[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 49 (Thursday, March 16, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4035-S4046]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

  Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to substitute 
the word ``item'' for the word ``time'' in amendment No. 329 agreed to 
on Wednesday, March 8. It corrects a typographical error. This has been 
cleared on both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I would like to indicate that in the 
next sequence of amendments, we will have the Leahy-Jeffords amendment, 
which will take perhaps a minute, and that will then be followed by a 
Roth-Glenn amendment which, again, will not call for a rollcall, 
according to the authors of the bill.
  We are now down to about two amendments left. We understand 
agreements have been worked out on the Republican side and we have 
about the same number--three amendments--on the Democratic side. I 
understand that those have been worked out.
  So we should be at a point where we will be wrapping up the long list 
of amendments and moving toward final passage. I just want to indicate 
that any Member who has an amendment to be handled in any form here on 
the floor, please contact us. We have about five or six that have been 
cleared on both sides. At an appropriate moment, we will use as a wrap-
up those agreed to.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, will the chairman yield?
  Mr. HATFIELD. Yes.
  Mr. INOUYE. Are we now prepared to have a time certain for final 
passage?
  Mr. HATFIELD. I am unable to say that, based upon the fact that on 
two amendments 20 minutes to half an hour has been requested for 
discussion--the Brown amendment and the Specter amendment. I am sure 
they will not require a great length of time. But I hope that perhaps 
in the next hour we will be able to reach final passage. I would be 
hesitant to set a time certain.
  Mr. INOUYE. I yield the floor.


                           Amendment No. 337
   (Purpose: To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a 
       Certificate of documentation for the vessel L.R. Beattie)

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf 
of myself and Senator Jeffords and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Vermont [Mr. Leahy], for himself and Mr. 
     Jeffords, proposes an amendment numbered 337.

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place, insert the following new title:

                        TITLE   --MISCELLANEOUS

       Sec.   01.--Notwithstanding sections 12106, 12107, and 
     12108 of title 46, United States Code, and section 27 of the 
     Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 883), as applicable 
     on the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Transportation may issue a certificate of documentation for 
     the vessel L. R. BEATTIE, United States official number 
     904161.

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I strongly support the amendment introduced 
today with my friend from Vermont, Senator Jeffords. This amendment 
would authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a certificate 
of documentation to grant coasting rights to the vessel L.R. Beattie. 
This certificate is commonly known as a Jones Act waiver.
  The L.R. Beattie, a 500 passenger, triple deck cruise boat, was 
originally built and flagged in the United States. The ship was later 
brought by a Canadian company, although it was never flagged in Canada. 
It has since been sold to a U.S. company and was bought last year by 
Lake Champlain Shorelines Cruises of Burlington, VT.
  Lake Champlain Shorelines Cruises bought the L.R. Beattie to operate 
tours on Lake Champlain and plans to rename it the Spirit of Ethan 
Allen II. This boat will be the showcase of a flourishing cruise 
industry on Lake Champlain. This boat will support over 30 Vermonters 
working on these cruises. But before this boat may begin carrying 
passengers on Lake Champlain, Congress must pass a Jones Act waiver for 
the L.R. Beattie because of its brief history under Canadian ownership.
  A Jones Act waiver is a routine and noncontroversial bill. It does 
not cost U.S. taxpayers a penny. It simply authorizes the Secretary of 
Transportation to issue a certificate of documentation to allow a 
vessel to operate on U.S. waters.
  But a Jones Act waiver for the L.R. Beattie has languished in 
Congress for more than a year. The Oceans Act of 1994, H.R. 4852, which 
reauthorized Coast Guard operations, contained a Jones Act waiver for 
the L.R. Beattie. The House of Representatives easily passed this bill. 
Unfortunately, it died in the Senate at the end of last year's session.
  This year, Senator Jeffords and I introduced legislation, S. 172, to 
allow the L.R. Beattie to receive a Jones Act waiver. The Senate 
Commerce Committee will soon consider this bill with other Jones Act 
waivers. The time table for final passage of these Jones Act waivers, 
however, may be too late for Lake Champlain Shoreline Cruises because 
of the fast-approaching cruise season. Without this simple, 
noncontroversial Jones Act waiver, this small business in Vermont could 
go out of business, throwing over 30 Vermonters out of work.
  Senator Jeffords and I have authored this amendment to respond to the 
special circumstances surrounding a Jones Act waiver for the L.R. 
Beattie.
  I want to thank Senator Hollings, the ranking member of the Senate 
Commerce Committee, and Senator Pressler, the chairman of the Senate 
Commerce Committee, for their invaluable cooperation on this amendment.
  Mr. JEFFORDS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. I join my senior Senator in this amendment, which will 
help make Vermont summers on Lake Champlain a little bit better.
  Mr. President, I wish to thank the managers of this legislation for 
accepting this important amendment. I would especially like to thank 
the chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator Pressler, and the 
ranking member, Senator Hollings, for their assistance with this 
measure.
  Mr. President, included in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Jones Act 
waivers allow for vessels transporting 
[[Page S4036]] cargo within U.S. waters which are not U.S. built, 
owned, and manned be given the right to do so. With the passage of this 
amendment, the Spirit of Ethan Ellan II, which was built in the United 
States and operated under Canadian ownership for a short time, will be 
able to resume operations as a United States vessel on Lake Champlain 
in time for the summer tourist season. The Spirit of Ethan Allen II 
will provide an invaluable service to Vermonters and tourists who come 
to appreciate Vermont's beautiful setting. I can think of no better way 
to view this beautiful and historic lake.
  This vessel will be the only one of its kind in Vermont, offering 
scenic cruises, wedding and prom receptions, and dinner parties. In 
addition, the Spirit of Ethan Allen II will be active in charity 
fundraisers and a program called Education on the Lake, informing young 
people of the geological and historical character of the Lake Champlain 
area.
  In addition, the Spirit of Ethan Allen II will host events for 
visiting conferences and conventions in the Burlington area, enhancing 
the experience of those who stay in the area's hotels and inns. Lake 
Champlain Shoreline Cruises will employ over 25 people to operate the 
vessel, making a significant contribution to the continuing development 
of the Burlington waterfront area.
  I am pleased that this legislation will ensure that the Spirit of 
Ethan Allen II begins operating in time for the summer tourist season.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 337) was agreed to.
  Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.


                           Amendment No. 338

    (Purpose: To state the sense of the Senate that indefinite and 
  unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is 
 essential for furthering the security interests of the United States 
                  and all the countries of the world)

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk. and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Delaware [Mr. Roth], for himself, Mr. 
     Glenn, Mr. Helms, Mr. Levin, Mr. McCain, and Mr. Nunn, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 338.

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate point, insert the following:
       The Senate finds that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
     of Nuclear Weapons, herein after referred to as the NPT, is 
     the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation 
     regime;
       That, with more than 170 parties, the NPT enjoys the widest 
     adherence of any arms control agreement in history:
       That the NPT sets the fundamental legal and political 
     framework for prohibiting all forms of nuclear 
     nonproliferation;
       That the NPT provides the fundamental legal and political 
     foundation for the efforts through which the nuclear arms 
     race as brought to an end and the world's nuclear arsenals 
     are being reduced as quickly, safely and securely as 
     possible;
       That the NPT spells out only three extension options: 
     indefinite extension, extension for a fixed period, or 
     extension for fixed periods;
       That any temporary or conditional extension of the NPT 
     would require a dangerously slow and unpredictable process of 
     re-ratification that would cripple the NPT;
       That it is the policy of the President of the United States 
     to seek indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT.
       Now, therefore, it is the sense of the Senate that:
       (1) indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT would 
     strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime;
       (2) indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT is in 
     the interest of the United States because it would enhance 
     international peace and security;
       (3) the President of the United States has the full support 
     of the Senate in seeking the indefinite and unconditional 
     extension of the NPT.
       (4) all parties to the NPT should vote to extend the NPT 
     unconditionally and indefinitely; and
       (5) parties opposing indefinite and unconditional extension 
     of the NPT are acting against their own interest, the 
     interest of the United States and the interest of all the 
     peoples of the world by placing the nuclear non-proliferation 
     regime and global security at risk.

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I rise today to propose an amendment on 
behalf of myself and Senators Glenn, Helms, Levin, McCain, and Nunn, 
which calls for the indefinite and unconditional extension of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  In only 4 weeks, the parties to the NPT will gather in New York to 
decide the future of this critical agreement. This resolution sends an 
unequivocal message to all the countries of the world that this body 
regards making the NPT permanent as absolutely essential. It also sends 
a clear signal to any country opposing indefinite and unconditional 
extension of the treaty that that nation is acting against not only 
against its own interest, but also against the interest of the United 
States and indeed of the people of the entire world, because their 
position places the nuclear non-proliferation regime and global 
security at risk.
  March 5 marked the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the 
NPT. That treaty is universally regarded as the the single most 
important component of the international effort to prevent the spread 
of nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is the very foundation upon which the 
entire global nuclear non-proliferation regime was constructed.
  When the five declared nuclear weapons states ratified the NPT, they 
pledged to end the nuclear arms race, to undertake measures toward 
nuclear disarmament and not in any way to assist nonnuclear weapon 
states in gaining nuclear weapons.
  For their part, the nonnuclear parties to the treaty pledged not to 
acquire nuclear weapons and to accept a system of safeguards to verify 
their compliance. Thus, in joining the NPT, these countries transformed 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons from an act of national pride to a 
violation of international law.
  Those who negotiated the NPT never expected that the treaty alone 
would end the global nuclear proliferation threat. Yet, I think even 
they could be surprised by its successes toward that end. Today, there 
remain only 5 declared nuclear weapons states--not the 20 or 30, many 
experts had once projected. There are also only three so-called 
``threshold'' states.
  The NPT has provided the overarching structure to end the nuclear 
arms race. With the ratification of START I, and the ongoing work of my 
able and distinguished colleagues in the Foreign Relations Committee on 
START II, the race now is to bring down the number of nuclear weapons 
as quickly, safely and securely as possible.
  Another indicator of treaty's success has been the steady increase of 
its membership. Today, with more than 170 parties, the NPT has the 
widest adherence of any arms control agreement in history. When backed 
by strong nonproliferation policies and verification measures including 
international safeguards, the NPT curbs inclinations countries may have 
in believing they need the bomb for safety. Thus, it advances the 
security of all the world's nations.
  Unfortunately, the NPT was established with a limited life-span. The 
treaty provides that 25 years after its entrance into force, a 
conference of the parties will be convened to decide whether the NPT 
will remain in force indefinitely, for one fixed period of time or for 
a series of fixed periods. The treaty further provides that the 
decision on extension will be made by majority of parties to the 
treaty. The result will be legally binding for all parties, whatever 
vote they cast.
  I believe it is beyond question that indefinite extension is 
essential. The NPT must be made permanent if we are to contain the 
terrible threat posed to all nations by the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons.
  Anything short of indefinite extension would deal a major blow to the 
global nuclear nonproliferation regime because at the end of any 
specified extension period, the treaty could be undermined. The global 
norm prohibiting the further acquisition of nuclear weapons would thus 
be destroyed.
  We must never allow such an outcome that would jeopardize the entire 
nuclear nonproliferation regime--so 
[[Page S4037]] painstakingly crafted over the past quarter century.
  In the aftermath of the cold war, the decisions we make today about 
global security will dramatically affect the lives of generations to 
come. No decision is more important than the one the world faces next 
month on the future of the NPT.
  Despite the critical need for making the NPT permanent, a number of 
countries are actively opposing indefinite extension. Most troubling to 
me are the strongly negative positions taken by Mexico and Egypt--two 
nations which have received so much support from the United States over 
the years.
  Some of the countries opposing the U.S. position say that indefinite 
and unconditional extension of the NPT should be made contingent on the 
ratification of a comprehensive test ban treaty or an agreement to cap 
the amount of material available for nuclear explosives. Others seek 
universal membership in the NPT or a timetable for complete nuclear 
disarmament.
  By holding the NPT's future hostage to such goals, these countries 
undermine the likelihood of the treaty's indefinite extension. What 
they do not seem to realize, ironically, is that in doing so they also 
jeopardize the very framework critical to the achievement of their own 
goals.
  Indefinite extension of the NPT does not preclude adjustments to the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime. In fact, it would make permanent the 
climate of trust conducive to more restrictive controls over weapons-
grade nuclear materials and related technologies and activities.
  Given the narrow focus of the NPT conference next month, the only 
question treaty parties should ask is whether the world is a safer 
place with the treaty in force. I believe that the answer to that 
question is unambiguously ``yes''. Indefinite and unconditional 
extension is thus the only choice that makes sense.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. GLENN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to include my name 
as a cosponsor of the amendment offered by my colleague and friend from 
Delaware, the chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, Senator 
Roth, expressing the sense of the Senate on the future of the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, better known as NPT, which 
entered into force on March 5, 1970.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, next month, representatives of the 173 
members of the NPT will gather in New York to determine how long the 
treaty shall remain in force.
  I support this amendment because I believe that the NPT, despite some 
shortcomings--and it has been far from perfect--still continues to 
advance U.S. national security interests and a peaceful world order.
  Accordingly, I urge all my colleagues to join in a sense of the 
Senate in favor of an indefinite and unconditional extension of the 
NPT. The NPT has come under attack over the years for not having fully 
halted the global spread of nuclear weapons, particularly in the case 
of certain NPT parties, with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea being the most 
celebrated examples.
  Some critics say the NPT gives too much emphasis on promoting 
peaceful uses of nuclear technology and not enough on its safeguards 
system. This argument has been directed specifically at the enforcement 
of the primary goal of safeguards; namely, the timely detection--timely 
detection--of the diversion of a significant quantity of special 
nuclear material for nuclear explosive uses. Simply put, the more 
countries come to engage in large-scale commercial uses of bomb-usable 
materials, the more likely it will be that some such materials will 
wind up in the hands of black marketeers or terrorists or nations bent 
on proliferation and getting their own nuclear weapons capability.
  Other criticisms, particularly coming from certain developing 
countries, have alleged that the NPT focuses too much on preventing the 
global spread of nuclear weapons and not enough on promoting nuclear 
disarmament. Anti-NPT propagandists have condemned the treaty's alleged 
system of atomic apartheid and its hidden purpose of, as they say, 
disarming the unarmed.
  Other critics have found fault with the treaty's easy exit clause, 
permitting a State to leave the treaty on 90 days' notice. The treaty 
does not define certain key terms like nuclear explosive device and 
manufacture. Nor does it prohibit exports of sensitive nuclear weapons-
related technology.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the Record at the 
end of my remarks an analysis prepared by Dr. Leonard Weiss, the staff 
director for the minority of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 
which describes and assesses these and several additional criticisms of 
the NPT.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, why should the United States press for an 
indefinite extension of such an imperfect treaty?
  Rather than rebut all of the allegations made by the treaty's 
critics, or recount all of the many arguments used on behalf of the 
treaty by its proponents, I would like to summarize briefly my own 
views on why the NPT should be extended indefinitely.
  First, to the ends. The world community needs a formal legal 
instrument to give form and substance to the international effort to 
reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons. Given its near-universal support 
in the world community, the NPT helps to delegitimize the further 
proliferation--and, ultimately, the possession--of nuclear weapons. It 
contributes to a global nonproliferation ethic that is invaluable to 
international security. Any short-term extension or extensions would 
only weaken the incentives of the nuclear-weapon states to expedite 
their nuclear disarmament activities. Such short-term extension options 
amount, in my opinion, to NPT confidence-reduction measures.
  Now, as to the means. The NPT was never intended as a silver bullet, 
as something magic. Nobody expects the NPT to act as a panacea to the 
global nuclear weapons proliferation threat. The NPT works best when it 
is supported by complementary national policies of its parties. For 
example, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and 
China have undertaken binding legal obligations that they will not in 
any way assist the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Each of these 
nuclear-weapon states must promulgate domestic laws and regulations to 
ensure this commitment is being upheld. At a time when each of these 
countries--including most particularly our own country--is experiencing 
great pressure to relax export controls under the false flag of 
economic competitiveness, now is not the time to abandon or weaken an 
obligation that serves to preserve responsible national systems of 
sanctions and export controls. Without the NPT, the world nuclear 
market would become a free-for-all--the new motto of the so-called 
post-cold war world order would soon become, ``Sell what you can while 
you can. At the same time prepare for the worst.''
  As to fairness, the NPT involves reciprocal duties on the parts of 
the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states. The former 
have no choice. They must not assist other countries to get the bomb, 
they must negotiate in good faith to curb the nuclear arms race, pursue 
nuclear disarmament, and work toward a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament. The latter also have no choice: they must not acquire the 
bomb, they must agree to safeguards over the full scope of their 
activities involving nuclear material, and also pursue global 
disarmament objectives. Though these are very different types of 
obligations, it is not correct to condemn the treaty as simply 
discriminatory. I doubt that this treaty would have 173 parties, 173 
nations all signed up, if those nations truly believed that this treaty 
was discriminatory. If the treaty--backed by strong national 
nonproliferation policies--helps to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons, all nations stand to gain the freedom from fear of regional or 
global nuclear wars.
  Now what are our next steps? The NPT is not a quick fix. It must be 
supplemented by strong national leadership and international 
cooperation. Here are just a few suggestions of some 
[[Page S4038]] specific initiatives that are needed to complement the 
NPT regime.
  No. 1. Increased efforts by all countries to integrate fundamental 
NPT obligations into domestic laws and regulations of all states party 
to the treaty. I have proposed legislation in our own country here and 
sent a bill, S. 102, that seeks to bring U.S. controls over exports of 
nuclear dual-use goods into line with U.S. obligations under the NPT 
and nuclear supplier guidelines. Now, I urge my colleagues to support 
this effort and to examine very closely the various pending proposals 
to reauthorize the Export Administration Act to ensure that these bills 
will advance rather than undercut our international nonproliferation 
commitments.
  For those who may think my use of the term ``undercut'' is a bit 
harsh, I would encourage them to read a report prepared last year by 
the General Accounting Office at my request. The report is entitled 
``Export Licensing Procedures for Dual-Use Items Need to be 
Strengthened.''
  No. 2. Pursuit of an international moratorium, preferably a ban, on 
the commercial sale, production, or use of separated plutonium or 
highly enriched uranium. In other words, bomb-rich material. A partial 
ban on the production of such materials for weapons or outside of 
safeguards is--assuming for now that it would not amount to a license 
to produce such materials under safeguards--a useful first step but is 
by no means a substitute for this more important goal. We cannot for 
long sustain an international arrangement that smiles upon large-scale 
commercial uses of such materials in certain privileged states while 
frowning upon such activities elsewhere. In other words, we need 
consistency of our policy.
  No. 3. Reaffirmation by the nuclear weapon states of their intention 
to live up to their obligation under article 6 of the NPT. In 
particular, we need rapid progress both on START II and on further 
reciprocal and verifiable cuts of strategic nuclear arsenals around the 
world, including those of France, the United Kingdom, and China. The 
nuclear-weapon states must devote less effort to attacking the basic 
goal of nuclear disarmament and more effort to exploring the means by 
which this objective can be achieved.
  No. 4. Negotiation at the earliest possible date of a verifiable--
underline verifiable--permanent comprehensive ban on the testing of 
nuclear explosive devices, with emphasis on those words ``verifiable,'' 
``permanent,'' ``comprehensive,'' and ``ban.''
  No. 5. Increased transparency both of the size and disposition of 
existing nuclear arsenals around the world, along with the size and 
disposition of existing stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material, 
including so-called civilian material. The ability of the United States 
to monitor the ultimate disposition of its own nuclear materials in 
international commerce is badly in need of improvement, as the GAO 
recently concluded in its report ``U.S. International Materials 
Tracking Capabilities are Limited.'' That report was prepared at my 
request, also. The longer such shortcomings are permitted to exist, the 
sooner the NPT will find itself in the position of the emperor with no 
clothes.
  No. 6. Strengthen both the capabilities and finances of safeguards 
implemented under the NPT. The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, 
enacted last year as title 8 of the foreign Relations Authorization Act 
for fiscal years 1994 and 1995, Public Law 103-236, contains a sense of 
the Congress urging 24 specific improvements in these safeguards. As 
the author of those provisions, I intend to monitor closely U.S. 
efforts to advance these much-needed reforms in the months ahead.
  No. 7. Reaffirmation of the prevention, not management, of 
proliferation as the foremost goal of U.S. nonproliferation policy.
  I see a great deal of attention being directed to implementing 
military responses to proliferation. The more I see of these efforts, 
however, the more convinced I become that the best defense against such 
weapons is to redouble our efforts to prevent their proliferation in 
the first place. One single attack using a biological or nuclear weapon 
could destroy virtually any city anywhere, regardless of the best of 
defenses. Stopping proliferation is somewhat analogous to fighting 
cancer: A few ounces of prevention will yield many kilograms of cure.
  Mr. President, in conclusion, even if these and other proposals were 
to be implemented today and even if the NPT is finally extended 
indefinitely, we will still have to live with a global nuclear weapons 
proliferation threat. I would prefer to address this threat, however, 
having a permanent NPT and these supplementary measures in my 
diplomatic tool kit rather than not having them.
  Accordingly, I hope that all my colleagues will join me in supporting 
the amendment of my distinguished colleague from Delaware on behalf of 
an indefinite extension of the NPT. Let us just get on with the 
business of nonproliferation.
  Mr. President, one additional remark. If we did not have the NPT, I 
think we would have to invent it. This is a group of 173 nations that 
gradually, over a series of 5 years, since back in the early 1970's, 
has come together to say that they forswear the development of nuclear 
weapons in return for our cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. We have supported that. We have been actively pursuing that.
  I do not believe that we need any more of these 5-year period 
reviews. I would like to see this extended indefinitely, and that is 
what the U.S. policy is trying to do as the 173 nations meet at the 
U.N. in New York next month, and I hope that they pass this as an 
indefinite extension of the NPT to show we are truly serious about this 
matter.
  Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time and yield the 
floor.
                               Exhibit 1

        The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Strengths and Gaps

                           (By Leonard Weiss)


                            I. Introduction

       The evolution of a strong nonproliferation ethic in the 
     world is, ultimately, the best stable long-term tool to 
     prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Such an ethic can 
     stimulate, and is, in turn, stimulated by the creation of 
     international institutions incorporating the notion of 
     nonproliferation at their core. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty\1\ (NPT), despite the confused philosophy of its 
     provenance, has become such an institution and has 
     demonstrated its value especially during the past few years. 
     It remains, however, a flawed institution that requires 
     considerable tending to, including constant efforts to obtain 
     a consensus of its parties concerning evolving 
     interpretations of its provisions in order to maintain its 
     effectiveness as a nonproliferation tool, if not its survival 
     altogether.
     Footnotes at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       It should not come as a surprise that the Treaty is an 
     imperfect nonproliferation instrument. It was created in 
     response to nonproliferation concerns arising from burgeoning 
     nuclear trade accelerated by a misguided atoms-for-peace 
     policy, trade promoted aggressively by nuclear policymakers, 
     technocrats, and diplomats whose visions of nuclear 
     technology-generated prosperity obscured the very real 
     national and international security problems being created. 
     Those problems, when they emerged, seem to have been viewed 
     as much in terms of the threat to future nuclear commerce as 
     they were in terms of the threat of life. Accordingly, the 
     Treaty was designed to endorse and encourage the spread of 
     nuclear technology for peaceful purposes at the time it was 
     to constrain, indeed prevent, the development and manufacture 
     of nuclear weapons.
       The incompatibility of these aims became apparent after the 
     Treaty went into effect in 1970 as some nuclear suppliers, 
     particularly Germany and France (one an NPT party and the 
     other pledged at the time to act as an NPT party) prepared to 
     export technology and equipment for production of fissionable 
     material, albeit under safeguards administered by the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to countries that 
     either were not NPT parties and were embarked on secret 
     military programs to develop nuclear weapons (Pakistan and 
     Brazil) or were NPT parties whose nonproliferation 
     credentials were suspect at the time (South Korea).
       What followed over the next few years, and is continuing 
     today, was the development
      of other institutions outside NPT designed to patch the 
     omissions, ambiguities, ill-conceived constraints and 
     other flaws in the Treaty. Thus, we now have nuclear 
     supplier agreements, bilateral agreements, national and 
     multinational export controls, national technical means of 
     surveillance and international intelligence links, and 
     positive and negative security assurances to assist us in 
     keeping genie in the bottle. These tools, along with the 
     NPT and the associated IAEA safeguards system, are 
     referred to, collectively, as the nuclear nonproliferation 
     regime, a regime that is still evolving in the direction 
     of greater effectiveness, but is not yet at the point 
     where any of the nuclear weapon states would be prepared 
     to put their nuclear arsenals aside with confidence.
       [[Page S4039]] Why is this so, and why has it been 
     necessary to create all these auxiliary tools to combat 
     proliferation? What have we learned over the past 25 years 
     that, had we known it in the 1960s, would have enabled us to 
     construct a better NPT and a better safeguards system? And, 
     in the end, does it matter, i.e., would a stronger NPT enable 
     us to rely for our security on this institution?


            ii. a review of the major elements of the treaty

                          A. Articles I and II

       Article I mandates that each nuclear-weapon-State Party to 
     the Treaty may not transfer to any recipient nuclear weapons 
     explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive 
     devices directly or indirectly; and may not in any way 
     assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to 
     manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other 
     nuclear explosive devices, or to obtain control over such 
     weapons or explosive devices. Article II prohibits non-
     nuclear-weapon-States from receiving those things which 
     weapon-States are prohibited in Article I from giving, and 
     are specifically prohibited from manufacturing or otherwise 
     acquiring nuclear explosive devices.
       The first problem with Articles I and II is that it is 
     unclear what constitutes ``assistance'', ``encouragement'', 
     or ``inducement'' to a non-nuclear-weapon-State; the second 
     problem is that it is unclear what constitutes 
     ``manufacture'' of a device; the third problem is that it is 
     unclear what constitutes a nuclear device because there is no 
     consensus on the definition of a nuclear explosion; and the 
     fourth problem is that there is no prohibition on a non-
     weapon-State assisting another non-nuclear-weapon-State to 
     acquire nuclear weapons.
       George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev, who were among the 
     negotiators of the text of the NPT, have written on the 
     question of what constitutes ``manufacture''\2\, and quote 
     the testimony of the Chief of the American delegation, 
     William C. Foster, before the Senate Foreign Relations 
     Committee. Foster said that ``the construction of an 
     experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device would not 
     be covered by the term `manufacture' as would be the 
     production of components which could only have relevance to a 
     nuclear explosive device''. He also made reference to 
     ``activities'' by a non-weapon-State that would ``tend'' to 
     put the Party in noncompliance of Article II if the purpose 
     of those activities was the acquisition of a nuclear 
     explosive device.\3\
       In order to allay concerns about how one would determine 
     the purpose of certain fuel cycle activities that could be 
     peaceful or weapons-related, Foster added that: ``Neither 
     Uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable 
     material in connection with a peaceful program would violate 
     Article II so long as those activities were safeguarded.'' 
     The reference to safeguards in his statement is immaterial, 
     because if a program is, indeed, peaceful, then there is no 
     violation of Article II even if the activity is 
     unsafeguarded. (In that case, the Party would be in 
     noncompliance with Article III, but that is another matter). 
     This points up a problem that runs throughout the NPT--lack 
     of definitive interpretation. Bunn/Timmerbaev write that the 
     Foster criteria for manufacture have generally been accepted 
     as authoritative interpretations by historians of the NPT 
     negotiations, but whether all current Parties to the NPT 
     would agree with those interpretations is unclear. It is 
     important to note that until the Iraq situation arose, there 
     was no indication that many of the Parties to the NPT viewed 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency as an appropriate 
     verification instrument to ensure that non-nuclear 
     weaponization activities weren't being carried out. Indeed, 
     there were debates in the past as to whether IAEA inspectors 
     were obligated to report any untoward activities they 
     observed (e.g., noting the presence of bomb components such 
     as machined hemispherical metal shells somewhere on the 
     premises) that were unrelated to the negotiated safeguards 
     agreement.
       However, the Iraq situation and the South African decision 
     to abandon its nuclear weapons program has allowed the IAEA 
     to put its toe in the water on non-nuclear weaponization 
     activities. In the case of Iraq, the agency has been provided 
     information by the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) regarding 
     the Iraqi program and in the case of South Africa, the IAEA 
     was invited to examine with full transparency the scope, 
     nature, and facilities of the weapon program after 
     dismantlement. This included some non-nuclear weapon 
     components. This coupled with the acceptance by the NPT 
     members of the IAEA's ability to do ``special inspections'' 
     in the wake of the Gulf War is a start toward significant 
     reform.
       By contrast, one may also note that the U.S./North Korea 
     Framework Agreement makes no mention of any non nuclear 
     weaponization activities or the disposition of any weapon 
     components that North Korea may have manufactured, and the 
     IAEA considers North Korea not in compliance with its 
     safeguards obligations because of its failure to allow 
     inspection of two nuclear waste sites. Ostensibly, if North 
     Korea were to allow these inspections and the result were to 
     show that all the plutonium in North Korea can be accounted 
     for, North Korea would then be considered by the IAEA an NPT 
     Party in good standing since there are not other allegations 
     officially pending regarding its NPT commitments.
       Since the existence of a North Korean nuclear weapons 
     program in an assumption shared by most observers of the 
     scene, it is hard to believe that some weapon components have 
     not been manufactured by North Korea. However, it appears 
     that the IAEA will ignore this possible violation of the NPT, 
     at least for the time being, until it can account for all the 
     nuclear material in North Korea.
       Another issue concerning manufacture is that of R & D, 
     particularly design information. Japan, in 1975, submitted a 
     paper to the Geneva Disarmament Conference arguing that the 
     NPT does not explicitly prohibit weapons-oriented R & D short 
     of actual production of nuclear explosive devices.\4\ In 
     rebuttal, much has been made of a statement made by the 
     drafters during the NPT negotiations that receipt by a non-
     weapon-State of ``information on design'' of nuclear 
     explosives is barred by virtue of the probibition on 
     assistance in the ``manufacture'' of such explosives\5\; 
     however, it is unclear whether this can be extended to 
     prohibit a non-weapon-State from doing its own design without 
     external assistance.
       It is a stretch to argue that the Foster criteria barred 
     such activity based on an assumption that the only purpose of 
     design is to acquire a nuclear explosive device. Some years 
     ago, Los Alamos asked some recently hired young physicists 
     with no weapons background to design a weapon based on the 
     open literature to see if it could be done and thereby to 
     gauge the possible extent of proliferation by this route. The 
     purpose of the activity was not to manufacture nuclear 
     weapons. The Treaty's vague language on ``manufacture'', 
     unless appropriately interpreted, would appear to allow 
     anyone to design weapons using the Los Alamos experiment and 
     rationale without violating the Treaty.
       Once again, however, even if the Treaty were to be air 
     tight on this issue, verification of compliance would be 
     virtually impossible.
       It is evident the Foster criteria do not settle the 
     question of what constitutes ``manufacturing''. The criteria 
     also don't settle some other important questions that arise 
     from consideration of the safeguards regime. Such 
     consideration will also reflect on the question of what 
     constitutes direct or indirect assistance or encouragement to 
     manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons which are 
     discussed in a later section.

                             B. Article III

       Article III has four parts. Article III.1 begins by 
     requiring Non-weapon-State Parties to accept safeguards, ``as 
     set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded'' 
     with the IAEA in accordance with the IAEA's statute and 
     safeguards system, ``for the exclusive purpose of 
     verification of the Parties' NPT obligations with a view to 
     preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to 
     nuclear weapons''.
       The remainder of Article III.1 states that safeguards 
     procedures shall be followed with respect to all source or 
     special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear 
     activities within the territory of the State, under its 
     jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
       Note that while there is nothing in this language 
     explicitly referring to the effectiveness of safeguards, 
     effectiveness is to be inferred from the context. That is 
     because the Treaty cannot be an effective non-proliferation 
     instrument if it allows equipment, material, and technology 
     that could be used for nuclear explosive purposes to be 
     transferred with
      ineffective safeguards attached. Unfortunately, this point 
     was not explicitly addressed by the drafters, and the 
     question of the relationship of trade to effectiveness of 
     safeguards (as opposed to the mere attachment of 
     safeguards) has accordingly become a contentious issue.
       In their deconstruction of the language of Article III.1, 
     Bunn/Timerbaev argued that Article III.1 authorizes the IAEA 
     to verify that non-nuclear components for nuclear weapons are 
     not being manufactured.\6\ It would not be a difficult case 
     to make if the Article did not contain so much emphasis in 
     connecting safeguards to nuclear materials rather than 
     equipment (either nuclear or non-nuclear). As a result, Bunn 
     and Timerbaev lean part of their argument on an 
     interpretation of the phrase stating the purpose of 
     safeguards as ``verification of the fulfillment of (the 
     State's) obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to 
     preventing diversion of nuclear energy * * *'' Bunn and 
     Timerbaev connect the clause ``with a view to preventing 
     diversion * * *'' to the State's obligations under the Treaty 
     not to manufacture weapons, but an equally if not more 
     plausible interpretation is that the antecedent of this 
     clause is safeguards, and that the clause has been added to 
     provide focus as to how safeguards relate in a practical way 
     to the State's NPT obligations. (Indeed, under the Bunn/
     Timerbaev interpretation, Article III.1 would put States 
     under an NPT obligation to establish effective physical 
     security over nuclear materials. That it does not was 
     recognized and remedied by the voluntary (!) Physical 
     Security Convention developed by the IAEA and adopted by many 
     (NPT and non-NPT) countries with nuclear programs).
       This is not to say that a case can't be made for safeguards 
     applying to non-nuclear weaponization activities, and Bunn/
     Timerbaev have made the best case possible. It is just that 
     the emphasis in Article III on material safeguards along with 
     the history 
     [[Page S4040]] of safeguard negotiations and agreements 
     provide no confidence that a majority of members of the IAEA 
     that are State Parties to the NPT share this broad view of 
     safeguards. Taking the broadest view of the stated purpose of 
     safeguards as ``verification of the fulfillment of a (Non-
     weapon-State's) obligations'' under the NPT could arguably 
     subject to inspection the agreements and arrangements by 
     which non-weapon-States allow weapon-States to place nuclear 
     weapons on their territory (Inspections of the agreements 
     could ensure that there were no protocols under which 
     transfer of authority or control over the weapons could take 
     place). Whether the weapon-States would agree to have the 
     IAEA inspectors examine these arrangements is, one suspects, 
     more than problematical.

                             Article III.2

       This Article provides that suppliers Party to the Treaty 
     shall not provide nuclear materials or equipment for 
     processing, use or production of such materials to a non-
     weapon-State unless safeguards are attached. Over a period of 
     years, it became apparent that a more detailed and finer 
     screen for nuclear transfers than this had to be devised in 
     order to ensure uniformity of compliance by suppliers. The 
     result was the so-called ``Zangger'' list of nuclear items to 
     which safeguards must be attached, and, more recently, a list 
     of dual-use items requiring safeguards as well. In addition, 
     the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has identified nuclear 
     export items requiring consideration of ``restraint'' and 
     ``consultation'' before the item is sent.\7\
                             Article III.3
       This Article is designed to ensure that safeguards 
     arrangements will not intrude on the ability of non-weapon-
     States to obtain assistance for or otherwise develop their 
     nuclear energy activities. It references Article IV which has 
     been the basis for many complaints over the years regarding 
     the policies of the suppliers, particularly the U.S. Article 
     III.3 reflects the mindset of the nuclear establishments and 
     the non-weapon-States at the time of the drafting of the 
     Treaty, which was that the Treaty was also to be an 
     instrument for facilitating international nuclear commerce. 
     This mindset resulted in a safeguards system that was 
     designed more for its nonintrusiveness than for its 
     effectiveness. This is still a problem despite the 
     improvements in the wake of the Gulf War.

                             Article III.4

       Provides for a timetable by which States Party to the 
     Treaty must enter into appropriate safeguards arrangements. 
     This timetable has not been met many times in the past, but 
     the most egregious example was that of North Korea, which 
     took six years to enter into a safeguards agreement with the 
     IAEA. No sanction was imposed on North Korea or other 
     violators of this provision.

                   The Safeguards System of the IAEA

       The IAEA was established in 1957 in the wake of the U.S. 
     Atoms-for-Peace initiative and began operating an inspection 
     program in the early 60's designed to detect diversions of 
     significant quantities of nuclear material. The NPT expanded 
     the scope of the agency's work significantly, and in 
     response, the IAEA developed a model safeguards agreement for 
     NPT Parties contained in the document INFCIRC/153.
       In this document, the IAEA states that the goal of 
     safeguards is the prevention of proliferation by ``the timely 
     detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear 
     material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture 
     of nuclear weapons or of other explosive devices or for 
     purposes unknown, and the deterrence of such diversion by the 
     risk of detection''.
       This was adopted in 1970 at a meeting of the so-called 
     Committee of the Whole which deliberated for 11 months before 
     the text of INFCIRC/153 was approved. Mr. Rudolph Rometsch 
     was the head of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards at the 
     time, and he was recently quoted in an interview saying that 
     the 1970 Committee meeting led to ``a sort of dogma for field 
     work--if not to a taboo. It was a question whether inspection 
     should be designed also to detect undeclared facilities. The 
     conclusion was clear at the time: looking for clandestine 
     activities was out of the question and the inspection system 
     was designed accordingly''\8\.
       Thus, inspectors paid attention only to activities or 
     structures within defined strategic points, and were 
     discouraged from asking questions about anything else lest 
     they become persona-non-grata with the State (which had the 
     right to refuse an inspector) and perhaps ultimately at IAEA 
     headquarters.
       INFCIRC/153, in addition to laying out the obligation on 
     the part of the State to have safeguards apply to all its 
     peaceful nuclear activities (so-called ``full scope 
     safeguards''), also stresses the importance of protecting 
     industrial and commercial secrets, not interfering in 
     peaceful nuclear activities, and not hampering economic and 
     technological development in the safeguarded state. This is 
     in keeping with the Agency's dual role. Its charter makes it 
     a promoter of nuclear energy at the same time it is to verify 
     that no diversions have taken place.
       As a result, much negotiation follows the signing of the 
     main Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and the State to 
     be inspected. The main agreement is followed (ostensibly 
     within 90 days) by Subsidiary Arrangements that specify what 
     the Agency and the State have to do in order for safeguards 
     to be applied. Nuclear installations must be listed, and 
     requirements for reporting to the Agency are specified in 
     negotiated detail. These subsidiary arrangements are not 
     published.
       The most specific safeguards documents are the facility 
     attachments to the Subsidiary Arrangements. These state 
     exactly what will be done at each facility containing nuclear 
     material, and lay out the ``Material Balance Areas'' the 
     Agency will establish for accounting purposes. The flow of 
     nuclear material across these areas must be reported to the 
     Agency. The facility attachments also specify the points at 
     which measurements can be taken or samples withdrawn, the 
     installation of cameras, the access to be afforded to 
     inspectors, the records to be kept, and the anticipated 
     frequency of inspections. These negotiated arrangements are 
     also not published.\9\
       Some years ago, the Agency developed internally a set of 
     technical objectives that provide a guideline for determining 
     the level of inspection and reporting that would ensure that, 
     at least for declared facilities in an NPT State, the goal of 
     timely detection by any diversion of a significant quantity 
     of nuclear materials would be met. Concern by inspected 
     States about intrusiveness has resulted in negotiated 
     safeguards agreements that do not come close to meeting these 
     technical objectives, and therefore cannot be said to be 
     producing effective safeguards by any objective criterion. 
     Inspected States have also leaned on the Agency to not even 
     exercise its full rights under the Agreements. In some cases, 
     the Agency itself refrains from exercising its full rights in 
     order to conserve resources.
       This is a basic problem in that the IAEA's safeguards 
     agreements do not provide for the agency to inspect any 
     location--declared or undeclared--at any time (outside of 
     regularly scheduled routine inspections) without some 
     evidence that the site should be subject to inspection. Nor 
     do the agreements provide for IAEA inspectors to verify use 
     of any material formally exempted from safeguards. Thus, when 
     inspectors doing a routine inspection in Iraq
      before the war were asked about buildings adjacent to an 
     Iraqi reactor, they were told it was used for nonnuclear 
     research. Since they were undeclared sites and IAEA had no 
     evidence of suspect activity, the agency had no basis to 
     inspect the building, which, as it turned out, contained a 
     radiochemical laboratory used for research on plutonium 
     separation.
       Furthermore, the safeguards agreements ensure that there is 
     no such thing as a surprise inspection, even though, in 
     principle, IAEA has the right to make ``unannounced'' or 
     short-notice inspections. Routine inspections must provide 
     the state with at least 24 hours notice, and IAEA must advise 
     the State periodically of its general program of announced 
     and unannounced inspections, specifying the general period 
     when inspections are foreseen. Hence, States generally know 
     when and where inspections will occur, and in any case, have 
     control over the timing of admission of inspectors to the 
     country and to the facility.
       The Gulf War has produced a situation where the IAEA has 
     successfully used its authority to conduct special 
     inspections in Iraq backed up by U.N. authority, and has 
     received voluntary offers from a number of states to allow 
     such inspections of declared or undeclared facilities. One of 
     those states was North Korea, which afterward withdrew its 
     offer after the agency demanded to inspect two sites the 
     North Koreans didn't want inspected. Those sites will be 
     inspected at some time in the future (at least 5 years) under 
     the U.S./North Korea framework agreement, which has the 
     unfortunate effect of leaving the agency holding the bag 
     despite its claims of access.
       The IAEA has also not resolved the problem that it cannot 
     verify the peaceful use of nuclear materials exempted by the 
     agency from inspection. Such materials may involve (1) 
     special fissionable material in gram quantities used for 
     instrumentation; (2) nuclear material for production of 
     alloys or ceramics in non-nuclear applications; (3) plutonium 
     (Pu) of a certain isotope concentration (e.g., high in Pu-
     238); or (4) limited quantities ranging from 1kgm of Pu to 20 
     tons of depleted uranium. Iraq used an exemption for a spent 
     fuel assembly to conduct research on separating plutonium 
     without informing the agency. The agency had no authority to 
     routinely verify what Iraq said it was doing with the spent 
     fuel assembly.
       It should be emphasized that the IAEA's problems are not 
     only with the Iraqs of the world. It has problems with many 
     states who are not suspected of weapons development. As 
     Lawrence Scheinman has pointed out; ``Over the past twenty 
     years, the Agency has experienced restraints on its right of 
     access, on the intensity and frequency of inspection efforts, 
     and even on the extent to which it could exercise its 
     discretionary judgment in planning, scheduling, and 
     conducting inspection''\10\.
       To this should be added that the Agency's technical 
     objectives are themselves unrealistic because they are based 
     on ``significant quantities'' of fissionable material that 
     are at least twice as large as the amounts that a non-weapon-
     State might need to construct its first nuclear explosive 
     device.
       Why doesn't the IAEA lower the amount it considers a 
     ``significant quantity''? Because inspections would then have 
     to be more frequent and more intrusive, and the agency 
     [[Page S4041]] currently has neither the financial nor the 
     political support to make this move.
       Raising the financial question exposes the agency's ``dirty 
     little secret''. Because safeguards are supposed to be 
     applied nondiscriminatively, much of the Agency's safeguards 
     budget goes to safeguards in Germany, Japan, and Canada, 
     while the largest current proliferation concerns are 
     elsewhere. The agency, which has been on a zero-growth budget 
     for the better part of a decade, attempts to address its 
     budget problems by slacking off on some inspections of 
     facilities it considers not of proliferation concern. But in 
     so doing it converts its nondiscriminatory character to the 
     status of myth and risks internal political turmoil. It 
     cannot help this because the cost of safeguarding bulk-
     handling nuclear facilities such as enrichment, reprocessing, 
     or fuel fabrication plants is enormous, requiring, in most 
     cases, on-site location of inspectors and much better 
     instrumentation and measurements. While the IAEA has only 
     been required to safeguard small reprocessing plants thus 
     far, the ability of the agency to safeguard effectively 
     (leaving aside the expense) a commercial scale reprocessing 
     plant, such as the one being built at Rokkasho in Japan, has 
     been called into question by many people over the years. A 
     very interesting analysis done by Marvin Miller11 for 
     the Nuclear Control Institute shows that, for a reprocessing 
     plant with an 800 tonne/yr. capacity and an average plutonium 
     content of 0.9%, with a (1)% uncertainty in the 
     input measurement of plutonium (and assuming this dominates 
     the error in measuring MUF); and with a material balance 
     calculation done once a year, the absolute value of the MUF 
     variance (i.e., the error in measuring MUF) will be 72 kgm/
     yr. In that case, the minimum amount of diverted plutonium 
     that could be distinguished form this measurement ``noise'' 
     with detection and false alarm probabilities of 95% and 5% 
     respectively is 246 kgm or more than 30 significant 
     quantities.
       No other conclusion is admissible than that ``timely 
     detection'' of plutonium diversion from a reprocessing plant 
     is an oxymoron. This problem was recognized during 
     consideration of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 
     1978 where the concept of ``timely detection'' of a diversion 
     was translated into the concept of ``timely warning'' of 
     weapons development or construction. The intent of the 
     authors was that, from a technical point of view, timely 
     warning was unavailable in the case of plutonium diversion if 
     it is assumed that the non-nuclear elements of the bomb have 
     been constructed or assembled a priori. The NNPA provided 
     that the President could still allow U.S.-origin spent fuel 
     to be reprocessed in a foreign country if political factors 
     make the risk of proliferation sufficiently low even though 
     ``timely warning'' of weapons construction would not be 
     available to the United States. Not wanting to admit that 
     reprocessing, especially commercial scale reprocessing, was a 
     dangerous, not effectively safeguardable, activity, Reagan 
     Administration officials boldly and falsely interpreted the 
     NNPA language as incorporating political factors into the 
     definition of timely warning, thereby depriving the concept 
     of any objective meaning. (See 12 for a full discussion 
     of the history of the ``timely warning'' criterion in the 
     NNPA).
       In like manner, the IAEA insists that bulk-handling 
     facilities can be effectively
      safeguarded, but Miller's analysis shows that this is not 
     the case, and if the definition of a ``significant 
     quantity'' of plutonium were to be changed (i.e., the 
     amount lowered), the inability to do ``timely detection'' 
     would become still worse.
       The response to these practical problems from within the 
     agency has been dismaying. Some have advocated lowering the 
     technical objectives, i.e., moving the goalposts so that 
     effectiveness of safeguards couldn't be so easily challenged.
       To be sure, the agency has been chastened by its Iraq 
     experience, and is currently crafting a new safeguard 
     approach that aims to detect tiny amounts of fissile material 
     through environmental monitoring techniques such as wall 
     swabs and water samples. This will undoubtedly raise the cost 
     of safeguards and it remains to be seen how well these 
     proposals will be received by the members of the IAEA and the 
     signatories of the NPT.
       Back in 1981, when the Reagan Administration was 
     formulating its non-proliferation policy, the Department of 
     Defense, in an interagency memo, expressed concern about the 
     IAEA's ``susceptibility to Third World * * * politics, its 
     lack of an intelligence capability and the limits of its 
     scope and jurisdiction''. While some of this complaint is 
     being addressed in the wake of the Gulf War (the IAEA is 
     considering how to use intelligence information brought to it 
     by member States), the Pentagon's 1981 warning ``against 
     undue reliance on the IAEA by those responsible for national 
     security'' within the U.S. government has as much resonance 
     today as in 1981 and will continue especially for as long as 
     production of fissile materials continues.

                             C. Article IV

       This article incorporates, in paragraph 2, one aspect of 
     ``the NPT bargain'' in which non-weapon-States Party to the 
     Treaty, in return for their adherence, ``have the right to 
     participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, 
     materials and scientific and technological information for 
     the peaceful use of nuclear energy''. The same paragraph also 
     calls on parties of the Treaty to cooperate in contributing 
     ``to the further development of the applications of nuclear 
     energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories 
     of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due 
     consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the 
     world''.
       In past years, the major complaints about the NPT by non-
     weapon-States have centered on this Article. these complaints 
     range from a generic one that the technologically advanced 
     States have not provided technical assistance or have not 
     sufficiently shared their nuclear know-how with others, to 
     specific complaints that the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and 
     especially the United States, in seeking to control nuclear 
     and dual-use exports or to exercise consent rights in nuclear 
     agreements, are engaged in willful and systematic violation 
     of Article IV.
       There are a number of things to say about this. First, 
     Article IV does not modify the
      requirements of Articles I and II not to assist or receive 
     assistance respectively in the manufacture of nuclear 
     explosive devices. Second, as indicated earlier, 
     verification of NPT obligations under Article III ``with a 
     view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from 
     peaceful uses to nuclear weapons'', cannot be effectively 
     carried out at this time for enrichment and reprocessing 
     facilities under the safeguards system that is the 
     instrument for the implementation of Article III.
       Accordingly, the transfer of facilities, equipment, or 
     technology to a non-weapon-State for the production of highly 
     enriched uranium or plutonium should be interpreted as not in 
     keeping with Article III's implicit qualification that 
     effective safeguards must be applied to all peaceful nuclear 
     activities. Otherwise, nuclear-weapon-States making such 
     transfers could find themselves in violation of Article I, 
     and the NPT would become an instrument for proliferation.
       Indeed, it is apparent that some States--Iraq, Libya among 
     them--signed the NPT because they saw Article IV as a 
     possible route to obtaining nuclear weapons-related 
     technology and equipment.
       To date, there has been no formal resolution of the 
     argument over Article IV, but one can interpret the Nuclear 
     Suppliers Agreement to exercise restraint in nuclear trade 
     involving export of reprocessing or enrichment technology as 
     recognition that Article IV should not be interpreted as 
     liberally as it appears to read. Unfortunately, the potential 
     recipients of such trade do not accept this tightened 
     interpretation, and were it not for the fact that the 
     economics of the back end of the fuel cycle have become so 
     egregious, the argument might well be as loud today as it was 
     in 1977 when the Carter Administration began moving away from 
     the earlier policy of relatively unrestricted nuclear trade.
       It is ironic that the Carter Administration and the U.S. 
     Congress were roundly denounced in 1978 for requiring, in the 
     NNPA, that Full Scope Safeguards be a nuclear export 
     criterion. With few exceptions, the nuclear suppliers refused 
     to go along despite the inferral that their opposition meant 
     they put export profits above support for the NPT. Eventually 
     all came around and adopted the criterion themselves, but it 
     took the Gulf War to do it.
       Finally, it is unfortunate, if understandable, that Article 
     IV is so fixated on nuclear technology cooperation. Assuming 
     the need for tangible incentives to produce NPT signatories 
     in the first place a much better NPT would have resulted if 
     Article IV had made cooperation in every development (not 
     just nuclear) the quid pro quo for an NPT signature. That 
     way, the fight over Article IV might have been avoided, and 
     it would have made the phrase ``with due consideration for 
     the needs (emphasis added) of the developing'' world more 
     trenchant.
                             D. Article VI

       Article VI expresses the second part of the ``NPT bargain'' 
     (Article IV expresses the first part). In this Article, 
     ``each of the Parties to the Treaty (especially including the 
     weapon-States)'' undertakes to pursue negotiations in good 
     faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the 
     nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament 
     under strict and effective international control''.
       Let us begin by noting that, at least in quantitative 
     terms, the nuclear arms race, as usually defined, that 
     included the U.S., the Former Soviet Union, Great Britain, 
     and France is over. None of these countries is increasing 
     their stockpile of nuclear arms (that may also be true of 
     China, but evidence is not forthcoming). If one defines the 
     nuclear arms race as including weapons modernization, even if 
     the numbers aren't going up, then the race may not yet be 
     over. It is to this issue that a Comprehensive Test Ban 
     Treaty (CTBT) is most relevant, not to mention the fact that 
     a CTBT is referenced in the Preamble to the NPT. Without 
     testing, radical new designs of nuclear weapons are 
     problematical, although simulation codes are now very highly 
     advanced. Therefore, the insistence by some non-weapon-State 
     Parties of the NPT that a CTBT be a short-term goal of the 
     NPT weapon states to fulfill part of their Article VI 
     responsibilities is not unreasonable. A CTBT would have other 
     non-proliferation benefits in that it would raise the 
     political barriers to overt testing by nuclear states not 
     Party to the NPT. Thus, the NPT is playing a useful role by 
     providing a forum 
     [[Page S4042]] and a rationale for those countries interested 
     in having a CTBT to push the weapon-States, particularly the 
     U.S., into a serious negotiation to formalize the current 
     moratorium. Some members of the Treaty are taking the 
     position that they will refuse to vote for indefinite 
     extension unless and until further progress is made toward 
     nuclear disarmament. Despite this threat, it is hard to 
     escape the conclusion that if the Cold War hadn't ended, the 
     prospect of a CTBT being completed in the near future, let 
     alone substantial progress toward nuclear disarmament, would 
     be poor despite the pressure on the weapon-States stemming 
     from their desire for an indefinite extension of the NPT when 
     the decision comes up at the 25-year Review Conference in 
     April, 1995.
       But the Cold War is over, and the U.S. now finds itself in 
     the ironic position of possibly being outvoted on the 
     extension issue by a group of countries who want progress in 
     nuclear disarmament, perhaps don't mind at the same time 
     discomfiting the weapon-States, and perhaps also enjoy the 
     fact that many of them were asked by the U.S. to sign the NPT 
     during the 80s despite their having no nuclear energy program 
     or prospects whatsoever.
       Could the NPT unravel over this issue? Hardly. There is no 
     serious current prospect of any NPT Party leaving the Treaty 
     or organizing a movement to terminate the Treaty. A majority 
     vote to recess the Review Conference for one or more years 
     while a CTBT is negotiated is possible. A limited extension 
     of the Treaty is also a possibility, in accordance with the 
     language of Article X (discussed in the next section). This 
     limited extension (which could be for a very long time) could 
     be divided into shorter periods with votes scheduled at the 
     end of each such period to determine whether the Treaty 
     should be extended into the
      succeeding period. It is conceivable that the start of each 
     such period of extension could be made contingent on some 
     requirement for a certain degree of disarmament by the 
     weapon-States.\13\
       The linkage of the extension vote to specific progress 
     toward nuclear disarmament is believed by some to be a risky 
     strategy. The latter is based on the threat of lowering 
     political barriers to proliferation if the weapon-States 
     don't take their obligations under Article VI more seriously, 
     and there is no doubt that the weapon-States do not wish to 
     see those barriers lowered. However, it can be argued that an 
     indefinite extension provides confidence that allows the 
     weapon-States to continue reducing their weapons stockpile, 
     while a limited extension designed to push the weapons-States 
     into faster progress could, if other political factors make 
     accelerated progress impossible, have the perverse effect of 
     putting a ceiling on progress precisely because of the fear 
     that the Treaty might end and new nuclear powers might then 
     emerge.
       As of this writing (November, 1994), the U.S. does not have 
     the votes to prevail on extending the Treaty indefinitely. It 
     appears likely that, in the absence of some new factor in the 
     debate, the Review Conference will either be recessed pending 
     completion of CTBT negotiations or will vote for a long-term, 
     but not indefinite, extension with periodic reviews of 
     progress toward disarmament.

                            E. Article VIII

       This Article lays out the procedures for amending the 
     Treaty. For a proposed amendment to be adopted, the text must 
     first be submitted to the Depositary Governments (U.S., U.K., 
     Russia) for circulation to all Parties to the Treaty. Then, 
     if requested by at least one third of the Parties to the 
     Treaty, a conference is convened to consider the amendment. 
     Adoption occurs only if the amendment is approved by:
       1. A majority of the Parties to the Treaty.
       2. All nuclear weapon-States Party to the Treaty.
       3. All Parties who, on the date of circulation of the 
     proposed amendment, are members of the Board of Governors of 
     the IAEA.
       The amendment then goes into force for those Parties that 
     have ratified it when a majority of the Parties to the Treaty 
     have filed their instrument of ratification. Thus, approved 
     amendments to the Treaty apply only to those Parties who wish 
     to have them apply and have so indicated via ratification.
       The remainder of this Article provides for the five-year 
     Review Conferences that have taken place since 1970.
                              F. Article X

       This next-to-last Article of the NPT provides that after 
     giving three months notice and an explanation, each Party has 
     the ``right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that 
     extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the 
     Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its 
     country''.
       The Article also provides for the 25th year Review 
     Conference to decide, by majority vote, whether the Treaty 
     shall be extended indefinitely or for an additional fixed 
     period or periods. As pointed out in a recent paper by Bunn, 
     Van Doren, and Fischer\14\, this language would allow for the 
     NPT to be extended for an indefinite number of fixed periods 
     unless a majority vote taken at the end of some fixed period 
     were to terminate the Treaty.
       It was the first paragraph of Article X that Saddam Hussein 
     would have employed to leave the NPT after putting into place 
     the infrastructure to build nuclear weapons. Since there is 
     no presumption in the Article of sanctions for leaving the 
     Treaty, the only real protection against the use of the 
     treaty to gain technology, equipment, and materials that 
     could be useful for weapons is to impose a set of 
     multilateral (and unilateral) export controls on appropriate 
     items with sanctions for violations of those controls. This, 
     of course, files in the face of the philosophy of laissez-
     faire technology transfer embodied in Article IV, but is 
     necessary if the nonproliferation regime is to be worthy of 
     its name.


                  III. Conclusions and Recommendations

                 A. Strengthening the safeguards system

       We have already discussed the deficiencies of the system in 
     conjunction with the discussion of Article III. To remedy 
     those deficiencies would require the following 
     (nonexhaustive) changes to the system:
       1. The IAEA must require more transparency in the nuclear 
     activities of its members. Among other things this should 
     include a complete list of sensitive or dual-use items 
     requiring export controls, and registry of trade in such 
     items. This list should contain the union of those items 
     brought to the table by IAEA members and not the 
     intersection; and should cover all sensitive technologies, 
     whether obsolete, current, or advanced.
       2. The IAEA must have access to intelligence information 
     obtained through national technical means concerning sites 
     that may require inspection, and must have an unequivocal 
     right to inspect such sites at short notice.
       3. Safeguards should apply to nuclear plants and equipment 
     as well as materials. INFCIRC/153 safeguards which apply to 
     the entire fuel cycle of a non-weapon-State Party to the NPT, 
     should be combined with the INFCIRC/66 safeguards, which 
     address plants and equipment as well as material for non-NPT 
     Parties. Any nuclear
      facility, whether it contains material or not should be 
     subject to inspection on short notice.
       4. Safeguards should also apply to uranium concentrates 
     such as U3O8, not just to UO2, and to nuclear 
     wastes containing fissionable material.
       5. A definition of effective safeguards should be adopted 
     based on agreed measures of performance embodying appropriate 
     technical objectives. That is the agency must be able to say 
     that with a specified (high) degree of probability and a 
     specified (low) false alarm rate, the diversion of a 
     significant quantity of specified nuclear material will be 
     detected withing a specified amount of time (depending on the 
     material) which is well in advance of the time needed by the 
     diverter to convert the material into a nuclear explosive 
     device, assuming that all non-nuclear weapon-related 
     activities have been carried out.
       6. The amount of nuclear material in a ``significant 
     quantity'' should be reduced by at least a factor of 2 in the 
     case of both uranium and plutonium.
       7. All States with safeguarded nuclear activities should be 
     required to post a bond with the IAEA based on that State's 
     GDP and the size and sensitivity of its nuclear program. 
     Safeguards violations and other violations of IAEA 
     regulations and NPT commitments, as well as a decision to 
     leave the NPT should result in forfeiture of part or all of 
     the bond.
       8. Safeguards should be imposed on non-nuclear materials 
     useful in manufacturing weapons such as Tritium, Lithium-6, 
     and Beryllium.
       9. Safeguards should be established over nuclear research 
     and development activities and facilities.
       10. The annual Safeguards Implementation Report of the 
     Agency should be a public docment.

            B. Interpreting the NPT to strengthen the regime

       The NPT, being a document negotiated among many people from 
     different nations and with different political objectives and 
     constraints, is inevitably a document of compromises, laced 
     with imprecise language, nuanced meaning, and cognitively 
     dissonant passages. Depending on how the Treaty is 
     interpreted, it is either, as claimed, the core of the 
     world's non-proliferation regime, or it is a tool for 
     proliferants to hide their ambitions and legitimize their 
     activities.
       There are at least two main areas where the non-
     proliferation regime can be strengthened via an 
     interpretation of the language of the NPT. The first involves 
     the language
      of Article I requiring that each weapon-State NPT Party not 
     in any way to assist a non-nuclear weapon-State to 
     manufacture nuclear explosive devices.
       As Eldon Greenberg\15\ has pointed out, the negotiating 
     history of the NPT does not permit one to conclude that 
     simply because safeguards are applied to a nuclear transfer, 
     then the transfer is legitimate. (Transfer of the components 
     of an explosive device is prohibited even if safeguards are 
     attached.) Moreover, the very real possibility that an NPT 
     Party may be a proliferator in disguise makes it incumbent 
     upon suppliers to make judgments about the ultimate use of 
     exported technology and equipment. Such judgments could take 
     into account the economic and technical need for the exported 
     items.
       Accordingly, it is at least arguable that the transfer of 
     reprocessing equipment or technology to a non-weapon-State, 
     because 
     [[Page S4043]] such technology cannot be effectively 
     safeguarded and exhibits no compelling economic need anywhere 
     in the world, constitutes prohibited assistance under Article 
     I.
       Article I's language prohibiting indirect assistance by a 
     weapon-State may also be interpreted as prohibiting nuclear 
     assistance of any kind by weapon-States to non-weapon-States 
     not party to the NPT, on the grounds that such assistance 
     releases resources by those States that may be used in 
     unsafeguarded nuclear programs--perhaps devoted in part to 
     weapons development.

           C. Some flaws in the treaty that ought to be fixed

       1. The NPT does not forbid a non-weapon-State from 
     possessing nuclear weapons. (It forbids the acquisition, but 
     in theory a country which weapons could sign the NPT as a 
     non-weapon-State and not give up weapons already made).
       2. There is nothing in the Treaty that prohibits a non-
     weapon-State Party to the Treaty from assisting another non-
     weapon-State to manufacture or otherwise acquire the bomb.
       3. The treaty should be clarified to ensure no challenge to 
     the notion that safeguards includes the ability to search for 
     non-nuclear activities relevant to bomb-making, including 
     R&D. To ensure that this doesn't convert the IAEA into a 
     university on weapons design, only inspectors from current or 
     former weapon-States should be involved in this activity.
       4. The Treaty does not require the IAEA to verify the 
     obligation of a non-weapon-State not to receive assistance in 
     the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons.
       5. The Treaty does not require the IAEA to verify that 
     exports of nuclear hardware by NPT suppliers to non-weapon-
     States are carrying safeguards.
       6. The Treaty does not define the point at which one can 
     say that construction of a nuclear explosive device has 
     begun. The Foster criterion relating ``manufacture'' to 
     construction of a component having relevance only to a 
     nuclear explosive device could constitute such a definition. 
     In that case, activities involving machines capable of 
     creating such components could become subject to special 
     inspections.
       7. The Treaty does not prohibit a non-weapon-State from 
     using nuclear energy for military purposes but is unclear as 
     to permitted ``military uses'' that are exempt from 
     safeguards. In his recent book, David Fischer\16\ posed 
     questions as to whether a non-weapon-State could build a 
     reactor, claim it is the prototype of a naval reactor and 
     thereby exempt its fuel from safeguards. Likewise a State 
     could withhold material from safeguards upon becoming an NPT 
     Party by claiming (to itself--it has no obligation to inform 
     the IAEA) that the material is for a permitted military 
     purpose. Finally, the Treaty appears to allow a ``military'' 
     enrichment plant whose output is only for naval reactors to 
     be unsafeguarded, and the Treaty appears to allow 
     unsafeguarded nuclear exports for permitted military use.
       8. The Treaty's language in Article III.3 has been used to 
     support arguments against making safeguards more intrusive. 
     The Treaty should state as a principle that whenever a 
     conflict occurs between effective safeguards application and 
     compliance with Article IV, resolution in favor of effective 
     safeguards shall govern.
       9. The Treaty does not embargo transfers of sensitive 
     equipment, materials or technology--but it should whenever 
     effective safeguards do not apply.
       10. The Treaty does not provide for sanctions for violators 
     or for withdrawal from the Treaty.
       11. The Treaty is difficult to amend, but worse than that, 
     only those parties ratifying the amendment are subject to it.
       12. The Treaty does not preclude possession and stockpiling 
     of plutonium or highly enriched uranium by a non-weapon-
     State, regardless of economic or technical justification or 
     the effectiveness of safeguards.
       13. The Treaty does not preclude nuclear trade with States 
     not Party to the NPT.
       14. The Treaty's provision on withdrawal does not provide 
     for any disposition of nuclear assets or payment for nuclear 
     assistance received by the withdrawing State by virtue of its 
     NPT membership.

   D. What should be our level of reliance on the NPT as a security 
                                measure?

       As stated at the outset, there is no question that the NPT 
     has been a valuable
      institution. It has helped create a non-proliferation ethic 
     that has raised the political barriers, at least in 
     democratic States, to overt proliferation. It has played a 
     useful role as an anchor or central element in all the 
     discussions about security with the Newly Independent 
     States and other States in Eastern Europe. It provided an 
     outlet for U.S./Soviet cooperation during the days of the 
     Cold War that made it more difficult for each side to 
     demonize the other and thereby lowered the risk of war. It 
     has provided an outlet for countries desiring to play a 
     role on the world stage in disarmament to do so without 
     becoming weapon-States themselves. It provided a way for 
     South Africa to give up its weapons program with a minimum 
     of lingering doubt and suspicion because of IAEA 
     verification, and it provided a basis for dealing with the 
     North Korean weapons program.
       On the other hand, the NPT has also has been a convenient 
     political cover for countries known to be interested in 
     acquiring nuclear weapons, played no essential role in 
     turning around the past South Korean and Taiwanese 
     clandestine weapons programs, did not produce an appropriate 
     response to Iraq's weapons program until after Saddam Hussein 
     invaded Kuwait and was militarily defeated, and provides no 
     restraint on the stockpiling of weapons materials by any 
     State as long as they are under safeguards.
       Since many of its adherents joined because of the promise 
     of technical assistance and technology transfer, the Treaty 
     does not incorporate any nuclear trade restrictions, leaving 
     it to the suppliers alone to decide what should or should not 
     be transferred.
       And in the end, the ability to leave the Treaty with 90 
     days notice means that there is no essential barrier to a 
     country, with the technological known-how to build weapons, 
     and that sees nuclear weapons as its best option for 
     enhancing its security, from proceeding to build them.
       Even if the Treaty and the safeguards system had been 
     originally constructed with the needed reforms discussed in 
     this paper, its implementation would still ultimately depend 
     on the resolve of the international community acting through 
     the Board of Governors of the IAEA (which occasionally has a 
     proliferator as Chair) and the UN Security Council.
       Nonetheless, the warts exhibited by the Treaty and its 
     still evolving safeguards system do not vitiate the political 
     value of the nonproliferation norm that has been nurtured by 
     the Treaty and the rest of the non-proliferation regime--the 
     nuclear weapons free zones, the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga 
     Treaties, the export control laws and agreements (both 
     multilateral and unilateral), and other instruments.
       In sum then, the Treaty cannot be a substitute for measures 
     one might otherwise take in protecting one's security. And 
     without reform it does not provide a good model for dealing 
     with proliferation threats other than nuclear, such as 
     chemical, biological, or missile, but it is an important 
     adjunct whose absence would raise current anxiety levels 
     about the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
                               footnotes

     \1\Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened 
     for signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
     \2\George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, ``Nuclear 
     Verification Under the NPT'', PPNN Study Five, Mountbatten 
     Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton, 
     England, 1994.
     \3\Remarks Submitted by William C. Foster, Hearings before 
     the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 10, 1968.
     \4\Working Paper submitted to Geneva disarmament conference 
     by Japan: Arms Control Implications of Peaceful Nuclear 
     Explosions, CCD/454, July 7, 1975, ACDA Documents on 
     Disarmament, 1975.
     \5\Bunn and Timerbaev, Op. Cit.
     \6\Bunn and Timerbaev, Op. Cit.
     \7\Nuclear Export Guidelines adopted by 15 Governments, 
     January 11, 1978, IAEA Doc. INFIRC/254, February, 1978.
     \8\Interview with Rudolph Rometsch, IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 36, 
     No. 3, p. 14, 1994.
     \9\U.S. General Accounting Office Report GAO/NSIAD/RCED-93-
     284, ``Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety: Challenges Facing 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency'', September, 1993.
     \10\Lawrence Scheinman, ``Assuring the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Safeguards System'', Atlantic Council, 
     Washington, D.C., October, 1992.
     \11\Marvin Miller, ``Are IAEA Safeguards on Plutonium Bulk-
     Handling Facilities Effective?'', Nuclear Control Institute, 
     Washington, D.C., August 1990.
     \12\Leonard Weiss, ``The Concept of Timely Warning in the 
     Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978'', Report (dated April 
     1, 1985), Congressional Record, pp. S2639 and S2646, March 
     21, 1988; also appendix to testimony delivered by Senator 
     John Glenn to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 
     15, 1987; to appear in Nuclear Nonproliferation Factbook, 
     prepared by Congressional Research Service of the Library of 
     Congress for the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 
     1995.
     \13\Eldon Greenberg, ``Opportunities for Improvement of the 
     NPT Regime'', Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, D.C., 
     August, 1990.
     \14\George Bunn, Charles Van Doren, and David Fischer, 
     ``Options and Opportunities: The NPT Extension Conference of 
     1995'', PPNN Study No. 2, Mountbatten Centre for 
     International Studies, University of Southampton, England, 
     1991.
     \15\Eldon Greenberg, ``The NPT and Plutonium'', Nuclear 
     Control Institute, Washington, D.C., May, 1993.
     \16\David Fischer, ``Towards 1995: The Prospects for Ending 
     the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,'' Dartmouth Publishing 
     Co., Vermont, U.S.A., 1993.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my two distinguished 
colleagues, Senators Roth and Glenn, and the other original cosponsors 
in urging the adoption of the sense-of-the Senate language on the 
unlimited and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty at the upcoming renewal session beginning next month. The 
importance of the treaty to U.S. nonproliferation efforts can hardly be 
exaggerated. The Committee on Governmental Affairs held a hearing on 
Tuesday of this week, with a panel of distinguished witnesses, which 
served to highlight the strong bipartisan support for extension of the 
treaty. I urge my colleagues to support this important resolution of 
endorsement of the unlimited and unconditional extension of the NPT.
  Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  [[Page S4044]] Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I say to the distinguished 
manager, we are ready for a voice vote on the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 338) was agreed to.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. GLENN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. BAUCUS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana.


                           Amendment No. 339

   (Purpose: To state the sense of the Senate on South Korean trade 
                barriers to United States beef and pork)

  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Montana [Mr. Baucus], for himself, Mr. 
     Byrd, Mr. McConnell, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Grassley, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. 
     Pressler, Mr. Burns, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Santorum, Mr. Simpson, 
     Mr. Lugar, Mr. Pryor, and Mr. Conrad, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 339.

  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 25, between lines 4 and 5, insert the following:

     SEC. 110. SENSE OF SENATE ON SOUTH KOREA TRADE BARRIERS TO 
                   UNITED STATES BEEF AND PORK.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (1) The United States has approximately 37,000 military 
     personnel stationed in South Korea and spent over 
     $2,000,000,000 last year to preserve peace on the Korean 
     peninsula.
       (2) The United States Trade Representative has initiated a 
     section 301 investigation against South Korea for its 
     nontariff trade barriers on United States beef and pork.
       (3) The barriers cited in the section 301 petition include 
     government-mandated shelf-life requirements, lengthy 
     inspection and customs procedures, and arbitrary testing 
     requirements that effectively close the South Korean market 
     to such beef and pork.
       (4) United States trade and agriculture officials are in 
     the process of negotiating with South Korea to open South 
     Korea's market to United States beef and pork.
       (5) The United States meat industry estimates that South 
     Korea's nontariff trade barriers on United States beef and 
     pork cost United States businesses more than $240,000,000 in 
     lost revenue last year and could account for more than 
     $1,000,000,000 in lost revenue to such business by 1999 if 
     South Korea's trade practices on such beef and pork are left 
     unchanged.
       (6) The United States beef and pork industries are a vital 
     part of the United States economy, with operations in each of 
     the 50 States.
       (7) Per capita consumption of beef and pork in South Korea 
     is currently twice that of such consumption in Japan. Given 
     that the Japanese are currently the leading importers of 
     United States beef and pork, South Korea holds the potential 
     of becoming an unparalleled market for United States beef and 
     pork.
       (b) It is the sense of the Senate that--
       (1) the security relationship between the United States and 
     South Korea is essential to the security of the United 
     States, South Korea, the Asia-Pacific region and the rest of 
     the world;
       (2) the efforts of the United States Trade Representative 
     to open South Korea's market to United States beef and pork 
     deserve support and commendation; and
       (3) The United States Trade Representative should continue 
     to insist upon the removal of South Korea's nontariff 
     barriers to United States beef and pork.

  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, this is a sense-of-the-Senate resolution 
urging the United States Government to remain firm in its effort to 
open the Korean market to American beef and pork exports. The United 
States has initiated a section 301 case on the issue, and this 
amendment will put the Senate on record in support of the USTR and our 
stockgrowers.
  We have been a good friend to South Korea over the years. And South 
Korea has abundant evidence of our friendship.
  Fifty-seven thousand Americans gave their lives in the Korean war. 
Today, nearly 40,000 American men and women are on the line of what is 
still one of the world's most dangerous regions. We are right to be 
there because our presence helps keep the peace in a critically 
important region.
  We are also a critically important market for Korea. We Americans buy 
Korean cars, kim chee, semiconductors and more. In total $17 billion in 
imports from Korea in 1993, and more than that, almost $20 billion last 
year.
  So we are good friends to Korea, but friendship works both ways. The 
least Korea can do is to be as open to our products as we are to 
theirs.
  Beef is a perfect example. Today, American meat exports to Korea are 
blocked by a web of nontariff barriers.
  Unscientific shelf-life requirements require chilled beef in Korea to 
be sold in very unrealistically short periods of time, combined with 
the Customs regulations that deliberately delay beef shipments at the 
ports, which creates a catch-22 situation, making it almost impossible 
to sell red meat in Korea.
  If Korea would remove these barriers, the meat industry estimates 
that the return could be as much as $240 million this year alone and by 
the turn of the century, our meat exports would rise to $1 billion a 
year.
  So the issue is simple: Ambassador Kantor is asking Korea to live by 
the standards that most trading nations already live by and that they 
have, as Koreans, accepted by their entry into the World Trade 
Organization.
  Up to now, they have not done so. One barrier has been abolished 
simply to be replaced by others. We have been patient for years, and 
the time has now come to be firm.
  We have, therefore, as Americans initiated a section 301 case on the 
issue, and history shows that when we have a good case--and we do--and 
we show that we are serious--and we are--section 301 cases get results.
  This sense-of-the-Senate amendment will put us on record in support 
of that case and strengthen Ambassador Kantor and his negotiators in 
their effort. I hope our stockgrowers can count on the support of the 
Senate. I ask for support of this amendment.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am pleased to cosponsor this sense-of-the-
Senate resolution on the question of Korean trade practices offered by 
the distinguished Senator from Montana [Mr. Baucus]. It encourages the 
United States Trade Representative to insist on South Korea's removal 
of unfair nontariff trade barriers to United States beef and pork 
products. The issue is, unfortunately, a familiar one in our trading 
relations with the Pacific--nontariff barriers to our trade, amounting 
to effective closure of their markets to our goods, regardless of 
tariff schedules, despite agreements to the contrary, flying in the 
face of our conception of free trade. The question of nontariff 
barriers, of closed market practices has bedeviled trade with Japan, 
and now is bedeviling our trading relations with Korea, as well as 
China.
  The specific issue is the Korean market for United States chilled 
beef and pork products, a potentially lucrative market worth as much as 
$240 million in exports this year, and growing to the $1 billion annual 
range by the end of the century. The issue has festered since at least 
1988 when American meat producers filed a petition concerning Korean 
discriminatory practices under section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. 
American producers succeeded in getting proceedings in a GATT panel, 
and this resulted in three bilateral trade agreements, in 1989, 1990, 
and 1993. Then in 1994 the USTR did accept the section 301 petition 
brought by American meat and pork producers, alleging unjustifiable 
regulatory restrictions that effectively block their export products 
from the Korean market.
  Now, Mr. President, what is the current result of nearly a decade of 
complaining, initiation of a 301 case, action under the GATT, extended 
negotiations, and the signing of several additional agreements? The 
director of the USTR's Asian division has informed my staff that as of 
today the total of United States imports into Korea of chilled pork is 
zero and red meat is minimal. The results are zero and minimal. This is 
America's fourth largest agricultural market, yet we cannot get meat 
into it, despite the signing of numerous agreements and constant 
negotiations. This dismal situation is not for lack of trying: USTR 
engaged the Koreans in consultation in mid-January, and resumed 
negotiations just this month. The negotiations just concluded have 
apparently failed to get 
[[Page S4045]] market access. What we are seeking is a specific 
timetable from the Koreans to eliminate what is obvious to both them 
and us as burdensome regulatory practices designed for the sole purpose 
of keeping United States meat products out of Korea.
  It is time for the Koreans to settle this issue. We have asked for 
the Koreans to reform their current antiquated regulatory requirements, 
establish an interim system to go into effect immediately, letting 
United States products into their market, and to permanently revise 
their regulations according to a specific timetable. While the Koreans 
announced last September that they intend to reform their system, they 
have stalled on doing so. The Koreans, in the latest round of 
negotiations this month would not agree to the establishment of such an 
interim system that would allow trade to take place. The Trade 
Representative has recently announced that the United States is now 
prepared to take the case to the newly-formed World Trade Organization 
[WTO] for ``consultations'' on the scientific basis for Korean meat 
exclusions, opening up a second track of discussions and dispute 
settlement, if it comes to that. I strongly encourage this route, 
exposing the Korean practices widely in a multilateral forum, raising 
the visibility of the problem. It would serve as an excellent test case 
of the WTO dispute settlement procedures. What is the WTO for, I ask my 
colleagues, if not for this type of situation? Of course, at any time 
the Koreans can avoid that by providing us with an interim regime of 
market access.
  Similar problems are being experienced with the Koreans in 
telecommunications equipment, with the Koreans refusing to certify an 
updated AT&T switch already operating in the Korean market in order for 
AT&T to compete in a new round of Korean procurement. Here again the 
discriminatory behavior is in violation of a United States-Korean 
bilateral agreement. The Koreans have had 2 years to investigate and 
certify the switch, but recently announced they would need another 70 
weeks to test it. Seventy weeks. This is just plain delay, calculated 
to give a Korean-made switch more time to compete.
  Similar situations have occurred in regard to other products, such as 
medical devices, bottled water, raisins, and candy. Let's take a recent 
example of chocolate. The Korean Minister of Health is refusing entry 
of five containers of Mars chocolate claiming insufficient label 
information, with new requirements never before announced. Several of 
the containers have been held since last December. The alleged missing 
information was not notified to either the United States or the World 
Trade Organization, and the resulting obstruction of trade is a 
violation of Korea's obligation under the WTO agreement to publish 
regulations affecting trade and administer them in a ``uniform, 
impartial and reasonable manner.'' We are getting nowhere fast with the 
Koreans on this matter either, which is resulting in substantial 
financial damage to an American company. Last week the Korean 
Government stiffed the United States Trade Representative's negotiators 
on the matter.
  Korean behavior on United States trade is clearly reaching a level of 
concern which can affect our overall bilateral relationship. It is 
affecting, in my view, the strength, fairness, and durability of our 
relationship with South Korea. American national security, the health 
of our defense budget, and our ability to continue to honor our 
commitment to defend South Korea depends on our overall long-term 
economic health. Our economic health is dependent, to a significant 
degree, on good trading balances, and such balances have been 
consistently negative with North Asian countries, Japan, China, and to 
a lesser extent, Korea. Korea needs to understand that trade and mutual 
defense are a two-way street. First, on trade the United States is 
vital to Korean exports of automobiles, semiconductors, and other 
items, now approaching $20 billion in annual revenues to Korean 
manufacturers. Second, the Koreans expect us to come to their defense 
on a moment's notice, because we have made a commitment to do so. I 
expect the Koreans to be forthcoming, to lean over backward to 
accommodate our trade, to honor the agreements we have reached with 
them in the spirit with which they were intended--that is, to give
 United States products reciprocal access to the Korean market. In 
addition, obfuscation, stonewalling, and erecting baloney barriers to 
such access violates the spirit of our overall relationship, and by 
that I mean our overall security relationship. Economic health is 
fundamental to America national security, and fundamental to the 
continuation of a strong United States-Korean defense relationship.

  I suggest that the officials with whom we have had such an excellent 
relationship with in the Korean defense establishment get in touch with 
the foot-draggers in the agencies stalling on United States trade and 
turn the lights on. The time is overdue for reciprocity on the part of 
Korea. I am going to watch closely for Korean agreement to set a 
specific timetable for allowing United States meat and pork into Korea, 
for allowing AT&T to compete in the 1995 Korean procurement cycle, for 
release of confectioneries from Korean ports to Korean store shelves, 
and in general for a change in attitude toward its most reliable 
defender. The United States is stationing nearly 40,000 of the 100,000 
personnel we have deployed to the Pacific for the defense of Korea, we 
shed the blood of tens of thousands more against invasion from the 
north during the Korean war. Korea is considered one of the two so-
called ``major regional conflicts'' around which we are basing the 
force structure and budget parameters of our defense budget. From what 
I am reading, the product with the best chance of gaining ready access 
to the Korean Peninsula is American troops, gladly accepted for the 
defense of Seoul. It is time for Korea to understand the critical 
importance of a healthy trading relationship, and it is time for Korea 
to treat the United States as an economic ally as well as a military 
ally.
  I commend the Senator from Montana for bringing this matter to the 
Senate's attention. The Trade Representative is doing the best he can 
to cope with Korean behavior, and if he eventually needs the benefit of 
congressional pressure on nontrade matters, I am sure it will be 
available.
  I also commend the Trade Representative on his recent success in 
regard to the progress he has made with the third of our north Asian 
trading partners, China. Late last month the USTR successfully 
negotiated an agreement with China to provide protection of 
intellectual property rights for United States companies and provide 
market access for such products. Just last week, he was able to 
conclude another agreement with the Chinese to gain Chinese compliance 
with a 1992 agreement for better access for nearly 3,000 different 
United States products over a period of several years. The Chinese did 
not fully comply with that accord, and now we have an agreement, 
apparently, to abide by the earlier agreement.
  Mr. President, the Chinese also need to understand that it is not 
enough to sign agreements, but that they must be abided by in a spirit 
of cooperation, in an effort to make them work, and not dance around 
them. The Chinese want to be a member of the World Trade Organization, 
and so they threatened to forego implementing existing agreements until 
we agree to give them another carrot in terms of support for membership 
in this organization. But, Mr. President, the proof of the pudding is 
in the eating, on these agreements. They must be energetically 
implemented. I believe that it would be very useful if the Senate 
conducted frequent reviews of the record of our trading partners in 
implementing the agreements they have signed with us. Implementation is 
the key, for instance to the extensive agreements we signed with 
Beijing on intellectual property. And it is certainly key to the 
various bilateral agreements we have signed with the Koreans. 
Compliance with the provisions of the WTO should also be insisted upon 
for Korea, and China if she is admitted.
  I hope that the Trade Representative will ensure that his Korean, as 
well as Chinese, counterparts are made aware of this Senate resolution 
and accompanying statements, and that they will understand the 
importance of these various trade matters to the Senate and the United 
States.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I want to state that I am informed that 
this 
[[Page S4046]] has been cleared by the Members on this side on the 
subcommittee involved. So I am prepared to accept the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 339) was agreed to.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. STEVENS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. BAUCUS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business for just 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  

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