[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 42 (Tuesday, March 7, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H2727-H2728]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                     PROPOSED BASE CLOSURES IN GUAM

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 4, 1995, the gentleman from Guam [Mr. Underwood] is recognized 
during morning business for 3 minutes.
  Mr. UNDERWOOD. Madam Speaker, under the Secretary of Defense's 
recently released list of base closures to be considered by BRAC, Guam 
is the hardest hit American community on the list. Four of Guam's 
facilities, all from the Department of the Navy, were slated for 
closure or realignment by the Department of Defense, affecting some 
2,700 civilian and 2,100 military positions. In terms of total 
personnel affected, Guam is targeted for more reductions than such 
large States as California, Virginia and New York.
  The proposed reductions could be devastating to Guam's economy. The 
reductions represent between 5 and 10 percent of the entire work force 
on Guam, and as much as a quarter of Guam's economy could be adversely 
affected. Let me repeat: up to 10 percent of the entire work force will 
be thrown out of work. And these are the DOD's own figures, not my 
estimates. To put it in perspective, if this magnitude of cut were 
undertaken in California, almost 1.5 million jobs would be affected.
  But these types of reductions did not occur in California. In fact, 
according to testimony by the Secretary of the Navy Dalton yesterday, 
four bases in California were spared because of the potential economic 
impact. Does anyone doubt whether they even considered the economic let 
alone the human impact of their cuts on Guam.
  To compound the job loss, the Navy is trying to have it both ways. 
They're closing down facilities, saying they don't need them, and at 
the same time holding on to all the assets in case they need them in 
the future. Under the proposal to close the ship repair facility, or 
SRF, the Navy would not transfer the piers, floating drydocks, its 
typhoon basin anchorage, floating 
 [[Page H2728]] cranes and other equipment to the local community. 
Similarly, they would retain all the pier space with the closure of a 
number of naval activities at the naval station.
  Their decision would be like moving all the troops out of Fort Ord, 
but holding onto the base. They cannot and should not have it both 
ways. Either they retain the facilities or turn them over to the local 
community so that Guam can recover the job losses. This schizophrenia 
will leave our community in a straitjacket without the tools for our 
own economic survival. If the Navy closes down these facilities and 
retains the assets we will be left with no access to the waterfront and 
a few empty buildings. This does not bode well for forming a successful 
reuse plan when we cannot even be given the opportunity to use our own 
resources.
  According to recent statements by the Secretary of Defense William 
Perry and other officials in the Pentagon, the decision to pull back 
from Guam was opposed by some high ranking uniformed officers, 
including the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command, Adm. Richard Macke. 
Apparently, Admiral Macke indicated that without Guam, the Navy will be 
forced to count on foreign facilities in Japan to meet their needs and 
would lose the most forward deployed U.S. military base on American 
soil in the Pacific. The CINC understands the big picture and the need 
for Guam as a strategic base. However, the computer model used by the 
Pentagon did not consider these implications.
  Computer models, bean counters, and technocrats did not consider such 
factors as reliability, loyalty and the long-term effect of these 
closures on our position in the Pacific. Apparently suits in the 
Pentagon overruled some of our uniformed military personnel who 
understand the need to maintain an SRF in Guam.
  A more logical approach than the one taken in the Secretary's 
recommendation would be a joint use agreement with the local 
government. Under such an arrangement, the Government of Guam could act 
as a corporate operator of the major facility, SRF. The Navy would then 
pay the government of Guam to operate the facility and retain access to 
it in times of crisis. In this way, the equipment and quality of work 
force is maintained and used for commercial use but the Navy does not 
have to pay for the entire cost anymore. It makes good economic sense 
by saving the Navy money and giving the local community the economic 
tools to survive.
  If this approach is rejected and BRAC decides that Guam is not needed 
as a forward deployed base then the Navy must turn over the assets and 
land upon completion of the closure. Otherwise, there is no way that 
the people of Guam could possibly recover the 25 percent loss to their 
economy and 5 to 10 percent reduction in the work force. The least the 
Navy can do if they are going to close these facilities is to give the 
local community the tools to recover from the loss.
  Since the Navy has taken the easy way out by making a wishywashy 
decision, it is now up to BRAC to decide.
  Madam Speaker, I urge BRAC to make the right decision.
  

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