[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 47 (Tuesday, March 14, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3861-S3862]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          WELCOMING CROATIA'S DECISION ON U.N. TROOP PRESENCE

  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I welcome the decision by Croatian President 
Franjo Tudjman to allow an international force to remain in Croatia. As 
one who has long opposed sending United States ground troops to Bosnia 
or Croatia, the good news about President Tudjman's decision seemed to 
be tempered, however, by a report in this morning's New York Times.
  According to that article, Secretary Perry announced that United 
States troops would be sent to Croatia to help with the reconfiguration 
of U.N. forces. Upon further examination, however, it appears that this 
morning's report may have been premature, as the President has not--
repeat not--yet made a decision with regard to a commitment of United 
States troops. Moreover, the administration continues to assure me that 
if United States troops were deployed, it would not be for the purpose 
of helping with a reconfiguration or withdrawal of U.N. troops from 
Croatia.
  Nonetheless, there is a great deal of confusion surrounding this 
issue, and accordingly, the administration needs to clarify its 
intentions with regard to troop commitments. Before any decision is 
made to send U.S. troops, I fully expect the administration to follow 
through on its commitment to consult with the Congress.
  The issue of United States troops aside, President Tudjman's decision 
walks us back from the brink of disaster in Croatia and indeed, the 
entire former Yugoslavia. I can sympathize with President Tudjman's 
fear that a continuation of the status quo might have contributed to a 
permanent separation of Croatia, creating in effect, another Cyprus.
  Despite Croatia's legitimate concerns, it would have been a grave 
mistake for U.N. troops to withdraw at this time. Following President 
Tudjman's January announcement that UNPROPFOR would have to begin 
withdrawing by March 31, there were 
[[Page S3862]] strong signs that the Krajina Serbs and the Croatian 
Army were girding for war. A renewed war in Croatia would almost 
certainly have drawn in Serbia as well as the Bosnian Serbs--leading to 
a greater Balkan conflict.
  While the United Nations does not have a flawless record in Croatia, 
UNPROFOR's presence since early 1992 has prevented the reemergence of 
full-scale war. Let us hope that the reduced U.N. force, under a new 
mandate, will help maintain the peace. The reduced U.N. force also will 
have as part of its mandate the patrolling of Croatia's borders with 
Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina--which will go a long way toward 
legitimizing Croatia's international borders.
  We are not out of the woods yet, however. Neither the Krajina Serbs, 
who control 30 percent of Croatia, nor Serbian President Milosevic, who 
serves as their patron, have indicated their views of the new mandate. 
Their response will be key to determining the ultimate success of the 
U.N. mission.
  The larger question, however, is where we go from here, and how a 
reduced and newly reconfigured U.N. force fits into the big picture. It 
appears that renewed war in Croatia will be averted in the near 
future--thanks in no small part to United States efforts. But now we 
must ask whether we are going to continue simply to put out fires in 
former Yugoslavia or whether we have long-term interests to pursue 
there. I am afraid that if we do not answer this question 
affirmatively, we will find ourselves in a continual crisis mode. We 
may find ourselves meeting one deadline after another--the next of 
which is the end of the Bosnian cease-fire on April 30--without a clear 
sense of purpose. I hope this impending deadline does not divert all of 
our attention from the remaining unresolved issues in Croatia. The two 
conflicts are after all, interconnected, and we must address them 
simultaneously.
  Before President Tudjman's January announcement that the United 
Nations would have to leave, an international plan to resolve the 
status of Croatia's U.N. Protected Areas [UNPA's] was on the table. By 
all accounts, the so-called Z-4 plan satisfies many of the concerns of 
both the Croatian Government and the Krajina Serbs. It calls for the 
restoration of Croatian sovereignty to all the U.N. areas, with 
considerable autonomy for the local Serbian population.
  Now that the immediate crisis has been averted, I hope that we will 
not miss out on an opportunity to address the underlying issues in 
Croatia. Now is a good time to revisit the Z-4 plan.


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