In the 1995 base closure round, unlike previous rounds, environmental 
cleanup will be funded by the DERA account. That is the very same 
account that this bill proposes cutting by $300 million.
  So I would say to all Senators, if you have a base in your State that 
may be scheduled for closure this year, think long and hard about 
cutting $300 million from the Department's primary environmental 
cleanup account. Believe me, you do not want to find yourself in a 
situation where the military is moving out, but the community cannot 
move in because of environmental contamination. California has been in 
that situation too often, and it is very, very unpleasant.
  The Senate considered an amendment last week offered by Senator 
McCain to reduce the rescission in this bill for environmental cleanup 
funding by increasing the cut for the Technology Reinvestment Project, 
or TRP. I opposed that amendment not because of the DERA increase--
which I support--but because of the draconian TRP cut. That amendment 
presented the Senate with an impossible choice: allow deep rescissions 
in DERA or kill the Technology Reinvestment Project outright.
  However, even without the McCain amendment, this bill rescinds $200 
million from the Technology Reinvestment Project. To be sure, this is 
better than the House rescission of $500 million, which would kill the 
program, but the Senate rescission will badly damage this critically 
needed program.
  Research and development is the key to maintaining our military 
advantage in the future. But the Department of Defense can no longer 
afford to maintain its own private research industrial base. We must 
gain access to the commercial technology sector, which in many ways out 
performs the defense technology base. We must gain access to this 
commercial technology in the most cost effective way possible--ensuring 
the public the greatest value for its tax dollar.
  The TRP achieves these goals. Let me cite just one example. The TRP 
has funded a proposal led by the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit 
District to develop an advanced automated train control system. Like 
all TRP projects, this grant is matched at least 50-50 by the private 
sector. For every dollar the government spends, the consortium led by 
BART spends at least one dollar.
  This technology currently being developed by the BART will allow 
system operators to know exactly where there trains are--even 
underground in tunnels. This allows trains to operate more safely and 
in closer proximity. Reducing separation distance between trains allows 
the BART to have more cars in service at the same time, which doubles 
passenger carrying capacity.
  Critics of the TRP complain vociferously about projects like the BART 
train control system. ``What has that got to do with national 
security?'', they say.
  The BART train control system has everything to do with national 
security. This project is based on the Army's Enhanced Position 
Location Reporting System, which is designed to enable commanders on 
the battlefield 
[[Page S4069]] to collect vital information about the location of 
troops in real time. The National Economic Council estimates that the 
technology developed by the BART's TRP project may improve the Enhanced 
Position Locator and at the same time, reduce its cost by up to 40 
percent.
  So what does this TRP project do for our country? For private 
industry, it provides a chance to break into a market dominated by 
foreign companies, perhaps creating thousands of American jobs and 
strengthening our economy. For the Department of Defense, it offers a 
better and cheaper way to collect battlefield information in real 
time--information that may save soldiers' lives. And for the people of 
San Francisco, this project provides safer, faster, and more efficient 
public transportation. This TRP grant creates a win-win-win situation--
one that is being duplicated with similar projects around the country.
  The TRP is a model dual-use program. It should be expanded and 
emulated, not cut to the point that its very existence is jeopardized.
  To offset the supplemental appropriations made in this bill, the 
committee has recommended rescinding environmental cleanup, the TRP and 
other high priority projects. I find it difficult to believe that less 
important offsets could not be found in the $260 billion Pentagon 
budget. Consider this: the Congressional Budget Office estimates that 
at the end of fiscal year 1995, more than $19 billion will remain 
unobligated in the Pentagon's procurement accounts.
  Surely, that $19 billion fund is large enough to offset the funds 
this bill would cut from environmental cleanup and the TRP. Simply 
cutting unobligated procurement funds by 3 percent would generate more 
than enough savings to offset the TRP and environmental cleanup 
rescission contained in this bill.
  I hope that when this bill is considered in conference committee, the 
Senate managers will take a very close look at these unobligated 
accounts and try to find a way to minimize the damage done to the very 
important TRP and DERA accounts.
  I also want to serve notice, Madam President, to those who would 
eliminate all defense reinvestment and environmental cleanup in the 
Pentagon budget. That must not happen.
  Defense reinvestment must remain a national priority for the security 
of our country and our communities. Environmental cleanup is the moral, 
ethical, and in many cases, legal responsibility of the Department of 
Defense, and its must continue.
  When the Senate debates the budget in the spring and when it debates 
the annual defense bills later in the year, these issues will certainly 
be revisited. Rest assured that I and other concerned Senators will 
continue to voice their strong support for these vitally needed 
programs.
  Finally Madam President, I must express my profound disappointment 
that the Senate accepted an amendment offered by Senator Hutchison to 
rescind funding needed to protect endangered species.
  This amendment is an irresponsible approach to some very real 
problems. It is clearly a first step in a piecemeal dismantling of the 
Endangered Species Act.
  It is important to note that this amendment was offered while the 
Committee on Environment and Public Works was diligently working on a 
bill offered by the Senator from Texas that was substantially similar 
to her amendment. I believe that the wiser course would have been to 
work cooperatively with the committee, under the able leadership of 
Senator Chafee, to find a mutually satisfactory solution to this 
important problem.
  The rescission of $1.5 million from the Fish and Wildlife Service 
listing budget for 1995, combined with the restriction on remaining 
funds, effectively kills the Endangered Species Act listing process for 
1995. This could cause some species to become extinct and surely will 
delay solving the very real problems that need attention. This is a 
irresponsible action, which I strongly oppose.
  For all these reasons, I must oppose this bill.
                              project elf

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, this bill marks a milestone for 
Wisconsin by rescinding funds for Project ELF, a Navy communications 
system located in Clam Lake, WI, and Republic, MI. This is one cut that 
the local congressional delegation will not oppose. In fact, I think 
most of us welcome it.
  In the last two Congresses. I have introduced legislation to 
terminate Project ELF. Senator Kohl has joined me in those efforts, as 
well as in letters to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense, and 
the relevant congressional committees urging ELF's termination. 
Congressman David Obey has been a consistent opponent of Project ELF 
throughout his congressional tenure, and indeed is responsible for 
keeping down the initial size of the program. Representatives from 
nearby areas have also been helpful in our quest. I am pleased that the 
Senate will take the first step, the first real action, toward finally 
terminating this outdated and effective program.
  The concept of extremely low frequency communications emerged when 
submarines started going so far beneath the surface ordinary radios 
could not reach them. In 1968, the Pentagon proposed the first version 
of ELF communications in Project Sanguine. It was to be 6,200 miles of 
cable buried underground, along with 100 ELF transmitter towers spread 
out over 40 percent of northern Wisconsin. It had to be built in 
Wisconsin because of unique granite bedrock which would not interfere 
with ELF signals. Project Sanguine was supposed to communicate with 
Trident submarines, and was designed to survive a nuclear attack. When 
residents became aware of it, the project was scuttled.
  In 1975, Project Sanguine came back as Project Seafarer. Seafarer was 
not supposed to have nuclear survivability, but would have above-ground 
transmitters with underground cables. As Project Seafarer, though, ELF 
communications lost their wartime efficacy. In fact, an ad hoc ELF 
review group of the Secretary of Defense advised that a small ELF 
system would be of marginal utility and was not credible as an ultimate 
ELF system. However, it recommended that building a small ELF was 
better than building no ELF at all because the modified version would 
provide a basis for future system growth if ELF requirements later 
increased. This was a typical bureaucratic foot in the door program.
  Again, due to public concern and budget pressures, President Carter 
terminated Seafarer in 1978 and directed further studies on how to 
proceed with ELF. Congressman Obey was successful in fencing off funds 
in fiscal year 1979 until the President certified that ELF was in the 
national interest and that it had found a place to be built.
  There was yet another scaled-down ELF system called Austere ELF that 
had been proposed in 1977. It would have been a single transmitter 
located at K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base in Michigan. Once it began 
development, Austere ELF was again in trouble with resident resistance 
and budget constraints. After a few years of misguided attempts and 
false starts, the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, recommended to 
the Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, that the ELF communication 
system be shelved.
  Secretary Lehman was overruled, though, and the Reagan administration 
ordered the development of a scaled down system called Project ELF in 
1981. In its present scaled down version, ELF consists of 28 miles of 
cable at Clam Lake and 56 miles of cable at Republic. ELF was initially 
ordered operational in 1985, and was fully functional by 1987.
  Scaled down Project ELF was supposed to cost $230 million for 
development and construction. However, in an October 1993 letter to 
Senator Nunn, the Pentagon said it had invested nearly $600 million in 
ELF. In a January 1994 report on ELF, the Navy said that ELF costs 
approximately $15 to $16 million a year in operating costs.
  If ELF served a strategic purpose, this would not be a significant 
investment. But Project ELF is ineffective and at best obsolete. For 
that reason, it is millions of dollars which can find a better use. 
Throughout its history, ELF has never found a mission fit for its 
times.
  The Navy officially states that ELF is simply a communications 
system 
[[Page S4070]] which tells a Trident to come to surface in order to 
receive a message; in effect, ELF is a bell ringer. If this was ever 
the true purpose, ELF is a faulty mechanism for that.
  First, the bell ringer is supposed to protect the Tridents from 
detection by permitting them to surface on the call of a signal that 
they had a longer message awaiting them. Yet if they have to rise to 
the surface to receive their message, then they are at risk of 
detection before executing any order ELF would tell them to retrieve. 
ELF itself cannot execute an order.
  Second, ELF has no reliable second strike or counterforce 
communication capability in any instance. It also cannot be counted on 
to communicate with a submarine during a crisis since its large size 
makes it extremely susceptible to conventional or nuclear attack. Thus, 
it is not dependable retaliatory action.
  Further, if ELF were to be destroyed during attack, then subs would 
be required to use their antennae at or near the surface, and receive 
their messages through LF/VLF. But in the case of a crisis, submarines 
should be brought closer to the surface anyway, not only for better 
communications, but also because missiles cannot be launched from such 
depths as ELF reaches.
  Finally, ELF is one-way communications system, so submarines cannot 
send messages back.
  Thus, Project ELF's utility appears only to be in a pre-war 
disposition, and only for one purpose: to serve only as a triggering 
signal for a first-strike launch. This is a capability we are 
dismantling. So, ELF's mere presence is far more provocative than its 
utility warrants.
  I should also mention that ELF's environmental impact may be quite 
damaging. Though no studies have conclusively found that ELF radiowaves 
are dangerous to residents in outlying areas, the research that has 
been done does little to comfort those living near Project ELF. A 1992 
Swedish study found that children living near relatively weak magnetic 
waves such as those emanating from ELF are four times more likely to 
develop leukemia. I certainly understand any fears Wisconsin residents 
must have. In fact, in 1984, a U.S. District court, ruling on State of 
Wisconsin versus Weinberger, order Project ELF to be shut down because 
the Navy paid inadequate attention to ELF's possible health effects and 
violated the National Environmental Policy Act. An appeals court, 
though, threw out the ruling arguing that the national security threat 
from the Soviets at the time was more important. Clearly, the premise 
of that ruling is no longer valid given the collapse of the U.S.S.R.
  For all these reasons, I am pleased that after trying to justify 
ELF's mission in the post-cold war world, the Navy is finally letting 
it go. Project ELF never made U.S. submarines invulnerable, and it 
doesn't make them invulnerable today. ELF is not worth any money 
because it doesn't have a purpose.
  If it is a first-strike weapon, then it is destabilizing and 
threatening, which hardly increases our security. If it is merely a 
communication system, it is inadequate. A weapon or communications 
device designed to keep deeply submerged submarines submerged is no 
longer necessary. ELF was built for war, not peace. It is not guarding 
against any capable enemy now, but is sucking up money that could be.
  I am pleased that the committee has recognized this, and recommended 
its termination in this rescission bill. I hope we will hold the cut in 
conference, and that, finally, this weapon, which has long been in 
search of a mission, is terminated.
                           amendment no. 336

  Mr. BRADLEY. Madam President, I regret that I was unable to be 
recorded on the vote on Senator Hutchison's amendment concerning the 
Endangered Species Act. I would like to declare for the Record that, 
had I been present, I would have opposed--strongly opposed--the 
Hutchison amendment.
  This amendment amounts to major legislation. This is not some little 
adjustment. There is little subtlety here. And, there is little doubt 
that this amendment has nothing to do with the task at hand, which is 
to provide supplemental appropriations to the Department of Defense and 
to cut Government spending.
  I understand the call for reform of the Endangered Species Act. I 
have heard many allegations of abuse and bureaucratic overreach. But 
the Hutchison amendment is not reform. It solves no problems. It does 
not belong on this bill and it does not reflect well on the Senate or 
the majority to legislate in such a cavalier fashion.
  Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I have been told that we are now ready 
for final passage.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further amendment to be 
proposed, the question is on the engrossment of the amendments and 
third reading of the bill.
  The amendments were ordered to be engrossed, and the bill to be read 
a third time.
  Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays on final 
passage.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the 
question is, Shall the bill pass?
  The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the 
roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 97, nays 3, as follows:
                      [Rollcall Vote No. 108 Leg.]

                                YEAS--97

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pressler
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner
     Wellstone

                                NAYS--3

     Boxer
     Hollings
     Pryor
  So the bill (H.R. 889), as amended, was passed as follows:

       Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives 
     (H.R. 889) entitled ``An Act making emergency supplemental 
     appropriations and rescissions to preserve and enhance the 
     military readiness of the Department of Defense for the 
     fiscal year ending September 30, 1995, and for other 
     purposes'', do pass with the following amendments:
       (1)Page 1, strike out all after line 2 over to and 
     including line 12 on page 16 and insert:

     That the following sums are appropriated, out of any money in 
     the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to provide 
     supplemental appropriations for the Department of Defense for 
     the fiscal year ending September 30, 1995, and for other 
     purposes, namely:
                                TITLE I

                               CHAPTER I

                      SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS

                    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE--MILITARY

                           MILITARY PERSONNEL
                        Military Personnel, Army

       For an additional amount for ``Military Personnel, Army'', 
     $35,400,000.

                        Military Personnel, Navy

       For an additional amount for ``Military Personnel, Navy'', 
     $49,500,000.

                    Military Personnel, Marine Corps

       For an additional amount for ``Military Personnel, Marine 
     Corps'', $10,400,000.

                     Military Personnel, Air Force

       For an additional amount for ``Military Personnel, Air 
     Force'', $37,400,000.

                        Reserve Personnel, Navy

       For an additional amount for ``Reserve Personnel, Navy'', 
     $4,600,000.
                       OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

                    Operation and Maintenance, Army

       For an additional amount for ``Operation and Maintenance, 
     Army'', $636,900,000.

                    Operation and Maintenance, Navy

       For an additional amount for ``Operation and Maintenance, 
     Navy'', $284,100,000.

                Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps

       For an additional amount for ``Operation and Maintenance, 
     Marine Corps'', $27,700,000.
          [[Page S4071]] Operation and Maintenance, Air Force

       For an additional amount for ``Operation and Maintenance, 
     Air Force'', $785,800,000.

                Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide

       For an additional amount for ``Operation and Maintenance, 
     Defense-Wide'', $43,200,000.
                Operation and Maintenance, Navy Reserve

       For an additional amount for ``Operation and Maintenance, 
     Navy Reserve'', $6,400,000.

                  OTHER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS

                         Defense Health Program

       For an additional amount for ``Defense Health Program'', 
     $14,000,000.

                           GENERAL PROVISIONS

       Sec. 101. No part of any appropriation contained in this 
     Act shall remain available for obligation beyond the current 
     fiscal year unless expressly so provided herein.
       Sec. 102. During the current fiscal year, appropriations 
     available to the Department of Defense for the pay of 
     civilian personnel may be used, without regard to the time 
     limitations specified in section 5523(a) of title 5, United 
     States Code, for payments under the provisions of section 
     5523 of title 5, United States Code, in the case of 
     employees, or an employee's dependents or immediate family, 
     evacuated from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, pursuant to the August 
     26, 1994 order of the Secretary of Defense.


                     (INCLUDING TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

       Sec. 103. In addition to amounts appropriated or otherwise 
     made available by this Act, $28,297,000 is hereby 
     appropriated to the Department of Defense and shall be 
     available only for transfer to the United States Coast Guard 
     to cover the incremental operating costs associated with 
     Operations Able Manner, Able Vigil, Restore Democracy, and 
     Support Democracy: Provided, That such amount shall remain 
     available for obligation until September 30, 1996.
       Sec. 104. (a) Section 8106A of the Department of Defense 
     Appropriations Act, 1995 (Public Law 103-335), is amended by 
     striking out the last proviso and inserting in lieu thereof 
     the following: ``: Provided further, That if, after September 
     30, 1994, a member of the Armed Forces (other than the Coast 
     Guard) is approved for release from active duty or full-time 
     National Guard duty and that person subsequently becomes 
     employed in a position of civilian employment in the 
     Department of Defense within 180 days after the release from 
     active duty or full-time National Guard duty, then that 
     person is not eligible for payments under a Special 
     Separation Benefits program (under section 1174a of title 10, 
     United States Code) or a Voluntary Separation Incentive 
     program (under section 1175 of title 10, United States Code) 
     by reason of the release from active duty or full-time 
     National Guard duty, and the person shall reimburse the 
     United States the total amount, if any, paid such person 
     under the program before the employment begins''.
       (b) Appropriations available to the Department of Defense 
     for fiscal year 1995 may be obligated for making payments 
     under sections 1174a and 1175 of title 10, United States 
     Code.
       (c) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall be effective 
     as of September 30, 1994.
       Sec. 105. Subsection 8054(g) of the Department of Defense 
     Appropriations Act, 1995 (Public Law 103-335), is amended to 
     read as follows: ``Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, of the amounts available to the Department of Defense 
     during fiscal year 1995, not more than $1,252,650,000 may be 
     obligated for financing activities of defense FFRDCs: 
     Provided, That, in addition to any other reductions required 
     by this section, the total amount appropriated in title IV of 
     this Act is hereby reduced by $200,000,000 to reflect the 
     funding ceiling contained in this subsection and to reflect 
     further reductions in amounts available to the Department of 
     Defense to finance activities carried out by defense FFRDCs 
     and other entities providing consulting services, studies and 
     analyses, systems engineering and technical assistance, and 
     technical, engineering and management support.''.
                             (RESCISSIONS)

       Sec. 106. Of the funds provided in Department of Defense 
     Appropriations Acts, the following funds are hereby rescinded 
     from the following accounts in the specified amounts:
       Operation and Maintenance, Navy, $16,300,000;
       Operation and Maintenance, Air Force, $2,000,000;
       Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide, $90,000,000;
       Environmental Restoration, Defense, $300,000,000;
       Aircraft Procurement, Army, 1995/1997, $77,611,000;
       Procurement of Ammunition, Army, 1993/1995, $85,000,000;
       Procurement of Ammunition, Army, 1995/1997, $89,320,000;
       Other Procurement, Army, 1995/1997, $46,900,000;
       Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, 1995/1999, $26,600,000;
       Missile Procurement, Air Force, 1993/1995, $33,000,000;
       Missile Procurement, Air Force, 1994/1996, $86,184,000;
       Other Procurement, Air Force, 1995/1997, $6,100,000;
       Procurement, Defense-Wide, 1995/1997, $81,000,000;
       Defense Production Act, $100,000,000;
       Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Army, 1995/
     1996, $38,300,000;
       Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy, 1995/
     1996, $59,600,000;
       Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force, 
     1994/1995, $81,100,000;
       Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force, 
     1995/1996, $226,900,000;
       Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide, 
     1994/1995, $77,000,000;
       Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide, 
     1995/1996, $351,000,000.


                          (transfer of funds)

       Sec. 107. Section 8005 of the Department of Defense 
     Appropriations Act, 1995 (Public Law 103-335; 108 Stat. 
     2617), is amended by striking out ``$2,000,000,000'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``$1,750,000,000''.
     SEC. 108. REPORT ON COST AND SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR MILITARY 
                   ACTIVITIES IN HAITI.

       (a) Requirement.--None of the funds appropriated by this 
     Act or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense 
     may be expended for operations or activities of the Armed 
     Forces in and around Haiti sixty days after enactment of this 
     Act, unless the President submits to Congress the report 
     described in subsection (b).
       (b) Report Elements.--The report referred to in subsection 
     (a) shall include the following:
       (1) A detailed description of the estimated cumulative 
     incremental cost of all United States activities subsequent 
     to September 30, 1993, in and around Haiti, including but not 
     limited to--
       (A) the cost of all deployments of United States Armed 
     Forces and Coast Guard personnel, training, exercises, 
     mobilization, and preparation activities, including the 
     preparation of police and military units of the other nations 
     of the multinational force involved in enforcement of 
     sanctions, limits on migration, establishment and maintenance 
     of migrant facilities at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere, and 
     all other activities relating to operations in and around 
     Haiti; and
       (B) the costs of all other activities relating to United 
     States policy toward Haiti, including humanitarian and 
     development assistance, reconstruction, balance of payments 
     and economic support, assistance provided to reduce or 
     eliminate all arrearages owed to International Financial 
     Institutions, all rescheduling or forgiveness of United 
     States bilateral and multilateral debt, aid and other 
     financial assistance, all in-kind contributions, and all 
     other costs to the United States Government.
       (2) A detailed accounting of the source of funds obligated 
     or expended to meet the costs described in paragraph (1), 
     including--
       (A) in the case of funds expended from the Department of 
     Defense budget, a breakdown by military service or defense 
     agency, line item, and program; and
       (B) in the case of funds expended from the budgets of 
     departments and agencies other than the Department of 
     Defense, by department or agency and program.
       Sec. 109. It is the sense of the Senate that (1) cost-
     shared partnerships between the Department of Defense and the 
     private sector to develop dual-use technologies (technologies 
     that have applications both for defense and for commercial 
     markets, such as computers, electronics, advanced materials, 
     communications, and sensors) are increasingly important to 
     ensure efficient use of defense procurement resources, and 
     (2) such partnerships, including Sematech and the Technology 
     Reinvestment Project, need to become the norm for conducting 
     such applied research by the Department of Defense.
       Sec. 110. None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made 
     available by this Act may be obligated or expended for 
     assistance to or programs in the Democratic People's Republic 
     of Korea, or for implementation of the October 21, 1994, 
     Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic 
     People's Republic of Korea, unless specifically appropriated 
     for that purpose.
       (2)Page 16 after line 12 insert:
     SEC. 111. LIMITATION ON EMERGENCY AND EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSES.

       (a) In General.--Funds appropriated or otherwise made 
     available to the Department of Defense may not be obligated 
     under section 127 of title 10, United States Code, for the 
     provision of assistance, including the donation, sale, or 
     financing for sale, of any item, to a foreign country that is 
     ineligible under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the 
     Arms Export Control Act to receive any category of 
     assistance.
       (b) Effective Date.--The limitations in subsection (a) 
     shall apply to obligations made on or after the date of 
     enactment of this Act.
       (3)Page 16, after line 12, insert:
       Sec. 112. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     no funds appropriated by this Act, or otherwise appropriated 
     or made available by any other Act, may be utilized for 
     purposes of entering into the agreement described in 
     subsection (b) until the President certifies to Congress 
     that--
       (1) Russia has agreed not to sell nuclear reactor 
     components to Iran; or
       (2) the issue of the sale by Russia of such components to 
     Iran has been resolved in a manner that is consistent with--
       (A) the national security objectives of the United States; 
     and
       (B) the concerns of the United States with respect to 
     nonproliferation in the Middle East.
       (b) The agreement referred to in subsection (a) is an 
     agreement known as the Agreement on the Exchange of 
     Equipment, Technology, and Materials between the United 
     States Government and the Government of the Russian 
     Federation, or any department or agency of that government 
     (including the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy), that the 
     United States Government proposes to enter into under section 
     123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153).
       (4)Page 16 after line 12 insert:
       Sec. 113. It is the sense of the Senate that--
       (1) Congress should enact legislation that terminates the 
     entitlement to pay and allowances for each member of the 
     Armed Forces who is sentenced by a court-martial to 
     confinement and either a dishonorable discharge, bad-conduct 
     discharge, or dismissal;
     [[Page S4072]]   (2) the legislation should provide for 
     restoration of the entitlement if the sentence to confinement 
     and punitive discharge or dismissal, as the case may be, is 
     disapproved or set aside; and
       (3) the legislation should include authority for the 
     establishment of a program that provides transitional 
     benefits for spouses and other dependents of a member of the 
     Armed Forces receiving such a sentence.
       (5)Page 16 after line 12 insert:
     SEC. 114. RESCISSION OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN MILITARY 
                   CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS.

       (a) Conditional Rescission of Funds For Certain Projects.--
     (1)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and subject 
     to paragraphs (2) and (3), of the funds provided in the 
     Military Construction Appropriations Act, 1995 (Public Law 
     103-307; 108 Stat. 1659), the following funds are hereby 
     rescinded from the following accounts in the specified 
     amounts:
       Military Construction, Army, $11,554,000.
       Military Construction, Air Force, $6,500,000.
       (B) Rescissions under this paragraph are for projects at 
     military installations that were recommended for closure by 
     the Secretary of Defense in the recommendations submitted by 
     the Secretary to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
     Commission on March 1, 1995, under the base closure Act.
       (2) A rescission of funds under paragraph (1) shall not 
     occur with respect to a project covered by that paragraph if 
     the Secretary certifies to Congress that--
       (A) the military installation at which the project is 
     proposed will not be subject to closure or realignment as a 
     result of the 1995 round of the base closure process; or
       (B) if the installation will be subject to realignment 
     under that round of the process, the project is for a 
     function or activity that will not be transferred from the 
     installation as a result of the realignment.
       (3) A certification under paragraph (2) shall be effective 
     only if--
       (A) the Secretary submits the certification together with 
     the approval and recommendations transmitted to Congress by 
     the President in 1995 under paragraph (2) or (4) section 
     2903(e) of the base closure Act; or
       (B) the base closure process in 1995 is terminated pursuant 
     to paragraph (5) of that section.
       (b) Additional Rescissions Relating to Base Closure 
     Process.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds 
     provided in the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 
     1995 for a military construction project are hereby rescinded 
     if--
       (1) the project is located at an installation that the 
     President recommends for closure in 1995 under section 
     2903(e) of the base closure Act; or
       (2) the project is located at an installation that the 
     President recommends for realignment in 1995 under such 
     section and the function or activity with which the project 
     is associated will be transferred from the installation as a 
     result of the realignment.
       (c) Definition.--In the section, the term ``base closure 
     Act'' means the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 
     1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 
     2687 note).
       (6)Page 16 after line 12 insert:
     SEC. 115. SENSE OF SENATE ON SOUTH KOREA TRADE BARRIERS TO 
                   UNITED STATES BEEF AND PORK.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (1) The United States has approximately 37,000 military 
     personnel stationed in South Korea and spent over 
     $2,000,000,000 last year to preserve peace on the Korean 
     peninsula.
       (2) The United States Trade Representative has initiated a 
     section 301 investigation against South Korea for its 
     nontariff trade barriers on United States beef and pork.
       (3) The barriers cited in the section 301 petition include 
     government-mandated shelf-life requirements, lengthy 
     inspection and customs procedures, and arbitrary testing 
     requirements that effectively close the South Korean market 
     to such beef and pork.
       (4) United States trade and agriculture officials are in 
     the process of negotiating with South Korea to open South 
     Korea's market to United States beef and pork.
       (5) The United States meat industry estimates that South 
     Korea's nontariff trade barriers on United States beef and 
     pork cost United States businesses more than $240,000,000 in 
     lost revenue last year and could account for more than 
     $1,000,000,000 in lost revenue to such business by 1999 if 
     South Korea's trade practices on such beef and pork are left 
     unchanged.
       (6) The United States beef and pork industries are a vital 
     part of the United States economy, with operations in each of 
     the 50 States.
       (7) Per capita consumption of beef and pork in South Korea 
     is currently twice that of such consumption in Japan. Given 
     that the Japanese are currently the leading importers of 
     United States beef and pork, South Korea holds the potential 
     of becoming an unparalleled market for United States beef and 
     pork.
       (b) It is the sense of the Senate that--
       (1) the security relationship between the United States and 
     South Korea is essential to the security of the United 
     States, South Korea, the Asia-Pacific region and the rest of 
     the world;
       (2) the efforts of the United States Trade Representative 
     to open South Korea's market to United States beef and pork 
     deserve support and commendation; and
       (3) The United States Trade Representative should continue 
     to insist upon the removal of South Korea's nontariff 
     barriers to United States beef and pork.
       (7)Page 16 after line 12 insert:
       Sec. 116. (a)(1) The Senate finds that the Treaty on the 
     Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, hereinafter referred to 
     as the NPT, is the cornerstone of the global nuclear 
     nonproliferation regime;
       (2) That, with more than 170 parties, the NPT enjoys the 
     widest adherence of any arms control agreement in history;
       (3) That the NPT sets the fundamental legal and political 
     framework for prohibiting all forms of nuclear 
     nonproliferation;
       (4) That the NPT provides the fundamental legal and 
     political foundation for the efforts through which the 
     nuclear arms race was brought to an end and the world's 
     nuclear arsenals are being reduced as quickly, safely and 
     securely as possible;
       (5) That the NPT spells out only three extension options: 
     indefinite extension, extension for a fixed period, or 
     extension for fixed periods;
       (6) That any temporary or conditional extension of the NPT 
     would require a dangerously slow and unpredictable process of 
     re-ratification that would cripple the NPT;
       (7) That it is the policy of the President of the United 
     States to seek indefinite and unconditional extension of the 
     NPT: Now, therefore;
       (b) It is the sense of the Senate that--
       (1) indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT would 
     strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime;
       (2) indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT is in 
     the interest of the United States because it would enhance 
     international peace and security;
       (3) the President of the United States has the full support 
     of the Senate in seeking the indefinite and unconditional 
     extension of the NPT;
       (4) all parties to the NPT should vote to extend the NPT 
     unconditionally and indefinitely; and
       (5) parties opposing indefinite and unconditional extension 
     of the NPT are acting against their own interest, the 
     interest of the United States and the interest of all the 
     peoples of the world by placing the nuclear nonproliferation 
     regime and global security at risk.
       (8)Page 16 after line 12 insert:
       Sec. 117. National Test Facility.--It is the sense of the 
     Senate that the National Test Facility provides important 
     support to strategic and theater missile defense in the 
     following areas--
       (a) United States-United Kingdom defense planning;
       (b) the PATRIOT and THAAD programs;
       (c) computer support for the Advanced Research Center; and
       (d) technical assistance to theater missile defense;
     and fiscal year 1995 funding should be maintained to ensure 
     retention of these priority functions.
       (9)Page 16 after line 12 insert:
       Sec. 118. (a) In determining the amount of funds available 
     for obligation from the Environmental Restoration, Defense, 
     account in fiscal year 1995 for environmental restoration at 
     the military installations described in subsection (b), the 
     Secretary of Defense shall not take into account the 
     rescission from the account set forth in section 106.
       (b) Subsection (a) applies to military installations that 
     the Secretary recommends for closure or realignment in 1995 
     under section 2903(c) of the Defense Base Closure and 
     Realignment Act of 1990 (subtitle A of title XXIX of Public 
     Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).
       (10)Page 16 after line 12 insert:
                               CHAPTER II

       Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs

                     bilateral economic assistance

                  funds appropriated to the president

                           debt restructuring

                         debt relief for jordan

       For the cost, as defined in section 502 of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974, of modifying direct loans 
     to Jordan issued by the Export-Import Bank or by the Agency 
     for International Development or by the Department of 
     Defense, or for the cost of modifying: (1) concessional loans 
     authorized under title I of the Agricultural Trade 
     Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, and (2) 
     credits owed by Jordan to the Commodity Credit Corporation, 
     as a result of the Corporation's status as a guarantor of 
     credits in connection with export sales to Jordan; as 
     authorized under subsection (a) under the heading, ``Debt 
     Relief for Jordan'', in title VI of Public Law 103-306, 
     $275,000,000, to remain available until September 30, 1996: 
     Provided, That not more than $50,000,000 of the funds 
     appropriated by this paragraph may be obligated prior to 
     October 1, 1995.
       (11)Page 16 strike out line 13 and insert:
                                TITLE II
       (12)Page 16, strike out all after line 20 over to and 
     including line 7 on page 17 and insert:
                         DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

                 Immigration and Naturalization Service


                       immigration emergency fund

                              (rescission)

       Of the amounts made available under this heading in Public 
     Law 103-317, $10,000,000 are rescinded.

                         DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

             National Institute of Standards and Technology


                     industrial technology services

                              (rescission)

       Of the amounts made available under this heading in Public 
     Law 103-317 for the Advanced Technology Program, $32,000,000 
     are rescinded.

            NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION


                  Operations, Research and Facilities

                              (rescission)

       Of the funds made available under this heading in Public 
     Law 103-317, $2,500,000 are rescinded.
      [[Page S4073]] NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION 
                             ADMINISTRATION


                   Information Infrastructure Grants

                              (RESCISSION)

       Of the amounts made available under this heading in Public 
     Law 103-317, $34,000,000 are rescinded.

                  Economic Development Administration


                ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

                              (RESCISSION)

       Of the amounts made available under this heading in Public 
     Law 103-317, $40,000,000 are rescinded.

                            RELATED AGENCIES

                     SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION


                         SALARIES AND EXPENSES

                              (rescission)

       Of the funds made available under this heading in Public 
     Law 103-317 for tree-planting grants pursuant to section 24 
     of the Small Business Act, as amended, $15,000,000 are 
     rescinded.

                       LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION


               payment to the legal services corporation

                              (rescission)

       Of the funds made available under this heading in Public 
     Law 103-317 for payment to the Legal Services Corporation to 
     carry out the purposes of the Legal Services Corporation Act 
     of 1974, as amended, $15,000,000 are rescinded.

                DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND RELATED AGENCIES

                          DEPARTMENT OF STATE

                   Administration of Foreign Affairs


           (acquisition and maintenance of buildings abroad)

                              (rescission)

       Of unobligated balances available under this heading, 
     $28,500,000 are rescinded.
       (13)Page 17, after line 18, insert:
       Of the funds appropriated in Public Law 103-316, $3,000,000 
     is hereby authorized for appropriation to the Corps of 
     Engineers to initiate and complete remedial measures to 
     prevent slope instability at Hickman Bluff, Kentucky.
       (14)Page 18, after line 6 insert:
       CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION

                              (rescission)

       Of the funds made available under this heading in Public 
     Law 103-306, $70,000,000 are rescinded.
       (15)Page 18, strike lines 14 to 20 and insert:
                      development assistance fund

                              (rescission)

       Of the funds made available under this heading in Public 
     Law 103-87 and Public Law 103-306, $13,000,000 are rescinded.


          assistance for eastern europe and the baltic states

                              (rescission)

       Of the funds made available under this heading in Public 
     Law 103-87 and Public Law 103-306, $9,000,000 are rescinded.


  assistance for the new independent states of the former soviet union

                              (rescission)

       Of the funds made available under this heading in Public 
     Law 103-87 and Public Law 103-306, $18,000,000 are rescinded, 
     of which not less than $12,000,000 shall be derived from 
     funds allocated for Russia.
       (16)Page 19, after line 14, insert:
                       DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR


                United States Fish and Wildlife Service

                          resource management

                              (rescission)

       Of the funds made available under this heading in Public 
     Law 103-332--
       (1) $1,500,000 are rescinded from the amounts available for 
     making determinations whether a species is a threatened or 
     endangered species and whether habitat is critical habitat 
     under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. 1531 et 
     seq.); and
       (2) none of the remaining funds appropriated under that 
     heading may be made available for making a final 
     determination that a species is threatened or endangered or 
     that habitat constitutes critical habitat (except a final 
     determination that a species previously determined to be 
     endangered is no longer endangered but continues to be 
     threatened).
       To the extent that the Endangered Species Act of 1973 has 
     been interpreted or applied in any court order (including an 
     order approving a settlement between the parties to a civil 
     action) to require the making of a determination respecting 
     any number of species or habitats by a date certain, that Act 
     shall not be applied to require that the determination be 
     made by that date if the making of the determination is made 
     impracticable by the rescission made by the preceding 
     sentence.
       (17)Page 20, strike out lines 2 to 6 and insert:
                      STUDENT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

                              (RESCISSION)

       Of the funds made available under this heading in Public 
     Law 103-112, $100,000,000 made available for title IV, part 
     A, subpart 1 of the Higher Education Act are rescinded.
       (18)Page 20, after line 10 insert:
                    FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

                        Facilities and Equipment


                    (AIRPORT AND AIRWAY TRUST FUND)

                              (RESCISSION)

       Of the available balances under this heading that remain 
     unobligated for the ``advanced automation system'', 
     $35,000,000 are rescinded.

                     FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION

                          Federal-Aid Highways


                          (HIGHWAY TRUST FUND)

                              (RESCISSION)

       Of the available contract authority balances under this 
     heading in Public Law 97-424, $13,340,000 are rescinded; and 
     of the available balances under this heading in Public Law 
     100-17, $126,608,000 are rescinded.

              Miscellaneous Highway Demonstration Projects


                              (RESCISSION)

       Of the available appropriated balances provided in Public 
     Law 93-87; Public Law 98-8; Public Law 98-473; and Public Law 
     100-71, $12,004,450 are rescinded.
       (19)Page 20, strike out lines 11 to 15
       (20)Page 20, strike out lines 16 to 19
       (21)Page 21, strike out lines 5 to 11
       (22)Page 21, after line 11 insert:
              DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

                            Housing Programs


               annual contributions for assisted housing

                              (rescission)

       Of the funds made available under this heading in Public 
     Law 103-327 and any unobligated balances from funds 
     appropriated under this heading in prior years, $400,000,000 
     are rescinded from amounts available for the development or 
     acquisition costs of public housing.
       (23)Page 21, after line 11, insert:
                        TITLE III--MISCELLANEOUS

       Sec. 301.--Notwithstanding sections 12106, 12107, and 12108 
     of title 46, United States Code, and section 27 of the 
     Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 883), as applicable 
     on the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Transportation may issue a certificate of documentation for 
     the vessel L. R. BEATTIE, United States official number 
     904161.
       (24)Page 21, after line 11, insert:
             TITLE IV--MEXICAN DEBT DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1995

     SEC. 401. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Mexican Debt Disclosure 
     Act of 1995''.

     SEC. 402. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds that--
       (1) Mexico is an important neighbor and trading partner of 
     the United States;
       (2) on January 31, 1995, the President approved a program 
     of assistance to Mexico, in the form of swap facilities and 
     securities guarantees in the amount of $20,000,000,000, using 
     the Exchange Stabilization Fund;
       (3) the program of assistance involves the participation of 
     the Federal Reserve System, the International Monetary Fund, 
     the Bank of International Settlements, the World Bank, the 
     Inter-American Development Bank, the Bank of Canada, and 
     several Latin American countries;
       (4) the involvement of the Exchange Stabilization Fund and 
     the Federal Reserve System means that United States taxpayer 
     funds will be used in the assistance effort to Mexico;
       (5) assistance provided by the International Monetary Fund, 
     the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank may 
     require additional United States contributions of taxpayer 
     funds to those entities;
       (6) the immediate use of taxpayer funds and the potential 
     requirement for additional future United States contributions 
     of taxpayer funds necessitates Congressional oversight of the 
     disbursement of funds; and
       (7) the efficacy of the assistance to Mexico is contingent 
     on the pursuit of sound economic policy by the Government of 
     Mexico.

     SEC. 403. REPORTS REQUIRED.

       (a) Reports.--Not later than April 1, 1995, and every month 
     thereafter, the President shall transmit a report to the 
     appropriate congressional committees concerning all United 
     States Government loans, credits, and guarantees to, and 
     short-term and long-term currency swaps with, Mexico.
       (b) Contents of Reports.--The report described in 
     subsection (a) shall include the following:
       (1) A description of the current condition of the Mexican 
     economy.
       (2) Information regarding the implementation and the extent 
     of wage, price, and credit controls in the Mexican economy.
       (3) A complete documentation of Mexican taxation policy and 
     any proposed changes to such policy.
       (4) A description of specific actions taken by the 
     Government of Mexico during the preceding month to further 
     privatize the economy of Mexico.
       (5) A list of planned or pending Mexican Government 
     regulations affecting the Mexican private sector.
       (6) A summary of consultations held between the Government 
     of Mexico and the Department of the Treasury, the 
     International Monetary Fund, or the Bank of International 
     Settlements.
       (7) A full description of the activities of the Mexican 
     Central Bank, including the reserve positions of the Mexican 
     Central Bank and data relating to the functioning of Mexican 
     monetary policy.
       (8) The amount of any funds disbursed from the Exchange 
     Stabilization Fund pursuant to the approval of the President 
     issued on January 31, 1995.
       (9) A full disclosure of all financial transactions, both 
     inside and outside of Mexico, made during the preceding month 
     involving funds disbursed from the Exchange Stabilization 
     Fund and the International Monetary Fund, including 
     transactions between--
       (A) individuals;
       (B) partnerships;
       (C) joint ventures; and
       (D) corporations.
     [[Page S4074]]   (10) An accounting of all outstanding United 
     States Government loans, credits, and guarantees provided to 
     the Government of Mexico, set forth by category of financing.
       (11) A detailed list of all Federal Reserve currency swaps 
     designed to support indebtedness of the Government of Mexico, 
     and the cost or benefit to the United States Treasury from 
     each such transaction.
       (12) A description of any payments made during the 
     preceding month by creditors of Mexican petroleum companies 
     into the petroleum finance facility established to ensure 
     repayment of United States loans or guarantees.
       (13) A description of any disbursement during the preceding 
     month by the United States Government from the petroleum 
     finance facility.
       (14) Once payments have been diverted from PEMEX to the 
     United States Treasury through the petroleum finance 
     facility, a description of the status of petroleum deliveries 
     to those customers whose payments were diverted.
       (15) A description of the current risk factors used in 
     calculations concerning Mexican repayment of indebtedness.
       (16) A statement of the progress the Government of Mexico 
     has made in reforming its currency and establishing an 
     independent central bank or currency board.

     SEC. 404. PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, before 
     extending any loan, credit, guarantee, or arrangement for a 
     swap of currencies to Mexico through any United States 
     Government monetary facility, the President shall certify to 
     the appropriate congressional committees that--
       (1) there is no projected cost to the United States from 
     the proposed loan, credit, guarantee, or currency swap;
       (2) all loans, credits, guarantees, and currency swaps are 
     adequately collateralized to ensure that United States funds 
     will be repaid;
       (3) the Government of Mexico has undertaken effective 
     efforts to establish an independent central bank or an 
     independent currency control mechanism; and
       (4) Mexico has in effect a significant economic reform 
     effort.

     SEC. 405. DEFINITION.

       As used in this title, the term ``appropriate congressional 
     committees'' means the Committees on Banking and Financial 
     Services and International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations and 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
       (25)Page 21, strike out lines 12 to 15 and insert:
       This Act may be cited as the ``Supplemental Appropriations 
     and Rescissions Act, 1995''.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The title amendment is agreed to.
  The title was amended so as to read:

       Making supplemental appropriations and rescissions for the 
     fiscal year ending September 30, 1995, and for other 
     purposes.

  Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I move to lay on the table the motion to 
reconsider.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gorton). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I move the Senate insist on its 
amendments and request a conference with the House on the disagreeing 
votes of the two Houses, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint 
the conferees on the part of the Senate.
  The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer (Mr. Gorton) 
appointed Mr. Hatfield, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Cochran, Mr. Gramm, Mr. 
Domenici, Mr. McConnell, Mr. Gorton, Mr. Specter, Mr. Bond, Mr. Burns, 
Mr. Byrd, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Hollings, Mr. Johnston, Mr. Leahy, Mr. 
Harkin, Mr. Lautenberg, Ms. Mikulski and Mr. Reid conferees on the part 
of the Senate.
  Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________