Congressional Record, Volume 141 Issue 49 (Thursday, March 16, 1995)

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 49 (Thursday, March 16, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4050-S4074]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS AND RESCISSIONS ACT

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

Amendment No. 340

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. PELL. I think the arguments have been pretty well outlined here.
I am prepared to vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 340) was agreed to.
Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. D'AMATO. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. D'AMATO. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DOLE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.

Agreed Framework with North Korea

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, during the first hearing of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, which I chair, back on January 10 of this year,
I expressed a concern about what was happening with the arrangements
between the United States and North Korea on the deal where North Korea
would have a 5-year window without inspection of used fuel rods, which
is the best way on an inspection line of determining what is happening
with respect to the potential for North Korea to build a nuclear
weapon.
During the course of the next several weeks, and in discussions with
a number of my colleagues, it seemed to me preferable to have that so-
called agreement, the United States-North Korea agreed framework for
resolving the nuclear issue, submitted to the United States Senate for
ratification, because it really was, in effect, a treaty even though
the administration had denominated it as an agreed framework, not even,
according to the administration, rising to the level of an executive
agreement which would activate certain congressional review.
On February 24, I prepared a letter, which was submitted under the
signatures of Senator Helms, in his capacity as chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee; Senator Murkowski, in his capacity as the chairman
of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee; and myself, as chairman
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to Senator Dole setting
forth our request that the Senate handle as a treaty under the
constitutional ratification process the United States-Democratic
Peoples Republic of Korea Agreed Framework for Resolving the Nuclear
Issue.
The letter set forth that the Clinton administration was seeking to
proceed under this so-called agreed framework without submitting it as
a treaty, which it really was, for Senate ratification.
We submitted at that time to Senator Dole a legal memorandum prepared
by the Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, dated
February 8, 1995, which set forth the criteria for considering whether
an arrangement was a treaty.
In our letter, we noted that, while the memorandum specifies that
``there are no `hard and fast rules,' we believe the underlying
rationale suggests that the agreement should be handled as a treaty
because it is a matter of great importance (involving North Korea's
potential for developing nuclear weapons),'' that the document
``constitutes a substantial commitment of funds extending beyond a
fiscal year and is of substantial political significance,'' all of
which were criteria for an evaluation as to whether the arrangement was
in fact a treaty.
We concluded our letter to Senator Dole noting that ``The formal
treaty ratification process will enable us''--that is, the Senate--``to
undertake a detailed factual analysis to determine whether this
agreement is in the national interest.''
[[Page S4051]] Madam President, it is my view that, on both
substantive grounds and constitutional grounds, this matter ought to be
handled as a treaty.
The Constitution of the United States provides for ratification by
the Senate on treaties. There are a whole series of criteria, some of
which I have just referred to, which indicate, suggest, provide
evidence for the conclusion that this agreed framework is in fact a
treaty.
If you take a look at some of the items which we have handled as
treaties in the Senate through the treaty ratification process, you
will note the great difference between the importance of this United
States-North Korean arrangement, contrasted with other matters which
have been submitted to the full Senate ratification process. For
example, Treaty 102-7, which is a Convention for the Prohibition of
Fishing with Long Drift Nets in the South Pacific; or Treaty Document
Exhibit EE 96-1, an International Convention on Standards of Training
Certification and Watch Keeping for Seafarers; or Treaty Document 100-
7, Agreement for Medium Frequency Broadcasting Service in Region Number
II; or Treaty Document No. 101-15, Amendments to the 1928 Convention
Concerning International Expositions, as Amended.
On some occasions, as is well known, in the Senate, we handle as many
as six treaties at one time in a single vote, with notification being
given to Senators that if they miss that one vote, it will be counted
as a half dozen absences, because the treaties do not rise to the level
of any individual identification or individual voting, but are very,
very much pro forma.
So that it is indeed surprising, when a matter comes before the
international forum and is the subject of a document between North
Korea and the United States, that it is denominated only as an agreed
framework for resolving the nuclear issues.
Following receipt of our letter, Senator Dole, by letter dated March
10, wrote to Secretary of State Christopher asking a series of specific
questions which set out the criteria for determining whether or not
such a matter is or is not a treaty.
It had been my intention to offer a sense-of-the-Senate resolution
early on as soon as a legislative vehicle arose. I had notified the
managers of this legislation that I would be offering that sense-of-
the-Senate resolution at this time. But I have decided to defer doing
that because Senator Dole's letter, dated March 10, 1995, is now
outstanding and, as of this date, March 16, there has not been an
adequate opportunity for the Secretary of State to respond to the
majority leader's letter.
I make the statement at this time to put the administration on notice
that it is my intention--and there are a number of cosponsors who are
prepared to join with me on this important matter, including the
distinguished Senator from Texas who is the Presiding Officer, was
asked a series of questions in closed session before the Intelligence
Committee on this matter. I state for the Record because the camera may
have been on me rather than her, and might have missed her acquiescing
nods.
There are a number of colleagues who agree with the seriousness of
this matter. In dealing with North Korea, while it is my hope that they
will abide by the international commitments, there is good reason for
concern as to whether they will abide by their commitments.
Nobody said it better than President Reagan when he made the comment
about trust but verify. There is a chronology on North Korea's
activities which raises very, very, considerable grounds for concern as
to whether North Korea will, in fact, comply with their commitments
under this statement of agreed principles.
Madam President, at this time I ask unanimous consent that the text
of the United States-North Korea Agreed Framework for Resolving the
Nuclear Issue be printed in the Record except as to a confidential part
which cannot be disclosed publicly at this time; that a copy of the
legal memorandum from the Congressional Research Service, dated
February 8, 1995, be printed in the Record; that a copy of the joint
letter submitted by Senators Helms, Murkowski, and myself, be printed
in the Record; as well as an unclassified document prepared by the
State Department on the North Korea nuclear timeline, showing many
actions by the North Koreans which raise real issue as to whether there
has been compliance by North Korea, and raising real issues as to what
might be expected in the future.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework for Resolving the Nuclear Issue

The attached package includes: (1) the Agreed Framework
between the U.S. and the DPRK, signed October 21, 1994, in
Geneva; (2) a Confidential Minute, signed the same day, which
should be treated as confidential for classification
purposes; and (3) a letter of assurance from President
Clinton to the DPRK's Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-II, which was
delivered in Geneva in connection with the signing. These
documents create a framework of political decisions and
practical actions to be taken by each side in order to
resolve the nuclear issue in North Korea.
____

Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Geneva, October 21, 1995

Delegations of the Governments of the United States of
America (U.S.) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 21,
1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue
on the Korean Peninsula.
Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the
objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 Agreed Statement
between the U.S. and the DPRK and upholding the principles of
the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the U.S. and the DPRK to
achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean
peninsula. The U.S. and the DPRK decided to take the
following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:
I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's
graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with
light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.
(1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of
assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S. will undertake to
make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR
project with a total generating capacity of approximately
2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 2003.
The U.S. will organize under its leadership an
international consortium to finance and supply the LWR
project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing
the international consortium, will serve as the principal
point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.
The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best
efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with
the DPRK within six months of the date of this Document for
the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin
as soon as possible after the date of this Document.
As necessary, the U.S. and the DPRK will conclude a
bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.
(2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of
assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S., representing the
consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy
foregone due to the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated
reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the
first LWR unit.
Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy
oil for heating and electricity production.
Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of
the date of this Document and will reach a rate of 500,000
tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of
deliveries.
(3) Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of
LWR's and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives,
the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and
related facilities and will eventually dismantle these
reactors and related facilities.
The freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and
related facilities will be fully implemented within one month
of the date of this Document. During this one-month period,
and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the
DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this
purpose.
Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and
related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is
completed.
The U.S. and the DPRK will cooperate in finding a method to
store safely the spend fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental
reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to
dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve
reprocessing in the DPRK.
(4) As soon as possible after the date of this document
U.S. and DPRK experts will hold two sets of experts talks.
At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to
alternative energy and the replacement of the graphite-
moderated reactor program with the LWR project.
At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific
arrangements for spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.
[[Page S4052]] II. The two sides will move toward full
normalization of political and economic relations.
(1) Within three months of the date of this Document, both
sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including
restrictions on telecommunications services and financial
transactions.
(2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's
capital following resolution of consular and other technical
issues through expert level discussions.
(3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side,
the U.S. and the DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the
Ambassadorial level.
III. Both sides will work together for peace and security
on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
(1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK,
against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.
(2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the
North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula.
(3) The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this
Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes
such dialogue.
IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the
international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
(1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow
implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.
(2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the
provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections
will resume under the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the
IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the
freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract,
inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of
safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the
freeze.
(3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is
completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the
DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards
agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all
steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following
consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the
accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all
nuclear material in the DPRK.
Robert L. Gallucci,
Head of the Delegation of the United States of America,
Ambassador at Large of the United States of America.
Kang Sok Ju,
Head of the Delegation of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, First Vice-Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
____

The White House,

Washington, October 20, 1994.
His Excellency Kim Jong Il,
Supreme Leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Pyongyang.
Excellency: I wish to confirm to you that I will use the
full powers of my office to facilitate arrangements for the
financing and construction of a light-water nuclear power
reactor project within the DPRK, and the funding and
implementation of interim energy alternatives for the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea pending completion of
the first reactor unit of the light-water reactor project. In
addition, in the event that this reactor project is not
completed for reasons beyond the control of the DPRK, I will
use the full powers of my office to provide, to the extent
necessary, such a project from the United States, subject to
approval of the U.S. Congress. Similarly, in the event that
the interim energy alternatives are not provided for reasons
beyond the control of the DPRK, I will use the full powers of
my office to provide, to the extent necessary, such interim
energy alternatives from the United States, subject to the
approval of the U.S. Congress.
I will follow this course of action so long as the DPRK
continues to implement the policies described in the Agreed
Framework Between the United States of America and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
____

Congressional Research Service,

The Library of Congress,

Washington, DC, February 8, 1995.
To: Charles Battaglia, staff director, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.
From: Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist in Separation of
Powers.
Subject: Agreed Framework with North Korea.
This memorandum responds to your request for an analysis of
certain issues that have surfaced in the U.S.-DPRK Agreed
Framework for Resolving the Nuclear Issue. Among the issues:
(1) this agreement was entered into as a ``political
agreement'' rather than an ``executive agreement,'' which
would have to be reported to Congress under the Case Act;
what are the precedents for this type of political
agreement?; (2) should this agreement have been entered into
as a treaty rather than as a political agreement?; (3) what
is the legally binding effect of the economic commitments in
this agreement?; (4) does the current funding of this
commitment, especially through the reprogramming process,
encroach upon congressional prerogatives over the purse?; (5)
what are possible legislative responses by Congress to this
agreement?

executive reports to congress under the case act

Hearings by the Symington Subcommittee (of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee) in 1969 and 1970 uncovered a
number of secret executive agreements that administrations
had made with South Korea, Thailand, Laos, Ethiopia, and
Spain, among others. In response, Congress passed legislation
in 1972 to keep itself informed about such agreements. The
statute, known as the Case Act, requires the Secretary of
State to transmit to Congress within sixty days the text of
``any international agreement, other than a treaty,'' to
which the United States is a party. If the President decides
that publication of an agreement would be prejudicial to
national security, he may transmit it to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and the House International Relations
Committee under an injunction of secrecy removable only by
the President. 86 Stat. 619 (1972), 1 U.S.C. 112b (1988).
Although the Case Act was broadly written to capture all
international agreements, State Department regulations and
subsequent administration practices have created a number of
exceptions to the general requirement to report executive
agreements to Congress.
exceptions to the case act

During consideration of the Case Act, executive officials
in the Nixon administration suggested that ``certain kinds of
agreements'' might not be transmitted under the Act. Senator
Clifford Case sought a written statement from the State
Department as to whether there were any categories of
agreements that might not be covered by the statute. The
State Department's Acting Legal Adviser, Charles N. Brower,
prepared a memo stating that the Case Act is intended to
include ``every international agreement, other than a treaty,
brought into force with respect to the United States after
August 22, 1972 [enactment date for Case Act], regardless of
its form, name or designation, or subject matter.''\1\
In subsequent years, however, certain types of
international agreements were not submitted to Congress under
the Case Act. In 1976, the Legal Adviser to the State
Department wrote to Senator John Sparkman, chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, recommending that only the
international agreements entered into by the Agency for
International Development at a level of at least $1 million
would be submitted under the Case Act. AID agreements less
than $1 million would be reported under the Case Act if they
were ``significant for reasons other than level of funding.''
The dollar threshold was later raised to $25 million.\2\
Moreover, agreements concluded in a ``non-binding'' form
and determined by the executive branch to be legally non-
binding on the United States are not referred to Congress
under the Case Act, although the executive branch may
voluntarily provide information about them to Congress. Non-
binding international agreements are viewed as involving
political or moral obligations but not legal obligations. One
example is the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), known as the Helsinki
Agreement.\3\
Regulations issued by the State Department to implement the
Case Act identify political agreements as outside the
reporting requirements of the statute. Parties to an
international agreement ``must intend their undertaking to be
legally binding, and not merely of political or personal
effect. Documents intended to have political or moral weight,
but not intended to be legally binding, are not international
agreements.'' 22 CFR Sec. 181.2 (1994). However,
these regulations also state that examples of arrangements
that ``may constitute international agreements'' are
agreements that:
(i) Are of political significance;
(ii) involve substantial grants of funds or loans by the
United States or credits payable to the United States;
(iii) constitute a substantial commitment of funds that
extends beyond a fiscal year or would be a basis for
requesting new appropriations;
(iv) involve continuing and/or substantial cooperation in
the conduct of a particular program or activity, such as
scientific, technical, or other cooperation, including the
exchange or receipt of information and its treatment, or the
pooling of data. 22 CFR Sec. 181.2(2).
Another group of international agreements not reported
under the Case Act are those that the State Department views
as contracts--usually commercial in nature and involving
sales or loans. As a result of the State Department's
interpretation of a provision in the Food, Agriculture,
Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, international agreements
entered into by the Secretary of Agriculture for financing
the sale and exportation of agricultural commodities are not
reported under the Case Act either.\4\

should this agreement have been submitted as treaty?

Although the State Department provides guidelines on what
should be transmitted to Congress as an executive agreement,
a bill, or a treaty, there are no hard and fast rules. This
issue arose last year with the GATT bill.\5\ Constitutional
scholars offered different views on whether that should have
been submitted as a bill or a treaty. On October 18, 1994,
hearings were held by the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and
[[Page S4053]] Transportation, with Professor Bruce Ackerman
testifying in favor of Congress acting on the bill through
the regular legislative process, and Professor Laurence Tribe
testifying in favor of the Senate acting through the treaty
process. Professor Tribe later wrote that he could not say
``with certainty that my prior conclusions should necessarily
be adopted by others or are ones to which I will adhere in
the end after giving the matter the further thought that it
deserves.''
No clear guidelines are available from parliamentary
practice or federal court decisions on the issue of whether
to submit international matters in bill form or as a treaty.
The enclosed CRS report, ``GATT and Other Trade Agreements:
Congressional Action by Statute or by Treaty?, by Louis
Fisher, November 17, 1994, summarizes the basic issues. Also
included in this report are criteria offered by the State
Department to distinguish between what should be submitted as
a bill or as a treaty. The decision to submit a matter in
treaty form depends on the President's judgment. Congress can
apply political pressure and retaliate in other ways, but the
basic call remains presidential.
In his statement on December 1, 1994, to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci said that
the administration did not submit the Agreed Framework as a
treaty because ``we would not have been able to bind
ourselves legally to the delivery of that $4 billion project
[for light water reactors].'' That is not a full answer. If
an administration decides that it cannot make a unilateral
commitment and must depend on Congress, there is no reason
why it cannot submit a treaty that makes clear that the
extent of the assistance promised depends on Congress through
its authorization and appropriation processes. That
understanding has been incorporated in previous treaties.

economic commitments in the agreed framework

The Agreed Framework, signed October 21, 1994, offers
assistance in replacing the DPRK's graphite-moderated
reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor
(LWR) power plants. The United States will organize an
international consortium to finance and supply the LWR
project and provide alternative energy in the form of heavy
oil for heating and electricity production. Delivery of heavy
oil is scheduled to begin within three months of the date of
the document and reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually. Upon
receipt of ``U.S. assurances'' (emphasis supplied) for the
provision of LWR's and for arrangement for interim energy
alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated
reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle
these reactors and related facilities. The Framework also
provides that the United States and the DPRK will cooperate
in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the
graphite-moderated reactors. Although some of the financial
commitments depend on organizing an international consortium
and securing financial support from other governments,
several of the key commitments--including U.S. assurances to
provide for LWR's and for arranging interim energy
alternatives, as well as disposing of spent fuel--fall
exclusively on the United States. The United States expects
to fully bear the cost of storing and disposing of spent
fuel.
In his letter of October 20, 1994, to DPRK President Kim
Jong II, President Clinton confirmed that he would use ``the
full powers of my office'' to facilitate arrangements for the
financing and construction of a light-water nuclear power
reactor project within the DPRK and the funding and
implementation of interim energy alternatives pending
completion of the first reactor unit of the light-water
reactor project. In addition, if the reactor project was
not completed for reasons beyond the control of the DPRK,
President Clinton would use ``the full powers of my
office'' to provide, to the extent necessary, such a
project from the United States, ``subject to approval of
the U.S. Congress. Furthermore, in the event the interim
energy alternatives are not provided, for reasons beyond
the control of the DPRK, President Clinton promised to use
``the full powers of my office'' to provide, to the extent
necessary, such interim energy alternatives from the
United States, ``subject to the approval of the U.S.
Congress.''
As explained in President Clinton's message, the effect of
the Agreed Framework is to make political and moral, not
legal, commitments. In his statement to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Ambassador Gallucci explained that the
administration decided to call the agreement an ``Agreed
Framework'' because it ``did not want to take on the
obligation of providing a light water reactor or two light
water reactors, to be precise.'' To the extent that
completion of the light-water nuclear reactor project or
supplying interim energy alternatives depend on congressional
action, Congress must provide approval through its
authorization and appropriation processes. Absent statutory
authority, President Clinton has no independent
constitutional power to provide that assistance, although his
political and moral commitment puts pressure on Congress to
act in a supportive manner through the statutory process.

does the framework encroach upon congressional prerogatives?

According to the statement by Ambassador Gallucci to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, initial implementation of
the Agreed Framework resulted in the United States in the
first three months providing 50,000 tons of heavy oil at a
cost of between $5 million and $6 million, and there ``will
be heavy oil shipments, up to 100,000 tons, by the end of
October 21, 1995.'' Ambassador Gallucci testified that the
Defense Department can provide the initial assistance of $5
million to $6 million ``under existing authorities.'' We do
not have the specific legal authorities referred to by
Ambassador Gallucci, but legislation governing DOD activities
and funding expenditures does not include restrictions
regarding North Korea. Section 127 of Title 10, however,
authorizes the Secretary of Defense, secretaries of a
military department, and the DOD Inspector General, to
``provide for any emergency or extraordinary expense which
cannot be anticipated or classified.'' The amounts available
for expenditure are subject to limitations in appropriations
acts and must be reported to Congress quarterly. The Defense
Department Appropriation, 1995 (P.L. 103-335), includes the
following amounts out of operation and maintenance accounts
for such emergencies: Secretary of Defense, $23.768 million
Army, $14.437 million; Navy/Marines, $4.301 million; and Air
Force, $8.762 million.
With regard to the need to clarify the water in which spent
fuel is placed, Ambassador Gallucci testified that the
Department of Energy estimates the cost to be a ``couple of
hundred thousand dollars [and] is something they can do
before the end of this year and really ought to for safety
reasons.'' Again, we have no information regarding the legal
authorities available to the Energy Department to perform
this work. Ambassador Gallucci discussed other activities by
the Energy Department, including the recontainment or
recanning of the fuel, which ``could take some millions of
dollars, less than $10 million, maybe more than $5 million--
in that range. This would involve a reprogramming and they
would follow the normal practice of coming to the Congress
for confirmation of reprogramming authority. This would
happen after January 1.''
It is unclear from this statement whether the
administration would simply be notifying designated
committees about the reprogramming or seeking their prior
approval. Nor is it clear whether the administration's
initial funding commitments are authorized by law. At this
point we have no citations to examine that issue. There are
other questions about the statutory authorities that might be
invoked to fulfill the initial funding commitment. If the
administration tapped a general contingency fund to provide
this initial assistance to North Korea, there may be adequate
authority in allocating emergency funds to do so. But if it
is a case of Congress appropriating funds with the
expectation that they will be used for a specific purpose, as
justified in agency budget requests, there is a substantial
issue of the administration reallocating those funds to a
purpose never justified to Congress. Ambassador Gallucci
testified that the administration expects ``the $4 billion
burden [for light water reactors] to be borne centrally by
South Korea, and this we understand.''

Legislative responses to the agreed framework

The Senate could respond to the Agreed Framework by
insisting, either through political pressure or a Senate
resolution, that it be submitted as a treaty and made subject
to full legislative debate. Whether Senators want to be in a
position of having to approve, reject, or amend the
administration's agreement is a question they need to decide
individually. Some Senators may decide that it is better for
the President to make non-binding promises, with the
understanding by all nations that under our constitutional
system it is Congress, not the President, that has the power
of the purse. To the extent that the President has acted
unilaterally and finds himself politically isolated, that
presently is the administration's problem, not Congress's. In
any case, the decision to submit the matter by treaty is in
the hands of the President.
Because of the funding implications and the need to obtain
appropriations from both chambers, if legislative action is
required it may be more appropriate to act by bill or joint
resolution. If Congress decides that it does not want to act
at this time by treaty or by bill, it could adopt non-binding
simple or concurrent resolutions to enunciate the policy and
constitutional concerns at stake for Congress as an
institution, many of which have been identified above.
I trust that this memorandum is helpful to you. If I can be
of any further assistance, please contact me at 7-8676.

footnotes

\1\Treaties and Other International Agreements. The Role of
the United States Senate, a Study Prepared for the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations by the Congressional Research
Service, S. Prt. 103-53, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (November
1993)
\2\Id. at 181.
\3\Id. at 190.
\4\Id. at 192.
\5\The GATT bill differs from the dispute over the Agreed
Framework. In the case of GATT, Congress had authorized the
use of the regular legislative process (action by both Houses
on a bill) and had extended this authority for completion of
the Uruguay Round.
[[Page S4054]] U.S. Senate,

Washington, DC, February 24, 1995.
Hon. Robert Dole,
Majority Leader,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Bob: We request that the Senate handle as a treaty
under the constitutional ratification process the U.S.-
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea Agreed Framework for
Resolving the Nuclear Issue.
The Clinton Administration is seeking to proceed on this
agreement without submitting it for Senate ratification.
For your review, we enclose a memorandum from the
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress,
dated February 8, 1995.
While the memorandum notes that there are ``no hard and
fast rules,'' we believe the underlying rationale suggests
that the agreement should be handled as a treaty because it
is a matter of great importance (involving North Korea's
potential for developing nuclear weapons), constitutes a
substantial commitment of funds extending beyond a fiscal
year and is of substantial political significance.
The formal treaty ratification process will enable us to
undertake a detailed factual analysis to determine whether
this agreement is in the national interest.
Sincerely,
Arlen Specter,
Chairman,
Select Committee On Intelligence.
Frank H. Murkowski,
Chairman,
Energy and Natural Resources Committee.
Jesse Helms,
Chairman,
Foreign Relations Committee.
Enclosure
North Korea Nuclear Timeline

early 1980's

North Korea begins construction of 5 MW reactor in
Yongbyon.

1985

Dec.--North Korea signs the NPT.

1986

Jan.--5 MW reactor begins operations.

1988

Dec.--First U.S.-DPRK official contacts in Beijing.

1989

Spring--Extended outage of 5 MW reactor.

1991

May--North Korea joins the United Nations.
Sept.--U.S. announces intention to redeploy tactical
nuclear weapons worldwide.
Dec.--North-South finalize non-aggression agreement and
North-South Denuclear-
ization Declaration.

1992

Jan.--ROK announces suspension of Team Spirit '92.
North Korea signs IAEA fullscope safeguards agreement.
U.S.-DPRK high-level talks (U/S Kanter in New York).
Mar.--North-South set up Joint Nuclear Control Committee
for implementing the Denuclearization Declaration.
Apr. 10--North Korea Supreme People's Assembly ratifies
IAEA safeguards agreement.
May 4--DPRK submits initial inventory of nuclear material.
First IAEA ad hoc inspection.
July--Second IAEA ad hoc inspection; first evidence of
``inconsistencies.''
Sept.--Third IAEA ad hoc inspection.
Oct.--U.S. and ROK announce Team Spirit.
Nov.--Fourth IAEA ad hoc inspection.
High-level IAEA-DPRK consultations in Vienna on
discrepancies; IAEA requests ``visits to two suspect waste
sites.''
Dec.--Fifth IAEA ad hoc inspection.

1993

Jan.--IAEA team travels to Pyongyang to discuss
discrepancies in DPRK declaration.
Sixth IAEA ad hoc inspection.
Feb. 9--IAEA requests special inspection of the two suspect
sites.
Feb. 20--Further DPRK-IAEA consultations, DPRK rejects
special inspections.
Feb. 25--IAEA Board of Governors passes resolution calling
for the DPRK to accept special inspections within one month.
Mar. 12--North Korea announces its intention to withdraw
from the NPT.
Mar. 18--Special Board meeting passes a second resolution
calling on the DPRK to accept special inspections by March
31.
Apr. 1--IAEA Board of Governors adopts resolution finding
the DPRK in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations;
reports to UNSC.
May 11--United Nations Security Council passes Resolution
825. It calls upon the DPRK to comply with its safeguards
agreement as specified in the February 25 IAEA resolution,
requests the Director General to continue to consult with the
DPRK, and urges Member States to encourage a resolution.
May--IAEA inspectors allowed into Yongbyon to perform the
necessary work relating to safeguards monitoring equipment.
June 11--U.S.-DPRK high-level talks in New York; in a joint
statement, the DPRK agrees to suspend its withdrawal from the
NPT and agrees to the principle of ``impartial application''
of IAEA safeguards. We told the DPRK that if our dialogue was
to
continue they must accept IAEA inspections to ensure the
continuity of safeguards, forego reprocessing, and allow
IAEA presence when refueling the 5MW reactor.
July--U.S.-DPRK high-level talks in Geneva; DPRK agrees to
resume discussion with the ROK and the IAEA on the nuclear
issue, U.S. agrees to in principle to support DPRK conversion
to Light Water Reactors.
Aug.--IAEA inspectors allowed into Yongbyon to service
safeguards monitoring equipment but, incomplete access to
reprocessing plant.
U.S.-DPRK working-level talks in NY begin.
Sept. 1-3--IAEA consultations with DPRK in North Korea on
impartial application of safeguards.
Oct. 1--IAEA Geneva Conference meeting adopts resolution
urging the DPRK to fully implement safeguards.
Nov. 1--United Nations General Assembly adopts a resolution
expressing grave concern that the DPRK has failed to
discharge its safeguards obligations and has widened the area
of non-compliance. It also urges the DPRK to cooperate
immediately with the IAEA in the full implementation of its
safeguards agreement.
Nov. 14--DPRK withdrawal suspends North-South talks.
Dec.--U.S. Commander in Chief, U.S. forces Korea, General
Luck, requests Patriot Missile Battalion to counter North
Korean Scud threat.
Dec. 5--IAEA Board of Governors Meeting. Blix states that
he can not give meaningful assurances about continuity of
safeguards, and that the possibility that nuclear material
has been diverted cannot be excluded.
Dec. 29--U.S.-DPRK agree in NY talks on an arrangement for
a third round. The North agreed to accept IAEA inspections
needed to maintain continuity of safeguards at seven declared
sites, and to resume North-South working-level talks in
Panmunjon. In exchange, U.S. agrees to concur in a ROK
announcement to suspend Team Spirit '94 and set a date for a
third round of U.S.-DPRK talks, which would be held only
after DPRK steps are completed.

1994

Jan.--North Korea begins talks with the IAEA in Vienna to
discuss the scope of inspections necessary to provide
continuity of safeguards.
Jan. 26--White House announces plans to send Patriot
Missile Battalion to South Korea.
Jan. 31--DPRK Foreign Ministry Statement accuses the U.S.
of overturning the December 29 understanding; threatens to
``unfreeze'' its nuclear program.
Feb. 15--IAEA-DPRK reach an understanding on a
comprehensive list of safeguards measures which are to be
performed to verify that no diversion of nuclear material has
occurred in the seven declared nuclear installations since
earlier inspections.
Feb. 21--IAEA Board of Governors meeting.
Feb. 25--U.S.-DPRK Joint statement outlining terms of
December agreement.
Feb. 26--DPRK authorities issue two week visas to the IAEA
inspection team.
Mar. 1--IAEA inspectors arrive in DPRK.
Mar. 3--Official ``Super Tuesday'' announcement--IAEA
inspections begin, N-S talks begin, suspension of TS '94, and
set date for a third round of U.S.-DPRK talks.
Mar. 9--2nd North-South meeting.
Mar. 12--3rd North-South meeting; DPRK and ROK reach an
agreement in principle on an exchange of envoys.
Mar. 15--IAEA inspection team leaves Pyongyang having
proceeded with inspections without difficulty at all
facilities except the Radiochemical Lab.
Mar. 16--IAEA DG Blix calls a special session of the Board
of Governors to informally report on the March 3-14
safeguards inspections in the DPRK.
Blix announces that the IAEA inspection team was unable to
implement the DPRK-IAEA Feb. 15 agreement, and as a result
the Agency is unable to draw conclusions as to whether
there has been diversion of nuclear material or
reprocessing since earlier inspections.
4th North-South meeting.
Mar. 19--5th North-South meeting; DPRK walks out of
meeting, threatens to turn Seoul into a sea of fire; Team
Spirit '94 back on.
Mar. 21--IAEA Board of Governors pass a DPRK resolution
finding the DPRK in further non-compliance and referring the
issue to the UNSC with 25 approvals, 1 rejection, and 5
abstentions, including China.
Mar. 21--Administration announces Patriot Missile Battalion
will be sent to ROK.
Mar. 31--UNSC unanimous Presidential Statement calling on
the DPRK to allow the IAEA to complete inspection activities
per the Feb. 15 agreement, and inviting IAEA DG Blix to
report back to the Council within six weeks.
Apr. 4--President Clinton directs the establishment of a
Senior Policy Steering Group (SSK) on Korea with
responsibility for coordinating all aspects of U.S. policy
dealing with the current nuclear issue on the Korean
Peninsula. A/S Gallucci is asked to Chair the group.
ROK announces Team Spirit '94 will be held during the
November time frame.
ROK drops North-South special envoys as a precondition to
the Third Round.
Apr. 18--Patriot Missile Battalion arrives in ROK.
Apr. 28--DPRK claims the 1953 Armistice Agreement is
invalid and announces its intent to withdraw from the MAC.
[[Page S4055]] May 4--DPRK begins reactor discharge
campaign.
May 18-23--IAEA inspectors complete March inspections and
maintenance activities for the continuity of safeguards
knowledge.
May 20--IAEA reports to the UNSC that the DPRK decision to
discharge fuel from the 5 MW reactor without prior IAEA
agreement for future measurement ``constitutes a serious
safeguards violation.''
May 25-27--IAEA-DPRK consultations in Pyongyang re: fuel
monitoring.
May 27--IAEA Director General Blix sends a letter to UNSC
Syg Boutros-Ghali stating the IAEA-DPRK talks have failed,
DPRK fuel discharge is proceeding at a faster rate, and the
IAEA's opportunity to measure the spent fuel in the future
will be lost within days if the fuel discharge continues at
this rate.
May 30--UNSC issues a Presidential Statement ``strongly
urging the DPRK only to proceed with the discharge operations
at the 5 MW reactor in a manner which preserves the technical
possibility of fuel measurements, in accordance with the
IAEA's requirements in this regard.''
June 3--IAEA Director General Blix reports to the UNSC on
failed IAEA efforts to preserve the technical possibility of
measuring discharged fuel from the DPRK 5 MW reactor.
June 9--IAEA BOG resolution is passed calling for immediate
DPRK cooperation by providing access to all safeguards-
related information and locations and suspends non-medical
IAEA assistance to the DPRK. 28 for, 1 opposed (Libya), 2
absent (Saudia Arabia, Cuba) and 4 abstentions (China, India,
Lebanon, Syria.)
June 13--North Korea officially withdraws from the IAEA.
June 15-18--Former President Carter visits North Korea and
receives assurances that the DPRK is willing to freeze the
major elements of the nuclear program (no reprocessing, no
refueling, and no construction) in order to continue dialogue
with the U.S.
June 20-22--The DPRK's intention to reestablish the basis
for dialogue by freezing the major elements of its nuclear
program was confirmed in an exchange of letters between FM
Kang and A/S Gallucci.
June 27--Agreement reached to hold the third round starting
July 8.
June 28--North-South Korean summit between DPRK President
Kim Il-Sung and ROK President Kim Young-Sam announced for
July 25-27.
July 8--Third Round of U.S.-DPRK talks in Geneva begins in
a businesslike atmosphere and confirms the DPRK's desire to
convert to light water reactor technology.
July 9--President Kim Il-Sung's death was announced and
accordingly, the third round was postponed until after the
mourning period and the planned July 25-27 North-South summit
was postponed indefinitely.
July 21--U.S.-DPRK agree on the resumption of the third
round on August 5.
July 19-28--A/S Gallucci-led delegation visits capitals
(Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing, Moscow) to discuss the provision of
and solicit support for the conversion of DPRK's graphite-
moderated reactors to light water reactors (LWR) that are
more proliferation resistant.
Aug. 5-12--Resumed third round in Geneva and signed an
agreement between the U.S. and the DPRK showing substantial
progress towards an overall settlement. As part of the final
resolution of the nuclear issue: the U.S. will provide LWRs
to the DPRK, make arrangements for interim energy
alternatives, and provide an assurance against the threat or
use of nuclear weapons;
the DPRK will remain a party to the NPT, allow
implementation of its safeguards agreement, and implement the
Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula; the U.S. and DPRK will begin to establish
diplomatic representation, hold expert-level on the technical
issues in the coming weeks, and recess the talks with
resumption scheduled for Sept. to resolve the remaining
differences.
Sept. 23--Third round, Session two begins in Geneva
Oct. 21--U.S. and DPRK sign an Agreed Framework (a final
settlement to the North Korean Nuclear issue) based on the
Aug. 12 agreement.
U.S. hands over Presidential Letter of Assurance and U.S.
and DPRK sign a Confidential Minute to the Agreed Framework.
Nov. 14-18--U.S. team of experts visits North Korea to
discuss safe storage and disposition of spent fuel.
Nov. 23-28--IAEA team of experts visits North Korea to
discuss details related to the monitoring and verification of
the freeze on DPRK nuclear facilities.
Nov. 30--Experts from the U.S. and DPRK meet in Beijing for
preliminary discussions on the LWR project.
Dec. 6-10--DPRK team of experts visits Washington, D.C. to
discuss technical and consular issues related to the planned
exchange of liaison offices.
Jan. 9--DPRK announces lifting of restrictions on imports
of U.S. products into the DPRK and restrictions on portcalls
by U.S. vessels into DPRK ports.
Jan. 17-24--U.S.-DPRK spent fuel talks in Pyongyang--Second
Session.
Jan. 19--First shipment of 50,000 metric tons of heavy fuel
oil is delivered to the DPRK.
Jan. 20--U.S. announces sanctions easing measures against
the DPRK in four areas: telecommunications and information,
financial transactions, imports of DPRK magnesite,
transactions related to the future opening of liaison offices
and other energy related projects.
Jan. 23-28--IAEA-DPRK discussion continue in Pyongyang on
implementation and verification of the freeze on DPRK nuclear
facilities.
Jan. 28--U.S.-DPRK LWR Supply Agreement Talks in Beijing--
Second Session.
Jan. 29--U.S. experts arrive in Pyongyang to survey
property sites for the future opening of a U.S. liaison
office.
Feb. 15--Australia publicly announces its contribution of
$5 million USD to KEDO.
Feb. 28--New Zealand publicly announces its contribution of
$300,000 USD to KEDO.
March 7-9--DPRK Preparatory Conference in New York.
Mar. 8--KEDO is formally established as an international
organization under international law--Canada, New Zealand,
Australia join.
Mar. 27-29--U.S.-DPRK LWR Supply Agreement Discussions in
Berlin continue--Third Session.
Apr. 4-8--DPRK experts arrive in Washington, DC, to survey
property for the future opening of a DPRK liaison office.

Mr. SPECTER. Finally, Madam President, I would like to ask unanimous
consent to print in the Record the proposed amendment that I had
intended to offer with a number of cosponsors, as I say, including the
distinguishing Senator from Texas who is presiding, so that all of that
will be part of the Record and available for review in anticipation of
the response by Secretary of State Christopher, to Senator Dole's
leadership.
There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following
new section:

SEC. --. TREATMENT OF AGREED FRAMEWORK WITH NORTH KOREA AS
TREATY.

(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, of the Constitution
requires that treaties may only be made by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) The Case Act (1 U.S.C. 112b) requires that the text of
international agreements other than treaties shall be
transmitted to Congress.
(3) The President does not consider the Agreed Framework
Between the United States of America and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea to be a treaty, for purposes of
seeking the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification,
or even to be any other type of international agreement, for
purposes of compliance with the Case Act (1 U.S.C. 112b).
(4) The Agreed Framework involves reciprocal binding
commitments by both the United States and North Korea on
resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and
is an international agreement.
(5) The commitments made by the United States under the
Agreed Framework, including undertakings that will involve
appropriations, are as substantial and ongoing as commitments
that customarily have been made by the United States through
treaties.
(6) Such commitments should be subject to Senate review and
approval.
(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that
the President should have submitted, and should now submit,
the Agreed Framework as a treaty to the Senate for its advice
and consent to ratification pursuant to Article II, Section
2, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States.
(c) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``Agreed
Framework'' means the document entitled ``Agreed Framework
Between the United States of America and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea'', signed October 21, 1994, at
Geneva, and the attached Confidential Minute.

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, this is an issue of really enormous
importance, as we have reviewed the work of the Intelligence Committee.
It has been my conclusion that the problems of international
terrorism and the problems of weapons of mass destruction are problems
of overwhelming importance, posing a security threat to the United
States.
When we have a document which has as much practical importance as
this so-called agreed framework does, it is simply inappropriate to not
have it subjected to Senate scrutiny. It may well be that this Senate
will ratify this treaty, the document that I consider to be a treaty.
It is certainly necessary, in my judgment, that matters of this sort
be elevated to a level where there is very, very, considerable public
scrutiny and scrutiny by the Senate under the constitutional doctrine
of checks and balances.
So awaiting the reply by Secretary of State Christopher, it is my
intention at the appropriate time to bring this matter to the Senate
for ratification because of its importance on the merits
[[Page S4056]] and on the substance, and because of its importance in
compliance with the U.S. Constitution. I thank the Chair.
I yield the floor.
Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. INOUYE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii is recognized.
Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
Amendments Nos. 342 through 346, En Bloc

Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I am about to send to the desk several
amendments on behalf of several Senators on both sides of the aisle. I
am pleased to advise you, Madam President, that these amendments have
been reviewed and cleared by the managers of the measure before us and
all of the appropriate Senators from committees of jurisdiction.
I send the amendments to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendments.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye] proposes amendments
numbered 342 through 346.

Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendments be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendments are as follows:

Amendment No. 342

Mr. INOUYE offered amendment No. 342 for Mr. McConnell, for himself,
Mr. Leahy, Mr. Dole, Mr. Daschle, Mr. Specter, Mr. Inouye, Mr.
Jeffords, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. Harkin, Ms. Mikulski, Mrs. Murray, and
Mrs. Feinstein.
The amendment is as follows:

On page 16, between lines 18 and 19 insert the following:

CHAPTER I

On page 25, between lines 4 and 5, insert the following:

CHAPTER II

foreign operations, export financing and related programs

bilateral economic assistance

funds appropriated to the president

debt restructuring

debt relief for jordan

For the cost, as defined in section 502 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, of modifying direct loans
to Jordan issued by the Export-Import Bank or by the Agency
for International Development or by the Department of
Defense, or for the cost of modifying: (1) concessional loans
authorized under Title I of the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, and (2)
credits owed by Jordan to the Commodity Credit Corporation,
as a result of the Corporation's status as a guarantor of
credits in connection with export sales to Jordan; as
authorized under subsection (a) under the heading, ``Debt
Relief for Jordan'', in Title VI of Public Law 103-306,
$275,000,000, to remain available until September 30, 1996:
Provided, That not more than $50,000,000 of the funds
appropriated by this paragraph may be obligated prior to
October 1, 1995.

Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, last July, Israel's Prime Minister
Rabin and Jordan's King Hussein appeared before a joint session of
Congress to declare the end of a 46-year state of war.
Their remarks were inspiring, particularly Prime Minister Rabin's
reminder that he served 27 years as a soldier, and in his words, ``sent
regiments into fire and soldiers to their death * * * and today we are
embarking on battle which has no dead and wounded, no blood no anguish.
This is the only battle which is a pleasure to wage, the battle for
peace.''
In turn, King Hussein declared Jordan ``ready to open a new era in
relations with Israel'' calling upon each of us for help and
cooperation in security a final peace settlement for the Middle East.
Later in the day at the White House the President affirmed the
American commitment to continue our role in securing a comprehensive
peace. The next important step in that process followed in October with
a peace treaty between the two nations.
This agreement was not an easy decision for Jordan. Given the radical
opponents to peace in the area, particularly terrorist groups
threatening retaliation against any country or leaders moving forward
in normalizing relations with Israel, the King demonstrated remarkable
courage.
In direct response to this significant breakthrough, President
Clinton pledged our support in relieving Jordan of its crippling debt
burden. In the foreign operations appropriations bill last year we
provided the first installment of that debt relief. Several weeks ago,
the President submitted a supplemental request and asked us to finish
the job.
That is the amendment before the Senate. At the President's request,
we are providing the balance of that debt relief. The funds will be
drawn from the foreign operations subcommittee allocation scheduled to
be released over fiscal year 1995 and fiscal year 1996 from existing
foreign operations resources.
But not exceeding our subcommittee allocation, should not suggest
this bill is free of costs. There are very painful tradeoffs that we
will be forced to make in the upcoming foreign operations
appropriations bill. By providing this relief for Jordan other programs
will have to be reduced. But, that is a choice that I am willing to
make and that is the clear choice of the Clinton administration.
Let me quote from the letter the President sent regarding this
request. Dated March 8, he says failure to provide the debt relief
``would threaten our ability to continue our leadership in the Middle
East Peace process. It undercuts those who are willing to take risks
for peace and it directly threatens the security of Israel and the
Israel-Jordan peace treaty.''
Those are the stakes. President Clinton's assessment is echoed by
every leader in the region committed to stability, security and peace.
In fact, the only critics of debt relief in the region seem to be those
few cynical opponents still consumed by the drive to destroy Israel.
Syria's President Assad already is challenging American credibility
and our national commitment to our friends in the region. His purposes
would be served if he could point out that the Congress failed to live
up to an American commitment to Jordan and other prospective the risk
takers.
It will be nothing less than a victory for Saddam Hussein if we
renege on the President's promise, if we abandon an obligation assumed
by Secretary Christopher and the administration.
Madam President, it has not been an easy process to bring this
legislation to the floor. Even with Secretary Christopher and his
negotiating team in the region attempting to inch the process forward,
there has been some reluctance by Members on both sides of the aisles
to support this legislation. I know my colleague Senator Leahy has some
reservations about the outlay consequences of providing this support,
but there have also been concerns raised about the administration's
management of this request.
Last year, during conference on the fiscal year 1995 Foreign
Operations bill, we received a late night request to add the first
tranche of aid to our conference report. We did so with the clear
understanding that the balance would be requested and provided in two
additional installments over the next fiscal years. Instead, once
again, we were presented with an emergency, last minute request.
The fact that Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty factored into
the decision to consolidate the second and third installments and I
believe was the reason why most of my colleagues have been prepared to
respond to the President's request, but I should point out that the
administration has not made it easy to vote for this commitment. In
fact, there have been several points when administration officials have
actually jeopardized prospects for providing the assistance.
When the House Appropriations Committee decided to provide part of
the funding while making the commitment to appropriate the balance in
the next fiscal year, the White House spokesman accused members of
contributing to the renewal of war between Israel and Jordan. Insult
was added to injury when other administration officials suggested
Republican isolationism would compromise our national commitment.
I think these charges are irresponsible, inaccurate and introduced a
mean spirited, unnecessary partisan
[[Page S4057]] element to an otherwise serious, important deliberation.
Frankly, the remarks were costly in building support for this
undertaking.
Nonetheless, many of us believe this is a commitment worth making and
keeping. My colleagues who joined in introducing this amendment share
the view that the cause of peace is at a critical point. Our partners
in this process must know we will not retreat.
I ask unanimous consent that the letter I referenced from President
Clinton be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

The White House,

Washington, March 8, 1995.
Hon. Mitch McConnell,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator McConnell: A comprehensive and lasting peace
in the Middle East that ensures the security of Israel has
been a bipartisan goal which every administration and
Congress has endorsed and pursued for nearly fifty years.
This goal was significantly advanced through the bold
leadership and courage displayed by King Hussein of Jordan
and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, which made possible the
signing last October of a treaty of peace between their
countries. The United States played a critical role in making
this possible, through our diplomacy and our commitment to
stand by those who worked for peace.
I told Prime Minister Rabin and King Hussein last July, as
they met at the White House and set out their vision for a
future of peace and cooperation, that the United States would
support Jordan--as we support Israel--to minimize the risks
it was taking for peace. The Congress expressed its own
support for the King's leadership in the peace process in the
extraordinary reception accorded the King and Prime Minister
when they appeared together before a Joint Session. This
expression of U.S. support was essential to King Hussein's
ability to move forward to conclude and implement a peace
with Israel which could serve as a model for regional
cooperation.
Accordingly, last year I proposed to Congress that we
forgive all of Jordan's official direct debt to the United
States. This was authorized by the Congress last August and
$99 million was appropriated as an initial tranche. I
proposed in the FY 1995 supplemental an appropriation of $275
million to complete debt forgiveness. I want to encourage
Congress to take immediate action to fulfill this commitment.
Failure to do so would threaten our ability to continue our
leadership in the Middle East peace process. It undercuts
those who are willing to take risks for peace and it directly
threatens the security of Israel and the Israel-Jordan peace
treaty. Prime Minister Rabin called me to express personally
his grave concern regarding the negative consequences for
both Israel and Jordan, as well as the broader peace process,
of failure to fully implement the proposed debt forgiveness.
The cause of peace in the Middle East is at a critical
point. We must not withdraw the support we have pledged to
those who face very real threats from terror and violence.
The people of Jordan must see that the United States stands
by its commitments. Israel must know that our leadership in
the Middle East remains a constant of bipartisan policy. And
those in the region who have not yet made peace must
recognize that we will not retreat from engagement in the
quest for an enduring settlement.
The price the United States and our friends in the Middle
East will pay for failure is high. I need your support to
ensure that our commitment is fulfilled and the full $275
million of debt forgiveness for Jordan is provided.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.

Mr. PELL. Madam President, this is an extraordinarily delicate moment
in the Middle East peace process. Israel's agreement with the
Palestinians is hanging precariously in the balance between success and
failure, and one more act of terrorism against Israel could cause the
agreement to unravel completely. At the same time, Israel's
negotiations with Syria are moving slowly, and could be eclipsed by the
pending Israeli electoral cycle.
While Secretary of State Christopher's recent trip to the Middle East
appeared to yield some progress on the Palestinian and Syrian tracks,
the truth is that we cannot be assured of the establishment of a
comprehensive peace in the coming year. One element of the peace
process, however, that has been an unqualified success is Jordan's
peace treaty with Israel. By all accounts, the pace and scope of the
agreement's implementation have exceeded expectations, and the accord
shows real promise of bringing about a peaceful, normal relationship
between Israel and Jordan. The Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty is a true
milestone in U.S. diplomatic efforts in the Middle East.
We cannot lose sight of how well the peace treaty serves our national
security and foreign policy concerns. Much like the Egypt-Israel peace
treaty that arose from the Camp David agreements, the Israel-Jordan
treaty resolves a major component of one of the most intractable
conflicts in history. As a result, it should make a significant
contribution to advancing our interests in the Middle East, namely,
ensuring the safety and security of Israel, promoting regional
stability, and preserving our access to--and the free flow of--oil.
That being the case, it is completely reasonable to provide full debt
relief to Jordan as compensation for implementing its peace treaty with
Israel. To me, a $275 million appropriation--when viewed in the context
of this historic peace treaty--is a fair price to pay in support of
peace. Moreover, if the United States leads by example in forgiving its
debt, then we might be able to use that as leverage over other donor
countries to enter into similar debt relief arrangements.
Madam President, I can think of many occasions in the past 30-some
years when I have stood in this very spot to commend King Hussein for
promoting peace in the Middle East. Now that the King has taken the
final step in signing and implementing a treaty--with, I might add, no
small amount of prodding from the Congress and successive U.S.
administrations--I believe we should send a signal of our appreciation.
That is why I support full debt forgiveness for Jordan.
Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I am pleased to join Chairman McConnell
in sponsoring the Jordan debt relief amendment. This amendment
concludes an effort that he and I began last summer when I was still
chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee and he was the ranking
member. My colleagues will recall the excitement that enveloped this
body at that time: Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and Jordanian King
Hussein paid a joint visit to Capitol Hill and confirmed that they were
making peace. I will never forget the shivers that ran down my spine as
I listened to them speak and realized that the day that we had so long
wished for had finally arrived. It was with enormous pride that I
worked late at night with Senator McConnell and Congressman Obey in a
last-minute drive to incorporate in our fiscal year 1995 appropriations
bill a downpayment on debt relief for Jordan as a token of United
States support for this wonderful, historic development.
That was just the beginning, however. In the space of just 2 months,
far more quickly than anyone had predicted, the governments of Jordan
and Israel completed negotiation of the formal peace agreement between
their two countries. Come the end of October, I found myself with
President Clinton witnessing the signing of that agreement on the
Jordan-Israel border north of the Gulf of Aqaba. Once again, I found
myself moved beyond words.
With the memories of that trip to the Middle East still fresh in my
mind, I was pleased last month to see included in the administration's
fiscal year 1996 budget request a proposal for a supplemental fiscal
year 1995 appropriation to fund the remainder of the Jordan debt
restructuring program that Congress authorized last summer. I was
further pleased 10 days ago to receive a call from Secretary of State
Christopher requesting my support for including $275 million for this
effort in the defense supplemental appropriations bill now before the
Senate. With the peace agreement signed and implementation proceeding
vigorously, it is imperative that the United States move quickly to
fulfill its promise and appropriate the funds required to complete the
debt relief effort. I told Secretary Christopher that I would support
this proposal enthusiastically.
Later that day, however, I received the details of the proposal and
realized that there was one serious drawback to it: it would require
that the bulk of the money--$225 million--for this effort come out of
the funds that will be available in fiscal year 1996 for our other
foreign assistance activities. In other words, in order to pay for our
aid to Jordan, we would have to cut back significantly our aid to other
countries and organizations. Mr. President, I worked all last week
trying to find a
[[Page S4058]] way to appropriate in full the $275 million for Jordan
debt relief that is essential at this critical stage in the Middle East
peace process, and at the same time avoid threatening serious harm to
the rest of our foreign assistance programs. Unfortunately, the State
Department advised me that any modification of the proposal would be
interpreted in the Middle East as a retreat by the United States from
its commitment to Jordan and its support for the peace process.
They also told me, however, that the administration will work hard in
the coming months to find ways to mitigate the prospective harm to
other programs. Given these assurances, and my strong commitment to
supporting the Middle East peace process, I am cosponsoring this
amendment with Chairman McConnell. Chairman McConnell has worked hard
on this amendment, and I have appreciated the chance to work with him
on it.
With this action, we make an important contribution to advancing the
peace process and we demonstrate to King Hussein the appreciation of
the United States for the heroic steps he has taken in support of the
peace process.
As we proceed through the fiscal year 1996 appropriations cycle, I
will work hard with the administration, Chairman McConnell, and my
other fellow Senators to minimize cuts to other essential foreign
assistance programs.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Madam President, I am joining with other members of
the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee in sponsoring the pending
amendment to relieve the remainder of Jordan's debt to the United
States. I do so because this initiative is integral to the ongoing
peace process in the Middle East.
This action will make good on the promise President Clinton and the
American people made to King Hussein--that the United States would
support Jordan as it took risks for peace.
In line with this commitment, last summer, President Clinton told
King Hussein that he would ask the Congress to relieve Jordan's debt to
the United States if Jordan took a bold step toward peace.
As the first step on the road to peace, Jordan and Israel signed the
Washington Declaration and King Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin
appeared for the first time together in public last July.
It was a historic moment. Many of us sat in the Capitol and marveled
as King Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin--two former enemies--stood
together before the Congress and spoke publicly about strengthening
ties between their nations, about moving toward a comprehensive peace
treaty.
We were inspired by their courage. We were moved that the two leaders
were taking concrete steps to bring their nations together. That they
were committing themselves publicly to waging a battle for peace.
In response, and consistent with the President's commitment, the
Congress forgave a portion--$220 million--of Jordan's debt to the
United States. to relieve all of the debt at that time would have been
premature. It was, after all, important to measure progress and to give
the King an additional incentive to sign a formal peace treaty with
Israel.
Now, Mr. President, Jordan has signed a formal peace agreement with
Israel. Jordan did not wait for other countries in the region to reach
an agreement with Israel. It boldly moved forward and signed a
comprehensive peace agreement with Israel on its own.
Now that Jordan has done its part, the United States needs to make
good on the President's commitment to relieve the remainder of its debt
to our country. The Jordanian Government has exposed itself to those
who would choose war rather than peace with Israel.
The Government and the people of Jordan need to believe that they are
being supported by the United States. They need to see that the fruits
of peace are tangible.
Madam President, the administration supports this amendment.
Secretary of State Christopher believes it is important to build the
confidence of promoters of peace in Jordan and throughout the Middle
East.
Last week, I spoke to Dennis Ross, the State Department's Middle East
negotiator, who was in the Middle East with Secretary Christopher. He
conveyed to me his strong belief that approving the remainder of
Jordan's debt relief at this time was necessary to build momentum in
the peace process and continue to strengthen American credibility in
the region.
Admittedly, this is a less than ideal solution. Approving this
amendment will put additional pressure on our foreign aid spending
bill. However, as we review spending cuts, we have to keep in mind
long-term American foreign policy and security interests, and reflect
on expenses that might be incurred, and lives that might be lost, if
the peace process does not move forward in the Middle East.
I hope this new commitment will be reflected in the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Subcommittee allocation for fiscal year 1996.
Relieving Jordan's debt is important for the peace process. A
successful conclusion to the peace process after decades of strife is
important to U.S. security interests and, hopefully, will avoid the
need for large defense expenditures or military involvement down the
road. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
amendment no 343

Mr. INOUYE offered amendment No. 343 for Mr. McConnell.
The amendment is as follows:

On page 26, at the end of line 23 add the following:
Of the funds appropriated in Public Law 103-316, $3,000,000
is hereby authorized for appropriation to the Corps of
Engineers to initiate and complete remedial measures to
prevent slope instability at Hickman Bluff, Kentucky.

Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I have proposed an amendment that is
essential to the continued survival of Hickman, KY. This town sits on
an eroding bluff on the bank of the Mississippi River. If the erosion
of the bluff is not halted the city of Hickman risks losing two
500,000-gallon water tanks, the police, fire, and ambulance stations,
the county health department, and the community library buildings. As
recently as 2 weeks ago the Fulton County School Board was evacuated
after engineers indicated that bluff erosion had made the building
unsafe.
Over the last several years, I have worked to find a solution to this
problem. In 1992, I obtained funds to direct the Corps of Engineers to
study the bluff's instability and determine the least costly
alternative to address the erosion problem. Last year I was able to get
additional funds included in the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations, subject to authorization. Unfortunately, the Water
Resources Development Act never passed the Senate, leaving the Corps of
Engineers without the authorization to initiate their plan to stabilize
the bluff. This amendment merely authorizes the expenditure of already
appropriated funds.
This year I am concerned that time may run out on the residents of
Hickman. Since the erosion does not conveniently conform to the
Senate's schedule, I simply can not stand by and wait to see if the
Water Resources Development Act will be passed this year. The city of
Hickman is counting on this funding to prevent any further loss of
their community.

amendment no. 344

(Purpose: To restore local rail freight assistance funds)

Mr. INOUYE offered amendment No. 344 for Mr. Pressler, for himself,
Mr. Harkin, Mr. Conrad, and Mr. Daschle.
The amendment is as follows:

On page 30, line 8, strike the dollar figure
``$120,000,000'' and insert in lieu thereof the dollar figure
``$126,608,000''.
On page 30, strike line 14 through line 18.
amendment no. 345

(Purpose: Sense of the Senate concerning the National Test Facility)

Mr. INOUYE offered amendment No. 345 for Mr. Brown.
The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place in the bill, add the following new
section:

``SEC. . NATIONAL TEST FACILITY.

It is the sense of the Senate that the National Test
Facility provides important support to strategic and theater
missile defense in the following areas: (a) United States-
United Kingdom defense planning; (b) the PATRIOT and THAAD
programs; (c) computer support for the Advanced Research
[[Page S4059]] Center; and (d) technical assistance to
theater missile defense, and fiscal year 1995 funding should
be maintained to ensure retention of these priority
functions.

amendment no. 346

(Purpose: To provide that the rescission from the environmental
restoration defense account shall not affect expenditures for
environmental restoration at installations proposed for closure or
realignment in the 1995 round of the base closure process)

Mr. INOUYE offered amendment No. 346 for Mrs. Feinstein.
The amendment is as follows:

On page 25, between lines 4 and 5, insert the following new
section:
Sec. 110. (a) In determining the amount of funds available
for obligation from the Environmental Restoration, Defense,
account in fiscal year 1995 for environmental restoration at
the military installations described in subsection (b), the
Secretary of Defense shall not take into account the
rescission from the account set forth in section 106.
(b) Subsection (a) applies to military installations that
the Secretary recommends for closure or realignment in 1995
under section 2903(c) of the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act of 1990 (subtitle A of title XXIX of Public
Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).
amendment to protect military bases

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, I rise today to offer an amendment
that would protect military bases recommended for closure or
realignment in 1995 from the proposed rescission in the Defense
Environmental Restoration Account [DERA]. I urge my colleagues to
support this important amendment.
As many of my colleagues know, DERA funds are used to clean up
environmental contamination at open military bases. Because, the
military is subject to Federal and State environmental laws and
regulations just like private parties, the Department of Defense has an
obligation to clean up its military bases, whether the bases will
remain open or will close due to the base realignment and closure
process.
I strongly support DERA efforts and am concerned about the proposed
$300 million rescission in this appropriation bill. But, I understand
that the supplemental funding is extremely important to ensure the
readiness of our Armed Forces and protect U.S. national security.
Because the Appropriations Committee has decided to fully offset the
increase in funding with spending cuts, difficult decisions need to be
made. I remain hopeful, however, that the severe cut in DERA funds can
be mitigated in conference.
I am particularly concerned about the impact of the DERA rescission
on bases that have been recommended for closure or realignment in the
current base closure round. Normally, cleanup at closing military bases
is funded out of the base realignment and closure [BRAC] account.
However, in the first year of a closure--before BRAC cleanup funds are
available--environmental cleanup at closing military bases is funded
from DERA.
Military bases slated for closure must be closed within 6 years of
the closure decision, therefore, it is important that environmental
cleanup not be delayed to ensure the timely and effective reuse of
bases. Environmental cleanup is vital to assisting impacted communities
with economic redevelopment efforts.
This amendment would protect bases recommended for closure or
realignment in 1995 from any funding cuts in DERA. The rescission would
still take place, but at least for the first year until BRAC funding
kicks in, closing bases would not be impacted. This amendment would
simply ensure that the timetable for cleaning up and closing a military
base is not adversely impacted.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the
amendments be considered and agreed to, en bloc; that the motions to
reconsider be laid upon the table, en bloc; and that statements
relative to the amendments be printed in the Record as though read.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
So the amendments (Nos. 342 through 346) were agreed to.

dod mail order pharmacy program

Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, I would like to bring to Senator
Stevens' attention an issue regarding improved options for access to
DOD health services.
Mr. STEVENS. I welcome my friend and colleague's input.
Mr. DOMENICI. The fiscal year 1993 Defense Authorization and
Appropriations Acts required the DOD to conduct mail service pharmacy
demonstration projects. The fiscal year 1994 Appropriations Act
included language requiring DOD to expand the mail service benefit to
include all base realignment and closure sites not supported by an at-
risk managed care support contract.
DOD has moved forward to implement at-risk managed care support
contracts; however, residents within the BRAC sites are still adversely
affected because the managed care contracts will not be fully
implemented in some areas for up to 27 months. This denies these
individuals the access and convenience they previously had in going to
medical treatment facility pharmacies.
By acting to extend the mail service pharmacy program now rather than
waiting for full implementation of the managed care at-risk contracts,
the Government can achieve the following objectives.
First, during the interim period, eligible residents will have access
and convenience to a benefit that is comparable to what they had before
by being able to go to the pharmacy at the medical treatment facility
before it closed.
Second, the existing mail service pharmacy benefit uses government
acquired pharmaceuticals, where as currently, beneficiaries are
reimbursed based on what they pay for medications on the commercial
market, which are considerably higher.
Third, expansion of this benefit now is consistent with previous
congressional mandates to provide access and interim coverage to
individuals affected by BRAC.
For these and other reasons, it is my hope that you will lend your
support to try to address this gap in coverage during the conference.
Mr. STEVENS. The Senator from New Mexico has my support for trying to
assist him in addressing this issue during the conference.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator. I very much appreciate his
support.
AIR FORCE SPACE PROGRAM FUNDING

Mr. STEVENS. Madam President, in discussions with the Air Force early
this month, the Defense Subcommittee learned about a potentially
serious problem with the financing mechanisms governing Air Force
support of the Cassini mission to Saturn sponsored by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA].
In addition, potential problems have been identified with the funding
of on-orbit incentives for several Air Force satellite programs.
The Cassini-related issue centers on the question of how much of the
funds reimbursed to the service by NASA, can the Air Force use to
finance the Titan IV/Centaur heavy-lift expendable launch vehicle
programs. There is no problem with the amount of reimbursement, or with
NASA's willingness to pay these funds. The problem apparently arises
due to legal interpretation of the statute governing interagency
exchanges of goods and services.
The subcommittee has been informed that resolution of this problem
should occur early this year to avoid significant impacts on the Titan
IV/Centaur space programs.
Similarly, early resolution may be needed for the on-orbit incentives
dilemma the Air Force faces. In this case, a change in guidelines for
budgeting for on-orbit incentives may have caused financial shortfalls
for important satellite programs. The Air Force states that these
financing changes may cause serious problems for the Defense Support
Program for early warning satellites, the Global Positioning System
navigation satellites, the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program,
and the Defense Satellite Communications System.
The subcommittee understands that possible solutions to the Cassini
and on-orbit incentives problems raise several legislative issues which
must be addressed. Because of these issues, I have asked the Secretary
of the Air Force to provide the subcommittee with her views on these
matters, as well as the views of other organizations within the
Department of Defense and NASA which may have an interest in solving
these problems expeditiously.
[[Page S4060]] I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record my
letter to Air Force Secretary Sheila E. Widnall on these matters at the
end of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. STEVENS. It is my objective to be able to address these problems
during our joint conference with our House counterparts. I am hopeful
that the additional information we are seeking will assist us during
this conference.
Exhibit 1

U.S. Senate,

Committee on Appropriations,

Washington, DC, March 16, 1995.
Hon. Sheila E. Widnall,
Secretary of the Air Force, The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
Dear Madam Secretary: In discussions with the Air Force,
the Defense Subcommittee has learned about a potentially
serious problem with the financing mechanisms governing Air
Force support for the Cassini mission to Saturn sponsored by
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In
addition, problems have been identified with the funding of
on-orbit incentives for several Air Force satellite programs.
The Subcommittee has been informed that resolution of these
problems would occur early this year to avoid significant
impacts on Air Force space programs.
The Subcommittee understands that possible solutions to
these problems raise several legislative issues which must be
addressed. Because of these issues, I would appreciate it
greatly if you would share with us your personal views on
these matters, as well as the views of other organizations
within the Department of Defense and NASA which may have an
interest in solving these problems expeditiously.
As I know you recognize, the Subcommittee stands ready to
assist the Air Force in meeting its national security
missions.
With best wishes,
Cordially,
Ted Stevens,
Chairman.
Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, I would like to review with the
distinguished chairman of the Defense Subcommittee the status of an Air
Force program to investigate new air defense surveillance technologies.
This program, called HAVE GAZE, has been managed for many years by the
Air Force's Phillips Laboratory in New Mexico. Last year, Congress
appropriated $8 million for fiscal year 1995 efforts. The same amount
was appropriated for fiscal year 1994.
Phillips Laboratory has developed this promising new radar technology
to the point where actual field experiments are necessary. These
experiments are designed to gather the hard data needed to determine
HAVE GAZE's operational potential and to determine whether the next
development steps are justified.
Unfortunately, the Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD] has
released only about $2.5 million of the fiscal year 1994 funds and has
withheld approval to spend the remaining $5.5 million for fiscal year
1994 and all of the fiscal year 1995 funds. Despite Congress' support
for the program, OSD initially tried to terminate HAVE GAZE and now
proposes more delays and more study before the Air Force can obligate
funds.
I would like to ask the distinguished Defense Subcommittee chairman
whether he shares my concerns about the Defense Department's latest
actions regarding HAVE GAZE.
Mr. STEVENS. I say to my colleague from New Mexico that I do, indeed,
share his concerns about HAVE GAZE. I am sorry to say the Department
has not acted expeditiously as we intended when we appropriated funds
in fiscal years 1994 and 1995. It is important that these previously
appropriated funds be released so that the technical data needed to
fully evaluate HAVE GAZE's potential is available to the Pentagon and
to the Congress.
Mr. DOMENICI. Is the chairman aware of the support from the military
for obtaining this HAVE GAZE data through the field experiments?
Mr. STEVENS. I am well aware of the fact that these HAVE GAZE
experiments are supported by both the U.S. Space Command and the Air
Force.
Mr. DOMENICI. I believe there is still an opportunity for the
appropriate and timely resolution of this difficulty. Does the
distinguished chairman agree?
Mr. STEVENS. I agree that there is need for the quick resolution of
the situation.
Mr. DOMENICI. Will the chairman be willing to continue to work with
me during the joint conference with our House counterparts to encourage
the Defense Department to release the HAVE GAZE funds without further
delay?
Mr. STEVENS. Let me assure my colleague on the Defense Subcommittee
that, should these delays continue, we will need to consider this topic
in our deliberations during conference with the House on this bill. I
will work closely with him on this important matter.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator. I greatly appreciate the support
of the distinguished chairman of the Defense Subcommittee in obtaining
an expeditious resolution of this HAVE GAZE issue.
military school maintenance

Mrs. MURRAY. Madam President, I rise to engage the chairman of the
Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee in a colloquy on the issue
of military school maintenance.
As the chairman may know, local education agencies [LEA's] which
serve the dependents on active military personnel have a unique and
very difficult challenge in meeting the needs of these students. Not
the least of these challenges is maintaining a safe and productive
learning environment in those educational facilities which are owned by
the Federal Government and located on military installations.
This situation is particularly acute in several LEA's which were
identified in the joint Department of Defense/Department of Education
report, the Dole Commission report mandated by Public Law 99-661, as
having the most severe problems while serving at least two major
military installations. In fact, some of these facilities would not
even meet local fire and safety regulations were they not located on
Federal property.
Congress has addressed this problem several times in the past. In
fiscal year 1994 Congress appropriated $10 million to initiate repair
problems at the above mentioned installations. This allowed the
Department to begin correcting the most severe building deficiencies in
advance of ownership transfer to the involved LEA's. In fiscal year
1995 Congress appropriated an additional $20 million to continue and
hopefully complete this work and transfer ownership.
Though the funds for fiscal year 1995 military school maintenance
programs were appropriated almost 6 months ago, I am advised that the
Department of Defense has yet to disburse these funds to the
appropriate schools.
Mr. STEVENS. I share the Senator's concern about DOD failing to
promptly disburse these funds. As the Senator from Washington knows,
the Department was directed--in the Senate report accompanying last
year's Defense appropriations bill--to allocate these funds to school
districts identified in the joint DOD/DOEd study as having the most
severe problems. As such, school districts in our two States are in
line for receiving some of these funds. One of the reasons for the
Department's delay, I am told, is that statutory language approved in
the 1995 Defense Appropriations Act does not allow funds for repairing
federally owned schools to be used to replace facilities. I believe
this problem faces both the Alaska and Washington schools. Is that the
Senator's understanding as well?
Mrs. MURRAY. I believe that to be the case. It is my hope that a
remedy to this situation will be considered in the conference on this
supplemental appropriations bill.
Mr. STEVENS. I look forward to working with the Senator from
Washington on this issue and will ask my staff to work closely with
your office to craft an appropriate remedy. I can assure the Senator
that this issue will be dealt with promptly.
apache helicopters

Mr. BOND. Madam President, there is one issue I would like to bring
to the attention of the chairman of our Defense Subcommittee--the
proposed rescission of $77.6 million from the Apache A procurement
program. Although this funding is no longer needed to prevent a gap in
the Apache production line, the Army claims that it is needed to
prevent a delay in the Apache Longbow modernization program, which is
one of the U.S. Army's priority programs.
I have been informed that the Army currently faces a significant
funding shortfall for long lead procurement
[[Page S4061]] items and for research and development in the Longbow
program. These funding shortfalls may cause significant downsizing and
delay in both efforts. A delay in exercising the long lead contract
options and in providing the RDT&E funding, may result in key suppliers
ceasing work and may cause delays in production planning, tooling
acquisition, and component production. Technical publications may be
placed at risk, and total program costs may increase.
I ask the chairman whether he would be willing to address this issue
in conference and to work with me to find some kind of accommodation to
avoid shortfalls in this critical program.
Mr. STEVENS. I recognize the concerns of the Senator from Missouri in
this matter, and I can assure him that I will be happy to work with him
within the fiscal limitations which constrain all of our decisions
during this time of austerity.
I want to extend to my colleague and fellow member of the Defense
Subcommittee my personal commitment to support the Apache Longbow
program as a centerpiece of the Army's aviation modernization plan. I
also recognize the significance of continuity in the Apache Longbow
procurement and development efforts to the consideration of Apache
helicopters for purchase by our NATO allies.
Let me add, for the benefit of my colleague, that I have directed the
Defense Subcommittee staff to begin discussions immediately with the
Army to determine the supplemental funding requirements for fiscal year
1995. The subcommittee is seeking this additional information so that
it can assure that adequate resources are available for the program and
that fiscal year 1995 funds support the efficient execution of the
fiscal year 1996 budget request for Apache Longbow.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Hawaii be willing to
engage in a short colloquy with the Senators from North Dakota?
Mr. INOUYE. I will be glad to engage in a colloquy with the Senators
from North Dakota.
Mr. CONRAD. According to my understanding, Congress appropriated $10
million in fiscal year 1994 and $10 million in fiscal year 1995 for the
U.S. Army to upgrade and procure the M149A2 water trailer.
Would the Senator from Hawaii tell me if my understanding is correct?
Mr. INOUYE. The Senator is correct. The Senator from North Dakota is
aware that, as Chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I
strongly supported procurement of the M149A2 because it provided the
Army with a modern water trailer which it sorely needed.
Mr. CONRAD. I recognize the key role the Senator has played in
procurement of the water trailer, and I am grateful for his support. As
the Senator from Hawaii is aware, the M149A2 is manufactured by the
Turtle Mountain Manufacturing Co., located on the Turtle Mountain
Indian Reservation in North Dakota.
Turtle Mountain Manufacturing Co. began manufacturing the water
trailer when the company was part of the Small Disadvantaged Business
8(a) set-aside program, and the company continued manufacturing the
trailer after it graduated from the 8(a) program. Procurement of the
M149A2 provided the Army with a vital piece of equipment. The
procurement also brought job opportunities to the Turtle Mountain
Indian Reservation.
However, I have recently learned that the Army has procured enough of
the water trailers to meet its new inventory objective. Due to planned
force structure changes, the Army does not need as many water trailers
as it previously anticipated.
Would the Senator tell me if I am correct?
Mr. INOUYE. The Senator is correct. The Army reports that it has
9,926 M149A2 water trailers on hand, and no longer needs more of the
water trailers. As the Senator has indicated, the Army still has $15
million of the funds Congress appropriated for the water trailers in
fiscal year 1994 and fiscal year 1995.
The Army does, however, need another trailer, the M105A3 cargo
trailer. The average age of the M105 cargo trailer is 16 years, while
the trailer's economic life is 20 years. Nearly one-quarter of the
Army's fleet of M105 cargo trailers is older than twenty years, and
many of these overage trailers are assigned to fight units. The overage
trailers can impair unit mobility and readiness.
Mr. CONRAD. As I understand it then, the Army has $15 million
remaining from procurement of the M149A2 water trailer. Although the
Army does not need additional water trailers, it does need the M105A3
cargo trailer.
Would the Senator support the Army's using this remaining $15 million
to procure the M105A3 cargo trailer?
Mr. INOUYE. I indeed support such action by the Army. The funds were
appropriated for trailer procurement, and the Army needs the M105A3. I
urge the Army to use the funds to procure the M105A3.
Mr. DORGAN. I echo the sentiments expressed by my colleague from
North Dakota. I thank the Senator from Hawaii for his support of
funding for the M149A2 water trailer. The Senator's support has been
vital to its inclusion in the defense appropriations bill.
Regarding the purchase of the M105A3 cargo trailer, I appreciate the
Senator's confirmation that the Army needs the trailer. Since
procurement of the M105A3 would essentially replace procurement of the
M149A2, which was originally procured under the small disadvantaged
8(a) program, would the Senator from Hawaii indicate whether he thinks
the M105A3 should be procured under a set-aside program?
Specifically, does the Senator from Hawaii think it would be
appropriate for the M105A3 contract to be set aside for small
disadvantaged businesses?
Mr. INOUYE. I do think it would be appropriate for the Army to set
aside the M105A3 contract for small disadvantaged businesses, and I
urge the Army to do so.
Senator Stevens, the chairman of the subcommittee, is on the floor.
Would the chairman of the subcommittee be willing to share his views on
this subject?
Mr. STEVENS. I am pleased to tell the Senator from Hawaii that I
share his opinion. The Army needs the M105A3 and, since the Army has
funds which were appropriated for trailer procurement, the Army should
use the $15 million in unused funds from procurement of the M149A2 to
procure the M105A3 cargo trailer.
Mr. CONRAD. I thank the Senator from Hawaii and the Senator from
Alaska.

funding for enterprise development in the nis

Mr. STEVENS. Madam President, I would like to express to the Senator
from Kentucky, the chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, my
concern as to whether the rescission in this bill to the Agency for
International Development [AID] budget might affect the fiscal year
1995 funding level for the Enterprise Development Program. The projects
funded in this program are some of the most successful in the former
Soviet Union. I have personal experience with the American Russian
Center [ARC] in Alaska, which receives its funding through this
program. As you may be aware, during its exit briefing for their
assessment of AID's programs in the Newly Independent States [NIS] the
General Accounting Office [GAO] stated that the ARC was one of the two
best programs in Russia. Mr. Tom Dine, the AID assistant administrator
for Eastern Europe and Russia, is quoted as saying ``I use it [ARC] as
an example to other Universities of how to get involved in the whole
economic transition effort taking place in the former Soviet Union.''
ARC is the only AID privatization program in the Russian Far East
Region, and in its first year provided training and technical
assistance to over 1,000 Russians. Does the committee support the
privatization programs, such as the ARC, in the NIS?
Mr. McCONNELL. Yes, it does.
Mr. STEVENS. The Enterprise Development Program in AID is funding the
development of private enterprises in Russia, not the Russian
Government. This is consistent with the goal of strengthening the
developing entrepreneur class in Russia. This entrepreneur class will
be the backbone of democracy in that country. Because of the
outstanding performance of the ARC and other programs like it, and
[[Page S4062]] their critical mission of supporting privatization in
Russia, I believe this program merits continued full funding. Is it the
intention of the chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee that
no reduction be applied to the highly rated projects in the Enterprise
Development Program such as the ARC?
Mr. McCONNELL. Yes, that is correct. AID should maintain full funding
for these programs.
Mr. STEVENS. Does the distinguished Senator support the original
fiscal year 1995 funding level for the Enterprise Development Program.
Mr. McCONNELL. Yes.
Mr. STEVENS. Madam President, I want to thank my colleague for
clarifying that point.
Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, I rise in my capacity as chairman of
the Budget Committee, to comment on H.R. 889, the defense supplemental
appropriations and rescission bill for the fiscal year ending September
30, 1995, as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee.
The bill provides for a net decrease in fiscal year 1995 budget
authority and outlays of $1.3 billion and $91 million, respectively.
These are real cuts to the deficit.
I ask unanimous consent that tables showing the relationship of the
pending bill to the Appropriations Committee 602 allocations and to the
overall spending ceilings under the fiscal year 1995 budget resolution
be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, and material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

STATUS OF H.R. 889 DEFENSE EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL AND RESCISSIONS--SENATE-REPORTED
[Fiscal year 1995, in millions of dollars, CBO scoring]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senate Total comp
Subcommittee Current H.R. 889 Subcmte 602(b) to
status\1\ total allocation allocation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture-RD:
Budget authority.............................. 58,117 -- 58,117 58,118 -1
Outlays....................................... 50,330 -- 50,330 50,330 -0
Commerce-Justice:
Budget authority.............................. 26,873 -177 26,696 26,903 -207
Outlays....................................... 25,429 -20 25,409 25,429 -20
Defense:
Budget authority.............................. 243,628 -0 243,628 243,630 -2
Outlays....................................... 250,661 -0 250,661 250,713 -52
District of Columbia:
Budget authority.............................. 712 -- 712 720 -8
Outlays....................................... 714 -- 714 722 -8
Energy-Water:
Budget authority.............................. 20,493 -100 20,393 20,493 -100
Outlays....................................... 20,884 -50 20,834 20,888 -54
Foreign Operations:
Budget authority.............................. 13,679 -172 13,507 13,830 -323
Outlays....................................... 13,780 -6 13,775 13,780 -5
Interior:
Budget authority.............................. 13,578 -- 13,578 13,582 -4
Outlays....................................... 13,970 -- 13,970 13,970 -0
Labor-HHS:\2\
Budget authority.............................. 266,170 -300 265,870 266,170 -300
Outlays....................................... 265,730 -4 265,726 265,731 -5
Legislative Branch:
Budget authority.............................. 2,459 -- 2,459 2,460 -1
Outlays....................................... 2,472 -- 2,472 2,472 -0
Military Construction:
Budget authority.............................. 8,836 -- 8,836 8,837 -1
Outlays....................................... 8,525 -- 8,525 8,554 -29
Transportation:
Budget authority.............................. 14,265 -187 14,078 14,275 -197
Outlays....................................... 37,087 -11 37,075 37,087 -12
Treasury-Postal:\3\
Budget authority.............................. 23,589 -- 23,589 23,757 -168
Outlays....................................... 24,221 -- 24,221 24,261 -40
VA-HUD:
Budget authority.............................. 90,256 -400 89,856 90,257 -401
Outlays....................................... 92,438 -- 92,438 92,439 -1
Reserve:
Budget authority.............................. -- -- -- 2,311 -2,311
Outlays....................................... -- -- -- 1 -1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Total Appropriations:\4\
Budget authority.......................... 782,655 -1,336 781,319 785,343 -4,024
Outlays................................... 806,241 -91 806,150 806,377 -227
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\In accordance with the Budget Enforcement Act, these totals do not include $1,394 million in budget authority
and $6,466 million in outlays in funding for emergencies that have been designated as such by the President
and the Congress, and $877 million in budget authority and $935 million in outlays for emergencies that would
be available only upon an official budget request from the President designating the entire amount as an
emergency requirement.
\2\Of the amounts remaining under the Labor-HHS Subcommittee's 602(b) allocation, $1.3 million in outlays is
available only for appropriations from the Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund.
\3\Of the amounts remaining under the Treasury-Postal Subcommittee's 602(b) allocation, $1.3 million in budget
authority and $0.1 million in outlays is available only for appropriations for the Violent Crime Reduction
Trust Fund.
\4\Of the amounts remaining under the Appropriations Committee's 602(a) allocation, $1.3 million in budget
authority and $1.4 million in outlays is available only for appropriations from the Violent Crime Reduction
Trust Fund.

Note.--Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

Source: Prepared by SBC majority staff, March 7, 1995.

FISCAL YEAR 1995 CURRENT LEVEL--H.R. 889, DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTAL AND
RESCISSIONS BILL
[In billions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Budget
authority Outlays
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current level (as of February 25, 1995)\1\........ 1,236.5 1,217.2
H.R. 889, Defense Supplemental and Rescissions, as
reported by the Senate........................... -1.3 -0.1
---------------------
Total current level......................... 1,235.2 1,217.1
=====================
Revised on-budget aggregates\2\................... 1,238.7 1,217.6
Amount over (+) / under (-) budget aggregates..... -3.6 -0.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\In accordance with the Budget Enforcement Act, the total does not
include $1,394 million in budget authority and $6,466 million in
outlays in funding for emergencies that have been designated as such
by the President and the Congress, and $877 million in budget
authority and $935 million in outlays for emergencies that would be
available only upon an official budget request from the President
designating the entire amount requested as an emergency requirement.
\2\Reflects revised allocation under section 9(g) of H. Con. Res. 64 for
the Deficit-Neutral reserve fund.

Note: Details may not add to total due to rounding.

Source: Prepared by SBC majority staff, March 7, 1995.

north korea--amendment no. 328

Mr. HATFIELD. Madam President, I wonder is my friend from Alaska will
allow me to respond to his final point about the necessity of having
this same language included in the rest of the 1996 appropriation
bills.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I welcome the chairman's comment on this point.
Mr. HATFIELD. I appreciate Senator Murkowski's willingness to modify
the language of the amendment to delete the reference to ``any other
act.'' As the Senator knows, it is my policy as chairman to pass
appropriation bills that do not contain amendments that attempt to
apply to other appropriation bills that have not yet come before us.
However, I want to give my assurances to the Senator from Alaska and
to the majority leader that I support the intent of this amendment and
will work with you in your efforts to include it in the remainder of
the 1996 appropriation bills.
The Murkowski/Dole amendment brings much needed discipline to the
administration's tactics for diverting money to the projects associated
with the United States DPRK agreed framework. As the Senator mentioned
in his remarks, in fiscal year 1995 the administration relied
exclusively on emergency and reprogrammed funds for this purpose. As
the chairman of the Appropriation Committee, I strongly support
[[Page S4063]] the Murkowski/Dole amendment for requiring the
administration to take an upfront approach from here on out. The
administration must specifically request that funds be set aside for
use in implementing the agreed framework. This will bring greater
accountability to the process, and perhaps decrease the necessity for
emergency supplementals such as the one we have before us today.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the chairman for his remarks, and also thank
the Senior Senator from Alaska for his support of this amendment. I
will look forward to working with you to see that the Murkowski/Dole
language is adopted in subsequent appropriation bills.
Mr. COVERDELL. Madam President, I had planned to offer an amendment
today but I will withhold in order to explain an agreement I have
reached with the Chairman and manager of this bill, Senator Hatfield.
My amendment would have prohibited the Department of Housing and Urban
Development [HUD] from expending further Community Development Block
Grant [CDBG] nonemergency monies until funds appropriated last August
for Tropical Storm Alberto were fully released.
Madam President, the State of Georgia this summer endured the worst
disaster in its history, Tropical Storm Alberto. Alberto has left in
its wake flooding unparalleled in the Southeast and damage estimates
nearing $1 billion. In the aftermath of this disaster, Georgia embarked
on a unified effort to build back its communities. This effort was
appropriately called ``Operation Buildback.'' During these efforts,
State officials with the assistance of their Federal representatives,
catalogued the damages and recommended priority projects for the
Federal agencies for whom emergency appropriations were made during our
appropriations process.
During the 1995 budget cycle, $180 million were made available for
this flood through the Housing and Urban Development [HUD] CDBG
program. Let me remind my colleagues that this process took place last
August. It has been a full 8 months since and HUD has not released over
one-third of the disaster aid. In addition, my three inquiries to
Office of Management and Budget [OMB] and HUD as to when the remaining
funds would be released were ignored until it was learned that I would
offer this amendment. There is $57 million outstanding and I would like
to know why. Eight months is entirely enough time to get these funds
released. The State of Georgia has done their part in submitting
project requests in December that were well in excess of the $180
million that was appropriated for the entire disaster. It is high time
for the Federal Government to do their part.
I submit that this is not way to treat disaster victims and their
communities. We have a responsibility to get that money back to those
who need it most instead of on a bureaucrat's desk in Washington. I
will not offer my amendment with the assurances of Committee Chairman
Hatfield that he will support my efforts to add such an amendment to
the second supplemental appropriations bill we consider if the
administration has not rectified this situation.
Mr. HATFIELD. The Senator from Georgia is correct in regard to our
agreement. If this situation has not been resolved by the time the
Senate considers the next supplemental appropriations bill, I will
support the amendment of the Senator of Georgia.
Mr. COVERDELL. I commend the chairman for his willingness to assist
me in this endeavor. It is of utmost importance to my State. I look
forward to working with him in the coming weeks to rectify this matter
and thank him for his leadership in this regard.
Mr. HATFIELD. I thank the Senator from Georgia.
Mr. DOLE. Madam President, before we vote on the supplemental
appropriation bill before us, I want to thank Chairman Hatfield,
Senator Byrd, Chairman Stevens, and Senator Inouye for their hard work
in hammering out a bill which will restore $1.9 billion needed for
training and readiness of our Armed Forces.
I am pleased that this bill is fully off-set in both budget authority
and outlays. Additionally, in my view, the committee has done a good
job in identifying the defense programs which should fund this
supplemental appropriation. However, I am concerned by the fact that
the operations and maintenance accounts of our Armed Forces are
continually being raided to fund unbudgeted contingencies that have
little if anything to do with our national security. The administration
requested this supplemental because it diverted 4th quarter O&M funding
to pay for operations in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Kuwait, Korea, and
Bosnia. Now, let me be clear, I am not saying that all of these
operations do not relate to U.S. interests. Certainly some, such as the
deployment to Kuwait and the increased operations in and around the
Korean peninsula, were in line with our national security interests.
That is the way it is supposed to be. The deployment of U.S. troops
should only be considered when the vital interests of the United States
are at stake. We simply cannot continue to raid our O&M accounts to pay
for every peace-keeping or peace-making operation dreamed up by the
United Nations.
Even as the drawdown continues, our fighting men and women are asked
to take on more missions in
hostile environments. They face greater dangers with fewer numbers and
less resources. In fact, since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the
Army has seen operational deployments increase by 300 percent. Last
year, the Army twice set a new record for soldiers operationally
deployed to other countries--with U.S. troops in more than 91 countries
around the world. Despite all of the administration's rhetoric, they
have provided neither an adequate force structure nor an adequate
defense budget for the challenges that face us in this new era.

Now, we in the Congress find ourselves in the position of voting on a
measure which essentially funds peace-keeping operations on which this
Chamber has not expressed its position. Certainly, the President should
have the flexibility to act in defense of our Nation and its interests.
But we have been put in a position where we are asked to reimburse the
Department of Defense for these operations, and if we do not, the
readiness of our forces will be irreversibly harmed. Earlier, my
colleague, Senator Stevens, laid out for us what it would mean to not
provide these funds. No doubt about it, the readiness of our forces
would be downgraded from their current level, which in my view is
precarious at best.
So, let me be clear, because I am concerned about the readiness of
our forces and because I support the men and women who put their lives
on the line whenever this Government asks them to, I will vote for this
bill. But that should not be interpreted as a stamp of approval of all
of the operations which made this supplemental necessary.
Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I want to start by commending the Senator
from Alaska and the Senator from Hawaii for their hard work on this
bill. I know there are no two members of the Senate more concerned
about our national security than Senator Stevens and Senator Inouye.
They have been given the difficult task of balancing our national
security needs with the need for deficit reduction, and I can certainly
appreciate the pressures they are under.
The Appropriations Committee has moved quickly on this supplemental,
which the administration says must be enacted by the end of this month.
I think the Senate has improved on the House bill in some respects. I
particularly want to commend the managers for rejecting the reduction
proposed by the House to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. That
is a program the Secretary of Defense feels very strongly about, as do
I.
I also think the managers were wise to reject the addition of $670
million in unrequested funds contained in the House bill. Some of those
additional funds do address must-pay bills, which I will come back to
in a moment, but they are not programs that belong in an emergency
supplemental.
Madam President, the Defense Department needs a supplemental, and I
think the leadership of the Defense Department is doing what they feel
they need to do to get a supplemental enacted in a timely fashion to
avoid a repeat of the disruptions in training that caused readiness
problems in fiscal year 1994. However, I have several concerns with the
approach the Senate is
[[Page S4064]] being asked to take in this legislation. I question
whether this supplemental is a good deal for the Defense Department on
balance.
First, it does not provide the net increase in defense spending for
readiness that was requested by the administration, despite the
concerns many of my colleagues have expressed about readiness. The
costs of the contingencies are covered, but only by making cuts
elsewhere in the defense budget. Unlike the administration request and
the House-passed bill, there is no net increase in funding for the
Department of Defense in this supplemental.
Because this bill is not designated as an emergency, it requires all
increases to be fully offset in both budget authority and outlays--
otherwise enactment of a supplemental could cause a sequester. As this
bill demonstrates, it is necessary to cut more budget authority than
you add in order to achieve that goal when the supplemental
requirements fall in the faster spending accounts, which is usually the
case. In the future, I fear that we will find that attempting to offset
fast-spending operation and maintenance outlays on a one-for-one basis
will be extremely difficult and overly restrictive.
DOD is willing to make some of the cuts in this bill, such as
termination of the TSSAM Program, which was anticipated in the budget,
but they had planned to use these cuts to offset the cost of other
must-pay bills later on this year. I might add that I regret that the
TSSAM Program was not able to overcome its problems, because it is a
technology we very much need, in my view. I am not quarreling with the
administration's decision to terminate the program, although I am
concerned that the amount of money rescinded in this bill will not
allow sufficient funds to pay the Government's termination costs. I
appreciate the comments of the Senator from Alaska that he is aware of
that issue and plans to review it in conference.
According to Deputy Secretary Deutch, DOD already has $800 million in
must-pay bills unrelated to these specific contingencies which will
require reprogrammings, which is a process by which funds are
transferred from one defense program to another during a fiscal year.
By taking the easier cuts for this bill, we are just making it harder
to deal with those other must-pay bills later.
Yet this bill also reduces DOD's 1995 reprogramming authority,
thereby reducing their flexibility later in the year if more problems
come up. There are other cuts in this bill that the Department of
Defense does not agree with, such as the reductions to the Technology
Reinvestment Program.
In addition to the concerns I have regarding specific programs in
this supplemental, I am troubled by the impact on the defense budget
and on defense management that the approach this bill takes of making
DOD absorb the full cost of these contingencies could have if it is
viewed as a precedent for funding future contingencies, which I hope it
will not be. It largely defeats the purpose of having a supplemental.
I am not sure we have really thought through the impact of what we
may be doing to the military with this 100 percent offset approach.
Last week, Gen. Gordon Sullivan, the Chief of Staff of the Army, told
the Armed Services Committee that if the Congress adopts a policy of
forcing the military to completely offset the costs of any contingency
operation:

. . . it is just going to destroy our training programs,
our quality of life programs, and it is going to be difficult
to manage the readiness of the force . . . It is going to
come out of reducing real property maintenance. We may have
to furlough civilians, terminate temporary employees, curtail
supply requests, park vehicles, reduce environmental
compliance. It is going to have a major impact.

General Sullivan said that in the event the military is told to
assist a large-scale evacuation of U.N. personnel from Croatia:

I just have to stop training, and I will have to move money
around from elsewhere to keep that operation going since
obviously what you expect me to do is to fight and win your
wars. So, I will have to get the money from people who are
not doing that to support it.

Now that may sound like an exaggeration to some, but if you
understand the laws that govern the defense budget, you will see why
General Sullivan's comments are right on target. The cost of an
operation, such as paying for the airlift to get there, the fuel, spare
parts, and so on, must come out of the operating budget. The military
does not have the authority to divert funds from the procurement of
weapons, or from research or military construction or military
personnel accounts, even if they wanted to.
And even within the operating budget, there are further constraints.
A large portion of the operating account is civilian pay, so you cannot
save money there without firing civilians. And you cannot cut really
cut the money to operate the bases--you have to pay the light bill. So
the areas General Sullivan is talking about--training, maintenance and
repair of the buildings on our military bases--are the only areas where
the military has the flexibility to change its plans halfway through
the year. And in fact that is exactly what happened last year--money
had to be diverted from training.
In the past we have paid for contingencies and natural disasters such
as the Midwest floods, the Los Angeles riots, the California
earthquake, and the cost of the Somalia and Rwanda operations last
year, as emergencies under the agreement reached in 1990 as part of the
Budget Enforcement Act that set up discretionary caps. What we have
done, at least in defense, was make a good faith effort to offset these
supplementals as best we could. About 70 percent of the cost of the
1994 Somalia supplemental was offset by defense rescissions, for
example, while all of the costs of the Rwanda mission, which was about
$125 million, were emergency funds. So in the past we have been
consistent about calling an emergency an emergency, but sometimes we
have fully or partially tried to offset those costs and sometimes we
have not.
That is basically the approach the House is taking. They provided
emergency supplemental appropriations for the Department of Defense and
then tried to offset those appropriations, in budget authority but not
in outlays, using savings from both defense and domestic programs. It
is my hope that the House position would prevail on this fundamental
point, that is, the question of whether we are going to treat the costs
of contingency operations that cannot be anticipated in advance as
emergencies for budget purposes.
If we start dropping the emergency designation, we could end up
tieing our hands in responding to future emergencies while we wait to
find 100 percent offsets. Strong consideration must be given to
budgeting for unanticipated contingencies in advance in the DOD budget,
but this inevitably runs into the issue of implicit congressional
approval for military operations and war powers considerations.
In addition to my concerns about the financial impact on the Defense
Department if this bill is viewed as a precedent, I also share the
concerns expressed by the Senator from Hawaii about the long term
policy implications of telling the military any future contingency they
are involved in is going to come out of their budget dollar for dollar.
This is going to have an impact on their ability and their willingness
to respond to situations like Haiti or Cuba, or especially a much more
expensive operation like peace enforcement in Bosnia, in the future. It
could have the effect of dictating our policy on the use of force
through the appropriations process.
I hope the policy of making the Defense Department absorb the costs
of these operations is viewed as a one-shot proposition, not as a
precedent for future supplementals, because if we are telling the
Department of Defense that any time there is an emergency that comes up
and they come over and request supplemental funds that they are going
to have to provide a 100-percent offset, then we are going to change
the nature of the responsiveness of the Department of Defense itself to
the missions that may, indeed, be crucial to our Nation's security.
If the Department of Defense is told that any unanticipated operation
they undertake, either unilaterally or with NATO or the United Nations,
is going to have to be completely offset within the defense budget,
which means they are going to have to basically kill or substantially
alter crucial defense programs in order to absorb those costs,
[[Page S4065]] then the result is going to be a very strong signal that
the United States is not going to be as involved as we have been in
world affairs, including commitments to our allies and commitments that
we have voted for at the U.N. Security Council.
This complete offset policy sounds good in speeches but it has very
serious implications for the Department of Defense. Make no mistake
about it, this complete offset policy means the long-term capability of
the Department of Defense is going to go down. It does not mean that
the immediate readiness is going down because that can be protected.
But future readiness, future capability, requires
modernization and it requires research and development, and those
are the programs being cut by this complete offset policy. So 5 or 10
years from now, people will have a very serious problem with readiness
if we continue to declare there is no emergency even when our forces
are responding to the unanticipated events that we all know will take
place somewhere in the world from time to time.

Madam President, I also want to note that this bill contains domestic
rescissions of about $1.5 billion. I understand that the defense
portion of this supplemental is outlay neutral in 1995 without the
domestic rescissions, but that over the 5-year period the domestic
rescissions are necessary to make the whole bill outlay neutral over
the long run.
Many of my colleagues do not support the idea of using domestic
rescissions to offset the cost of a defense supplemental. My view is
either we have firewalls or we do not. The Congress has cut defense to
pay for domestic supplementals in the past, so I do not see any reason
why we should not look to domestic programs to offset the cost of
defense supplementals, especially if we are going to start adopting the
policy of offsetting both the budget authority and outlays of
supplementals.
I hope we decide to reinstate defense firewalls, Madam President. But
until we do, I believe domestic programs should be on the table to fund
defense supplementals, just as defense programs have been put on the
table to fund domestic supplementals.
In 1990, for example, $2 billion in defense funds were rescinded to
substantially offset the cost of a supplemental providing economic aid
to the new democratic governments of Panama and Nicaragua as well as
funds for food stamps, fighting forest fires, veterans programs, and
many other programs.
That same fiscal year, discretionary spending was reduced across the
board to fund antidrug programs. So once again there was a net transfer
of funds from the defense budget to the non-defense discretionary part
of the budget.
I should also point out that previously the defense budget has been
held to a higher standard than the domestic budget. As I have already
pointed out, 70 percent of the defense funds provided in last year's
emergency supplemental for Somalia were offset by defense rescissions.
But only about 25 percent of the non-defense funds provided in that
supplemental were offset by rescissions. If the Congress is
contemplating setting out a new policy for offsetting supplementals, or
not offsetting supplementals, I think that policy has to be fair in its
treatment of defense and domestic emergencies.

Haiti Reporting Requirement

Madam President, I am also concerned that the requirement for a
Presidential report on the cost and source of funds for military
activities in Haiti is linked to a cutoff of funds for those activities
if the report is not submitted within 60 days after enactment of this
act.
I generally oppose linking a cutoff of funds for any military
operation to anything other than the accomplishment of the mission. If
the Senate opposes a military activity or operation, it should vote to
cut off the funding. In the case of the Haiti operation, however, the
Senate voted several times in the last session not to prohibit the
President from ordering the deployment of United States forces to
Haiti. I do not think that the Senate would be prepared to vote to
terminate the funding for the Haiti mission now that it has been
carried out with such professionalism by United States forces and is in
the process of being turned over to a U.N. operation that will be
commanded by a United States general officer.
In this case, moreover, virtually all of the information that the
President would have to provide in his report to Congress was mandated
last session by Public Law 103-423, a joint resolution regarding United
States policy toward Haiti, that was signed into law by the President
on October 25, 1994. President Clinton has now submitted four reports
pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of that legislation that call for monthly
reports until the mission is over. Those reports were submitted to
Congress on November 1, December 6, and December 31, 1994, and on
February 8, 1995.
If the President had refused to submit those reports, then perhaps it
would make sense to condition the continued availability of funding on
the submission of such reports in the future. But the President has
been submitting those reports and there are no indications that he
plans to stop submitting them.
I do not plan to offer an amendment to this bill to delete the cutoff
of funding provision. I base my decision on the urgent need of the
Department of Defense for this supplemental funding and my realization
that there will be a difficult conference with the House on this bill.
I therefore want to avoid any action that could delay this legislation.
The fact that President Clinton will be able to submit the report
required by this bill has minimized my concern over the funding cutoff
provision. But I did want to note my concern over this provision and to
signal my determination that this provision not serve as a precedent
for this type of action.
ef-111 system improvement program [sip]

Mr. D'AMATO. Madam President, I would like to commend my good
friends, the distinguished chairman and ranking minority member of the
Defense Subcommittee, for not including EF-111A System Improvement
Program [SIP] funds in the defense rescission package of the
supplemental funding measure now before the Senate.
I believe the House Committee on Appropriations acted prematurely by
including EF-111A SIP funds in its version of the supplemental. As my
colleagues know, the EF-111A SIP has been under siege since fiscal year
1993 when some in Congress suggested that the program duplicated the
Navy's EA-6B Advanced Capability [ADVCAP] Program.
At the time, the Pentagon sharply challenged the notion that the EF-
111 and EA-6B were duplicative. Then-Air Force Secretary Don Rice was
quoted as saying: ``The F-111 does escort jamming as well as local area
jamming; it has the capability to keep up with the F-15E's and F-111F's
and F-16's when they're doing interdiction missions. The EA-6B does
not.'' The Pentagon appeal to the fiscal year 1993 Defense
Appropriations Conference was even more detailed:

The elimination of the EF-111 would significantly
compromise the U.S. ability to provide standoff jamming in
support of tactical air operations for two reasons. First,
the EF-111 and the EA-6B each have capabilities not possessed
by the other. Although the two jamming systems will be
roughly comparable following modernization, the EF-111 is,
and will continue to be, more capable than the EA-6B in
supporting deep strike missions. This is due to the EF-111's
significant advantage over the EA-6B in speed, range, and
time on station.
Second, even if the two platforms were comparable in all
respects, there is an insufficient number of EA-6B's in the
Navy inventory to support the mission requirements of both
Services. To procure additional EA-6B's to compensate for the
loss of the EF-111's would be much more expensive than to
retain and modernize the existing EF-111 inventory.

In the end, the Department of Defense was successful in reversing the
proposed elimination of EF-111A funding. Soon thereafter, in February
1993, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff report on the roles,
missions, and functions of the Armed Forces of the United States
endorsed the retention and modernization of both the EA-6B and the EF-
111A.
In retrospect, the roles and missions report was the high water mark
of Pentagon support for the EF-111A. As my distinguished colleagues
know, the fiscal year 1996 defense budget request calls for the
termination of the EF-111A SIP program in fiscal year 1996 and
retirement of the EF-111A fleet in fiscal year 1997. Navy EA-6B's,
according to the Air Force, will fill the gap
[[Page S4066]] left by the retirement of the EF-111A fleet.
This plan is fatally flawed. The EA-6B ADVCAP program was canceled in
February, 1994, and the future of Navy electronic warfare has been in
turmoil ever since. In the wake of this cancellation, the Pentagon
commissioned the Joint Tactical Air Electronic Warfare Study to examine
the relationship between the EA-6B and EF-111A and to review overall
electronic combat requirements.
I would like to ask the distinguished Defense Subcommittee chairman
whether the results of the joint tactical air electronic warfare study
have been delivered to the Congress.
Mr. STEVENS. I will answer my colleague by saying that the results of
this study are long overdue and may not be available until June, 1995.
Mr. D'AMATO. Will the distinguished chairman also agree that, until
the Congress has had a full opportunity to evaluate the results of this
study, any proposal to eliminate EF-111 SIP funds and to retire the
entire EF-111 fleet is extremely premature?
Mr. STEVENS. I certainly agree with my colleague from New York.
Mr. D'AMATO. In my opinion, the bottom line is that we are being
asked by the House to lay waste to the Air Force's support jammer
capability without sufficient analysis or debate. We know the Navy
option is woefully inadequate.
We should ask ourselves several critical questions before we even
decide what to do about Air Force and Navy support jamming
requirements. First, what are the alternatives to the EF-111A SIP?
Second, if there are none, how will the termination of the SIP, and the
retirement of the EF-111A's, affect the efficiency and survivability of
our strike forces?
Does the distinguished Defense Subcommittee chairman agree that,
until we can answer these questions, any suggestion of rescinding EF-
111A SIP funds is fraught with too many risks for our national
security.
Mr. STEVENS. I agree with my colleague that terminating the EF-111
SIP program and planning for the retirement of the EF-111 fleet at this
time would be an unwise and risky course of action.
Mr. D'AMATO. Is my colleague willing to work with me and do what he
can to prevail over the House in the upcoming joint conference on the
supplemental?
Mr. STEVENS. Recognizing that we have a difficult conference before
us, and that funds are desperately short, let me assure the Senator
from New York that we will do what we can in joint conference to hold
the Senate position and to protect his interests to the greatest extent
possible.
Mr. GLENN. Madam President, I would like to raise my concerns related
to the pending supplemental appropriations bill.
I certainly understand the difficulty under which the Appropriations
Committee must work, particularly when the budget deficit looms as
large as it does.
But, I am concerned, Madam President, about the precedent set in this
bill by requiring that emergency supplemental spending be fully offset.
In the past, Congress and the administration have agreed to allow for
emergency spending without requiring offsets, but taking offsets in a
more benign manner, usually in cases where programs have been canceled
or where contract funds were available because they could not be
obligated during the fiscal year for which they were provided.
The supplemental before us takes a much different approach that bears
dramatic consequences.
By requiring complete offsets from prior year funding, we really are
not cutting lower priority programs as a result of tight fiscal
constraints. We are victimizing programs basically because they are in
slower spending accounts and their funds are still available to raid. I
know a number of my colleagues have expressed similar concerns and I am
hopeful that we can craft a new method of funding future emergency
spending.
I also note, Madam President, that this approach may be more easily
accomplished in the earlier quarters of a fiscal year, but what happens
later in the year after we have exhausted the resources of these slower
spending accounts?
Will we bring our normal planned operations, maintenance, and
training to a screeching halt? Will we stop paying our troops? This is
what will happen when we require the cost of contingency operations to
be paid from the current operating budget for operations in places like
Iraq, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti. Shortfalls in training
and maintenance are the very kinds of actions for which the
administration has been criticized and which the President's
supplemental request is intended to avoid.
I appreciate the committee's desire and attempt to impose fiscal
responsibility and I appreciate the committee's efforts to keep the
technology reinvestment project, the so-called TRP, alive, but I don't
believe we should fool ourselves that requiring complete offsets does
not have important implications for the overall readiness of our Armed
Forces.
The effect of this bill, Madam President, is to reduce current
defense spending by $1.9 billion. This is particularly curious, Madam
President, at a time when the majority, in its Contract With America,
calls for additional spending to ensure readiness.
Today's supplemental eats our seed corn in a number of important
areas. This bill will cut over $500 million from defense research and
development programs. To me, research and development ensures the
Nation's future readiness. Make no mistake, yesterday's investment in
R&D is what is winning today's battles. It is short sighted, in my
view, to downplay or overlook the critical research and development
plays in our overall readiness.
I would like to take a moment, to direct my comments to two programs
that have been embroiled in the debate over how to fund this
supplemental request. They are the TRP Program and the Department of
Commerce's Advanced Technology Program. I am very much relieved that
the committee did not take the same kind of draconian cuts the House
made and I urge the committee to maintain its position on these
programs in conference with the House.
I, like virtually every other Member of this body, have been a strong
supporter of the technology reinvestment project [TRP]. When Congress
first crafted this program in 1992, incorporating the recommendations
of both the Democratic and the Republican task forces on defense
conversion, the program received virtually universal support.
Several Members on both sides of the aisle came to the floor to
express their support for the program and the amendment providing
funding for the program was adopted by a vote of 91 to 2. To suggest
now that TRP funding is not a high priority is to forget the level of
support this program has enjoyed.
It is not surprising either because the TRP is an innovative, and I
might add a more cost effective, way for the Department of Defense to
meet its research and development requirements. The Defense Department
has always spent a portion of its R&D funds on dual-use technologies,
notwithstanding recent claims that funding for dual-use technologies is
some sort of a handout.
The truth of the matter is that DOD will continue to be involved in
developing dual-use technologies, because one of the uses in any given
dual-use technology is its military use.
The operative question becomes how do we go about developing this
dual-use technology that the military needs. The military can pay the
full freight and develop it on its own as it has in the past. Or, the
military can try to get the private sector to pay for half of it, since
the dual-use technology also will have a commercial application.
It seems simple to me. Do we want to pay full price or half price? I
prefer to take advantage of the discount. TRP is not a subsidy or grant
program for contractors. If anything, it is like a reverse subsidy for
DOD, Mr. President.
Just one example bears this out. The uncooled infrared rifle sight
technology under development through TRP funding will help soldiers
locate and engage the enemy in bad weather. In the private sector, it
can be used by industry to detect energy losses in houses and
buildings.
Under a TRP funded, dual use approach the military's goal is to
reduce
[[Page S4067]] the unit price from about $100,000 to less than $10,000
per unit, by tapping into the potential commercial market which is 10
times larger than the military requirement. Without TRP, the military
could pay 10 times more for the same technology.
TRP funding is a small investment, accounting for less than two-
tenths of 1 percent of this year's Defense budget request. Yet, it
leverages those defense dollars through industry cost-sharing and it
could yield significant benefits to long-term military readiness. To
kill the technology reinvestment project, as the House bill would do,
would be like killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. It just does
not make sense.
Madam President, my concern about efforts to erode government-
industry joint efforts to develop next-generation technology extends to
the House-passed $107 million rescission of funds for the Advanced
Technology Program [ATP].
ATP is cost-shared, industry-led, competitively awarded R&D which
pursues cutting edge technologies with strong potential for later
commercial success but technology that presently is too risky or too
long term to be pursued by industry alone.
Like TRP, ATP was developed with strong bipartisan support in the
Congress. ATP is intended to capitalize on America's strength in
research and development to create jobs and economic growth, and
increase our competitiveness in the global economy. While I believe any
cut in these critical technology programs is extraordinarily short-
sighted, at least the Senate has reduced the amount of the rescission
to $32 million; I urge my colleagues on the Appropriations Committee to
do everything they can to maintain the Senate position in conference.
Finally, Madam President, I cannot yield the floor without expressing
my concern over the cuts taken in both the Defense Environmental
Restoration Account and the Department of Energy's Environmental
Management Program. A number of my colleagues have identified
environmental cleanup as lower priority spending that could be used for
other programs. This is terribly wrong headed Mr. President. I hope
that the cuts taken in this supplemental do not signal the beginning of
a full scale assault on these important programs in the future.
Both DOD and DOE have legal obligations to clean up their facilities.
We already know that failure to meet cleanup milestones will result in
fines and penalties. In addition, for DOE, the cost to cleanup will
increase substantially simply by virtue of the delay. I intend to
address this issue at greater length in a separate statement. Like the
mechanic in the transmission commercial, you can either pay me now or
you can pay me later. But, it will cost more later.
I yield the floor.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Madam President, I want to comment on an important
aspect of the debates that took place to develop the legislation
approved today, and which I believe is directly related to the kind of
military security, growing economy, and strong job base that Americans
should be able to count on.
I am referring to the work of the programs within the Department of
Commerce, the Department of Defense, and other parts of the Federal
Government that serve as partners with industry to spur advances in
technology. My belief in these programs is very basic. Knowing what the
investment in technology that our foreign competitors are making and
the role that technology plays in expanding industries and high-wage
jobs in our own country, I view these programs as an essential key to
the economic security that West Virginians and the rest of the American
people should expect Congress to work toward.
For awhile, it appeared that this appropriations package would be
used to cripple some of the most important technology programs in our
public arsenal. But thanks to the efforts of many of my colleagues, and
I am privileged to work closely with a group of them, we were fairly
successful in reminding the Senate that a retreat from technology
investments is a dangerous course in military and economic terms.
In fact, I was pleased to see the Senate approve the Sense of the
Senate resolution, offered by Senators Bingaman and Nunn and which I
cosponsored, that expresses a continued commitment to the development
of dual-use technologies to be used by both the military and the
private sector.
These kinds of private-public partnerships, including the Technology
Reinvestment Project [TRP] and the Advanced Technology Program [ATP],
chart the course we should be taking for a strong military and economic
future. This concept is at the heart of the President's technology
policy, and is the most cost effective way to employ the ever-shrinking
Federal dollar in a way that maximizes our Federal dollars to the
benefit of both the public and the private sector.
To understand these kinds of partnerships, and the value of the TRP
and the ATP, we need to look first at the Advanced Research Projects
Agency [ARPA], which was set up nearly 40 years ago by President
Eisenhower. I think we can all agree that ARPA is one of the big
success stories to come out of the military-industrial complex over the
years. Aside from technologies it helped develop that our armed
services rely on today, things like stealth, the Global Positioning
System and smart weapons, it is also one of the parents to some of the
technologies that the people of America take for granted in their daily
lives, things as varied as a desktop computer is from the laser in a CD
player.
I want to also remind my colleagues that the Internet, which is at
the heart of the information super highway America is discovering, was
originally known as ARPAnet. All of these technological breakthroughs
were developed for the military, but have now been spun off into our
daily lives. That is what the TRP, and the ATP, are about.
It is about something even greater. We do not spend taxpayers' hard-
earned dollars on the TRP just because of what it does for the economy.
It is housed in the Department of Defense because of its direct role in
military readiness and the strength of our defense. Increasingly,
cutting edge technology is not being developed in the military
industrial complex, it is coming out of the private sector. The TRP
program, and other public-private partnership give the Federal
Government, and in the case of the TRP, the Department of Defense,
access to the brain power and resources of our best civilian
technologists. It is becoming less an issue of spin-offs and more an
issue of spin-ons.
We all know that great advances in computing came as spin-offs from
DOD programs, but today the leading minds, the human and material
resources, are in the private sector. Programs like the TRP give the
military the chance to work with those minds and develop software and
applications in conjunction with the private sector, where most of the
innovation is happening. Then we can spin those technologies invented
in partnership with the private sector on to military applications.
And let me be clear, this is not about industrial policy; picking
winners and losers. The private sector, in conjunction with the
Department of Defense, are picking the winners. Where a program only
has defense applications, such as a submarine, the private sector will
not be interested in participating in a joint R&D project with the DOD.
But when we are developing something that will have commercial and
military applications, then the TRP can and should play a part.
It is a ridiculous waste of our country's private and public capital
to duplicate our investments in research and development where the
military needs something that the private sector may be developing on
their own. Frankly, we cannot afford it on either end. If last month's
balanced budget debate illuminated anything for the American people, it
is that we are going to have to squeeze every last dollar we can out
of the Federal budget. I support the deficit reduction portion of this
bill. I do not like every line-item in the rescissions package, but
overall, it is something we simply have to do. Likewise, the government
cannot afford to do all the research and development on leading edge
technologies that they will need to maintain the kind of fighting force
we all envision. But if we pool our Federal resources with the private
sector's, then we all benefit.
[[Page S4068]] I want to point out just one example that demonstrates
the usefulness of the TRP to both the armed services and America's
consumers. Right now, DOD, in conjunction with private industry is
developing something called multi-chip module [MCM] technology. This
will allow electronic systems to work faster and more reliably while
using less power. DOD needs MCM's for things like precision-guidance of
advanced weapons and real-time signaling for intelligence activities.
Likewise, the private sector is itching to put MCM's to use in a
variety of consumer products, from cars to digital signals in audio and
video telecommunications. Certainly we can fund this out of our defense
budget, but when there is a clear private sector interest in doing this
jointly, why go it alone?
And this should not be a political issue. Many of my colleagues on
the other side of the aisle have supported technology programs such as
this in the past. As has been noted by others, the basis of this sense-
of-the-Senate amendment is former Senator Rudman's task force report of
1992, which was endorsed by many of my current distinguished
colleagues, Senators Stevens, McCain, Warner, and Thurmond among them.
I should note, that the defense supplemental portion of this package
is breaking new ground here. This bill was submitted to the Congress
for emergency consideration. That is because the costs that we are
trying to cover were unforseen. They were unplanned activities that
were undertaken in our national interest.
Madam President, we must be fiscally responsible. But we should
resist the fool's game of trying to outfox or out-cut one another. We
were elected to set priorities, to deal with current national needs and
plan for the future. Because of the size of the Federal deficit, that
must include an intense effort to get our books in order. But it should
not be a political contest or done blindly. If we abandon the programs
and investments designed to maintain a military and economic foundation
for all Americans, we will see the pain from a crumbling manufacturing
base and defenses after it is too late.
We cannot compromise our future, be it in technology, education, or
child nutrition, for the sake of today's political brinkmanship. We
must fight for what we know must be national priorities, and I will
fight for West Virginia's. The winners will be our soldiers in the
field, our children and their ability to learn, the workforce needed to
keep this country strong. And in the case of the technology programs
discussed in this statement, we want to make sure the winners include
our indusries--and our workers--who are on the frontline of the global
economic battlefield.
Mrs. BOXER. Madam President, after much thought and analysis, I have
decided to oppose this bill. I have made this decision for one simple
reason: on balance, I believe this bill is bad for California and bad
for the Nation.
I support the supplemental appropriations contained in this bill,
which cover the costs of unbudgeted contingencies in Somalia, Bosnia,
and Haiti. However, I believe that these unplanned operations should
have been treated by the committee as emergency requirements, as
requested by the Department of Defense.
Having elected to recommend supplemental funding without the
emergency designation, the committee was obligated to find offsetting
rescissions. Regrettably, the committee has recommended for rescission
in this bill programs that are vital to the defense of our country and
to the economic security of the State of California. The cuts made in
environmental cleanup programs and in research and development programs
like the Technology Reinvestment Project, or TRP, are wrong for this
country and wrong for California. I cannot support these reckless cuts,
Madam President, and I will not.
This bill contains a $300 million rescission for DERA, the Defense
Environmental Restoration Account--twice the cut passed by the House.
What would this rescission mean for the State of California?
At the Marine Corps Logistics Base in Barstow, efforts to clean
contaminated groundwater could be delayed. Soil contaminated with heavy
metals, petroleum hydrocarbons, pesticides, and herbicides may not be
removed.
At the Concord Naval Weapons Station in the bay area, cutting DERA
means delaying cleanup on polluted tidal and inland areas. If this
rescission is enacted, contaminated water and soil may sit idle so we
can say we did the responsible thing by ensuring that every dollar in
this bill was offset by a rescission somewhere else in the Pentagon
budget. But that's not really the responsible thing. The responsible
thing to do is not create an environmental hazard in the first place,
but if you do, you clean it up, and you clean it up fast.
I want to make a final point on this DERA rescission. Earlier this
month, the Department of Defense announced which military bases it
wants to close in the 1995 BRAC round. California was hit again. One
major base was recommended for closure and several other installations
face realignment. I will fight hard for those bases and get their
positive stories out. But if those
installations stay on the list, I want the contaminated sites at those
bases cleaned up as fast as possible so the communities can do
something productive with that land.

In the 1995 base closure round, unlike previous rounds, environmental
cleanup will be funded by the DERA account. That is the very same
account that this bill proposes cutting by $300 million.
So I would say to all Senators, if you have a base in your State that
may be scheduled for closure this year, think long and hard about
cutting $300 million from the Department's primary environmental
cleanup account. Believe me, you do not want to find yourself in a
situation where the military is moving out, but the community cannot
move in because of environmental contamination. California has been in
that situation too often, and it is very, very unpleasant.
The Senate considered an amendment last week offered by Senator
McCain to reduce the rescission in this bill for environmental cleanup
funding by increasing the cut for the Technology Reinvestment Project,
or TRP. I opposed that amendment not because of the DERA increase--
which I support--but because of the draconian TRP cut. That amendment
presented the Senate with an impossible choice: allow deep rescissions
in DERA or kill the Technology Reinvestment Project outright.
However, even without the McCain amendment, this bill rescinds $200
million from the Technology Reinvestment Project. To be sure, this is
better than the House rescission of $500 million, which would kill the
program, but the Senate rescission will badly damage this critically
needed program.
Research and development is the key to maintaining our military
advantage in the future. But the Department of Defense can no longer
afford to maintain its own private research industrial base. We must
gain access to the commercial technology sector, which in many ways out
performs the defense technology base. We must gain access to this
commercial technology in the most cost effective way possible--ensuring
the public the greatest value for its tax dollar.
The TRP achieves these goals. Let me cite just one example. The TRP
has funded a proposal led by the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit
District to develop an advanced automated train control system. Like
all TRP projects, this grant is matched at least 50-50 by the private
sector. For every dollar the government spends, the consortium led by
BART spends at least one dollar.
This technology currently being developed by the BART will allow
system operators to know exactly where there trains are--even
underground in tunnels. This allows trains to operate more safely and
in closer proximity. Reducing separation distance between trains allows
the BART to have more cars in service at the same time, which doubles
passenger carrying capacity.
Critics of the TRP complain vociferously about projects like the BART
train control system. ``What has that got to do with national
security?'', they say.
The BART train control system has everything to do with national
security. This project is based on the Army's Enhanced Position
Location Reporting System, which is designed to enable commanders on
the battlefield
[[Page S4069]] to collect vital information about the location of
troops in real time. The National Economic Council estimates that the
technology developed by the BART's TRP project may improve the Enhanced
Position Locator and at the same time, reduce its cost by up to 40
percent.
So what does this TRP project do for our country? For private
industry, it provides a chance to break into a market dominated by
foreign companies, perhaps creating thousands of American jobs and
strengthening our economy. For the Department of Defense, it offers a
better and cheaper way to collect battlefield information in real
time--information that may save soldiers' lives. And for the people of
San Francisco, this project provides safer, faster, and more efficient
public transportation. This TRP grant creates a win-win-win situation--
one that is being duplicated with similar projects around the country.
The TRP is a model dual-use program. It should be expanded and
emulated, not cut to the point that its very existence is jeopardized.
To offset the supplemental appropriations made in this bill, the
committee has recommended rescinding environmental cleanup, the TRP and
other high priority projects. I find it difficult to believe that less
important offsets could not be found in the $260 billion Pentagon
budget. Consider this: the Congressional Budget Office estimates that
at the end of fiscal year 1995, more than $19 billion will remain
unobligated in the Pentagon's procurement accounts.
Surely, that $19 billion fund is large enough to offset the funds
this bill would cut from environmental cleanup and the TRP. Simply
cutting unobligated procurement funds by 3 percent would generate more
than enough savings to offset the TRP and environmental cleanup
rescission contained in this bill.
I hope that when this bill is considered in conference committee, the
Senate managers will take a very close look at these unobligated
accounts and try to find a way to minimize the damage done to the very
important TRP and DERA accounts.
I also want to serve notice, Madam President, to those who would
eliminate all defense reinvestment and environmental cleanup in the
Pentagon budget. That must not happen.
Defense reinvestment must remain a national priority for the security
of our country and our communities. Environmental cleanup is the moral,
ethical, and in many cases, legal responsibility of the Department of
Defense, and its must continue.
When the Senate debates the budget in the spring and when it debates
the annual defense bills later in the year, these issues will certainly
be revisited. Rest assured that I and other concerned Senators will
continue to voice their strong support for these vitally needed
programs.
Finally Madam President, I must express my profound disappointment
that the Senate accepted an amendment offered by Senator Hutchison to
rescind funding needed to protect endangered species.
This amendment is an irresponsible approach to some very real
problems. It is clearly a first step in a piecemeal dismantling of the
Endangered Species Act.
It is important to note that this amendment was offered while the
Committee on Environment and Public Works was diligently working on a
bill offered by the Senator from Texas that was substantially similar
to her amendment. I believe that the wiser course would have been to
work cooperatively with the committee, under the able leadership of
Senator Chafee, to find a mutually satisfactory solution to this
important problem.
The rescission of $1.5 million from the Fish and Wildlife Service
listing budget for 1995, combined with the restriction on remaining
funds, effectively kills the Endangered Species Act listing process for
1995. This could cause some species to become extinct and surely will
delay solving the very real problems that need attention. This is a
irresponsible action, which I strongly oppose.
For all these reasons, I must oppose this bill.
project elf

Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, this bill marks a milestone for
Wisconsin by rescinding funds for Project ELF, a Navy communications
system located in Clam Lake, WI, and Republic, MI. This is one cut that
the local congressional delegation will not oppose. In fact, I think
most of us welcome it.
In the last two Congresses. I have introduced legislation to
terminate Project ELF. Senator Kohl has joined me in those efforts, as
well as in letters to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense, and
the relevant congressional committees urging ELF's termination.
Congressman David Obey has been a consistent opponent of Project ELF
throughout his congressional tenure, and indeed is responsible for
keeping down the initial size of the program. Representatives from
nearby areas have also been helpful in our quest. I am pleased that the
Senate will take the first step, the first real action, toward finally
terminating this outdated and effective program.
The concept of extremely low frequency communications emerged when
submarines started going so far beneath the surface ordinary radios
could not reach them. In 1968, the Pentagon proposed the first version
of ELF communications in Project Sanguine. It was to be 6,200 miles of
cable buried underground, along with 100 ELF transmitter towers spread
out over 40 percent of northern Wisconsin. It had to be built in
Wisconsin because of unique granite bedrock which would not interfere
with ELF signals. Project Sanguine was supposed to communicate with
Trident submarines, and was designed to survive a nuclear attack. When
residents became aware of it, the project was scuttled.
In 1975, Project Sanguine came back as Project Seafarer. Seafarer was
not supposed to have nuclear survivability, but would have above-ground
transmitters with underground cables. As Project Seafarer, though, ELF
communications lost their wartime efficacy. In fact, an ad hoc ELF
review group of the Secretary of Defense advised that a small ELF
system would be of marginal utility and was not credible as an ultimate
ELF system. However, it recommended that building a small ELF was
better than building no ELF at all because the modified version would
provide a basis for future system growth if ELF requirements later
increased. This was a typical bureaucratic foot in the door program.
Again, due to public concern and budget pressures, President Carter
terminated Seafarer in 1978 and directed further studies on how to
proceed with ELF. Congressman Obey was successful in fencing off funds
in fiscal year 1979 until the President certified that ELF was in the
national interest and that it had found a place to be built.
There was yet another scaled-down ELF system called Austere ELF that
had been proposed in 1977. It would have been a single transmitter
located at K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base in Michigan. Once it began
development, Austere ELF was again in trouble with resident resistance
and budget constraints. After a few years of misguided attempts and
false starts, the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, recommended to
the Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, that the ELF communication
system be shelved.
Secretary Lehman was overruled, though, and the Reagan administration
ordered the development of a scaled down system called Project ELF in
1981. In its present scaled down version, ELF consists of 28 miles of
cable at Clam Lake and 56 miles of cable at Republic. ELF was initially
ordered operational in 1985, and was fully functional by 1987.
Scaled down Project ELF was supposed to cost $230 million for
development and construction. However, in an October 1993 letter to
Senator Nunn, the Pentagon said it had invested nearly $600 million in
ELF. In a January 1994 report on ELF, the Navy said that ELF costs
approximately $15 to $16 million a year in operating costs.
If ELF served a strategic purpose, this would not be a significant
investment. But Project ELF is ineffective and at best obsolete. For
that reason, it is millions of dollars which can find a better use.
Throughout its history, ELF has never found a mission fit for its
times.
The Navy officially states that ELF is simply a communications
system
[[Page S4070]] which tells a Trident to come to surface in order to
receive a message; in effect, ELF is a bell ringer. If this was ever
the true purpose, ELF is a faulty mechanism for that.
First, the bell ringer is supposed to protect the Tridents from
detection by permitting them to surface on the call of a signal that
they had a longer message awaiting them. Yet if they have to rise to
the surface to receive their message, then they are at risk of
detection before executing any order ELF would tell them to retrieve.
ELF itself cannot execute an order.
Second, ELF has no reliable second strike or counterforce
communication capability in any instance. It also cannot be counted on
to communicate with a submarine during a crisis since its large size
makes it extremely susceptible to conventional or nuclear attack. Thus,
it is not dependable retaliatory action.
Further, if ELF were to be destroyed during attack, then subs would
be required to use their antennae at or near the surface, and receive
their messages through LF/VLF. But in the case of a crisis, submarines
should be brought closer to the surface anyway, not only for better
communications, but also because missiles cannot be launched from such
depths as ELF reaches.
Finally, ELF is one-way communications system, so submarines cannot
send messages back.
Thus, Project ELF's utility appears only to be in a pre-war
disposition, and only for one purpose: to serve only as a triggering
signal for a first-strike launch. This is a capability we are
dismantling. So, ELF's mere presence is far more provocative than its
utility warrants.
I should also mention that ELF's environmental impact may be quite
damaging. Though no studies have conclusively found that ELF radiowaves
are dangerous to residents in outlying areas, the research that has
been done does little to comfort those living near Project ELF. A 1992
Swedish study found that children living near relatively weak magnetic
waves such as those emanating from ELF are four times more likely to
develop leukemia. I certainly understand any fears Wisconsin residents
must have. In fact, in 1984, a U.S. District court, ruling on State of
Wisconsin versus Weinberger, order Project ELF to be shut down because
the Navy paid inadequate attention to ELF's possible health effects and
violated the National Environmental Policy Act. An appeals court,
though, threw out the ruling arguing that the national security threat
from the Soviets at the time was more important. Clearly, the premise
of that ruling is no longer valid given the collapse of the U.S.S.R.
For all these reasons, I am pleased that after trying to justify
ELF's mission in the post-cold war world, the Navy is finally letting
it go. Project ELF never made U.S. submarines invulnerable, and it
doesn't make them invulnerable today. ELF is not worth any money
because it doesn't have a purpose.
If it is a first-strike weapon, then it is destabilizing and
threatening, which hardly increases our security. If it is merely a
communication system, it is inadequate. A weapon or communications
device designed to keep deeply submerged submarines submerged is no
longer necessary. ELF was built for war, not peace. It is not guarding
against any capable enemy now, but is sucking up money that could be.
I am pleased that the committee has recognized this, and recommended
its termination in this rescission bill. I hope we will hold the cut in
conference, and that, finally, this weapon, which has long been in
search of a mission, is terminated.
amendment no. 336

Mr. BRADLEY. Madam President, I regret that I was unable to be
recorded on the vote on Senator Hutchison's amendment concerning the
Endangered Species Act. I would like to declare for the Record that,
had I been present, I would have opposed--strongly opposed--the
Hutchison amendment.
This amendment amounts to major legislation. This is not some little
adjustment. There is little subtlety here. And, there is little doubt
that this amendment has nothing to do with the task at hand, which is
to provide supplemental appropriations to the Department of Defense and
to cut Government spending.
I understand the call for reform of the Endangered Species Act. I
have heard many allegations of abuse and bureaucratic overreach. But
the Hutchison amendment is not reform. It solves no problems. It does
not belong on this bill and it does not reflect well on the Senate or
the majority to legislate in such a cavalier fashion.
Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I have been told that we are now ready
for final passage.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further amendment to be
proposed, the question is on the engrossment of the amendments and
third reading of the bill.
The amendments were ordered to be engrossed, and the bill to be read
a third time.
Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays on final
passage.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the
question is, Shall the bill pass?
The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the
roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 97, nays 3, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 108 Leg.]

YEAS--97

Abraham
Akaka
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Bradley
Breaux
Brown
Bryan
Bumpers
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Cohen
Conrad
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Exon
Faircloth
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Harkin
Hatch
Hatfield
Heflin
Helms
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnston
Kassebaum
Kempthorne
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murkowski
Murray
Nickles
Nunn
Packwood
Pell
Pressler
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Shelby
Simon
Simpson
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
Wellstone

NAYS--3

Boxer
Hollings
Pryor
So the bill (H.R. 889), as amended, was passed as follows:

Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives
(H.R. 889) entitled ``An Act making emergency supplemental
appropriations and rescissions to preserve and enhance the
military readiness of the Department of Defense for the
fiscal year ending September 30, 1995, and for other
purposes'', do pass with the following amendments:
(1)Page 1, strike out all after line 2 over to and
including line 12 on page 16 and insert:

That the following sums are appropriated, out of any money in
the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to provide
supplemental appropriations for the Department of Defense for
the fiscal year ending September 30, 1995, and for other
purposes, namely:
TITLE I

CHAPTER I

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE--MILITARY

MILITARY PERSONNEL
Military Personnel, Army

For an additional amount for ``Military Personnel, Army'',
$35,400,000.

Military Personnel, Navy

For an additional amount for ``Military Personnel, Navy'',
$49,500,000.

Military Personnel, Marine Corps

For an additional amount for ``Military Personnel, Marine
Corps'', $10,400,000.

Military Personnel, Air Force

For an additional amount for ``Military Personnel, Air
Force'', $37,400,000.

Reserve Personnel, Navy

For an additional amount for ``Reserve Personnel, Navy'',
$4,600,000.
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

Operation and Maintenance, Army

For an additional amount for ``Operation and Maintenance,
Army'', $636,900,000.

Operation and Maintenance, Navy

For an additional amount for ``Operation and Maintenance,
Navy'', $284,100,000.

Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps

For an additional amount for ``Operation and Maintenance,
Marine Corps'', $27,700,000.
[[Page S4071]] Operation and Maintenance, Air Force

For an additional amount for ``Operation and Maintenance,
Air Force'', $785,800,000.

Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide

For an additional amount for ``Operation and Maintenance,
Defense-Wide'', $43,200,000.
Operation and Maintenance, Navy Reserve

For an additional amount for ``Operation and Maintenance,
Navy Reserve'', $6,400,000.

OTHER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Defense Health Program

For an additional amount for ``Defense Health Program'',
$14,000,000.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 101. No part of any appropriation contained in this
Act shall remain available for obligation beyond the current
fiscal year unless expressly so provided herein.
Sec. 102. During the current fiscal year, appropriations
available to the Department of Defense for the pay of
civilian personnel may be used, without regard to the time
limitations specified in section 5523(a) of title 5, United
States Code, for payments under the provisions of section
5523 of title 5, United States Code, in the case of
employees, or an employee's dependents or immediate family,
evacuated from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, pursuant to the August
26, 1994 order of the Secretary of Defense.

(INCLUDING TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

Sec. 103. In addition to amounts appropriated or otherwise
made available by this Act, $28,297,000 is hereby
appropriated to the Department of Defense and shall be
available only for transfer to the United States Coast Guard
to cover the incremental operating costs associated with
Operations Able Manner, Able Vigil, Restore Democracy, and
Support Democracy: Provided, That such amount shall remain
available for obligation until September 30, 1996.
Sec. 104. (a) Section 8106A of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1995 (Public Law 103-335), is amended by
striking out the last proviso and inserting in lieu thereof
the following: ``: Provided further, That if, after September
30, 1994, a member of the Armed Forces (other than the Coast
Guard) is approved for release from active duty or full-time
National Guard duty and that person subsequently becomes
employed in a position of civilian employment in the
Department of Defense within 180 days after the release from
active duty or full-time National Guard duty, then that
person is not eligible for payments under a Special
Separation Benefits program (under section 1174a of title 10,
United States Code) or a Voluntary Separation Incentive
program (under section 1175 of title 10, United States Code)
by reason of the release from active duty or full-time
National Guard duty, and the person shall reimburse the
United States the total amount, if any, paid such person
under the program before the employment begins''.
(b) Appropriations available to the Department of Defense
for fiscal year 1995 may be obligated for making payments
under sections 1174a and 1175 of title 10, United States
Code.
(c) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall be effective
as of September 30, 1994.
Sec. 105. Subsection 8054(g) of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1995 (Public Law 103-335), is amended to
read as follows: ``Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, of the amounts available to the Department of Defense
during fiscal year 1995, not more than $1,252,650,000 may be
obligated for financing activities of defense FFRDCs:
Provided, That, in addition to any other reductions required
by this section, the total amount appropriated in title IV of
this Act is hereby reduced by $200,000,000 to reflect the
funding ceiling contained in this subsection and to reflect
further reductions in amounts available to the Department of
Defense to finance activities carried out by defense FFRDCs
and other entities providing consulting services, studies and
analyses, systems engineering and technical assistance, and
technical, engineering and management support.''.
(RESCISSIONS)

Sec. 106. Of the funds provided in Department of Defense
Appropriations Acts, the following funds are hereby rescinded
from the following accounts in the specified amounts:
Operation and Maintenance, Navy, $16,300,000;
Operation and Maintenance, Air Force, $2,000,000;
Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide, $90,000,000;
Environmental Restoration, Defense, $300,000,000;
Aircraft Procurement, Army, 1995/1997, $77,611,000;
Procurement of Ammunition, Army, 1993/1995, $85,000,000;
Procurement of Ammunition, Army, 1995/1997, $89,320,000;
Other Procurement, Army, 1995/1997, $46,900,000;
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, 1995/1999, $26,600,000;
Missile Procurement, Air Force, 1993/1995, $33,000,000;
Missile Procurement, Air Force, 1994/1996, $86,184,000;
Other Procurement, Air Force, 1995/1997, $6,100,000;
Procurement, Defense-Wide, 1995/1997, $81,000,000;
Defense Production Act, $100,000,000;
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Army, 1995/
1996, $38,300,000;
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy, 1995/
1996, $59,600,000;
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force,
1994/1995, $81,100,000;
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force,
1995/1996, $226,900,000;
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide,
1994/1995, $77,000,000;
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide,
1995/1996, $351,000,000.

(transfer of funds)

Sec. 107. Section 8005 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1995 (Public Law 103-335; 108 Stat.
2617), is amended by striking out ``$2,000,000,000'' and
inserting in lieu thereof ``$1,750,000,000''.
SEC. 108. REPORT ON COST AND SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES IN HAITI.

(a) Requirement.--None of the funds appropriated by this
Act or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense
may be expended for operations or activities of the Armed
Forces in and around Haiti sixty days after enactment of this
Act, unless the President submits to Congress the report
described in subsection (b).
(b) Report Elements.--The report referred to in subsection
(a) shall include the following:
(1) A detailed description of the estimated cumulative
incremental cost of all United States activities subsequent
to September 30, 1993, in and around Haiti, including but not
limited to--
(A) the cost of all deployments of United States Armed
Forces and Coast Guard personnel, training, exercises,
mobilization, and preparation activities, including the
preparation of police and military units of the other nations
of the multinational force involved in enforcement of
sanctions, limits on migration, establishment and maintenance
of migrant facilities at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere, and
all other activities relating to operations in and around
Haiti; and
(B) the costs of all other activities relating to United
States policy toward Haiti, including humanitarian and
development assistance, reconstruction, balance of payments
and economic support, assistance provided to reduce or
eliminate all arrearages owed to International Financial
Institutions, all rescheduling or forgiveness of United
States bilateral and multilateral debt, aid and other
financial assistance, all in-kind contributions, and all
other costs to the United States Government.
(2) A detailed accounting of the source of funds obligated
or expended to meet the costs described in paragraph (1),
including--
(A) in the case of funds expended from the Department of
Defense budget, a breakdown by military service or defense
agency, line item, and program; and
(B) in the case of funds expended from the budgets of
departments and agencies other than the Department of
Defense, by department or agency and program.
Sec. 109. It is the sense of the Senate that (1) cost-
shared partnerships between the Department of Defense and the
private sector to develop dual-use technologies (technologies
that have applications both for defense and for commercial
markets, such as computers, electronics, advanced materials,
communications, and sensors) are increasingly important to
ensure efficient use of defense procurement resources, and
(2) such partnerships, including Sematech and the Technology
Reinvestment Project, need to become the norm for conducting
such applied research by the Department of Defense.
Sec. 110. None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made
available by this Act may be obligated or expended for
assistance to or programs in the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea, or for implementation of the October 21, 1994,
Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, unless specifically appropriated
for that purpose.
(2)Page 16 after line 12 insert:
SEC. 111. LIMITATION ON EMERGENCY AND EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSES.

(a) In General.--Funds appropriated or otherwise made
available to the Department of Defense may not be obligated
under section 127 of title 10, United States Code, for the
provision of assistance, including the donation, sale, or
financing for sale, of any item, to a foreign country that is
ineligible under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the
Arms Export Control Act to receive any category of
assistance.
(b) Effective Date.--The limitations in subsection (a)
shall apply to obligations made on or after the date of
enactment of this Act.
(3)Page 16, after line 12, insert:
Sec. 112. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
no funds appropriated by this Act, or otherwise appropriated
or made available by any other Act, may be utilized for
purposes of entering into the agreement described in
subsection (b) until the President certifies to Congress
that--
(1) Russia has agreed not to sell nuclear reactor
components to Iran; or
(2) the issue of the sale by Russia of such components to
Iran has been resolved in a manner that is consistent with--
(A) the national security objectives of the United States;
and
(B) the concerns of the United States with respect to
nonproliferation in the Middle East.
(b) The agreement referred to in subsection (a) is an
agreement known as the Agreement on the Exchange of
Equipment, Technology, and Materials between the United
States Government and the Government of the Russian
Federation, or any department or agency of that government
(including the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy), that the
United States Government proposes to enter into under section
123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153).
(4)Page 16 after line 12 insert:
Sec. 113. It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) Congress should enact legislation that terminates the
entitlement to pay and allowances for each member of the
Armed Forces who is sentenced by a court-martial to
confinement and either a dishonorable discharge, bad-conduct
discharge, or dismissal;
[[Page S4072]] (2) the legislation should provide for
restoration of the entitlement if the sentence to confinement
and punitive discharge or dismissal, as the case may be, is
disapproved or set aside; and
(3) the legislation should include authority for the
establishment of a program that provides transitional
benefits for spouses and other dependents of a member of the
Armed Forces receiving such a sentence.
(5)Page 16 after line 12 insert:
SEC. 114. RESCISSION OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN MILITARY
CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS.

(a) Conditional Rescission of Funds For Certain Projects.--
(1)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and subject
to paragraphs (2) and (3), of the funds provided in the
Military Construction Appropriations Act, 1995 (Public Law
103-307; 108 Stat. 1659), the following funds are hereby
rescinded from the following accounts in the specified
amounts:
Military Construction, Army, $11,554,000.
Military Construction, Air Force, $6,500,000.
(B) Rescissions under this paragraph are for projects at
military installations that were recommended for closure by
the Secretary of Defense in the recommendations submitted by
the Secretary to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission on March 1, 1995, under the base closure Act.
(2) A rescission of funds under paragraph (1) shall not
occur with respect to a project covered by that paragraph if
the Secretary certifies to Congress that--
(A) the military installation at which the project is
proposed will not be subject to closure or realignment as a
result of the 1995 round of the base closure process; or
(B) if the installation will be subject to realignment
under that round of the process, the project is for a
function or activity that will not be transferred from the
installation as a result of the realignment.
(3) A certification under paragraph (2) shall be effective
only if--
(A) the Secretary submits the certification together with
the approval and recommendations transmitted to Congress by
the President in 1995 under paragraph (2) or (4) section
2903(e) of the base closure Act; or
(B) the base closure process in 1995 is terminated pursuant
to paragraph (5) of that section.
(b) Additional Rescissions Relating to Base Closure
Process.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds
provided in the Military Construction Appropriations Act,
1995 for a military construction project are hereby rescinded
if--
(1) the project is located at an installation that the
President recommends for closure in 1995 under section
2903(e) of the base closure Act; or
(2) the project is located at an installation that the
President recommends for realignment in 1995 under such
section and the function or activity with which the project
is associated will be transferred from the installation as a
result of the realignment.
(c) Definition.--In the section, the term ``base closure
Act'' means the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of
1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C.
2687 note).
(6)Page 16 after line 12 insert:
SEC. 115. SENSE OF SENATE ON SOUTH KOREA TRADE BARRIERS TO
UNITED STATES BEEF AND PORK.

(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) The United States has approximately 37,000 military
personnel stationed in South Korea and spent over
$2,000,000,000 last year to preserve peace on the Korean
peninsula.
(2) The United States Trade Representative has initiated a
section 301 investigation against South Korea for its
nontariff trade barriers on United States beef and pork.
(3) The barriers cited in the section 301 petition include
government-mandated shelf-life requirements, lengthy
inspection and customs procedures, and arbitrary testing
requirements that effectively close the South Korean market
to such beef and pork.
(4) United States trade and agriculture officials are in
the process of negotiating with South Korea to open South
Korea's market to United States beef and pork.
(5) The United States meat industry estimates that South
Korea's nontariff trade barriers on United States beef and
pork cost United States businesses more than $240,000,000 in
lost revenue last year and could account for more than
$1,000,000,000 in lost revenue to such business by 1999 if
South Korea's trade practices on such beef and pork are left
unchanged.
(6) The United States beef and pork industries are a vital
part of the United States economy, with operations in each of
the 50 States.
(7) Per capita consumption of beef and pork in South Korea
is currently twice that of such consumption in Japan. Given
that the Japanese are currently the leading importers of
United States beef and pork, South Korea holds the potential
of becoming an unparalleled market for United States beef and
pork.
(b) It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) the security relationship between the United States and
South Korea is essential to the security of the United
States, South Korea, the Asia-Pacific region and the rest of
the world;
(2) the efforts of the United States Trade Representative
to open South Korea's market to United States beef and pork
deserve support and commendation; and
(3) The United States Trade Representative should continue
to insist upon the removal of South Korea's nontariff
barriers to United States beef and pork.
(7)Page 16 after line 12 insert:
Sec. 116. (a)(1) The Senate finds that the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, hereinafter referred to
as the NPT, is the cornerstone of the global nuclear
nonproliferation regime;
(2) That, with more than 170 parties, the NPT enjoys the
widest adherence of any arms control agreement in history;
(3) That the NPT sets the fundamental legal and political
framework for prohibiting all forms of nuclear
nonproliferation;
(4) That the NPT provides the fundamental legal and
political foundation for the efforts through which the
nuclear arms race was brought to an end and the world's
nuclear arsenals are being reduced as quickly, safely and
securely as possible;
(5) That the NPT spells out only three extension options:
indefinite extension, extension for a fixed period, or
extension for fixed periods;
(6) That any temporary or conditional extension of the NPT
would require a dangerously slow and unpredictable process of
re-ratification that would cripple the NPT;
(7) That it is the policy of the President of the United
States to seek indefinite and unconditional extension of the
NPT: Now, therefore;
(b) It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT would
strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime;
(2) indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT is in
the interest of the United States because it would enhance
international peace and security;
(3) the President of the United States has the full support
of the Senate in seeking the indefinite and unconditional
extension of the NPT;
(4) all parties to the NPT should vote to extend the NPT
unconditionally and indefinitely; and
(5) parties opposing indefinite and unconditional extension
of the NPT are acting against their own interest, the
interest of the United States and the interest of all the
peoples of the world by placing the nuclear nonproliferation
regime and global security at risk.
(8)Page 16 after line 12 insert:
Sec. 117. National Test Facility.--It is the sense of the
Senate that the National Test Facility provides important
support to strategic and theater missile defense in the
following areas--
(a) United States-United Kingdom defense planning;
(b) the PATRIOT and THAAD programs;
(c) computer support for the Advanced Research Center; and
(d) technical assistance to theater missile defense;
and fiscal year 1995 funding should be maintained to ensure
retention of these priority functions.
(9)Page 16 after line 12 insert:
Sec. 118. (a) In determining the amount of funds available
for obligation from the Environmental Restoration, Defense,
account in fiscal year 1995 for environmental restoration at
the military installations described in subsection (b), the
Secretary of Defense shall not take into account the
rescission from the account set forth in section 106.
(b) Subsection (a) applies to military installations that
the Secretary recommends for closure or realignment in 1995
under section 2903(c) of the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act of 1990 (subtitle A of title XXIX of Public
Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).
(10)Page 16 after line 12 insert:
CHAPTER II

Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs

bilateral economic assistance

funds appropriated to the president

debt restructuring

debt relief for jordan

For the cost, as defined in section 502 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, of modifying direct loans
to Jordan issued by the Export-Import Bank or by the Agency
for International Development or by the Department of
Defense, or for the cost of modifying: (1) concessional loans
authorized under title I of the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, and (2)
credits owed by Jordan to the Commodity Credit Corporation,
as a result of the Corporation's status as a guarantor of
credits in connection with export sales to Jordan; as
authorized under subsection (a) under the heading, ``Debt
Relief for Jordan'', in title VI of Public Law 103-306,
$275,000,000, to remain available until September 30, 1996:
Provided, That not more than $50,000,000 of the funds
appropriated by this paragraph may be obligated prior to
October 1, 1995.
(11)Page 16 strike out line 13 and insert:
TITLE II
(12)Page 16, strike out all after line 20 over to and
including line 7 on page 17 and insert:
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Immigration and Naturalization Service

immigration emergency fund

(rescission)

Of the amounts made available under this heading in Public
Law 103-317, $10,000,000 are rescinded.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Institute of Standards and Technology

industrial technology services

(rescission)

Of the amounts made available under this heading in Public
Law 103-317 for the Advanced Technology Program, $32,000,000
are rescinded.

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION

Operations, Research and Facilities

(rescission)

Of the funds made available under this heading in Public
Law 103-317, $2,500,000 are rescinded.
[[Page S4073]] NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION

Information Infrastructure Grants

(RESCISSION)

Of the amounts made available under this heading in Public
Law 103-317, $34,000,000 are rescinded.

Economic Development Administration

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

(RESCISSION)

Of the amounts made available under this heading in Public
Law 103-317, $40,000,000 are rescinded.

RELATED AGENCIES

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

SALARIES AND EXPENSES

(rescission)

Of the funds made available under this heading in Public
Law 103-317 for tree-planting grants pursuant to section 24
of the Small Business Act, as amended, $15,000,000 are
rescinded.

LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION

payment to the legal services corporation

(rescission)

Of the funds made available under this heading in Public
Law 103-317 for payment to the Legal Services Corporation to
carry out the purposes of the Legal Services Corporation Act
of 1974, as amended, $15,000,000 are rescinded.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND RELATED AGENCIES

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Administration of Foreign Affairs

(acquisition and maintenance of buildings abroad)

(rescission)

Of unobligated balances available under this heading,
$28,500,000 are rescinded.
(13)Page 17, after line 18, insert:
Of the funds appropriated in Public Law 103-316, $3,000,000
is hereby authorized for appropriation to the Corps of
Engineers to initiate and complete remedial measures to
prevent slope instability at Hickman Bluff, Kentucky.
(14)Page 18, after line 6 insert:
CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION

(rescission)

Of the funds made available under this heading in Public
Law 103-306, $70,000,000 are rescinded.
(15)Page 18, strike lines 14 to 20 and insert:
development assistance fund

(rescission)

Of the funds made available under this heading in Public
Law 103-87 and Public Law 103-306, $13,000,000 are rescinded.

assistance for eastern europe and the baltic states

(rescission)

Of the funds made available under this heading in Public
Law 103-87 and Public Law 103-306, $9,000,000 are rescinded.

assistance for the new independent states of the former soviet union

(rescission)

Of the funds made available under this heading in Public
Law 103-87 and Public Law 103-306, $18,000,000 are rescinded,
of which not less than $12,000,000 shall be derived from
funds allocated for Russia.
(16)Page 19, after line 14, insert:
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

United States Fish and Wildlife Service

resource management

(rescission)

Of the funds made available under this heading in Public
Law 103-332--
(1) $1,500,000 are rescinded from the amounts available for
making determinations whether a species is a threatened or
endangered species and whether habitat is critical habitat
under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. 1531 et
seq.); and
(2) none of the remaining funds appropriated under that
heading may be made available for making a final
determination that a species is threatened or endangered or
that habitat constitutes critical habitat (except a final
determination that a species previously determined to be
endangered is no longer endangered but continues to be
threatened).
To the extent that the Endangered Species Act of 1973 has
been interpreted or applied in any court order (including an
order approving a settlement between the parties to a civil
action) to require the making of a determination respecting
any number of species or habitats by a date certain, that Act
shall not be applied to require that the determination be
made by that date if the making of the determination is made
impracticable by the rescission made by the preceding
sentence.
(17)Page 20, strike out lines 2 to 6 and insert:
STUDENT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

(RESCISSION)

Of the funds made available under this heading in Public
Law 103-112, $100,000,000 made available for title IV, part
A, subpart 1 of the Higher Education Act are rescinded.
(18)Page 20, after line 10 insert:
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Facilities and Equipment

(AIRPORT AND AIRWAY TRUST FUND)

(RESCISSION)

Of the available balances under this heading that remain
unobligated for the ``advanced automation system'',
$35,000,000 are rescinded.

FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION

Federal-Aid Highways

(HIGHWAY TRUST FUND)

(RESCISSION)

Of the available contract authority balances under this
heading in Public Law 97-424, $13,340,000 are rescinded; and
of the available balances under this heading in Public Law
100-17, $126,608,000 are rescinded.

Miscellaneous Highway Demonstration Projects

(RESCISSION)

Of the available appropriated balances provided in Public
Law 93-87; Public Law 98-8; Public Law 98-473; and Public Law
100-71, $12,004,450 are rescinded.
(19)Page 20, strike out lines 11 to 15
(20)Page 20, strike out lines 16 to 19
(21)Page 21, strike out lines 5 to 11
(22)Page 21, after line 11 insert:
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Housing Programs

annual contributions for assisted housing

(rescission)

Of the funds made available under this heading in Public
Law 103-327 and any unobligated balances from funds
appropriated under this heading in prior years, $400,000,000
are rescinded from amounts available for the development or
acquisition costs of public housing.
(23)Page 21, after line 11, insert:
TITLE III--MISCELLANEOUS

Sec. 301.--Notwithstanding sections 12106, 12107, and 12108
of title 46, United States Code, and section 27 of the
Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 883), as applicable
on the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Transportation may issue a certificate of documentation for
the vessel L. R. BEATTIE, United States official number
904161.
(24)Page 21, after line 11, insert:
TITLE IV--MEXICAN DEBT DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1995

SEC. 401. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ``Mexican Debt Disclosure
Act of 1995''.

SEC. 402. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds that--
(1) Mexico is an important neighbor and trading partner of
the United States;
(2) on January 31, 1995, the President approved a program
of assistance to Mexico, in the form of swap facilities and
securities guarantees in the amount of $20,000,000,000, using
the Exchange Stabilization Fund;
(3) the program of assistance involves the participation of
the Federal Reserve System, the International Monetary Fund,
the Bank of International Settlements, the World Bank, the
Inter-American Development Bank, the Bank of Canada, and
several Latin American countries;
(4) the involvement of the Exchange Stabilization Fund and
the Federal Reserve System means that United States taxpayer
funds will be used in the assistance effort to Mexico;
(5) assistance provided by the International Monetary Fund,
the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank may
require additional United States contributions of taxpayer
funds to those entities;
(6) the immediate use of taxpayer funds and the potential
requirement for additional future United States contributions
of taxpayer funds necessitates Congressional oversight of the
disbursement of funds; and
(7) the efficacy of the assistance to Mexico is contingent
on the pursuit of sound economic policy by the Government of
Mexico.

SEC. 403. REPORTS REQUIRED.

(a) Reports.--Not later than April 1, 1995, and every month
thereafter, the President shall transmit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees concerning all United
States Government loans, credits, and guarantees to, and
short-term and long-term currency swaps with, Mexico.
(b) Contents of Reports.--The report described in
subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of the current condition of the Mexican
economy.
(2) Information regarding the implementation and the extent
of wage, price, and credit controls in the Mexican economy.
(3) A complete documentation of Mexican taxation policy and
any proposed changes to such policy.
(4) A description of specific actions taken by the
Government of Mexico during the preceding month to further
privatize the economy of Mexico.
(5) A list of planned or pending Mexican Government
regulations affecting the Mexican private sector.
(6) A summary of consultations held between the Government
of Mexico and the Department of the Treasury, the
International Monetary Fund, or the Bank of International
Settlements.
(7) A full description of the activities of the Mexican
Central Bank, including the reserve positions of the Mexican
Central Bank and data relating to the functioning of Mexican
monetary policy.
(8) The amount of any funds disbursed from the Exchange
Stabilization Fund pursuant to the approval of the President
issued on January 31, 1995.
(9) A full disclosure of all financial transactions, both
inside and outside of Mexico, made during the preceding month
involving funds disbursed from the Exchange Stabilization
Fund and the International Monetary Fund, including
transactions between--
(A) individuals;
(B) partnerships;
(C) joint ventures; and
(D) corporations.
[[Page S4074]] (10) An accounting of all outstanding United
States Government loans, credits, and guarantees provided to
the Government of Mexico, set forth by category of financing.
(11) A detailed list of all Federal Reserve currency swaps
designed to support indebtedness of the Government of Mexico,
and the cost or benefit to the United States Treasury from
each such transaction.
(12) A description of any payments made during the
preceding month by creditors of Mexican petroleum companies
into the petroleum finance facility established to ensure
repayment of United States loans or guarantees.
(13) A description of any disbursement during the preceding
month by the United States Government from the petroleum
finance facility.
(14) Once payments have been diverted from PEMEX to the
United States Treasury through the petroleum finance
facility, a description of the status of petroleum deliveries
to those customers whose payments were diverted.
(15) A description of the current risk factors used in
calculations concerning Mexican repayment of indebtedness.
(16) A statement of the progress the Government of Mexico
has made in reforming its currency and establishing an
independent central bank or currency board.

SEC. 404. PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, before
extending any loan, credit, guarantee, or arrangement for a
swap of currencies to Mexico through any United States
Government monetary facility, the President shall certify to
the appropriate congressional committees that--
(1) there is no projected cost to the United States from
the proposed loan, credit, guarantee, or currency swap;
(2) all loans, credits, guarantees, and currency swaps are
adequately collateralized to ensure that United States funds
will be repaid;
(3) the Government of Mexico has undertaken effective
efforts to establish an independent central bank or an
independent currency control mechanism; and
(4) Mexico has in effect a significant economic reform
effort.

SEC. 405. DEFINITION.

As used in this title, the term ``appropriate congressional
committees'' means the Committees on Banking and Financial
Services and International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations and
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
(25)Page 21, strike out lines 12 to 15 and insert:
This Act may be cited as the ``Supplemental Appropriations
and Rescissions Act, 1995''.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The title amendment is agreed to.
The title was amended so as to read:

Making supplemental appropriations and rescissions for the
fiscal year ending September 30, 1995, and for other
purposes.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I move to lay on the table the motion to
reconsider.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gorton). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I move the Senate insist on its
amendments and request a conference with the House on the disagreeing
votes of the two Houses, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint
the conferees on the part of the Senate.
The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer (Mr. Gorton)
appointed Mr. Hatfield, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Cochran, Mr. Gramm, Mr.
Domenici, Mr. McConnell, Mr. Gorton, Mr. Specter, Mr. Bond, Mr. Burns,
Mr. Byrd, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Hollings, Mr. Johnston, Mr. Leahy, Mr.
Harkin, Mr. Lautenberg, Ms. Mikulski and Mr. Reid conferees on the part
of the Senate.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

____________________