Congressional Record, Volume 141 Issue 42 (Tuesday, March 7, 1995)

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 42 (Tuesday, March 7, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H2760-H2780]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[[Page H2760]]
SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 105 and rule
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 1058.

{time} 1621

in the committee of the whole

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 1058) to reform Federal securities litigation, and for other
purposes, with Mr. Combest in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having
been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Bliley] will be
recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr.
Markey] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Bliley].
Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 1058, the Securities
Litigation Reform Act. A recent survey by the National Venture Capital
Association found that 62 percent of responding entrepreneurial
companies that went public in 1986 had been sued by 1993. The survey
concluded that, if historical rates continue, ``unprecedented numbers
of newly public companies are likely to be sued in the coming years.''
This is a national tragedy and a situation the Congress cannot allow to
continue. H.R. 1058 is an important first step in our continuing review
of litigation reform.
H.R. 1058 is the product of months of intensive negotiations. I would
like to highlight for the Members of this body major changes that were
made to this legislation during the committee drafting process.
The entire bill has been modified where necessary to make clear that
restrictions on bringing legal actions based on the antifraud
provisions of section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act and rule 10b-5
apply only to private suits, not to SEC enforcement actions. The
legislation was intended to curb strike suits, not SEC enforcement
actions, and that is now what it does.
Similarly, the bill has been modified to apply only to implied
actions under section 10b, and does not override other sections of the
securities laws that provide their own express causes of action. Strike
suits are almost always brought under section 10, and actions based on
other sections of the securities laws have not been a problem.
The intentional fraud-only standard of H.R. 10 has been modified.
H.R. 1058 provides for actions based on misrepresentations or omissions
done recklessly, but a defendant found reckless can only be held for
the proportionate share of his liability. The definition of
recklessness is based, in part, on language taken from the leading case
in this area. Intentional fraud will still bring joint and several
liability, as well it should. Anyone who intentionally breaks the law
should know that he will be responsible for all damages that flow from
his actions.
The bill preserves the principle of ``fraud on the market'' by
removing the obligation in H.R. 10 to prove reliance in each instance
of misrepresentation. Existing case law allowing plaintiffs to meet
their obligation of showing reliance by relying on the market price
will be codified for the first time. Members who seek to apply fraud on
the market to all securities and not just those with liquid markets do
not understand the legal principle and economic theories that underly
the legislation.
The provision governing fee shifting, ``Loser Pays,'' has been
modified significantly under the terms of H.R. 1058. The prevailing
party can recover his costs only if he can prove that the losing
party's case was without substantial merit, and that imposing those
costs on the loser will not be unjust to either side. This entire
provision applies to judgments; if a case is settled, it does not
apply.
One thing has not changed. H.R. 1058 addresses the same issue as H.R.
10 did, that is, the crying need to reform the process by which
securities class actions are litigated. H.R. 1058 is a refinement of
H.R. 10, brought about by debate and consultation between many Members
on both sides of the aisle. I urge its support by all Members of the
House.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 6 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, what I would like to do to help all those who are
trying to decide how they are going to vote here today is to perhaps
assist them by applying a multiple choice test, so that people can
choose themselves, as we go through the test, which they think would be
the correct answer.
Let me begin by asking which one of these four categories would be
hurt by H.R. 1058: A, insider traders; B, fraudulent derivative
brokers; C, wrongdoer accountants; or D, fraud victims.
The correct answer there is D, fraud victims would in fact be harmed,
because it is going to essentially cripple the ability of private fraud
actions to be brought by individual investors who have in fact had
their life savings ripped off by investors, by companies that have
misled them in their investment strategy.
Next question: out of the 235,000 suits filed in 1994, how many were
securities fraud cases in this country: A, 31,800 out of the 235,000;
B, 9,500; C, 18,670; D, 290, 290 out of the 235,000 cases. The correct
answer is 290 cases in the securities fraud area.
The next question, by what percentage have securities fraud class
actions increased over the last 20 years in our country: A, a 150-
percent increase; B, a 100-percent increase; C, a 50-percent increase;
D, minus 4.3-percent. The correct answer is D, a 4.3-percent decrease
in securities fraud actions brought over the last 20 years.

{time} 1630

Next question, just trying to be helpful:
Out of the 14,000 public companies, how many were sued each year on
average in securities fraud class actions over the last several years?
A. 7,000 public companies sued each year.
B. 3,500 public companies sued each year.
C. 1,400 companies in America sued each year.
D. 125 companies sued for fraud each year in the United States.
The correct answer, D, only 125 companies are sued each year in the
United States for securities fraud.
Next question:
Which is H.R. 1058's solution to the derivatives crisis facing dozens
of municipalities and other counties in the United States?
A. Improve the supervision and regulation of derivatives dealers.
B. Strengthen fraud liability.
C. Increase customer protections.
D. Make it virtually impossible for victims to recover their losses
from fraudulent brokers.
The answer, D, make it impossible for all intents and purposes for
there to be a recovery when individuals have been injured.
Next question:
Which one do the English not like?
A. Tea.
B. Soccer.
C. Fish and chips.
D. The English rule.
The correct answer is the English rule. they do not like the English
rule in England.
Economist, the leading conservative periodical in that country, last
month editorialized against the English rule arguing that the American
rule is a better rule if ordinary individuals are to be compensated for
harm which has befallen them because of fraudulent activity in the
financial marketplace.
Next question:
Which is not a defense to securities fraud under H.R. 1058?
A. The plaintiff did not plead specific facts of my state of mind.
B. The plaintiff did not read on line 12 of page 68 of the prospectus
where I made my fraudulent misrepresentation.
C. Sorry, I forgot the truth.
D. None of the above.
The answer, D.
H.R. 1058 requires plaintiff's complaints to make specific
allegations which, if true, would be sufficient to establish scienter
as to each defendant
[[Page H2761]] at the time the alleged violation occurred. In addition,
it is expressly made insufficient for this purpose to plead the mere
presence of facts inconsistent with a statement or omission alleged to
have been misleading.
Next question:
How much will H.R. 1058 reduce the Federal budget?
A. By $100 million.
B. By $50 million.
C. By zero.
D. It will increase it by up to $250 million over the next 5 years.
The answer, D, it will increase the Federal deficit by $250 million
according to the Congressional Budget Office because of the needed
additional enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission out in
the financial marketplace.
Finally, under H.R. 1058, who will pay fraud victims the share of the
damages caused by the primary wrongdoer who is in jail or bankrupt?
A. The reckless wrongdoers who participated in the fraud.
B. Aiders and abetters in the fraud who helped to make it possible.
C. The accountants who claim they forgot to disclose the fraud.
D. Nobody.
The answer is, D, nobody else would have to pay if somebody lost
their life's fortune after being misled into a terrible investment with
information which was completely and totally erroneous.
That is the problem we have with this bill. We hope that as we move
into the specific amendments that those who are concerned about
integrity and honesty in the financial marketplace will support some of
the amendments we have to improve the bill.
Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Chairman, for purposes of debate only, I yield 5
minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Fields], chairman of the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance.
(Mr. FIELDS of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I begin with a quiz of my own.
Were the remarks of my friend:
A. Inaccurate.
B. Misleading.
C. Entertaining.
D. Good-natured.
I think the answer is ``all of the above,'' and we are going to have
plenty of time to debate this.
I rise in support of H.R. 1058, the Securities Litigation Reform Act.
This legislation revolutionizes the standard by which all disputes
under securities laws will be litigated.
For example, the Securities Litigation Reform Act will introduce the
concept of proportional liability into the Federal securities laws for
the first time. A defendant may be liable for joint and several damages
only if found to have acted knowingly. Defendants found liable for
recklessness will be held proportionately liable. A person will be
liable for all the damages he causes but only the damages that person
causes. The concept is common sense and so simple one must wonder why
it was not adopted long ago.
Arguably, the adoption of proportional liability alone is the most
significant development in private securities litigation in the 61
years since the Federal securities laws were passed. This provision
alone will go a long way toward eliminating strike suits, in that deep-
pocket defendants will no longer be subject to the same coercive
pressure to settle. By the adoption of this provision, we will
eliminate the abuses of the current system that amount to a
socialization of the risk. More importantly, Congress should do
everything it can to ensure that the constitutional right of wrongly
accused defendants, yes, even corporate defendants, to have an
opportunity to defend themselves in court is protected. The costs of
defending frivolous lawsuits today prevents that from happening.
Proportional liability is a reform that will help accomplish this
objective.
It is impossible to review the impact of spurious litigation and the
abuses possible within the current securities class action system and
not realize how important this bill is for the economic welfare of our
country.
Critics of this legislation will tell us that private securities
litigation is a critical addition to an effective enforcement program
at the Securities and Exchange Commission. We agree, but surely
frivolous lawsuits are not a necessary part of the Securities and
Exchange Commission enforcement mechanism. Lawsuits brought solely for
the purpose of coercing settlements out of deep-pocket defendants have
no place in our law enforcement mechanism.
The frightening implication of the arguments of opponents of
litigation reform is that everything is just fine the way it is. They
see strike suit lawyers bringing lawsuits as a regulatory device that
should be encouraged to promote market efficiency. We on this side of
the aisle could not disagree more. We believe the only justifiable
purpose for a lawsuit is to recover damages for people who have been
injured. Academic studies of class action strike suits, however, show
that even successful plaintiff shareholders recover just pennies on the
dollar. The lawyers without clients who bring these suits take home
millions of dollars in fees. Strike suits do not contribute to market
efficiency. They contribute to affluent lifestyles of strike suit
lawyers.
H.R. 1058 is dramatic, it is revolutionary legislation because that
is what is necessary. The old ways of doing things are just not
working. The bill provides that the losing party, his attorney or both
will pay the prevailing party's legal fees if a court enters a final
judgment against them. The court has discretion not to award fees if
the losing party establishes that its position was substantially
justified. The court will require the attorney, the class, or both to
post security for costs to ensure that funds are available to pay the
legal fees if they are awarded. This section represents a compromise
from the original ``loser pays.'' It will be a powerful deterrent to
the filing of frivolous suits. It will also ensure that successful
plaintiffs receive a full recovery of their damages and that successful
defendants do not suffer injury from having been wrongly accused.
Some provisions in this legislation are not revolutionary but just
good public policy. For the first time in the securities laws, a
standard for reckless conduct is defined. Similarly for the first time
the Federal securities laws have been modified to specifically allow
proving reliance by demonstrating a fraud on the market, that that has
occurred. Finally, the bill creates a safe harbor for forward looking
statements issued by companies so that they need not fear litigation if
projections they make in good faith do not turn out as expected.
H.R. 1058 is a breakthrough piece of legislation. I urge the support
of all my colleagues.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin].
(Mr. TAUZIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, a good legal system is not one that is
measured by the number of lawsuits that are filed. It is not one
measured by the length of those lawsuits, about how many judgments are
rendered. Quite the contrary. A good legal system is one that deters
bad behavior and, therefore, leads to fewer lawsuits. It is one in fact
that encourages settlements of merited cases rather than the massive
settlement of all cases regardless of merits.
On that test, this legal system we are trying to reform today is a
rotten one. The gentleman from Massachusetts has told you that there
were only a few cases filed. Let me give Members the facts.
In 1993, there were 723 of these cases pending, more than any other
year except 1974. In fact, in the last 4 years, from 1990 to 1993,
there have been 1,180 of these cases filed and that is almost equal to
the number filed in the 10 previous years. Many more lawsuits. While
Federal lawsuits are generally declining by 30 percent, these lawsuits
are up by 10 percent.
Second, these lawsuits are not sailboats sailing on the ocean of
litigation. These are massive carriers, massive lawsuits. The 723 cases
pending today estimated request $28.9 billion in damages. These are
huge lawsuits that clog up the system and that send a message out to
everybody across America that the lawsuits are waiting for you the
first time your stock prices drop.
The ripple effect of these lawsuits is massive. To businesses sued
and those
[[Page H2762]] not sued, the message is simple: ``Don't tell investors
anything about your company because anything you say will be held
against you in a lawsuit filed by lawyers who xerox the claims, appoint
their own clients and get a lawsuit going worth billions of dollars in
which most of the parties end up settling at 10 cents on the dollar.''
Let me ask Members something: When 93 percent of these cases never
reach a jury, when most of them are settled for 10 cents on the dollar,
do you not get the impression I get, that this is a system where merit
does not matter, everybody settles all the time?
Why? Because these are massive lawsuits and merit does not count. The
liability is so huge, the shotgun effect of the lawsuit against all
parties is so dramatic, the damages claimed is so huge that the
temptation is to get out of it as fast as you can, 10 cents on the
dollar, take care of the lawyer, do not worry about the stockholders,
is the way this system works.
This is a bad legal system. And when we are told, as we are told,
that only 6 cents on the dollar ends up being recovered for
stockholders under this system, you and I ought to be deeply concerned
about it. It means that real fraud is not being prosecuted. It means
that meritless cases are filed and stockholders get nothing, but a few
big law firms in America are doing quite well.
When you have that kind of a system where merit does not matter,
where lawsuits are filed on a Xerox machine, where one lawyer in
California says, ``I have the best law practice in America, I have no
clients,'' he just names whoever he wants to represent the class and
files a lawsuit.
When you have professional plaintiffs appearing time after time on
these lawsuits and bounties, legal bounties paid in order to get these
lawsuits going, when you have got that kind of a system, is not time to
reform it?
For 4 years now, I have been asking this Congress to do that and I am
delighted today we will have that chance. As we debate amendments over
the next 8 hours, let me tell Members that we have tried to accommodate
concerns. We have tried to bring this bill this year as close as we can
to the Dodd-Domenici bill of last year and to the Tauzin bill of last
year that got 182 cosponsors, 67 Democrats to cosponsor it.
We will see when this debate is over an awful lot of Members on both
sides of this aisle voting for this measure. We will improve it in the
process in the next 8 hours. It will be a better bill, closer to the
bill that we offered last year and the year before. I am proud to tell
Members the coalition that I have been working with has endorsed this
bill and the effort to improve it is still on this floor. We will join
with many other Democrats in a bipartisan effort to improve this
section of the law.
When we are through, we are going to have a statute that discourages
fraud because it counts on real merited cases to be filed, and it
counts on them to be brought to fruition and the guilty parties
punished. It will be a system that discourages frivolous, shakedown
strike lawsuits that benefit no one in this country except the few law
firms who make a havoc of our legal system and a ton of money over it.
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman
from California [Mr. Cox], one of the principal authors of the
legislation.
Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, it is frequently said that
lawyers are turning America into a nation of victims. Thanks to the
trial bar which makes its living fanning these flames, not only real
injuries but every imaginable harm is now compensable in court, except
one; the one category of injury for which there is seemingly no
recompense is injury inflicted by lawyers themselves.
What is the remedy for the ruinous economic losses, the delays, and
the sheer misery caused by the fraudulent abuse of our laws, in
particular of our securities laws? The answer is none. None. Fraudulent
securities litigation may be the most egregious instance of this cure
today. It is a legal torture chamber for plaintiffs and defendants
alike, more suitable to the pages of Charles Dickens' ``Bleak House''
than a nation dedicated to equal justice under law.
The current system of private securities litigations is an outrage
and a disgrace. It cheats both the victims of fraud and innocent
parties by lavishly encouraging meritless cases, it has destroyed
thousands of jobs, undercut economic growth and American
competitiveness and raised the prices every American pays for goods and
services.
It mocks the many victims of real fraud who receive pennies on the
dollar while the lawyers take millions. The only beneficiaries are the
lawyers. Their clients typically get a pittance for their claims.
Who are the victims of these strike suits which are brought to
generate settlement value, which are brought in order to generate a
nuisance value so that the lawyers can be paid simply to stop their
harassment? First and foremost, victims of this kind of system are the
victims of real fraud.The current system herds them into powerless
classes of plaintiffs who are completely under the thumb of strike suit
lawyers. The class members do not even have the chance to participate
personally; oftentimes they are not even identified until very late in
the proceedings.
Earlier today we heard from a company in Arlington, VA, just across
the river from the Capitol, who spent hundreds of thousands of dollars
responding to one of these strike suits generated for the purpose of
making the company pay the lawyers to go away. The class representative
that was selected by these lawyers as the most representative of all of
the plaintiffs finally sent a postcard to the company and ended it this
way by saying, ``I did not know the lawyer was going to do this; he
talked to my wife. He acted against my wishes. I was in the hospital at
the time. I like your company.''
That is the degree to which class action lawyers are able to control
this kind of litigation. The lead plaintiffs who supposedly represent
the victims' interests are not average investors. As often as not the
so-called lead plaintiffs are virtually employees of the counsel. As
one of the leading attorneys in this area once put it, and as the
gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin] so eloquently reminded us, he
said, ``I have the greatest practice of law in the world. I have no
clients.'' That is the way class action securities strike suit lawyers
view their opportunity to harass ordinary investors.
The same stable of tame lead plaintiffs appears in case after case.
That is why our bill puts a limit on the number of suits that
professional plaintiffs can bring to five in every 3 years.
How bad is this problem? Harry Lewis has appeared
as lead plaintiff in an estimated 300 to 400 lawsuits. Rodney
Shields has been in over 80 cases. William Weinberger has appeared in
90 cases just since 1990. One court recently called one of these
professional plaintiffs the unluckiest investor in the world.
Obviously, a wry sense of humor, that judge.

With the lawyers in charge of the litigation, it is little wonder
they manage to benefit their own interests at the expense of their
clients. Many recent studies have shown that the current system
encourages strike suits lawyers to ignore even overwhelming cases of
fraud. Flagrant cases that should lead to 100 percent recovery are
instead settled for cents on the dollar while the lawyers get millions
in settlement fees.
Even when the fraud victims get a full recovery the current winner-
loses system unique to America still ensures they will never get fully
compensated. Their attorneys' fees and costs come right off the top.
And because the plaintiffs' lawyers, not the victims, control the
litigations, they make sure those attorneys' fees are top dollar no
matter how meager their clients' recovery.
The current system ensures that investors will suffer ever more
avoidable losses in the future. Even good faith reasonable predictions
about the future events of a company's prospects are penalized under
the current securities laws. The threat of lawsuits over so-called
forward looking information, how is this company going to do in the
future, is so serious that many if not most CEO's these days refuse to
talk to the press at all about their company's performance and yet that
is exactly the kind of information the market needs to operate. How a
company has performed in the past is interesting, but everybody wants
to know what is going to happen from here forward.
[[Page H2763]] That is the information the market seeks out. Because
the market is after that information they are now getting it through
the black market and under the table. We would like to make sure that
it is quality information, that a reasonable statement made in good
faith should be available and should come from the source.
Strike suits claim virtually every American as a victim. Most
particularly by this I mean ordinary workers and consumers all are
victims of the heavy litigations tax levied by strike suit lawyers. The
tens of millions of dollars siphoned off each year by strike suits
represents thousands of workers not hired, new products delayed or
canceled outright and vital research that will never be done, and price
increases imposed on consumers. This tax will fall most heavily on
high-tech biotechnology and other growth companies, the very industry
most critical to American competitiveness.
One out of every four strike suits targets high-tech companies. High-
tech and biotech companies have paid 40 percent of the costs of strike
suit settlements handing out some $440 million, however, over the last
2 years alone.
Strike suits claim a last category of victims: tens of millions of
Americans who have invested in securities through their labor union
pension funds, ESOP's or their individual mutual fund. They suffer
twice. They suffer whenever price fluctuation triggers the suit, and
they suffer again through the costs of litigating and settling the
strike suits that follow.
The current system is not protecting them; our legislation will.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minuted to the gentlewoman from
California [Ms. Eshoo].
Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Chairman, at the first Committee on Commerce hearing
on this issue I stated that our final objective must be the Congress
must pass and the President should sign into law legislation which
provides relief from meritless lawsuits and do it this year. Let me
state the plain facts. Meritless lawsuits are crippling our high-
technology industry. They cost money, they cut investment and stifle
initiative. They must be stopped.
Twenty-six of the 40 largest high-tech companies in Silicon Valley
have been sued. In fact I think if you place them all in the room, all
of the players in Silicon Valley, the only difference between them is
those that have sued and those that will be.
H.R. 1058 attempts to stop these suits and I commend my colleagues
for bringing this issue to the floor. We share the same goal of ending
frivolous lawsuits.
In my view, in the effort to right the wrongs, many of the reform
proposed by H.R. 1058 go too far. By eliminating such protections as
the recklessness standard for fraud, this legislation would strip the
ability of shareholders with legitimate claims, let me underscore that
again, with legitimate claims to go to court.
Just yesterday the White House called H.R. 1058 ``manifestly
unfair,'' and the chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, has said the
Commission cannot support the bill. That is why it is being debated,
that is why it has been brought to the floor, and that is why there are
many key amendments that will be offered to improve the bill.
So Mr. Chairman, high technology businesses should not have to wait
another year. They need relief now.
Recently I introduced legislation, H.R. 675, along with my colleague,
the gentleman from California, Mr. Norm Mineta, who is my next-door
neighbor and represents part of the Silicon Valley, which mirrors the
broad bipartisan legislation introduced again this year by Senators
Dodd and Domenici. I believe H.R. 675 will put an end to frivolous
suits while protecting investors' rights. This bill, I believe,
protects investors' rights and is a bill which ultimately I think will
break a legislative stalemate which would only delay protection for our
high technology community.
We must craft a piece of legislation that stops the frivolousness and
yet still protects shareholders and investors, and the bill before us
today I think is a step in the right direction.
In my view, the balance of the work still remains to be done. As H.R.
1058 advances through the legislative process, our objective again must
be to end meritless lawsuits quickly and efficiently and with fairness,
and I think that is an operative word.
Mr. Chairman, my constituents need and deserve relief, and I look
forward to working on producing that for them.
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Gillmor].
Mr. GILLMOR. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me, and I rise in support of H.R. 1058, the Securities Litigations
Reform Act.
This week we are going to be debating a number of important legal and
economic issues, and one of the most critical will be finally
addressing the explosion of abusive and speculative litigation known as
``strike suits.'' For too many years American high technology and
manufacturing companies have faced the unreasonable risk and threat of
litigation at the cost of higher product prices, diminished earnings
shareholder returns, reduced capital investment, and a less vibrant
American economy.
As a result many people are not willing to serve on the boards of
directors of these companies. Many companies, even where there is no
fraud and no negligence committed, are faced with the tremendous cost
of litigations. It also makes companies far less willing to disclose
useful and valuable information to the public. Such abuses simply
cannot be allowed to continue unchecked.
Robert Samuelson, a noted economist, pointed out the huge increase in
legal costs in our society. Over a 22-year period legal fees as a
percent of the gross national product increased nine-tenths of 1
percent to 1.7 percent, nearly double.
When you consider that 3 or 4 percent is considered good growth in
the economy, and you drain off 1.7 percent in nonproductive fees of
this sort, it is clear the tremendous harm that it does to our economy,
the harm it does to jobs and to the standard of living of the average
working American.
Let me close by quoting from Jim Kimsey, who represents the American
Electronic Association, before the Telecommunications Committee.
Of the explosion in securities litigation he said: ``We believe the
current securities litigation system promotes meritless litigation,
shortchanges investors, and costs jobs. It is a showcase example of the
legal system run awry. It is bad law, bad policy, and bad economics.''
Mr. Chairman, the time has come to act and pass securities reform
litigation.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Michigan [Mr. Dingell] the ranking minority member of the full
committee.
(Mr. DINGELL asked and was given permission to revise his remarks.)
Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to use a modest
display.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Michigan?
There was no objection.
Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, there are ways of cleaning up the abuses
that exist with regard to citizens' suits regarding securities. But
this legislation is not the way that it should be done.
My colleagues on the Republican side would have us believe that the
securities industry and the marketplaces of this country are some kind
of kindergarten or perhaps a cloistered nunnery where nothing that is
good for us is brought out. No, sir, nothing could be further from the
truth. The hard fact of the matter is this is the place where rascals
and rogues go to plunder the American people, honest investors who
invest their life savings and that is all. And this legislation, while
it might correct abuses of which the other side complains, will also
strip law-abiding citizens of their rights to litigate where wrongdoing
has been done to them and where their assets have been stolen by
wrongdoing.

{time} 1700

This is not a handout from the trial lawyers. This is a prestigious
business publication. It says, ``Can you trust your broker?'' The
answer is you may be able to, but you may not. It is inside the
publication, and I would commend it to the reading of my colleagues.
Look at some of the things that have had happened recently in the
securities industry, and you will understand why
[[Page H2764]] it is that this is bad legislation: a billion-dollar
collapse of Barings investment banking firm in England. The lawsuits
against the perpetrators of that wrongdoing would have probably been
sheltered by this legislation. Similarly, the $2 billion collapse of
Orange County investments that led that county to declare bankruptcy
probably would be sheltered by this legislation. Limited partnership
fraud so far has cost Prudential Securities better than $1 billion.
Twelve billion dollars in litigation in a fraud case against Drexel
Burnham Lambert; the case was settled for $3 billion, no shakedown by
trial lawyers, but action by the Federal Government.
How about the securities fraud and insider trading scandals
perpetrated by Ivan Boesky, Dennis Levine, Martin Siegel and others on
Wall Street?
What about some other splendid securities frauds which probably would
have been sheltered under this legislation? Lincoln Savings and Loan,
Charlie Keating and his cohorts; they sold worthless bonds to the
elderly in bank lobbies; Washington Public Power Supply System, a
massive default of $10 billion and more in bonds, led to a class-action
lawsuit which resulted in more than an $800 million settlement,
probably would have been proscribed under the legislation that we are
addressing. In Salomon Brothers, a group of elite institutions worked
together to raid government bonds auctions; probably lawsuits would
have been banned under the legislation we are talking about. At
Miniscribe, the company shipped bricks in boxes instead of hard disk
drives, or at Phar-Mor, where executives maintained two sets of books
so that as much as $1 billion could be diverted for personal interests.
Those are some of the better.
But you know that in some 35 other communities other than Orange
County, some publicly supported institutions also reported massive
losses in 9 months, these because of exotic derivatives, and it goes on
and on, Kemper Financial Services, which was recently charged by the
SEC with illegally diverting stock trades for the benefit of its own
profit-sharing plan. Kemper settled a similar charge earlier with the
SEC for $10 million. We do not know how much they are going to come up
with on this one.
The Wall Street Journal reported the SEC charged more than a dozen
individuals and companies with wireless cable fraud bulking 3,000
investors out of $40 million. On February 27, the Journal and the Times
reported Hanover, Sterling & Co., a brokerage company, was ordered to
cease all operations. Why? Because thousands of investors in the 16
stocks to which the firm was a market-maker suffered massive losses
ranging from 57 percent to 80 percent when the shutdown was reported.
Business Week on February 20 said, ``Can you trust your broker?'' The
answer, as I have said, was not reassuring. It says a rising wave of
cynicism, both inside and outside the industry on widely accepted ways
of doing business at the largest and most prestigious firms.
What we are talking about here is legislation that has been offered
by my Republican colleagues that shelters wrongdoing. It does not only
protect innocent people against strike suits, but it requires, for
example, that in pleading, a pleader has to prove what was going on
inside the head and the mind of the wrongdoer, and the question then
is, what is the representative of the hurt litigant? Is it a lawyer? Is
it a psychic or is it a psychiatrist?
This is outrageous legislation and should be rejected.
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the
distinguished gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Schaefer].
(Mr. SCHAEFER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SCHAEFER. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 1058, the
Securities Litigation Reform Act.
As a member of the Telecom and Finance Subcommittee, I have long
supported similar legislation to fix our broken securities litigation
system. The system is broken for defrauded investors who recall and
recover only a small amount of their losses when part of valid cases.
The system is broken for businesses, especially the startup high-tech
firms who rely on capital markets for financing. And it is broken for
the general public who ultimately must pay the price of frivolous
litigation in the form of slower economic growth, fewer jobs, and
higher prices.
It is very clear we have a serious problem. I say to my colleagues,
strike a blow for our small businesses and startup enterprises. Support
H.R. 1058.
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from Iowa [Mr. Ganske].
Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of H.R.
1058.
We must end abuse that is eroding our legal system. As stated by SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt, private actions are intended to compensate
defrauded investors and deter securities violations.
If the current system fails to distinguish between strong and weak
cases, it serves neither purpose effectively. I could not agree more.
Unfortunately, this is precisely with what we are left today, an
ineffective system.
The changes mandated by this legislation would help restore
responsibility and respectability to our corporate system. First, the
provision that imposes loser-pays rules when the court determines the
position of the losing party was not substantially justified are
warranted. This would prevent the consummate race to the courthouse.
Plaintiffs will have to weigh the merits of the case before filing
suit. Opponents claim this will have a chilling effect on plaintiffs'
right to sue. This is simply not the case.
The modified loser-pays provision will only result in fee shifting in
cases that should not have been
brought in the first place. The only thing chilled by this provision
would be meritless suits which I believe deserve to be put in the deep
freeze.

Second, as for the definition of recklessness, the current law is
vague and uncertain. Parties may engage in nearly identical conduct,
yet courts reach completely different results. The vagueness and
uncertainty of the current standard has led to a great deal of
inconsistency, confusion, and unfairness in our judicial system.
I think all of us would agree that by creating consistency we can
increase fairness and decrease the probability of injustice in our
legal system.
In general, most strike suits under current law do more harm than
good. Reform is needed for two main reasons. No. 1, proper plaintiffs
must have a place to redress valid grievances.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, I would just like to point out to my colleagues that
there are 435 votes in this House to improve class action security
fraud lawsuits.
We want to stop the race to the courthouse. We want to sanction
lawyers who bring frivolous cases or bring them in bad faith.
But what we really hear from the other side about the virtues that
our antifraud laws bring to our investors and to our market, we rarely
hear about the need for a balanced approach to reform. We rarely hear
the mention of the terrible frauds that have occurred over the last 10
years, and we never hear assurances from the other side that their
legislation will not adversely impact these disastrous situations like
Drexel and Milken and Boesky and Lincoln Savings and Keating and
Miniscribe and many others.
If the legislation brought here today was meant to shut down these
legal firms that take professional plaintiffs and terrorize private
corporations across this country, I think we can find a consensus. The
truth of the matter is though the legislation we are considering here
today shuts down the good suits, the legitimate suits, the suits that
have to be brought by individuals in this country against Boesky and
against Milken and against Keating and against all of those S&L scam
artists that were out there in the 1980's, the scam artists that
resulted in the U.S. Congress being forced to vote for 100 to 150
billion dollars' worth of taxpayer dollars in order to insure that
those who had put their life savings in the S&L's and banks across this
country did not in fact face bankruptcy.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from Massachusetts [Mr. Blute].

[[Page H2765]]

Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman, the distinguished
chairman of the subcommittee, who wrote this legislation.
Mr. Chairman, the engine of economic growth in this country is under
assault from some lawyers who give the term ``gone fishing'' an
entirely new meaning.
These strike-suit lawyers are trolling for easy money won from
vulnerable companies whose only crime is being subject to a volatile
market.
Entrepreneurial high-tech companies in my State such as EMC Corp.
based in my district are being hit with strike suits which seek damages
for loss in stock value. This is a company that has created thousands
of jobs in the State of Massachusetts. Since going public in 1986, it
has been the subject of two such suits. One was filed less than 24
hours after the company disclosed quarterly earnings lower than the
previous quarter.
This kind of situation is not unusual. Hundreds of suits are filed by
lawyers and professional plaintiffs who prey on small high-tech firms
because their stocks tend to be more volatile and they are more
inclined to settle.
In fact, between 1989 and 1993, 61 percent of all strike suits were
brought against companies with less than $500 million in annual sales,
and 33 percent against companies with less than $100 million in sales.
Mr. Speaker, the problem is critical, because these high-tech
companies are the job-creating innovators, where many of our cutting-
edge products originate. These are companies that are leading our
export efforts in our economy. Biotechnology companies in my district
are developing treatments for cancer and AIDS. These kinds of strike
suits are jeopardizing the development of those life-saving products by
holding these companies hostage.
These companies are forced to divert resources, energy, talent, and
money to fighting these unwarranted strike suits.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this bill, and let us
have a strong growth export economy.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
Michigan [Mr. Conyers], the ranking minority member of the Committee on
the Judiciary.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts
for yielding to me and commend him on the excellent job that he has
done today and through the years on this very important subject.
Ladies and gentlemen, the committee report explaining why this
legislation is needed talks about the typical case of high-growth,
high-technology stock which experiences a sudden change in price,
thereby giving rise to securities lawsuits and a claim for damages by
shareholders.
But that is not the type of lawsuit that would be affected by the one
killer amendment by the gentleman from California who will offer it
very soon in this debate. By blocking all possibility of civil RICO
lawsuits for securities fraud, the Cox amendment would incredibly harm
plantiffs such as the elderly bondholders who were cheated out of their
life's savings by Charles Keating in the Lincoln Savings and Loan
debacle. It would deny any effective remedy for the thousands of
depositors of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, the
notorious BCCI, which regulators from 62 countries united to shut down
because of the bank's fraudulent practices.
Why an amendment of such a broad sweep that it would prevent lawsuits
against some of the biggest white-collar criminals in the Nation's
history, even though the sponsors of the amendment may not have
intended such a result? The answer is this amendment was hastily put
together without the benefit of any hearings or debate in any committee
or the possibility of a markup where there could have been important
improvements, and now within an 8-hour ambit, we are asked to consider
the revocation of the greatest single crime-fighting bill provision,
RICO, on the law books today.

{time} 1715

It is a shame for what is going on now.
Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. Cox], who
is a member of the Committee on the Judiciary, by the way.
Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I point out that the RICO
amendment, which the gentleman is accurate in stating that I will soon
offer, was in fact inadvertently left out of the bill when we combined
the Commerce and Judiciary portions. It was in the original bill
introduced on January 4, also in the original bill of last year and
introduced and made public as part of the Contract With America in
October. It has always been in the bill.
Mr. CONYERS. Well, may I just respond to the gentleman? Could we
inadvertently leave it out when there were no hearings on it? It was
mentioned in the bill, but there were a lot of things mentioned in the
bill. On this pretext, anything that was not put in the bill could have
been accidentally left out.
The problem that we have is that the gentleman's amendment is asking
the Congress in broad daylight to believe that the biggest amendment
for fighting civil fraud that has ever been put on the books was
accidentally left out. I guess we accidentally did not have any
hearings. I guess there accidentally were not any witnesses. I guess
this was all an accident that needs to be corrected right now.
If it was an accident, let us go back and do it correctly. The
provision of this amendment is broader than any attempt at a
modification of RICO, and the gentleman knows it.
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman
from Oklahoma [Mr. Coburn].
Mr. COBURN. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Mr. Chairman, something I learned a long time ago from my father that
I think would do us all well and that is his definition of a good
lawyer. And a good lawyer is somebody who solves problems rather than
creates them.
The legislation that we are considering has in fact addressed an
issue before us that is causing and wreaking havoc with a large number
of America's most consistent job-providing industries.
I believe the American people are sick and tired of those who feed
off of our system and weaken American competitiveness. They are sick of
the unscrupulous few who make a mockery of our concept of justice by
exploiting the legal system for their own personal gain.
Mr. Chairman, a glitch in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
called rule 10 B-5, created a new group of parasites known as
professional plaintiffs. These professional plaintiffs are recruited by
those who figured out how to exploit our judicial system by filing
frivolous lawsuits.
Currently, exploitation of rule 10 B-5 allows these clever few to sue
companies through the use of professional plaintiffs for fraud whenever
the price of a stock drops. These professional plaintiffs, or
parasites, if you will, who hold only a tiny share of stock, launch
fishing expeditions and rack up formidable discovery fees to force the
defendants to settle out of court rather than to pay the costs of
defending themselves. The result has been a threefold explosion of
securities fraud suits over the last 5 years. One out of every eight
companies on the New York Stock Exchange has been hit with this type of
suit. I believe America's economic growth is stifled by such a
perversion of our legal system by a small handful of lawyers that file
the lion's share of suits, hitting one in every four high-technology
firms in our country today. Just nine law firms in this country have
accounted for two-thirds of the 1,400 class suits filed between 1988
and 1993.
The threat that exploitation of rule 10 B-5 poses to our time, our
peace of mind, and our pocketbooks, the pocketbooks of the average
American, is immoral and should be illegal.
I am supporting the Securities Reform Act because it will free
American Businesses from the ever-present threat of baseless and
expensive lawsuits. This bill will deter the practice of frivolous
lawsuits that serve only to line the pockets of those who rob our
corporations of investment capital and rob them of the resource for
competitive research and development and ultimately rob us of an
increased standard of living and high-wage jobs.
I therefore urge passage of H.R. 1058.
[[Page H2766]] Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Klink].
Mr. KLINK. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
You know, proponents of this so-called securities litigation reform
are arguing that private securities and class action suits are making
it virtually impossible for public companies to raise capital and are
preventing these companies from going public.
But they will tell you only anecdotes about their friends in big
business who would prefer not to be sued because they really cannot
rely on the facts. The facts will show that our markets have been
tremendously successful in raising capital for public companies. Every
important statistical measure of the success of our securities markets,
the number and proceeds of initial public offerings, the volume and
value of common stock offerings, the volume of trading, have been at
all-time highs. The number of initial public security offerings has
risen 9,000 percent in the last 20 years while the proceeds raised have
skyrocketed 38,000 percent.
The staff report of the Senate Subcommittee on Securities has found
that, ``Despite the claims by critics that securities litigation is
hampering capital formation, initial public offerings have proceeded at
a record pace in recent years.''
We all know that recently the Dow-Jones Industrial Averages surpassed
the 4,000 mark, which is an all-time high. That has to make us all
wonder how can it be that there is such a serious problem from the
roughly 300 fraud class action cases filed each year.
In light of the facts, claims by companies that they are afraid to go
public to raise capital because of fear of litigation are nothing but
really self-serving nonsense. If they are really are so concerned about
litigation, they would not be restricting the minuscule number of
private securities fraud class actions, they would be restricting the
huge and increasing numbers of business-versus-business suits.
As the Rand Corp.'s recent study of the litigation patterns of
Fortune 1,000 companies demonstrates, by far, is that you are seeing
many more firms that are suing other firms. As the Wall Street Journal,
in an article of December 3, 1993, entitled ``Suits by Firms Exceed
Those by Individuals,'' noted, ``Businesses may be their own worst
enemies when it comes to the so-called litigation explosion.''
So why is it that proponents are seeking to limit only private
actions and not business suits?
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to our good
friend on the other side of the aisle, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr.
Moran].
Mr. MORAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
Mr. Chairman, I do not know if there are others of my colleagues who
have been stockbrokers at some time in their life, but I was for 10
years. I have watched what has happened in the securities marketplace.
The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Dingell] is absolutely right: There
are corporate abuses.
Mr. KLINK, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, is also correct that the
securities market itself is doing quite well.
But the fact remains that there is an abuse within this industry that
does need to be corrected. And it is focused primarily on those firms
that provide the highest rate of growth to our economy, those firms
that take the greatest risks, in the area of high-technology.
Legent Corp., in Herndon, VA, now in Vienna, actually, they had a
slight change in their earnings expectation, the stock dropped.
Immediately they were hit with one of those strike lawsuits. They
required 200,000 pages of documentation, many, many days of very
valuable employee time was spent, and they wound up settling for $2
million in legal fees even though it was acknowledged it was a
frivolous lawsuit.
Metrix Corp., same thing happened; A small reduction in their
earnings expectation, the stocks began to drop, and they got hit with a
strike lawsuit. They had to produce 50,000 documents, 200,000
electronic messages to the plaintiffs' lawyers, 20 employees had to
spend full time on this. They wound up settling for $975,000.
Mr. Chairman, I want you to recognize this: The investors, the
shareholders got $400 or less. The lawyer got $330,000. That is what
this is all about. They are fishing expeditions for lawyers who have
found a way to abuse the system. It should not be tolerated in the
courts and it should not be tolerated in the Congress.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Bryant].
Mr. BRYANT of Texas. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to
me.
Mr. Chairman, I was inspired after hearing my friend, the gentleman
from Virginia [Mr. Moran], for whom I have great respect, enormous
respect. After I heard him speak, I want to say that he voices the
sentiments by many of us on this side that we ought to make some
modifications that deal with the real problems.
But the bill we have before us today is one of a long line of
measures that are so extreme, that go so far and that are so, in many
respects, absurd as to, I think, astonish anyone who is an observer or
a participant in the system of jurisprudence in America today.
If the problem was as it has been described by the majority, surely
the Securities and Exchange Commission would have been here saying so.
But they came before the committee and did not say that this bill was
the solution.
The gentleman from Virginia, [Mr. Moran] quoted anecdotes. There are
many anecdotes; some of them are right on point. But when you get to
anecdotes and you look at them carefully, you begin to find that the
point one wishes to make by using anecdotes begins to fall apart.
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman
from New York State [Mr. Paxon].
Mr. PAXON. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1058. This needed
legislation strikes at the very heart of the serious problem, the
strike suits and abusive litigation.
As we have heard from previous speakers, our capital markets are the
envy of the world, but that position is being seriously threatened. It
is threatened by a privileged few, a group of people who are not
injured in any way, but have found a system for legal extortion, a
system where all you need is to read stock quotes for a falling stock
and pair it up with a data base, and there is a comprehensive list of
ready plaintiffs.
Mr. Chairman, for far too long this has been going on. It is time to
stop it and for Congress to approve this important legislation.
I believe it is a balanced approach that will benefit all Americans.
It will not eliminate the ability of injured Americans to bring
claims, but it will stop get-rich attorneys from filing spurious claims
against companies.
I am proud of our Committee on Commerce, the work product they have
put forth, and particularly the work of the gentleman from California,
Mr. Cox, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Fields, and the gentleman from
Virginia, Chairman Bliley.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the 2 minutes to conclude.
Mr. Chairman, the cover of NewsWeek just out tells the story: ``The
boy who lost a billion dollars, Nick Leeson, the 28-year-old trader who
bankrupted England's oldest investment firm.''
Now, Nick Leeson is an interesting case. It is not directly on point
here, except to the extent to which there are Nick Leesons out there
and they do prey upon innocent investors, they do engage in practices
that risk the life savings of individuals who believe that the holding
out, the representation made by the S&L, is in fact accurate.
Now, with the Dow-Jones Industrial Average rising to 4,000 this week,
there is unprecedented confidence in the American marketplace, that it
is honest and efficient, but honest above all.
That is what our American laws have given assurances to the rest of
the world over the last 60 years. If you go to Singapore, if you go to
England, if you go to any other place in the world, you go to a country
that has lower standards than our country. It is this system of laws
which we have put in place which has given the reason for individual
investors to look at the thousands of companies which we have, take
their savings and put them into these companies that have allowed our
[[Page H2767]] Dow-Jones Industrial Average to rise to 4,000. That is
what we should be extremely cautious about as we deal with this issue
here today.
Our system works. If we want to deal with rogue lawyers, if we want
to deal with frivolous law cases let us deal with them, but let us not
also kid ourselves, there are many here who are interested in ensuring
that the legitimate cases that have to be brought to protect the public
are also excluded as well.
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remaining
minute.
{time} 1730

Mr. Chairman, some of the examples we have heard from the other side
of the aisle, Milken, Keating, Leeson, they all share something
important. Each of these acted with intent. Each of these acted with
the intent to defraud.
The legislation that we are considering today would not affect
shareholder actions against those people or people like them in the
future. Those people would be jointly and severally liable. That has
not changed in our legislation, and, Mr. Chairman, I think that is a
compelling point in ending this debate.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, while H.R. 10 is called the
Common Sense Legal Reform Act, the more accurate title would be the
Citizens' Rights Reduction Act. For more than 200 years, the citizens
of the United States have possessed the right by their own States to
hold wrongdoers accountable. Under H.R. 10, such rights would be taken
away from the citizens of the States. With an apparent Congress-knows-
best attitude, the proponents of this bill want to take away the rights
of ordinary Americans to hold wrongdoers accountable and to seek fair
and just compensation when they are wronged. This bill is wrong.
Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 1058, the
Securities Litigation Reform Act, a bill that will discourage meritless
suits.
There is a securities litigation explosion in this country. In 1993
we saw the highest number of pending cases in any year for which data
are available except 1974. Since 1990, filings have increased
dramatically. The number of cases filed in the 4 years from 1990 to
1993 nearly equals the number filed in the previous 10 years combined.
Some argue that H.R. 1058 will hurt investors, but just the opposite
is true. The current litigation explosion punishes investors because
companies increasingly fear so called strike suits which are filed each
time their stock fluctuates. Thus, companies reveal less and less
information to investors that could be used against them in the future.
Clearly, investors lose when they do not have access to information
when making decisions about where to place their life savings.
Investors are also hurt under current law because they, in reality,
are the ones who pay the costs when a company has to go to court to
defend itself against a meritless lawsuit. They also pay the high cost
of maintaining insurance against these strike suits.
Finally, investors, who have legitimate claims,
receive less money than they deserve because it is common practice
to simply settle out of court. Companies settle out of court, whether
or not the suit has merit, because it costs an average of $692,000 in
legal fees and 1,055 hours of management time to successfully defend a
strike suit. When meritless suits can be dismissed, the cases of real
fraud will be brought to court. Then, investors will get paid the real
value of their loss.

That is just not the case today. Today, investors receive between 6
and 14 cents on the dollar lost.
Securities litigation reform will reward investors by removing these
punishments. However, in addition, specific provisions are included in
the bill to give investors the same authority over their attorney as
other clients, in other types of litigation, have. The bill provides
for a court-appointed steering committee to make sure that lawsuits are
maintained in the client's best interest. It also requires settlement
offers to disclose the amount paid to lawyers and class members per
share of stock. These significant changes favor those investors who
have legitimate and important suits.
But investors are not the only ones punished by meritless strike
suits. High-technology and high-growth companies are also punished. One
in every eight companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange is hit
with a strike suit. Even more startling is that one of every four
strike suits targets these high-growth companies. The average
settlement, which is over $8.6 million, has, in essence, become a
litigation tax on these companies.
Those who have a tangential relationship to these suits, primarily
the accountants who certify the books, are also punished. The long arm
of the law has sought to include them, even when there is no fraud on
their part, just because they have deep pockets.
It's time that we reform our judicial system so that those who commit
crimes are the ones who are punished, not those who abide by the law.
H.R. 1058 will restore integrity to our system and I urge my colleagues
to join me in voting to pass this important bill.
The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired. Pursuant to
the rule, the bill is considered as having been read for amendment
under the 5-minute rule.
The text of H.R. 1058 is as follows:
H.R. 1058
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Securities
Litigation Reform Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Prevention of lawyer-driven litigation.
(a) Plaintiff steering committees to ensure client control of
lawsuits.
``Sec. 36. Class action steering committees.
``(a) Class action steering committee.
``(b) Membership of plaintiff steering committee.
``(c) Functions of plaintiff steering committee.
``(d) Immunity from civil liability; removal.
``(e) Effect on other law.''
(b) Prohibition on attorneys' fees paid from Commission disgorgement
funds.
Sec. 3. Prevention of abusive practices that foment litigation.
(a) Additional provisions applicable to private actions.
``Sec. 20B. Procedures applicable to private actions.
``(a) Elimination of bonus payments to named plaintiffs in class
actions.
``(b) Restrictions on professional plaintiffs.
``(c) Awards of fees and expenses.
``(d) Prevention of abusive conflicts of interest.
``(e) Disclosure of settlement terms to class members.
``(f) Encouragement of finality in settlement discharges.
``(g) Contribution from non-parties in interests of fairness.
``(h) Defendant's right to written interrogatories establishing
scienter.''
(b) Prohibition of referral fees that foment litigation.
Sec. 4. Prevention of ``fishing expedition'' lawsuits.
``Sec. 10A. Requirements for securities fraud actions.
``(a) Scienter.
``(b) Requirement for explicit pleading of scienter.
``(c) Dismissal for failure to meet pleading requirements; stay of
discovery; summary judgment.
``(d) Reliance and causation.
``(e) Allocation of liability.
``(f) Damages.''
Sec. 5. Establishment of ``safe harbor'' for predictive Statements.
``Sec. 37. Application of safe harbor for forward-looking Statements.
``(a) Safe harbor defined.
``(b) Automatic protective order staying discovery; expedited
procedure.
``(c) Regulatory authority.''
Sec. 6. Rule of construction.
Sec. 7. Effective date.
SEC. 2. PREVENTION OF LAWYER-DRIVEN LITIGATION.

(a) Plaintiff Steering Committees To Ensure Client Control
of Lawsuits.--The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78a et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following
new section:

``SEC. 36. CLASS ACTION STEERING COMMITTEES.

``(a) Class Action Steering Committee.--In any private
action arising under this title seeking to recover damages on
behalf of a class, the court shall, at the earliest
practicable time, appoint a committee of class members to
direct counsel for the class (hereafter in this section
referred to as the `plaintiff steering committee') and to
perform such other functions as the court may specify. Court
appointment of a plaintiff steering committee shall not be
subject to interlocutory review.
``(b) Membership of Plaintiff Steering Committee.--
``(1) Qualifications.--
``(A) Number.--A plaintiff steering committee shall consist
of not fewer than 5 class members, willing to serve, who the
court believes will fairly represent the class.
``(B) Ownership interests.--Members of the plaintiff
steering committee shall have cumulatively held during the
class period not less than--
``(i) the lesser of 5 percent of the securities which are
the subject matter of the litigation or $10,000,000 in market
value of the securities which are the subject matter of the
litigation; or
[[Page H2768]] ``(ii) such smaller percentage or dollar
amount as the court finds appropriate under the
circumstances.
``(2) Named plaintiffs.--Class plaintiffs serving as the
representative parties in the litigation may serve on the
plaintiff steering committee, but shall not comprise a
majority of the committee.
``(3) Noncompensation of members.--Members of the plaintiff
steering committee shall serve without compensation, except
that any member may apply to the court for reimbursement of
reasonable out-of-pocket expenses from any common fund
established for the class.
``(4) Meetings.--The plaintiff steering committee shall
conduct its business at one or more previously scheduled
meetings of the committee, of which prior notice shall have
been given and at which a majority of its members are present
in person or by electronic communication. The plaintiff
steering committee shall decide all matters within its
authority by a majority vote of all members, except that the
committee may determine that decisions other than to accept
or reject a settlement offer or to employ or dismiss counsel
for the class may be delegated to one or more members of the
committee, or may be voted upon by committee members
seriatim, without a meeting.
``(5) Right of nonmembers to be heard.--A class member who
is not a member of the plaintiff steering committee may
appear and be heard by the court on any issue relating to the
organization or actions of the plaintiff steering committee.
``(c) Functions of Plaintiff Steering Committee.--The
authority of the plaintiff steering committee to direct
counsel for the class shall include all powers normally
permitted to an attorney's client in litigation, including
the authority to retain or dismiss counsel and to reject
offers of settlement, and the authority to accept an offer of
settlement subject to final approval by the court. Dismissal
of counsel other than for cause shall not limit the ability
of counsel to enforce any contractual fee agreement or to
apply to the court for a fee award from any common fund
established for the class.
``(d) Immunity From Civil Liability; Removal.--Any person
serving as a member of a plaintiff steering committee shall
be immune from any civil liability for any negligence in
performing such service, but shall not be immune from
liability for intentional misconduct or from the assessment
of costs pursuant to section 20B(c). The court may remove a
member of a plaintiff steering committee for good cause
shown.
``(e) Effect on Other Law.--This section does not affect
any other provision of law concerning class actions or the
authority of the court to give final approval to any offer of
settlement.''.
(b) Prohibition on Attorneys' Fees Paid From Commission
Disgorgement Funds.--Section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78u(d)) is amended by adding at the
end the following new paragraph:
``(4) Prohibition on Attorneys' Fees Paid From Commission
Disgorgement Funds.--Except as otherwise ordered by the
court, funds disgorged as the result of an action brought by
the Commission, or of any Commission proceeding, shall not be
distributed as payment for attorneys' fees or expenses
incurred by private parties seeking distribution of the
disgorged funds.''.

SEC. 3. PREVENTION OF ABUSIVE PRACTICES THAT FOMENT
LITIGATION.

(a) Additional Provisions Applicable to Private Actions.--
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended by inserting
after section 20A (15 U.S.C. 78t-1) the following new
section:
``procedures applicable to private actions

``Sec. 20B. (a) Elimination of Bonus Payments to Named
Plaintiffs in Class Actions.--In any private action under
this title that is certified as a class action pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the portion of any
final judgment or of any settlement that is awarded to class
plaintiffs serving as the representative parties shall be
equal, on a per share basis, to the portion of the final
judgment or settlement awarded to all other members of the
class. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit
the award to any representative parties of actual expenses
(including lost wages) relating to the representation of the
class.
``(b) Restrictions on Professional Plaintiffs.--Except as
the court may otherwise permit for good cause, a person may
be a named plaintiff, or an officer, director, or fiduciary
of a named plaintiff, in no more than 5 class actions filed
during any 3-year period.
``(c) Awards of Fees and Expenses.--
``(1) Authority to award fees and expenses.--If the court
in any private action arising under this title enters a final
judgment against a party litigant on the basis of a motion to
dismiss, motion for summary judgment, or a trial on the
merits, the court shall, upon motion by the prevailing party,
determine whether (A) the position of the losing party was
not substantially justified, (B) imposing fees and expenses
on the losing party or the losing party's attorney would be
just, and (C) the cost of such fees and expenses to the
prevailing party is substantially burdensome or unjust. If
the court makes the determinations described in clauses (A),
(B), and (C), the court shall award the prevailing party
reasonable fees and other expenses incurred by that party.
The determination of whether the position of the losing party
was substantially justified shall be made on the basis of the
record in the action for which fees and other expenses are
sought, but the burden of persuasion shall be on the
prevailing party.
``(2) Security for payment of costs in class actions.--In
any private action arising under this title that is certified
as a class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court shall require an undertaking from the
attorneys for the plaintiff class, the plaintiff class, or
both, in such proportions and at such times as the court
determines are just and equitable, for the payment of the
fees and expenses that may be awarded under paragraph (1).
``(3) Application for fees.--A party seeking an award of
fees and other expenses shall, within 30 days of a final,
nonappealable judgment in the action, submit to the court an
application for fees and other expenses that verifies that
the party is entitled to such an award under paragraph (1)
and the amount sought, including an itemized statement from
any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing on
behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the
rate at which fees and other expenses are computed.
``(4) Allocation and size of award.--The court, in its
discretion, may--
``(A) determine whether the amount to be awarded pursuant
to this section shall be awarded against the losing party,
its attorney, or both; and
``(B) reduce the amount to be awarded pursuant to this
section, or deny an award, to the extent that the prevailing
party during the course of the proceedings engaged in conduct
that unduly and unreasonably protracted the final resolution
of the action.
``(5) Awards in discovery proceedings.--In adjudicating any
motion for an order compelling discovery or any motion for a
protective order made in any private action arising under
this title, the court shall award the prevailing party
reasonable fees and other expenses incurred by the party in
bringing or defending against the motion, including
reasonable attorneys' fees, unless the court finds that
special circumstances make an award unjust.
``(6) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection
shall be construed to limit or impair the discretion of the
court to award costs pursuant to other provisions of law.
``(7) Protection against abuse of process.--In any action
to which this subsection applies, a court shall not permit a
plaintiff to withdraw from or voluntarily dismiss such action
if the court determines that such withdrawal or dismissal is
taken for purposes of evasion of the requirements of this
subsection.
``(8) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection--
``(A) The term `fees and other expenses' includes the
reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable cost
of any study, analysis, report, test, or project which is
found by the court to be necessary for the preparation of the
party's case, and reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses.
The amount of fees awarded under this section shall be based
upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of
services furnished.
``(B) The term `substantially justified' shall have the
same meaning as in section 2412(d)(1) of title 28, United
States Code.
``(d) Prevention of Abusive Conflicts of Interest.--In any
private action under this title pursuant to a complaint
seeking damages on behalf of a class, if the class is
represented by an attorney who directly owns or otherwise has
a beneficial interest in the securities that are the subject
of the litigation, the court shall, on motion by any party,
make a determination of whether such interest constitutes a
conflict of interest sufficient to disqualify the attorney
from representing the class.
``(e) Disclosure of Settlement Terms to Class Members.--In
any private action under this title that is certified as a
class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, any settlement agreement that is published or
otherwise disseminated to the class shall include the
following statements:
``(1) Statement of potential outcome of case.--
``(A) Agreement on amount of damages and likelihood of
prevailing.--If the settling parties agree on the amount of
damages per share that would be recoverable if the plaintiff
prevailed on each claim alleged under this title and the
likelihood that the plaintiff would prevail--
``(i) a statement concerning the amount of such potential
damages; and
``(ii) a statement concerning the likelihood that the
plaintiff would prevail on the claims alleged under this
title and a brief explanation of the reasons for that
conclusion.
``(B) Disagreement on amount of damages or likelihood of
prevailing.--If the parties do not agree on the amount of
damages per share that would be recoverable if the plaintiff
prevailed on each claim alleged under this title or on the
likelihood that the plaintiff would prevail on those claims,
or both, a statement from each settling party concerning the
issue or issues on which the parties disagree.
``(C) Inadmissibility for certain purposes.--Statements
made in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) concerning
the amount of damages and the likelihood of prevailing shall
not be admissible for purposes of any Federal or State
judicial action or administrative proceeding.
``(2) Statement of attorneys' fees or costs sought.--If any
of the settling parties
[[Page H2769]] or their counsel intend to apply to the court
for an award of attorneys' fees or costs from any fund
established as part of the settlement, a statement indicating
which parties or counsel intend to make such an application,
the amount of fees and costs that will be sought (including
the amount of such fees and costs determined on a per-share
basis, together with the amount of the settlement proposed to
be distributed to the parties to suit, determined on a per-
share basis), and a brief explanation of the basis for the
application. Such information shall be clearly summarized on
the cover page of any notice to a party of any settlement
agreement.
``(3) Identification of lawyers' representatives.--The name
and address of one or more representatives of counsel for the
class who will be reasonably available to answer written
questions from class members concerning any matter contained
in any notice of settlement published or otherwise
disseminated to the class.
``(4) Other information.--Such other information as may be
required by the court, or by any plaintiff steering committee
appointed by the court pursuant to section 36.
``(f) Encouragement of Finality in Settlement Discharges.--
``(1) Discharge.--A defendant who settles any private
action arising under this title at any time before verdict or
judgment shall be discharged from all claims for contribution
brought by other persons with respect to the matters that are
the subject of such action. Upon entry of the settlement by
the court, the court shall enter a bar order constituting the
final discharge of all obligations to the plaintiff of the
settling defendant arising out of the action. The order shall
bar all future claims for contribution or indemnity arising
out of the action--
``(A) by nonsettling persons against the settling
defendant; and
``(B) by the settling defendant against any nonsettling
defendants.
``(2) Reduction.--If a person enters into a settlement with
the plaintiff prior to verdict or judgment, the verdict or
judgment shall be reduced by the greater of--
``(A) an amount that corresponds to the percentage of
responsibility of that person; or
``(B) the amount paid to the plaintiff by that person.
``(g) Contribution From Non-Parties in Interests of
Fairness.--
``(1) Right of contribution.--A person who becomes liable
for damages in any private action under this title (other
than an action under section 9(e) or 18(a)) may recover
contribution from any other person who, if joined in the
original suit, would have been liable for the same damages.
``(2) Statute of limitations for contribution.--Once
judgment has been entered in any such private action
determining liability, an action for contribution must be
brought not later than 6 months after the entry of a final,
nonappealable judgment in the action.
``(h) Defendant's Right to Written Interrogatories
Establishing Scienter.--In any private action under this
title in which the plaintiff may recover money damages, the
court shall, when requested by a defendant, submit to the
jury a written interrogatory on the issue of each such
defendant's state of mind at the time the alleged violation
occurred.''.
(b) Prohibition of Referral Fees That Foment Litigation.--
Section 15(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78o(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
``(8) Receipt of Referral Fees.--No broker or dealer, or
person associated with a broker or dealer, may solicit or
accept remuneration for assisting an attorney in obtaining
the representation of any customer in any private action
under this title.''.

SEC. 4. PREVENTION OF ``FISHING EXPEDITION'' LAWSUITS.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.)
is amended by inserting after section 10 the following new
section:

``SEC. 10A. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS.

``(a) Scienter.--
``(1) In general.--In any private action arising under this
title based on a fraudulent statement, liability may be
established only on proof that--
``(A) the defendant directly or indirectly made a
fraudulent statement;
``(B) the defendant possessed the intention to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud; and
``(C) the defendant made such fraudulent statement
knowingly or recklessly.
``(2) Fraudulent statement.--For purposes of this section,
a fraudulent statement is a statement that contains an untrue
statement of a material fact, or omits a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading.
``(3) Knowingly.--For purposes of paragraph (1), a
defendant makes a fraudulent statement knowingly if the
defendant knew that the statement of a material fact was
untrue at the time it was made, or knew that an omitted fact
was necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances in which they were made, not
misleading.
``(4) Recklessness.--For purposes of paragraph (1), a
defendant makes a fraudulent statement recklessly if the
defendant, in making such statement, is guilty of highly
unreasonable conduct that (A) involves not merely simple or
even gross negligence, but an extreme departure from
standards of ordinary care, and (B) presents a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers that was either known to the
defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been
consciously aware of it. For example, a defendant who
genuinely forgot to disclose, or to whom disclosure did not
come to mind, is not reckless.
``(b) Requirement for Explicit Pleading of Scienter.--In
any private action to which subsection (a) applies, the
complaint shall specify each statement or omission alleged to
have been misleading, and the reasons the statement or
omission was misleading. The complaint shall also make
specific allegations which, if true, would be sufficient to
establish scienter as to each defendant at the time the
alleged violation occurred. It shall not be sufficient for
this purpose to plead the mere presence of facts inconsistent
with a statement or omission alleged to have been misleading.
If an allegation is made on information and belief, the
complaint shall set forth with specificity all information on
which that belief is formed.
``(c) Dismissal for Failure To Meet Pleading Requirements;
Stay of Discovery; Summary Judgment.--In any private action
to which subsection (a) applies, the court shall, on the
motion of any defendant, dismiss the complaint if the
requirements of subsection (b) are not met, except that the
court may, in its discretion, permit a single amended
complaint to be filed. During the pendency of any such motion
to dismiss, all discovery and other proceedings shall be
stayed unless the court finds upon the motion of any party
that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve
evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that party. If a
complaint satisfies the requirements of subsection (b), the
plaintiff shall be entitled to conduct discovery limited to
the facts concerning the allegedly misleading statement or
omission. Upon completion of such discovery, the parties may
move for summary judgment.
``(d) Reliance and Causation.--
``(1) In general.--In any private action to which
subsection (a) applies, the plaintiff shall prove that--
``(A) he or she had knowledge of, and relied (in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security) on, the statement
that contained the misstatement or omission described in
subsection (a)(1); and
``(B) that the statement containing such misstatement or
omission proximately caused (through both transaction
causation and loss causation) any loss incurred by the
plaintiff.
``(2) Fraud on the market.--For purposes of paragraph (1),
reliance may be proven by establishing that the market as a
whole considered the fraudulent statement, that the price at
which the security was purchased or sold reflected the
market's estimation of the fraudulent statement, and that the
plaintiff relied on that market price. Proof that the market
as a whole considered the fraudulent statement may consist of
evidence that the statement--
``(A) was published in publicly available research reports
by analysts of such security;
``(B) was the subject of news articles;
``(C) was delivered orally at public meetings by officers
of the issuer, or its agents;
``(D) was specifically considered by rating agencies in
their published reports; or
``(E) was otherwise made publicly available to the market
in a manner that was likely to bring it to the attention of,
and to be considered as credible by, other active
participants in the market for such security.

Nonpublic information may not be used as proof that the
market as a whole considered the fraudulent statement.
``(3) Presumption of reliance.--Upon proof that the market
as a whole considered the fraudulent statement pursuant to
paragraph (2), the plaintiff is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption that the price at which the security was
purchased or sold reflected the market's estimation of the
fraudulent statement and that the plaintiff relied on such
market price. This presumption may be rebutted by evidence
that--
``(A) the market as a whole considered other information
that corrected the allegedly fraudulent statement; or
``(B) the plaintiff possessed such corrective information
prior to the purchase or sale of the security.
``(4) Reasonable expectation of integrity of market
price.--A plaintiff who buys or sells a security for which it
is unreasonable to rely on market price to reflect all
current information may not establish reliance pursuant to
paragraph (2). For purposes of paragraph (2), the following
factors shall be considered in determining whether it was
reasonable for a party to expect the market price of the
security to reflect substantially all publicly available
information regarding the issuer of the security:
``(A) The weekly trading volume of any class of securities
of the issuer of the security.
``(B) The existence of public reports by securities
analysts concerning any class of securities of the issuer of
the security.
``(C) The eligibility of the issuer of the security, under
the rules and regulations of the Commission, to incorporate
by reference its reports made pursuant to section 13 of this
title in a registration statement filed under the Securities
Act of 1933 in connection with the sale of equity securities.
[[Page H2770]] ``(D) A history of immediate movement of the
price of any class of securities of the issuer of the
security caused by the public dissemination of information
regarding unexpected corporate events or financial releases.

In no event shall it be considered reasonable for a party to
expect the market price of the security to reflect
substantially all publicly available information regarding
the issuer of the security unless the issuer of the security
has a class of securities listed and registered on a national
securities exchange or quoted on the automated quotation
system of a national securities association.
``(e) Allocation of Liability.--
``(1) Joint and several liability for knowing fraud.--A
defendant who is found liable for damages in a private action
to which subsection (a) applies may be liable jointly and
severally only if the trier of fact specifically determines
that the defendant acted knowingly (as defined in subsection
(a)(3)).
``(2) Proportionate liability for recklessness.--If the
trier of fact does not make the findings required by
paragraph (1) for joint and several liability, a defendant's
liability in a private action to which subsection (a) applies
shall be determined under paragraph (3) of this subsection
only if the trier of fact specifically determines that the
defendant acted recklessly (as defined in subsection (a)(4)).
``(3) Determination of proportionate liability.--If the
trier of fact makes the findings required by paragraph (2),
the defendant's liability shall be determined as follows:
``(A) The trier of fact shall determine the percentage of
responsibility of the plaintiff, of each of the defendants,
and of each of the other persons or entities alleged by the
parties to have caused or contributed to the harm alleged by
the plaintiff. In determining the percentages of
responsibility, the trier of fact shall consider both the
nature of the conduct of each person and the nature and
extent of the causal relationship between that conduct and
the damage claimed by the plaintiff.
``(B) For each defendant, the trier of fact shall then
multiply the defendant's percentage of responsibility by the
total amount of damage suffered by the plaintiff that was
caused in whole or in part by that defendant and the court
shall enter a verdict or judgment against the defendant in
that amount. No defendant whose liability is determined under
this subsection shall be jointly liable on any judgment
entered against any other party to the action.
``(C) Except where contractual relationship permits, no
defendant whose liability is determined under this paragraph
shall have a right to recover any portion of the judgment
entered against such defendant from another defendant.
``(4) Effect of Provision.--This subsection relates only to
the allocation of damages among defendants. Nothing in this
subsection shall affect the standards for liability under any
private action arising under this title.
``(f) Damages.--In any private action to which subsection
(a) applies, and in which the plaintiff claims to have bought
or sold the security based on a reasonable belief that the
market value of the security reflected all publicly available
information, the plaintiff's damages shall not exceed the
lesser of--
``(1) the difference between the price paid by the
plaintiff for the security and the market value of the
security immediately after dissemination to the market of
information which corrects the fraudulent statement; and
``(2) the difference between the price paid by the
plaintiff for the security and the price at which the
plaintiff sold the security after dissemination of
information correcting the fraudulent statement.''.

SEC. 5. ESTABLISHMENT OF ``SAFE HARBOR'' FOR PREDICTIVE
STATEMENTS.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 37. APPLICATION OF SAFE HARBOR FOR FORWARD-LOOKING
STATEMENTS.

``(a) Safe Harbor Defined.--In any action arising under
this title based on a fraudulent statement (within the
meaning of section 10A), a person shall not be liable for the
publication of any projection if--
``(1) the basis for such projection is briefly described
therein, with citations (which may be general) to
representative sources or authority, and a disclaimer is made
to alert persons for whom such information is intended that
the projections should not be given any more weight than the
described basis therefor would reasonably justify; and
``(2) the basis for such projection is not inaccurate as of
the date of publication, determined without benefit of
subsequently available information or information not known
to such person at such date.
``(b) Automatic Protective Order Staying Discovery;
Expedited Procedure.--In any action arising under this title
based on a fraudulent statement (within the meaning of
section 10A) by any person, such person may, at any time
beginning after the filing of the complaint and ending 10
days after the filing of such person's answer to the
complaint, move to obtain an automatic protective order under
the safe harbor procedures of this section. Upon such motion,
the protective order shall issue forthwith to stay all
discovery as to the moving party, except that which is
directed to the specific issue of the applicability of the
safe harbor. A hearing on the applicability of the safe
harbor shall be conducted within 45 days of the issuance of
such protective order. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
court shall either (1) dismiss the portion of the action
based upon the use of a projection to which the safe harbor
applies, or (2) determine that the safe harbor is unavailable
in the circumstances.
``(c) Regulatory Authority.--In consultation with investors
and issuers of securities, the Commission shall adopt rules
and regulations to facilitate the safe harbor provisions of
this section. Such rules and regulations shall--
``(1) include clear and objective guidance that the
Commission finds sufficient for the protection of investors,
``(2) prescribe such guidance with sufficient particularity
that compliance shall be readily ascertainable by issuers
prior to issuance of securities, and
``(3) provide that projections that are in compliance with
such guidance and that concern the future economic
performance of an issuer of securities registered under
section 12 of this title will be deemed not to be in
violation of section 10(b) of this title.''.

SEC. 6. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in the amendments made by this Act shall be deemed
to create or ratify any implied private right of action, or
to prevent the Commission by rule from restricting or
otherwise regulating private actions under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

SEC. 7. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This Act and the amendments made by this Act are effective
on the date of enactment of this Act and shall apply to cases
commenced after such date of enactment.

The CHAIRMAN. The bill will be considered for amendment under the 5-
minute rule for a period not to exceed 8 hours.
During consideration of the bill for amendment, the Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole may accord priority in recognition to a Member
who has caused an amendment to be printed in the designated place in
the Congressional Record. Those amendments will be considered read.
Are there any amendments to the bill?

amendment offered by mr. cox of california

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Cox of California: Page 28, after
line 2, insert the following new section (and redesignate the
succeeding sections and conform the table of contents
accordingly):

SEC. 6. AMENDMENT TO RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS ACT.

Section 1964(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended
by inserting ``, except that no person may bring an action
under this provision if the racketeering activity, as defined
in section 1961(1)(D), involves conduct actionable as fraud
in the purchase or sale of securities'' before the period.

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment that would
prevent plaintiffs' attorneys from bringing actions alleging securities
law violations under the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations
Act which we know as RICO.
Today we are fulfilling our Contract With America by curbing
frivolous securities litigation. For many years now shrewd plaintiffs'
attorneys have been using RICO to evade the requirements that Congress
has established in the Federal securities laws. Supreme Court Justice
Thurgood Marshall called our attention to this problem as far back as
1985 when he explained that the civil RICO statute, quote, ``virtually
eliminates decades of legislative and judicial development of private
civil remedies under the Federal securities laws.'' Today's amendment
seeks only to reform RICO in the area of securities legislation, but I
should point out that this House under its previous control by today's
minority, the Democrats, have previously passed wholesale RICO reform
by an overwhelming margin. This reform measure, authored by the
gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Boucher] and the gentleman from Florida
[Mr. McCollum], now the chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on
Crime, enjoyed overwhelming bipartisan support. My amendment is fully
consistent with this effort, if more limited.
The provision originally in the Contract With America that addressed
the problem of civil RICO actions in the securities area, as I
explained in my colloquy a moment ago with the gentleman from Michigan,
was omitted from the bill as reported out of committee inadvertently.
It was not opposed in committee. If we do not reinsert this provision
by adopting my
[[Page H2771]] amendment, we will fail to address a significant number
of frivolous actions based on alleged securities law violations, but
brought under the RICO statute. When Congress enacted RICO back in
1970, we intended that it be used as a weapon against organized
criminals, not as a weapon against ordinary investors and the business
community.
The problem posed by the widespread use of civil RICO is one
recognized by legal experts across the spectrum. In the Supreme Court
case from which I just quoted, in 1985 Justice Marshall, along with
Justice Powell, was in the dissent but the majority who said that the
law needs to be changed still agreed that the
abuse of RICO is very real.

Let me quote from the majority opinion:

In its private civil version RICO is evolving into
something quite different from the original conception of its
enactors; in other words, Congress. The extraordinary uses to
which civil RICO has been put appear to be primarily the
result of the failure of Congress.

That from the majority of the Supreme Court, so the majority and the
minority of the Supreme Court agreed that RICO is being abused by its
application in the securities area.
Plaintiffs' attorneys' inappropriate and abusive use of RICO has also
been recognized by the current White House counsel, Abner Mikva. While
still a judge for the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, Mr. Mikva detailed his observations of RICO abuse when
testifying before the House Committee on Criminal Justice in 1985. Mr.
Mikva, of course, has been a Member of Congress in 1970, and he had
warned back then that RICO might be stretched and abused in a way. Here
is his testimony in 1985 before the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice:

I stand amazed to realize that my hyperbolic horrible
examples of how far the law would reach pale into
insignificance when compared to what actually has happened.
What started out as a small cottage industry for Federal
prosecutors has become a commonplace weapon in the civil
litigation arsenal.

Most significantly, those that have the responsibility of regulating
our securities markets support my amendment. For the past 10 years the
chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the SEC, have all
supported civil RICO reform. Beginning in 1985, former SEC Chairman
John Shad testified before Congress in support of legislation to amend
RICO in this way. In 1986, Mr. Chairman, the SEC even submitted draft
legislation for civil RICO reform. In 1989, the SEC General Counsel,
Dan Goelzer, testified before Congress in favor of this civil RICO
reform, and today the SEC continues to support civil RICO reform.
In testimony before our committee, Mr. Chairman, the chairman of the
SEC, Arthur Levitt, stated that H.R. 10, as originally drafted,
contained the kind of civil RICO reform that is necessary. He recently
wrote a letter to our Committee on Commerce chairman, the gentleman
from Virginia [Mr. Bliley], stating that the SEC fully supports this
provision that I am offering today.
The reason this area is one of such wide-ranging consensus is because
almost everyone who studied the issue recognizes that the civil RICO
statute has been abused in securities fraud legislation to distort the
incentives and remedies that the Federal securities laws are supposed
to provide. They have done this by taking advantage of a loophole in
RICO that has permitted inclusion of securities laws violations as a
predicate act for which the defendant may be tagged as a racketeer and
held liable for treble damages and attorney fees.
Additionally, because many claims that could be asserted as
securities laws claims can also be characterized as mail or wire
fraud----
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Cox] has
expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Cox of California was allowed to proceed
for 5 additional minutes.)
Mr. COX of California. Because many claims that could be asserted as
securities laws claims can also be characterized as mail or wire fraud,
and because mail and wire fraud are also predicates for civil RICO
liability, Plaintiffs' attorneys have a devastating, potent, and
readily available alternative for bringing actions under RICO instead
of under our securities laws. As the SEC general counsel stated in his
1989 testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary, and I quote
now,

The commission is concerned that the civil liability
provisions of RICO can, in many cases, convert private
securities law fraud claims into RICO claims. Successful
plaintiffs in such cases are entitled to treble damages,
despite the express limitations on recovery under the
securities laws to actual damages. Private plaintiffs may be
able to bypass the carefully crafted liability provisions of
the securities laws and thereby recover damages in cases in
which Congress or the courts have determined that no recovery
should be available.

Congress initially passed securities laws in order to impose a
uniform system of duties and liabilities upon the securities industry
and to protect investors. Each time we have acted to amend the
securities laws we have balanced the need to provide the maximum amount
of consumer protection against the need to maintain fluid, stable and
reliable markets. Today we are seeking to enact litigation reforms
because we have identified significant problems and abuses in the
current system that are hurting investors, consumers, and the Nation as
a whole.
Mr. Chairman, the failure to adopt this amendment would undermine the
reforms we are hoping to achieve because attorneys could then do an end
run around all of the reform by simply using the RICO statute. In
evading the reforms that we are seeking to achieve today enterprising
lawyers will have the continuing ability to extort settlements from
innocent defendants based on claims that will allow them no chance of
recovery under the reforms that we have today. Lest we have any doubt
about the ability of plaintiffs' attorneys to leverage settlements from
defendants under civil RICO, we need only listen again to Justice
Thurgood Marshall who explained that, quote,

Many a prudent defendant, facing ruinous exposure, will
decide to settle a case even with no merit. It is, thus, not
surprising that civil RICO has been used for extortive
purposes, giving rise to the very evils it was designed to
combat.

Mr. Chairman, unless we adopt my amendment, a plaintiff's attorney
alleging a single violation of the securities laws will be able to
bring an action under civil RICO and leverage a hefty settlement from
an innocent victim. Because an element of RICO is a pattern, plaintiffs
would have the latitude to conduct discovery of records dating as far
back as 10 years. Discovery costs like that run up a tab of millions of
dollars. Often, faced with the cost of these multimillion-dollar
discovery fees, the prospect of being labeled a racketeer and the
prospect of being held liable for treble damages and attorney fees,
defendants, as Thurgood Marshall has said, are forced to settle
meritless cases brought under RICO.
Mr. Chairman, our economy's health depends on the efficient operation
of America's capital markets. We must continue to balance the
provisions of adequate remedies for injured investors and the
imposition of excessive penalties on all participants in our capital
markets. The treble damage blunderbuss of RICO undermines this balance
and imposes exorbitant litigation costs, impedes the raising of
capital, and
Mr BRYANT of Texas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. COX of California. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. BRYANT of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I just took note of the fact that
the gentleman said a moment ago that for some kind of a loophole in the
RICO statute that allows people to sue securities dealers who they
believe are guilty of a pattern of fraudulent activity, but I am
looking here at the language from the statute: 18 U.S.C. says that
actually racketeering; that is, predicate action with the RICO statue,
include, quote, any fees involving fraud and the sales of securities. I
ask, ``In view of that, how can you describe this as a loophole?''
Mr. COX of California. As I mentioned, the Supreme Court, all of the
Justices, both in the majority and minority of this RICO case, viewed
this as an area where congressional action is richly needed because
RICO, although technically being exploited within the letter of the
law, was never intended to apply to securities cases.
[[Page H2772]] Mr. BRYANT of Texas. Well, I just read the statute to
the gentleman which specifically related to----
Mr. COX of California. Well, reclaiming my time----
Mr. BRYANT of Texas. Fraud and the sale of securities----
Mr. COX of California. So I can fully and adequately respond to the
gentleman----
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Cox] has
expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Cox of California was allowed to proceed
for 1 additional minute.)
Mr. COX of California. The SEC chairman came and testified before our
Committee on Commerce, and here is what he said. It is very brief, and
I will just share it with the gentleman:
For many years the Commission has supported legislation to eliminate
the overlap between the private remedies under RICO and under the
Federal securities laws. The securities laws generally provide adequate
remedies for those injured by security fraud. It is both unnecessary
and unfair to expose defendants in securities cases to the threat of
treble damages and other extraordinary remedies provided by RICO.
Mr. BRYANT of Texas. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield further?
Mr. COX of California. This is according to the Clinton appointment
to head up the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Mr. BRYANT of Texas. If the gentleman would yield further just to
point out the gentleman said it was a loophole, and I read to the
gentleman the law indicating it is not a loophole. Now the gentleman is
reading to me testimony, or something, from the SEC, but we never had
hearings on the issue of RICO in the committee that the gentleman and I
are members of. We never had any hearings----
Mr. COX of California. Reclaiming my time, we did, of course, have
hearings on this testimony that was given at that hearing----
Mr. BRYANT of Texas. There were no hearings on RICO----
Mr. COX of California. The SEC.
Mr. BRYANT of Texas. The gentleman will have to acknowledge we had no
hearings on RICO.
Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I think my 60 seconds have
expired.
Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment that would prevent plaintiffs'
attorneys from bringing actions alleging securities law violations
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [RICO].
Today we are fulfilling our Contract With America by curbing frivolous
securities litigation. For many years now, shrewd plaintiffs' attorneys
have been using RICO to evade the requirements we have established in
the Federal securities laws. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall
called our attention to this problem as far back as 1985 when he
explained that the civil RICO statute ``virtually eliminates decades of
legislative and judicial development of private civil remedies under
the Federal securities laws.'' Sedima, S.P.R.I. v. Imrex Company, Inc.,
105 S.Ct. 3292, 3294 (1985) (dissenting). Indeed, while today's
amendment seeks only to reform RICO in the area of securities
litigation, the House--Democrats in control--has previously passed
wholesale RICO reform by an overwhelming margin. This reform measure,
authored by the gentlemen from Virginia [Mr. Boucher] and Mr. McCollum,
the chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, enjoyed
overwhelming bipartisan support. My amendment, I believe is fully
consistent with this effort.
This provision originally in the Contract With America that addressed
the problem of civil RICO actions in the securities area (H.R. 10,
Title I Sec. 107) was omitted from the bills reported out of committee.
If we do not reinsert this provision by adopting my amendment, we will
fail to address a significant number of frivolous actions based on
alleged securities law violations, but brought under the RICO statute.
When we enacted RICO back in 1970, we intended that it be used as a
weapon against organized criminals, not as a weapon against ordinary
investors and the business community.
The problem posed by the widespread use of civil RICO is one
recognized by legal experts across the spectrum. In addition to Justice
Marshall, Chief Justice Rehnquist has observed:

Virtually everyone who has addressed the question agrees
that civil RICO is now being used in ways that Congress never
intended when it enacted the statute in 1970. Most of the
civil suits filed under the statute have nothing to do with
organized crime.

(Rehnquist, Reforming Diversity Jurisdiction and Civil RICO, St. Mary's
L.J. 5, 9 (1989) (originally presented at the Brookings Institution's
Eleventh Seminar on the Administration of Justice, April 7, 1989).
Plaintiffs' attorneys' inappropriate and abusive use of RICO has also
been recognized by current White House Counsel Abner Mikva. While still
a judge for the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, Mr. Mikva detailed his observations of RICO abuse when
testifying before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice in 1985.
While a Member of Congress in 1970, Mr. Mikva had warned his colleagues
about RICO's overbreadth. In 1985, in testifying before the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, he noted the following about his
comparison of his initial thoughts on RICO back in 1970 with the
subsequent reality:

I stand amazed * * * to realize that my hyperbolic horrible
examples of how far the law would reach pale into
insignificance when compared to what has actually happened *
* * What started out as a small cottage industry for federal
prosecutors has become a commonplace weapon in the civil
litigation arsenal.

As we learned yesterday, Mr. Mikva and the Administration have a
number of problems with the legislation before us today. However, as
observed above, my amendment is one provision upon which we all agree.
Also, most significantly, those that have the responsibility of
regulating our securities markets similarly support my amendment. For
the past 10 years, the Chairmen of the Securities and Exchange
Commission [SEC] have all supported civil RICO reform. Beginning in
1985, former SEC Chairman John Shad testified before Congress in
support of legislation to amend RICO. In 1986, the SEC even submitted
draft legislation to Congress that would have significantly limited
civil RICO claims based on alleged securities law violations. In 1989,
SEC General Counsel Dan Goelzer testified before Congress in favor of
civil RICO reform. And today, the SEC continues to support civil RICO
reform. In a recent letter to Commerce Committee Chairman Bliley, SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt stated that the SEC fully supports this
provision I am offering today.
The reason why this is one area where there is such wide-ranging
consensus is because almost everyone who has studied this issue
recognizes that plaintiffs' attorneys have used the civil RICO statute
to distort the incentives and remedies that the federal securities laws
provide. They have done this by taking advantage of a loophole in RICO
that has permitted inclusion of securities law violations as a
predicate act for which a defendant may be tagged as a racketeer and
held liable for treble damages and attorneys' fees. Additionally,
because many claims that could be asserted as securities law claims can
also be characterized as mail or wire fraud, and because mail and wire
fraud are also predicates for civil RICO liability, plaintiffs'
attorneys have a devastating potent and readily available alternative
for bringing actions under RICO rather than under our securities laws.
As SEC General Counsel Goelzer stated in 1989 testimony before the
House Judiciary Committee:

The Commission is concerned, however, that the civil
liability provisions of RICO can in many cases convert
private securities law fraud claims into RICO claims.
Successful plaintiffs in such cases are entitled to treble
damages, despite the express limitations on recovery under
the securities laws to actual damages. Private plaintiffs may
be able to bypass the carefully crafted liability provisions
of the securities laws, and thereby recover damages in cases
in which Congress or the courts have determined that no
recovery should be available under those laws. As a result,
civil RICO places increased and unwarranted financial burdens
on commercial defendants, including securities industry
defendants.

Congress initially passed securities laws in order to impose a
uniform system of duties and liabilities upon the securities industry,
and to protect investors. Each time that we have amended the securities
laws, we have balanced the need to provide the maximum amount of
consumer protection possible against the need to maintain fluid,
stable, and reliable markets. Today, we are seeking to enact litigation
reforms because we have identified significant problems and abuses in
the current system that are hurting investors, consumers, and the
nation as a whole. We are seeking to enact changes to our federal
securities laws in those areas where we have identified reforms are
needed. We are seeking a losers pay provision to punish plaintiffs for
bringing frivolous actions. In addition, we are seeking a limitation on
joint and several liability to restore fairness to the federal
securities laws. The failure to adopt my amendment would undermine the
reforms we are hoping to achieve today without any award, unscrupulous
attorneys could do an end run around the reforms by using the RICO
statute. Through the use of civil RICO, plaintiffs will be able to
initiate law suits based on alleged securities law violations, and will
be entitled to seek treble damages and attorneys' fees.
[[Page H2773]] In evading the reforms we are seeking to achieve
today, enterprising plaintiffs' attorneys will have the continuing
ability to extort settlements from innocent defendants based on claims
that would allow them no chance of recovery under the reforms before us
today. Lest we have any doubt about the ability of plaintiffs'
attorneys to leverage settlements from defendants under civil RICO, we
need only listen again to Justice Marshall, who explained that ``[m]any
a prudent defendant, facing ruinous exposure, will decide to settle
even a case with no merit. It is thus not surprising that civil RICO
has been used for extortive purposes, giving rise to the very evils it
was designed to combat.'' Sedima, 105 S.Ct. at 3295. Unless we adopt my
amendment, a plaintiff's attorney, alleging a single violation of the
securities laws, will be able to bring an action under civil RICO and
leverage a hefty settlement from an innocent victim. Because an element
of a RICO action is a ``pattern,'' plaintiffs have the latitude to
conduct discovery of records dating back 10 years or more. Such
discovery costs defendants millions of dollars. Often, faced with the
cost of these multi-million dollar discovery fees, and the prospect of
being labeled a racketeer, and being held liable for treble damages and
attorneys' fees, defendants are forced to settle meritless cases.
Our economy's health depends on the efficient operation of its
country's capital markets. We must continue to balance the provision of
adequate remedies for injured investors and the imposition of excessive
penalties on all participants in our capital markets. The treble damage
blunderbuss of RICO undermines this balance and imposes exorbitant
litigation costs, impedes the raising of capital and ultimately puts
these costs on the shoulders of consumers and emerging innovative
companies.
Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to read several comments
from judges across the country who have commented on the abuses
prevalent in civil RICO litigation. If there is one message we should
extract from these opinions, it is that we must reform RICO to prevent
plaintiffs' attorneys from bringing actions more appropriately brought
under our securities laws.

``It is true that private civil actions under the statute
are being brought almost solely against such defendants
[respected and legitimate businesses], rather than against
the archetypal, intimidating mobster. Yet this defect--if
defect it is--is inherent in the statute as written, and its
correction must lie with Congress.'' The Supreme Court,
Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3286-87.
``I have a feeling about RICO in the civil world * * * as
being the most conspicuous case I know of legislation
requiring Congressional attention to revision.''--Former U.S.
District Court Judge Simon Rifkind of the Southern District
of New York.
``An imaginative plaintiff could take virtually any illegal
occurrence and point to acts preparatory to the occurrence,
usually the use of the telephone or mails, as meeting the
requirement of pattern.''--U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for
the 5th Circuit Judges Higginbotham, Politz, and Jolly
(Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 424
(5th Cir. 1987)).
``Congress * * * may well have created a runaway treble
damage bonanza for the already excessively litigious.''--
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit Judges
Wood, Cummings, and Hoffman (Schacht v. Brown, 711 F2d, 1343,
1361 (7th Cir. 1983)).
``[O]ne of the proliferating developments in civil
litigation has been the use of RICO * * * in civil claims, in
routine commercial disputes, including those arising under
the federal securities laws. I think that the proliferation
of these claims and the use of a law that was designed to
eliminate organized crime is a very bad influence on the
commercial community.''--U.S. District Court Judge Milton
Pollack of the Southern District of New York.
``McCarthy, though armed with substantial damage claims,
with a requested ad damnum of $312,220 in compensatory and $1
million in punitive damages, obviously cannot resist the
treble damages and attorneys' fees lure of RICO.''--Judge
Shadur, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois (McCarthy Cattle Co. v. Paine Webber, Inc., 1985 WL
631 (N.D. Ill., April 11, 1985).
``[The plaintiff's complaint] demonstrates at least two
facts of life in an urban district court in a litigation-
prone society: * * * RICO's lure of treble damages and
attorneys' fees draws litigants and lawyers * * * like
lemmings to the sea.''--Judge Shadur (Wolin v. Hanley Dawson
Cadillac, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 890, 891 (N.D. Ill. 1986).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment
offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. Cox].
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this amendment, we must
never forget, has arrived here by extraordinary means. It was
accidentally, like when you sweep up trash at night in the Committee on
the Judiciary. This little slip of paper called RICO fell to the ground
in a corner. Nobody noticed it, and, therefore, we have a whole
securities bill that went to the Committee on Rules, was dealt with,
and then the Committee on Rules came back again and said, ``Oh, we
overlooked civil RICO, and we have an amendment, not to modify it as
applies to securities, which has been the main use of civil RICO in
securities ever since RICO was started. We said we will not pare it
down, we will not deal with the other amendments that have always
applied to RICO before in the Committee on the Judiciary without so
much as mentioning this name RICO. We now have a measure in one
sentence that will remove it from all securities legislation from this
point on.

{time} 1745

Are you aware of the magnitude of what it is we are proposing to do
here as the first amendment to this legislation on the floor? We are
now saying that the fact that RICO was used in all of the major fraud
cases, that we have now reached the point on the basis of a Supreme
court case that goes back 10 years to say that now RICO is so abused we
must now get rid of it.
Remember, the last time I saw an idea about RICO was when the former
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Hughes] developed a gatekeeper concept,
in which we would filter through under a very strict set of principles
which cases might make it to a RICO suit.
But now--and I disagreed with that. But the gatekeeper concept was a
very modest one. It kept RICO alive in terms of civil litigation. It
was much more carefully crafted than a blanket exemption from RICO in
all securities cases.
What we are saying is that all of the major fraud cases in which RICO
busted people who were bilking millions of dollars, sometimes billions
of dollars, is now going to be thrown in the trash heap, and we will
not need it anymore.
That is why those who want to preserve RICO includes the Association
of Attorneys General, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the North American
Securities Administration associations. It is very clear that public
prosecutors and regulators are aghast at the Cox amendment and the
implications of what it has in store in us trying to police this very
tricky, complex area of money crimes that is now still as much a
problem has it has always been.
Civil RICO, with their treble damages, which frequently are used for
great leverage purposes, can recover money which pay attorney fees and
are a vital remedy that should not be diminished in any way. RICO is
critical in the fight against savings and loan fraud, bank and
insurance and financial crimes. Using civil RICO, the victims of white
collar crime can sue these malfeasors for triple their losses, and it
is frequently the only effective means for victims.
Do not throw the baby out with the bath water. There has never been a
minute's hearing in any of the committees of jurisdiction, certainly
not Judiciary, and I really must say that this is the most outrageous
proposal in terms of securities regulation that I have ever heard. Vote
down the Cox amendment.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
(Mr. McCOLLUM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman. I rise in support of the amendment
offered by the gentleman from California. In the last several
Congresses the subject of RICO reform and, in particular, the use of
the RICO statute in civil business disputes, has received significant
attention. Hearings have been held; bills have been introduced; but in
the end, nothing has happened. A law that was originally intended to
strike a major blow to organized crime and racketeering, has continued
to be used as a hammer in routine civil cases.
Today, we take a step toward meaningful civil RICO reform. This
amendment will end inappropriate use of the civil RICO statute in an
area of the law where it has been most abused--the securities law area.
Congress never intended for the RICO statute to be used as the
principal means of litigating disputes over securities transactions.
The
[[Page H2774]] securities laws themselves provide aggrieved buyers and
sellers with private causes of action so that they may seek
compensation for their losses. The increases in the use of the
racketeering statue for this purpose, however, has produced
consequences that Congress never intended. The threat of RICO sanctions
has had a chilling effect on entrepreneurship and ultimately economic
growth.
Mr. Chairman, the civil RICO statute is tough, and it should be. The
statute's provision for treble damaged and attorneys fees awards were
designed to help private citizens strike back against criminal
enterprises and other corrupt organizations. But they were never
intended to be used as a means to litigate disputes between parties to
bona fide securities transactions.
The amendment offered by the gentleman from California will begin the
process of restoring the civil RICO statute to the uses that Congress
intended. This amendment will put an immediate stop to one of the
greatest abuses of the civil RICO statute.
It must be noted, however, Mr. Chairman, that adopting this amendment
will not remedy all of the problems with the way the civil RICO statute
is being misused. As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, where
jurisdiction over this issue resides, I intend to introduce RICO
reform. It is my hope that the subcommittee will bring forward
legislation to help ensure that the RICO statutes are used in the
manner that Congress originally intended.
In the interim, however, this amendment will stop some of the most
egregious abuses of the civil RICO statute. This amendment is an
important first step in the RICO reform process. I urge my colleagues
to support it.
Mr. Chairman, I also want to commend the gentleman from Virginia [Mr.
Boucher] for his work on the other side of the aisle in trying to get
civil RICO reform over the past sessions of Congress. Many hearings
were held in this past decade. Where there might not have been one this
session of Congress, we have certainly had plenty on the subject in the
past.
The truth of the matter is the House once even passed a reform of
RICO that did not go through the Senate, which would have required a
prior criminal conviction before you could get civil RICO. I dare say,
to allay the gentleman from Michigan's concerns, there are plenty of
remedies for those bad apples that commit serious fraud out there
without going and using the civil RICO statute for the kind of abusive
purposes that have been happening in the securities area and in many
others.
So I commend the gentleman from California for offering the
amendment, I urge my colleagues to support it, and I appreciate the
time.
Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
(Mr. DINGELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, this is a most extraordinary day. When we considered
the bill in the committee, this is the headline we got in the Wall
Street Journal, a well-known bastion of left wing liberalism and
excessive regulation said this: ``Fraud Shields for Companies Gain in
House.''
I do not know whether we ought to amend RICO or not. There is not one
scintilla of evidence in the record of the Committee on Commerce
whether we should or we should not. And there is nothing there which
says that we ought to take away the right of a person to sue civilly
under RICO where there is interstate trafficking in stolen securities.
RICO had securities violations as the subject of civil suits from the
very first day that it was enacted into law.
Now, we have a market which is the most trusted in the world. It is
for two reasons: One, because we have good enforcement at the SEC. The
other is because we have an extraordinarily good system of private
enforcement, enforcement by private citizens suing wrongdoers to
collect for wrongdoing. And millions and millions of dollars are
collected for this reason.
My colleagues never saw this language in the committee. We never knew
it was coming until late last night, when the Committee on Rules
decided that something should be done about this matter. No discussion
was offered in the committee. The author of the legislation had nothing
to say on this subject. No one on the Republican side had anything to
say about the need to address the wrongdoing under RICO.
It is interesting to note that in Russia they are now saying, and
this is what the chairman of the Russian Securities Fund had to say,
``Each scandal chips away at investors' trust, and trust is the only
thing we can rely on to get more business.''
I have told the securities industry time after time, people think
that the securities industry and the markets in this country run on
money. They do not. They run on public confidence. And if there is
public confidence, then everyone will make lots of money. What we are
doing here is sneaking out of the Committee on Rules a proposal to
repeal RICO, and it is not going to contribute to the trust of the
American people in the securities market or in the marketplace.
The only confidence that is going to be boosted by this amendment is
going to be the confidence of rascals and scoundrels, who will then be
secure in the knowledge that if they engage in theft of resources
belonging to others, that they are not going to get sued. That is all.
This legislation comes to the floor with abbreviated hearings and not
adequate opportunity for amendments to be offered. The legislation is
controlled by the Committee on Rules, which has said we will add RICO,
which is not germane to the bill, and which is not even in the
Committee on Energy and Commerce.
We are amending a statute which is not even under the jurisdiction of
the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and we are amending it without
ever having a word of hearings or a bit of evidence or testimony taken
on the subject. Why is RICO taken up now when it could be addressed in
another committee in proper fashion after appropriate hearings? I have
no explanation. Perhaps the gentleman from California who offers the
amendment has, but I seriously doubt if he does or will.
Many Americans had hoped that the Contract on America would be an
engine for progress by making needed and targeted reforms. This
amendment is just another demonstration that the contract instead has
become a gravy train for any special interest with enough money and
resources that they can get aboard and go where they want to go at the
expense of the ordinary American.
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
(Mr. FIELDS of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I would just point out, we just
saw an exhibit on the floor and, as is so often the case when one reads
the headlines, you miss the story. In the fine print the gentleman from
Michigan forgot to tell us the last sentence of that happens to be a
concise statement of the purpose of the bill. It says, ``The purpose of
the bill,'' and this was actually on what he presented to us, but you
could not read it, only the headline, ``The purpose of this bill
remains to reduce litigation to cut down on fraud committed by
unscrupulous lawyers and professional plaintiffs.''
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, today we are
seeking to enact fundamental reforms of the manner in which securities
actions are litigated. In order to ensure that our reforms are
comprehensive, we must make every effort to identify oversights or
omissions in our legislation that could potentially hamper the
effectiveness of H.R. 1058.
Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. DINGELL. I was much impressed by the comments of the gentleman
from California. The quote that he gave is an excellent one: ``The
purpose of the bill is to cut down on litigation and to cut down on
fraud committed by
[[Page H2775]] unscrupulous lawyers and professional plaintiffs.'' And
the authority that is quoted in the article is, guess who? The
gentleman from California [Mr. Cox].
Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield
further, I think that the gentleman from Michigan earlier pointed out
that the Wall Street Journal usually understands where to get their
information, and there is not much question but that that is what the
bill does, and in particular this amendment will help us to achieve
that objective.
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, as I was
pointing out, there have been oversights, and this amendment seeks to
address an oversight of the drafting. In the current bill we have
failed to prescribe civil RICO actions based on conduct that is
actionable in fraud and the purchase or sale of securities. Left
uncorrected, this omission would seriously undermine our efforts today.
The original drafters of H.R. 10 recognized this fact and included
this identical provision in title I, section 107. As a result of sheer
error, section 107 was not included in any of the versions reported out
of committee. By offering this amendment, the gentleman from California
[Mr. Cox] is seeking to do no more than reinsert this provision back
into the Contract With America.
Mr. Chairman, it is particularly important to note that this
amendment has the support of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission. In providing the views of the Commission to the Committee
on Commerce on title II of H.R. 10 on February 23, 1995, this year,
Chairman Levitt stated the Commission supports the elimination of civil
RICO liability predicated on security law violations.
{time} 1800

The enactment of this legislation will provide much needed reform by
helping curb frivolous securities actions. This amendment will go a
long way toward guaranteeing meaningful reform because civil RICO
actions are well-recognized vehicles for bringing frivolous lawsuits.
If we do not adopt this amendment, plaintiffs' attorneys will be free
to evade our reforms by merely bringing securities actions under RICO,
thereby frustrating the efforts of this legislation.
We should have no doubt that if we fail to adopt this amendment,
plaintiffs' attorneys will take full advantage of our omission. Almost
every claim that a plaintiff alleges as a violation of securities laws
may also be pled as a RICO violation. Plaintiffs' attorneys can easily
allege both the enterprise and the pattern elements necessary to turn a
securities action into a RICO claim, because most security law
violations are committed in the course of conducting the affairs of a
business or an enterprise.
Moreover, virtually all securities transactions involve the use of
the mail or telephone.
Further demonstrating the need to enact this amendment is the
significant number of securities fraud cases brought as RICO claims. As
early as 1985, the American Bar Association found that 40 percent of
all civil RICO cases filed in Federal courts were based on securities
fraud. If we fail to pass this amendment, we will continue to leave
this avenue wide open for the plaintiffs' bar. The failure to amend
RICO to exclude issues for conduct that is actionable as a securities
law violation would enable plaintiffs' attorneys to continue to seek
treble damages and to evade the most important elements of the types of
reform we hope to accomplish.
We need only compare the provisions of this legislation with those of
the RICO----
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Fields] has
expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Fields of Texas was allowed to proceed for
3 additional minutes.)
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, we need only compare the
provisions of this legislation with those of the RICO statute in order
to identify those reforms that plaintiffs' attorneys will be able to
avoid. H.R. 1058, this legislation, has a losers pay provision. RICO
does not. H.R. 1058 preserves a one year statute of limitation. The
RICO statute of limitations is longer. H.R. 1058 limits joint and
several liability to knowing securities fraud; RICO does not. The list
continues.
But the point is clear, unless we eliminate the RICO alternative, our
reforms under this legislation will be undermined.
The U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Marshall, and the Judicial Conference have all recognized the ability
of plaintiffs' attorneys to bring meritless actions under RICO and
leverage substantial payments for defendants through such actions. As
Justice Marshall explained about civil RICO actions in 1985, and I
quote:

Many a prudent defendant, facing a ruinous exposure, will
decide to settle even a case with no merit. It is thus not
surprising that civil RICO has been used for extortive
purposes, giving rise to the very evils that it was designed
to combat.

Mr. Chairman, we enacted civil RICO many years ago to provide private
citizens with a weapon against organized crime and racketeering. We did
not intend RICO to be a supplement to the Federal securities laws. We
never intended to give trial lawyers treble damages in these types of
civil lawsuits.
Nonetheless, unless we adopt this amendment, plaintiffs' attorneys
will use RICO to evade our efforts of reform.
I urge all of my colleagues to support the Cox amendment and follow
through with our promise to the American people to provide common sense
and comprehensive legal reform.
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, the whole purpose of this debate, the whole purpose of
this multi-year effort to bring this issue to the floor and eventually
hopefully to pass this bill, is to change the incentives in this
system, in this legal system, to change them in a very positive way, to
create an incentive system that says, if you find knowing fraud,
prosecute it. You will have, under knowing fraud, under the examples
illustrated by several of my colleagues on this side, you will have the
full recourse of 10(b)(5) litigation remedies at your disposal. You
will have full joint and several liability available to you. You sue
all the parties. They are all 100 percent responsible. It is up to them
to figure out who is going to contribute to each other in a knowing
fraud case.
It says where there is not knowing fraud--and by the way, the
original statute we are amending never talked about anything but
knowing fraud. Courts have invented another standard of violations of
the statutes. Courts have invented something that they said was called
recklessness, something close to knowing. It was so close to knowing
they said that you almost had to be believed to have known that you
were committing a fraud or you were so reckless, you were so in fact in
violation of common standards of what we perceive to be good behavior
that you literally will be presumed to have known.
In those cases where it is a reckless behavior, not a knowing
behavior, this statute creates a new liability structure. It says, in
those cases that you identify the persons who were reckless. You
identify their percentage liability or the court does eventually in the
judgment, and each is proportionately liable for their share of the
recklessness, as opposed to the joint and several liability that
attaches to knowing fraud, the guys that intend to harm you and, in
fact, do harm you.
It is the purpose of this statute to create these two liabilities for
one simple reason: Without a change in the law, as this bill suggests,
plaintiffs will, plaintiffs' lawyers will continue to file these
shakedown lawsuits, scattershot everybody connected with the company,
everybody associated with it, officers, board members, accountants,
lawyers, everybody connected with a company, and then sit back and do
discovery and continue the litigation until somebody says, wait a
minute, we have had enough, here is 10 cents on the dollar. We are out
of here. That has been the practice.
If you want to discourage that, you need to make this important
change in the way these kinds of lawsuits are brought. Remember we are
talking about civil lawsuits. This bill does nothing, nothing to change
the authority nor the responsibility of the SEC to
[[Page H2776]] prosecute claims of fraud under its enforcement
authority already guaranteed in law and preserved in this statute.
What this amendment does, and it is supported by the SEC, is to say
that plaintiff lawyers who do not like these reforms, who want to
continue bringing these massive lawsuits to shake people down, will not
be able to use the civil processes of RICO to do that. They are going
to use this reform statute. Without this amendment, this reform is
meaningless. Lawyers can simply continue to do, as some have suggested
they will do, and that is use the treble damage approach of the RICO
statute to avoid the reforms of this legislation and, therefore,
continue to wreak havoc upon a legal system that is creating some awful
problems for us in the marketplace.
We have heard through witnesses before our committee in the last
Congress and this Congress what some of those awful problems are,
problems in which small companies, particularly growth companies, who
are doing their best with a new invention to get it going and to
produce it and sell it to the marketplace find that their stock may
jump up one day, jump down the next. And all of a sudden they are in a
massive lawsuit, they and everybody connected with them
Problems that we have found in companies across the board where they
have said, we would like to tell you more about our company, if you
want to invest in it, but we are afraid to tell you anything because
whatever we say somebody is going to say we misled you in a lawsuit
next week. And we are going to find ourselves involved in another
massive litigation with a lot of court costs and legal fees.
If we do not cure those problems soon, this legal mess created under
10(b)(5) will continue to erode the productivity of small growth
companies who are desperately trying to employ Americans and to produce
more products not only for our marketplace but for the marketplaces of
the world. It is that simple.
Lawyers who actually use this system today and who want to fight
these reforms would love to have somewhere else to go, some other
system, and using the civil RICO is the way they might go. This
amendment needs to be passed.
Mr. WHITE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I will not take 5 minutes because this is really a very
simple argument. If Members do not want to reform the securities laws,
then they do not want to vote for this amendment. But if they do want
to reform the securities laws, this amendment is absolutely essential.
Why? Because the RICO statute which this amendment would take away from
applying to securities laws has become the stealth bomber of civil
litigation in our society.
This is a statute that is so poorly drafted by this body that
plaintiffs' lawyers can apply it to everything but the kitchen sink.
And anybody who has practiced law knows that the way around an
established regime in the statutory framework is to file a civil RICO
suit because then none of the laws apply.
That is why a statute designed to apply to racketeering and organized
crime in 40 percent of the cases now applies to securities lawsuits.
This is a statute that is out of control. If we do not exempt this
litigation from this statute, we will never get this job done.
Mr. Chairman, we are trying to reform the securities laws. Reform is
desperately needed. I think almost all of us acknowledge that. But if
we do not eliminate RICO, we are not going to get this reform done.
RICO is a loophole large enough for any plaintiff's lawyer to drive
the largest Mercedes Benz through. We have to exempt it from this
statute. I urge every single one of my colleagues who believe in
securities law reform to vote for this amendment.
Mr. BRYANT of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to start by saying, I really think that
the offering of this amendment today is a low point in the operation of
this House this year. This is an amendment that has a sweeping impact,
yet we never had any hearings on this matter. Why? Because the
committee with jurisdiction over this bill, which the gentleman from
Texas, [Mr. Fields] presides over, at least the subcommittee, does not
even have jurisdiction over RICO.
The result of that is that we are going to hear in this debate today,
we have already heard, we are going to continue to hear a whole series
of misstatements and a lot of remarks that are going to be read that
somebody else wrote. Why? Because nobody in the debate on either side
knows very much about RICO.
I used to be the cosponsor in previous Congresses of a bill, along
with a number of my colleagues on this side of aisle and that side of
the aisle, to reform the RICO statute. There are problems with it. But
I dare say, nobody who has spoken so far on that side of aisle or on
this side of the aisle knows what they are. The fact of the matter is,
we never saw
this amendment until late last night. We never had any hearings on it.
I just have to say that bringing a sweeping proposal like that to the
House that has such an enormous impact without anybody really knowing
what it is is, in my view, not the way to legislate. I urge Members to
look at it in that light.

We have heard a number of interesting statements. The last speaker a
moment ago, the gentleman from California [Mr. Cox], has gotten up and
said, we have got to get rid of RICO. It is a loophole in the law. You
probably believe that it is loophole in the law. Somebody our staff
told you that. Maybe a lobbyist told you that.
But I read to the gentleman from California [Mr. Cox] just a moment
ago and I will read for the benefit of this gentleman as well, 18
United States Code which says, ``Any offense involving fraud in the
sale of securities is one of the predicate acts of racketeering.'' It
has been there in there from the very beginning. It is not a loophole.
It has always been in there. Surely the gentleman would not wish to
mislead the House. I am not sure he did not intend to. We have all made
mistakes.
The fact is, when you do not have any hearings on a proposal, when it
has not been seen by anybody until the night before the bill comes up,
there are going to be mistakes made. And that is one of them.
We heard the gentleman from California [Mr. Cox] and others stand up
and praise the SEC and say the SEC wants this. We do not know if the
SEC wants it or not. There was language that was sort of a side bar
language in their testimony with regard to the underlying bill that
made some statements with regard to the need to reform RICO. I agree
that there is a need to reform RICO. But the fact is, the SEC did not
testify on RICO. Why? There have not been any hearings on RICO before
the House of Representatives or any of its committees this year. So we
do not know what their clear view is of RICO.
Also they invoked the SEC. They say we should look at these casual
remarks that they have made and apply them to our own judgment of RICO.
What about the SEC's opinion of the loser-pays bill that you brought up
here? They think it is a bad idea. What about their opinion of your
standard of recklessness? They think it is a bad idea. What about the
SEC's opinion of your definition of fraud on the market? They think it
is a bad idea. And what about the SEC's opinion of the pleading
requirements which you have put in the bill? They think those are a bad
idea as well.
{time} 1815

I note that the gentleman repeatedly gets up and says, ``It is a
shame that plaintiff just does not recover enough in these cases.''
This is a RICO statute that provides treble damages. That is the one
you want to repeal with this amendment. You might not have even
realized that, inasmuch as there were no hearings, and very few people
in this debate today are going to know very much about what the RICO
statute even says.
Finally, I think it is perhaps maybe a symbol of this whole debate,
but after the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Dingell, made a stirring
speech condemning this whole effort, the gentleman from California, Mr.
Cox, gets up and referred to Mr. Dingell's clipping, and reads to him
from the last line of the
[[Page H2777]] clipping, making it appear that somehow the Wall Street
Journal has said the opposite of what Mr. Dingell says.
Then Mr. Dingell gets up and realizes who Mr. Cox is quoting; he is
quoting himself. Why? Because he did not have any hearings, and he does
not have anybody else to quote. This amendment is not based upon any
hearings, it is not based upon any jurisprudential, it is not based
upon any data, any economic study, it is based upon an idea those guys
had late last night.
I urge Members to vote this amendment down and restore some dignity
to the proceedings of this House.
Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I happen to have heard my colleague, the gentleman from
Michigan, mention in not too glowing terms the concept of rascals and
rogues who had capitalized off of certain situations in our society. My
question is as to who are the rascals and who are the rogues.
Frankly, when we have 40 percent of the cases under the RICO being
identified as being not as the original intention to the depth of what
the original intention was supposed to come out, Mr. Chairman, there
are rascals and rogues who would manipulate the law for their own
personal gains. This amendment would try to rectify that problem.
I do not think anybody who voted for the original intention expected
it to be a free ride for those in the legal profession, to be able to
dig deep into other people's pockets, or to be able to have procedures
that they could not use in any other civil cases.
However, to take advantage of a law that was meant to stop
racketeering, to take advantage of legislation that was meant to
protect the people of this country from organized crime, truly is
immoral. Frankly, I think that this abuse that has been recognized by
the Supreme Court is probably a good example of why the bar
associations of this country probably are not doing their job, and
because of that, we need to do our job here to straighten out abuses
that have become obvious, obvious to the point to where we have to
correct the well-intentioned RICO regulations.
Mr. Chairman, I think that we do have rascals and rogues out there, a
segment of our society that refuses to live by the rulings and the good
intentions that the rest of us take for granted. There are those that
take a look at legislation and say what a great opportunity not to have
to play by the rules.
I think this amendment, Mr. Chairman, will help to straighten it out
and say we will live by the rules, and I think that the amendment will
say that the rules will be set the same for these cases.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BILBRAY. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, about the gentleman's concern, does he know that
alleged Mafia links in securities cases would not be prosecutable under
RICO? Is that part of his intention in repealing RICO, as applies to
securities?
Mr. BILBRAY. Of course not, Mr. Chairman. There are 40 percent of the
cases being used under this. Is the gentleman saying that 40 percent of
the cases under RICO are all racketeering?
Mr. CONYERS. No, I have no idea.
Mr. BILBRAY. Here is the point: RICO is meant to go after
racketeering. It is being misused by attorneys, because it means they
do not have to play by the other rules.
Mr. CONYERS. If I could remind the gentleman, we have already read
the statute on the floor. It includes as a predicate offense securities
violations. It is in plain English, and it was there from the first day
that RICO was enacted into law, having passed this Congress.
However, my point is, would the gentleman preclude Mafia activities
with securities from being a prosecutable offense under RICO? Because
when we take RICO away, we are taking away the opportunity to prosecute
Mafia involvement with securities.
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BILBRAY. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I apologize to the gentleman on
the other side of the aisle that I do not have the statute book with
me, but as the gentleman knows, the civil part of RICO is just one or
two sentences, and that is that one or two sentences that has made a
number of civil actions to be brought under RICO. That is not what our
intent is.
Mr. BILBRAY. It does not constitute 40 percent of the legislation.
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. If someone is breaking the law, as the gentleman
alleges, as a Mafia mobster, that person would still be penalized under
the criminal sections of RICO.
Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, what we are talking about, those one or
two sentences, are being manipulated for 40 percent of the actions. I
do not think the legislation, and the gentleman was here, probably, I
was not, I cannot believe the gentleman meant for 40 percent of this
law to be used in this manner. I cannot believe that was his intention.
Mr. CONYERS. If the gentleman will yield, we did not mean any
percentages, Mr. Chairman. Nobody had any percentages in mind. The fact
of the matter is if the law can apply in a case being prosecuted
civilly, it ought to apply.
Treble damages under RICO is an incredibly important tool, without
which we are going to be at a loss for a lot of violations, including
Mafia violations that are being reported in the Wall Street Journal.
Mr. BILBRAY. I think that what the gentleman is saying, see, the
gentleman is trying to use that. This law was meant to go after the
Mafia. The fact is it is being abused.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment. This is
Congress operating at its worst. The amendment that we have here on the
floor was never considered before our committee. There were no hearings
that were called on this issue. In fact, the statute that we are
amending right now is a separate statute altogether, the RICO statute.
It has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of this committee.
In fact, Mr. Chairman, this subject was never referred to our
committee for consideration. Moreover, the Committee on the Judiciary,
which does have jurisdiction over this issue, did not consider it, and
had no witnesses on this subject as part of the process of bringing
this bill out onto the floor.
Mr. Chairman, we can all have a debate about whether or not
racketeering should be considered to cover this, that, or another
category, or potential defendants in suits, but let us not kid
ourselves. When our subcommittee held hearings on penny stock fraud in
1989 and 1990, we had to have our witnesses testify with bags over
their heads because of the fear of retaliation by organized crime in
the penny stock market of this country.
Mr. Chairman, for any of the Members who think that as we talk about
racketeering, that somehow or other it is exclusive of the securities
marketplace, believe me, the penny stock market was rife with organized
crime, so much so that there were life-threatening circumstances that
many of our witnesses felt they were going to encounter.
Mr. Chairman, that is even apart from the central question, though,
that we have to answer tonight: Is it proper for this Congress to take
up an issue of such a magnitude with no hearings, in fact, with markups
before our committee, that is, a process by which we could make
amendments to the legislation, that resulted in both subcommittee and
full committee markups being truncated down to a point where there was
no more than 2 or 3 hours on each occasion, even to consider amendments
to the subject which was before us, much less this, which was not
before us?
To then come out here with a historic amendment to a separate piece
of legislation with the Committee on Rules having a special hearing
last night to put in order a nongermane amendment to a piece of
legislation that has nothing to do with the business, and then asking
our Members to rush out here at 6:30 and cast a vote on that, it is
unfair. It is wrong. Congress
[[Page H2778]] should not operate this way. It is completely
unnecessary.
The Committee on the Judiciary, chaired by the gentleman from
Illinois, is fully capable of having a hearing on RICO that considers
all aspects of it, that has witnesses coming in from the Justice
Department, from the States, from the private bar, and from all others
to give testimony.
Congress tonight is being asked to cast a historic vote on a subject
with no information before us except the opinions of a few Members who
have been able to get a nongermane amendment put in order. It is
Congress at its worst.
I recommend to all Members to vote ``no'' on such an important
subject, and send that signal that this subject should be sent back to
the Committee on the Judiciary so that they have hearings on the issue,
and send us out a bill that deals with that relevant subject in a way
that dignifies this most important of all legislative bodies in the
country.
Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MARKEY. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. DINGELL. I would like to address, if the gentleman would permit,
the substance of the amendment, Mr. Chairman. The amendment says
``Except no person may bring an action under this provision if the
racketeering activity as defined in section 1961,'' and so forth,
``involves conduct actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of
securities'' before the period.
What this means is if fraud involving securities is involved in the
question that is involved in the lawsuit----
Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman
may proceed for 4 additional minutes.
Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I object.
The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.
Mr. DINGELL. What this says, Mr. Chairman, because the language of
the amendment reads as it does, is that if you are charged in a civil
suit with violation of wire laws, of narcotics, or any of the other
things which are prohibited under RICO, you had better make darned sure
that you have been involved in some way with securities, because then
you get a wash.
This amendment guts RICO. It guts civil suits under RICO. It should
be rejected.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr.
Markey] has expired.
(At the request of Mr. Fields of Texas and by unanimous consent, Mr.
Markey was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr.
Dingell].
Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, just so that we understand, because of the
redundant way in which the amendment is drawn, it says that if the suit
by a citizen involves securities, you cannot sue under RICO, so you
would not be able to sue under RICO for any of the other things which
are prohibited under RICO: for example, murder; for example, violation
of narcotics laws; for example, participating in a criminal enterprise
of any kind, or for any kind of interstate fraud, gambling, narcotics,
or whatever it might happen to be.
Mr. Chairman, if we are going to deal with the question of RICO
reform, then good sense says that we should deal with it well. We ought
not offer, simply because the individual can rush into court and say
``But you cannot sue me under RICO for gambling or narcotics because I
was involved in securities, and the language of the Cox amendment says
that I can't be sued if securities were involved.''
I do not blame the gentleman from California for objecting, because I
would not want anybody to say these things about me on the floor, but
the hard fact is the legislation is poorly drawn, it is hurried to the
floor without proper hearings, without any
intelligent consideration, and it has results far different, far
broader, far worse from the standpoint of RICO, law enforcement, and
getting at criminals generally. That is what is involved here.

The amendment ought to be rejected, if for no other reason than it is
sloppy work. It is an embarrassment to the House. It may not embarrass
the author of the amendment, but it assuredly embarrasses me, because I
believe that this body should legislate well and efficiently. It should
legislate wisely, so we do not surprise ourselves with the stupid
consequences of irresponsible, unwise, and careless work. I urge that
the amendment be rejected.

{time} 1830

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words, and I yield to my colleague the gentleman from
California [Mr. Cox].
Mr. COX of California. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I am disappointed with the intemperate remarks of the gentleman from
Michigan who certainly knows that we have had ample testimony on the
subject of RICO in many, many committees in this Congress over years
and years and years which I recounted when the gentleman apparently was
not on the floor commencing in 1985, dating all the way up to this year
when just a few weeks ago, the current Commissioner of the Securities
and Exchange Commission came before our Committee on Commerce and
supported this amendment. He also has sent a letter to the current
chairman of the Committee on Commerce supporting this amendment.
I mentioned that Abner Mikva has testified before Congress in support
of this amendment, in support of RICO reform. I mentioned that the
Supreme Court of the United States when it examined this issue 10 years
ago found that it is up to Congress to fix this problem and both the
majority and the minority in that Supreme Court decision said that RICO
is being stretched beyond what Congress originally intended in the
securities area.
I even quoted from Justice Thurgood Marshall. Thurgood Marshall was
in the dissent, in the minority in that case, and it was Thurgood
Marshall and Justice Powell who would have voted to limit RICO in the
Supreme Court, but we are doing it here in Congress because majority
said it is really Congress' mistake, Congress should fix it. The SEC's
general counsel has testified in favor of this and we quoted from his
testimony. I have submitted for the Record comments from judges across
America who have said that this is an abuse. Almost all of the examples
that we just recently heard were examples where criminal RICO, which is
the whole bulk of the statute, civil RICO is only a few sentences,
where criminal RICO should be used.
It is certainly important that criminals be prosecuted and that is
exactly what will happen before and after this amendment. But what we
do not want to see is for our carefully crafted Federal securities laws
to be shunted aside and instead for people to be able to use a statute
never intended to apply in these civil cases in this way so that they
can get treble damages, something not provided for in our securities
laws, so that they can get discovery going all the way back 10 years to
show a pattern which is part of RICO, not part of the securities laws,
and in short so they can gin up settlements where a settlement is not
in order.
This is exactly the kind of securities litigation fraud that we are
here to punish and we certainly should not do anything that would
permit it to continue.
I urge my colleagues very strongly to support his amendment. If there
are no further comments, I would ask for a vote.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California [Mr. Cox].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.

recorded vote

Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 292,
noes 124, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 17, as follows:
[Roll No. 209]

AYES--292

Ackerman
Allard
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Bonilla
Bono
Boucher
Brewster
Browder
[[Page H2779]] Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cardin
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chapman
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clement
Clinger
Clyburn
Coble
Coburn
Collins (GA)
Combest
Cooley
Costello
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Danner
Davis
de la Garza
Deal
DeLauro
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Durbin
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Eshoo
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Farr
Fawell
Fazio
Fields (TX)
Flanagan
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Frank (MA)
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Gunderson
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hancock
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kelly
Kennelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Latham
LaTourette
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Longley
Lucas
Maloney
Manzullo
Martini
Mascara
McCollum
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Metcalf
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Minge
Moakley
Molinari
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moorhead
Moran
Morella
Myers
Myrick
Neal
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Nussle
Orton
Oxley
Packard
Parker
Paxon
Payne (VA)
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Riggs
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Sawyer
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Schumer
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Stockman
Stump
Talent
Tanner
Tate
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas
Thornberry
Thornton
Thurman
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Torricelli
Traficant
Upton
Vento
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Ward
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer

NOES--124

Abercrombie
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Bevill
Bonior
Borski
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant (TX)
Clay
Clayton
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Conyers
Coyne
Cramer
DeFazio
Dellums
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Engel
Fattah
Fields (LA)
Filner
Foglietta
Ford
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Jackson-Lee
Jacobs
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E.B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kleczka
Klink
LaFalce
Lantos
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lincoln
Luther
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
McCarthy
McDermott
McHale
McNulty
Meehan
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Mink
Nadler
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Pelosi
Pomeroy
Rahall
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Rivers
Roemer
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Schroeder
Scott
Serrano
Skaggs
Slaughter
Stark
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Taylor (MS)
Thompson
Torres
Towns
Tucker
Velazquez
Visclosky
Volkmer
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Williams
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn

ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--1

Lowey

NOT VOTING--17

Boehner
Condit
Flake
Gibbons
Greenwood
Hansen
Jefferson
Largent
McDade
McKinney
Meek
Murtha
Norwood
Rangel
Rose
Roth
Yates
{time} 1851

The Clerk announced the following pairs:
On this vote:

Mr. Largent for, with Mr. Flake against.
Mr. Roth for, with Mr. Jefferson against.

Messrs. JOHNSON of South Dakota, GENE GREEN of Texas, and LEVIN
changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Ms. LOFGREN and Messrs. PETERSON of Florida, THORNTON, and MOAKLEY
changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
personal explanation
Mr. LARGENT. Mr. Speaker, had I been present for the following votes
on Tuesday, March 7, 1995, I would have voted as follows:
On House Resolution 105, agreeing to the resolution--``yea.''
On the Cox amendment to H.R. 1058, to prohibit claimants from
bringing securities lawsuits under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations [RICO] Act--``yea.''
amendment offered by mr. fields of texas

Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I offer a technical amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Fields of Texas: Page 9, line 5,
strike ``verifies'' and insert ``certifies''.
Page 11, line 21, and page 13, line 20, strike ``any
settlement'' and insert ``any proposed or final settlement''.
Page 12, line 9, insert ``per share'' after ``potential
damages''.
Page 14, beginning on line 18, strike ``The order shall
bar'' and all that follows through line 23, and insert the
following:
The order shall bar all future claims for contribution
arising out of the action--
``(A) by any person against the settling defendant; and
``(B) by the settling defendant against any person older
than a person whose liability has been extinguished by the
settling defendant's settlement.
Page 16, line 20, insert ``section 10(b) of'' after
``under''.
Page 17, line 6, insert ``to state'' after ``or omits''.
Page 17, line 25, strike ``or sellers'' and insert ``,
sellers, or security holders''.
Page 18, line 2, strike ``consciously''.
Page 19, line 25, insert ``knowledge and'' after
``paragraph (1),''.

Mr. FIELDS of Texas (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask
unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed
in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Texas?
There was no objection.
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, this amendment contains only
technical and conforming changes that have been agreed to by the
majority and minority.
The amendments clarify that disclosure is required for both proposed
and final settlements, and that such disclosures includes a statement
of potential damages per share. They also prevent settlement discharge
bar orders from prohibiting a defendant from using an indemnification
agreement or suing a subordinate. The amendments clarify that the new
section 10A applies only to actions under old section 10(b) and make
certain other technical and conforming changes.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FIELDS of Texas. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from
Massachusetts.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Indeed this amendment does include several technical changes which
have been agreed upon between the majority and the minority, and we
would recommend them to the full committee.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Fields].
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I am about to make a motion that the committee do rise,
but before doing so I would like to announce that when the Committee
returns to this measure tomorrow, the first order of business will be
the amendment of the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Eshoo].
Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mrs.
Vucanovich) having assumed the chair, Mr. Combest, Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1058) to
reform Federal
[[Page H2780]] securities litigation, and for other purposes, had come
to no resolution thereon.

____________________