[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 39 (Thursday, March 2, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3431-S3432]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                         ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

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              F-22 ELECTRONIC COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS TESTING

 Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, what is it about F-22 electronic 
combat effectiveness testing that terrifies Air Force?
  The fiscal year 1995 Senate Defense Appropriations Report 103-321 
included the following language:

       The Committee is concerned that the F-22 test and 
     evaluation master plan [TEMP] may not include sufficient 
     electronic combat effectiveness testing before the onset of 
     production. The Committee believes that it is important for 
     the F-22 to demonstrate its capabilities in an offensive air 
     superiority mission against a full array of likely threats. 
     Those threats should include a modern integration air defense 
     system, at a minimum on a simulated basis to the extent 
     practicable, affordable, and cost effective.
       Therefore, the Committee directs that no more than 65 
     percent of the funds provided for the F-22 program for fiscal 
     year 1995 may be obligated until the Assistant Secretary of 
     the Air Force (acquisition) submits to the congressional 
     defense committees a report outlining the cost and schedule 
     impacts on the F-22 program, and the technical and 
     operational advantages and disadvantages, of revising the 
     TEMP to include significantly more thorough electronic combat 
     effectiveness testing before initiation of: (1) pre-
     production vehicle procurement; (2) commitment to low-rate 
     initial operational test and evaluation.
       This report shall include, as a baseline, thorough 
     electronic combat testing at the real-time electromagnetic 
     digitally controlled analyzer and processor [REDCAP] and the 
     Air Force electronic warfare evaluation simulator [AFEWES], 
     and an installed system test facility with a capable wide-
     spectrum radio frequency generator that is interfaced for 
     real-time control from remote facilities and a high 
     capability dome, visual system cockpit simulator.
       The report also shall identify the funding required between 
     fiscal years 1996-99 to allow the electronic combat test 
     facilities cited in the preceding paragraph to thoroughly 
     undertake effectiveness testing on integrated avionics 
     suites.

  This report requirement was retained in Conference, though, as a 
courtesy of the House colleagues, the fence was dropped.
  Well, March 1, 1995 has come and gone, but no report; however, there 
has been an interesting development. On February 28, 1995, the Air 
Force base closure and realignment recommendations were made public. 
The Air Force operates 10 major test and evaluation [T&E] facilities 
with a combined budget in fiscal year 1995 of $1.722 billion. Not one 
was recommended for closure; but two very small T&E facilities with a 
combined fiscal year 1995 budget of less than $20 million were 
recommended for closure: the Real-time Electromagnetic Digitally-
Controlled Analyzer and Processor [REDCAP] and the Air Force Electronic 
Warfare Evaluation Simulator [AFEWES], the very facilities where 
Congress directed the Air Force to consider conducting F-22 electronic 
combat effectiveness testing. What is the Air Force afraid of?
  The one facility mentioned in the Senate report that was not closed, 
the installation system test facility, belongs to the Navy. Apparently, 
the Air Force could not get at it.
  The most perplexing thing about the aversion of the Air Force to 
proper testing of the F-22 is that the B-2 program is about to 
undertake tests at the REDCAP very similar to those being avoided by 
the F-22. The B-2 test program has been thorough to the point of 
exhaustive. Is the B-2 successful because it was thoroughly tested, or 
was it successful so it is being thoroughly tested? Either way, what 
lesson can we draw about the F-22?
  When our needs are so many, and money so short, Congress can ill-
afford to buy a pig in a poke. Congress gave the Air Force the 
opportunity to prove its claims regarding the F-22. The Air Force 
responded by trying to eliminate the facilities that could have 
rendered a judgment on the effectiveness of the F-22, Obviously, the 
Air Force has something to hide. If they will not test it, we will not 
buy it. Come budget 
[[Page S3432]] time, I will lead the fight to strike F-22 
funds.


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