[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 48 (Wednesday, March 15, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E605-E607]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                         THE PRESSLER AMENDMENT

                                 ______


                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                       Wednesday, March 15, 1995
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, next month Pakistani Prime Minister 
Benazir Bhutto comes to Washington and will be conferring with Members 
in several meetings on the Hill.
  Bilateral relations between the United States and Pakistan since 1990 
have been dominated by the Pressler amendment, which stipulates that no 
United States assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan, and no 
military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to 
Pakistan, until the President on an annual basis certifies that 
Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device.
  In an effort to inform Members prior to Prime Minister Bhutto's visit 
to the Hill about this legislation and its impact on United States-
Pakistani relations, I ask permission to include in the Record 
testimony I submitted a few days ago to the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations.
  The Pressler Amendment Statement by Representative Lee H. Hamilton, 
Submitted to the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
                 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

       First of all, Mr. Chairman, I wish to congratulate you for 
     calling this hearing on a most timely subject. Four weeks 
     from today, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto will be 
     visiting Capitol Hill. Holding this hearing today on what has 
     become the defining element in the bilateral U.S.-Pakistani 
     relationship serves an important purpose by forcing us to 
     examine the current status of, and prospects for, that 
     relationship.
       Let me add that I deeply appreciate the courtesy you have 
     afforded me by inviting me to submit testimony as part of the 
     official record of this hearing.
       I also wish to take a moment to pay tribute to the two 
     American diplomats who were killed yesterday in Karachi. The 
     tragic deaths of Mr. Durell and Ms. Vanlandingham, as well as 
     the wounding of Mr. McCloy, should serve to remind us that 
     courageous American men and women place their lives on the 
     line daily on behalf of the United States. I am sure that you 
     join me in saluting their dedication and sacrifice, and 
     calling upon the Pakistani government to spare no effort to 
     bring their killers to justice.
       Mr. Chairman, you have called this hearing to discuss our 
     nonproliferation policies in South Asia. There are few issues 
     of greater importance to U.S. security. The previous director 
     of the Central Intelligence Agency identified the Indian 
     Subcontinent as the most likely place in the world for the 
     outbreak of a nuclear conflict--a catastrophe that would 
     affect the United States as well as more than one billion 
     people in South Asia.
       Moreover, a failure to stop the spread of nuclear weapons 
     in South Asia will also limit our ability to keep such 
     weapons out of the hands of Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and 
     other would-be nuclear powers. A world with fifteen or twenty 
     nuclear weapons states is a world we don't wish to 
     contemplate. So the importance of your hearing today--coming
      as it does only weeks before the international community is 
     to convene in New York to determine the fate of the 
     Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty--cannot be overestimated.
       [[Page E606]] Mr. Chairman, my argument today can be 
     summarized in a few brief propositions: Pakistan is a country 
     the United States cannot and should not ignore. The Pressler 
     amendment has undermined our bilateral relations with 
     Pakistan. As a nonproliferation tool, the Pressler amendment 
     has outlived its usefulness, and is now counterproductive. It 
     is time to modify this amendment, or even to lift it 
     altogether.
       Allow me to amplify each of these propositions in turn.


i. pakistan is a country the united states cannot and should not ignore

       U.S. National Interests: Why is it in the national interest 
     of the United States to maintain decent relations with 
     Pakistan?
       There is, first of all, the matter of sheer numbers. 
     Pakistan is the 7th largest nation in the world. It is the 
     world's second largest Moslem nation. Size alone compels the 
     United States to pay attention to Pakistan.
       Second, considerations of global and regional security make 
     cooperation with Islamabad important for the United States. 
     Pakistan occupies a strategic location on the map. It is 
     situated near major countries--China, Russia, Iran, India--
     and neighbors the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and central 
     Asia. Its army is the world's eighth largest. Even in a post-
     cold war world, the United States should not ignore these 
     geopolitical and geostrategic considerations.
       In addition, the United States has an important interest in 
     working to prevent the outbreak of a South Asian war that 
     could spiral into a nuclear conflict. We can best promote 
     regional peace and stability if we have good relations with 
     Pakistan as well as India.
       Third, Pakistan has been an active supporter of United 
     Nations peacekeeping activities. Its 7,000 troops in Somalia 
     comprised the largest international component in that 
     difficult operation. Islamabad contributed more than one 
     thousand troops to the U.N. operation in Cambodia. It 
     currently has 3,000 soldiers in Bosnia. In fact, Pakistan has 
     provided more troops for U.N. peacekeeping efforts around the 
     world than any other country--including our own.
       Fourth, this and previous administrations have identified 
     missile and nuclear nonproliferation as a primary component 
     of U.S. security. As one of the world's few nuclear weapons-
     capable states not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
     Treaty [NPT], Pakistan is crucial to the success of our 
     global nonproliferation efforts. Similarly, it is in our 
     national interest to prevent the deployment of the ballistic 
     missiles both India and Pakistan are developing.
       The fifth reason we should not ignore Pakistan relates to 
     our desire to combat international terrorism and drug 
     trafficking. Yesterday's tragic events in Karachi have once 
     more brought home to us the grave threat posed by terrorism. 
     The value of Pakistani cooperation in the fight against 
     terrorism was vividly demonstrated last month when Prime 
     Minister Bhutto, in the face of certain domestic opposition, 
     moved swiftly to extradite to the United States the 
     individual alleged to be the mastermind behind the 1993 
     bombing of the World Trade Center.
       On the narcotics front, Pakistan is a conduit for opium and 
     heroin grown in Afghanistan, the second largest opium 
     producer in the world. If the deadly flow of Afghan drugs is 
     to be stanched, we must have Pakistani cooperation. And while 
     we have not been fully satisfied with the steps Pakistan has 
     taken in the counter-narcotics area in recent years, just 
     last week President Clinton stated that the government of 
     Pakistan has laid the foundation for significant progress 
     during the current year in the fight against illicit drugs.
       Sixth, the United States has a clear-cut interest in 
     encouraging democracy, pluralism, secularism, and a respect 
     for human rights in Pakistan. Pakistan can be a model of a 
     democratic, secular Islamic state, a partner in the effort to 
     combat the spread of religious and ideological extremism. The 
     administration believes that Pakistan has used its moderating 
     influence with other Islamic countries. We should seek to 
     buttress that influence.
       Finally, economic and trade considerations call for 
     friendly relations with Pakistan. Admittedly these U.S. 
     interests are not as important in a statistical sense as in 
     some other countries. Nonetheless, we have an interest in 
     promoting continued economic reform, deregulation, and trade 
     liberalization in Pakistan.
       U.S.-Pakistani differences: Let me hasten to add, Mr. 
     Chairman, that none of this suggests that we see eye to eye 
     with Pakistan on all important issues. We don't. We would 
     like to see Islamabad join the NPT, but it refuses to do so. 
     We wish Pakistan would cease all military support for the 
     Kashmiri insurgents. We want more vigorous law enforcement 
     against the druglords. We are concerned about the uneven 
     respect given human rights in Pakistan. We are sometimes 
     dismayed by what passes for democratic politics in Pakistan.
       But most fundamentally, we believe that Pakistan, by 
     choosing to embark upon a nuclear weapons program, has broken 
     its pledge to us in a way that directly challenges U.S. 
     national interests.
       The substantial levels of U.S. assistance provided to 
     Pakistan throughout the 1980s were part of an explicit 
     bargain: we would furnish Pakistan with financial and 
     military aid, in return for which Islamabad would forgo the 
     nuclear weapons option. Pakistan violated that bargain. The 
     subsequent deterioration in our bilateral relations flows 
     directly from that action. Until Pakistan redresses that 
     breach of faith, ties between our two countries will never 
     recapture the warmth and sense of common purpose they 
     possessed a decade ago.
       In the sense, it is neither prudent nor possible to ``let 
     bygones be bygones.'' But at the same time, insofar as it 
     advances American purposes, we should try to build on the 
     shared interests I have set forth above in order to promote 
     U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.


ii. the pressler amendment has undermined our bilateral relations with 
                                pakistan

       After a close and productive relationship throughout the 
     1980s, bilateral ties between Washington and Islamabad 
     plummeted after President Bush proved unable in 1990 to 
     certify, under the Pressler amendment, that Pakistan does not 
     possess a nuclear explosive device.
       In the four-and-a-half years since then, the Pressler 
     amendment has been by far the most important element shaping 
     the bilateral relationship. By banning aid and most military 
     sales and transfers, the amendment has sharply limited the 
     possibility of a U.S.-Pakistani collaborative relationship.
       In some respects, it is surprising that U.S.-Pakistani 
     relations have remained as good as they have since 1990. 
     Islamabad continues to attach great importance to its 
     relationship with Washington. There exists in Pakistan, 
     especially at the official level, a deep reservoir of good 
     will toward the United States.
       Nonetheless, there is no denying that the Pressler 
     amendment has had a corrosive impact on bilateral ties. 
     Moreover, so long as Pressler remains the law of the land, 
     relations are unlikely to improve. Secretary Perry's trip to 
     Pakistan in January, for all the warm sentiments it evoked, 
     did not break the fundamental impasse between Washington and 
     Islamabad.
       The F-16 Problem: During Prime Minister Bhutto's visit to 
     Washington next month, the single most important item on her 
     agenda will be the F-16s Pakistan bought, but which have not 
     been directed because of Pressler amendment restrictions. If 
     Ms. Bhutto fails to persuade the United States to release the 
     F-16s, she will at a minimum ask for the return of the $658 
     million Pakistan has paid for these warplanes.
       I am worried about the creation of excessive expectations 
     for the prime minister's visit. Pakistan is unlikely to get 
     the F-16s. More than that, serious problems stand in the
      way of returning the full $658 million. This money has 
     already been paid to the manufacturer. The U.S. government 
     does not have the ability to give the money back, even if 
     it were so inclined.
       We face the distinct possibility, therefore, that someone 
     who has been a good friend to the United States, the head of 
     government of an important country with longstanding ties to 
     the United States, is about to come to Washington for what 
     many of her countrymen may see as a diplomatic fiasco.
       And all this, ironically, because of legislation that, when 
     adopted in 1985, was designed as a Pakistan-friendly 
     amendment. The members of this subcommittee will recall that 
     when Sen. Pressler first offered his amendment, he envisioned 
     it as a means of heading off far more punitive legislation.


        iii. the pressler amendment has outlived its usefulness

       Speaking to a New York audience recently, Secretary Perry 
     called the Pressler amendment ``a blunt instrument'' that has 
     undercut our influence in Pakistan and hindered our efforts 
     to avert a nuclear arms race in South Asia.
       I concur. It has reduced our voice in a large, militarily-
     significant, moderate Islamic country. It has led to an 
     increase in Chinese, and possibly Iranian, influence in 
     Pakistan. It has hampered our ability to achieve other 
     important U.S. objectives in the region, such as 
     strengthening democracy and human rights, fighting illicit 
     narcotics, and promoting economic development.
       Even in the area of nonproliferation, the Pressler 
     amendment has become counterproductive. It has given India no 
     incentive to engage in meaningful negotiations on 
     nonproliferation, since New Delhi prefers a status quo that 
     punishes only Pakistan. It has, by reducing Pakistan's 
     conventional strength, given arguments to those in Pakistan 
     who wish to pursue the nuclear option more vigorously. It 
     even threatens to drive Pakistan into an unholy nuclear 
     partnership with Iran, Iraq, or other would-be 
     proliferations--though to date, fortunately, there is no 
     evidence that Pakistan has succumbed to this temptation.
       Let me remind this subcommittee that the Pressler amendment 
     was never intended to be triggered. Its proponents hoped that 
     by drawing a clear line, they would give Pakistan an 
     incentive to avoid crossing that line. Once those hopes were 
     dashed and the amendment was invoked, it lost its usefulness. 
     In the four-plus years since then, our once flourishing 
     partnership with Pakistan has deteriorated, while nuclear 
     tensions on the Subcontinent, and the possibility of a 
     nuclear catastrophe, remain unabated.


             iv. it's time to modify the pressler amendment
       I suppose it is no surprise that my own preferences would 
     be to repeal this legislation altogether. But, Mr. Chairman, 
     I can 
     [[Page E607]] count votes, and I understand that this does 
     not appear to be the position held by a majority of my 
     colleagues.
       As the next best thing, then, I think your Committee should 
     ask the administration to take another look at what the 
     Pressler amendment requires--to see if there are 
     opportunities for useful modification.
       This is not a radical suggestion. Indeed, both this and the 
     previous administration have already begun to do this. So has 
     the Congress. For instance:
       In each of the past three years, the foreign operations 
     bill has contained a provision allowing the U.S. government 
     to spend monies for assistance programs in Pakistan operated 
     by non-governmental organizations. Last year, for the first 
     time, USAID provided nearly $10 million for child survival 
     and female literacy programs in Pakistan.
       Under the terms of the Pressler amendment, Pakistan is not 
     permitted to receive International Military Education and 
     Training [IMET]. But in January, Secretary Perry agreed in 
     principle that Islamabad could purchase professional military 
     education [PME] courses, so long as the transfer of 
     technology was not involved.
       What I am proposing now is that the administration, in 
     close consultation with the Congress, push this process 
     forward. Certain desirable steps will require legislative 
     action, but there are also steps the administration, after 
     consultation with Congress, should take on its own. For 
     instance:
       (1) Pakistan should be made eligible for Overseas Private 
     Investment Corporation [OPIC] insurance programs. OPIC is not 
     an aid donating agency. Its purpose is to promote U.S. 
     business interests in overseas markets. By withholding OPIC 
     eligibility, we only penalize our own business community. 
     OPIC, moreover, has the added virtue of being self-financing.
       (2) The Administration should waive the storage fees 
     charged to Pakistan for holding its F-16s--fees that amount 
     to $50,000 per plane per year. We are refusing to release the 
     airplanes, as the Pressler amendment requires, and then we 
     insist that Pakistan pay us for holding them. This doesn't 
     pass the common sense test.
       (3) The Administration should move forward with Secretary 
     Perry's suggestion that Pakistan be allowed to purchase PME 
     courses. In this way, we will strengthen military-to-military 
     ties, at a time when the Pakistani military, which for much 
     of the country's history had been a threat to democracy, may 
     now be the ultimate guarantor of Pakistani democracy. (The 
     army's role during the year-long political crisis of 1993, 
     for instance, has been viewed by many observers as positive.)
       (4) We should provide visa enforcement training for 
     Pakistani customs employees. Here again, this is a common 
     sense move. Slowing down illegal immigration to the United 
     States is in our interest.
       (5) We should be offering flight safety training to 
     Pakistani air controllers. Since this would be of direct 
     value to U.S. travelers, it is difficult to see why anyone 
     should object.
       (6) I would like to see the provisions contained in recent 
     foreign operations bills maintained or even expanded, in 
     order to permit limited economic assistance for social 
     programs--population planning, for instance, or primary 
     education, or rural clinics. While any assistance made 
     available in this fashion would be modest in amount, it would 
     send the message that the United States has not turned its 
     back on a friend.
       (7) Finally, I believe that fairness and good policy 
     require that we return some of the military items that the 
     Pakistani military sent here for repair or other work prior 
     to the invocation of the Pressler amendment, and which we 
     have kept because of the Pressler legislation.
       Conclusion: None of these steps in and of themselves will 
     turn the U.S.-Pakistani relationship around. But they would 
     have a symbolic importance out of all proportion to their 
     actual significance. They would say to the Pakistanis that we 
     still value their friendship, that we care about this 
     relationship. And they would help contribute to the success 
     of Prime Minister Bhutto's visit.
       I would urge the Administration to consult closely with the 
     Congress before taking any of these steps. I am pleased to 
     note that considerable consultation already has taken place. 
     I would now encourage the Executive to come forward with 
     specific recommendations, and I would encourage my colleagues 
     in the Legislative branch to give such recommendations 
     serious consideration.
       From the standpoint of advancing U.S. policy objectives in 
     South Asia, as well as promoting our global nonproliferation 
     goals, we should accept the fact that the Pressler amendment, 
     however well intended, has outlived its usefulness. The 
     administration and the Congress should acknowledge this 
     reality, and move to place our South Asia policy on a sounder 
     footing.
       The first step should be to life some of the restrictions 
     imposed by the Pressler amendment. I urge the members of this 
     distinguished subcommittee to take the lead in this 
     enterprise.
     

                          ____________________