[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 48 (Wednesday, March 15, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3922-S3926]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                SENATE DISASTER RELIEF TASK FORCE REPORT

  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I am very pleased at this time, along with 
my friend and colleague from Missouri, Mr. Bond, as cochairs to lay 
before the Senate the Final Report of the Senate Task Force on Funding 
Disaster Relief. The task force was established pursuant to a sense-of-
the-Senate resolution contained in Public Law 103-211, the emergency 
supplemental appropriations relief bill for victims of the Northridge, 
CA, earthquake.
  I think I can speak for Senator Bond when I say that our sense of 
accomplishment in presenting this report is somewhat tempered by events 
past and present, in that we have just marked the solemn 1-year 
anniversary of the devastating California earthquake. For all the good 
that has happened in the past year, thanks to selfless efforts by 
friends, neighbors, charities and, yes, Government bureaucrats of all 
stripes, we know that for so many their lives have been irrevocably 
changed.
  We also share the grief and shock of the Japanese people who had a 
tragedy of their own, the horrendous Kobe earthquake. We know the 
character of the Japanese people, and given some time and help--and we 
are glad President Clinton and the able Director of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], James Lee Witt, have offered some 
of our technical expertise--we know the Japanese will soon be on their 
feet again.
  These catastrophes--and need I mention the terribly destructive 
floods which recently rained down on California--underscore the 
importance of having an integrated and comprehensive emergency 
management system, and we are making great progress toward that goal 
today.
  Our task force was commissioned to look at Federal disaster 
assistance programs, funding and effectiveness, possible program and 
policy modifications, budgetary and funding options, and the role of 
State, local, and other service providers.
  The report covers a spectrum of issues on how we can best ensure that 
Federal assistance will always be there when needed and how our 
disaster response system might be made more efficient and more cost-
effective. Given the enormity of this project, Senator Bond and I 
decided to enlist the resources of congressional entities such as the 
Congressional Budget Office [CBO], the Library of Congress, and, in 
particular, the General Accounting Office [GAO], which we tasked to 
coordinate and take the lead working with our staff on the preparation 
of this study.
  The end product, I believe, is a testament to the professional work 
and collaboration of all of these different groups and bodies. Many 
individuals labored long and hard, and we in the Senate owe them a debt 
of gratitude.
  One of the more striking aspects we found was the lack of 
comprehensive Government-wide data on Federal disaster expenditures. I 
had thought going in this would be readily available. We found it was 
not. While most agencies can produce statistics for a particular 
disaster or annual spending, the number of persons assisted and 
estimated benefits, these have not been systematically collected across 
Government--until now.
  GAO has totaled up how much we have spent across the board between 
1977 through 1993. In doing so, they examined our disaster planning, 
mitigation response, and recovery programs, and these programs I would 
like to describe in just a little bit more detail.
  Our disaster preparedness and mitigation programs consist chiefly of 
FEMA grants and assistance for fire suppression, floodplain management, 
earthquake and hurricane vulnerability; flood control and coastal 
erosion works under the Army Corps of Engineers; NOAA's severe weather 
tracking programs; U.S.G.S. earthquake and volcanic reduction programs, 
and; coastal zone management activities through the Department of 
Commerce.
  In the area of Federal disaster response and recovery programs, we 
are dealing primarily with FEMA's individual and public assistance 
grants, temporary housing, community disaster loans, and unemployment 
benefits; Small Business Administration loans; repairing crucial 
roadways through the Department of Transportation; aid for the 
restoration of school facilities by the Department of Education; 
disaster 
 [[Page S3923]] recovery grants by the Economic Development 
Administration; emergency disaster assistance loans, payments and food 
stamps administered by the Department of Agriculture, and; the Army 
Corps' emergency water supply operations and flood control and coastal 
works repair.
  To state the obvious, our emergency management system is far, far 
more complex than most people realize. It involves quite a number of 
Government agencies.
  I should note that these figures do not include FEMA's mission 
assignment requests of other agencies to provide specific types of 
assistance, depending on the situation and the need.
  There is a pervasive cynicism in our land today that derides 
Government's ability to deliver efficient and effective services and to 
return taxpayer dollars in a meaningful way to those who sent them to 
Washington in the first place. In short, to touch people's lives when 
there is a desperate need.
  What I just listed does that and more. We may talk about cutting 
Government, but these programs I feel are real, they are vital, and 
they are indispensable.
  If in times of major emergencies we do not provide this assistance, 
then who will? I spent many days on the floor managing the minority 
side for the unfunded mandates bill and agree with much of what is said 
by States and localities regarding Federal mandates. But what we, the 
Feds, have spent in helping States and our citizens prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from disasters has never really been quantified 
until today.
  This report shows that from fiscal years 1977 through 1993, Federal 
agencies obligated almost $120 billion for emergency management 
programs--$120 billion in constant 1993 dollars for emergency 
management programs.
  Most of which, about $87 billion, was for post-disaster recovery 
assistance. Over $64 billion, 54 percent of the total, was in the form 
of either grants to disaster victims and communities or expenses from 
disaster-related activities and response. Some $55 billion, 46 percent 
of the total, consisted of various disaster recovery loans made by 
FEMA, SBA, or the Farmers Home Administration.
  Since a large portion of the loans will ultimately be repaid, the 
entire loan amount is not necessarily a Federal cost, though costs are 
incurred through subsidized interest rates and when loans are forgiven 
or are written off.
  (Mr. THOMAS assumed the chair.)
  Mr. GLENN. For example, during this same timeframe, the Farmers Home 
Administration [FmHA] obligated over $34 billion for disaster emergency 
loans and wrote off about $7.5 billion. That is not too bad in a 
situation like this, I do not think.
  To sum up, we have spent directly over $64 billion between fiscal 
years 1977 and 1993 and some $55 billion indirectly through low-cost 
Government loans.
  While this data is the best we have to date, it is not exhaustive. It 
excludes what we have spent to repair or rebuild damaged Federal 
Government facilities, which we do not currently track. It also does 
not include costs incurred by the Federal Government through subsidies 
and disaster insurance programs.
  During this timeframe, we spent about $10 billion on the Federal Crop 
Insurance Program and almost $3 billion in costs through FEMA's 
National Flood Insurance Program.
  Last year, Congress did change both of these programs to make them 
more cost-effective, to minimize potential losses but still provide 
protection from these tragic events at a reasonable cost.
  We soon will consider another supplemental bill to pay for additional 
costs from the Northridge earthquake. I know this is something my 
distinguished co-chair will be holding a hearing on, I believe 
tomorrow, in the HUD-VA Subcommittee on Appropriations, and 
particularly how we are going to pay for this request. That is a tough 
one.
  As our communities continue to grow, so do our potential risks and 
liabilities. We need to see if there are better ways to prepare 
financially for such catastrophic events.
  Increasingly, the debates on disaster relief aid and where the money 
comes from have grown rather contentious, and that is understandable.
  Since these measures are deemed ``emergencies,'' they have not been 
subject to budget caps requiring program offsets, so they add to the 
deficit.
  Also, these bills have become too often the proverbial Christmas 
trees for items that may have little or no bearing on our disaster 
response efforts.
  In other words, people know this legislation is going to go through, 
it is going to pass in some form, so whatever their pet program is, 
with the Senate's lack of germaneness rules, it can be brought out and 
attached. It is something I think we ought to correct in Senate rules 
and procedures sometime in the future.
  But anyway, this tendency to treat some of these emergency bills as 
Christmas trees has attracted heightened scrutiny and distracts us and 
the public from our purpose at hand, which is to help fellow citizens 
in their time of need.
  The report we are releasing today proposes several funding and 
budgetary options for consideration of the Senate.
  By changing current procedures, these options could reduce the use of 
emergency supplementals and lower total Federal spending--but at a 
price, making it harder to provide such aid.
  Our mission with this report was not one of coming up with one firm, 
solid recommendation. It was to lay out options for the Senate's 
consideration. It was to define problems, how we have dealt with these 
things in the past, and what options we have for dealing with them in 
the future.
  Each of these options is more fully described in an appendix to my 
statement, which I ask unanimous consent be included at the completion 
of my remarks, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. GLENN. Each of these options has its own advantages and 
disadvantages, and there probably is no clean, pure and simple magic 
bullet because, for one reason, we do not have clean and simple 
disasters out there so we can plan for them in advance like we might 
prefer to do.
  There are five basic options:
  First, tighten the criteria for using the emergency safety valve of 
the Budget Enforcement Act.
  In other words, setting a threshold on what is categorized as truly 
emergency spending. This could mean that States don't always request 
Federal funding on things that normally, in times past, could and 
should have been taken care of by the local community or the county or 
the State government.
  Second, fund disaster programs at historic average levels.
  Third, establishing a rainy day fund to cover future disaster 
expenses for Federal disaster relief.
  Fourth, eliminate the emergency safety valve and cut other spending 
to offset the cost of disaster assistance.
  Fifth, allow funding only for emergencies in any supplemental 
containing an emergency designation.
  Those are five options.
  With increasing budgetary constraints, these approaches deserve 
serious consideration. I know Senator Bond is going to be on the hot 
seat grappling with these issues on his appropriations subcommittee, 
particularly what the implications are if his subcommittee accounts 
will have to absorb much of the current supplemental request. In other 
words, what is going to get cut if it all has to come out of his 
subcommittee accounts. I do not think it right that this should happen, 
but that is one of the things he has to deal with--whether these funds 
will come out of veterans programs, out of the space station, or out of 
low-income housing, all of which are covered under his subcommittee.
  And those are going to be tough decisions.
  I hope he would not have to make those decisions from within just the 
confines of that budget restriction, and that we could make separate 
funds available for emergency consideration. Being forced to change the 
rules in the middle of the game is a very serious policy change and one 
we should not adopt lightly.
  Another area I wish to address is the rise in the number of 
Presidentially declared disasters.
   [[Page S3924]] In 1988, just 7 years ago, we had 17 declared 
disasters, but in 1993 there were 58.
  Now, whether that is the result of Mother Nature becoming more testy 
or whether it is classifying more types of events as declared national 
disasters than in the past, or more generous Presidents--or a 
combination of all of these things--remains to be seen. But as the 
report suggests, we might want to examine setting very explicit and 
objective criteria for Presidential disaster declarations.
  I also want to note two integral components of our emergency 
management system. We depend on the States and localities--the 
emergency managers, the firefighters, the rescue squads and, sometimes, 
the National Guard--to be the primary responders in times of 
difficulty, times of disaster. And that is as it has been in the past.
  We do not want it to be that every time some disaster occurs, the 
Federal Government is called in to do everything rather than having 
State and local people be mainly responsible themselves. The efforts of 
these primary responders, the emergency managers, the firefighters, 
rescue squads and, sometimes, the Guard are augmented through the good 
work of charitable organizations like the American Red Cross, the 
Salvation Army, and many other worthy religious, church, and 
professional groups.
  Locally, they provide what historically has been the way in this 
country of ours, and that is that neighbors take care of neighbors, 
locals take care of locals, States take care of their own situation as 
much as possible and only call on the Federal Government to supplement 
their efforts when things are basically out of control.
  Now, our report highlights their special role and the enormous 
contributions made by thousands of dedicated volunteers. But we, the 
Federal Government, need to supplement their efforts where disasters 
get beyond the resources of local communities.
  By and large, this system has worked well for the vast majority of 
disasters. It is only when we have a truly catastrophic disaster, one 
that is beyond the capabilities of these entities, that the Federal 
Government enters the picture in any significant way.
  It is not to say, however, there is no room for improvement. A 
section of our study looks at how Federal assistance to States, 
localities and individuals is being spent. The short answer is: We 
really do not know. We must do a better job in overseeing what results 
we are getting for our money, whether the funds are being used 
effectively, and if program objectives are being met.
  Further, I was also struck by the sheer number of Federal disaster 
programs we currently have spread across many agencies. I think it is 
imperative we begin to look at whether any of these are redundant or 
duplicative, can be done more efficiently, or organized differently. 
Can they be streamlined or consolidated to maximize resources and 
increase their efficiency? In a time of budget constraints, a thorough 
review of the mission, the management and organization of these various 
agency programs is long overdue.
  We must also remember that our disaster response system is, in fact, 
a partnership which is, indeed, a hallmark of our federal system.
  I know that some States take these matters quite seriously but 
others, perhaps, less so. As States have been faced with their own 
fiscal constraints, too often their emergency management programs get 
cut to the bone with the assumption: ``Why bother; the Feds will come 
to the rescue.'' That is the wrong attitude.
  Our own position is shaky enough. We must ensure that the States are 
doing their part to uphold their end of the bargain.
  I think it is telling that before this study took shape, neither FEMA 
nor the States had an idea of what the States were spending or getting 
for their emergency management and related programs. And thanks to this 
effort, FEMA is now working with the National Emergency Managers 
Association [NEMA] to do just that. I think it is critical to know 
exactly how the States shape up in this regard.
  The report also suggests a number of ideas to improve Federal-State 
coordination such as: adopting performance standards; providing 
incentives for planning and mitigation; cost-sharing reductions for 
those not up to par; more frequent exercises and training, and; very 
importantly, I believe, post disaster analysis to learn what worked, 
what did not, were the money and resources well spent. In short, to 
determine lessons learned after each disaster.
  We should work with the States to implement these approaches, and 
FEMA is now beginning to do that. We also must make sure FEMA itself 
has the capabilities to effectively manage and oversee this effort so 
we will better know how well or how poorly the States are doing their 
job.
  So, again, I wish to recommend to my colleagues they take a look at 
our task force report. I thank all those who have devoted their time 
and effort to putting it together.
  In particular, GAO did an outstanding job in supervising and 
coordinating this effort. It is a job well done. And I already have 
asked unanimous consent the appendix be printed in the Record.
  I want to close by giving full credit to my cochair in this effort, 
Senator Bond. After the election of last fall, when the leadership in 
the Senate changed, we sort of changed roles on this a bit. He took a 
major role from there on in putting this whole thing together and has 
done a superb job. I compliment him for his efforts in this regard, for 
leading this effort. It has been a pleasure to work with him on it.
  We have made a report that does not solve all of our problems, but 
under his leadership, and working with him, I think we have been able 
to put together a report that is the most definitive report ever on 
disaster relief assistance, the Federal role, its historical 
connotations, and to provide some suggestions for the Senate's guidance 
of how we should deal with this in the future.
  It has been a pleasure to deal with Senator Bond on this. I know he 
will submit our report on this officially. I yield the floor.
                               Exhibit 1

           Appendix--Task Force Budgetary and Funding Options


i. tighten criteria for using the emergency safety valve of the budget 
                         enforcement act (bea)

       This option would require Congress and the President to 
     issue specific, written justifications for designating 
     appropriations as emergencies to escape funding constraints. 
     Such formal criteria could impose a higher threshold that 
     funding measures would have to hurdle to avoid the 
     disciplines of the BEA. How high the threshold would be 
     raised--and how much savings might result--is an open 
     question. But such written justifications would provide 
     Members more information and would presumably give those 
     opposing such funding a more defined target.


         ii. fund disaster programs at historic average levels

       This alternative would require appropriations for FEMA, SBA 
     disaster loans, and other disaster programs to be made in 
     regular appropriations bills in amounts equal to an historic 
     average or expected funding need for each program before the 
     emergency designation could be used for supplemental funds. 
     In theory, this should increase regular appropriations for 
     such programs and lower the amounts of emergency 
     supplementals.
       Currently, the appropriation request for FEMA is loosely 
     based on an historic average, which was calculated years ago 
     and excludes the costs of major disasters. FEMA's regular 
     appropriation was $292 million in 1994. Had the 10-year 
     average of about $645 million been appropriated, the size of 
     FEMA supplementals would have been about $350 million 
     smaller. If the appropriations caps were unchanged--meaning 
     spending in other programs was reduced to accommodate this--
     the Federal deficit would have been $350 million less.
       It should be noted that, since 1993, firefighting programs 
     of the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior have 
     been funded based on a 10-year moving average. These programs 
     also have the authority to borrow from other accounts. Since 
     this practice was begun, no supplementals for these 
     activities have been necessary.
       On the other hand, unobligated balances could accumulate in 
     the program accounts during some periods. If they grew large 
     enough, it would be awfully tempting to lower the threshold 
     of what is really a disaster, be more generous in our 
     response, or to raid it for other purposes.
       Of course, setting strict definitions of eligible disasters 
     and developing procedures that would isolate this account 
     money could be part of any legislative package to carry out 
     this option.


 III. establishing a rainy day fund to cover future disaster expenses 
                      for federal disaster relief

       This approach would create a so-called rainy day fund, or 
     reserve account, financed 
      [[Page S3925]] by cutting other discretionary spending, by 
     raising new taxes, or a combination of both.
       Annual payments to the fund could be made until some 
     desired balance is reached. Spending from this account could 
     be subject to appropriation at the whenever the need arose. 
     Unlike the previous option--where the executive branch could 
     obligate accumulated account funds on their own--this 
     approach would allow Congress to retain the discretion over 
     using this money.
       This option would cause disaster relief to be paid for up 
     front--either by spending cuts or higher taxes--rather than 
     borrowing and increasing the deficit, as we do now. But 
     again, there could be some temptation--particularly in times 
     of fewer, less costly disasters--for Members to be more 
     generous than envisioned in utilizing any large, accumulated 
     balances in this account.


  IV. Eliminate the Emergency safety valve and cut other spending to 
                 offset the cost of disaster assistance

       This alternative would remove the emergency safety valve 
     provided for in the Budget Enforcement Act. Disaster 
     assistance would be paid for by reducing other spending, 
     thereby lowering the Federal deficit.
       One version of this option would require that current year 
     spending be reduced. Another approach would mandate that 
     discretionary caps be reduced in future years to offset the 
     increase in current year spending.
       Under both these scenarios, if there is any unnecessary or 
     excess relief now provided, it would be far less likely to 
     occur in this modified pay-as-you-go procedure. Of course, as 
     spending caps grow increasingly tighter, finding the programs 
     to cut to accommodate the variable needs of disaster relief 
     is going to be all the more difficult.


V. allow funding only for emergencies in any supplemental containing an 
                         emergency designation

       This option would establish a new point of order in the 
     House and Senate against considering any bill or joint 
     resolution containing an emergency appropriation if it also 
     provides an appropriation for any other nonemergency 
     activity. While not directly addressing disaster assistance 
     funding, it seeks to eliminate the ``Christmas tree'' addons.
       Opponents of this change could argue there is a 
     longstanding practice of considering supplemental funding 
     needs en masse, and this would be akin to requiring separate 
     votes on provisions of regular appropriations bills.
       Whether or not this approach would actually reduce the 
     deficit is also open. Nonemergency items in supplementals 
     must be estimated to have no net effect on the deficit, since 
     there is no room left under the spending caps. So some would 
     contend that while the policy might change, the Federal 
     deficit likely would not.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ashcroft). The Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I express my sincere thanks to my good 
friend and colleague from Ohio, Senator Glenn. On this as on other 
matters he has been very easy to work with. I appreciate the tremendous 
efforts he and his staff put in and the great leadership he showed on 
this task force.


                      Order for Printing of Report

  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent on behalf of 
myself and Senator Glenn that the report of the Senate Bipartisan Task 
Force on Funding Disaster Relief be printed as a Senate document. In 
addition to the usual number of copies, I also ask an additional 300 
copies be printed for the use of the Senate. As noted, the task force 
was established by Public Law 103-211 in February 1994. Subsequently 
Senator Glenn and I were named cochairs of the task force.
  I understand this request has been cleared on both sides of the 
aisle.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I have already said how much I appreciate 
the opportunity to work with Senator Glenn. He has shown great 
dedication and concern about disaster declarations and how we provide 
assistance. I think he has given, in his remarks, an excellent overview 
of the contents of this report. I join him in commending the GAO, CRS, 
and the other agencies that worked on this, as well as the members of 
the task force and their staffs. As my colleagues can see, this is no 
small task. The information was very difficult to compile. It had not 
been done before. I believe it is a useful effort and I commend it to 
my colleagues. The good news is you do not have to read the whole 
thing. There is an executive summary so you can see what we are talking 
about.
  I also want to highlight the comments that Senator Glenn made about 
the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the National Guard, the other 
organizations, individual volunteers, and the State and local 
governments that respond in these disasters.
  I have had more experience than I want in dealing with disasters as 
Governor of Missouri. I found that out of the hardship, death, injury, 
damage, and widespread devastation that nature frequently visits on our 
country comes a tremendous human response that is probably one of the 
most gratifying and encouraging things one can see in a disaster. I 
also appreciate Senator Glenn's comments about the funding difficulties 
that Senator Mikulski, my ranking member, and I on the Veterans' 
Administration, HUD and Independent Agencies Subcommittees on 
Appropriations will face if we have to make cuts solely in our 
subcommittee in order to handle the disaster implications. This is 
something we do need to address because in no subcommittee in 
Appropriations is there a great deal of slack to cover the costs of 
major disasters.
  Let me share just briefly some of my observations. There are a couple 
of points I want to highlight about this report. As most of my 
colleagues will remember, nearly 2 years ago the Midwest experienced 
one of the worst floods in the Nation's history. It was deemed a 500-
year flood in some areas. We in Missouri saw firsthand the devastating 
power of Mother Nature. Families were forced out of homes. Businesses 
and infrastructure, in some cases whole communities, were under water. 
Over the 3-month period of June to August 1993, northern and central 
Missouri received over 24 inches of rain. We thought that was a lot of 
rain. North of us, in east central Iowa, they dwarfed us with over 38 
inches of rain.
  The Missouri and Mississippi Rivers crested and fell, crested and 
fell, and then crested again. When the waters finally receded, because 
the ground was so saturated it took weeks, not days, before people 
could begin the nasty, dirty business of cleaning up. If you never had 
to be in an area of cleaning up after a major flood, you cannot really 
appreciate how difficult and how unpleasant a task that is. Needless to 
say, the damage which resulted was extraordinary, and efforts to repair 
roads, levees, airports, and communities are continuing in some areas 
even today.
  It was with this experience still fresh in my mind that I accepted 
with pleasure the opportunity to serve as cochair, with my friend 
Senator Glenn, and accepted the responsibilities for the Senate's 
Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief last February.
  As a former Governor who saw several disasters during my two terms as 
well as a 500-year flood, I was very pleased to be given the 
opportunity to take on the task of reviewing the Federal Government's 
disaster relief programs and policies. Our task force was asked to do 
several things: review the history of disaster relief and its funding; 
evaluate the types and amounts of Federal financial assistance provided 
to individuals as well as State and local governments; review the 
relationship between funding disaster relief and our budget enforcement 
rules; and report our findings, options, and any recommendations. As 
mentioned earlier, this proved to be an immense task and one which 
could not have been done without the massive amount of work done by the 
professionals at GAO, CBO, and CRS, who teamed up to put together this 
first-ever comprehensive review.
  Our colleagues in Congress have been concerned, and rightfully so, 
that the cost of disaster assistance was growing exponentially while at 
the same time the temptation to declare anything and everything a 
disaster in order to get out from under the budget caps was also 
increasing. Thus, after seeing the sixth large supplemental moving 
through the Senate, our colleagues decided the time had come to take a 
longer look at our disaster programs. This report is the result of that 
decision, and tomorrow I plan to hold a hearing with the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], and a panel composed of GAO, CBO, 
and CRS, to begin exploring where we go from here.
  Several of our report's findings are worth highlighting. First, the 
actual amount obligated by the Federal Government on disaster 
assistance, as has already been stated, from fiscal year 1977 to fiscal 
year 1993 has been, in constant 1993 dollars, $120 billion.
   [[Page S3926]] The distinguished occupant of the Chair, who served 
as Governor of Missouri, was on the receiving end of some of that 
assistance. I know he and our other colleagues around the country know 
how important that assistance can be.
  Of this figure, $55 billion are in the form of loans, with $34.5 
billion originating from the Farmers Home Administration and nearly $21 
billion from the Small Business Administration.
  The other major expenditures have been $16 billion from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture for crop losses, $25 billion from the Corps 
of Engineers for hazard mitigation efforts, and $10 billion for FEMA's 
disaster recovery programs.
  But of interest to many of my colleagues is the number of disasters 
since 1988. That year there were 17 disasters with a total cost of $2.2 
billion.
  In fiscal year 1989 there were 29 disasters; fiscal year 1990, 35; 
fiscal year 1991, 39; fiscal year 1992, 48; and by fiscal year 1993, 
there were 58 disasters at a cost of $6.6 billion. And then last year, 
not included in this report's totals, an $8.4 billion supplemental 
appropriations was agreed to. As I speak, we have pending before the 
Veterans Administration, HUD, and Independent Agencies Subcommittee of 
the Appropriations Committee a fiscal year 1995 supplemental request 
for an additional $6.7 billion FEMA request. As has been said in many 
other instances, that begins to mount up to real money.
  Mr. President, I believe this report will serve as a very useful tool 
in two basic ways. First, it reminds our colleagues of the costs which 
have been occurring as a result of natural disasters and our responses 
to them; second, that we need to get everyone to take a second look at 
how we have been evaluating the successes or failures of our disaster 
responses.
  For the past few years, we have been concentrating on improving the 
speed of response and the timeliness of the payments--how fast we can 
shovel the money out the door. For the most part, there have been 
dramatic improvements. We can really shovel it out the door quickly. 
However, it is about time that we look to see how the money is being 
spent. Senator Glenn has already referred to that. It is not just the 
fact that we shovel it out in a timely fashion. Where does it go and 
what does it do? I think that his comments are right on target. And 
this will be the subject of the hearing we will be holding tomorrow to 
begin to explore how this money is actually spent. Where does it go 
when it is shoveled out the door?
  I invite my colleague, or others who are interested, to sit in or to 
have a staff member sit in as we begin to explore where the money goes, 
what it does, and if it is the kind of expenditure that we really need 
to make.
  In the past 5 years, Congress, through FEMA alone, has provided $12 
billion in emergency relief. We now are faced with another request by 
FEMA of $6.7 billion for this year. It should be obvious to everyone, 
as I think it is obvious to me, that in the budget climate we face, we 
must address these escalating costs to ensure that the billions we are 
spending is spent wisely.
  I hope that this report will jump start the effort. I ask our 
colleagues to review at least the executive summary of the report so 
that they will have an idea of how we are spending billions and 
billions of dollars--$120 billion since fiscal year 1977. That is a 
significant amount of money, and one which we should take care to 
assure we are spending properly.
  Mr. President, that concludes my remarks. I yield the floor.
  Mr. GLENN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I want to say once again what a great job 
Senator Bond did on this report. I think that is exactly what the 
Senate had in mind when they asked us to do this. I congratulate him. 
We worked on it very closely together.

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