[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 44 (Thursday, March 9, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H2940-H2967]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                          PERSONAL EXPLANATION
  Mr. McINNIS. Mr. Chairman, I was unable to vote on rollcall Vote No. 
223 because I was serving as the chairman pro tem of the Committee on 
Rules, during this vote. Had I been present, I would have voted ``no'' 
on the amendment offered by Representative Furse.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed 
in House Report 104-72.


                     amendment offered by mr. hyde

  Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment at the desk, made in order under 
the rule.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Hyde: Page 3, line 12, strike 
     ``are'' and insert ``is''.
       Page 3, line 15, strike ``protect'' and insert ``project''.
       Page 3, line 23, strike ``and is costing'' and insert 
     ``causing''.
       Page 4, line 18, strike ``transactions'' and insert 
     ``transaction''.
       Page 8, beginning in line 2, strike ``Except as provided in 
     subsection (c) in'' and insert ``In''.
       Page 8, line 11, strike ``the'' and insert ``a''.
       Page 18, redesignate subsection (e) as subsection (f) and 
     insert after line 16 the following:
       (e) Exception.--
       (1) Reasonable care.--A failure to exercise reasonable care 
     in selecting among alternative product designs, formulations, 
     instructions, or warnings shall not, by itself, constitute 
     conduct that may give rise to punitive damages.
       (2) Award of other damages.--Punitie damages may not be 
     awarded in a product liability action unless damages for 
     economic and noneconomic loss have been awarded in such 
     action. For purposes of this paragraph, nominal damages do 
     not constitute damages for economic and noneconomic loss.
       Page 18, line 17, strike ``Consideration'' and insert 
     ``Considerations''.
       Page 29, in lines 8 and 12, strike ``has'' and insert ``has 
     or should have''.

[[Page H2941]]

             modification to amendment offered by mr. hyde

  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to delete lines 1 
through 9 on page 1 of my amendment in subparagraph E, and on page 2, 
lines 1 through 4.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Modification to amendment offered by Mr. Hyde: Strike out 
     ``Page 18, redesignate'' and all that follows through the 
     proposed new subsection (e) of section 201.

  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Illinois?
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I want to 
commend the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] for this modification, 
which has come about as a result of the discussions between our staffs. 
I think this is a very important deletion, because it makes the 
amendment more technical and takes out the part that was giving us a 
lot of trouble. I commend the gentleman.
  Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Illinois?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. The amendment is modified.
  The text of the amendment, as modified, is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Hyde, as modified: Page 3, line 
     12, strike ``are'' and insert ``is''.
       Page 3, line 15, strike ``protect'' and insert ``project''.
       Page 3, line 23, strike ``and is costing'' and insert 
     ``causing''.
       Page 4, line 18, strike ``transactions'' and insert 
     ``transaction''.
       Page 8, beginning in line 2, strike ``Except as provided in 
     subsection (c), in'' and insert ``In''.
       Page 8, line 11, strike ``the'' and insert ``a''.
       Page 18, redesignate subsection (e) as subsection (f) and 
     insert after line 16 the following:
       Page 18, line 17, strike ``Consideration'' and insert 
     ``Considerations''.
       Page 29, in lines 8 and 12, strike ``has'' and insert ``has 
     or should have''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. 
Hyde] is recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member in opposition will be 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment consists primarily of technical 
corrections to the text of H.R. 1075. It is almost exclusively 
technical in nature.
  In section 101, Findings and Purposes, the amendment changes the 
tense of words, corrects typographical errors, and makes a plural word 
singular.
  In section 105, Misuse or Alteration, it removes the reference to a 
nonexistent subsection (c) and says ``a'' defendant, rather than 
``the'' defendant.
  In the heading for subsection 201(f) the amendment makes the word 
``Consideration'' plural, because there is a list of nine different 
factors that the jury is directed to consider.
  In section 303 which is the Definitions section of the Biomaterials 
Suppliers title, the amendment makes it clear that a person would not 
be a ``biomaterials supplier'' within the meaning of title III, if it 
has ``or should have'' registered with the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services pursuant to section 510 of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, or has ``or should have'' included a medical device on 
the list of devices filed with the Secretary of HHS pursuant to section 
510(j) of the same law.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. 
Conyers] can claim the 5 minutes in opposition to the amendment.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I do so, and I yield myself such time as I 
may consume. Mr. Chairman, I agree that the interpretation given by the 
chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary is correct. I think the 
gentleman has facilitated this, with a lot of time being saved by his 
having made the deletion. We have no objection to the technical 
amendment, and urge support of the amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] as modified.
  The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 printed 
in House Report 104-72.


                     amendment offered by mr. oxley

  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment made in order pursuant 
to the rule.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Oxley: Page 19, insert after line 
     19 the following:
       (f) Drugs and Devices.--
       (1)(A) Punitive damages shall not be awarded against a 
     manufacturer or product seller of a drug (as defined in 
     section 201(g)(1) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
     (21 U.S.C. 321(g)(1)) or medical device (as defined in 
     section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
     (21 U.S.C. 321(h)) which caused the claimant's harm where--
       (i) such drug or device was subject to pre-market approval 
     by the Food and Drug Administration with respect to the 
     safety of the formulation or performance of the aspect of 
     such drug or device which caused the claimant's harm or the 
     adequacy of the packaging or labeling of such drug or device, 
     and such drug was approved by the Food and Drug 
     Administration; or
       (ii) the drug is generally recognized as safe and effective 
     pursuant to conditions established by the Food and Drug 
     Administration and applicable regulations, including 
     packaging and labeling regulations.
       (B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply in any case in which 
     the defendant, before or after pre-market approval of a drug 
     or device--
       (i) intentionally and wrongfully withheld from or 
     misrepresented to the Food and Drug Administration 
     information concerning such drug or device required to be 
     submitted under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 
     U.S.C. 301 et seq.) or section 351 of the Public Health 
     Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262) that is material and relevant to 
     the harm suffered by the claimant, or
       (ii) made an illegal payment to an official or employee of 
     the Food and Drug Administration for the purposes of securing 
     or maintaining approval of such drug or device.
       (2) Packaging.--In a product liability action for harm 
     which is alleged to relate to the adequacy of the packaging 
     (or labeling relating to such packaging) of a drug which is 
     required to have tamper-resistant packaging under regulations 
     of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (including 
     labeling regulations related to such packaging), the 
     manufacturer of the drug shall not be held liable for 
     punitive damages unless the drug is found by the court by 
     clear and convincing evidence to be substantially out of 
     compliance with such regulations.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. 
Oxley] will be recognized for 20 minutes, and a Member opposed to the 
amendment will be recognized for 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Oxley].
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise to offer the bipartisan FDA defense 
amendment, along with my colleagues Mr. Coburn, Mr. Burr, Mr. Tauzin, 
Mr. Brewster, and Mr. Stenholm.
  Mr. Chairman, the amendment states simply that when the manufacturer 
of a drug or medical device receives pre-market approval from the FDA 
and complies with all post-approval reporting requirements, the 
manufacturer will not be liable for punitive damages in a civil suit.
  The amendment protects the rights of plaintiffs to receive full 
compensatory damages, including pain and suffering. Punitive damages 
are not compensatory. They are intended to punish malicious conduct. To 
bring a drug from the laboratory to the marketplace takes on average 
9\1/2\ years and costs manufacturers $350 million. The sponsors and 
supporters of this amendment believe that compliance with the process, 
and post-approval reporting requirements, clearly demonstrate a lack of 
malice. Punitive damages are quasi-criminal in nature, and careful 
adherence to an expensive 10-year process is certainly not criminal.
  Members have asked me, what if the manufacturer knows the drug is 
dangerous, but still goes through the process and gets FDA approval? 
The defense is denied in that case, as it is when a manufacturer 
discovers a problem after approval. The defense only applies when the 
maker of the drugs or device acts in good faith and discloses all 
relevant information.
  [[Page H2942]] This amendment is needed to provide some 
predictability for liability in the development of life-saving drugs 
and medical devices. Because of our liability lottery, drugs are more 
expensive in the United States than almost anywhere on Earth. Products 
are kept off the market, or withdrawn after introduction. The effect of 
our liability system on drugs and medical devices was recently 
summarized by the American Medical Association:

       Innovative new products are not being developed or are 
     being withheld from the market because of liability concerns 
     * * * Certain older technologies have been removed from the 
     market not because of sound scientific evidence indicating 
     lack of safety or efficacy, but because product liability 
     suits have exposed manufacturers to unacceptable financial 
     risks.

  Mr. Chairman, writing on punitive damage damages, Justice Lewis 
Powell said, ``* * * punitive damages invite punishment so arbitrary as 
to be virtually random.''
  Faced with a threat of random punishment, many manufacturers are 
understandably reluctant to put a new drug or device on the market. Our 
amendment says to them invest $350 million, wait 9\1/2\ years, obtain 
FDA approval, observe all reporting requirements, disclose fully, and 
we will say you did not act wantonly or maliciously. If your product 
causes injury, you are responsible for compensation. That determines 
the difference between economic and noneconomic and punitive damages. 
The plaintiff will be able to recover economic and noneconomic damages.
  This amendment is common sense and deserves the support of this body. 
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1700

  The CHAIRMAN. Is there a Member who wishes to manage opposition to 
the amendment?
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I do.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Dingell] is recognized 
for 20 minutes.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 4 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, the FDA defense has been a topic of considerable 
discussion and controversy over the years. In the past I have supported 
the adoption of provisions affording the FDA defense. This was done 
based on my belief that strong support and appropriate oversight by the 
Congress would enable the FDA to provide thoughtful, careful review for 
drug and medical device approvals and scrupulous post-market 
surveillance, all of which are essential to the protection of the 
American consuming public.
  If this were to be the case, there would be no question but what 
Congress should afford the FDA approval as a defense against punitive 
damages. Regrettably, that appears not, however, to be the case. Times 
have changed and it appears that congressional support for FDA and 
support for a strong, viable, adequately-funded, well-staffed agency is 
at risk at this particular time.
  We have been hearing about privatizing, cutting back, reducing and 
eliminating FDA. It is my strong belief that until these questions have 
been satisfactorily resolved and until we are satisfied that FDA 
approval really means something, that we should not then afford a 
weakening of the civil suit process which affords protection to the 
American consumer from misbehavior by manufacturers of devices and 
prescription pharmaceuticals.
  The ability of FDA to properly process the business before them, to 
see to it that the new drugs are properly approved, that all 
information necessary is produced, to see to it that there is no deceit 
or duplicity in the offer, to see to it that there are no changes in 
the drugs as manufactured, to see to it that the Food and Drug 
Administration's requirement for good manufacturing practices be met 
during the manufacturing of the drugs is absolutely essential to 
consumer safety. If that is to be tampered with or impaired with 
through the budget process or through actions of Congress or through 
less than vigorous enforcement by the administration because of lack of 
adequate funds or because of congressional pressure, then clearly this 
kind of amendment is not in the public interest.
  I would urge, therefore, that until we have seen more fully the state 
of affairs with regard to the strength and the adequacy of FDA 
supervision of new drugs, new drug applications, and with regard to the 
safety and adequacy of supervision by FDA of devices, that this 
Congress should not relax the supervision that is given to 
manufacturers of both devices and prescription pharmaceuticals until we 
are more sure that the protections of FDA are meaningful and have not 
been impaired by budget cuts, by reductions in the authority of the 
agency, by roll back of the abilities of the agency to carry out its 
responsibility or by actions like those taken more recently by the 
Congress in setting up cost-benefit analyses and things of that kind. 
Those are actions which are inimical to good protection of the consumer 
and to assurances of adequate safety, because if FDA must take that 
length of time to do these things, they will not be looking at the 
question of safety of prescription pharmaceuticals or devices from the 
standpoint only of health and safety of the individual who purchases 
that commodity.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North 
Carolina [Mr. Burr].
  Mr. BURR. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the FDA exemption 
amendment. In the past several weeks, we have made many efforts to 
streamline government and to eliminate unnecessary duplication. This is 
another area where we can effectively do just that.
  The Food and Drug Administration has been charged with scientifically 
weighing the risks and benefits that go along with the development of 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices. Anyone would be hard pressed to 
successfully argue that randomly selected tort juries are more 
qualified to reach these difficult, scientific conclusions.
  Progress comes with a certain degree of risk. Opponents of this 
amendment have argued that it will limit the ability of those harmed by 
a minimal risk factor to receive compensatory and non-economic damages 
such as pain, suffering, and lost wages.
  This amendment does not preclude their right to just compensation.
  By offering this exemption from punitive damages, our amendment will 
allow many people to reap the benefits of drugs and devices that 
companies have not manufactured, for fear of litigation.
  Support life drug research. Support a scientific balance between 
benefits and risk. Support the Oxley-Burr-Coburn-Tauzin-Brewster-
Stenholm amendment to H.R. 1075.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia [Mr. Scott].
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to cite a case of corporate 
wrongdoing that would benefit by the passage of this amendment as an 
example of why it should not pass. This is the O'Gilvie versus 
International Playtex case from Kansas, 1985, where Playtex voluntarily 
removed from the market tampons linked to toxic shock syndrome after a 
Federal court jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages. A Kansas 
woman died from toxic shock syndrome using the company's super-
absorbent tampons.
  Playtex had complied with FDA regulations. It had gotten that 
approval fair and square. However, the jury found that the FDA 
requirements only set minimum standards and mere compliance with those 
standards had been inadequate under the circumstances.
  Mr. Chairman, the 10th circuit, in reviewing the case on appeal, 
found that there is an abundance of evidence that Playtex deliberately 
disregarded studies and medical evidence linking high-absorbency tampon 
fibers with increased risk of toxic shock at a time when other 
manufacturers were responding to this information by modifying or 
withdrawing their product. Moreover, there is evidence that Playtex 
deliberately sought to profit from this situation by advertising the 
effectiveness of its high-absorbency tampons when it knew that other 
manfacturers were reducing the absorbencies of their products due to 
the evidence of casual connection between high absorbency and toxic 
shock.
  Mr. Chairman, consumers are now protected from this product. With 
the 
[[Page H2943]] passage of this amendment, we will be turning the clock 
back on consumer protection. Unfortunately, it is consistent with the 
loser pays and limits on awards and other discouragements from people 
bringing these meritorious suits to protect the consumer from these 
products.
  I hope we will defeat the amendment.
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Oklahoma [Mr. Coburn].
  Mr. COBURN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from Virginia 
for bringing this up for in fact that is a misconception on the case 
against the Playtex. And under this bill, they would be fully liable. 
They would not be excluded under this amendment from full prosecution, 
and they would have been exposed to FDA clearance and punitive damages. 
This bill would not have excluded that agreement from punitive damages. 
Because, in fact, they have knowledge or did have knowledge of the 
worsening condition which was required to be reported to the FDA.
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. COBURN. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, if they complied and provided all of the 
information and FDA approved it anyway, when there were studies that 
the FDA just approved it, when the jury found that only minimum 
standards were set----
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. Coburn] 
has expired.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, how much time remains on both sides, 
please?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Dingell] has 14 
minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Oxley] has 14 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Berman].
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Just on this last point, the exemption from immunity for punitive 
damages is the defendant before or after premarket approval of a drug 
or device intentionally and wrongfully withheld from or misrepresented 
to the FDA information concerning such drug or device. It is not 
whether or not the party knew that harm could come from the product, 
whether there was any of that kind of conduct. It is withholding of 
information from the FDA. That is the only escape clause here.
  I disagree, from what I have heard about this case, with the 
gentleman.
  The point I would like to make follows up a little bit on the 
gentleman from Michigan's point. We are getting, sometimes there is a 
great deal of pressure on the FDA to loosen up its regulatory process 
to allow drug approval quicker. In my own area where the medical device 
manufacturers, they are furious and being driven crazy by the delays 
they have in getting products on the market. But never one has ever 
said to me that they should be able to get away from accountability and 
responsibility for their negligence or avoid punitive damages for the 
conduct, intentional or wanton disregard, conduct, or reckless conduct 
from tort liability.
  I just find it very strange that the same party that is promoting the 
concept of deregulation so strongly now wants to undermine the other 
way in which we can keep parties responsible to a high standard of 
conduct, which is the accountability through the judicial process. When 
you do both, I promise you the consequence is going to be greater 
negligence, greater harm, less willingness to take the kinds of 
precautions necessary to avoid danger. That is why I think this is a 
bad situation.
  I would like to read about one case myself. In 1980 the drug Zomax, a 
painkiller, was marketed by the McNeil Drug Co. Reports in 1982 of 
allergic reactions causing death and severe illness came to McNeil. 
McNeil reported those adverse drug reactions to the FDA as required, 
thereby not getting out of avoiding that problem of the punitive damage 
suit if this were to be in effect, and the company embarked on a 
massive selling campaign to get rid of the supply before the word 
spread about the negative side effects. The salesmen were instructed to 
not bring up the subject.
  During the McNeil sales campaign 14 people died and over 400 suffered 
life-threatening allergic reactions. Incidentally, McNeil 
Pharmaceutical called its Zomax campaign one-eleven, representing the 
$111 million sales target by McNeil.
  When you have this law in place, FDA has approved it, FDA had all the 
information, but Zomax acted wrongfully and in an intentional--McNeil 
acted wrongfully and in an intentional fashion to market a product they 
knew had adverse reactions without advising the consumers of this and 
without letting the FDA know that they were increasing their marketing.
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute and 30 seconds to the 
gentlewoman from New York [Ms. Molinari].
  Ms. MOLINARI. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the 
amendment of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Oxley], and I urge my 
colleagues to include it in the bill.
  The purpose of the amendment is very simple. If the FDA has approved 
a drug or a device, then the manufacturer cannot be held liable for 
punitive damages, unless, as in the case of the tampons and the toxic 
shock syndrome, the company withheld information regarding potential 
damages. This amendment in that case clearly would not apply.
  Mr. Chairman, I find it disturbing that some opponents of this 
amendment claim it is antiwoman. This is a provision that is prowomen. 
I will tell you why.
  Last year $600 million was spent on cosmetic research, $30 million 
was spent on contraceptive research. Only two companies currently 
perform contraceptive research. The reason why is they fear huge 
punitive damages. Research in this area and in the larger area of 
reproductive health is too risky for companies. And it is not just 
reproductive health research. It is research on other diseases, too.
  One in nine women will get breast cancer in her lifetime, and 
although there are treatments, there are no cures. It frightens me that 
there may be a cure out there but companies will not find it, because 
the risk liability is too great. We cannot afford to let this happen, 
not for breast cancer, not for uterine cancer, not for any disease that 
strikes predominantly men or women.
  It is a tragedy, but we should not punish companies that play by 
FDA's stringent rules. If you ask me, I think it is a far greater 
tragedy that young men and women die because drug companies are afraid 
to pursue research.

                              {time}  1715

  Mr. DINGELL. I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Waxman].
  (Mr. WAXMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, let us understand that this legislation 
before us today sets a very high threshold before punitive damages can 
be awarded. I think what this amendment is doing is using the FDA as a 
cover for manufacturers whose products have caused real harm to 
consumers. Even in cases where the manufacturers' behavior has been 
egregious, malicious, or knowingly negligent, there is a high standard 
for collection of awards. Title II of the bill states that in order to 
collect punitive damages, a claimant must be able to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that a manufacturer specifically intended to cause 
harm or engage in conduct that illustrated a conscious, flagrant 
indifference to the safety of others.
  If a plaintiff who is injured can maintain that threshold and show 
that a company acted with flagrant disregard for the safety of others, 
why should a drug company be protected because of the FDA approval? The 
FDA approval does not mean that the FDA is there as a watchdog, to be 
sure that the company, after it has that approval, is doing everything 
it properly should. The FDA may never know about the complaints that 
the company has had that the product that they
 manufacture is now causing a lot of harm to people, yet they continue 
to sell it. Should an injured consumer be punished if a company 
continues to sell a product which it knows or suspects is not 
performing properly, when the company was in possession of numerous 
consumer complaints or other 
[[Page H2944]] kinds of reports that it may, technically, not have been 
``required to submit'' to the FDA?
  Mr. Chairman, the FDA has very limited independent legal authority to 
demand documentation from manufacturers, nor does the agency have the 
resources to police these manufacturing facilities. The agency relies 
on the manufacturers to be honest and to follow the rules. The majority 
of them, no doubt, do that.
  However, what about those cases where they do not, but they still 
technically meet the test of this amendment; that is, they submitted 
what was required to FDA, they have not bribed an official, they have 
not lied to the FDA during the product review in order to receive an 
approval? What about those cases where there is harm and that harm is a 
result of the company's misconduct, or of the company's taking chances 
on safety, of a company's operating just on the razor's edge of 
legality?
  For those cases, this bill establishes, elsewhere, a high standard 
under which consumers would seek punitive damages. That standard is 
sufficient to protect ethical, honest, careful companies. Such 
companies do not need to hide behind the shield of this FDA defense 
that this amendment would provide.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that we do not have a crisis 
of high punitive damages being awarded in these cases. The reports 
about this kind of national crisis traceable to outlandish and numerous 
awards of punitive damages are not supportable by actual data. Contrary 
to what the supporters of this amendment would like us to believe, 
punitive damages are not common in product liability lawsuits. In the 
cases where such damages are awarded, they are not excessively high.
  A number of scholarly legal studies published between 1987 and 1991 
concluded that punitive damages in a variety of State jurisdictions was 
awarded in no more than 8 percent of the cases. In those cases, awards 
were on the average comparable in size to amounts awarded for 
compensatory damages.
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to my good friend, the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm].
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time, and I yield to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, as a woman, mother of four, and corporate 
lawyer, my life experience intersects the issues involved in this 
amendment in many ways. My decision to support it was a close one for 
me, and I thank my colleagues on both sides for giving me the time to 
explain my views.
  On the one hand, all of us are horrified by the stories of 
individuals, many of them women, injured by drugs and medical devices. 
However, on the other hand, there is a fundamental fairness argument, 
and real evidence that our present system chills research and 
development on new drugs and medical device breakthroughs which could 
be enormously helpful to various at-risk communities, especially women.
  This amendment is based on the view that if a drug manufacturer is in 
full compliance, and I stress, full compliance with Federal regulatory 
requirements, it should not be liable for damages designed to otherwise 
punish that behavior. I agree. To be sure, the FDA is not all-knowing 
when it comes to assuring product safety, but it is the best mechanism 
we have available in balancing the social values associated with drugs 
and medical devices and the unfortunate injuries which may result from 
known or unknown side effects. If there are ways to improve the FDA's 
performance, let us do it.
  There are risk living in a modern, technologically advanced society. 
I hope we can minimize those risks, but I give a very high priority to 
the development of a predictable and fair system where pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology firms can rely on Government approval and reasonable 
limits on liability, and thus, invest the millions of dollars it takes 
to develop medical breakthroughs that will benefit all our citizens. 
Without these breakthroughs, women really will not have choice, none of 
us will have choice. None of us will have the opportunities that our 
first-rate and first-in-the-world medical system could offer.
  I urge support of this amendment, and would make three related 
comments about this legislation. First, I hope as it moves through the 
Congress, two things will change. First, I think the noneconomic 
damages, which are extremely important to women, will be brought to a 
parity with economic damages, and, second, I think the cap on punitive 
damages should be raised at least to $1 million. I know many of us 
would have supported an amendment in this body to do so.
  And third, my colleagues from California, Mr. Waxman, who preceded me 
to the well, was correct in pointing out that the explosion of civil 
suits has not been in the personal injury area. In California, at 
least, the number of personal injury suits has been level if not on the 
decline. Indeed, the number of such suits declined from 132,000 in 1988 
to 88,000 in 1992. Still the bill before us is important in that it 
replaces the costly patchwork of state laws with a uniform law that 
speeds recovery and provides certainty to manufactures.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma 
[Mr. Brewster].
  (Mr. BREWSTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise this afternoon to support this 
legislation. As a pharmacist, I know firsthand the need for the passage 
of the Oxley amendment. Our country has the most rigorous drug approval 
process in the world. A company which has researched and developed a 
new drug spends an average of $359 million to get that drug from the 
laboratory to the market.
  They undertake exhaustive clinical trials involving thousands of 
individuals, spanning many years, before they are able to sell the 
product on the market. Often during the course of the trials problems 
arise and the project is stopped. Often a treatment has been in the 
research and development pipeline for many years before warning signs 
or problems have arisen and the trials are halted. Such clinical trials 
are similar to the gut-wrenching dry holes those of us in the oil patch 
are all too familiar with.
  This amendment puts no limits on actual or noneconomic damages. It 
simply protects companies who have, in good faith, invested many years 
of work and millions of dollars in a product, from the fear of 
frivolous lawsuits and out-of-sight jury awards. I encourage my fellow 
Members on both sides of the aisle to vote ``yes'' on the amendment.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Oxley] for his 
generosity with time. I rise in strong support of the amendment. This 
is an attempt to put some common sense back into our public liability 
system, and to allow technology in America to move forward.
  Most of the criticisms of this amendment have to be balanced with a 
commonsense statement of saying that our current system is broken. 
Perhaps there are weaknesses by moving forward, but in my judgment, 
adopting this amendment, allowing technology to move forward, and 
saying to any individual company that if you in fact have a product 
that is approved under the best technology possibly available, and then 
something goes wrong because Charles Stenholm uses it, at that time no 
punitive damages should be allowed because you have followed the rules.
  If we cannot bring ourselves to adopt this kind of legal law, we are 
going to have a difficult time competing in the future marketplace.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Oxley-Burr-Coburn-
Tauzin-Brewster-Stenholm amendment to H.R. 956, the Common Sense 
Product Liability and Legal Reform Act.
  Our amendment offers a limited exemption from punitive damages for 
Food and Drug Administration [FDA] approved products. Manufacturers of 
drugs and medical devices are already subject to the agonizing delays 
and costly bureaucratic scrutiny of the FDA approval process, in order 
to determine if the benefits of a product outweigh the risks--not to 
assert that the use of a product carries no risk, or that all uses, 
under any circumstances are completely safe. In doing so, the FDA and 
medical community decide if the risks that a product poses are socially 
acceptable.
  Under our current liability system, a jury second guesses this 
scientific evaluation done by the medical community and can punish 
manufacturers because their products are inherently risky.
  [[Page H2945]] Our amendment is simple, if a manufacturer or product 
seller of a drug or medical device which caused the claimants harm was 
pre-market approved by the FDA, punitive damages shall not be awarded.
  Opponents of this measure have said that it will prevent plaintiffs 
from suing drug and device manufacturers, and that it will hurt the 
consumer. This is simply not true. Punitive damages can still be sought 
in appropriate cases--those where the manufacturer was at fault, either 
by withholding or misrepresenting information or through participation 
in fraudulent activities. More importantly, injured parties will still 
be able to sue for compensatory damages. This amendment in no way 
limits compensation for loss, damages, pain and suffering.
  The Oxley-Burr-Coburn-Tauzin-Brewster-Stenholm amendment makes good 
sense. I urge my colleagues to support this important amendment.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Watt].
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in reluctant opposition to the amendment, 
reluctant because one of the sponsors is my colleague, the gentleman 
from North Carolina [Mr. Burr].
  However, I have concerns about this amendment on three counts. First, 
the FDA's responsibility is to set minimum standards for bringing a 
product to the market, and we should note that while we are setting a 
clear and convincing standard in our courts of law to win these cases, 
no such standard applies to the FDA.
  Second, the regulatory process is subject to political pressures, 
economic pressures, and pressures that hopefully the jury system is not 
subject to. We factor out all of these things in the court, we hope, to 
the best extent possible, and get a fair and impartial verdict in the 
process.
  The third point I want to make, Mr. Chairman, is when all else fails, 
I have started to read the fine print in these amendments that are 
being offered. I would submit to my colleague, the gentlewoman from 
California [Ms. Harman], that I do not see anything in this amendment 
which talks about full compliance.
  I do see a second provision in the bill that goes beyond simply FDA 
approval, which says that the producer or manufacturer is exempt if the 
drug is generally recognized as safe and effective, pursuant to 
conditions established by the Food and Drug Administration. I have no 
idea, and I would submit to my colleagues that they have no idea, what 
kind of Pandora's box that opens up for litigation, because every kind 
of product or drug which comes to the market that ever gets through the 
process is going to be recognized, we hope, as generally safe and 
effective.
  Mr. Chairman, I think when we start setting one standard, clear and 
convincing, to win cases, we ought to at least be holding the 
regulatory bodies to that same standard if we are going to say that 
compliance with their regulations will make the manufacturer immune 
from liability.
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Bilbray], a valuable member of the Committee on 
Commerce.
  Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, tonight we are speaking a lot about 
lawyers, a lot about corporations, a lot about pharmaceutical 
companies, but we are talking about consumers only as victims. However, 
the victimization goes both ways, Mr. Chairman. We hear a lot about the 
things that go wrong in our society when people use products. We hear 
about the bad things that the consumer products do.
  However, Mr. Chairman, we do not talk about the fact, about the woman 
who goes to her pharmacist to be able to get a drug that she has used 
for years, but that drug no longer is available to her, not because the 
FDA found it not safe, not because a court found that it was not safe, 
but because of the huge liability that was being created by lawsuits 
that were being brought forward without merit, but with substantial 
resources, to the point where they were driving these products off the 
market.
  Mr. Chairman, for years Bendectin has been used by pregnant women for 
a long time, and it is not available today for one reason, and that is 
because of lawsuits.

                              {time}  1730

  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman for 
Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin], a member of the committee.
  Mr. TAUZIN. I thank my good friend, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. 
Dingell], for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Chairman, let me just say that when we talk about punitive 
damages, we are talking about quasi-fines. Quasi-fines. It is one thing 
to say that you are going to fine somebody for doing something wrong. 
It is another thing to say that we are going to first authorize you to 
do it as a Government agency and then allow you to be fined for doing 
it even though we said it is OK to do it. That is the issue in this 
debate.
  The FDA goes through an extraordinary process of approving drugs for 
the American public. It is a lengthy, complicated process. Once they 
approve something for us, they put their stamp of approval on it, 
should we as a government say now we are going to allow somebody to sue 
you and collect a fine after we have authorized you to sell that 
particular drug or product to the American public?
  It seem a bit ludicrous. I suggest to Members that if the speed limit 
says you can go 35, you ought not have to pay a fine if you have stayed 
under that speed limit. That is essentially what this argument is all 
about. I urge Members to adopt the amendment and make this bill a 
better bill.
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Georgia [Mr. Norwood], a member of the committee.
  (Mr. NORWOOD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. NORWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I rise to strongly support the Oxley-Burr 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I know the FDA is not perfect, I will admit that, but 
if we have to choose between the FDA and tort juries, the FDA is 
obviously better suited to make judgments as to what products should be 
on the market. This amendment is intended to prevent tort juries from 
second-guessing and overriding often very, very difficult but essential 
and scientific conclusions and risk-benefit assessments the FDA must 
make in approving a drug and deciding what warnings must and must not 
accompany a drug.
  We must pass this amendment, Mr. Chairman, for the health of our 
Nation. When juries are permitted to punish defendants for conduct 
approved by the FDA, substituting their amateur scientific judgment and 
cost-benefit analysis for the judgment of the FDA's professional 
scientists, it makes drug manufacturers very wary of producing new 
products.
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. McCollum].
  (Mr. McCOLLUM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  I rise to strongly support this amendment today. It is very clear 
from the work we did in the Committee on the Judiciary that this is 
essential. What we are talking about is only application to punitive 
damages and it is obvious that if a pharmaceutical company gets the 
approval of the Food and Drug Administration for a pharmaceutical 
product, then the Government has gone through about 12 years of 
processing to determine if that product is indeed sound and safe.
  No product is 100 percent safe, but for gosh sakes if the FDA has 
approved it and sanctioned it, why should we be subjecting a 
pharmaceutical company to the threat of punitive damages for something 
that goes awry in that product that comes out later? We are only 
stifling the opportunity to develop the diversity of new products that 
we need for the health of America.
  I urge in the strongest of terms that this amendment be adopted 
today. It is a good, sound exemption and safeguard for the 
pharmaceutical industry, for the health of the future of this country 
if we give this particular protection in those cases, those limited 
punitive damage cases where the FDA has approved a pharmaceutical 
product.
  [[Page H2946]] Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Cooley].
  Mr. COOLEY. Mr. Chairman, before coming to Congress and being in the 
cattle business for a few years, I spent 10 years as director of 
regulatory affairs for an international pharmaceutical company. Our 
company literally spent millions and millions of dollars in complying 
with the FDA approval process. This process is the most rigorous 
process in the entire world to prove safety and efficacy of a drug. If 
we have no confidence in the FDA to do this, then we should find 
another agency to do this job for us.
  As long as a company complies with the licensing requirements and 
continues the research after a drug is introduced on the market, I 
cannot believe that we can have punitive damages which should be only 
directed toward those companies who have reckless misconduct in the 
selling and administering of the drug. Currently prices of important 
drugs and medical devices are artificially high because of the cost of 
the liability insurance. Under this amendment plaintiffs still will 
have full compensation.
  I urge passage of this amendment.
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 valuable seconds to the gentleman 
from Ohio [Mr. Chabot].
  Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support this amendment. It makes 
no sense to allow punitive damages against companies that have acted in 
good faith and gotten the FDA's approval. Most importantly, this 
amendment will help those who truly need help the most, those who need 
drugs which otherwise would probably not come on the market at all to 
relieve agonizing pain and those who need drugs which may preserve life 
itself.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will inform the committee that the gentleman 
from Ohio [Mr. Oxley] is entitled to close debate.


                         parliamentary inquiry

  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary 
inquiry.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his inquiry.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. My inquiry has to do with why the 
gentleman on that side has the right to close debate. We are defending 
the committee position on this side this time.
  The CHAIRMAN. If the Chair might respond to the inquiry, the 
gentleman from Ohio is the author of the amendment and there is no 
official committee position that is being represented here by 
opposition to the amendment. So the gentleman from Ohio is entitled to 
close debate on the amendment.


                             point of order

  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state the point of order.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I make this point of order, 
and I have already gone through this with the parliamentarian today.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is aware of that.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Any time that anyone makes a position 
that is contrary to the committee's position which in this case is the 
bill, and the amendment is contrary to the bill, I was told earlier 
today that whoever is defending the committee's position would be 
entitled to close.
  The CHAIRMAN. In response to the gentleman's question, this amendment 
does not strike language from the bill at all.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, pursuing my point of order, 
the amendment on which I made the inquiry this morning did not strike 
any language from the bill. It was Mr. Schumer's amendment----
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is not aware of exactly what amendment it was 
that was being discussed with the parliamentarian.
  The gentleman may proceed.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. I thank the Chair. I thought we had 
gotten to the point in this body that a Member cannot even make a point 
of order anymore.
  The inquiry that I made this morning was on Mr. Schumer's amendment 
which struck nothing from the bill, and I was told at that time by the 
parliamentarian that any amendment that was contrary to the position, 
and it was presumed that the position of the bill was that it would not 
be amended at all, it would be the party that was defending the 
committee's position, which in this case is presumed to be the bill 
itself, not the amendment, that would be allowed to close.
  The CHAIRMAN (Mr. Dreier). The Chair has perceived that the gentleman 
from Michigan [Mr. Dingell] is not necessarily carrying the position of 
the committee.
  The Chair will acknowledge that it is a difficult call, but that is 
the determination of the Chair.


                        parliamentary inquiries

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I have a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. 
Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Are there any standards by which the 
Chair perceives? This is a very disturbing statement the Chair has just 
made.
  The gentleman from Michigan is the ranking minority member, I 
believe, of one of the two committees of jurisdiction over this bill, 
and when we have had stated that there is nothing in the bill one way 
or the other, are we totally dependent----
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman offers a very good parliamentary inquiry. 
The issue is addressed as follows:
  It is the call of the Chair and it is the determination of the Chair 
that the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Dingell] does not represent the 
position of the committee. It is for that reason that it has been 
determined that the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Oxley], the author of the 
amendment, would be entitled to close debate on the amendment.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I have a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. 
Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his inquiry.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, we have a very important 
point here, and I must say I am distressed by the tone of these 
rulings. By what standards can Members know how a chairman is going to 
divine whether or not someone represents the position of the committee? 
Is there no objective standard as to who
 represents the position of the committee when the ranking minority 
member defends the position of the committee? I would point out this 
amendment as I understand it was considered at least in one of the 
committees and rejected by one of the committees. What are the 
standards?

  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rules of the House, the proponent of the 
amendment has the right to close unless the committee position is being 
offered by another member.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I have further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. 
Chairman.
  Anytime there is silence in the bill on an amendment, can we safely 
assume that the proponent of an amendment will then be allowed to 
close?
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair does not take that position.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Or does the chairman take the position 
whatever he wants will be the case and if he wants to give his party an 
advantage, he will do it?
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has stated that the proponent of the 
amendment has the right to close unless the committee position is being 
represented by another Member.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. But the question is, by what standard do 
you determine that? My parliamentary inquiry is, are there any 
standards by which you determine that? Or is it just arbitrary as it 
appears to be in this case?
  The CHAIRMAN. There is not an absolute objective standard that exists 
for making that determination.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Is there a relative standard?
  The CHAIRMAN. It is the prerogative of the Chair to make that 
determination and the Chair has determined that in this case, the 
proponent of the amendment, because a position of the committee is not 
being represented by another Member, has the right to close.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I have another parliamentary inquiry.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, if the Chair decides to 
give partisan advantage, is there any recourse?
  [[Page H2947]] The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his inquiry.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. If the chairman decides then to simply 
follow partisan instincts, does the Member have any recourse?
  The CHAIRMAN. This is the discretion of the Chair, and this is the 
ruling of the Chair.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. A parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his inquiry.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. My inquiry is, is the Chair expecting to 
consult with the parliamentarian? Because the parliamentarian clearly 
gave me this morning a completely contrary opinion. Is the Chair 
planning to consult with the parliamentarian?
  The CHAIRMAN. It is the determination of the Chair that in this 
instance, the proponent of the amendment will close debate as the 
committee position is not being represented by another Member.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. I have parliamentarian inquiry, Mr. 
Chairman.
  My inquiry is, is the Chair planning to consult with the 
parliamentarian?
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will consult with the parliamentarian. It is 
the determination, having consulted with the parliamentarian, that in 
this instance the gentleman from Ohio, the proponent of the amendment, 
has the right to close as the committee position is not being 
represented by another Member.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. A parliamentary inquiry Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Does the Chair have some psychic 
connection with the parliamentarian since nobody here has seen him 
consult?
  The CHAIRMAN. That is not a parliamentary inquiry.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Regular order, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman knows that is not a parliamentary 
inquiry.
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Minnesota [Mr. Ramstad].
  Mr. RAMSTAD. I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Oxley amendment as 
cochair of the bipartisan House Medical Technology Caucus.
  Why in the world, Mr. Chairman, should any manufacturer be deemed 
malicious if it has complied with all regulations, reported all 
relevant information, and received FDA approval to market a product?
  Mr. Chairman, let's quit stifling medical innovation. Let's quit 
stifling research and development, drugs and medical devices. Let's 
adopt the Oxley amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Oxley amendment, as 
cochair of the bipartisan House Medical Technology Caucus. This 
amendment is needed because manufacturers are currently being forced to 
withhold life-saving drugs and medical devices rather than face 
unlimited liability.
  Why in the world should any manufacturer be deemed malicious if it 
has complied with all regulations, reported all relevant information, 
and received FDA approval to market a product?
  The FDA defense was originally in H.R. 917 and should be part of this 
important tort reform legislation. Let's quit stifling research and 
development in drugs and medical devices. Let's quit stifling medical 
innovation. Let's help those consumers and patients who need life-
saving drugs and medical devices.
  Let's adopt the Oxley FDA amendment.
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. McIntosh].
  (Mr. McINTOSH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
                              {time}  1745

  Mr. McINTOSH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment. It 
is vitally needed.
  In talking with one of the leading medical device industry 
specialists, Mr. Dane Miller of Indiana, he has told me it is becoming 
extremely difficult if not impossible for that industry to provide 
lifesaving devices because of the threat of liability. The reason: I 
think liability risks are forcing the suppliers of raw materials, 
companies such as DuPont and Dow Chemical which have an outstanding 
record will not take the risk of providing the materials because of the 
threat of liability.
  I urge Members to vote in favor of this amendment.
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how much time I have 
remaining?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Oxley] has 2 minutes 
remaining, and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Dingell] has 3 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
North Carolina [Mr. Heineman].
  (Mr. HEINEMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HEINEMAN. Mr. Chairman, the FDA defense is simple and it is fair. 
If the Food and Drug Administration approves a drug, then the 
pharmaceutical company which manufactures that drug should not be 
liable for punitive damages.
  Currently the fear of unnecessary litigations stifles innovations and 
limits the types of drugs which are available to the American consumer. 
Without the FDA defense, beneficial drugs will be driven out of the 
marketplace and manufacturers will continue to be discouraged from 
developing new drugs to treat illnesses such as AIDS and cancer. I urge 
my colleagues to support the amendment.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes, my remaining time, to 
the distinguished gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers].
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan for 
yielding me this time. He has worked on this matter for many years, and 
I have noted his change of position, his reluctance now to allow FDA 
approval to reign superior in this instance; we now have those who are 
seeking this amendment, many of them are at the same time holding FDA 
in a suspended state of animation, which could result in an important 
diminution of its powers and resources and ability to do the job.
  I have heard it said here on the floor several times, if there are 
ways to improve the FDA's ability to get the job done, then let us do 
it. But we may be going in the opposite direction. As badly as the FDA 
needs support, the problem right now is whether it is going to be able 
to continue funding at its present level.
  So I rise in clear opposition to an amendment which will ultimately 
have the effect of immunizing manufacturers of defective products who 
happen to obtain FDA approval.
  This amendment would provide a complete defense to liability for any 
drug or medical device that received premarket approval from the FDA. 
In other words, if
 the FDA for whatever reason allows a defective product on the market, 
the victims would not be able to sue at all. Even if both the 
manufacturer and the FDA have evidence of the dangers of a product but 
permitted it to be marketed anyway, the innocent, injured victim would 
be left without any opportunity for compensation whatsoever.

  Do the authors of this amendment really want us to place that much 
faith in an underfunded Federal regulator?
  It goes without saying that the amendment would have a 
disproportionate impact on the ability of women in particular to 
recover punitive damages which could occur from grossly negligent 
conduct, since many of the cases that involve large awards involve 
defective medical products placed inside women's bodies, the very 
products likely to need FDA approval.
  These are products such as the Dalkon Shield, the Cooper-7 IUD 
device, high-absorbency tampons linked to toxic shock syndrome and 
silicone breast implants. For each of these products, the manufacturer 
had information indicating the dangers posed by the product.
  So join me and the gentleman from Ohio in opposing this amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Oxley] is recognized for 
1\1/2\ minutes to close debate.
  Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support this amendment 
which will strengthen H.R. 956, the Common Sense Product Liability and 
Legal Reform Act and address what I see as a deterrent to research and 
development of lifesaving pharmaceuticals and medical devices.
  [[Page H2948]] The out-of-control tort situation in our country is 
forcing companies that research and develop medical equipment and 
lifesaving drugs to back away from developing important new treatments 
for diseases such as AIDS or cancer.
  The United States has the most rigorous drug and medical device 
approval process in the world. Companies which research and develop new 
medical treatments spend millions, sometimes billions of dollars, on 
developing and testing these products in order to meet FDA standards 
and approval, before they are able to make these important products 
available to the public. In addition to the money spent, the time 
involved with the process of FDA approval can take up to 10 years.
  The proposed limitation on punitive damages makes sense. Even when 
every effort is made to ensure the safety and efficacy of the drug for 
the illness or condition it is designed to treat, no drug is 100 
percent risk free. The FDA recognizes this and in making its approval 
decision must weight the risks and benefits of each new pharmaceutical 
in order to minimize, if not eliminate, risk of injury. If injury does 
occur, despite all the companies research and the government's review, 
and the manufacturer has complied with all relevant federal 
requirements, it should not then be held liable for ``punitive 
damages.''
  Without this amendment, there remains a powerful disincentive to 
certain types of pharmaceutical research. Enacting the government-
standards defense will encourage new research and development.
  I am pleased to support this amendment which I believe offers a fair 
balance of protection for consumers and businesses alike.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to support the amendment to 
H.R. 956 offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Oxley]. This amendment 
will bar punitive damages for the sale or manufacture of drugs or 
devices which have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration.
  Our medical device and pharmaceutical companies must be able to 
continue to pioneer life-saving, cost-effective products. The explosion 
of litigation and the skyrocketing costs that are attendant to such 
lawsuits are in great part responsible for the high costs of healthcare 
in the United States. They also dampen our enthusiasm for innovative 
and breakthrough research that produces products that enhance our 
quality of life. This amendment would produce a ``government 
standards'' defense where companies that adhere to strict government 
regulations designed to preserve safety would not be held liable for 
punitive damages involving a product.
  New medicines and medical devices increase life expectancy and make 
life better for those who need it most: people afflicted with disease 
or people with disabilities. Our approval process for these items is 
the most stringent in the world, and require huge investments of 
funding and human resources. The testing process is rigorous and 
complete. Clinical trials are exhausting. Paperwork substantiating 
these processes usually runs 100,000 pages or more for a single 
product.
  Clearly the decision to allow such products on the market prove that 
their benefits outweigh any risk that may be involved. Punitive damages 
were designed to punish businesses or individuals for willfully 
negligent or harmful behavior. Companies that submit products for FDA 
review do not do so in bad faith.
  Mr. Chairman, in my Indiana District we are the home of three 
important producers of biomedical products. The Biomet, Zimmer and 
DePuy Corporations are the makers of orthotic and prosthetic devices 
that are critical to the health and well-being of people throughout the 
world. They invest constantly in improving their products, and in turn 
create good jobs and contribute heavily to our trade balance. The work 
they do is only for the common good, and their contribution to modern 
health and quality of life must be acknowledged in this legislation.
  This amendment provides a level of protection for these companies 
while protecting the rights of individuals to seek damages for 
expenses, pain or suffering. I commend the gentleman from Ohio for 
offering this measure and encourage my colleagues to support this 
important provision.
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, this has been a very worthwhile debate. I am 
only sorry we did not have more time. This has been a worthwhile and 
edifying debate.
  Let me conclude by answering some questions that have been raised 
during the debate and particularly from some conversations I have had 
with my good friend from New York, Mr. Towns, as to what this amendment 
does or does not do.
  First of all, this amendment applies only to punitive damages. 
Second, the amendment does not cap noneconomic damages in any way, so 
that the plaintiff would be entitled to receive economic and 
noneconomic damages; only punitive damages would not be permitted.
  Thirdly, the FDA is the agency we rely on to regulate food and drug 
purity and the only agency authorized to give premarket approval.
  This amendment encourages innovations, it protects consumers and it 
makes good common sense.
  Mr. Chairman, this was a bipartisan effort on this amendment, and we 
think it goes to the heart of the entire process of approving medical 
devices and drugs. It is in the best interests of our consumers and of 
our constituents that we have a system that we can rely on and that 
provides adequate protection against voracious punitive damage awards 
against drug companies or other manufacturers of medical products.
  The Oxley bipartisan amendment is an amendment that all Members can 
and should support.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Oxley].
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10 printed 
in House Report 104-72.


                     amendment offered by mr. hoke

  Mr. HOKE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

       Amendment offered by Mr. Hoke: Page 19, redesignate section 
     202 as section 203 and insert after line 19 the following:

     SEC. 202. DEPOSIT OF DAMAGES.

       If punitive damages of more than $250,000 are awarded in a 
     civil liability action, 75 percent of the amount of such 
     damages in excess of $250,000 shall be deposited--
       (1) if the action was in a Federal court, in the treasury 
     of the State in which such court sits, and
       (2) if the action was in a State court, in the treasury of 
     the State in which such court sits.
     This section shall be applied by the court and shall not be 
     disclosed to the jury.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. 
Hoke] will be recognized for 10 minutes and a Member in opposition to 
the amendment will be recognized for 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Hoke].
  Mr. HOKE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this punitive damages amendment is fairly simple and 
straightforward. What it does is it restores the original intent of 
punitive damages awards which is namely to punish wrongdoers, it is not 
to compensate plaintiffs.
  Every day in courtrooms across America, plaintiffs are compensated 
for lost wages, for medical and rehabilitation costs, loss of the use 
of property, emotional distress, injury to their reputation, 
humiliation, and loss of companionship or consortium. These are the 
awards that are intended to make the defendant whole or complete. These 
are compensatory awards.
  But in addition to these economic and noneconomic damages, plaintiffs 
are receiving themselves windfalls that were never meant to play part 
in making them whole. This windfall comes in the form of punitive 
damages that by their very definition are intended to be punishment for 
wrongdoing defendants. This punishment is intended to deter future 
wrongdoing.
  The key to a fine's effectiveness is not who receives it but who is 
forced to pay. That is why I am proposing that 75 percent of punitive 
damages in excess of $250,000 be paid to the State in which the action 
is litigated. In other words, plaintiffs will still receive 100 percent 
of any punitive damages up to $250,000 and will receive 25 percent of 
any amount awarded in excess of $250,000.
  I believe this arrangement strikes a very good balance between 
maintaining the plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney's incentive to 
seek punitive damages, and emulating the model of a criminal fine.
  This amendment also stipulates that the arrangement is to be applied 
by the court and is not to be disclosed to the jury. This provision 
safeguards against juries using punitive damages to finance State 
initiatives in a way that would improperly bias their outcome.
  Ten States have adopted laws sending a portion of punitive damages to 
their State for a variety of purposes. 
[[Page H2949]] The Georgia Supreme Court has upheld its law sending a 
portion of punitive damage awards directly to the State.
  This has broad support, Mr. Chairman. It is supported by people from 
former Attorney General Griffin Bell to the State legislatures of 10 
States across this country.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there a Member who wishes to manage the opposition 
to the Hoke amendment? Does the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] 
wish to manage the opposition to the Hoke amendment?
  Mr. CONYERS. I do, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] is recognized 
for 10 minutes.


                         parliamentary inquiry

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, on a point of procedure, would I have the 
right to close on this since this is an amendment against the bill?
  The CHAIRMAN. As a member of the reporting committee, the gentleman 
has the right to close.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment continues chipping away at the entire 
concept of punitive damages by reducing punitive damages over $250,000 
by an additional 75 percent and giving it to the Federal or State 
treasury rather than to the individual who sued.
  Do State treasuries want these awards? New York said, ``No thanks,'' 
and repealed its apportionment law. In Colorado, the supreme court held 
that giving punitive awards to a State fund was an unconstitutional 
``taking.''
  Who benefits? The corporations who will simply build economic damages 
into their costs of doing business, without fear of facing large 
punitive damages that would have deterred them from knowingly selling 
products that cause devastating injury to the buyer.
  Who loses? Those at the lower end of the economic scale who will have 
less incentive to sue, especially when their recovery is determined by 
how much they earn rather than the outrageousness of the defendant's 
conduct.
  Some Members on the other side will argue that punitive damages 
should punish wrongdoers and are not intended to compensate plaintiffs, 
but they should know better. Lawsuits brought by victims, not 
Government regulation, brought about safety improvements like 
restricting asbestos use, like beepers on reversing garbage trucks that 
had resulted in numerous injuries to children, like recalling the 
Dalkon Shield. Punitive damages put an end to the exploding fuel tank 
and the heart by-pass drug that resulted in amputation caused by 
gangrene.
  The likely result if this amendment passes is more dangerous products 
on the market and less incentive for the victims to sue, a prospect 
that does not advance the common good but will only please the sponsors 
of this Contract with Corporate America.

                              {time}  1800

  Please reject the Hoke amendment.
  Mr. HOKE. Mr. Chairman, I point out once more, while we are talking 
about our punitive damages, not compensatory damages, compensatory 
damages are already paid to compensate a victim for his economic and 
noneconomic losses.
  Mr. Chairman, at this time I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Hyde], the chairman of the committee.
  Mr. HYDE. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. 
Hoke] provides for 75 percent of punitive damages awards in excess of 
$250,000 to be deposited to the treasury of the State in which the 
particular Federal or State court sits. Since punitive damages are 
limited under Section 201(b) to $250,000 or 3 times the damages awarded 
for economic loss--whichever is greater--punitive damages can exceed 
$250,000 only if the damages for economic loss exceed $83,333.33. I 
support this proposal because it effectuates the public interest in 
allowing large punitive damages awards to benefit the appropriate State 
without either compromising the rights of claimants to full 
compensation for injuries sustained or eliminating incentives to seek 
punitive damages.
  Punitive damages are designed to punish or deter egregious 
misconduct--in contrast to compensatory damages that compensate 
claimants for both economic and non-economic losses. Compensatory 
damages cover such monetary items as medical expenses and lost wages 
and such non-monetary items as pain and suffering. Claimants who are 
fully compensated for both monetary and non-monetary losses receive 
windfalls when they also collect punitive damages. It makes eminent 
good sense for punitive damages to be allocated for public purposes--
which essentially is what we accomplish by directing such funds to 
state treasuries. The States in turn can decide on the best uses to be 
made of these funds.
  Although in theory all of these awards should go to the appropriate 
State, we recognize the practical need to retain incentives for 
claimants to seek such awards. For that reason, the amendment leaves 
untouched State law schemes that allow claimants to collect punitive 
damages up to $250,000. The claimant's share of amounts in excess of 
$250,000 will equal 25 percent provided the law of the particular State 
permits the claimant to collect it. The amendment includes sufficient 
incentives for claimants to continue seeking punitive damages in 
appropriate cases while recognizing the public interest in retaining 
benefits from large punitive damages awards.
  The amendment is meritorious and represents a positive contribution 
to this legislation.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Nadler].
  Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I recognize the intention of the gentleman from Ohio 
[Mr. Hoke]. I had a similar amendment, similar but different, in 
committee, which I am sorry that the Committee on Rules did not make in 
order.
  The purpose of punitive damages, the main purpose, is to deter, to 
deter egregious, terrible conduct. When we are dealing with a 
malefactor of great wealth, as the Republican President once put it, 
you need a large punitive award.
  But why should the individual victim be unjustly enriched just 
because the tort feasor was a very wealthy individual or a big 
corporation.
  So I do not mind the limit of $250,000 or 3 times the economic 
damage, whichever is greater, as the recovery for the victim. But that 
will totally limit the deterrent effect against the large tort feasor.
  So I suggested let the victim get the $250,000 or 3 times economic 
damage, whichever is greater, and let government, for deficit 
reduction, get any award in excess of that.
  So you still get the deterrent effect, but not unjust enrichment.
  The gentleman from Ohio turned it around, and he says let us give 75 
percent to the government of the excess over $250,000 below 3 times 
economic damages. So if the economic damage was $400,000, 3 times 
economic damages would be $1.2 million. Mr. Hoke says limit what the 
victim gets to $250,000 plus a quarter of that difference.
  So this is reducing below what the bill said the possible recovery 
is. I think this is wrong because the victim is entitled to some 
reasonable recovery of punitive damages in relation to economic 
damages.
  Mr. HOKE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. NADLER. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. HOKE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask the gentleman, is it not true what his amendment 
would have done would have been to eliminate the cap on punitive 
damages?
  Mr. NADLER. Yes. Reclaiming my time, that is exactly the point. There 
should not be a cap on punitive damages necessary as a deterrent but to 
avoid unjust enrichment. I can understand the cap on the recovery to 
the victim. But to cap the total award and then to say underneath that 
cap we are going to say the victim cannot get it all, that I think is 
wrong to the victim and does not provide an adequate deterrent to the 
tort feasor.
  Mr. HOKE. Would the gentleman not agree that it is true that we just 
rejected that concept by rejecting soundly the First Amendment in this 
Congress? We just rejected that idea.
  [[Page H2950]] Mr. NADLER. Well, I think the majority is wrong.
  Mr. HOKE. But we had a vote on what the gentleman wanted.
  Mr. NADLER. But what the gentleman is doing goes further. What the 
gentleman is saying is the cap of 3 times economic damages $250,000, 
and we are going to deny part that have to the victim.
  If you want to say we should not have any cap at all, then it makes 
sense to say to the victim he should not unjustly enrich himself to any 
extent.
  I urge defeat of the amendment.
  Mr. HOKE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Goodlatte].
  Mr. GOODLATTE. I thank the gentleman for yielding and commend him for 
what I think is a very good amendment.
  In fact, it is an amendment that helps to cure one of the objections 
raised on the other side to the fact that there is a cap on punitive 
damages. The cap is important in order to keep juries from becoming 
legislators. They are not elected. They do a very good job of resolving 
disputes between individuals, but when you have multimillion-dollar 
awards, you have a problem with juries imposing rules on society that 
ought to be imposed by State legislatures.
  In this case, you are now dealing with the problem that they observe 
once you impose the cap, and that is that it is discriminatory because 
they said somebody with a very wealthy background might have high 
economic losses, they got 3 times that and recover far more than 
somebody with a poorer background who could only have a $250,000 cap.
  So I compliment the gentleman because he is saying that everybody up 
to $250,000 is equal. Once you get beyond $250,000, we have gone 
already beyond the purpose of punitive damages. They are not to reward 
an individual or even compensate an individual for loss they get from 
the economic loss and the noneconomic loss.
  That is medical bills that they are entitled to be reimbursed for, 
lost income, pain and suffering, all of that is not affected by 
punitive damages.
  So, by saying that 75 percent of the amount above $250,000 will go to 
the public treasury where it should go because it is, in effect, a fine 
is a very good idea. And that is exactly the parallel to fines.
  The standard for punitive damages is a very high one. It is only for 
people who do serious wrong.
  So when we impose a fine on people and it is a serious wrong meeting 
a high standard, it ought to go into that public treasury just as a 
fine imposed on a criminal wrongdoer.
  That was exactly the point made by former Supreme Court Justice Lewis 
Powell, who said that the private windfall aspects of punitive damages 
aggravates the problems that we have with the whole rack of standards 
in punitive damages because, unlike fines, which go to the public 
treasury, punitive damages go to the private plaintiffs. To a limited 
extent, that is fine, and your bill does it. Beyond that, it goes into 
the public treasury.
  I commend the gentleman for a very good amendment.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Scott], a member of the Committee on the 
Judiciary.
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, we keep hearing these generalities about 
excessive awards, but we do not hear specific cases that outraged 
juries so much that they actually awarded punitive damages.
  We have to put this amendment in the context of the other amendments 
that we have already had and recognize punitive damages are designed to 
be high enough to protect society from a corporate calculation that it 
is easier to pay the damages for somebody injured, maimed or killed, 
than it is to correct the situation.
  Earlier today we talked about the situation with flammable pajamas 
where the court found that the corporation knew that the pajamas--that 
newsprint burned only slightly faster than the pajamas. Because of the 
punitive damages, children can now go to bed safely knowing they are 
not wearing these things.
  In the context of loser pays and a separate trial for punitive 
damages, this amendment would essentially remove any incentive that a 
plaintiff would have to go after punitive damages, thereby removing the 
safety valve that others will enjoy by virtue of the fact that 
corporations are afraid of these punitive damages. The loser pays, you 
can win the case, on the compensation, you could even win punitive 
damages. But if you come in under the offer, you end up paying your 
attorneys' fees, the other peoples' attorneys' fees, and you are 
therefore discouraged from bringing these cases.
  This amendment is another discouragement in protecting society from 
corporate wrongdoing and ought to be defeated.
  Mr. HOKE. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to respond to the last 
speaker by saying that clearly when you still have a $250,000 amount of 
money, I do not know why that is not considered to be an incentive, not 
to mention that in terms of criminal fines that is a tremendous fine. 
If somebody is fined for criminal negligence or felonious activity, a 
$250,000 fine is disproportionate to almost anything you will find in a 
State legislature's code of criminal penalties.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Bilbray].
  Mr. BILBRAY. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, frankly, I think if you tried to explain this to the 
average citizen in the United States, they would think it is absurd 
that somebody is going to be given a fine and that fine is going to be 
given to the plaintiff. With fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, 
we do not have those fines and forfeitures going to the victim of the 
crime. That may be more logical than what we have here because at least 
in the criminal case they have not been made whole.
  By definition, they should have been made whole before punitive is 
ever considered.
  I think what we have to do is get the lottery out of this. I would 
ask that we support this amendment. I would prefer that all punitive 
damages go to a public fund because that is where penalty fees should 
be going. They go to a public fund in a criminal case. By definition, 
they should be going to such a fund.
  Mr. HOKE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Tennessee [Mr. Bryant].
  Mr. BRYANT of Tennessee. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of 
this amendment.
  I think the concept has oft been repeated today about compensatory 
and punitive damages and the purposes of each. Clearly, we have 
established today that punitive damages are to punish and deter. We 
have a parallel concept in the criminal code when we have restitution 
and fines. In that instance, the court may award restitution; that is 
to the victim of the crime. But the fine that they punish that criminal 
with goes to the State.
  In the instance of the civil justice system, punitive damages are 
used in a civil case to deter conduct. In our civil justice system, 
punitive damages are used to deter conduct for the good of society as a 
whole. Under those circumstances it is only right that society as a 
whole should reap the benefit of the punitive damages. For that reason 
I strongly support and commend the gentleman from Ohio for his 
amendment.
  Mr. HOKE. I thank the gentleman for those kind words.
  I will close with two thoughts. First of all, I want to thank the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Bilbray] for wanting to speak on this 
subject. He has been walking around with pneumonia for 3 days. He felt 
so strongly enough, he said he wanted to come down and speak on this, 
and I think that says a great deal.
  Mr. Chairman, this is not a farfetched amendment, by any means. What 
you are going to hear from the other side is somehow this is taking 
rights away, money away, dollars away from people. Nothing could be 
further from the truth than that.

                              {time}  1815

  The fact is that a punitive damage award is meant to take the place 
of a criminal fine. We are saying that the first $250,000 of that can 
go to the victim. After that, it still goes 25 percent to the victim 
and 75 percent to the 
[[Page H2951]] State. It was never intended to make a plaintiff whole. 
We have already done that with economic and noneconomic compensatory 
damages. That is not what this is intended to do, never has been, never 
will be. But what we have to do is we need to put the money back to the 
State. That is where criminal fines go. That is where this, the 
punitive damage awards should go.
  That is what this bill is all about; it is a common sense balancing 
approach to this problem.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. 
Conyers] for 1\1/2\ minutes to close debate.
  Mr. CONYERS. Members of the Committee, we have seen a chipping-away 
effect that has now reached the point that I think Members on the other 
side will begin to be repelled by it. The entire concept of punitive 
damages are now being reduced by an additional 75 percent when they 
exceed $250,000 by giving it to the Federal or State treasury rather 
than to the individual who sued.
  When is this going to end? What reason does a person have to come 
into court with a lawyer, to risk his all, under the accentuated costs 
and risks that he must not attend, and then, if he recovers, it goes 
not to him, but it goes to the State or to the Federal Government 
itself? What kind of nationalistic scheme are we talking about?
  I say to my colleagues, ``You don't have to be a supporter of states 
rights to take exception to this.''
  Where will we draw the line? What are we doing? Has each citizen 
become an apparatchik for the State even when he or she goes to court 
and recovers?
  The New York State court has said ``no,'' the Supreme Court of 
Colorado has said ``no,'' and now we should say ``no'' to the gentleman 
from Ohio [Mr. Hoke].
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Hoke].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. HOKE. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 162, 
noes 265, not voting 7, as follows:
                             [Roll No. 224]

    
    

                               AYES--162

     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Baker (CA)
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bereuter
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bliley
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Browder
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Condit
     Cox
     Crane
     Cremeans
     Cunningham
     Deal
     DeLay
     Doggett
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Fowler
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hancock
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoke
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Jacobs
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kanjorski
     Kasich
     Kim
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaFalce
     Laughlin
     Leach
     Lewis (KY)
     Lincoln
     Linder
     Luther
     Maloney
     Martinez
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (CA)
     Miller (FL)
     Moorhead
     Neumann
     Norwood
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce
     Regula
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Roth
     Royce
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schumer
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shaw
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thurman
     Towns
     Upton
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Williams
     Wolf
     Young (FL)
     Zimmer

                               NOES--265

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allard
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (LA)
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Bass
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Bonior
     Bono
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant (TX)
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Callahan
     Canady
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clinger
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Combest
     Conyers
     Cooley
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crapo
     Danner
     Davis
     de la Garza
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Engel
     Ensign
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Everett
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Foley
     Ford
     Fox
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Graham
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hayes
     Hefner
     Herger
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Horn
     Hoyer
     Hutchinson
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kaptur
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     King
     Kleczka
     Klink
     LaHood
     Lantos
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lightfoot
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Longley
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Martini
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McDade
     McDermott
     McHale
     McHugh
     McIntosh
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Meyers
     Mfume
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Pickett
     Poshard
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Riggs
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schiff
     Schroeder
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stockman
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stupak
     Tate
     Taylor (MS)
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Traficant
     Tucker
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Waldholtz
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weldon (PA)
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates
     Young (AK)
     Zeliff

                             NOT VOTING--7

     Cubin
     Forbes
     Gibbons
     Hayworth
     Rangel
     Tiahrt
     Ward

                              {time}  1838

  Messrs. ZELIFF, TATE, BUNNING of Kentucky, BREWSTER, HANSEN, VENTO, 
BONO, BARCIA, DICKS, KENNEDY of Massachusetts, OBERSTAR, CALLAHAN, 
WAMP, MONTGOMERY, CHAMBLISS, EVERETT, and SISISKY, and Ms. BROWN of 
Florida changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Messrs. PAYNE of Virginia, PAXON, GREENWOOD, McINNIS McCRERY, and 
DORNAN changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 11, 
printed in House Report 104-72.


               amendment offered by mr. cox of california

  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Cox of California:
       Page 1, strike line 7 and all that follows through the 
     matter that precedes line 1 on page 2, and insert the 
     following:
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents is as 
     follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings and purposes.

                   TITLE I--PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM

Sec. 101. Applicability.
Sec. 102. Liability rules applicable to product sellers.
Sec. 103. Defense based on claimant's use of intoxicating alcohol or 
              drugs.
Sec. 104. Misuse or alteration.
Sec. 105. Frivolous pleadings.
Sec. 106. Several liability for noneconomic loss.
Sec. 107. Statute of repose.
Sec. 108. Definitions.
[[Page H2952]] TITLE II--LIMITATION ON SPECULATIVE AND ARBITRARY DAMAGE 
                                 AWARDS

Sec. 201. Treble damages as penalty in civil actions.
Sec. 202. Limitation on additional payments beyond actual damages.
Sec. 203. Fair share rule for noneconomic damage awards.
Sec. 204. Definitions.

                   TITLE III--BIOMATERIALS SUPPLIERS

Sec. 301. Liability of biomaterials suppliers.
Sec. 302. Procedures for dismissal of civil actions against 
              biomaterials suppliers.
Sec. 303. Definitions.

         TITLE IV--LIMITATIONS ON APPLICABILITY; EFFECTIVE DATE

Sec. 401. Application limited to interstate commerce.
Sec. 402. Effect on other law.
       Sec. 403. Federal cause of action precluded.
       Sec. 404. Effective date.
     SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
       (1) the civil justice system, which is designed to 
     safeguard our most cherished rights, to remedy injustices, 
     and to defend our liberty, is increasingly being deployed to 
     abridge our rights, create injustice, and destroy our 
     liberty;
       (2) our Nation is overly litigious, the civil justice 
     system is overcrowded, sluggish, and excessively costly, and 
     the costs of lawsuits, both direct and indirect, are 
     inflicting serious and unnecessary injury on the national 
     economy;
       (3) excessive, unpredictable, and often arbitrary damage 
     awards and unfair allocations of liability have a direct and 
     undesirable effect on interstate commerce by increasing the 
     cost and decreasing the availability of goods and services;
       (4) the rules of law governing product liability actions, 
     damage awards, and allocations of liability have evolved 
     inconsistently within and among the several States, resulting 
     in a complex, contradictory, and uncertain regime that is 
     inequitable to both plaintiffs and defendants and unduly 
     burdens interstate commerce;
       (5) as a result of excessive, unpredictable, and often 
     arbitrary damage awards and unfair allocations of liability, 
     consumers have been adversely affected through the withdrawal 
     of products, producers, services, and service providers from 
     the national market, and from excessive liability costs 
     passed on to them through higher prices;
       (6) excessive, unpredictable, and often arbitrary damage 
     awards and unfair allocations of liability jeopardize the 
     financial well-being of many individuals as well as entire 
     industries, particularly the Nation's small businesses, and 
     adversely affects governments, taxpayers, nonprofit entities 
     and volunteer organizations;
       (7) the excessive costs of the civil justice system 
     undermine the ability of American companies to compete 
     internationally, and serve to decrease the number of jobs and 
     the amount of productive capital in the national economy;
       (8) the unpredictability of damage awards is inequitable to 
     both plaintiffs and defendants and has added considerably to 
     the high cost of liability insurance, making it difficult for 
     producers, consumers, and individuals to protect their 
     liability with any degree of confidence and at a reasonable 
     cost;
       (9) because of the national scope of the problems crated by 
     the defects in the civil justice system,
      it is not possible for the several States to enact laws that 
     fully and effectively respond to those problems;
       (10) it is the constitutional role of the national 
     government to remove barriers to interstate commerce; and
       (11) there is need to restore rationality, certainty, and 
     fairness to the civil justice system in order to protect 
     against excessive, arbitrary, and uncertain damage awards and 
     to reduce the volume, costs, and delay of litigation.
       (b) Purposes.--Based upon the powers contained in Article 
     I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution, the 
     purposes of this Act are to promote the free flow of goods 
     and services and to lessen burdens on interstate commerce 
     by--
       (1) establishing certain uniform legal principles of 
     product liability which provide a fair balance among the 
     interests which provide a fair balance among the interests of 
     product users, manufacturers, and product sellers;
       (2) placing reasonable limits on damages over and above the 
     actual damages suffered by a claimant;
       (3) ensuring the fair allocation of liability in civil 
     actions;
       (4) reducing the unacceptable costs and delays of our civil 
     justice system caused by excessive litigation which harm both 
     plaintiffs and defendants; and
       (5) establishing greater fairness, rationality, and 
     predictability in the civil justice system.
       Page 2, strike line 3 and all that follows through line 24, 
     and page 4 (and redesignate subsequent sections accordingly).
       Page 11, strike lines 17 through 24 (and redesignate 
     subsequent sections accordingly).
       Page 12, strike line 24 and all that follows through line 2 
     on page 13 (and redesignate the subsequent section 
     accordingly).
       Page 17, strike lines 10 through 12 and insert the 
     following:

    TITLE II--LIMITATION ON SPECULATIVE AND ARBITRARY DAMAGE AWARDS

     SEC. 201. TREBLE DAMAGES AS PENALTY IN CIVIL ACTIONS.

       Page 17, line 21, insert ``rights or'' before ``safety''.
       Page 17, beginning in line 25, strike ``for the economic 
     loss on which the claimant's action is based'' and insert 
     ``for economic loss''.
       Page 18, insert after the period in line 2 the following: 
     ``This section shall be applied by the court and shall not be 
     disclosed to the jury.''.
       Page 18, line 3, strike ``and Preemption''.
       Page 18, strike ``title'' in lines 4 and 6 and insert 
     ``section''.
       Page 18, beginning in line 7, strike ``in any jurisdiction 
     that does not authorize such actions'' and insert after the 
     period in line 8 the following: ``This section does not 
     preempt or supersede any State or Federal law to the extent 
     that such law would further limit the award of punitive 
     damages.''.
       Page 19, after line 19, insert the following new sections 
     (and redesignate the subsequent section accordingly):

     SEC. 202. FAIR SHARE RULE FOR NONECONOMIC DAMAGE AWARDS.

       (a) Fair Share of Liability Imposed According to Share of 
     Fault.--In any product liability or other civil action 
     brought in State or Federal court, a defendant shall be 
     liable only for the amount of noneconomic damages 
     attributable to such defendant in direct proportion to such 
     defendant's share of fault or responsibility for the 
     claimant's actual damages, as determined by the trier of 
     fact. In all such cases, the liability of a defendant for 
     noneconomic damages shall be several and not joint.
       (b) Applicability.--Except as provided in section 401, this 
     section shall apply to any product liability or other civil 
     action brought in any Federal or State court on any theory 
     where noneconomic damages are sought. This section does not 
     preempt or supersede any State or Federal law to the extent 
     that such law would further limit the application of the 
     theory of joint liability to any kind of damages.
       Page 19, after line 21, insert the following new paragraph:
       (1) The term ``actual damages'' means damages awarded to 
     pay for economic loss.
       Page 19, line 22, strike ``(1)'' and insert ``(2)''.
       Page 20, line 4, strike ``(2)'' and insert ``(3)''.
       Page 20, line 12, strike ``(3)'' and insert ``(4)''.
       Page 20, line 18, strike ``(4)'' and insert ``(5)''.
       Page 20, after line 20, insert the following new paragraph 
     (and redesignate subsequent paragraphs accordingly):
       (6) The term ``noneconomic damages'' means damages other 
     than punitive damages or actual damages.
       Page 20, line 21, strike ``(5)'' and insert ``(7)''.
       Page 21, line 1, strike ``(6)'' and insert ``(8)''.
       Page 30, strike lines 6 and 7, and insert the following:

         TITLE IV--LIMITATIONS ON APPLICABILITY; EFFECTIVE DATE

     SEC. 401. APPLICATION LIMITED TO INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

       Titles I, II, and III shall apply only to product liability 
     or other civil actions affecting interstate commerce. For 
     purposes of the preceding sentence, the term ``interstate 
     commerce'' means commerce among the several States or with 
     foreign nations, or in any territory of the United States or 
     in the District of Columbia, or between any such territory 
     and another, or between any such territory and any State or 
     foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any 
     State or territory or foreign nation.
       Redesignate subsequent sections accordingly.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Cox] and a Member opposed will each be recognized for 20 minutes.


                         parliamentary inquiry

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary 
inquiry.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. As a member of the reporting committee, I 
wonder, by whatever process of mental divination the Chair uses, if he 
would decide that I had the right to close on this.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is correct, he will have the right to 
close.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I thank the Chair.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Cox].
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, the tenor of the debate on this entire bill and all of 
the amendments to this bill is pretty clear: We have too many lawsuits 
in America. We have become too litigious. It costs too much money, and 
simple justice is not being served.
  The amendment that I am proposing, along with my colleague, Mr. Pete 
Geren from Texas, advances a simple rule that will go a long way to 
making 
[[Page H2953]] sure that fair justice exists once again in our courts. 
Our simple rule is called the fair-share rule.
  Under this provision, a person will be made to pay for the damages 
that he, she, or it caused, but no person will be made to pay for 
damages that someone else caused. Our rule will hold wrongdoers 
responsible for their actions, and our rule will permit people who are 
not responsible for that damage to understand that their conduct will 
have been rewarded faithfully by the law.
  The so-called joint and several liability doctrine is really the 
fair-share rule stood on its head. If you are adjudged 1 percent 
liable, you can be required to pay under the current system 100 percent 
of the damages caused by someone else if it turns out that you are the 
only one in the picture that has any money. It is known to plaintiffs' 
trial lawyers as the deep-pockets opportunity. Find somebody, not 
necessarily a rich person, perhaps just a small business person or an 
individual who has an insurance policy, who you think can therefore be 
made to pay, or just from whom a settlement can be extorted, and bring 
them into the lawsuit.
  Take the case of a drunk driver going down the street, goes off the 
sidewalk onto the front lawn and kills someone. If that person is sued 
and the jury were to find, and this is approximately the facts in a 
real case in California, the jury finds that the drunk driver is 95 
percent liable for the damage that the drunk driver caused, but the 
city is 5 percent liable because there was a pothole on the way, and 
the drunk driver does not have any money, then the taxpayers are stuck 
for all of the damage caused by the drunk.

                              {time}  1845

  That is our current system. Under the fair share rule, someone 
adjudged 5 percent liable will pay 5 percent of the damage. That is the 
fair share rule.
  I urge support for this amendment.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes and 30 
seconds to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers], the ranking 
member of the full Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  We are confronted with a very strange amendment here, because what 
has not been mentioned by the author of it is that it seeks to exclude 
foreign manufacturers from the service of process requirement that 
American manufacturers are subject to. And so members of the committee, 
we are back to the same amendment on the other end that we voted only a 
few hours ago, where we said that a foreign manufacturer was subject to 
the same discovery proceedings that a national manufacturer, a domestic 
manufacturer is subject to.
  We said that we should not be able to have them avoid litigation 
because their discovery may take them to Europe or to Japan, that they 
must subject themselves to discovery. And this amendment, although 
strangely enough it has not been said yet, and you are going to have to 
read pretty carefully to find it anywhere, is that this is going to 
change the service of process in suits brought against foreign 
manufacturers.
  It is another way to let them out of playing the game on a level 
playing field with domestic manufacturers.
  I think we all know what some of them are doing. They sell their 
goods, freight on board, in Japan or Germany, just so they will not be 
treated as having contacts in this country which could subject them to 
suit there. They know that this makes U.S. citizens go through repeated 
hurdles to bring suit against them, ranging from translating the 
complaint into another language and asking the State Department to 
serve action, and even then the foreign business may elect to ignore 
the action.
  This is another backdoor way of giving a foreign manufacturer a leg 
up. To make sure that everybody knows what the gentleman is doing, I do 
not know why the gentleman did not just come out, the gentleman from 
California did not just come out and say what this is going to do. It 
is going to change the way service of process is implemented by a 
foreign manufacturer, and that is just the front door way of getting 
around the discovery amendment that would have given them a break that 
we just rejected.
  Why do you want to give different rules in court to foreign 
companies? What benefit do you see in that? I know there are a lot of 
foreign companies
 here, but do you not see, my friend, that citizens that are sued and 
want to sue will need to have service of process. And if you try to 
take this out, we are going to be doing ourselves a grave disservice to 
all of our constituents?

  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman makes a very fair 
point. In fact, the effect of gentleman's just having won on his 
amendment is that the provisions of this amendment that would otherwise 
have dealt with service of process will have no effect. The gentleman 
has carried the day, and the gentleman's amendment will in fact be 
successfully included in this bill.
  Mr. CONYERS. Reclaiming my time, the current language in this bill is 
carefully balanced. It offers a carrot and a stick. The end result is a 
substantially more balanced playing field.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. My sense would be, in most parliamentary 
situations, that the last enactment would supersede the previous one. 
So the notion that by a prior action we could somehow control a 
subsequent action is a dubious proposition at best. The gentleman has 
got a drafting problem. He cannot solve it by something that we did a 
couple of hours ago, because by a subsequent action we would be deemed 
to have amended or modified the previous action.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment strikes a blow against U.S. 
citizens, the same as the other discovery amendment tried to do.
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pete Geren.
  (Mr. PETE GEREN of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. PETE GEREN of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. COX of California. Our amendment dealt with section 109 and 
struck it. The gentleman from Michigan added a new section 110. Our 
amendment has no effect on it. So the gentleman has carried the day.
  Mr. PETE GEREN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment. The amendment in 
front of us applies to noneconomic damages known to most people as pain 
and suffering, emotional distress. Joint and several liability for 
noneconomic damages is a system that asks Peter to pay for Paul's sins. 
The bill currently remedies this inequity for all products cases.
  However, our amendment extends this much-needed reform to all civil 
actions. This means that each defendant will be liable for damages for 
pain and suffering in an amount proportional to his fair share.
  When joint and several liability was first developed, plaintiffs had 
to be found completely blameless to recover damages. Now with few 
exceptions, plaintiffs can recover damages even if they are partially 
or mostly at fault. In a recent case involving Walt Disney and a woman 
injured on bumper cars, Walt Disney was found 1 percent at fault in an 
accident, yet the trial court held and the Florida Supreme Court 
affirmed that Disney had to pay 86 percent of the plaintiff's damages.
  It may make sense to require that a single defendant be held 
accountable for all economic damages to make sure that the defendant is 
made financially whole to the extent that dollars can account for the 
problems suffered by the plaintiff, but there is little justification 
for allocating liability in this manner for highly subjective 
noneconomic damages.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in voting for this amendment. The 
problems of joint and several liability are not limited exclusively to 
the product liability area. Excessive noneconomic damages are not 
commmonplace in all types of cases, including claims against 
[[Page H2954]] citizen, small businesses, charities, and the Little 
League.
  Let us ask each citizen to pay his or her fair share of the damages, 
no more, no less. That is fair.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the 
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Dingell].
  (Mr. DINGELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, the House a little earlier rejected an 
amendment which would have denied discovery to American firms which 
were involved in product liability cases where foreigners were taking 
advantage of them and where they were receiving shelter under the bill. 
Note that the vote was 258 in favor of that amendment, an overwhelming 
win. This amendment would, and language of section 109, eliminate the 
requirement that foreign companies inside this country appoint an agent 
for purposes of receiving service in the case of product liability 
suits.
  I say that the House has once rejected that principle and should 
again reject it. Under the previous amendment, you could not get 
discovery. Now you cannot even get into court under this amendment.
  Let us talk about something other. In eliminating the joint and 
several liability, a man hires two hoodlums to kill his mother-in-law. 
The woman is horribly disfigured. Judgment is collected ultimately by 
the woman against the husband and the two hoodlums. She can only 
collect approximately a third because no longer is there joint and 
several liability.
  Another case: A Member of Congress is liabled by his local newspaper, 
charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor. No longer 
under this amendment is there joint and several liability. He sues the 
newspaper and the two reporters. Because joint and several liability is 
no longer there, we can only collect approximately a third of the 
damages which would have been appropriately assessed against the 
wrongdoers.
  This is a bad amendment. It is an admirable reason for why we ought 
not write legislation of this kind on the floor. It carries the 
question of liability. It carries the question of compensation well 
beyond the question of product liability.
  It carries it into all civil wrongs and all civil litigation.
  The amendment should be rejected. It favors foreigners, it favors 
wrongdoing. It puts the innocent at risk. It denies people proper 
recovery for serious wrongs, intentional or otherwise.
  I urge the amendment be rejected.
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DINGELL. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, the section that is being deleted by the 
Cox amendment requires the foreign manufacturer to appoint an agent for 
service or process. The prior amendment of the gentleman from Michigan 
[Mr. Conyers] did not touch that issue at all. So what this is doing is 
something very inconsistent with the spirit of the Conyers amendment, 
but if this amendment should pass, contrary to the author's 
representations, it would do great damage just as the gentleman has 
suggested.
  Mr. DINGELL. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, it strikes the 
provision relative to service of process. It strikes the proper 
requirement that foreign companies appoint an agent for purposes of 
receiving service.
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, 
the House, previously, by an overwhelming margin adopted the amendment 
of the ranking Member, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers]. It 
does deal with trying to assure parity that we, for once, do not give 
all the advantages to the foreign manufacturers, that we realize the 
importance of American manufacturers and now the spirit and the 
principle of that amendment is being undermined by the amendment being 
offered at this point, because it deletes the section in this 
particular provision that requires these foreign manufacturers to have 
an agent for process, something that every American manufacturer has to 
do.
  Mr. DINGELL. The House has already spoken. Foreigners should respond 
in discovery. But this amendment strikes the ability to even get them 
in court. It takes away the ability of an American injured by foreign 
misbehavior in the area of product liability to even get service, 
because no longer must the foreigner appoint an agent for purposes of 
receiving service under this legislation.
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  It is very interesting to note that the fair share rule that we are 
proposing in this amendment is apparently so unobjectionable that the 
minority chooses not even to debate it, but rather to debate the red 
herring, first, that the Conyers amendment that we earlier passed might 
be stricken by this amendment. They have now conceded that the Conyers 
amendment is protected, is part of this bill. We have just passed it. 
It is not stricken.
  But the argument is raised that the service of process provisions in 
another part of the bill, which are required in order to make the 
Conyers amendment work, would be stricken. That is neither here nor 
there because the Hague Service Convention already provides procedures 
consistent with our international agreements that will permit the 
Conyers amendment to work perfectly fine.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. 
Christensen].
  Mr. CHRISTENSEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding 
time to me.
  I rise in support of the Cox-Geren-Ramstad-Christensen bill under 
debate here. This is an important piece of legislation that will ensure 
small businesses and volunteer organizations, to make sure that they 
are brought under the umbrella of protection that we have sought to 
provide other American manufacturers.
  This amendment will extend the prohibition against the unjust 
application of joint and several liability to all civil cases involving 
interstate commerce.
                              {time}  1900

  The litigation explosion is having an adverse affect, not only on our 
manufacturing, but also on the Nation's start-up businesses and other 
small businesses. Frivolous and excessive litigation has an especially 
destructive affect on small businesses.
  We all know these sorts of businesses. They are undercapitalized and 
understaffed, which means they cannot afford either the lawyer bills or 
the ridiculous amounts of time it takes for an individual to deal with 
a legal matter.
  Under the rule of joint and several liability, a small business can 
find itself literally driven out of business by a jury in search of a 
pocket, and a pocket with money in it. It is usually the deep pocket 
they are looking for.
  But small businesses are not alone in being threatened by joint and 
several liability. We have all heard the horror stories about the 
vastly increased insurance premiums that volunteer organizations and 
municipalities across the country are being forced to pay because of 
the ridiculous rulings against them.
  Those rulings, based on the doctrine of joint and several liability, 
based on the idea that you can be held entirely responsible for the 
injury if you are only 1 percent or 2 percent at fault, are absolutely 
wrong. When trial lawyers go looking for a State that has been very 
kind to them, and sympathetic juries, they go to States like Alabama 
and Texas. I will tell the Members, it is time to restore some common 
sense back to this rule.
  That is why Congress needs to exercise its authority to serve as the 
arbiter on the issues that are involving interstate commerce, so that 
we have cases that are judged similarly in New York and in Texas and in 
Alabama and in Omaha, NE, where I am from.
  We need to end the arbitrary doctrine of joint and several liability, 
and we need to end it today. I urge my colleagues to vote for this Cox-
Ramstad-Geren-Christensen amendment, and to do it today.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Bateman].
  Mr. BATEMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.
  [[Page H2955]] Let me say first of all, Mr. Chairman, there is 
bipartisan support for this amendment, but my opposition I hope will 
demonstrate that there is indeed some bipartisan opposition to this 
amendment. I wish there were more than 2 minutes in order for me to 
explain all of the variety of reasons why I do so.
  Fundamental to it is, No. 1, the recitations of the findings and 
purposes of the amendment I think are inordinately broad. They 
represent a conclusion by this Congress that we think there are too 
many lawsuits being brought in America, and plaintiffs are winning too 
many of them. That may or may not be the case, but I suggest it is not 
even the function of this Congress to make that judgment. The function 
of this Congress is as to Federal law, to set forth the ground rules, 
the parameters, and the substantive law for the Federal courts in cases 
where there is Federal jurisdiction.
  I complain of this amendment because it federalizes a significant 
aspect of the law which, until now, has been relegated to the State 
courts and to a State court system in which most of the litigation is 
brought. I would suggest that we make a mistake to federalize civil 
justice in this United States from this Congress, and would say to my 
colleagues, especially on this side of the aisle, if we do it today in 
this fashion, under these findings, for these purposes, it can be done 
tomorrow for entirely different purposes.
  Mr. Chairman, let me finally say that this notion of joint and 
several liability is bottomed on principles, principles that were part 
of the common law of England, brought to America in the 13 original 
colonies, and a part of the law of all of those 13 original colonies 
forming the Union, and have been a part of the law of all of the States 
for all of the years since.
  I wish there was time for me to discuss with the Members, and I hope 
someone else will, the principle on which that rule regarding joint and 
several liability is bottomed. There is a principle involved.
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Ramstad].
  Mr. RAMSTAD. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this amendment to extend 
the fair-share rule to all civil actions.
  Mr. Chairman, other than the vote on final passage, make no mistake 
about it, this will be the most important vote we will have on tort 
reform. The bottom-line question for each of us to answer is this: Why 
on earth should a defendant with 1 percent or 2 percent of liability be 
held 100 percent responsible for payment of noneconomic damages. That 
is the question each of us has to answer. That is not fair, and 
everyone knows it.
  Let me stress what this amendment will not do. It will not end joint 
liability for medical expenses. Thus, even though a party may be only 1 
or 2 percent at fault, such a defendant could still be held 100 percent 
liable for the plaintiff's medical expenses and other economic damages, 
such as lost wages.
  While this also may not be fair to such a defendant, it would be more 
unfair to deny an injured plaintiff the means to be made whole again, 
and that is what our tort system is all about, to make an injured 
plaintiff whole.
  Mr. Chairman, let us make it perfectly clear that this amendment 
simply limits noneconomic damages in proportion to each defendant's 
share of fault. This, Mr. Chairman, is just common sense. Let me give 
Members an idea of an actual case involving the problem that joint 
liability can cause.
  Those of the Members who have been there or lived there know that in 
Minnesota we have two seasons, winter and road construction. We see 
signs for most of the year ``Slow down, give them a break, under 
construction.''
  Now, picture among these signs a drunk driver careening at an 
excessive speed through detours posted at 45 miles an hour. The end 
result is a crash. Next comes a lawsuit brought by the drunk driver. 
Who does the drunk driver sue? For starters, he sues the State highway 
department, but the State in this case imposes limits on its 
liabilities, so the driver's attorney sues every deep pocket 
imaginable: in this actual case, not only the State but the road 
contractor, the utility company who owned the adjoining property, the 
engineering firm who designed the detour through which the drunk driver 
plowed his car, and so forth.
  In the end, the defendants decided to settle out of court for $35,000 
each. This was after a 15-member engineering firm spent over $200,000 
in legal fees over 5 years, and 100 hours of work that should have been 
spent on engineering. Clearly, the drunk driver's attorney would have 
thought twice about suing all possible deep pockets if joint liability 
were not available.
  I urge all of my colleagues to support this amendment to restore 
common sense to our legal system, to restore proportionate liability 
and the fair share rule.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Berman].
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, the intellectual weakness of the arguments 
of the proponents is really quite amazing, if you take just a couple of 
moments to think about it. First, every case they cite talks about the 
1-percent negligent party, but the vast majority, I believe all the 
Republicans, voted for a rule which prohibited amendments to eliminate 
any minor wrongdoer, anyone below 20 percent, from having joint 
liability, while keeping the major wrongdoers in the case, because in 
the end, the issue is who is going to get shafted. Either it is the 
plaintiff, or it is one of the wrongdoers.
  We concede, at least in my amendment that I offered, and it was 
denied, that minor tort feasor should not have to pay the entire 
judgment. Second, a great deal is made about how important and logical 
this is, and it is only fair, but it does not apply to economic 
damages.
  The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] had an amendment to 
exclude anybody who is under for economic or noneconomic damages. If it 
is unfair to pay the pain and suffering, why is it fair to pay the 
economic damages?
  I know why you did not do it that way, because it looked too cruel, 
because the proponents of the amendment talk about ``We are just 
dealing with the feelings part of this.'' If a person becomes a 
quadriplegic because of the negligence of another, and they say ``You 
pay the medical bills and the wage loss and that is it, everything else 
is just about feelings,'' you amputate the wrong leg because of the 
negligence of the hospital or the doctor, you pay whatever wage loss 
there is, there may be none, you pay the medical bills, and then 
everything else is just feelings, we are talking about compensating the 
person and making them whole.
  Get rid of the minor tort feasors by excluding the 1 percent, 2 
percent, 5 percent, 10 percent case. Do not let off the major 
wrongdoers, and leave the plaintiff without being made whole, without 
compensation. You talked about the drunk driving case. What you have 
passed with title II in this bill is a punitive-damages statute which 
keeps a person who is injured by a drunk driver from suing the drunk 
driver for punitive damages on State remedies.
  The amendment is so broad it reaches into the typical automobile case 
in a neighborhood in any city in America. It is not limited to product 
liability. It is not limited to interstate commerce. It is the most 
far-reaching, intrusive kind of amendment imaginable.
  The best comments I have heard today were from the gentleman from 
Virginia [Mr. Bateman], a true conservative, who wanted to know what 
business is it of Congress' whether in an automobile accident case at 
an intersection, there is joint and several liability or not?
  We can make arguments either way, but the State legislature and the 
Governor, they are the people to decide. They are the ones closest to 
the voters. There is no Federal question involved in this, but there 
are some economic interests and some insurance companies who want it, 
and I do not believe that is the motivation, because I am not into 
attributing motivations to people; some people see that perspective, 
but they do not see what is going to be left for the plaintiff or for 
the concept of Federalism.
  [[Page H2956]] Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 
such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the gentleman who just spoke stated ``It isn't limited 
to interstate commerce.'' Were that true, I would not support this 
amendment, but of course, it is expressly limited to interstate 
commerce, which is precisely the role of this Congress under Article 1, 
section 8.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. 
Hyde], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I shall have to talk fast.
  Mr. Chairman, 33 States have abolished joint and several liability. 
That is the problem. There are 33 different laws, different methods of 
avoiding and evading joint and several liability, which is very unfair. 
The serious problem of inconsistency in the tort laws of the 50 States 
is there. This seeks uniformity, which makes legal common sense.
  Mr. Chairman, let me briefly address the federalism aspect that I 
have heard so much about today. I have heard from Members on our side 
of the aisle who are troubled by our preempting of State laws. They 
insist that the States are important and should not be administrative 
districts of the Federal Government.
  I just want them to know what the passing of time has done to that 
notion. We have the Environmental Protection Agency, Food and Drug 
Administration, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
National Labor Relations Board, Federal Trade Commission, Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission. Every aspect of life is 
regulated by the Federal Government. I have not mentioned the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, ERISA.
  The only facet of our great economy that is left untouched is the 
multibillion-dollar litigation industry. It seems to me it is eminently 
justified that we try to put some common sense and rationality, 
predictability, into this big business of lawsuits. That is what the 
gentleman is trying to do. I support it wholeheartedly.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Scott].
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, in these cases, all the victim knows is that 
he was injured. If you have a doctor who is clearly negligent, the 
doctor can escape some liability by saying it was 5 percent the nurse's 
fault, 10 percent the anesthesiologist's, 10 percent the hospital, 10 
percent the product, and now where are we in the lawsuit?
  The plaintiff has to have five different defendants, five different 
sets of lawyers, five different judgments, five different collections, 
some insolvent. This consumer just has to, I guess, get over it. They 
are not going to be able to become whole.
  Mr. Chairman, we have always had loser pays. Even if they win, they 
might be having to pay opposing counsel. We have limited damages. We 
have come up with new defenses.
  Mr. Chairman, this reduces the accountability of wrongdoers. It 
allows wrongdoers to escape responsibility for their actions, at the 
expense of the innocent victims. Consumer protection is taking another 
giant step backward. I would hope that we would defeat this amendment.
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. Shays].
  Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, 50 States, 50 different State laws affecting interstate 
commerce, and we have for so long allowed a tremendous ripoff. It blows 
my mind that we have tolerated this for so many years.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of Common Sense Product Liability and 
Legal Reform Act of 1995, and I rise in support of the amendment of the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Cox] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
Pete Geren] the fair share amendment.
  It is so simple. It does not take a lot of words, a lot of legalese. 
The bottom line is so simple. If you are responsible, you should pay 
your proportionate share of whatever problem you caused, but if you are 
not responsible, you should not be held liable.
  When I hear of the outrageous awards that are given to an individual 
plaintiff, and then I learn of the liability that company had, which 
was 100 percent, when in fact they only caused 5 or 10 percent of the 
action, and then I think ``Who pays?'' I pay, you pay. We all pay for 
this outrage. This outrage needs to end.

                              {time}  1915

  The bottom line is so simple, it is so clear and maybe it is just one 
has to be an attorney to find it confusing. If you are in fact 
responsible, you should pay. If you are 50 percent responsible, you 
should pay 100 percent of your 50 percent. But you should not have to 
pay when you are not responsible in the vast majority of the cases.
  I urge my colleagues to vote this amendment and vote this bill. I 
consider it of all the bills coming before this Chamber the most 
important bill that we will vote on in this entire 2 years.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. COX of California. May I inquire of the Chair how much time 
remains on each side?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. Cox] has 3 minutes 
remaining and the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] has 5\1/2\ 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. DOGGETT. Perhaps the gentleman might yield on section 109.
  Mr. COX of California. As I indicated, I would like to reserve time 
at the end for such purpose.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. 
Bryant].
  Mr. BRYANT of Tennessee. I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  I rise in strong support of this bill to abolish the doctrine of 
joint and several liability. The core of our judicial system, I think, 
is one of fairness and has been repeated so often today.
  In this context, it just seems to me the fairest thing, that a person 
at fault have to pay and if a person is not at fault, then they should 
not have to pay, that it ought to be grossly unfair for this system to 
require a defendant to pay the full judgment, 100 percent of a 
judgment, when a jury has decided that they are not 100 percent liable, 
perhaps as little as 1 percent liable.
  The example that I have seen used so many times, you have got 3 
defendants, X, Y, and Z, and X is held to be 10 percent at fault and Y 
and Z 45 percent at fault each for a total of 100 percent. If 10 
percent is the deep pockets in the case and they are going to have to 
pay 100 percent of the judgment, they may have a right to go back 
against the other two defendants, Y and Z, but if Y and Z have no 
money, which is usually the case, it is worthless.
  Let me address just briefly before I sit down two
   examples that have been brought forward from the other side. One had 
to do with the doctor who might be 5-percent liable and point the 
finger at the nurse and this nurse and this doctor and this hospital 
and that the lawsuit would result in more defendants coming in. Let me 
assure the gentleman from Virginia that the lawsuit will certainly 
include all of those people, anyway. There is a shotgun approach that 
is used so often in litigation to sue anybody that might be at fault 
and that is what happens in the type of system we are working under.

  Under another example cited by the gentleman from Michigan, he used 
the example of a husband hiring two hoodlums to beat up his wife and 
somehow that the husband might escape 100-precent fault on that because 
of the actions of the hoodlums. I would suggest that the legal theory 
of principal and agent would be at work there and certainly whatever 
the hoodlums did to his wife, he would be held 100-percent accountable 
and I would assume a jury would so find him and he would be 100-percent 
liable for the judgment to his wife. Again I think this is the only 
fair thing to do under the circumstances, and I strongly support the 
bill.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my 
time for the purpose of closing.
  Mr. COX of California. Would the gentleman from Massachusetts who 
[[Page H2957]] has significantly more time be willing to yield to the 
gentleman to ask a question?
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. No.
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Roth].
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I just learned something this evening. O.J. 
Simpson does not have the most creative lawyers in the world; the most 
creative lawyers in America are right in this Chamber.
  Did Members hear some of these arguments? One fellow from Michigan 
who I admire a great deal got up and said, ``Don't vote for this 
amendment, people in Congress, because if you do, you can't sue your 
local newspaper if they wrong you.''
  Have you ever heard of a Congressman winning a case against a local 
newspaper? In fact, Sullivan versus New York Times says you cannot sue 
your local newspaper.
  The reason that this is a great amendment comes not from this body 
but from George McGovern. Remember him? After he left the Senate, he 
went into business, and here is what he said in the New York Times. He 
said,

       America is in the midst of a new Civil War, a war that 
     threatens to undercut the civic basis of our society. The 
     weapons of choice are not bullets and bayonets but abusive 
     lawsuits brought by an army of trial lawyers subverting our 
     system of civil justice while enriching themselves.

  That is why this is a good amendment. The Manhattan Institute says it 
costs $100 billion a year. Vote for this amendment. It is a great 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. To close debate, the Chair recognizes the gentleman 
from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. To begin, Mr. Chairman, there is not the 
remotest evidence that George McGovern was talking about this 
particular amendment, because this amendment is not about product 
liability. The restriction on joint and several liability for 
noneconomic damages on product liability is in the bill. This bill, and 
I was glad to hear the gentleman from Illinois proclaim the death of 
States rights, because what this bill says is, ``This section shall 
apply to any product liability or other civil action brought in any 
Federal or State court on any theory where noneconomic damages are 
sought.''
  This is an amendment that does not deal with product liability but 
that is already covered. This says any lawsuit anywhere in America 
where people are looking for noneconomic damages, we will tell the 
States how to run things. People said, ``Well, we've got to protect our 
manufacturing. We do a lot of exports.'' Then they mentioned the Little 
League. Well, it is not my impression we export that many little 
leaguers. I know the kids go overseas to play ball, but most come home. 
They rarely leave but one or two behind. The fact is that this is a 
statement by the Republican Party on the whole, not all of them, 
saying, ``We don't trust local juries, we don't trust local 
legislatures, we don't trust local judges. We will tell you how to run, 
not manufacturing, not interstate commerce, any civil lawsuit.'' 
Someone falls down the steps, someone is sued for libel, someone claims 
alienation of affection, anyone, so it is the most arrogant grab from 
the States by the Federal Government. Because it is not about 
manufacturing. We do not need that. The amendment is about every single 
lawsuit and it says we cannot trust the juries and we cannot trust the 
States.
  As to the noneconomic damage thing, I offered an amendment that said 
if you are less than 20 percent responsible, you do not get joint 
liability for economic or noneconomic damages. That must have been a 
good amendment. How do I know? The Committee on Rules would not let it 
in. The Committee on Rules is for openness on any amendment they think 
they can beat.
  The argument made is that it is unfair to the small tort-feasor to 
give that person joint liability. It is unfair economically and it is 
unfair in the noneconomic. The distinction is not between economic and 
noneconomic damages in a logical world
 but between the large and the small degree of responsibility.
  So I said all right, let's not discriminate between economic and non-
economic with the gender bias and the class bias that that implicates, 
let's cut off the small versus the large. But the Republican Committee 
on Rules said, ``Oh, no, that's too logical and we can't have that, 
because if we're going to tell every State court in America how to deal 
with every lawsuit in America where anybody alleges noneconomic 
damages, then we better do it the other way.''
  Plus we also have the gentleman's amendment which does weaken the 
amendment of the gentleman from Michigan. Under the amendment of the 
gentleman from Michigan, a foreign manufacturer must name an agent to 
be served here. The gentleman strikes that in this amendment. We would 
still theoretically have jurisdiction if we can find them to serve 
them.
  I mean in Croatia, they have jurisdiction over Serbian war crimes but 
they are not going to try many Serbs and we will still have technical 
jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers but if the gentleman from 
California's amendment passes and they do not have to designate an 
agent for accepting process, we will not get many of them into court. 
It is an abstract discussion and what he is saying is to every State 
court in America, every State court in America, if there is a foreign 
manufacturer, you can't require them to serve process and if you want 
to sue them in State court, good luck to you. Maybe the United Nations 
can pick them up on the way to try and find some Serbs in Croatia, 
because they will have about as much chance.
  This belies the notion that the Contract is about empowering the 
States. This says when we feel that the economic interests with which 
we are in most sympathy will be better served by nationalizing matters 
that have been State law for 200 years, we will do so. And we will 
claim it is according to interstate commerce, that will be the entering 
wedge. Then we will give you an amendment which says any civil action 
in any Federal or State court on any theory.
  This is the ``anys'' amendment. Every ``any'' that applies got put 
into this amendment. Any case, any State, any cause of action, any 
reason they want, congratulations, you are now under Federal law.
  This amendment brings back Selective Service. You have just drafted 
every State court and every State
 jury and every State cause of action and it has nothing to do with 
interstate commerce. Maybe the Republican party has adopted the theory 
that there is no more interstate commerce.

  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. No, no more than the gentleman would 
yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Maybe you have now adopted a theory that there is no more interstate 
commerce, that we are all one big unitary society. I think you are 
going a little far myself, but I take it after we heard the gentleman 
from Illinois who said everything in American life has been 
nationalized except this, that you have now conceded that everything is 
now fair game nationally and we will not hear the States rights 
arguments again.
  Fifty different State laws, is that not terrible? Of course where 
poor children are concerned, 50 different State laws is a good idea. 
Where school lunches are concerned, 50 different low levels of State 
nutrition, that is a good idea. Where Aid to Dependent Children 3- and 
4-year-olds who need economic support, let's give it back to the 
States.
  I have never seen such selectivity about what goes to the States and 
what does not.
  I yield to my friend the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. DOGGETT. This amendment deletes section 109 from the bill. 
Section 109 of this bill requires that a foreign manufacturer to 
benefit from this bill at all, to get any benefit from it, appoint an 
agent for service of----
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Cox].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 17-minute vote.
  [[Page H2958]] The vote was taken by electronic device, and there 
were--ayes 263, noes 164, not voting 7, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 225]

                               AYES--263

     Allard
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clement
     Clinger
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooley
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis
     Deal
     DeLay
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Lincoln
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lucas
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     McCarthy
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (CA)
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Morella
     Myers
     Myrick
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Richardson
     Riggs
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schumer
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tate
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Torricelli
     Traficant
     Upton
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                               NOES--164

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Barrett (WI)
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bishop
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant (TX)
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     de la Garza
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Durbin
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Fox
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hayes
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoyer
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klink
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Laughlin
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Martini
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moran
     Nadler
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Orton
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Pickett
     Poshard
     Rahall
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Rivers
     Rose
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schiff
     Schroeder
     Scott
     Serrano
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stupak
     Tauzin
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torres
     Towns
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--7

     Cubin
     Forbes
     Gibbons
     Murtha
     Owens
     Rangel
     Tucker

                              {time}  1945

  Messrs. POSHARD, HAYES, and COLEMAN changed their vote from ``aye'' 
to ``no.''
  Messrs. HOLDEN, MILLER of California, FAZIO, TEJADA, and Mrs. 
KENNELLY changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
                              {time}  1945

  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 12, 
printed in section 2 of House Resolution 109, as modified.


               amendment offered by Mr. Cox of california

  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. COX of California:
       Page 19 redesignate section 202 as section 203 and after 
     line 19 insert the following:

     SEC. 202. LIMITATION ON NONECONOMIC DAMAGES IN HEALTH CARE 
                   LIABILITY ACTIONS.

       (a) Maximum Award of Noneconomic Damages.--In any health 
     care liability action, in addition to actual damages or 
     punitive damages, or both, a claimant may also be awarded 
     noneconomic damages, including damages awarded to compensate 
     injured feelings, such as pain and suffering and emotional 
     distress. The maximum amount of such damages that may be 
     awarded to a claimant shall be $250,000. Such maximum amount 
     shall apply regardless of the number of parties against whom 
     the action is brought, and regardless of the number of claims 
     or actions brought with respect to the health care injury. An 
     award for future noneconomic damages shall not be discounted 
     to present value. The jury shall not be informed about the 
     limitation on noneconomic damages, but an award for 
     noneconomic damages in excess of $250,000 shall be reduced 
     either before the entry of judgment or by amendment of the 
     judgment after entry. An award of damages for noneconomic 
     losses in excess of $250,000 shall be reduced to $250,000 
     before accounting for any other reduction in damages required 
     by law. If separate awards of damages for past and future 
     noneconomic damages are rendered and the combined award 
     exceeds $250,000, the award of damages for future noneconomic 
     losses shall be reduced first.
       (b) Applicability.--Except as provided in section 401, this 
     section shall apply to any health care liability action 
     brought in any Federal or State court on any theory or 
     pursuant to any alternative dispute resolution process where 
     noneconomic damages are sought. This section does not create 
     a cause of action for noneconomic damages. This section does 
     not preempt or supersede any State or Federal law to the 
     extent that such law would further limit the award of 
     noneconomic damages. This section does not preempt any State 
     law enacted before the date of the enactment of this Act that 
     places a cap on the total liability in a health care 
     liability action.
       (d) Definitions.--As used in this section--
       (a) The term ``claimant'' means any person who asserts a 
     health care liability claim or brings a health care liability 
     action, including a person who asserts or claims a right to 
     legal or equitable contribution, indemnity or subrogation, 
     arising out of a health care liability claim or action, and 
     any person on whose behalf such a claim is asserted or such 
     an action is brought, whether deceased, incompetent or a 
     minor.
       (b) The term ``economic loss'' has the same meaning as 
     defined at section 203(3).
       (c) The term ``health care liability action'' means a civil 
     action brought in a State or Federal court or pursuant to any 
     alternative dispute resolution process, against a health care 
     provider, and entity which is obligated to provide or pay for 
     health benefits under any health plan (including any person 
     or entity acting under a contract or arrangement to provide 
     or administer any health benefit), or the manufacturer, 
     distributor, supplier, marketer, promoter, or seller of a 
     medical product, in which the claimant alleges a claim 
     (including third party claims, cross claims, counter claims, 
     or distribution claims) based upon the provision of (or the 
     failure to provide or pay for) health care services or the 
     use of a medical product, regardless of the theory of 
     liability on which the claim is based, or the number of 
     plaintiffs, or defendants or causes of action.
       Page 17, line 10, insert ``and other'' after ``punitive''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California 
[[Page H2959]] [Mr. Cox] will be recognized for 20 minutes, and a 
Member in opposition will be recognized for 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Cox].
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, we are coming to the conclusion of our debate about 
reform of our civil justice system in America so that the courts will 
once again earn the maxim ``Equal justice under law,'' and no longer 
will people have to fear the courthouse and think it is not a place for 
them and think it merits rather the admonition from Dante's Inferno, 
``Abandon hope, all ye who enter here.''
  It is impossible, it is unthinkable, to handle lawsuit reform in the 
Congress without considering health care, because nowhere in our 
American life have the skyrocketing costs of lawsuits done more damage 
than in our health care system.
  For the last 2 years, in 1993 and 1994, we debated health care in 
this country. And during that last 2 years of debate, in 1993 and 1994, 
through all the hearings, we all know the story. The American people 
came to the essential realization that we need to control health care 
costs so that we can increase access for those who are least able to 
afford basic care from doctors and good hospitals.
  We decided we did not want a government-run
   system, but we decided if we can, we would like to get rid of all of 
the extra costs that lawsuits and lawyers suck out of our health care 
system, to get rid of all of the extra costs that defensive medicine 
imposes on our health care system, that is all the unnecessary tests 
that all doctors perform. Three-quarters admit they do this because of 
the threat of liability, if for no other good reason, $9 billion in 
extra malpractice premiums attributed to defensive medicine. Another 
$20 or $30 billion according to various estimates are attributed to 
this defensive medicine, which is doctors behaving not in the best 
interests of the patients, but lawyers, so Ralph Nader and Joel Hyatt 
seem to have more to say about the kind of health care we have in this 
country than doctors and patients.

  We have a system in place in several States in this country, in 
particular my home State of California, that has worked very well, 
called MICRA. It has limited our health care premiums for the average 
Californian from somewhere between 33 percent and over 50 percent less 
than other States without these reforms. That is what I propose in this 
amendment today. The only change that this makes is in health care 
cases; not all civil cases like the last one, just health care cases.
  We believe that we should have a system in America that compensates 
without limit, 100 percent of all of the damages that somebody might 
suffer. They should be able to claim these through a lawsuit, all of 
the damages for their medical expenses, for their doctors' expenses, 
for their hospital expense, without limit, all of their rehabilitation 
expenses, all of their future estimated lost income and earnings. All 
of these things called economic damages should be compensable without 
limit.
  We have already decided that on top of that, they should be able to 
multiply all of their real, actual damages times three and get that in 
punitive damages. In our country uniquely we have something called 
noneconomic damages. That means things we cannot really monetize, we 
cannot figure out how much it is worth, but we just want to add extra 
on top of all the real damages and punitive damages.
  Only four other countries in the world allow this kind of damage. For 
the rest of the world it is zero, and for the other countries that 
allow it limit it sharply. In Canada this type of damage award is 
limited to $180,000. In California we limit it to $250,000. That is 
what we would do in this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote for this vitally important 
health care reform. We know we need it. I hope that Members will act 
upon it.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. Berman] is 
recognized for 20 minutes.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself two minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, let me initially correct some of what I am sure are the 
inadvertent misrepresentations of the gentleman from California. No. 1, 
California's health care premiums did not go down 33 percent over what 
they would have been. The gentleman is referring to the malpractice 
premiums paid by physicians, not the health care premiums paid by 
citizens.
  Second, this bill is not in any fashion limited to medical 
malpractice. It covers, with a $250,000 limit on pain and suffering, 
any health care liability action which is defined in this bill under 
any theory, tort, or contract, that a contractor could have a provision 
for liquidated damages, anything like that that goes beyond the medical 
costs and the lost wages, and it seeks to put this $250,000 limit on 
that.
  The anomaly is when this day is done, if this amendment passes, and 
you ride in a car which is manufactured defectively, it explodes, and 
you are paralyzed, there is no limit on what you can get for pain and 
suffering. Difficult to quantify, but very real. You are paralyzed for 
the rest of your life, you are a quadriplegic, the wrong leg is 
amputated, there is something there beyond wage loss, and there is 
something there beyond just the simple cost of your medical treatment.
  If you are injured in that explosion by that defective car, no limit. 
If you are injured because of the negligence in a defective medical 
device and it results in your being paralyzed, you are capped at 
$250,000.
  What is the logic of the distinction? I do not know. I will be 
interested in hearing the gentleman speak to that particular issue.
  Once again, we have gone way beyond the issue of product liability 
and gone way beyond the issue of medical malpractice. In California 
there are a series of damage remedies for bad faith insurance 
practices. If it is a health insurance policy and the health insurance 
company does not pay and the result is serious injury to the person, if 
he is arbitrarily canceled and there are massive losses and a breach of 
contract, under that theory, no matter what the contract provision 
provides for damages, this comes in and caps the pain and suffering 
with those limitations.
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to respond to the gentleman from 
California by saying he is correct that as a result of the health care 
lawsuit reform passed in California, by a Democratic legislature I 
should add, medical liability premiums are 33 percent to 50 percent 
lower on average than those in other States that do not have these 
reforms.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the distinguished coauthor of this 
amendment, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Pete Geren], 2 minutes.
  (Mr. PETE GEREN of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. PETE GEREN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this 
amendment, and I want to direct Members' attention to the change that 
has been made in this amendment. This was an amendment that was the 
subject of the rules change earlier today in the printing in DSG that 
describes it as a limit on noneconomic damages for all civil actions. 
That is no longer correct. This is limited to health care liability 
actions. It is patterned after the MICRA system in California.
  The Office of Technology Assessment reported in 1993 that limits of 
this type that will come about as a result of this amendment are the 
single most effective reform in containing medical liability premiums. 
Ohio is a good example of a State in which a cap on noneconomic damages 
had a substantial impact on costs until it was struck down. Prior to 
the enactment of the cap, Ohio's payment of medical malpractice claims 
was 3.7 percent of the total nationwide. That declined to 2.9 percent 
while the reforms were in force. In 1982, the Supreme Court invalidated 
the claim, and by 1985 the percentage of nationwide claims had almost 
doubled to 5.4 percent.
  California had the highest liability premiums in the Nation prior to 
its enactment of a cap of this type. Since its 
[[Page H2960]] enactment, cap premiums are now one-third to one-half of 
those in New York, Florida, Illinois and other States that do not have 
these kind of limits.
  Contrary to what many are saying, a ceiling on noneconomic damages 
will not in any way restrain the ability of an injured party to recover 
medical expenses, lost wages, rehabilitation costs, or any other 
economic out-of-pocket loss suffered. It only limits those damages 
awarded for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment, and other intangible 
items. These items routinely account for 50 percent of the total 
payment of a suit and are highly subjective.
  Mr. Chairman, this system has worked in California, it is an 
important planning in any health care reform we consider as a country, 
and it will help us hold down the skyrocketing costs of health care in 
this country.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

                              {time}  2000

  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Durbin].
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Chairman, I do not profess to be an expert on any 
subject. But I come to this debate with some experience. Prior of my 
election to Congress, I spent 10 years practicing law, specializing in 
medical malpractice. I defended doctors, and I brought suit against 
them.
  Let me ask my colleagues, if they can for a few moments, to forget 
the lobbyists, forget the companies, the insurance companies, and 
forget all of the special interests and listen to one simple tragic 
story.
  One of my first cases involved a baby girl. I would say to the 
gentleman from California, Mr. Cox, and to the gentleman from Texas, 
Mr. Pete Geren, that like most parents in America, these parents took 
their baby girl to the pediatrician for her baby shots. Unfortunately, 
this little girl has suffered from a rash called roseola a few days 
before she went for her shots. Because of the doctor's failure to ask 
and examine, the little girl suffered a devastating reaction to the 
vaccination. The brain damage was so severe she was left in a permanent 
vegetative state. She would never speak, never walk, never go to 
school. She would be in diapers as long as she lived.
  For 5 years or 50 years or more, she and her loving parents would 
suffer from the negligent act of that doctor.
  Mr. Cox and his amendment would decide that no matter how long she 
lived, no matter how long she suffered, her maximum recovery for pain 
and suffering would be $250,000. Mr. Cox would take away from any court 
or jury in America the right to decide that she and her parents deserve 
1 penny more.
  My Republican colleagues call this common sense legal reform. 
Limiting a deserving victim's right to recover for pain and suffering 
does not even reach the threshold of common decency.
  We are not talking about frivolous lawsuits. We are talking about 
parents facing a lifetime of caretaking because of a doctor's 
negligence. We are not talking about verdicts that we giggle about when 
we hear about them on the radio. We are talking about verdicts that 
when you hear about them you say, it could not be enough. You could not 
pay me enough money to live with that injury to myself or my baby.
  But Mr. Cox is prepared to say no matter what your injury, no matter 
what your pain, no matter how many years you will be crippled and 
broken, your right to recover will be limited.
  Our system of justice is far from perfect, but this Cox amendment 
would invite tragic, unjust results which would be visited on the lives 
of innocent victims and their families for decades to come.
  This amendment is mean in the extreme. Vote ``no.''
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Christensen].
  (Mr. CHRISTENSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. CHRISTENSEN. Mr. Chairman, do not be confused about the opponents 
that I just heard visit on this, this little child will be compensated 
for those damages for the rest of her life. The plaintiffs bar are 
going to try to confuse the issue here, but in Omaha, NE, an ob/gyn 
pays 20,000 in medical malpractice insurance. Just across the river 
that same ob/gyn pays 60,000 in medical malpractice insurance. Why? 
Because of the reason we have tort reform in Nebraska. We have a cap on 
medical malpractice in Nebraska. And that is why we need to continue to 
enforce this State by State so other States can enjoy what we have in 
my home State.
  Because of the litigation explosion, the cost of insurance to 
obstetricians jumped 350 percent between 1982 and 1988. In some areas a 
doctor will spend over 100,000 on medical malpractice insurance. Faced 
with these numbers, many doctors cannot afford to deliver babies in 
rural areas and poor areas. We need to put a reasonable ceiling on 
health care liability so it will open the way for lower insurance 
costs. Too many personal injury lawyers are making their careers out by 
waging war on doctors these days. Because of their activity, men and 
women and children across this land are going to suffer each and every 
day. This bill restores some common sense to what we need to restore in 
our civil justice system.
  I yield to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Barr].
  Mr. BARR. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  Mr. Chairman, this begins an important process that is not 
independent of the process but it begins an important process, this 
legislative proposal, in curbing the worst excesses of the current tort 
system. In the future, I propose that we address additional amendments 
that will take into account extraordinary circumstances warranting 
adjustments to these otherwise generous caps.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Oklahoma [Mr. Istook].
  Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment. I believe this 
is a deadly amendment. I believe it is a damaging amendment. I think it 
is an amendment that fails to take stock of reality. Under this bill, 
your losses must be one of two types: either they must be economic 
damages, as defined on page 20 of the bill, something that is a 
financial loss. Everything else is noneconomic damage.
  If you lose your sight, it is noneconomic damage. If you lose any 
other organ, your ears, your hearing, it is noneconomic damage. If you 
lose your arm, if you lose both legs, if you are paralyzed for the rest 
of your life, it is noneconomic damage. And it is capped; it is treated 
under the same cap as intangibles such as pain and suffering.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. ISTOOK. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, what does this do to the nature and extent 
of the injuries such as someone with an amputated foot?
  Mr. ISTOOK. This means that if you can still make a living with your 
amputated foot, then you are restricted in what you can recover, even 
if you can no longer play football with your kids or soccer or 
baseball. If you lose your sight, you cannot even go to a movie or 
watch a TV program. You cannot see your children. You cannot see a 
family picture. You cannot check out and watch a video. Whatever it may 
be, that is what we are restricting if this amendment is adopted.
  Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  Mr. ISTOOK. I want to urge my fellow Republicans, those of us who 
have been supporting tort reform, to vote down this amendment. I do not 
think a lot of Members realize what you are lumping in. The reference 
in the text of the amendment to pain and suffering is only by way of 
example and inclusion. It is not the complete definition of noneconomic 
damages. It does not pretend to be. Do not tell me that there is no 
difference between having a lifetime where you may have perpetual pain.
  I had a young man that I hired in my office as a staff member that 
was a paraplegic in a wheelchair. Do not tell me that because he was 
still able to work, which he did, tremendous young man, tremendous 
worker, but do not tell me because of that, the accident that cost him 
his feelings from below the waist, is not worth anything more than 
someone that says, I hurt or I have emotional distress. Do not treat 
those as the same. Do not treat someone that 
[[Page H2961]] has this type of disability as no different than someone 
who just says, I have pain or I have emotional distress.
  This amendment does that. I urge my colleagues, even those who 
support tort reform, vote down this amendment.
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  I am sure that the gentleman from Oklahoma did not mean to 
mischaracterize in his statement. He said that there are only two types 
of damages, economic and noneconomic. He inadvertently left out 
punitive damages which has been the subject of much debate here. Under 
our legislation, punitive damages are allowed, in addition, up to three 
times all of the actual damage.
  I should also point out that there is another more important reason 
that we need to do health care lawsuit reform tonight. It is that the 
poor and the disadvantaged who use our public hospitals, our free 
clinics and our community clinics are the worst injured by the high 
liability costs today.
  Qualified doctors increasingly are refusing to do high-risk 
procedures. And where do these high-risk procedures occur but in our 
public hospitals.
  The front page of the New York Times last Sunday is a great example. 
The bottom line for babies weighing over 5\1/2\ pounds, the cutoff they 
use as a general gauge of good health for babies, the death rate the 
first 4 weeks after birth in New York City's public hospitals is 80 
percent higher than for babies born at private hospitals. New York's 
unlimited tort liability system has not stopped malpractice cases.
  They hired as an obstetrician a man who had failed for 14 years his 
national exams. Just a few months after he was hired by the city 
hospitals of New York, he became another one of their malpractice 
cases. New York, unlike California, does not have this kind of health 
care reform.
  They have thousands of lawsuits. Over the past two decades those 
lawsuits have not stopped malpractice. They have made it worse. A 1992 
report studied lawsuits of 64 children in those New York hospitals who 
have been left brain damaged or permanently crippled because of 
negligence in the delivery room. These 64 lawsuits alone cost city 
hospitals $78 million and another 793 lawsuits were still pending. What 
is seen is that more and more lawsuits lead to ever higher liability 
premiums and this leads to even fewer qualified doctors willing to 
handle the kinds of higher-risk cases that typify low-income health 
care.
  That in turn leads to less and less access to quality care for the 
poor. The patients suffer.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Thomas].
  (Mr. THOMAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Cox] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Pete Geren] for 
having the courage to bring this amendment to the floor.
  I just wanted to tell my colleagues that the high point in the last 
Congress for me was as ranking member of the health subcommittee in 
discussing the President's health care plan. Democrats and Republicans 
together in a bipartisan way passed a medical malpractice reform 
provision out of the subcommittee. It was, of course, denied in the 
full committee, and we went on not to do anything at all on the floor 
of the 103d Congress about health care reform.
  And 3 months into this Congress, on the floor of the House, is the 
key to health reform.
  A yes vote on this amendment will, of course, lower health care costs 
by lowering malpractice insurance rates. A yes vote on this amendment 
will remove the defensive medicine costs and lower health care rates. A 
``yes'' vote on this amendment will get rid of the ridiculous border 
games now played between States and doctors because of the 
nonuniformity of malpractice laws across this country.
  But more important and fundamentally, get your eyes off of this 
amendment and look up. This vote is on health care reform. It this 
amendment loses, the chances of meaningful health care reform in this 
Congress are virtually gone. This is the time and this is the moment.
  I also might add, we maybe need truth in packaging around here. I 
want to confess, I am not an attorney. And I am for this amendment, 
because in passing this amendment, we have laid the fundamental 
groundwork for real health care reform in this Congress. Three months 
into this Congress, we will have made a statement to everybody. This 
Congress intends to be bipartisan, not just in subcommittees, not just 
in committees, but on the floor. Pass this amendment, and we can pass 
health care reform. Vote ``yes'' on this amendment.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Waxman].
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am astounded at the comments of my 
colleague from California, new chairman of the Subcommittee on Health 
of the Committee on Ways and Means. Our State of California has these 
limits that this proposal would impose upon the whole country. Is that 
health care reform? The State of California has 3 million people who 
are uninsured. It has not solved our problems. Has it led to any less 
defensive medicine? There is no evidence of that whatsoever. Has it 
reduced the premiums the doctors pay? Perhaps, somewhat, it is 
stabilized. It may have had that value. But this is not health reform.
  If you are being told we have to keep somebody who is injured and 
maybe even butchered in surgery from recovering to make them whole so 
that we have health reform, this is not what health reform is all 
about.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. WAXMAN. I yield to the gentleman from California.

                              {time}  2015

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, I ask the gentleman, is he an attorney?
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman, I am an 
attorney. What is that supposed to mean?
  Mr. THOMAS of California. Thank you.
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, is the gentleman a doctor?
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. Bilirakis].
  Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Chairman, in the previous Congress I coauthored 
consensus health reform legislation with our former colleague, Dr. Roy 
Rowland of Georgia, health reform that sought to bring to the table 
issues upon which broad agreement existed in the Congress and among the 
public. It became one of the leading health reform proposals at that 
time, and it was the one truly bipartisan health bill considered by the 
103d Congress.
  One of the consensus issues in our bill was medical malpractice 
reform. It was an issue upon which many Members of this body on both 
sides of the aisle agreed. In fact, it was a consensus item addressed 
in most of the health reform bills introduced in the previous Congress. 
I have no reason to believe that medical malpractice reform is any less 
of a priority in this Congress. All of these bills included a $250,000 
cap on noneconomic damages, just as does this amendment.
  Did the 98 Members who signed onto our legislation, 36 of them 
Democrats, support this cap because they wished to deny an individual 
the full legal redress to which he or she was entitled? The answer, of 
course, is no. Opponents of this amendment
 today claim that we cannot quantify the pain and suffering of a victim 
of injury. I tell them this, I cannot agree with them more. I believe 
that our legal system should pay the complete costs of injury, 
including lifetime medical costs, rehabilitation, disfigurement, or 
other forms of actual damage, without limit.

  But the very fact that noneconomic pain and suffering damages cannot 
be quantified has led us into a swamp of astronomical awards that 
amount not to judgments but to windfalls. No other country in the 
world, Mr. Chairman, allows these kinds of windfall awards. Is that 
because they have any lack of feeling or sympathy for the victims of 
injury? Again, the answer is, of course not. The true reason for 
limiting these 
[[Page H2962]] awards is that it is the single most effective method of 
reducing medical liability costs. This, in turn, leads to reduced 
health care costs for everyone. I strongly urge my colleagues to vote 
for the Cox-Geren-Ramstad-Christensen amendment today.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
North Dakota [Mr. Pomeroy], a nonlawyer.
  Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Chairman, I would tell the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Berman], I do have a law degree, and practiced for 5 years. I 
never brought a medical malpractice action. More recently, I regulated 
insurance for 8 years. I am the only former State insurance 
commissioner in Congress, and it is in connection with this that I 
rise.
  My friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. Thomas], urged you to 
take your eyes off the amendment and look at the health care issue and 
pass this bill. The health care issue is not before us; the amendment 
is. I urge Members to go back and look at the text, because we could 
embarrass ourselves by passing this amendment as drafted.
  Mr. Chairman, on page 2, between lines 13 and 16, it says ``This 
shall apply to any health care liability action brought on any 
theory.'' I wish the sponsor of the amendment would have yielded to my 
question, because I was going to ask him, does that mean you cannot sue 
for noneconomic loss in excess of $250,000 a psychologist that was 
abusing his patients? I believe yes, under the strict terms of the text 
you have offered.
  On page 3 of the bill, health liability action is
   defined as more than the providing of health care, but also the 
paying for health care. In connection with this, I have a lot of 
experience, because I adjudicated claims that were unfairly denied by 
health insurers. I am aware of people who have had bills, hospital 
bills they have owed, bill collectors hounding them on those bills, and 
yet they have not been paid by their insurance company.

  Clearly, Mr. Chairman, we do not want to protect that. There is a lot 
of noneconomic loss that can flow from that, but that is covered under 
the bill, the liability is capped under the bill on any theory. No 
matter how egregious the conduct of the health insurer, no matter how 
blatant, how cruel, the liability is capped.
  This bill may address a very important concept, one we need to work 
on. We did not have a hearing on it, we did not discuss it. The 
language brought before us in this amendment overreaches and would put 
you in the position of protecting the abusing psychologist and the 
claim-denying health insurer. You do not want to be in that position.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would inform the committee that the gentleman 
from California [Mr. Berman] has the right to close debate.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Michigan [Ms. Rivers].
  Ms. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, I offer the committee the words of one Frank Cornelius, 
who says ``I think tort reform as we know it is totally bad. We have a 
judicial system that I find quite adequate, if allowed to function in 
its own way;'' so you have to ask, who is Frank Cornelius? Is he some 
parasitic trial lawyer? Is he some rabid consumer rights advocate? No, 
Frank Cornelius is a lobbyist for the insurance industry. He was part 
of an effort in Indiana to cap noneconomic damages. What happened to 
Frank Cornelius? Soon after these caps were put in place, major 
malpractice was worked upon him. He expects to die within the next 2 
years from those problems. He has a different point of view now that he 
sees the problem from the side of a patient, as opposed to the side of 
the insurance industry. He acknowledges there is a certain poetic 
justice to the injury that he suffered, but he adds ``If there is a 
God, and I believe there is, what happened to me has a purpose. It 
changed my way of thinking and looking at things.'' He says ``Medical 
negligence cannot be reduced by simply restricting consumers' legal 
rights.'' That is what is being proposed here. Mr. Cornelius found this 
out the hard way.
  Mr. Chairman, how many other citizens will have to learn this 
selfsame lesson? Not many, I hope.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute and 30 seconds to the 
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Dingell].
  (Mr. DINGELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I want Members to look at what this 
amendment says, at page 13. It covers anything of a medical character. 
It caps pain and suffering and noneconomic damages at $250,000.
  Let us look at some of the things for which a person will get 
$250,000 maximum for pain and suffering and other noneconomic damages. 
A person is blinded, a person is rendered a paraplegic, loss of a leg 
or an arm, loss of reproductive capacity. A woman can never have a 
child again, she gets $250,000.
  How can this body justify the enactment of a proposal which has this, 
on which there has been no hearings whatsoever; no hearings, no 
testimony, nobody knows what this does. It springs like Hebe from the 
brain of Jove, without the faintest appreciation of what is done, 
without the least awareness of what it acccomplishes.
  Think of the hurt and pain and suffering that you are not properly 
compensating with this outrageous amendment. This is an outrageous 
amendment. I cannot in conscience see how I can vote for it, and I 
cannot imagine anybody else who could contemplate voting for this kind 
of outrage. No hearings, capping pain and suffering, without the 
faintest acknowledgment of what it will in fact cost.
  Let me remind the Members, a citizen can get more on workmen's 
compensation, on railroad compensation, or on maritime compensation 
than they could get under this.
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Michigan suggests that it is 
outrageous to propose health care reform on this floor because health 
care reform has not had hearings in this Congress. I think that is 
something, after 2 years of hearings on health care, the American 
people would find outrageous.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. 
Ganske].
  Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support this amendment. I am a 
doctor. I would like to talk about three things. I would like to talk 
about the economic costs of medical malpractice, I would like to talk 
about the noneconomic costs to the patient, and let us talk for just a 
second about how lawsuits have limited care.
  Twenty years ago when I was in medical school, when we would make 
rounds we would talk about the patient's illness and we would talk 
about the solutions. Today when you make hospital rounds you talk about 
the patient's illness and solutions, and how those solutions may cause 
a lawsuit.
  What happens? You practice defensive medicine. What happens with 
defensive medicine? Additional tests get ordered that you would not 
naturally do to cover your backside, and unfortunately, this results in 
tremendous increases in expense to the total system.
  This is real, Mr. Chairman. When I get called to the emergency room 
to take care of somebody with a scalp laceration, if I did not tell the 
emergency room doctor ``Do not order that series of x-rays until I see 
the patient,'' there would be $400 worth of facial or scalp x-rays 
sitting there, whether it is needed or not.
  The funny thing about this issue is that the noneconomic costs to 
patients by invasive tests that sometimes are ordered to prevent a 
lawsuit actually cause a paradox. Every type of invasive test has a 
small chance of injury, so what are we doing? We are taking and making 
an increased chance of injury. I urge my colleagues to support this 
amendment.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Cardin].
  (Mr. CARDIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Bryant] for purposes of a dialog.
  [[Page H2963]] Mr. BRYANT of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could 
ask the gentleman, the doctor, who just spoke, a question.
  Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BRYANT of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.
  Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to respond.
  Mr. BRYANT of Texas. Mr. Chairman, last week a member of the 
gentleman's profession did some surgery down in Florida. I heard on the 
radio, he was supposed to cut off a person's foot. He amputated it, and 
when that person woke up, they had cut off the wrong foot.
  How much money does the gentleman think that fellow ought to get for 
pain and suffering and noneconomic damages? He woke up and he lost the 
wrong foot, which means he is going to lose both his feet, because a 
fellow in your profession made a mistake.
  How much money do you think he ought to get for noneconomic damages, 
an open-ended question?
  Mr. GANSKE. If the gentleman will continue to yield, it is inevitable 
that mistakes are going to be made.
  Mr. BRYANT of Texas. Yes, it is.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Nadler].

                              {time}  2030

  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, in 1986 I and a number of other Members of 
this House were members of the New York Legislature and we took up the 
issue of medical malpractice. We made so-called tort reforms, we 
limited joined and several liability, we limited ability of continent 
fees, and did a number of other things. But we also ordered a study to 
see what was really going on, what would really work to reduce 
malpractice premiums.
  Several years later, the Harvard study that we had ordered came down. 
What it showed is this: It showed that limiting damages for pain and 
suffering to a quarter of a million dollars would not reduce insurance 
premiums. It showed that 2 percent of the doctors were responsible for 
80 percent of the claims and 80 percent of the awards, that the real 
answer to this problem of insurance premiums overwhelming the doctors 
is to tell the States to crack down on the 1\1/2\ percent or 2 percent 
of the doctors who are killing and maiming people because they are 
incompetent and are driving up everyone else's insurance rates.
  Victimizing the victim further by this amendment is not the answer. 
Cracking down on incompetent doctors is the answer.
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume to say that earlier in the debate, one of the Members on 
the other side put a question to one of our Members but then did not 
yield him sufficient time to respond to that question. The question 
that was put was what ought to be the recompense for someone who has 
lost a foot due to the negligence of a doctor or a hospital, and the 
answer to that question is quite clear. Replacing someone's lost foot 
is very expensive in today's world. It involves a great deal of 
technology, a great deal of doctors and professional care, probably 
lifelong rehabilitation and hospitalization, and in a fair system, 100 
percent of those costs without limit would be paid by the people who 
were responsible, and that is exactly what will obtain when we pass 
this amendment. Nothing in this amendment will change that.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to close the debate to 
the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm].
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas is recognized to close debate 
for 2\3/4\ minutes.
  (Mr. STENHOLM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, status quo is not acceptable. This debate 
today is about changing the status quo. Everyone agrees that patients 
must be reasonably protected against malpractice and against undue harm 
for medical devices, drugs and other medical products. Unfortunately, 
our current system is not working, and to all of those who have spoken 
so eloquently against all of the faults of this amendment, none of 
those comments have been addressed to changing the status quo.
  As one Member who has wanted to have hearings last year, the year 
before, the year before, of reasonably getting into debating this 
question, we were denied. We were never able to bring this discussion 
to the floor as we are doing today. I wished we had not brought that 
point up, because that is a sore point to this man.
  Patients and physicians all are losing under our current system. That 
is what some of us want to change tonight, the status quo. Numerous 
reforms must be enacted if we are going to control health care costs. 
My colleague from California, a classmate from the 96th Congress, said 
it very eloquently and very truthfully and very factually. If we want 
to reform our health care system, we must start with malpractice 
reform. We must begin to honestly deal with the problems of health 
system reform by changing first the malpractice system. That alone will 
not solve it.
  It is ironic that in one of our largest States, what we are now 
saying will not work has been working. This is puzzling to me. The case 
for medical liability relief is overwhelming. Lawsuit abuse is driving 
up the cost of health care for all of us. As one who represents a rural 
district in which we can no longer get doctors to come to our rural 
hospitals to deliver babies, how in the world can anyone stand here 
today and say the current system is adequate, the current system cannot 
be changed, we cannot dare to try something new, that we have to 
preserve that which we are doing today?
  I strongly urge the support of the Cox-Geren amendment. Change the 
status quo. Let us make our system better.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, to close the debate, I yield the balance of 
my time to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Doggett].
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Doggett] is recognized 
for 4\3/4\ minutes.
  Mr. DOGGETT. I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Chairman, perhaps it is a peculiar observation at a time when we 
focus so much attention on lawyers and lawsuits to suggest that maybe a 
little bitty part of the problem of malpractice in this country, 
malpractice litigation, is malpractice itself. The statistics from the 
Harvard Medical School study conducted by a group of doctors in 1990 
suggest that every 7 minutes in this country, someone dies in a 
hospital from medical malpractice. Maybe that has something to do with 
why we have a medical malpractice problem in this country. But the 
suggestion that, well, there will be mistakes completely avoids the 
question, because the question is, who is going to bear the burden of 
that mistake, and the suggestion by the author of this amendment that 
we can somehow give back a foot through medical technology suggests the 
ability to do something that only God can do.
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DOGGETT. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. WAXMAN. I want to make the point that this amendment which was 
just thrown together on the floor last night, revised again today, 
never had a day of hearings, it does not apply just to mistakes. It 
applies to intentional conduct. A doctor who comes in, a surgeon who 
comes in drunk and butchers somebody would be protected under this 
amendment to no more than $250,000 in damages. It has no relationship 
to the kind of conduct that might have been involved, like a 
psychiatrist raping an individual patient and harming that person for 
life. That is a psychological damage. If you say they are $250,000 in 
total noneconomic damages, there may be no economic damages for that 
kind of case. But to say that somebody should get $10,000 a year, when 
their lives are destroyed, for 25 years, that is good enough? I find 
that tremendously offensive. If you cannot create a leg to put on 
somebody whose leg was amputated improperly, then the pain and 
suffering and the humiliation means nothing more than some limited 
damage. I just want to point that out to the gentleman.
  Mr. DOGGETT. This is as the gentleman suggests a poorly crafted 
amendment that applies not only to careless conduct but to grossly 
careless conduct, to intentional conduct. It applies not only to the 
family physician 
[[Page H2964]] that drags this legislation along in the speeches but to 
the nursing home that intentionally abuses older Americans. But to 
suggest that this has something to do with health care reform is 
frivolous in and of itself. The studies have shown that all the medical 
malpractice insurance and litigation in this country amounts to a big 
63 cents out of every $100 spent on medical care. If that is where you 
want to start health care reform, I would submit that we start with the 
other 99-plus dollars out of health care and not focus on the part that 
relates to protecting people who are harmed by those who are careless 
or in this case engaged in intentional misconduct.
  Mr. WAXMAN. If the gentleman will permit, medical malpractice and 
defensive medicine is a real problem. We need to address it. We need to 
look at a lot of different alternatives, alternative dispute 
mechanisms, some ways to compensate people who can never find an 
attorney to allow them to get some access to some reward for the pains 
that they have suffered. But this does not address these issues. The 
committees have never held hearings on it. This is an amendment dropped 
on us this morning in this latest form and I am sure that as they read 
through how poorly drafted it is, with the unintended, I assume 
unintended consequences, that it is an embarrassment to those who are 
supporting it.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DOGGETT. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. DINGELL. This amendment does absolutely nothing to deter 
litigation. It simply cuts the amount that can be paid to a person who 
has been wronged by medical malpractice or by other unfortunate 
improper practices. It denies them proper recovery. If that is medical 
reform, I do not know what it is.
  I urge the rejection of the amendment. I thank the gentleman.
  Mrs. SEASTRAND. Mr. Chairman, we need to institute a phrase from the 
NFL when they were still using instant replay called, ``Upon further 
review.'' Because upon further review, it is clear our judicial system 
is filled with inconsistencies and arbitrary decisions. The 
``feelings'' or non-economic damage claims lead the pack. These claims 
result in unlimited damage awards and turn our system into a virtual 
lottery. The lawyers get rich while the system is brought to its knees.
  Make no mistake. Our system should and will pay for the full cost of 
injury, medical costs, property damage and income, without limit. I 
will fight for that. But we simply must do something to cap the 
unlimited and arbitrary damage claims to pay for someone's feelings. 
The way our system currently operates brings a whole new meaning to the 
Clinton phrase ``I feel your pain.'' Do we ever.
  However, there is a model for reform. The state of California. Our 
state set in place a cap of $250,000 for non-economic damages and that 
is what this amendment does. It says the defendant is responsible for 
all medical costs, all past and future income and all real economic 
damages. Then they can also be held accountable for up to a quarter of 
a million dollars in non-economic or pain and suffering damages. And 
this model works. In fact this model is credited with being the most 
effective reform in containing medical liability costs.
  Mr. Chairman, we will never be able to put a price tag on someone's 
feelings or pain, but this amendment does try to place a reasonable 
limit on the awards so those involved in suits won't have to play the 
lawsuit lottery.
  Mr. BARR. Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe along with many of my 
colleagues that tort reform must address the serious abuses that occur 
in the area of punitive awards for non-economic damages. On this 
subject, I seek a balance that takes into account important but diverse 
interests. We must protect against awards that bear no reasonable 
relation to the injury and threaten the economic integrity of our 
profit and non-profit enterprises. We must also permit sufficient 
discretion to ensure that injuries are compensated in full. In this 
regard, I continue to believe that while arbitrary caps on punitive 
damages in all instances are to be avoided, this legislation begins an 
important process in curbing the worst excesses of the current tort 
system. In the future, I propose that we address additional amendments 
that will take into account extraordinary circumstances warranting 
adjustments to those otherwise generous caps.
  Mr. NORWOOD. Mr. Chairman, we have gone too far in the area of non-
economic damages. No other country in the world awards non-economic 
damages at or even near the levels of awards in the United States. It 
is almost impossible for anyone to put a dollar figure on such non-
economic terms as pain and suffering; yet, our legal system continues 
to allow unlimited awards for pain and suffering. No other nation in 
the world comes close to placing economic burdens on society through 
non-economic damages the way we do in this country.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment is particularly important to our 
constituents. It is a major factor in the cost of health care today. 
This amendment will provide one of the best weapons possible in 
reducing the cost of health care. Forty percent of all MD's will find 
themselves party to a lawsuit, 50 percent of all surgeons will be party 
to a lawsuit, and 75 percent of all obstetricians will be party to a 
lawsuit. The problems of our tort system are not
 insignificant in the medical profession--they threaten the health of 
this nation by tying the hands of doctors. Doctors should not be forced 
to practice defensive medicine because they are terrified of $30 
million lawsuits. The practice of medicine is not perfect. It is the 
science and art of the practice of medicine. No matter how good a 
doctor you are, when dealing with the human body, things do not always 
turn out perfect--as we would like.

  Of course, neither is the legal profession perfect. In fact, writing 
laws is not perfect. Each law we write hurts some people--but the goal 
should be to pass laws that help the most people possible. This 
amendment is not perfect, but it will greatly help the majority of 
people in this country by reducing the cost of health.
  Our physicians are being forced to practice defensive medicine. To 
perfect their own families. We have taken away one of the most 
important things you want in your doctor--to use good judgment in the 
practice of medicine. But when every decision is being watched over by 
suit-minded lawyers just waiting for the less than perfect outcome so 
they can get rich, it forces the doctor to make his or her first 
decision ``How can I not be sued?'' The thought process goes like 
this--I know we do not need this test or this x-ray for the patients 
benefit--but I must order this test or this x-ray in case I am sued, 
because some lawyer will make it appear I did not do all I can do.
  There is a limit to how much malpractice one can pay for, but there 
is no limit to how much a jury of our peers can award. Some physicians 
pay as much as $150,000 per year for malpractice insurance. That 
increases the cost of medicine. And with jury verdicts in the tens of 
millions of dollars, one can never carry enough insurance to be sure 
you aren't ruined by a lawsuit. There must be a cap if you wish this 
country to continue to have the best health care system in the world--
There must be a cap if you want the cost of health care to come down.
  We have listened so long to the half-truths about protecting the 
middle class put out by the other side, it is time to lower the veil of 
ob-fus-cation and look at the costly reality that our tort system has 
become. We must no longer endanger the health of this Nation--we must 
place limits on all non-economic damages.
  We should pass this amendment today.
  Mr. Chairman, Congress has recognized this problem before. In 1992, 
Congress created the Federal Tort Claims Act in response to 
skyrocketing malpractice insurance premiums from federally funded 
community health centers. Under this act, judges rather than juries 
decide damages. Attorney's fees are limited and punitive damages are 
disallowed altogether. Why would the Federal Government institute such 
a restrictive system? Because the Federal Government, that is of course 
the taxpayers has to pay for the cost of these suits. If it is good 
enough for the government, it ought to be good enough for the rest of 
the health care industry. Let's give the rest of the medical industry 
that same relief.
  Mr. Chairman, I end my remarks with one simple thought for your 
consideration. The Office of Technology Assessment recently identified 
a ceiling on non-economic damages as the single most effective reform 
in containing medical liability costs. We should do the same.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Cox].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 247, 
noes 171, not voting 16, as follows:
                             [Roll No. 226]

                               AYES--247

     Allard
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     [[Page H2965]] Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooley
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cunningham
     Davis
     DeLay
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Eshoo
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (TX)
     Foley
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kim
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     Longley
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Minge
     Molinari
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Morella
     Myers
     Myrick
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Parker
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Richardson
     Riggs
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Torricelli
     Traficant
     Upton
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Wamp
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                               NOES--171

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Baesler
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bishop
     Bonior
     Borski
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant (TX)
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Danner
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Engel
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Flanagan
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Graham
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoyer
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     King
     Kleczka
     Klink
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     LaTourette
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lincoln
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manton
     Markey
     Martini
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McDade
     McDermott
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Nadler
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Pelosi
     Pomeroy
     Pryce
     Rahall
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Rivers
     Rose
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schiff
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shadegg
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stupak
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torres
     Towns
     Tucker
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weldon (PA)
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Boucher
     Clinger
     Cubin
     DeFazio
     Forbes
     Gibbons
     Hall (OH)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Martinez
     Murtha
     Owens
     Rangel
     Weller
     Williams
     Yates

                              {time}  2057

  Messrs. JACOBS, GILCHREST, and de la GARZA changed their vote from 
``aye'' to ``no.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, product liability legislation has been 
debated in Congress for several years now and I would like to express 
some thoughts on past efforts to rectify problems with our legal 
system.
  In 1987, I introduced H.R. 1115, the Uniform Product Safety Act of 
1987, to establish standards in determining product liability lawsuits. 
This legislation was the subject of 22 hearings and mark-ups which 
enabled manufacturers, sellers and consumers to offer their views. My 
bill had 96 cosponsors from both sides of the aisle. Comparatively, 
today's bill H.R. 956, the Common Sense Legal Standards Reform Act has 
received little bipartisan input and leans heavily in favor of business 
interests.
  My legislation clearly defined reasonable standards of liability for 
manufacturers that would have reduced excessive lawsuits without 
infringing on State laws or the rights of consumers. H.R. 1115 did not 
try to restructure technical provisions of the legal code such as 
abolishing joint and several liability for noneconomic loss. With 
congressional prodding, legislators in New Mexico have enacted reforms 
that meet the needs of both consumers and business groups.
  Today's short-sighted debate is discouraging to Members who believe 
such broad measures are not only unnecessary but potentially dangerous. 
Among my concerns for today's legislation is the 15 years statute of 
repose for all products. I am hesitant to support such an all-knowing 
directive.
  Furthermore, my legislation exempted from the new standards 
industrial waste, pollutants or contaminants released into air or 
water, tobacco and tobacco products, alcoholic beverages, and any drug 
or device which is used as a contraceptive or abortifacient or which 
interferes with human reproduction under certain circumstances. Have we 
really considered the long-term ramifications of today's bill?
  Finally, H.R. 1115 contained provisions to increase the availability 
of information in product liability actions. The 1988 bill allowed 
courts to disclose information that presented a risk to the public 
health and safety. It is hypocritical for Congress to place the burden 
of proof on consumers as H.R. 956 does while allowing companies to 
withhold information that could educate consumers.
  My efforts to enact responsible legislation in the 100th Congress are 
indicative of my support for product liability reform. In the light of 
current research used by the U.S. Supreme Court which claims that there 
is no epidemic of punitive damage awards, I remain hesitant to support 
the broad, precedent-setting legislation before us today. It is 
unfortunate that we have not been able to craft a responsible piece of 
legislation.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, this Member rises in support of this 
measure and to express his pleasure at seeing this much needed 
legislation finally brought before this body.
  This Member introduced the first product liability legislation in the 
Nebraska Unicameral Legislature in 1977. During this process this 
Member realized that this issue must be dealt with on the Federal 
level, because the vast majority of products and services move through 
interstate commerce. Addressing product liability at the state level is 
like patching one hole in a tire with fifty holes.
  Now, finally, this issue is being debated on the House floor after 
years of being bottled-up in committee by the trial attorneys and the 
former chairmen of the respective committees.
  Mr. Speaker, all Americans are paying much higher prices for consumer 
goods and services because this legislation has been delayed for so 
very long. The insurance costs incurred by companies protecting against 
and paying for outrageous and unreasonable product liability suits are 
passed along to the consumer each and every day, in nearly every 
product and service purchased.
  Perhaps even more outrageously, the current system unfairly imposes 
upon the American public product design standards, which are created in 
response to penalties awarded in a few states with the highest punitive 
and compensatory damages. Those States get to impose their juries' 
ideas of appropriate design and safety standards on the rest of the 
Nation. That is a perversion of Federalism. National standards should 
be set by the national legislature. That is what this bill will do.
  Mr. Chairman, this Member has been a long-time co-sponsor of product 
liability reform, dating back to at least 1986. This Member is pleased 
that this long delayed measure is finally being debated on the House 
floor and urges his colleagues to support it.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to voice my opposition to H.R. 
956, the Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act of 1995. This bill 
is an undisguised assault on the safety of the American people that 
will result in more unsafe products, more injuries, and less 
compensation for those who are hurt by corporate misconduct and 
negligence.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill contains two provisions that are particularly 
harmful to women: The punitive damages cap and the provision 
[[Page H2966]] that shields FDA-approved products from full liability.
  Punitive damages in our Legal System Act as a powerful incentive for 
companies to make safety improvements to their products.
  A punitive damages award as little as $250,000 will fail to serve as 
an effective deterrent in many cases. In addition, capping punitive 
damages awards at $250,000, or at three times the amount of economic 
damages, whichever is greater, discriminates against women and others 
who may not have large incomes.
  Economic damages were generally not as high in the products liability 
cases of women who developed endometriosis, pelvic inflammatory 
disease, toxic shock syndrome, and other illnesses that left them 
sterile when they used copper-7 intrauterine devices or super 
absorbency tampons.
  A punitive damage award cap is less harmful to those with higher 
salaries and discriminates against those who have lower incomes, many 
of whom are women. Justice would be meted out very differently for two 
people injured by the same defective Ford Pinto. The corporate CEO 
could seek a large punitive award based on economic damages, while the 
homemaker would be severely limited by the provisions of this bill.
  Second, Mr. Chairman, this bill shields products from liability that 
have been previously approved by the FDA in spite of the fact that the 
record is filled with examples of drugs that have been approved or 
underregulated by the FDA only to cause immense physical harm once 
authorized for sale on the open market.
  For example, the FDA approved high estrogen birth control pills which 
caused renal failure. It also approved the copper-7 intrauterine device 
which caused sterility in young childless women. The FDA defense 
shields negligent manufacturers at the expense of our nation's women 
and should be rejected.
  Mr. Chairman, there is no national crisis in products liability 
litigation, nor is there any epidemic in punitive damages awards. To 
the contrary, the facts demonstrate that our current State-based 
products liability system works well.
  It allows our citizens to seek redress when they have been injured by 
corporate negligence and it provides ample incentives to correct 
defective products when cause harm.
  This bill favors powerful corporations at the expense of women, the 
elderly, the young, and all working Americans.
  I urge my colleagues to reject these ill-advised reforms and to vote 
against H.R. 956.
  Mr. RUSH. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong opposition to H.R. 
956, the so-called Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act.
  There is nothing even vaguely common-sensical about this bill. On the 
contrary, this bill is nothing more than a thinly disguised, let's kill 
all the trial lawyers bill.
  Mr. Chairman, unlike so many of my colleagues on both sides of the 
aisle, I am not an attorney. But, unlike many who support this bill, I 
do not view the trial lawyers to be inherently greedy or evil.
  Instead, it is my strong and considered opinion that a good lawyer 
can be a wronged party's only friend just when he or she needs one the 
most.
  The overwhelming majority of our nation's products liability 
plaintiffs are not just nameless, faceless individuals but hard-working 
Americans with mortgages and families. Their right to seek compensation 
for faulty or defective workmanship in consumer products cannot and 
should not be denied.
  Many States are also moving to harm consumers and working Americans 
by placing arbitrary limits on monetary damage awards in product 
liability suits. The Governor of my State, for example, signed into law 
today a measure that caps punitive and pain and suffering awards while 
making it harder for wronged citizens to see justice served in Illinois 
State Courts. My colleagues, this is an outrage. We must work ever 
harder to see that these efforts are defeated at all levels of 
government.
  The bill before us today would make sure that many of these persons 
will have nowhere to turn to redress their injuries. The rights of 
working-class American consumers have never been more under threat than 
they are now. I therefore implore my fellow Members on both sides of 
the aisle to oppose this extremely underhanded and reckless bill. We 
must work together to see that it is defeated.
  Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Common 
Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995. Civil justice reform is an extremely 
important part of the Contract with America. The time for enacting 
effective product liability reform is now. The first comprehensive 
product liability bill was introduced in the House of Representatives 
six Congresses ago by former Representative Jim Broyhill. I was proud 
to be an original cosponsor of this legislation. Since that time we 
have been blocked from action time and time again. During this long 
wait for federal action, the situation has only deteriorated.
  The average American is confronted with a civil justice system that 
is too costly, too protracted and oftentimes seems to work better for 
the attorneys than for their clients. Each day in America, hundreds of 
lawsuits are filed by lawyers against fellow citizens, businesses, 
civic institutions, government entities, and countless other targets. 
This seemingly endless series of legal attacks has practically numbed 
America to the fact that, as a nation, we have become the most 
litigious society on Earth and that an onslaught of lawsuit abuse has
 had damaging and lasting effects on the standard of living of all 
Americans. While most legal actions brought in the United States seek 
legitimate redress for harm caused, unfortunately many are groundless, 
frivolous and the result of lawyers who abuse the system and seek to 
claim lottery sized dollar awards from both their advisory and their 
client. It is these types of abuses that bring discredit to the 
American legal system, damage the U.S. economy, and drain precious 
national resources into the dark hole of endless litigation. The 
current system creates fear among Americans that they will likely be 
the victim of an unjust lawsuit. It chills their desire to volunteer 
and participate in many aspects of ordinary life, and it prevents the 
introduction of new and beneficial products and services to the 
American people. Companies in many industries across the 50 states have 
discontinued product lines, closed plants, shut down divisions, been 
forced overseas and, in some cases, have been bankrupted by the current 
product liability system in this country. We should ask the men and 
women who have lost their jobs in these industries whether or not we 
need to change the current system. When the House Judiciary Committee 
considered this legislation, we heard testimony from a medical 
equipment manufacturer that it will soon be unable to get raw materials 
to make pacemakers and other implantable medical devices because of 
liability concerns of its suppliers. We have been warned specifically 
that the current product liability system is stifling innovation and 
preventing newer and more effective lifesaving medical devices from 
ever coming to market. Biomedical and pharmaceutical executives have 
testified repeatedly before Congress that they are not developing 
vaccines and medicines because of fear generated by the current 
unpredictable liability lottery they face in this country. We should 
ask the millions of Americans suffering from heart disease, AIDS, 
cancer and other deadly illnesses whether there is an urgent need to 
unleash medical innovation and discovery by reforming the current 
system.

  Today, standards of liability vary from State to State, and sometimes 
even from Court to Court within a State. Neither the injured 
individual, the product manufacturer, nor the seller has any idea what 
liability standard will be applied, and all are subjected to 
conflicting rules on their responsibility in the use, design, 
production, and sale of products. The legislation before us establishes 
clear guidelines for determining who shall be responsible for harm 
caused by an accident. Uniformity is essential in order to provide 
fairness and predictability to consumers, manufacturers, and sellers. 
Although tort law is generally considered a matter for the States, it 
has been clear for quite some time that, due to the interstate nature 
of the sale of products, liability reform should be dealt with at the 
Federal level.
  It is time to recognize that America will never be the best place in 
the world to create a job until we reform our current product liability 
system. It is time we provide the reform necessary to unleash American 
ingenuity in the development of new and more effective products, create 
jobs, increase our international competitiveness, and provide fairness 
to product consumers, sellers and manufacturers alike. Enactment of the 
proposals put forth in H.R. 956 will form the basis of strong and 
effective legal reform which will loosen the grip of lawyers on 
America. These common sense reforms are necessary to ensure that 
American consumers, manufacturers, product sellers, employers and 
employees alike receive fairness and justice under our civil justice 
system. The time has come to end lawsuit abuse in America.
  Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I am dumbfounded that this 
bill to restrict the rights of victims and consumers to adequate 
compensation for and reasonable protection from injury caused by 
unsafe, down right dangerous, and sometimes even deadly products has 
been named the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act. This bill absolutely 
turns common sense on its head.
  Tell me, Mr. Chairman, is it common sense that the greatest leniency 
will be reserved for manufacturers of products that hurt children? 
That's what this bill will do. Is it common sense that a pharmaceutical 
company could face lower penalties if its product kills a senior 
citizen rather than a middle-aged man? That's what this bill will do. 
Is it common sense that victims of hazardous and unsafe products will 
have less of a chance to recover damages if 
[[Page H2967]] they are women, or poor? That's right--this bill will do 
that too.
  Most importantly, do the American people really think that it's 
common sense to take away the power of our most democratic 
institution--the citizen jury--to impose deterrents against unsafe 
products and practices? I think not.
  It's not hard to sell common sense reforms to the American people but 
supporters of this bill should be ashamed to put that label on a 
package of tricks that are crafted to increase corporate profits at the 
expense of the most vulnerable in our society. Perhaps the most 
dangerous product around these days is this bill, and when people get a 
chance to look inside the box and see what's really there they will be 
outraged. The Members of Congress who vote for it, however, will 
ultimately have to answer to the consumers, which is more than you can 
say for negligent manufacturers if this bill passes.
  One of the most troubling aspects of H.R. 956 is the rule for 
calculating punitive damages, setting a cap at three times the amount 
of economic loss, or $250,000, whichever is greater. This bill 
establishes appallingly unequal penalties based not on the severity of 
the harm caused or the extent of negligence or even malice, but on the 
income of the victim.
  Punitive damages have a positive impact on decisions made by product 
manufacturers and sellers. The Conference Board, a business-funded 
research organization, surveyed companies about the effect of strong 
product liability penalties on their operations. They reported, 
managers say that products have become safer, manufacturing procedures 
have improved, and labels and use instructions have been more explicit.
  Yet by tying the amount of punitive damages to monetary loss alone, 
and not noneconomic damages like pain and suffering, this bill takes 
away the threat of heavy punitive damages for products that severely 
hurt people with low-income, or no-income, like kids.
  Think about it. Under this bill, if a product kills a child, punitive 
damages, regardless of the situation, will be capped at $250,000 since 
there will be no lost earnings to calculate as monetary losses.
  I worked hard during the 103rd Congress to improve product safety, 
especially for children. A child toy safety bill was one of the 
products of my efforts. Yet now we are seriously considering a bill 
that says that a toy manufacturer's concern about product safety might 
be diminished because the potential penalties are tied to the income of 
the victim. Large manufacturers and corporations will simply calculate 
punitive damages as defined under this bill as a small cost of doing 
business rather than attempt to improve the safety of their products.
  Recently, a group of Illinois families joined together around their 
concerns about the lack of a safety latch on the rear hatch of a 
popular brand of mini-van. Since 1993, the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration has been investigating the rear liftgate of these 
vans because they fly open in crashes. According to the NHTSA, the 
latches failed to keep the rear hatches closed in at least 51 
accidents, causing 74 ejections and 25 known deaths. Who rides in the 
rear seats of mini-vans? Kids, of course. This bill would mean that the 
van manufacturer probably does not need to worry about hefty punitive 
damages in civil actions. If the issue were the front door latch of a 
luxury sports car, a manufacturer would almost certainly pay more 
attention.
  Is this common sense?
  Harming senior citizens would also tend to carry lesser punitive 
damages under this bill, since their incomes tend to be less. Of 
course, senior citizens are big consumers of pharmaceutical drugs. With 
this bill the majority is setting a lower standard for safety for drugs 
marketed to seniors than for drugs marketed to the general population. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers often say that fear of liability keeps 
them from marketing certain drugs. Does that mean that removing some 
fear of extensive punitive damages will lead them to market drugs to 
seniors that they might not otherwise sell? Is this really what the GOP 
wants to accomplish?
  Is this really common sense?
  Punitive damages are levied by juries as punishment for actions by 
manufacturers and sellers to deter the marketing of unsafe products. 
Therefore, punitive damages should be related to the severity of injury 
and the actions of the manufacturer or seller, not the economic status 
of the victim.
  That is true common sense.
  Unfortunately, the bill before us also sets up yet another dual 
standard for recovery of damages in a product liability case based on 
the income of the victim. The bill eliminates the doctrine of joint and 
several liability, which ensures compensation for an injured party even 
if one or more of the defendants are unable to pay, for non-economic 
damages.
  Women, senior citizens, children, and low-wage workers are more 
likely to receive compensation in the form of non-economic damages 
rather than economic damages. Yet this bill says that if one of the 
parties responsible for hurting someone goes bankrupt, the victim 
cannot recover full compensation, regardless of what the jury says. 
Upper-income men, who are more likely to be awarded economic damages 
for loss of income, are not affected by this provision of the bill 
because joint and several liability for economic damages remains 
intact.
  Consider a case where two people suffer an injury. One is a man, the 
other a woman. The man is a lawyer and receives his full compensation 
whether or not all responsible parties contribute. The woman is a 
homemaker, and so the compensation she receives could be severely 
limited if one of the responsible parties is unable to pay.
  Is this fair? Is this common sense?
  Are the Republicans saying with this bill that they don't value 
women, seniors, children, or the poor? You bet they are.
  Mr. Chairman, I have just finished fighting a bill passed by this 
chamber which suspends all new Federal regulations, including those 
designed to protect the public from unsafe products. Now the majority 
has come forward with this effort to close the only remaining mechanism 
average citizens have to protect themselves. With one hand, they remove 
regulation, and with the other, they take away the power of citizen 
juries to control corporate behavior through the threat of punitive 
damages.
  What next? I probably shouldn't ask.
  The American people have plenty of common sense, and when they are 
able to step back and see the whole of what is being done here, they 
will know whose interests are being protected, and who is being sold 
down the river.
  The leadership may want to call this bill the Corporate Profits 
Protection Act, or the Corporate Wrongdoers Protection Act, or even the 
``Profits Regardless of Who Gets Hurt Act,'' but they will find that 
the people are far too smart to let them call this the Common Sense 
Legal Reform Act for long. Its not hard to see why the majority wants 
to act so quickly on this bill. After all, you can't fool all the 
people all the time. And time is running out.
  Mr. Chairman, the American people will be shocked when they find out 
what this bill calls common sense.
  I urge my colleagues to reject H.R. 956.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly the Committee rose; and the SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. 
Longley) having assumed the chair, Mr. Dreier, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 956) to 
establish legal standards and procedures for product liability 
litigation, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

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