[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 44 (Thursday, March 9, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E569-E570]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


   U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR POSSIBLE NATO EFFORT TO HELP UNPROFOR WITHDRAW 
                        FROM BOSNIA AND CROATIA

                                 ______


                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                         Thursday, March 9, 1995
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, last year President Clinton made the 
commitment to deploy United States forces to assist in a NATO effort to 
withdraw U.N. peacekeeping troops from Bosnia if this becomes 
necessary. On March 31, we are approaching a deadline imposed by the 
Government of Croatia for the beginning of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR 
from Croatia, to be completed by the end of June. The President still 
has not committed United States forces to assist in a possible 
withdrawal from Croatia, in part so as not to prejudice delicate on-
going negotiations with the Croatian government.
  Given the seriousness and the implications of the President's 
commitment of United States forces for these possible missions and the 
dangerous situation in Croatia, I wrote to Secretary Christopher in 
February setting forth my concerns. I received a response to my letter 
today. I am including both in the Record in order that my colleagues 
can be informed about the important, serious issues before us.
  In the response to my letter Assistant Secretary of State for 
Legislative Affairs, Wendy Sherman, emphasizes that in assisting the 
possible pull-out of UNPROFOR, ``NATO has no intention of engaging in 
offensive combat in Bosnia and/or Croatia, or of remaining in the 
region following the UNPROFOR pull-out.''
  Assistant Secretary Sherman also stresses that to give our diplomatic 
efforts a chance to succeed, the administration is not yet making a 
public case for assistance with the UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia. 
But if there is no alternative, the President will explain to the 
American people what is at stake, which above all, is ``our collective 
security, as exemplified by mutual commitment to Allies.''
  In testimony today before the International Relations Committee, 
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Richard Holbrooke, 
gave assurances that United States troops, if they are ever deployed in 
Bosnia or Croatia, will do so only to help UNPROFOR troops leave, 
period.
  The exchange of letters follows:
                                                      Committee on


                                      International Relations,

                                Washington, DC, February 22, 1995.
     Hon. Warren Christopher,
     Secretary of State, Department of State,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Secretary: On January 3, I wrote to you regarding 
     the President's decision in principle to commit U.S. ground 
     forces to a future NATO-led operation to support UNPROFOR 
     withdrawal from Bosnia. I appreciated your reply of January 
     19.
       I am writing again because my policy and process concerns 
     about this decision persist. Indeed, they have been 
     sharpened, as a result of: (1) the increasingly fragile 
     situation in Bosnia; (2) information provided to the 
     Committee that the first contingency steps to implement a 
     withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia are now going forward; and 
     (3) the decision of the Croatian government to terminate the 
     mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia after March 31, 1995.
       I would like to ask a number of questions about U.S. 
     policy:
       1. Does the President's commitment to assist in the 
     withdrawal UNPROFOR from Bosnia extend to a withdrawal of 
     UNPROFOR from Croatia as well?
       If such a commitment has not been made, is it under active 
     consideration at this time?
       What would be the U.S. troop and cost requirements of such 
     an additional commitment?
       2. How would a prior withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia 
     complicate an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia?
       How would an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia change the 
     U.S. troop, cost and logistics requirements of a NATO-led 
     operation to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia?
       3. How does the possibility of renewed fighting in both 
     Bosnia and Croatia affect your estimates of the U.S. troop 
     and cost requirements of a NATO-led operation to support 
     UNPROFOR withdrawal?
       If fighting resumes, do you believe that U.S. forces 
     participating in a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR will be 
     able to keep out of the conflict?
       4. I appreciate the Department of State's reply of January 
     19th, ``that the Administration has no intention of keeping 
     U.S. ground forces in Bosnia following a withdrawal 
     operation.'' I agree with that policy limitation, but I 
     remain concerned about the strong pressures on U.S. ground 
     forces--during and in the aftermath of an UNPROFOR 
     withdrawal--to intervene in the conflict:
       To provide humanitarian assistance;
       To protect civilian populations; or
       To respond to military provocations by parties to the 
     conflict.
       How do you address each of these issues, from the 
     standpoint of keeping U.S. forces focused on their mission, 
     and preventing mission creep?
       I also want to reiterate my concern, which I know you 
     share, that a commitment to put U.S. ground troops in harm's 
     way is the most serious undertaking a President can make.
       To my knowledge, the President has yet to make a public 
     case for sending U.S. ground forces to assist in UNPROFOR 
     withdrawal from Bosnia. Unless or until the President makes 
     the case directly to the American people, I believe there 
     will be little support for his decision in the Congress or 
     among the public at large. I strongly urge the President to 
     state the policy and explain the commitment.
       I appreciate your attention to this letter, and I look 
     forward to your answers to the several questions raised.
       With best regards,
           Sincerely,
                                                  Lee H. Hamilton,
     Ranking Democratic Member.
                                                                    ____



                            United States Department of State,

                                    Washington, DC, March 9, 1995.
       Dear Mr. Hamilton: Thank you for your letter of February 22 
     to Secretary Christopher, in which you pose additional 
     questions about possible U.S. participation in a NATO-led 
     effort to help UNPROFOR withdraw from Bosnia and/or Croatia.
       Before addressing your questions individually, I would like 
     to stress that the Administration shares your concern over an 
     UNPROFOR pull-out: like you, we fear withdrawal may 
     contribute to a widening of the war in both Bosnia and 
     Croatia. For this reason, we have undertaken an active 
     diplomatic campaign to convince President Tudjman to allow an 
     international peacekeeping force to remain in his country. 
     Assistant Secretary Holbrooke held meetings in Zagreb March 6 
     to that end.
       Because all the Allies agree that an international force 
     should remain in the region, NATO's planning for assistance 
     to UNPROFOR withdrawal has been conducted on a contingency 
     basis only. NATO has taken care to ensure that laying solid 
     groundwork for possible withdrawal does not imply accession 
     to UNPROFOR's departure. President Clinton has avoided making 
     an explicit statement that the U.S. would help facilitate 
     UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia so as not to precipitate a 
     pull-out. Practically speaking, if a situation were to 
     develop in Croatia where no alternative to NATO-led 
     withdrawal appeared feasible, as in Bosnia our Alliance 
     commitments would militate in favor of U.S. participation. 
     But let me emphasize that we do not want this to come to 
     pass, and we are pressing Tudjman to moderate his stance so 
     UNPROFOR does not have to leave and NATO does not have to 
     deploy.
       You correctly suggest that UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia 
     would significantly complicate the situation for UNPROFOR in 
     Bosnia. Evacuation routes through Croatia that soldiers in 
     UNPROFOR/Bosnia would have to use might be harder to secure 
     if UNPROFOR/Croatia were no longer in place. Also, if the 
     Krajina Serbs tried to prevent UNPROFOR withdrawal from 
     Croatia (as they have sometimes threatened), conflict could 
     spill over into the volatile Bihac area, where Bosnian Serbs 
     might feel compelled to support Krajina Serbs, thus 
     endangering UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia.
       Because UNPROFOR's departure from one state may bring it 
     under threat in the other, and in response to President 
     Tudjman's stated wish to end UNPROFOR's mandate on March 31, 
     NATO military authorities have been tasked with updating 
     their contingency Bosnia withdrawal plan to include steps to 
     facilitate withdrawal from both countries. NATO's revised 
     plan is scheduled to be ready in mid-March. We do not yet 
     have NATO's final cost estimates, but a team of budget 
     experts from the Department of Defense, the Office of 
     Management and Budget, the State Department, and the National 
     Security Council travelled to Brussels and to AFSOUTH 
     headquarters in Naples the week of March 6 to study existing 
     figures for Bosnia withdrawal and determine whether figures 
     were available for Croatia. Once NATO has released its 
     revised plan, and we have made preliminary decisions on what 
     our response should be, we will discuss funding options with 
     Congress.
       As for troop numbers, NATO has not yet asked member states 
     to indicate possible contributions, nor has it projected 
     troop needs. It is worth noting that a significant number of 
     NATO troops facilitating UNPROFOR withdrawal would be 
     reflagged UNPROFOR contingents from Allies already in the 
     region. As with costs, troop needs for a Bosnia-only 
     operation would be somewhat higher than for a Croatia-only 
     operation, and somewhat lower than for an operation to help 
     UNPROFOR withdraw from both states. Again, once NATO has 
     released its revised 
     [[Page E570]] plan in mid-March, we will be in a better 
     position to consult with you on possible U.S. troop 
     contributions.
       For planning purposes, NATO is calculating personnel and 
     equipment needs under the most adverse circumstances. NATO 
     projects that in facilitating UNPROFOR's departure, it might 
     provide close air support to UNPROFOR troops, as it is 
     already committed to do, and undertake other activities in 
     defense of the international peacekeepers. NATO has no 
     intention of engaging in offensive combat in Bosnia and/or 
     Croatia, or of remaining in the region following an UNPROFOR 
     pull-out.
       The pressures you describe on NATO--and thus the U.S.--to 
     become involved in the conflict should UNPROFOR withdraw are 
     real and sobering. Without UNPROFOR, civilian populations 
     will indeed have little protection. International relief 
     organizations will find it difficult to make humanitarian 
     deliveries. Minor conflicts that could be quelled even by the 
     presence of international observers would escalate. Thus, as 
     we note above, it is clearly preferable for UNPROFOR, or a 
     similar international presence, to remain in the region. We 
     are working actively toward that end in Croatia; in Bosnia, 
     the Contact Group is in touch with the various parties to try 
     to prevent a resurgence of fighting, which might provoke 
     UNPROFOR withdrawal. The Administration is also continuing to 
     argue against unilateral lift, the other likely trigger for 
     UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia.
       As the situation clarifies itself, we will need to make 
     decisions. We want UNPROFOR to stay, but if an upsurge in 
     fighting threatens the safety of our Allies, we do not intend 
     to leave them stranded. In order to give our diplomatic 
     efforts a chance to succeed, we are not yet making a public 
     case for assistance with an UNPROFOR pull-out. But should 
     there be no alternative, the President will explain to the 
     American people what is at stake: our collective security, as 
     exemplified by mutual commitments to Allies. We trust we can 
     count on your support, and that of the Congress, should we 
     have to undertake an operation to assist our Allies depart 
     from the former Yugoslavia.
       We hope this information will be helpful to you and the 
     members of the Committee. Please do not hesitate to contact 
     us if we can be of further assistance.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Wendy R. Sherman,
                         Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
     

                          ____________________