[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 45 (Friday, March 10, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H3015-H3027]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            COMMON SENSE LEGAL STANDARDS REFORM ACT OF 1995

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 109 and rule 
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole on 
the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, H.R. 
956.

                              {time}  1032


                     in the committee of the whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of 
the bill (H.R. 956) providing for further consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 956) to establish legal standards and procedures for product 
liability litigation, and for other purposes, with Mr. Dreier in the 
chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Thursday, March 
9, 1995, amendment No. 12, printed in section 2 of House Resolution 
109, offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. Cox], had been 
disposed of.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 13 printed in House 
Report 104-72.
  Apparently the amendment is not being offered.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 14 printed in House 
Report 104-72.
                     amendment offered by mr. gekas

  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment that has been made in 
order by the rule.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Gekas: Revisions to the heading of 
     H.R. 1075:
       Add the words ``and civil'' after the words ``product 
     liability'' and before the word ``litigation''.
       Revisions to the Table of Contents:
       Page 2, redesignate title IV as title V and renumber 
     sections 401, 402, and 403 as sections 501, 502, and 503, 
     respectively, and after the words ``SEC. 303. DEFINITIONS.'' 
     add the following title:

                TITLE IV--COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE REFORM
Sec. 401. Findings.
Sec. 402. Applicability and preemption.
Sec. 403. Collateral source payments.
Sec. 404. Definitions.

       Page 30, line 1, redesignate title IV as title V and 
     redesignate sections 401, 402, and 403 as sections 501, 502, 
     and 503, respectively, and insert on line 1 the following:

                TITLE IV--COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE REFORM

     SEC. 401. FINDINGS.

       (1) The practice of not permitting the jury to weigh 
     evidence of collateral source benefits in making its award of 
     damages in health care liability actions burdens interstate 
     commerce by leading to increased costs for health care 
     consumers, decreased efficiency for the legal system, and 
     double recovery for plaintiffs which, in turn, encourages 
     fraud, abuse, and wasteful litigation; and
       (2) there is a need to restore rationality, certainty, and 
     fairness to the legal system in order to protect against 
     excessive damage awards and reduce the costs and delay of 
     litigation.

     SEC. 402. APPLICABILITY AND PREEMPTION.

       This title governs any health care liability action brought 
     in any State or Federal court and to any health care 
     liability claim brought pursuant to an alternative dispute 
     resolution process, by any claimant, based on any conduct, 
     event, occurrence, relationship or transaction involving, 
     affecting or relating to commerce, regardless of the theory 
     of liability on which the claim is based, including claims 
     for legal or equitable contribution, indemnity, or 
     subrogation. The provisions of this title shall preempt State 
     law, with respect to both procedural and substantive
      matters, only to the extent that such laws are inconsistent 
     with this title and only to the extent that such law 
     prohibits the introduction of collateral source evidence 
     or mandates reimbursement from the claimant's recovery for 
     the cost of collateral source benefits. The provisions of 
     this title shall not preempt any State law that imposes 
     greater restrictions on liability or damages than those 
     provided herein.

     SEC. 403. COLLATERAL SOURCE PAYMENTS.

       In any civil liability action subject to this title, any 
     defendant may introduce evidence of collateral source 
     benefits. If any defendant elects to introduce such evidence, 
     the claimant may introduce evidence of any amount paid or 
     contributed or reasonably likely to be paid or contributed in 
     the future by or on behalf of the claimant to secure the 
     right to such collateral source benefits. No provider of 
     collateral source benefits shall recover any amount against 
     the claimant or receive any credit against the claimant's 
     recovery or be equitably or legally subrogated to the right 
     of the claimant in any civil liability action subject to this 
     title. This section shall apply whether a civil action is 
     settled or resolved by a fact finder.

     SEC. 404. DEFINITIONS.

       (a) The term ``claimant'' means any person who asserts a 
     health care liability claim or brings a health care liability 
     action, including a person who asserts or claims a right to 
     legal or equitable contribution, indemnity, or subrogation, 
     arising out of a health care liability claim or action, and 
     any person on whose behalf such a claim is asserted or such 
     an action is brought, whether deceased, incompetent or a 
     minor.
       [[Page H3016]] (b) The term ``economic loss'' has the same 
     meaning as defined in section 202(3) of this Act.
       (c) The term ``health care liability action'' means a civil 
     action brought in a State or Federal court or pursuant to any 
     alternative dispute resolution process, against a health care 
     provider, an entity which is obligated to provide or pay for 
     health benefits under any health plan (including any person 
     or entity acting under a contract or arrangement to provide 
     or administer any health benefit), or the manufacturer, 
     distributor, supplier, marketer, promoter, or seller of a 
     medical product, in which the claimant alleges a claim based 
     upon the provision of (or the failure to provide or pay for) 
     health care services or the use of a medical product, 
     regardless of the theory of liability on which the claim is 
     based, or the number of plaintiffs, or defendants or causes 
     of action.
       (d) The term ``health care liability claim'' means a demand 
     by any person, whether or not pursuant to an alternative 
     dispute resolution process, against a health care
      provider, health care organization, or the manufacturer, 
     distributor, supplier, marketer, promoter or seller of a 
     medical product, including, but not limited to, third-
     party claims, cross claims, counter-claims or contribution 
     claims, which are based upon the provision of (or the 
     failure to provide or pay for) health care services or the 
     use of a medical product, regardless of the theory of 
     liability on which the claim is based, or the number of 
     plaintiffs, defendants, or causes of action.
       (e) The term ``health care organization'' means any person 
     or entity which is obligated to provide or pay for health 
     benefits under any health plan, including any person or 
     entity acting under a contract or arrangement to provide or 
     administer any health benefit.
       (f) The term ``health care provider'' means any person or 
     entity required by State or Federal laws or regulations to be 
     licensed, registered, or certified to provide health care 
     services, and being either so licensed, registered, or 
     certified, or exempted from such requirement by other statute 
     or regulation.
       (g) The term ``health care services'' means any service 
     provided by a health care provider, or by any individual 
     working under the supervision of a health care provider, that 
     relates to the diagnoses, prevention, or treatment of any 
     human disease or impairment, or the assessment of the health 
     of human beings.
       (h) The term ``medical product'' means a drug (as defined 
     in section 201(g)(1) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
     Act (21 U.S.C. 321(g)(1)) or a medical device as defined in 
     section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 
     U.S.C. 321(h)), including any component of raw material used 
     therein, but excluding health care services, as defined in 
     subsection (g) of this section.
       (i) The term ``noneconomic damages'' means damages for 
     physical and emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, 
     physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of 
     enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship, loss of 
     consortium (other than loss of domestic service), hedonic 
     damages, injury to reputation and all other nonpecuniary 
     losses other than punitive damages.
       (j) The term ``punitive damages'' has the same meaning as 
     defined in section 202(5) of this Act.
       (k) The term ``State'' has the same meaning as defined in 
     section 202(6) of this Act.
       request for modification to amendment offered by mr. gekas

  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment 
be modified. The modification is also at the desk.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Modification of amendment offered by Mr. Gekas: 
     (Technicals)
       On page 3, at the beginning of line 24, insert the words 
     ``As used in this title:''
       On page 4, strike lines 7 and 8 and on page 6 strike lines 
     11 through 19 and redesignate the subsections accordingly.
       On page 6, line 9, strike ``(g)'' and insert ``(f)''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania?
  Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, we would 
like to have a further inquiry as to this modification. I do not 
believe we have seen a copy of it.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. STUPAK. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, this is purely technical in nature. What 
happened was when I or my office prepared a series of amendments, six 
of them to go before the Committee on Rules, all of them were 
correlated one with the other. Some of the definitions applied. Three 
of them, specifically, applied to other portions of other bills as if 
there were a general bill.
  We are, by this modification, extracting those from the definitions 
portion of my amendment.
  Mr. STUPAK. Continuing my reservation of objection, Mr. Chairman, we 
would like to see the amendment. It has not been cleared by the 
minority. We have not seen it. We would like an opportunity to do that. 
I would ask the gentleman if he would respectfully withdraw his 
amendment until we have had a chance to take a look at it. Then we may 
be able to come back and agree to it.
  Mr. GEKAS. If the gentleman will yield further, I will not withdraw 
it. We cannot withdraw, we have to move along with the amendment. I 
would be willing to enter into a soliloquy until the gentleman has a 
chance to review it.
  Will somebody furnish the minority with what we are doing here with 
the definitions?
  Mr. Chairman, I assure the gentleman that they are purely technical, 
that I am not engaged in subterfuge or in any kind of attack on the 
minority's right to know what we are doing. This is simply technical. 
The essence of the amendment remains intact.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will inform the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
that we can proceed with the amendment as it was printed in the Record 
and as reported out by the Committee on Rules.
  Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?
  Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Chairman, there is objection to the unanimous-consent 
request.
  The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.
  The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] is recognized for 15 
minutes in support of his amendment, and a Member in opposition is 
recognized for 15 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, today we offer a corollary, as it were, to the bill 
that was approved yesterday in the House of Representatives, where we 
took a giant step in compacting the costs of medical liability when the 
House so overwhelmingly adopted the cap on noneconomic damages.
  This portion of the debate will center on collateral source. This has 
been in itself a source of great irritation to the liability community 
across the Nation, but more than that, it has been a source of 
increased costs, in many cases double dipping or double recovery, which 
was paid for in each instance and is continued to be paid for by, guess 
who, the general public who pay the premiums on their insurances.
  Let me give an example of how this works. If I as a claimant received 
some hospital services, and as a result of that I was unfortunately 
injured because of some alleged negligence that I say that the hospital 
performed or was guilty of, in that instance I have to have more doctor 
care and other hospital bills accrue.
  That total package of bills that now I have to pay, let us say it is 
$10,000, those $10,000 are paid immediately by my personal insurance. I 
have insurance to cover that. I have, maybe, disability insurance or 
some kind of health coverage that pays my doctor bills and hospital 
bills forthwith, so I now undergo, as a result of this negligence, an 
extra $10,000 worth of bills, but they are paid for by the insurance 
company which I very foresightedly was able to obtain for myself for 
just such circumstances.
  Now what happens? This is where the double dipping could enter into 
it. I now sue the hospital. I sue the hospital for, get this now, as 
part of the damages, the hospital bills and the doctor bills, that 
$10,000 package for which I have already received payment.
  In addition to that, I may sue for lost wages, other kinds of things, 
pain and suffering that go around with this new round of 
hospitalization and doctoring that I had to go through, but the point 
is that the $10,000 that I have already been paid, that has been paid 
to my doctors, forms part of this claim.
  If I recover, let us say, a $100,000 judgment, I,
   in effect, have been doubly enriched. The $10,000 costs in fees to 
the doctors and hospitals have been paid, and I recover them anew with 
the suit that I have successfully endeavored to bring to the court, and 
which has yielded a $100,000 verdict.
  [[Page H3017]] In that regard what happens is that you and I, the 
general public who purchases health insurance and pays doctors and 
hospitals, because of the way that the health care structure is 
dominant in the land, we all pay for that double recovery of this 
plaintiff. It is not fair, but more than that, it is costly. That is 
what we are about here today.
  Mr. Chairman, let us follow through with our example. The Members 
will recall that I had $10,000 worth of damages, hospital and doctor 
bills, following my little incident in the hospital. Under the bill 
that we now have in front of us, the amendment that I am offering, this 
would occur.
  The collateral source, namely, the insurance company that paid my 
doctor's bills and hospitals bills right away, that $10,000, is now, 
under the collateral source rule, in a situation where that stops. If 
the bills are paid promptly, as my example shows they were, then when I 
sue, when I sue the hospital and the doctors involved there for my 
incident in the hospital, the jury, under the amendment that I offer, 
will be able to take into consideration the fact that I have already 
been paid for my hospital damages and the doctor's bills.
  In other words, the jury will know and will be able to take into 
consideration in their deliberations the fact that some of the damages 
are already zero, because my own insurance company has already paid 
those.
  What does that do? That results in a lower cost all across the board.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GEKAS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois. Does he want to 
engage in a cacophony?
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I want to engage in a cacophony, then, right.
  As I understand the gentleman's amendment, it cuts off subrogation 
claims, is that correct?
  Mr. GEKAS. That is correct.
  Mr. HYDE. If the gentleman will yield further, therefore, therefore, 
if the gentleman has insurance, if he is farsighted enough to pay 
premiums and make an insurance contract, and he is injured, and his 
insurer, his health insurance, pays that, the benefit of his foresight 
and the premiums that he has paid for years accrue to the wrongdoer. 
The wrongdoer walks scot free because the gentleman's company cannot 
subrogate against him.
  The gentleman is paid because he had the smarts enough, the wisdom 
enough, the foresight to pay premiums, and the real winner is the 
wrongdoer, am I right?
  Mr. GEKAS. Seizing back my time, Mr. Chairman, no, the gentleman is 
not correct. Here is the way I would paint that.
  The gentleman is looking at it from the standpoint of the defendant, 
as you call him, the wrongdoer, but our whole system of justice calls 
out for the plaintiff, the claimant, to be reimbursed in full. Nowhere 
does it say that he should be double dipping, that he should have a 
double recovery.
  If the result of what we are doing here is to eliminate that double 
dipping, even if it inures to the benefit of lower premiums for medical 
liability, both for the hospitals and the doctors, then the wrongdoer 
is not benefiting from that. The general public is, because their 
doctors and their hospitals will be able to purchase insurance for a 
lesser amount, thus making the cost of hospital service less.
  Mr. HYDE. If the gentleman will continue to yield, Mr. Chairman, 
would the gentleman consider making the wrongdoer reimburse the 
plaintiff for the premiums he has paid for 22 years.
  Mr. GEKAS. There, Mr. Chairman, the legislation that we have in front 
of us, the amendment does call for the plaintiff, for the jury, to have 
the right to take into account what the plaintiff has paid for this 
coverage.
  Mr. HYDE. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for that point?
  Mr. GEKAS. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

                              {time}  1045

  Mr. GOODLATTE. It is my understanding that the problem with a 
plaintiff recovering double is largely being taken care of now with 
subrogation agreements that are taken care of outside of court.
  My concern is that we are sending separate messages for a plaintiff 
who has been responsible and for years has paid for health insurance, 
compared to one who might have the same economic circumstances, same 
type of injury, who has not paid. That plaintiff gets to go into court 
and say, here are all of my medical bills.
  Mr. GEKAS. I understand the point.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Give me a big award.
  The one who has been responsible, then the defendant gets to come in 
and say, ``Don't worry about him because his medical bills are being 
paid by someone else,'' and that contravenes public policy.
  Mr. GEKAS. Recapturing my time, I understand the gentleman's division 
of thought as to the one who has bought insurance and paid premiums and 
taken care of his family by doing so and the one who for one reason or 
another has not done so.
  Let me give the same example and see if it does not comport with the 
gentleman's concerns. I who have bought insurance and paid $3,000 for 
this coverage, you say, will be treated less handsomely because the 
verdict will be lower presumably; is that correct? Because the jury 
could take into consideration all of this and come out with a lower 
verdict.
  Well, in a similar circumstance, if there is a case on all fours 
exactly with somebody who does not have insurance, the verdict could be 
higher and you think that might be unjust enrichment, do you not?
  However, here is what can and frequently does occur, at least in 
States like yours and mine that do not have this collateral source idea 
embedded in their laws. In these cases, the one who does not have 
insurance, in suing, gets a higher award, shall we say, has to pay 
higher attorneys' fees because of that, No. 1. No. 2, there is always 
the right in the entity that provided the medical service for the 
claimant to go against the verdict to recover their costs and fees, 
anyway. That has happened time and time again. A verdict and a judgment 
is always subject to attachment by the entities that provided the 
services and ran up bills in favor of the claimant. So it still comes 
out. There might be aberrations.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. I have no dispute whatsoever that a plaintiff should 
not be able to double dip, if you will, but I think that should be 
taken outside the courtroom. This argument that somehow insurance 
should be brought into the case is exactly comparable to where the 
defendant should not want the plaintiff to come into court and tell the 
jury that the defendant has insurance to take care of the losses.
  Mr. GEKAS. Recapturing my time, I would say notwithstanding the 
gentleman's own State policy and my own State policy of not having this 
collateral source, 20 other States do have it. So in those States which 
we have reviewed, and particularly that in California where their whole 
system is based around these elements of medical liability reform, 
these objections or concerns of the gentleman's have been resolved over 
time, and in balance what has happened is that the public has 
benefited, in California where this is in place, with a stabilized 
system of medical liability and the costs that are attached thereto.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to inform the gentleman that he has 
consumed 10\1/2\ minutes of his 15 minutes.
  There has yet to be recognized a Member for the 15 minutes of time in 
opposition to the amendment.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I squander my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman squanders the balance of his time.
  Is there a Member seeking to manage opposition to the Gekas 
amendment?
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise to ask the gentleman from Virginia 
[Mr. Scott] to control the time on our side in opposition.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Scott] is recognized 
for 15 minutes to manage the opposition to the amendment.
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, we had reserved the right to object to the 
unanimous-consent request. Is that still pending?
  The CHAIRMAN. No. The request was made by the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania and there was an objection heard, so we are proceeding 
with the 
[[Page H3018]] original amendment offend by the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Scott].
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, there were no hearings on this amendment. it has been 
slapped together, we tried to fix it on the floor, and we apologize for 
the confusion on this side where we were disruptive. We were trying to 
figure out what the last-minute change in the amendment was. That is 
what happens when we do not have hearings and do not go through a 
deliberative process.
  But in this case, Mr. Chairman, I think there was an intent not to 
have a hearing because on this same issue, we did have a hearing last 
year. Let me quote from that hearing last year when we were doing 
health reform on malpractice reform. The witness who spoke in favor of 
tort reform, who supported limitations on attorney's fees, restrictions 
on joint and several liability, reductions in statute of limitations, 
modifications in punitive damages, when this issue came up, he was 
asked of the three people of interest in this case, you have got the 
plaintiff, you have got the defendant, and you have got the health 
insurance company. Which one ought to receive the benefit of the 
payment? As the chairman of the committee has suggested, the tort-
feasor really ought to be the last person to benefit from the insurance 
premiums.
  I asked the witness, ``Why should the tort-feasor, the wrongdoer, 
receive the benefit of the insurance?''
  The witness said: ``Our position is that there should not be a double 
recovery.''
  Then I asked: ``Well, who ought to receive the recovery? Why 
shouldn't Blue Cross-Blue Shield get the money back?''
  And the witness, a physician, said: ``I think they should. In other 
words, insurance company ought to be paid.''
  Then I said: ``Well, then if the plaintiff doesn't get the money, why 
shouldn't Blue Cross-Blue Shield be reimbursed?''
  He said: ``They should.''
  ``They should?''
  ``Yes.''
  Then, just to make sure: ``Don't you agree that the tort-feasor, 
which in this case could be medical malpractice, in another case it 
could be a drunk driver, ought that be the last person to receive the 
benefit?''
  Answer: ``Yes.''
  ``So if we deny the plaintiff the basis of recovery for the 
insurance, then we ought to have subrogation so Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
can get this money back?''
  And the witness said, ``I would agree with that.''
  That is the kind of answer we would have gotten if we would have had 
a hearing. This is a good soundbite amendment but it only rewards the 
wrongdoer. A hearing would have proved that as it did last year. If 
there is not going to be any double recovery and you are going to say 
no to the policyholder who paid his premium, if you are going to deny 
him the extra benefit of this foresight in paying the premium, then you 
ought to have subrogation so the health insurance company can get its 
money back. If it is going to get its money back, at least the premium 
payer can get some benefit, because presumably the premium payment 
would be lower if they had subrogation.
  This is an attack on consumers again, and I would hope that this 
amendment would be rejected. We had a hearing last year. The idea was 
rejected. I would hope that this would be rejected again.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Berman].
  Mr. BERMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Chairman, if the Gekas amendment were to deal specifically with 
the problem of double-dipping as the California law is focused on, I 
would support this amendment. I think in a tort action for negligence, 
the plantiff is entitled to be made whole. He is not entitled to be 
paid twice for the same occurrence. If his medical bills are being paid 
by one source, he is not entitled to pocket those payments again from 
another source. But the Gekas amendment goes far beyond the California 
Micra law and it goes far beyond medical malpractice. It deals with two 
issues I am very concerned with.
  It is written in a fashion that guarantees that the health care 
provider as the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Scott] pointed out will 
not get subrogated, in fact it seems to prohibit that very act, that 
the malpractice insurer rather than the health insurance provider will 
get the protection, and more importantly by doing it as a matter of 
evidentiary question, it would be somewhat equivalent to my offering an 
amendment that said in the course of a trial, it is quite appropriate 
for the plaintiff's counsel to point out that the defendant is insured, 
create the sense of the deep pocket, the big pocket so that the 
recovery will be big and if we ever get to the issue of punitive 
damages, they will zap them good because they know that there is a 
place to get that money from.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BERMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Also look at the parallel that we talked about a 
moment ago between the plaintiff who has been concerned about--say it 
is a self-employed individual, been concerned about his family, has 
bought insurance for the family for years, compared to a plaintiff who 
has never bought insurance and not because of income, comparable income 
rates, they have the same injury, that plaintiff without insurance gets 
to go into court and say, ``Look at all the medical bills I have, give 
me a big award.''
  They do not have that with this. What we are doing is we are setting 
a public policy against people having insurance.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to inform the committee that the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] has 4\1/2\ minutes remaining, 
and the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Scott] has 10 minutes remaining.
  Mr. GEKAS. If the gentleman from Virginia wants to continue drawing 
on his resources, I would have no objection since he has more resources 
at the moment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania continues to squander 
his time.
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder].
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. I thank the gentleman from Virginia for yielding me 
time.
  I think the gentleman from California made the point very well. This 
is about making the plaintiff whole, and that is what it is all about. 
If we do not do this, or making the defendant whole, not doing 
everything we can to make their life miserable.
  The plaintiff has bought this insurance, the plaintiff has paid this 
insurance, and now the very lucky defendant who may have insurance, 
let's say the defendant has insurance, the defendant's company does not 
have to pay, even though he is liable, if this were to happen. I think 
that that is really flipping the whole incentive program so that the 
plaintiff who bought the insurance, his insurance is now going to cover 
his cost. The defendant who may have liability insurance, his premiums 
are going to stay lower because he never has to get that part 
reimbursed from his. I think that is part of what the gentleman from 
Virginia was talking about even though we do not allow people to say 
whether or not the defendant had insurance.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding. In fact what we 
are saying here is this is a case where liability has already been 
established on the part of the defendant. The defendant is the 
responsible party, the one who has caused the harm and now gets to say, 
hey, don't worry about charging me for this because the plaintiff has 
insurance and they will take care of it.
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. That is right.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. How would that same defendant like to be put in the 
situation where the plaintiff said, ``I've got a harm here, it's been 
established, don't worry about how much you give me because this 
defendant has X number of millions of dollars in insurance coverage.''
  [[Page H3019]] Mrs. SCHROEDER. Reclaiming my time, the gentleman's 
point is that we are not allowed to say that the defendant has 
insurance.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. That is correct.
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. So if we are looking at the two insurance companies, 
then the question becomes, which one should have to pay, which one's 
premium should have to go up, and I think it should be the defendant 
that should have to go up, and I think the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
should be looking at collateral source rules and not this.
  I would hope that the amendment would be defeated.
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, is the gentleman from Pennsylvania going to 
waive again?
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I will take my time now if I may. Does the 
gentleman want to allow me to go on?
  Mr. SCOTT. I have several other speakers.
  Mr. GEKAS. I may make a unanimous-consent request to withdraw the 
amendment. That would help, would it not?
  Mr. SCOTT. In that case, Mr. Chairman, I would certainly defer.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
who has to this point chosen to squander the balance of his time.
  Mr. GEKAS. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to apprise the gentlewoman from Colorado that the concerns 
that she has raised here should be thrust at the capital, the State 
capital of Colorado where there is in existence a collateral source 
statute and which has been employed for many years.

                              {time}  1100

  So, we are not varying that far in this proposal from what is already 
established in her province in her home State.
  But nonetheless, I do not want to yield now because what the 
gentlewoman has done along with others, they have raised enough 
questions that perhaps we ought to look at this a little bit more 
accurately between now and the time that it takes its place in the 
debate either in the Senate or in conference.
  With that, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania?
  There was no objection.


                    Amendment Offered by Mr. Schumer

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 15.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is the gentleman the designee of the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Schumer]?
  Mr. CONYERS. Yes, I am, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 15 printed 
in House Report 104-72.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer the amendment No. 15.


                             Point of Order

  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his point of order.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, in looking at the rule, I do not see where a 
designee is allowed, for it says it may be offered only by a Member 
designated in the report, and that is for the gentleman from New York 
[Mr. Schumer].
  I am not going to object. There he is. I was not going to object, but 
I wanted to know if this was cleared with the gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
Bryant].
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would say in response to the point of order 
of the distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary that 
the report clearly states the amendment is to be offered by 
Representative Schumer of New York or a designee.
  Mr. HYDE. I am sorry; I did not see it in the rule.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is in the report.
  Mr. HYDE. I was not going to object. I just wanted to make sure it is 
cleared with the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant].
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 15 printed 
in House Report 104-72.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Schumer: Page 31, line 5, insert 
     before the period the following: ``AND SUNSET'', in line 6, 
     insert ``(a) Effective Date.--'' at the beginning of the 
     line, and after line 8 insert the following:
       (b) Sunset.--Titles I, II, and III shall expire 5 years 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act unless the 
     Secretary of Commerce has certified to the Congress not less 
     than 90 days before the expiration of such years--
       (1) that insurance rates covering liabilities affected by 
     such titles have declined by not less than 10 percent after 
     taking into account changes in the Consumer Price Index, or
       (2) that insurance rates have not declined by at least 10 
     percent because of extraordinary circumstances, has specified 
     such extraordinary circumstances, and has explained their 
     impact on such insurance rates.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Schumer] and a Member opposed will each be recognized for 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Schumer].
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 4 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, we are now at the conclusion of the debate on the tort 
reform proposal, and while I think much has been ballyhooed about the 
contract, I would agree that this proposal as it emerges, at least in 
the area of law that we are dealing with, is indeed revolutionary. In 
fact, the bill goes quite a bit further than was ever imagined, 
particularly in terms of the two Cox amendments.
  We are eliminating joint and several liability in any tort lawsuit 
anywhere in America. I supported that amendment. I thought it was a 
wise choice.
  We are also putting a cap of $250,000 on all damages, all noneconomic 
damages in the health care area. That is a major, major change, plus 
all of the other changes proposed in the product liability area, plus 
the effect of the cap on punitive damages throughout lawsuits 
everywhere. Indeed, my colleagues, the bill is revolutionary.
  I would say this: We do not know if it is going to work. And in fact, 
there are many of us who think the bill goes too far. There are some I 
guess on the far right, mainly on that side of the aisle, who feel that 
the bill is very good because it is revolutionary. There are some, 
probably mainly on this side of the aisle, on the far left side, who 
say the bill is horrible and we should not change very much at all. But 
there are many of us in the middle who feel the system is out of 
control, but who are terribly troubled, terribly troubled by the fact 
that we are making such radical changes without having any idea of what 
their effect will be.
  This amendment deals with those concerns and anxieties. For those of 
us on both sides of the aisle who find ourselves in the middle, we want 
real change but we may think that this bill goes too far or we are 
worried that it does.
  It simply says that if liability insurance rates do not go down 10 
percent 5 years after these laws take effect, this bill takes effect, 
then the proposal should sunset.
  What is the reason we are doing all of these changes? I certainly 
believe the proponents of the bill are sincere, they do not want to 
hurt the little guy, they do not want to hurt defendants, plaintiffs. 
They certainly think it will make salutary changes for America. But I 
also know that one of the main reasons we are doing this is because we 
feel insurance rates are too high. We have heard that over and over and 
over again.
  Perhaps the nostrums we are applying will work. If they do, liability 
insurance should decline at least 10 percent, and I have counted in 
inflation, this is 10 percent after accounting for inflation, and then 
we will say we have done a good thing. Those who voted yes will be 
proud; those who voted no will admit they made a mistake. But if it 
does not work, why take away all of the various rights of the little 
people who need to sue if it is not going to bring insurance rates down 
at all? And so we propose this sunset.
  This is a moderate amendment. It is saying, OK, we are going to make 
very radical changes, but let us have a little bit of a break on them 
just in case they do not work. The sunset has been proposed on many 
pieces of legislation. In fact, some of them I did not agree with, but 
many I did, but when you do something this breathtaking and this 
radical, and potentially this dangerous, at 
[[Page H3020]] the very least there ought to be a sunset in case the 
proposal does not work.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does the chairman of the committee seek to manage the 
opposition to the Schumer amendment?
  Mr. HYDE. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] is recognized 
for 10 minutes.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I strongly oppose this amendment. It is 
unnecessary. Focusing on the pricing practices of insurers is 
irrelevant in many places because most large businesses self-insure and 
do not purchase liability insurance. This amendment places the future 
of a fair civil justice system in the hands of Federal Government 
bureaucrats. Americans overwhelmingly support the reforms in this bill 
and it is ludicrous to give the Department of Commerce the power to 
determine whether Americans will continue to benefit by these reforms.
  This amendment sunsets this legislation 5 years after the date of 
enactment unless the Secretary of Commerce certifies that insurance 
rates either have declined at least 10 percent or have not declined 
that much because of extraordinary circumstances.
  This sunset is ill advised because factors other than this 
legislation contribute significantly to determining rates charged by 
insurance companies and the beneficial effects of this legislation are 
not limited to anticipated savings in insurance-related costs.
  As the Committee on the Judiciary noted in its report, ``Our 
excessive reliance today on a patchwork
 of conflicting State statutes and common law relating to allegations 
of product defects excessively burdens interstate commerce, discourages 
innovations, exacerbates liability insurance costs, compromises 
American competitiveness and forces Americans to pay higher prices.''

  We had more than the cost of insurance in mind when we crafted this 
legislation. The limitation on joint and several liability, for 
example, recognizes the injustice of requiring minimally responsible 
defendants to pay for all noneconomic damages. We propose punitive 
damage reform, an important title of this bill, not only to ameliorate 
adverse effects on interstate and foreign commerce but also to protect 
due process rights. The unfairness of ignoring extent of fault or 
responsibility in assessing liability for noneconomic damages and the 
unfairness of virtually unlimited punitive damage awards in a range of 
cases that extend beyond the product liability context necessitated 
congressional action.
  The 10-percent formula relating to insurance rates is flawed. Our 
objective of reducing insurance rates will be undermined rather than 
advanced by this amendment. The sunset creates uncertainty for 
insurance companies. They will not know whether the reforms 
incorporated in this legislation will remain in effect 5 years hence, 
and this uncertainty will affect risk calculations leading to higher 
rates.
  I am confident this legislation, without a sunset, will have a 
positive effect on insurance rates. I cannot predict how other 
developments extraneous to this legislation, such as accident patterns 
and medical care costs, may impact on the risks the insurance company 
faces. The business of insurance, let us remember, is subject generally 
to State rather than Federal regulation and the capacity of the Federal 
Government to achieve rate reductions is limited.
  If insurance rates do not decline by at least the arbitrary 10-
percent figure, the explanation may have nothing to do with this 
legislation. The amendment gives the Secretary of Commerce excessive 
power to scuttle this legislation because only he or she can certify to 
the extraordinary circumstances to justify a deviation from the 10-
percent requirement.
  Congress does not need a sunset to revisit the issues addressed in 
this legislation. We can do that in any and every session that is 
forthcoming. In response to experiences in the years ahead, we are free 
to modify and refine the new law. Perhaps stronger medicine will be 
needed to deter abuses in the litigation process. Perhaps unforeseen 
developments will justify amending our work product. But a sunset 
provision that essentially says we may have to return to square one at 
the say so, the fiat of whoever is the Secretary of Commerce, is not a 
sensible way to legislate.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio], chairman of the Democratic 
caucus.
  Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend from New York for yielding 
time to me. I must admit this has been a very difficult piece of 
legislation for me. I have been associated with Members who wish to see 
a products liability bill enacted, I have been associated with those 
who want to move on the question of medical malpractice, and I have 
made some votes, uncomfortable votes for me because I think the 
amendments were flawed in their drafting and I indicated that earlier 
in the deliberation on this bill.
  But I must rise in support of the Schumer sunset provisions and in 
opposition to the enactment of this bill because I think it frankly is 
a travesty the way it has been put together here at the last minute on 
the floor, the way it combines a number of disparate elements in the 
tort reform area. I will be the first to admit these issues should have 
been deliberated in prior Congresses but the fact they have not does 
not in my view excuse the approach that has been taken in the 
amalgamation of all of these various provisions in this bill at this 
time.
  Tort reform is a subject this Congress must deal with. It has not 
dealt with it effectively in this bill, and the bill should be opposed.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] has 5 minutes 
remaining, and the gentleman from New York [Mr. Schumer] has 5 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Oxley].
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. When 
we first set out on this legislation we had several goals in mind, and 
I would remind the Members that it was to improve the competitiveness 
of American business, to increase economic growth, create more jobs, 
reduce overall liability costs of which insurance rates are only one 
portion of that equation.
  The gentleman from New York [Mr. Schumer] who offers the amendment it 
seems to me really misses the point behind the efforts that we are 
making with this legislation.
  The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey], who I assume will 
speak later, had a similar approach in the Committee on Commerce, which 
was rejected at that point and I think the full House should reject the 
Schumer amendment as well.
  There are a lot of factors. The insurance rates are affected by a 
number of factors, medical costs, crime rates, accident patterns, court 
interpretation of legal reforms; punitive damages are not insurable in 
most jurisdictions, meaning that one of the core provisions of the 
legislation would not be relevant to insurance rates in most of the 
States. Insurer losses on which premiums are in part based will 
probably not decrease for several years because of all of the 
litigation in the pipeline.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, this amendment places unprecedented power in 
the hands of the Secretary of Commerce, essentially giving one 
individual life or death power over this legislation and the good that 
it is trying to accomplish.
                              {time}  1115

  So, Mr. Chairman, for all those reasons, and for the fact that we 
have a number of ambiguous circumstances involved in the uncertainties, 
I would ask that the Schumer amendment be defeated.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey].
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, the Schumer amendment is really the did-it-
really-work amendment. Are all the promises which are being made by the 
proponents of this reform going to 
[[Page H3021]] come to pass? In other words, consumers out there are 
being told that they will see lower doctor bills, that they will see 
lower costs for products because insurance rates are going to go down?
  Now I remember back in 1988 in the Committee on Commerce when we had 
hearings. In that particular hearing we actually had insurance 
executives, and I asked them, ``Will insurance rates go down?''
  They said, ``No, no, no.''
  Well, if that is the ostensible guise for all of this, let us have a 
determination 5 years later whether or not the promise, like 
Reaganomics, of cutting taxes and actually having more revenues is 
going to work here in insurance product liability as well, and if it 
cannot withstand the crucible of scrutiny 5 years from today, and 
insurance companies are retaining windfall profits as----
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. 
Markey] has expired.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from New York [Mr. LaFalce], the ranking Democrat on the 
Committee on Small Business.
  Mr. LaFALCE. Mr. Chairman, many years ago I had dozens of hearings on 
the issue of product liability and as long ago as 1978 introduced a 
uniform product liability law. It was opposed by the Republicans in the 
Chamber of Commerce at that time because they argued it ought not to be 
a Federal matter, this was a prerogative of the States.
  Mr. Chairman, I will not point out the things that are wrong with the 
bill that we have today; they are too countless, it is too egregious. 
There are a lot of things that is wrong with what is not being done, 
too. We are not dealing with the problems of the insurance industry, 
and, if we need a law for anything, we need it for the regulation and 
practices of the insurance industry.
  Second, we have Federal regulation now over remedies for product 
liability cases, but the most fundamental thing, the basic cause of 
action for a product defect, is left unattended. So we will have 50 
separate causes of actions, but we will have one Federal law with 
respect to limitation of remedies.
  Last, and there are so many other things I could point out, but 10 
percent of the cases----
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York [Mr. LaFalce] 
has expired.
                         Parliamentary Inquiry

  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.
  Mr. SCHUMER. I would inquire of the Chair if today is the day when 
the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] has the right to close, or is it 
the day when we have the right to close?
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I direct that parliamentary inquiry as well. 
I was told that I have the right to close.
  The CHAIRMAN. The chairman of the committee controlling time in 
opposition has the right to close.
  Mr. SCHUMER. I appreciate the determination of this very important 
rule.
  The CHAIRMAN. That is the way it works.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman, I yield my remaining time to the 
distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant], a member of the 
committee.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant] is recognized for 
3 minutes.
  Mr. BRYANT of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding 
this time to me and for the opportunity to close on this, on our side 
of the amendment.
  We are today taking steps to eliminate 200 years of common law in 
this country. We are taking an enormous amount of power from the 
States, something that was thought to be a prohibitive tenet of the 
Republican philosophy that we would never do, and we are raising a 
barrier to the middle class of this country that will prevent them from 
using the courthouse to redress grievances against the most powerful 
economic interests in our country. The question has to be why. Why are 
we doing it? We have asked over, and over, and over in this debate, and 
we asked over, and over, and over in committee, ``Do you have any 
empirical data to show us that indicates that there is an explosion of 
lawsuits or there is an explosion in the size of verdicts? Any at 
all?'' We have had some papers waved at us, but the answers have always 
been no every time we ask it of our witnesses, every time we ask it of 
you.
  The fact of the matter is that there is no explosions with regard to 
litigation. We do data; it is not data we put together, but data that 
was available to my colleagues as well from the National Center for 
State Courts which indicates that product liability filings are only 
thirty-six one-hundredths of a percentage of the total civil caseload, 
that only 10 percent of the people who were ever injured from torts 
ever used the tort system in the first place. As a matter of fact, the 
number of cases in State courts and Federal courts are going down, and 
so I ask, Why are you doing this?
  They will come back to us and say, Well, we think it's going to bring 
down insurance rates, and so the gentleman from New York [Mr. Schumer] 
comes out with an amendment here that says:
  ``OK. Since we don't know whether what you're promising will work or 
not, let's put something in the bill that says, `In 5 years, if 
insurance rates with regard to the things that are affected by this 
bill have not come down by 10 percent, this bill will sunset,' and then 
you stand up on the floor this morning and say, `Well, we are not sure 
insurance rates really will come down.'''
  Well, Mr. Chairman, then what is the purpose of this bill? The 
bottom-line purpose is this:
  ``You want to do a favor for some wealthy, powerful
   people in this country who are your social peers, who are the people 
that you live with, the folks that you think about, the people whose 
opinions you adopt regardless of its impact on the American people, on 
the average middle class people, and in spite of the lack of any 
available data to support the direction you're going.''

  I say to my colleagues, Mr. Schumer has a commonsense amendment. If 
what you say is true, even if you have no evidence, then insurance 
rates will surely over 5 years come down 10 percent, and, if they do, 
the bill stays on the books. If they don't, it won't.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant] has 
expired.
  Mr. BRYANT of Texas. Vote for the Schumer amendment, and vote against 
this outrage against the American people.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am consoled that the class struggle has not 
expired with the demise of the former Soviet Union. We still put class 
against class here. The inability to understand that the 
nonavailability of medical help, and vaccines and drugs because of the 
unpredictability of product liability has not permeated our opponents, 
and I guess there is no way that it ever will.
  But this amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Schumer] guts the bill because the purpose of the bill is to have 
common standards wherever possible on those important items that affect 
our economy and predictability. A 5-year sunset means that in 5 years 
nobody knows what is going to happen. Insurance companies would not be 
able to set rates with any confidence or predictability, and who is 
going to make the determination? The Secretary of Commerce.
  So, Mr. Chairman, I hope and pray that this amendment is defeated 
handily, but in closing, and this will be the last vote on this very 
important bill, I would like to bring to the Members' attention a 
letter that the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] and I got dated 
March 6 from the National Governors Association, and I will just read a 
couple of little paragraphs:

       We're writing to convey the support of the Nation's 
     Governors for legislation to establish a uniform product 
     liability code. Since 1986 the association has been on record 
     in support of a uniform, consistent, and predictable approach 
     to product liability. While Governors do not usually support 
     one-size-fits-all legislation, we believe in this case 
     uniform product liability standards can only be achieved by 
     Federal action. We urge you to act swiftly to enact this 
     legislation.
  [[Page H3022]] I thank the Chair for the courtesy and the efficiency 
with which he has conducted these four sessions, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Schumer].
  The question was taken; and the chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 175, 
noes 249, not voting 10, as follows:
                             [Roll No. 227]

                               AYES--175

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Baesler
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bishop
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant (TX)
     Bunn
     Cardin
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Danner
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Durbin
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gibbons
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hayes
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Holden
     Hoyer
     Jackson-Lee
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Johnston
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Klink
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Laughlin
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lincoln
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Poshard
     Rahall
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Rivers
     Rose
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Taylor (MS)
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Traficant
     Tucker
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                               NOES--249

     Allard
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clinger
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Cooley
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cunningham
     Davis
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     Martini
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Mineta
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Moorhead
     Morella
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thornton
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Upton
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Williams
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Bevill
     Cubin
     Gephardt
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Kanjorski
     McIntosh
     Rangel
     Riggs
     Towns

                              {time}  1143

  The Clerk announced the following pairs:
  On this vote:

       Mr. Kanjorski for, with Mr. McIntosh against.
       Mr. Jefferson for, with Mrs. Cubin against.

  Mr. SAWYER changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. BAESLER changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as amended.
  The amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed 
to.
  Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the bill currently 
before the House, H.R. 956.
  Last night the Republican majority shoved through an amendment that 
was poorly drafted, superficially considered, and will hurt a lot of 
people. The Cox amendment imposed a cap of $250,000 on noneconomic 
damages in all civil lawsuits.
  What this amendment does is limit the amount that can be recovered 
against insurance companies that refuse to pay health care claims that 
they legitimately owe.
  I used to be an insurance commissioner. I used to help people who 
paid hard dollars for insurance so they would be protected against 
doctor and hospital bills only to find their claims denied and medical 
bill collectors at their door. The amendment adopted last night now 
protects those insurance companies who fail to pay what they owe.
  I cannot understand how the majority Members of this House can turn 
their back on people in their districts that will have to deal with 
bill collectors, shattered credit standing, repossessed automobiles and 
even foreclosed houses because their insurance companies fail to pay 
the claim they owe.
  They call this bill common sense legal reform. I doubt there is a 
single American who has had to fight their insurance company to get a 
claim paid who would think this bill makes any sense at all.
  As amended I cannot in good conscience vote for this bill.
  Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, I reluctantly express my 
opposition to the passage of H.R. 956. There is no doubt that some 
reforms of the American civil justice system are needed, despite the 
fact that this area of the law has historically been largely the 
province of the individual States. It is true that the courts are too 
often slow and overburdened, and that jury awards sometimes seem 
inconsistent and instances of apparent excessive awards are well known. 
I am particularly concerned over problems involving medical malpractice 
claims and I have supported State and Federal legislative initiatives 
in that area.
  Nonetheless, this bill is not well thought through and too little 
serious and reasoned deliberation has gone into its formulation. It 
makes little sense to me that a corporate CEO might be able to recover 
$1 million or more punitive damages under this bill but a typical 
working family in my State would have punitive damages capped at 
$250,000. It doesn't make sense to me that the punitive damage limit is 
the same for small business as it is for Fortune 500 corporations, much 
to the advantage of the largest corporations. I am not pleased that 
over 60 proposed amendments were not made in order for debate on the 
House floor and an inadequate amount of time is allowed for debate even 
for those amendments which were made in order. I am not pleased that 
the House was not permitted to debate or vote on an amendment which 
would have prevented Federal preemption of State laws to punish sexual 
predators and drunk drivers.
  This legislation preempts State laws, not just in the product 
liability arena, but relative to all civil litigation, and increases 
the likelihood that injured individuals will not be able to collect 
compensation for their legitimate injuries 
[[Page H3023]] from wrongdoers. It is little wonder that this specific 
bill is opposed by, among others, the Consumer Federation of America, 
Consumers Union, the National Conference of State Legislators, YWCA, 
National Women's Health Network, and the American Association of 
Retired Persons as well as the American Bar Association.
  Mr. POSHARD. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Common 
Sense Legal Standards Reform Act, because I believe this bill moves us 
in the right direction of reforming our Nation's liability system. 
However, I also believe this bill is overreaching in its attempts to 
reform the system, and that is why I supported several amendments that 
I believe would have broadened an individual's opportunity to use the 
courts to seek due compensation for an injury.
  While I understand and agree that injured parties are entitled to 
fair and just compensation, we all recognize the fact that many people 
have taken advantage of our health care providers along the way. The 
reality is the only person that pays for the outrageous settlements our 
health care providers are often forced to pay is the patient.
  I believe the most serious harm caused by our current liability 
system is reduced access to health care. Increasing premiums and the 
threat of liability have caused physicians to abandon practices or to 
stop providing certain services in various areas of the country, 
especially in rural America. In my State of Illinois, 68 percent of all 
family doctors significantly decreased or eliminated obstetrics over a 
5-year period, because of the danger of being sued.
  Many of the obstetrical patients in my district travel over our 
State's eastern border to Indiana where caps on noneconomic damages 
made the profession of obstetrics more palatable. Because these threats 
of lawsuits exist, the doctors in my district and across the Nation 
have been forced to purchase exorbitant amounts of malpractice 
insurance to protect themselves from the threat of multimillion dollar 
lawsuits. No longer can many of our rural doctors and hospitals afford 
this costly insurance or the threat of expensive and time-consuming 
lawsuits.
  Many rural hospitals are on the verge of closing, because of their 
inability to pay for malpractice insurance or million dollar 
settlements. The doctors, nurses, and hospitals of rural America are 
only trying to provide aid and comfort to our injured and sick. It is 
unfair to these health care officials that we allow a legal system to 
exist that simply sits and waits for them to make a mistake. Because of 
the constant fear of being sued, the practice of defensive medicine is 
costing Americans billions of dollars each year and driving our rural 
hospitals and medical centers to the brink of financial disaster.
  Understand, I support compensating people injured by an individual or 
corporation's mistake, but I do not believe it is just to seek a high-
priced settlement at the expense of a doctor or hospital that serves 
communities that would otherwise not have access to health care 
services. It is clear that the impacts of high malpractice premiums and 
lawsuit threats have created a situation that greatly disadvantages 
rural Illinois families.
  Let me say again, I support this bill today, because I believe it is 
a step in the right direction, especially in its efforts to reform 
malpractice suits. However, unless the scope of this bill is further 
limited in the Senate or during conference committee, I will not be 
able to support the bill in its final form when it comes before the 
House of Representatives. In particular, the cap being placed on 
noneconomic losses, an individual's pain and suffering, must be raised 
to at least $500,000 if this bill is to receive my support in the 
future.
  I support sending this bill to the Senate, because I believe it is a 
good and reasonable foundation on which to continue building. However, 
I could not in god conscience send to the President a bill that I 
believe would not be fair to those looking to the courts for due 
compensation.
  Just yesterday, the Governor of Illinois signed into law a tort 
reform measure which may help mitigate the serious problems plaguing 
our liability system. Nonetheless, Federal action on the issue of 
malpractice reform could significantly improve the opportunity for 
rural Americans to have access to quality and affordable health care, 
and I will do all in my power to foster legislation that will bring 
about liability reforms which are fair, balanced and effective.
  Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. Chairman, America is in the midst of a litigation 
explosion. Not long ago a woman in New York was using a knife to 
separate a package of frozen hors d'oeuvres she bought in the 
supermarket. The knife slipped and she cut her hand. She got a lawyer 
and sued. She sued the supermarket; she sued the manufacturer; and she 
sued the packager. We are a litigious society--and we're all paying for 
it.
  In 1991, nearly 19 million new civil suits were filed in our Nation's 
courts. These lawsuits exact a huge price--a price that is ultimately 
paid not by big business but by America's consumers. In fact, recent 
estimates put the price tag at $300 billion annually. That's $1,200 for 
every man, woman and child in America.
  Civil litigation attorneys present themselves as champions of the 
underdog, yet its estimated that only one-third of each dollar awarded 
in liability cases gets into the hands of the injured party. The great 
bulk of jury awards goes instead to pay court costs and the lawyers 
themselves.
  The cost to consumers is high. As much as $500 may be added to the 
cost of your new car because of litigation costs passed on by the 
manufacturer. Nearly $3,000 of the cost of an $18,000 pacemaker goes to 
the tort tax. As much as $500 of the cost of a 3-day maternity stay is 
due to liability costs.
  And it's not just the costs to America's consumers: This litigious 
feeding frenzy is costing the United States in terms of 
competitiveness. In a global economy, U.S. businesses have to be able 
to provide better value for the dollar than their competitors in, say, 
Japan and Europe. But it's not a level playing field when our products 
carry a legal surcharge.
  The Japanese have 30 times fewer lawsuits than we do. We have 70,000 
product liability lawsuits in the United States every year. In Great 
Britain, they have 200. The greatest loss, however, may not be a 
question of economics. It can't be measured in dollars and cents. It 
comes from the products--often medically necessary, life-saving 
products--that are kept off the market because of the high costs 
imposed by a civil litigation system run amok.
  I believe it's time to stop the litigation explosion. The House took 
the first step today with the passage of the Contract With America's 
Common Sense Legal Reform Act. It makes a number of common sense 
changes, including limiting punitive damage awards to a reasonable 
relationship to the actual or compensatory damages incurred; punitive 
damages would be either three times the actual damages or $250,000, 
whichever is greater. It would help to limit the huge profits tort 
lawyers now rake in. This will make a plaintiff's lawyer and a 
potential litigant think carefully before filing a suit.
  To discourage frivolous lawsuits, it would provide--as almost all 
other industrialized nations do--that the loser in civil cases pays 
costs. This will make a potential litigant think carefully before 
filing a suit. Right now, plaintiffs may sue on unsubstantiated 
grounds, because they have nothing to lose even if the jury throws the 
case out of court. The accused, however, may be saddled with tens of 
thousands in court costs, despite complete and utter innocence.
  I believe common sense and fairness have prevailed by Congress' 
passage of these legal system reforms.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, although I shall support the amendment to 
H.R. 1075, offered by Mr. Cox, which will add a noneconomic cap in 
medical malpractice awards, I do so with major reservations. The 
$250,000 cap is too low. My State of Maryland which originally enacted 
a $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages has increased that cap to 
$500,000. Such an amount is far more reasonable.
  I also resent the fact that the amendment is being considered without 
any opportunity for me to submit an amendment to the Cox amendment, No. 
12, to raise the cap or for me to submit a separate amendment regarding 
this subject.
  My vote in favor of the Cox amendment should be interpreted only to 
support the inclusion of a cap. I trust the cap will be adequately 
adjusted by the Senate or in conference.
  Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to clarify an important issue 
regarding title III of H.R. 956. This title incorporates the provisions 
of H.R. 753, the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act, a bill to ensure 
that adequate supplies of biomaterials are available to medical device 
manufacturers. During the Commerce Committee's markup of H.R. 917, I 
offered an amendment to protect these vital supplies, the text of which 
now appears, with some modifications, in H.R. 965.
  It has come to my attention, however, that in the period of time 
between offering my amendment and today, language has been added to 
deal with the difficult issue of biomaterials suppliers who are alleged 
to have wrongfully withheld or misrepresented safety information, or 
who know of fraudulent use of their materials. I agree, of course, that 
conduct of this type, if it occurs, should not go unpunished. However, 
I have concerns regarding the specific language added to H.R. 965 to 
address this issue.
  I have heard from a number of biomaterials suppliers in recent days 
that the new language will not arrest the flight of suppliers from the 
implantable device market. May I remind my colleagues that we came to 
this debate to achieve a singular objective: To stem the exodus of 
biomaterials suppliers from the 
[[Page H3024]] implantable device market. We must reduce the incidence 
of unnecessary and costly litigation to prevent further flight by these 
suppliers. If we do not act, American patients will not have access to 
life-saving, life-enhancing implantable devices, including pace makers, 
heart valves, artificial blood vessels, hydrocephalic shunts, hip and 
knee joints, and even simple sutures for common surgeries.
  Mr. Chairman, in the final analysis, this debate is about more than 
legal theory and procedure. It is about ensuring that those devices 
which can save and enhance a person's life will be available when they 
need them. It is imperative that we fix this problem.
  In closing, I believe that the issues I have raised need to be 
discussed further. With the help of my colleagues, I am sure we can 
draft language that addresses these concerns.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, title III of H.R. 1075 essentially 
incorporates the provisions of H.R. 753, the Biomaterials Access 
Assurance Act, which I introduced to help assure adequate supplies of 
biomaterials for medical devices.
  Language has been added in H.R. 1075 to deal with the difficult issue 
of biomaterials suppliers who are alleged to have wrongfully withheld 
or misrepresented safety information or who know of fraudulent use of 
their materials. I believe strongly that conduct of this type should 
not go unpunished.
  Under current law, a medical device manufacturer can bring an action 
in such circumstances against the biomaterials supplier, and may 
recover from the supplier any damages that the manufacturer had to pay 
as a result of a lawsuit by an individual who has been injured. This is 
unchanged by title III of H.R. 1075. This is as it should be.
  The new language in title III, however, prevents a motion for 
dismissal by a biomaterials supplier if the injured individual claims 
misrepresentation or fraud. This will keep the deep pockets supplier in 
the case and subject to the same kind of costly litigation that now 
threatens to dry up the supply of biomedical materials. So the purpose 
of title III, to ensure the continuing availability of life-saving and 
life-enhancing medical devices made from these materials, will be 
thwarted. Again, let me emphasize that under existing law the 
manufacturer will have recourse against the errant supplier. The 
wrongdoer will have to pay for its action. Wrongful conduct will not be 
immunized.
  As this legislation moves forward, I believe this situation should be 
kept in mind with a view toward finding an appropriate solution.
  Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today with words of support 
for H.R. 956, the Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act, 
as well as H.R. 10, the entire package of commonsense legal reforms 
which the House of Representatives has passed this week.
  I strongly support the efforts of this House to bring much needed 
reforms to our tort liability system. This legislation, if enacted, 
will benefit the State of New Jersey, its businesses, and its 
consumers.
  I have heard from hundreds of constituents and businesses in the 11th 
District of New Jersey regarding the need for limitations on frivolous 
lawsuits. These constituents are all too familiar with the rising costs 
of liability insurance.
  I have also heard from constituents whose businesses, increasingly in 
the past several years, have been the targets of frivolous lawsuits 
which were eventually found meritless. These decisions came only after 
having spent obscene amounts of time and money defending themselves. 
These constituents are all too familiar with the phenomenon of costly 
settlements having to be made to settle even costlier lawsuits.
  The reality is that even a single frivolous lawsuit is sometimes 
enough to force a small business out of business. Unfortunately, the 
costs associated with this reality are then passed on to clients and 
consumers.
  Everyone agrees that citizens should have the right to sue and 
collect reasonable compensation if they are wrongfully injured. These 
bills will continue to protect fully, that right.
  I am pleased to support passage of this well-balanced legislation.
  Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to affirm my support for 
product liability reform and commonsense legal reforms, but it is with 
great regret that I am not able to vote for final passage of this 
measure.
  First, let me be clear that I strongly believe that we need to 
replace the current costly patchwork of State laws on product liability 
with a uniform standard which is fair to consumers, manufacturers, and 
small businesses. Although over 70 percent of products routinely travel 
across State lines, under our current laws, the outcome of product 
liability lawsuits more often depend on geography than the merits of 
the cases. this confusion of 50 separate State laws stifles business 
innovation and development. As a result of skyrocketing liability 
costs, 39 percent of American manufacturers have decided not to 
introduce new products and 25 percent have discontinued new product 
research. For consumers, disparate liability laws means that the costs 
for litigation and skyrocketing insurance rates are passed on to them 
through higher prices for products.
  Furthermore, I support restoring fairness to liability litigation by 
applying a fair share principle for determining noneconomic damage 
awards, a step that the majority of States have already taken. This 
provision would ensure that victims are fairly compensated, but put an 
end to the practice of lawyers suing any deep pocket who is even 
remotely connected to the case.
  However, I must express my great disappointment and frustration with 
the way this legislation was brought to the floor. While the title of 
this legislation is ostensibly the Common Sense Legal Reform Act, I 
cannot understand why the authors of this bill did not have the common 
sense to give more careful and deliberate consideration to these 
complicated issues. This legislation was rushed through the committee 
process, and as a result, I do not believe this legislation in any way 
represents the best effort this body can make to produce a uniform 
liability law. This flawed measure may be keeping the Contract With 
America on its timetable, but I do not believe it is worth the price of 
a bad bill.
  For example, I supported the Cox amendment addressing the important 
issue of medical malpractice because I have been a proponent of similar 
provisions contained in California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform 
Act [MICRA]. MICRA was adopted to respond to the crisis in the 
availability and affordability of professional liability coverage for 
health professionals
 throughout the State in a way that preserved a high level of quality 
assurance for patients. MICRA compensates injured patients without 
limit for all economic losses, but limits noneconomic losses to no more 
than $250,000.

  However, I wish to make it clear that I believe this amendment is a 
blunt instrument in which to bring MICRA type malpractice reform into 
the broader national debate about liability reform. This amendment 
would extend a cap on noneconomic damages to include medical devices as 
well as health insurance, provisions that are not part of my State's 
current law. I understand that this amendment was hastily drafted and 
went under a number of major revisions within less than 24 hours before 
it was debated. While I am troubled that this amendment contained 
provisions that were not thoroughly examined or debated, I supported 
the amendment because I believe that it was an important step to 
highlight the needs of malpractice reforms. With more time and 
consideration, this issue could have been addressed much more 
effectively.
  Moreover, if the Rules Committee would have allowed for a fair and 
reasonable amendment process, I could have likely supported this bill. 
Regrettably, the Rules Committee shut out the most reasonable 
amendments that could have made this legislation a sound and workable 
solution to our product liability problems.
  For example, I believe that placing a cap on punitive damages in 
product liability cases could relieve some the needless uncertainty 
that exists today about the lottery of current litigation, a system 
which leads companies to agree to large settlements even in cases with 
extremely tenuous liability. However, the cap on punitive damages in 
this bill--$250,000 or three times the amount of monetary awards, which 
ever is greater--was just too low to serve as a true incentive to 
manufacturers to ensure their products are safe. Furthermore, this cap 
applied to all civil cases, not just product liability cases. The cap 
on punitive damages was a key issue in this debate, and a number of 
amendments were submitted to the Rules Committee which would have given 
us the opportunity to keep caps on punitive damages in the bill, but 
raise them to a more reasonable level or more specifically target the 
caps to product liability cases. The amendments we were allowed to 
consider on the floor did not adequately address these critical issues.
  Thus, without the opportunity to vote on a better liability reform 
bill, I must oppose the final version of H.R. 956. It is my sincere 
hope that this legislation will eventually go to conference with the 
Senate, and return in a form that I can support which will be fair to 
consumers and business alike.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Walker) having assumed the chair, Mr. Dreier, Chairman of the Committee 
of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that 
Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 956) to 
establish legal standards and procedures for product liability 
litigation, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 109, 
he reported the bill back to the House with 
[[Page H3025]] an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the Whole? If not, 
the question is on the amendment.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.

                              {time}  1145


                motion to recommit offered by mr. gordon

  Mr. GORDON. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Walker). Is the gentleman opposed to the 
bill?
  Mr. GORDON. In its present form, Mr. Speaker, I am.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Gordon moves to recommit the bill to the Committee on 
     the Judiciary with instructions to report the bill back to 
     the House forthwith, with the following amendments:
       Add at the end of the bill the following:

     SEC. 404. SERVICE OF PROCESS.

       This Act shall not apply to a product liability action 
     unless the manufacturer of the product or component part has 
     appointed an agent in the United States for service of 
     process from anywhere in the United States.
       Change the limit in section 201 on punitive damages to the 
     following: ``3 times the amount of damages awarded to the 
     claimant for the economic loss on which the claimant's action 
     is based, or $1,000,000, whichever is greater''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Gordon] is 
recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion.
  Mr. GORDON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise as someone who is a supporter of products 
liability reform, not just in this Congress, but in past Congresses. I 
supported the bipartisan bill last year because I do not think status 
quo is satisfactory. However, I am disappointed that this House has 
been required to work under a gag rule that has gagged amendments, has 
gagged this House from fully discussing this issue, and has really 
gagged the American people from having a full discussion of this issue 
and allowing us to put better amendments on the floor.
  So I rise with a motion to recommit that I think improves this bill 
in two years: One, to put back in the bill a provision that will 
require foreign manufacturers to designate an agent in this country. 
The reason for that is that American consumers are going to be 
disadvantaged if they are the recipient of some harm by goods in this 
country by a foreign manufacturer and then cannot get service on them, 
and American business is going to be at a disadvantage if they are 
going to be responsible for liability in this country, however foreign 
manufacturers would not because they do not have an agent to be served.
  Mr. Speaker, the second part of this motion to recommit will raise 
the punitive damage level from $250,000 to a more reasonable $1 million 
for outrageous conduct.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. 
Conyers].
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Tennessee for 
the excellent job he has done.
  Mr. Speaker, the motion to recommit makes two simple changes, first 
restoring the provision from the committee-passed bill which would 
require foreign manufacturers to be subject to service of process in 
this country before they could benefit from the bill's provision, and 
then second increase the cap on punitive damages from a quarter million 
dollars to $1 million.
  Although the body approved a separate amendment by a 92-vote margin 
that I offered yesterday dealing with foreign manufacturers, that 
amendment merely ensured that foreign manufacturers were subject to 
Federal court rules in terms of discovery and jurisdiction. However, we 
all know that being subject to court rules is not worth anything unless 
you can actually serve the company with process and bring them into 
court.
  Unfortunately, the first Cox amendment approved yesterday I like to 
think inadvertently knocked out my service-of-process language. This 
gutted the whole bill. So the Cox amendment gutted the whole provision 
of being able to hold foreign wrongdoers responsible for their actions.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly support the motion to recommit.
  Mr. GORDON. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. 
Dingell].
  (Mr. DINGELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, the function of this motion to recommit is 
a very simple one: One, to include what essentially would have been a 
bipartisan amendment to this legislation, which would have been offered 
by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Oxley] and the gentleman from Tennessee 
[Mr. Gordon], that would have raised the amount of punitive damages to 
$1 million or three times the economic damages, a very fair and a very 
humane amendment which would protect the rights of persons injured by 
serious wrongdoing by manufacturers and others.
  The other thing that the amendment does is something which was voted 
on yesterday and in which by 258 to a substantially lesser number this 
body came to the judgment that we ought to see to it that foreigners 
are treated the same way as Americans are.
  The Cox amendment yesterday struck from the bill a requirement that 
foreigners appoint an agent for purposes of receiving service. The 
striking of that provision meant that no longer is it easy to get 
jurisdiction over foreigners who engage in improper processes in 
manufacturing.
  Let me give you an example. An American manufacturer manufactures an 
automobile. In it he includes foreign parts. He is sued for product 
liability because of the manufacturing of that automobile. Service is 
easy on the American manufacturer. Under the Cox amendment, it is 
almost impossible.
  Mr. Speaker, if you wanted to treat Americans fairly with foreigners, 
vote for the motion to recommit. Otherwise vote for the bill as it is.
  Mr. GORDON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, in summary, let me state this motion to recommit offers 
us a chance to protect U.S. citizens harmed by foreign products, allow 
American business a chance to compete against foreign manufacturers on 
an equal footing, and keep the most dangerous products in this country 
off the market.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge Members to support the Conyers-Dingell motion to 
recommit.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the distinguished gentleman from 
Ohio [Mr. Oxley].
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to recommit, and I do 
so with some concern, because the fact is the language added regarding 
service of process I think is a bogus argument and is simply an effort 
to bash foreign manufacturers.
  The motion to recommit, as far as the language increasing its 
punitive damage ceiling and the cap to $1 million, is an amendment that 
I had supported and had offered, in fact, to the Committee on Rules. 
But clearly the language involving service of process in my estimation 
has no business in the motion to recommit. Frankly, it has no business 
in the bill.
  Mr. Speaker, for that, I feel compelled to oppose the motion to 
recommit.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, there are three points to be made on this motion to 
recommit. The first one is on the first part of the motion to recommit, 
it has to do with service on foreign corporations. The amendment of the 
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] was not 
[[Page H3026]] stricken by the Cox amendment. It still is in the bill, 
the one that passed last night making foreign manufactures subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Federal courts in product liability actions.
  What the motion to recommit does has to do with service of process on 
foreign corporations. I tell you it is unnecessary. The Hague 
Convention, to which we are all subscribers, already provides for 
service of process on foreign corporations. So it is unnecessary and it 
is unneeded.
  As to the second part of the motion to recommit, it seeks to elevate 
the ceiling on punitive damages from $250,000 or three times the 
economic damages, which could exceed $250,000, to $1 million.
  Now, I point out with as much fervor as I can muster, punitive 
damages are not meant to compensate anybody. They are a punishment, 
they are a deterrent. There is no inhibition, there is no impediment to 
a plaintiff suing for medical expenses, economic expenses, noneconomic 
expenses, pain and suffering, loss of use. All of those things are 
elements of damages that are recoverable. We are talking now about 
punitive damages meant to punish somebody, and the purpose of this bill 
is to have a consistent, reasonable figure so insurance companies and 
manufacturers are not terrorized by the possibility of bankrupting 
punitive damages assessed against them in some of the States.

                              {time}  1200

  Punitive damages impede quick settlements. They get in the way. The 
reforms in our bill are reasonable. The Governors Association said, 
``We urge you to act swiftly to enact this legislation.''
  Now, if you elevate the ceiling to $1 million, you adulterate and you 
diminish the effect of having a good products liability bill, a good 
tort reform bill.
  I hope Members will stay with the committee, stay with the bill and 
defeat the motion to recommit.
  I want to say something about the remarks of the gentleman who moved 
this motion to recommit. He called it a gag rule. I, for one, am very 
tired of having the Republican side berated for issuing rules that do 
not make in order 82 different amendments but do make in order 
significant amendments of the opposition. This rule, this rule made in 
order 8 Democrat amendments out of 15.
  I just say to the gentlemen and gentlewomen of this House that they 
have a short memory if they do not recall in the last session the 
motor-voter bill, where we got one amendment permitted; the assault 
weapons ban, where we got no amendments. Do Members hear that? No 
amendments.
  That is a closed rule, let me tell my colleagues. Reinventing 
Government, do Members know how many amendments Republicans were 
permitted on that? Zero. How about campaign reform? Do my colleagues 
know how many amendments we were permitted? Zero. That is one of my 
objections to term limits. People will forget the way we were treated. 
And they have the, shall I say, ``chutzpah'' to say we put a gag rule 
on you when we give you eight amendments. I am sorry. I resist that.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HYDE. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Walker). The time of the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Hyde] has expired.
  Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to 
recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. GORDON. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 195, 
noes 231, not voting 8, as follows:
                             [Roll No. 228]

                               AYES--195

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Baesler
     Baldacci
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bishop
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant (TX)
     Cardin
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Danner
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Graham
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hayes
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Holden
     Hoyer
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Johnston
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klink
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Laughlin
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lincoln
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Rahall
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Rose
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schiff
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torres
     Traficant
     Tucker
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                               NOES--231

     Allard
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brewster
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clinger
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooley
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cunningham
     Davis
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     Martini
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Moorhead
     Morella
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Riggs
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tate
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Upton
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--8

     Cubin
     Jefferson
     Kanjorski
     McIntosh
     Moakley
     Rangel
     Torricelli
     Towns
                      [[Page H3027]] {time}  1220

  The Clerk announced the following pairs:
  On this vote:

       Mr. Jefferson for, with Mrs. Cubin against.
       Mr. Kanjorski for, Mr. McIntosh against.

  So the motion to recommit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Walker). The question is on passage of 
the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 265, 
noes 161, not voting 8, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 229]

                               AYES--265

     Allard
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bereuter
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clement
     Clinger
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooley
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis
     Deal
     DeLay
     Dickey
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennelly
     Kim
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Lincoln
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Minge
     Molinari
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Morella
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Riggs
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Traficant
     Upton
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                               NOES--161

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Baldacci
     Barrett (WI)
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bishop
     Bonior
     Borski
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant (TX)
     Cardin
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     de la Garza
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Durbin
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hinchey
     Hoyer
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     King
     Klink
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Martini
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Pelosi
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Rahall
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Rivers
     Rose
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Stark
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stupak
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Tucker
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--8

     Chambliss
     Cubin
     Gibbons
     Hilliard
     Jefferson
     McIntosh
     Rangel
     Towns

                              {time}  1239

  The Clerk announced the following pairs:
  On this vote:

       Mrs. Cubin for with Mr. Jefferson against.
       Mr. McIntosh for with Mr. Towns against.

  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  

                          ____________________