[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 39 (Thursday, March 2, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3320-S3325]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
PEACE AND FREEDOM
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, yesterday the majority leader gave a very
important speech at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom and outlined
what he called the five global realities that affect our vital interest
and dictate what it will take to maintain leadership throughout the
world.
First, the golden age of capitalism. From India and Latin America to
China and Russia, 4 billion people formerly under some form of
socialism are striving to establish market economies. This offers great
opportunities for America and American business, but requires American
leadership to protect our interests and ensure adherence to the rules
of the international trading system.
Second, the new world energy order. Senator Dole correctly noted that
the security of the world's oil and gas supplies will remain a vital
national interest. At the same time, Iran and Iraq remain hostile
threats in the oil-rich gulf, while other energy rich areas in Eurasia
are subject to disorder. He makes the insightful observation that ``in
this new energy order, many of the most important geopolitical
decisions--ones on which a nation's sovereignty can depend--will deal
with the location and routes for oil and gas pipelines.'' I would add
that we are already seeing in the case of Azerbaijan, over which Moscow
is trying to regain effective control in order to determine the route
through which Azeri oil will flow. Senator Dole concluded that ``our
strategy, our diplomacy and our forward military presence need
readjusting'' to meet this reality.
Third, the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The majority leader
issued a clarion call yesterday that ``we must prepare now for the
future,'' in which weapons of mass destruction will become more
widespread, greatly affecting our vital security interests. He wisely
asked ``what would we have done--or not done--if Iraq had one or two
nuclear weapons in 1990? A chilling question and one which we could
face in just a few years as a real, not a hypothetical question, with
regard to Iran or North Korea. In response to this threat, Senator Dole
quite rightly focused on the possibility of preventive military action
and the need for missile defenses to protect America and our allies.
Fourth, increase in extremist religious and ethnic movements. The
majority leader highlighted the many areas in which religious or ethnic
passions have led to conflicts and identified those that pose a threat
to American interests. America cannot become complacent he wisely
warned his audience.
Fifth, rivalry with Russia. In perhaps in most important
observations, Senator Dole warned that ``geopolitical rivalry with
Russia did not end with the demise of Soviet communism.'' Quoting Henry
Kissinger, he noted that the Soviet threat was one of both communism
and imperialism, and while communism was defeated the trend toward
imperialism remains. While an early supporter of President Yeltsin,
Senator Dole warned against ``the Clinton administration's misguided
devotion to a ``Russia First'' policy, which has turned into a
``Yeltsin First'' policy, and he quoted President Nixon who told the
Duma ``when we have differences, we should not assume they will be
overcome by a good personal relationship even at the highest level.''
To buttress his case, the majority leader listed numerous examples of
how Moscow has taken actions in recent months that are in conflict with
U.S. interests.
To address this situation, Senator Dole prescribed a ``new realism''
about Russia. This would not mean a return to the cold war past, he
noted, but would require ``developing a more honest relationship, one
that does not paper over important policy differences with an appeal to
personal ties.''
In conclusion, Senator Dole reaffirmed the need for American
leadership to secure peace and freedom for future generations of
Americans.
In an article just published in the current issue of Foreign Affairs,
Senator Dole builds on these themes and defines his vision for the
future American role in the world and 10 principles to guide our
international relations. He also provides an incisive critique of the
Clinton administration's foreign policy and how and why it has, in
Senator Dole's view, failed in various respects.
I will merely quote the final paragraph of his article:
As the United States approaches the next century, two
principles should remain constant: protecting American
interests and providing American leadership. The end of the
Cold War has provided us with a historic opportunity. Such an
opportunity should not be forfeited in favor of the pursuit
of utopian multilateralism or abandoned through intentional
isolationism. We have seen the danger to America's interests,
prestige, and influence posed by both of these approaches.
Instead, we must look to the lessons of the Cold War to guide
our future foreign policy: Put American interests first and
lead the way. The future will not wait for America, but it
can be shaped by an America second to none.
Mr. President, I think that in yesterday's speech and this new
article with the majority leader has provided us with a clear vision
and practical proposals for guiding American foreign policy. I would
urge my colleagues to give the most careful attention to both these
documents, and I would ask unanimous consent to insert them in the
Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. COHEN. In his speech yesterday, President Clinton also reaffirmed
that he gives very high priority to ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
Mr. President, there have been many supporters on this side of the
aisle for efforts to control and ban chemical weapons--Senator Dole,
Senator Kassebaum, Senator Hatfield, Senator McCain and others come to
mind, and I have been pleased to work with them on different measures
to achieve that goal.
During the 1980's, I supported replacement of our aging chemical
stocks with binary weapons, a necessary step to get Moscow to negotiate
seriously.
Exhibit 1
Foreign Policy--Winning the Peace: American Leadership and Commitment
(By Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole)
I can't help but think back to the day in January of 1994,
when President Nixon made his last visit to the United States
Capitol.
The occasion was the 25th anniversary of his inauguration
as President. And over 100 past and present Senators and
Congressmen--Republicans and Democrats alike--attended a
lunch honoring President Nixon that Bob Michel and I hosted.
At the conclusion of the lunch, President Nixon stood--and
without a note in his hand--delivered one of the most
compelling speeches many of us could remember.
As always, he talked politics, and he also shared some
personal reflections on his life and career. But the majority
of his remarks
[[Page S3321]] were devoted to his life's passion--foreign
policy.
President Nixon served as our guide, leading us on an
around-the-world tour, offering his unique perspective on the
strengths and weaknesses of our allies and adversaries, and
on the future as he saw it.
In his remarks, he repeated a statement that he made again
and again during the last year of his life. He said, ``The
Soviets have lost the Cold War, but the United States has not
yet won it.''
Those words were true then--and are just as true today. And
while the title of this conference--``After Victory''--has a
nice ring to it, I believe the declaration may be a bit
premature. It is, after all, possible to win the war and lose
the peace--as the years between World War I and World War II
demonstrate.
world still uncertain
Don't get me wrong. The stage is set. We are the world's
only superpower. And the words spoken by Nikita Khrushchev in
that famous ``kitchen debate'' were dead wrong. Not only will
America's children never live under communism--neither will
Russia's children. Still, there are far too many gains to
consolidate, and far too many uncertainties in the world to
say that a final peace has been won.
For example, there is a resurgent Russia, asserting its
position around the globe. China has international ambitions
of its own, and is in the midst of a leadership transition.
There are international terrorists--often state-supported.
There are global crime syndicates. There are extremist
movements based on religion or ethnic origin. While none of
these compare to the challenge of the Soviet empire, each of
these can pose threats to important American interests.
five global realities affect america's interests
It seems to me these multifaceted threats should be viewed
in the context of five clear global realities which affect
America's fundamental interests. Only by recognizing these
realities--and dealing with them with the same commitment
which led to the defeat of Soviet Communism--will America
truly be able to claim victory.
reality no. 1: the ``golden age of capitalism''
The first new reality is that the whole world is plunging
headlong into what David Hale of the Kemper Organization in
Chicago has termed a ``new golden age of capitalism.''
I remember when Lech Walesa told me that the definition of
a communist economy was ``100 workers standing around one
shovel.'' Now, in places like Poland, Russia, India, Latin
America, and
even China--four billion people formerly under some form of
socialism are now fighting with everything they can lay
hands on to not just grab a shovel--but to build shovel
factories.
There are now more than 30 stock markets in the developing
world, and capitalization of the four-year-old Shanghai
securities exchange has reached $30 billion. Deng Xiaoping
himself has said that no one cares any more what color the
cat is, as long as it catches mice. The bottom line is that
everyone wants to trade, and everyone wants to create and use
capital on a world-wide basis.
While this new ``golden age of capitalism'' offers great
opportunity for America, we must remember that many of the
countries so eager to enjoy the benefits of membership in the
world trading system may not fully understand or accept the
rules and discipline that go with it.
A trade war was averted with China, but other threats to
U.S. commercial interests will surely arise in the coming
months and years, and our continued vigilance and leadership
will be required.
reality no. 2: the ``new world energy order''
The second inescapable reality of the post-20th century
world is that the security of the world's oil and gas
supplies will remain a vital national interest of the United
States and of the other industrial powers.
The Persian Gulf--the heartland of world energy for half a
century--is still a region of many uncertainties. Saudi
Arabia has been weakened financially. Iran and Iraq continue
to exhibit great hostility to the West and pose threats to
their neighbors. And the boundaries of the oil and gas
heartland are being redrawn to the north, to include the
great hydrocarbon deposits of the Caucasus, Siberia, and
Kazakhstan.
In this ``new energy order,'' many of the most important
geopolitical decisions--ones on which a nation's sovereignty
can depend--will deal with the location and routes for oil
and gas pipelines. In response, our strategy, our diplomacy
and our forward military presence need readjusting.
reality no. 3: spread of weapons of mass destruction
The third inevitable reality for America--and for the
world--is the fact that while the Berlin Wall may have
crumbled, weapons of mass destruction haven't.
Listen to just a partial roll call of countries and groups
that already possess nuclear, biological or chemical weapons:
North Korea. Iraq. Iran. Libya.
Have any of these nations earned our trust? And given their
past behavior, is it any surprise that there are startling
signs that a world wide black market in nuclear weapons has
emerged?
All this is taking place as talks to review the global
treaty limiting the spread of nuclear weapons will soon
begin. Even if the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty is
extended indefinitely, however, we must avoid falling into a
false sense of security. We must prepare now for the future.
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea all illustrate the failures of
traditional non-proliferation efforts, which depend largely
on the cooperation of other states.
Only after Desert Storm did the West learn just how far
Iraqi nuclear ambitions had progressed. And instead of
announcing that the United States will veto any efforts to
ease or end U.N. sanctions on Iraq, the administration
dispatches an envoy to plead with the Europeans for
cooperation. Where would such timidity have gotten us in the
Cold War?
Iran also appears poised for a great leap forward in its
nuclear program--thanks to a cash-hungry Russia doing for
Iran what the Clinton Administration has done for North
Korea.
And make no mistake about it, the Agreed Framework with
North Korea has little prospect of successfully addressing
the North Korean threat, and apparently, has already been
violated by Pyongyang.
American leadership in addressing these non-proliferation
challenges is essential if additional states are not to
choose the nuclear option. It's worth asking: What would we
have done--or not done--if Iraq had one or two nuclear
weapons in 1990? Preventive military action as a non-
proliferation policy tool cannot be ruled out.
There are defensive options, however, that could provide
the United States and our allies with protection against
accidental and limited ballistic missile strikes. Pursuing an
effective
ballistic missile defense capability should be a top
priority for U.S. defense policy now and for the
foreseeable future.
reality no. 4: increase in extremist religious and ethnic movements
The fourth new global reality is the increase in violence
due to extremist religious and ethnic movements in many parts
of the globe.
Some of these movements, like the tribal warfare in Rwanda,
or conflicts in Burma or West Africa have little direct
impact on American interests.
However, some of the instability and turmoil due to ethnic
and religious violence is important for American interests--
and could lead to the disintegration of key states. Serbian
genocidal aggression in the Balkans, for example, threatens
to spill over to Macedonia, Albania, and beyond. American and
European inaction in the face of that aggression cannot help
but embolden other radical ``ethno-nationalists'' by giving
them a green light for ethnic cleansing.
The Indian rebellion in Mexico coupled with financial
uncertainty has resulted in genuine security concerns on our
southern border--and make no mistake that illegal immigration
is a security threat.
A key NATO ally in Turkey faces Islamic extremism and a
separatist ethnic movement. Violent Islamic fundamentalists
threaten the government in Algeria, and have launched an
assault on Egypt. How long would the Camp David Treaty be
honored if fundamentalists took power in Egypt?
Islamic terrorists seek to destroy the peace process
between Israel and the PLO--and may be having some success.
With support from Iran and others, Islamic terrorists also
demonstrated at the World Trade Center that America is not
immune from attack.
And ethnic turmoil in the former Soviet Union cannot be
ignored, as warfare has occurred in five former republics.
And the Chechens may be just one of many ethnic groups
willing to use violence to alter boundaries originally set by
Joseph Stalin.
In short, the list of world ``hot spots'' is far too
lengthy for anyone to conclude that America can become
complacent.
reality no. 5: rivalry with russia
And this leads to the fifth global reality we must face:
the fact that geopolitical rivalry with Russia did not end
with the demise of Soviet Communism.
On his last trip abroad, President Nixon spoke before the
Russian State Duma, and he foreshadowed a change in Russian-
American relations, saying: ``Russia is a great power, and
Russia as a great power must chart its own course in foreign
policy * * * When we have differences, we should not assume
they will be overcome by a good personal relationship even at
the highest level.''
And as we have seen time and time again, the foreign policy
course that Russia is charting, is one that is often in
conflict with American interests.
For example:
Russia stepped in the middle of the North Korea agreement
by offering to provide nuclear reactors--which would have the
clear effect of killing the U.S. brokered deal.
Russia continues to threaten prospective NATO members over
alliance expansion, thereby confirming the need to enlarge
NATO sooner rather than later.
In December 1994, Russia vetoed a sanctions resolution on
Serbia in the U.N. Security Council, its first substantive
veto since the height of the Cold War in 1985.
Russia persists in supplying weapons and nuclear technology
to the rogue regime in Iran.
Russia continues to maintain an intelligence facility and
support personnel in Cuba, thereby prolonging Castro's
oppression.
[[Page S3322]] Russian pressure, subversion and
intimidation of the sovereign states in the ``Near Abroad''
follows a historical pattern set long before the Bolsheviks
took power in 1917.
As Dr. Kissinger said last month before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, ``* * * what we dealt with in the Cold
War was both communism and imperialism, and while communism
was defeated, the trend toward imperialism still exists.''
Let me be clear in saying that no one has been more
supportive of President Yeltsin than I. In June 1991, I went
to Andrews Air Force Base to meet President Yeltsin virtually
alone,
since the United States State Department believed Gorvachev
was the ``only game in town.''
But just as it was wrong to place too much focus on
Gorbachev in 1991, it is wrong in 1995 to ignore that fact
that President Yeltsin has made serious errors, has moved
toward authoritarian rule, and has lost the political support
of virtually all reform-minded Russians.
The Clinton Administration's misguided devotion to a
``Russia First'' policy--which has turned into a ``Yeltsin
first'' policy--resulted in the loss of a tremendous
opportunity to state American concerns forcefully before
thousands were slaughtered in Chechnya.
new realism about russia
A ``new realism'' about Russia and its prospects for the
future does not mean a return to the Cold War past. It does
mean developing a more honest relationship, one that does not
paper over important policy differences with an appeal to
personal ties.
New realism means emphasizing the significance of Russia's
1996 elections, and of the pivotal importance of a peaceful,
democratic transition of power.
And new realism means that developments like arms sales to
Iran, violence in Chechnya, and U.N. vetoes on behalf of
aggressors should not be excused, ignored and minimized. Our
differences with Russia should be identified--they should be
negotiated when possible and condemned when necessary. Such
an approach would ultimately serve both the Russian and the
American people better than defending, denying and
rationalizing Russian misdeeds.
tests for american leadership
Let me conclude by sharing with you words that Richard
Nixon spoke at the announcement of the creation of the Center
for Peace and Freedom in January 1994.
``Some are tired of leadership. They say (America) carried
that burden long enough. But if we do not provide leadership,
who will? The Germans? The Japanese? The Russians? The
Chinese? Only the United States has the potential . . . to
lead in the era beyond peace. It is a great challenge for a
great people.''
Ladies and gentlemen, President Nixon was right. Leadership
does come with a price tag. But it is a price worth paying.
Dealing with the five realities I have outlined will test
America's resolve and her leadership. If we fail those
tests--if we refuse the mantle of leadership--any declaration
of victory will be a long time coming.
But I am an optimist. Like Richard Nixon, I believe in
America and In American leadership. I believe we will pass
our tests, and in doing so, we can claim the biggest victory
of all--we will have secured the future of our great
republic, and of peace and freedom, for generations to come.
____
Shaping America's Global Future
(By Bob Dole)
It is now a cliche that America is the world's only
superpower. But Americans would do well to reflect on how we
got to this point--and on how unprecedented our status is in
American history. America has always been blessed with
security, protected by two oceans, our two land borders safe
from invasion since the mid-nineteenth century. Never before,
however, has America been so alone at the pinnacle of global
leadership.
It was not always this way. America fought three major wars
in this century-World War I in Europe; World War II in
Europe, Africa, and Asia; and the Cold War across the globe.
In each of these conflicts, Americans were asked to give
their blood and treasure in support of U.S. interests and
ideals overseas. Three times this century, America rose to
the occasion.
It is sometimes said that Americans win the war and lose
the peace. Clearly that was true after World War I, when
Wilsonian idealist ambitions overran American interests, and
when protectionism, isolationism, and decline were the
result. Yet after the defeat in 1945 of Nazism in Europe and
Japanese militarism in Asia, we rose to the challenge of
winning the peace through American leadership. New
multilateral institutions were established: the United
Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.
They were important, but they were insufficient. What made
the difference was American will and power as reflected in
the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and the establishment
of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). These and other related actions
cemented the American commitment to Europe and signaled
America's determination to oppose Soviet expansionism.
It was American leadership and commitment--supported by our
allies throughout the world--that led to the overwhelming
victories in the Cold War: the crumbling of the Berlin Wall
in 1989 and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. For more
than four decades, the central purpose and chief objective of
American national security policy was the containment of
Soviet communism. Who can doubt that U.S. policy played a
central role in the disintegration of Soviet communism? The
great success of America and its democratic allies in the
Cold War is something to be proud of, and the costs of the
victory should not be forgotten. While historic event
occurred barely three years ago, myths contradicting the
facts of why and how the Cold War was won have already
surfaced.
Myth #1: Foreign policy was easier during the Cold War.
While a common enemy often did serve to unite the United
States and its allies during the Cold War, it is difficult to
argue that security policy was easier when the Soviet Union
was ready, willing, and able to oppose American interests. A
nuclear-armed superpower committed to undermining the West
created more difficult and demanding foreign policy
challenges than any faced since 1991. No current challenge,
for example, rivals the magnitude of the Cuban Missile Crisis
of 1962 or the Yom Kippur War of 1973--either of which could
have escalated to thermonuclear war.
Myth #2: The Cold War was supported by a great bipartisan
consensus. In large part because of the historic partnership
between President Harry Truman and Senator Arthur Vandenberg,
the late 1940s saw considerable bipartisan cooperation in
creating a new international security system. But ``politics
stopping at the water's edge'' lasted only for two decades--
until the Vietnam War. While there were partisan
disagreements in the 1950s, for example over ``who lost
China,'' it was the war in Southeast Asia that shattered the
bipartisan consensus on waging the Cold War. In the 1970s,
even Republicans were divided over the wisdom of pursuing the
Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente. Moreover, in the later
years of the Cold War, debates over the nuclear freeze, the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), opposing communist
aggression in Central America, or using force to defend U.S.
interests reflected very little bipartisanship. Despite the
broad bipartisan agreement at the beginning of the Cold War,
precious few ``Scoop Jackson Democrats'' were around by its
end.
Myth #3: The doves were right. Unlike the revisionist
history written by some in the Clinton administration, the
``doves'' were wrong all along in the Cold War. Why?
The doves advocated spending less on defense and doing less
with American armed forces. In the end, as former Soviet
leaders now reveal, American defense spending and activism in
Afghanistan, Poland, and elsewhere were critical to the
Soviet demise.
The doves argued for toning down anti-Soviet rhetoric no
matter how accurate it was (remember the shock at President
Ronald Reagan's proper characterization of the Soviet Union
as the ``Evil Empire''?). More significantly, they preferred
the resignation of U.S. policy to the permanent existence of
the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the doves' self-fulfilling
prophecy was not heeded.
The doves opposed SDI and supported the nuclear freeze and
other arms control measures, arguing that weapons, not
ideology and intentions, posed the threat to the United
States.
The doves opposed the Reagan Doctrine of supporting freedom
fighters opposing communist regimes around the world.
The breakup of the Soviet empire in 1991 came faster and
happened more completed than virtually anyone envisioned. If
the doves' policies had prevailed, however, that day would
have been delayed for years, if not decades--and may never
have come. The fall of the Soviet empire was not inevitable,
nor was it foreordained by impersonal forces of history;
rather, it was the leadership, actions, and sacrifices of the
West that brought victory in the Cold War.
Debunking the mythologies of the Cold War does not
automatically lead to prescriptions for a post-Cold War
foreign policy. Our Cold War victory allows the United States
to be more selective
in its involvement around the world, but it is not a license
for America to withdraw from the world. Exhaustion after a
great conflict is natural, but American withdrawal would
jeopardize the gains of the last 40 years, and it would
inevitably mean less prosperity and less security for the
American people.
Nevertheless, in the wake of the Soviet Union's defeat,
numerous observers have suggested America should withdraw
from the world. First, some claim America cannot be involved
in the world because we do not have the resources--the
``declinist'' school. We won the Cold War and remain the only
global power but, in the perverse logic of the declinists,
this adds up to weakness.
The declinists have multilateralist cousins who promote a
view that America must work with and within international
organizations because we do not have the resources to act on
our own. Other multilaterialists believe America does not
have the legal or moral authority to act without the sanction
of international organizations. The declinists--and their
multilateralist kin--ignore the strength of America and
underrate the power of American leadership. It is true that
America must be strong domestically to be strong abroad, but
America has the ability to do both if resources are used
wisely and decisions are made soundly.
This is not necessarily the view in the current
administration. The declinists and multilateralists are alive
and well in the Clinton administration. First came the
[[Page S3323]] ``Tarnoff Doctrine'' of May 1993, when the
State Department's undersecretary for political affairs,
Peter Tarnoff, argued for retrenchment because the United
States lacked the resources, inclination, and will to lead.
Then there was the ``Halperin Doctrine'' expressed in these
pages in the Summer of 1993, in which a current National
Security Council staff member, Morton Halperin, argued that
the United States should use force to defend its interests in
cases like Grenada and Panama only with prior multilateral
approval.
There are also protectionists who argue that America should
engage in trade with the world only on a one-way basis--
shutting our doors to foreign products in the vain hope that
foreign doors will remain open to American products. American
industries do not need protection, they need competition.
Where there is truly free trade, U.S. businesses have
prospered and the U.S. economy has grown.
Finally, some argue that America should not get involved in
the world. Historically, the isolationists have had adherents
on the Left who believe America will corrupt the world, and
on the Right who believe the world will corrupt America.
There are no serious and immediate threats to vital American
interests, the isolationists say. While that may be true now,
retreat from the world is the surest way to invite the
emergence of such threats in the future. The fact is that
America must remain firmly engaged in the world. If we do not
protect our interests, no one else--neither other countries
nor international organizations--will do the job for us. The
various approaches of the declinists, multilateralists,
protectionists, and isolationists all would make a dangerous
world even more so.
two failures of vision
We have witnessed two efforts to ``reinvent'' American
foreign policy since the end of the Cold War: President
George Bush's New World Order and the Assertive
Multilateralism, or Engagement and Enlargement, of President
Bill Clinton. Unfortunately, neither effort has been
successful.
The New World Order--whatever it was meant to be--rapidly
became a new world disorder; instead of strengthened
collective security, enhanced international organizations,
and a new partnership of nations, there was expansion of
violent ethnic and religious unrest, proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, international aggression, and civil war.
The flaw of the New World Order approach was its assumption
that the end of the Cold War meant the end of international
tension that could lead to hot war. President Bush and his
advisers may be excused for over-optimism in the wake of the
stunning multilateral coalition they built--under the United
Nations auspices--to defeat Saddam Hussein's aggression. In
retrospect, however, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm may
have been the high point of post-Cold War U.N. collective
security efforts. Just as United Nations action in Korea in
1950 was possible only because the Soviet Union was absent
for the crucial authorizing vote, United Nations action in
the Persian Gulf was possible only because the Soviet Union
was inclined to cooperate with the West in the final months
of 1990. Such cooperation is rapidly becoming a thing of the
past as Russia pursues its traditional objectives in the
``near abroad'' and around the globe. In this regard, the
first substantive United Nations Security Council veto
exercised by Russia since 1984 (during the height of the
Cold War) came in December 1994 on the issue of tougher
sanctions against Serbia and may be the beginning of a
trend.
Despite the conceptual flaws of the New World Order, to
hear the current administration complain about its foreign
policy inheritance is surprising and often merely an excuse
for poor performance. In my view, no administration has ever
received a stronger foreign policy inheritance. The legacy of
12 years of Reagan-Bush foreign policy included millions
liberated in Central and Eastern Europe, finally closing the
book on the post-World War II era after four decades; 15
independent states to replace the Soviet empire, and no near-
term threat from Russia; a defeated Iraq in the Persian Gulf,
and a newly invigorated peace process in the Middle East; the
dramatic expansion of democratic governments around the
world--best illustrated in the Western Hemisphere (where only
Cuba and Haiti were exceptions to the democratic tidal wave);
free trade agreements negotiated with Canada and Mexico (the
North American Free Trade Agreement), nearly negotiated with
the world (the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade), and outlined for the Western Hemisphere
(Enterprise for the Americas); and a growing Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum for U.S. relations with
Asia and the Pacific Basin. All added up to an America more
secure and stronger than at any time in our history, and the
only global power on earth.
In the two years since the end of the Bush administration,
much has changed. In the minds of many, U.S. foreign policy
has been marked by inconsistency, incoherence, lack of
purpose, and a reluctance to lead. American lives have been
risked, and lost, in places with little or no connection to
American interests. From Bosnia to China, from North Korea to
Poland, our allies and our adversaries doubt our resolve and
question our commitments.
firm principles
The failures of Assertive Multilateralism/Enlargement lie
not just in its execution or communication--they lie in its
very conception. The following 10 principles, which should
guide American foreign policy, have been ignored or
misapplied by the Clinton administration.
while much has changed, much remains the same
The successful end of the Cold War has not changed the core
interests of America:
Preventing the domination of Europe by a single power,
Maintaining a balance of power in East Asia,
Promoting security and stability in our hemisphere,
Preserving access to natural resources, especially in the
energy heartland of the Persian Gulf,
Strengthening international free trade and expanding U.S.
access to global markets, and
Protecting American citizens and property overseas.
These interests cannot be protected without American
involvement in the world. Many states and many movements
opposed to American interests are awaiting American
withdrawal.
In addition to our interests, America has core ideals that
we have supported throughout our history: freedom, democracy,
the rule of law, observance of human rights, and deterring
and responding to aggression. Too much has been made of the
tensions between American interests and American ideals. Some
went so far as to suggest that we should set aside our values
during the Cold War to follow a policy of moral relativism.
Nothing would have been more ill-conceived. The Cold War was
won precisely because of the convergence of our interests and
ideals. By preventing Soviet expansion into Europe, we
stopped the domination of the continent by a hostile power
and prevented the enslavement of millions more Europeans
under communist rule.
Our interests and ideals converge in support for free-
market economies and democratic pluralism as well. Capitalist
democracies tend to make better trading partners and stronger
allies, and also treat their own people and their neighbors
better than authoritarian, closed societies. To retain the
support of the American people and to protect the future of
our children, American foreign policy must continue to
combine the protection of American interests and the
promotion of American ideals. That is our tradition.
American Leadership Is Essential
The United States, as the only global power, must lead.
Europe--as individual states or as a collective--cannot.
China, Russia, India,
Brazil, and Japan are important regional powers, and some
may be potential regional threats. But only the United
States can lead on the full range of political,
diplomatic, economic, and military issues confronting the
world.
Leadership does not consist of posing questions for
international debate; leadership consists of proposing and
achieving solutions. The American attempt in May 1993 to
discuss lifting the Bosnian arms embargo with NATO allies,
for example, was simply wrong: It was a discussion, not a
U.S. initiative, and was readily perceived by the Europeans
as a half-hearted attempt lacking President Clinton's
commitment. By comparison, if President Bush had followed a
similar course after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990,
Saddam Hussein would still be in Kuwait today--if not in
Saudi Arabia--and he would very possibly be armed with
nuclear weapons.
Leadership is also saying what you mean, meaning what you
say, and sticking to it. That includes a willingness to use
American force when required. To state that North Korea
``cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb'' and then one
year later to sign an agreement that ignores the issue of the
existing arsenal is confusing to the American people and to
our allies. To threaten to withdraw most-favored-nation
trading status from China because of human rights violations
and then to extend such status months later--despite no
change in Chinese human rights practices--makes the world
wonder why the linkage was made in the first place. To
introduce a resolution in the U.N. Security Council to lift
the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina, while top
administration officials claim the war is over and the Serbs
have won, severs any link between the words of U.S.
policymakers and their deeds.
u.s. sovereignty must be defended, not delegated
International organizations--whether the United Nations,
the World Trade Organization, or any others--will not protect
American interests. Only America can do that. International
organizations will, at best, practice policymaking at the
lowest common denominator--finding a course that is the least
objectionable to the most members. Too often, they reflect a
consensus that opposes American interests or does not reflect
American principles and ideals. Even gaining support for an
American position can involve deals or tradeoffs that are not
in America's long-term interests. Acquiescence in Russian
activities in Georgia and other border states, for example,
may be too high a price for Russian acceptance of U.S.
positions.
The choices facing America are not, as some in the
administration would like to portray, doing something
multilaterally, doing it alone, or doing nothing. These are
[[Page S3324]] false choices. The real choice is whether to
allow international organizations to call the shots--as in
Somalia or Bosnia--or to make multilateral groupings work for
American interests--as in Operation Desert Storm.
Subcontracting American foreign policy and subordinating
American sovereignty encourage and strengthen isolationist
forces at home--and embolden our adversaries abroad.
international bureaucrats are no substitute for allies
The United States should not look to the United Nations
first, but to itself and its allies--preserving alliances
inherited from the Cold War and leading to create new ones
where necessary. Who could doubt that NATO has the power to
address the tragic aggression against Bosnia? Instead, a
misnamed ``United Nations Protection Force'' provides
convenient ``hostages'' to the aggressors, thereby protecting
them from NATO power. Substituting the judgment of
international civil servants for NATO military professionals
has severely damaged the credibility of the Atlantic
Alliance.
Allies will not simply do our bidding in one area and
ignore our policies in another. It was folly to pursue a
policy of economic sanctions against North Korea while
publicly criticizing China on human rights concerns and Japan
on trade issues. And after proposing sanctions and gaining
support from South Korea and Japan, allowing a freelance
mission by a former president to reverse the policy suggests
that America is not to be taken at its word. Alliances and
allies require careful attention, not just episodic
engagement.
do not confuse u.s. hopes and desires with u.s. interests
The core interests outlined above have been played down,
and sometimes superseded, by the desires of Clinton
administration policymakers. Pollution or overpopulation in
West Africa or South Asia are problems, but their effect on
American interests is peripheral, at best.
Famine and disease in Somalia or Rwanda are tragic. America
should help in humanitarian disasters, consistent with our
resources, and in a manner that does not undermine our
military readiness. But events in Rwanda or Somalia have a
marginal--at most--impact on American interests.
The promotion of free markets and fostering of democratic
institutions are in America's interest, but they are not
absolute goals. When democratic institutions are manipulated
by enemies of America--as in the case of radical Islamic
fundamentalists in Algeria--our long-term interests must take
precedence over the short-term ideal of enlarging democracy.
Likewise, when deviations from free-market trading principles
threaten a key strategic alliance in the Western Pacific,
such a trade dispute must be handled more carefully than one
with a trading partner that is not also a strategic ally.
allocate resources based on interests
Just as hopes and desires about the world have clouded
American attention, American resources have been
misallocated. Sometimes dollars speak louder than words. For
example, nearly $2 billion will be spent on occupation and
nation-building in Haiti, where American interests are
marginal; yet only a small fraction of that amount has been
spent supporting a free market and democratic transition in
the strategically critical country of Ukraine. And defense
dollars are spent on environmental projects and defense
`'conversion,'' while military readiness, modernization, and
personnel lack sufficient funding. Foreign aid and defense
dollars should be instruments of national policy to enhance
American security; they should not be squandered on
nonessential programs.
use all the tools of statecraft
Diplomacy without force is empty, and force without
diplomacy is irresponsible. The fundamental relationship
between diplomacy and force is not understood by the current
administration. In Somalia and in Haiti (until saved by the
Carter-Powell-Nunn mission), we saw force without diplomacy.
In Bosnia, we see a clear example of diplomacy without force:
Hollow threats are followed by countless concessions to the
aggressor.
This administration has displayed a basic discomfort with
American military power--unless that power is exercised
pursuant to United Nations authorization. In Haiti, the 1823
Monroe Doctrine has been replaced with the Halperin
Doctrine--unilateral action only after multilateral approval.
An unfortunate precedent has been set in seeking prior United
Nations support for what an American president proclaimed was
in America's interests--interests that should not be second-
guessed, modified, or subject to the approval of
international organizations.
Failure by the administration to appreciate military
assistance as a tool of diplomacy has resulted in dramatic
reductions in such programs. Despite presidential doctrines
from Truman to Nixon to Reagan advocating help for victims of
aggression who are willing to help themselves, and despite
campaign promises to the contrary, President Clinton refuses
to lift the illegal and immoral arms embargo on Bosnia. One
need only contrast this refusal to the significant military
and political impact of providing Stinger antiaircraft
missiles to the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan.
Finally, covert and overt political action can
also further U.S. interests, providing important options
between diplomacy and sending to the Marines.
rebuild american military power
America does not need the same defense posture in 1995 that
it had in 1985. But just because American defense spending is
a bargain does not mean that defending America is free. U.S.
defense spending has been cut too far, too fast. The current
administration initially planned to cut $60 billion in
defense--but then added plans to slash $127 billion over 5
years. Despite these deep cuts--and a recent conversion to
supporting higher levels of defense spending--the Clinton
administration's thirst to commit U.S. military forces abroad
has not declined. As a result, for the first time since the
``hollow Army'' of the 1970s, three American divisions were
not ready for combat in late 1994. Soldiers who expect and
deserve 12 months in between overseas tours are given half
that. My old unit from World War II, for example, the 10th
Mountain Division, has spent three straight Christmases
overseas: deployed to Somalia in December 1992 (only weeks
after cleaning up from Hurricane Andrew), and deployed again
in September 1994 to Haiti--just six short months after
returning from their tragic encounter in Somalia.
Furthermore, we cannot keep asking our men and women in
uniform to do more with less. It is nothing short of
scandalous when American enlisted soldiers have to work
second jobs or receive food stamps to meet the needs of their
families. And we cannot keep undermining our military force
posture for ``humanitarian operations'' that do nothing to
enhance American security.
America must take both a short-term and a long-term view of
its military readiness. Not only must we have the ability to
fight and win today, we must constantly prepare to fight and
win future wars. The Clinton cuts to the defense budget
create the grave risk that we will not make the investment
necessary to re-equip and reorient our forces toward
tomorrow's challenges. During the Cold War, we concentrated
on blocking a Warsaw Pact invasion of Europe and deterring a
nuclear attack on America, which meant that our doctrine,
training, and equipment all were based on those threats.
In the future we will face new threats in places and under
circumstances we cannot easily predict. To deal with them we
will need unprecedented flexibility, agility, and mobility:
no more gearing up for the central front in Europe with
lavish prepositioning of equipment and a large permanent
troop presence. In the future we will have to get to remote
theaters of conflict quickly and with the most effective
systems our technological prowess will enable us to field.
But the transition to a smaller, quicker, and more
effective force will require a solid industrial base and will
cost money: for a robust and well-targeted research and
development program; for new weapons systems capable of
breathtaking accuracy; for the capability to ``stand off''
and fire from safe distances, beyond the reach of enemy
forces; and for training American troops to be the most
powerful and best protected in history. If the money is not
there, we will be forced to make do with what remains of our
old Cold War force, even though it is the wrong force for the
future.
Finally, we need to rely on our capabilities and not place
our trust solely in multilateral regimes to ensure our
security. For example, effective ballistic missile defenses
would do more to enhance American and allied security by
providing real protection against limited and accidental
strikes than would nonproliferation policies, which rely on
the goodwill and cooperation of others to halt the spread of
nuclear technology and weapons of mass destruction to rogue
states.
Americans Lives Should Be Risked Only for American Interests
Placing American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in
harm's way is the gravest decision a president can make.
After the disaster in Mogadishu on October 3-4, 1993, some
observers concluded the American public will no longer
tolerate casualties. In fact, the ``Somalia syndrome'' stems
from the shock of seeing American bodies dragged through the
dust when the American people thought that Operation Restore
Hope was about feeding the hungry--not about nation-building
or enforcing U.N. arrest warrants. American lives should not
be risked--and lost--in places like Somalia, Haiti, and
Rwanda with marginal or no American interests at stake. Such
actions make it more difficult to convince American mothers
and fathers to send their sons and daughters to battle when
vital interests are at stake. The American people will not
tolerate American casualties for irresponsible
internationalism. And like overreliance on the United
Nations, such adventures ironically end up reinforcing
isolationism and retreat.
Be Creative: Do Not Cling to the Conventional Wisdom
In June 1991, I went to Andrews Air Force base to meet a
Russian opposition politician arriving for an informal visit.
The only ``official'' representative of the U.S. government
there was a mid-level State Department official. The view of
the foreign policy establishment and the Bush administration
was that Mikhail Gorbachev was the ``only game in town.''
That Russian politician, Boris Yeltsin, later told me that he
never forgot my willingness to see him.
Especially now that the certainties of the Cold War are
gone, traditional views about foreign policy should be
reexamined; some will remain valid while others may not. The
conventional view of
foreign aid, for example, is that it must be maintained in
about
[[Page S3325]] the same amounts in about the same programs to
demonstrate that America is not retreating from the world.
But it is hard to see how the billions of dollars of
international aid spent in Rwanda or Somalia before their
civil wars, for example, advanced any U.S. interest. Support
for the peace process in the Middle East has paid great
dividends, but much of the rest of the foreign aid program
simply feathers the nests of old-boy contractors and further
discredits ``development'' theories. Foreign aid should be
transitional, to help an ally through a crisis or to help a
developing country develop; it should not lead to a permanent
state of dependency. Reform and reductions in the U.S. aid
program are the overseas equivalent of welfare reform at
home.
The world of 1995 and beyond is still a dangerous place.
There are many new and emerging threats as we approach the
millennium. A resurgent Russia filling a vacuum in Central
Europe or looking for a foreign diversion from internal
secessionist struggles; a revitalized Iraq threatening the
oil fields of Saudi Arabia; a fundamentalist Iran seeking to
dominate the Persian Gulf; a nuclear-armed North Korea
threatening South Korea and Japan with ballistic missiles--
all are scenarios that the United States could face in the
near and medium terms. Islamic fundamentalism sweeping across
North Africa could overwhelm the successes to date in
achieving peace in the Middle East. A fourth conflict between
India and Pakistan could escalate into the world's first
nuclear war. Nuclear-armed terrorist states like Libya or
Iran, emboldened by the North Korean example and armed with
missiles from Pyongyang, could threaten allies in the Middle
East or Europe. Economic competition between Japan and China
could take a military turn. Radical ``ethno-nationalists,''
religious militants, terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and
international organized crime networks all pose threats to
states in regions of the world where America has core
interests. While the collapse of Somalia or Rwanda may not
affect those interests, the disintegration of states like
Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, or Pakistan would.
American leadership, however, can overcome the challenges
of building a just and durable peace after the Cold War. The
words of President Dwight Eisenhower's first inaugural
address are as true today as they were in 1953:
To meet the challenge of our time, destiny has laid upon
our country the responsibility of the free world's
leadership. So it is proper that we assure our friends once
again that, in the discharge of this responsibility, we
Americans know and we observe the difference between world
leadership and imperialism; between firmness and truculence;
between a thoughtfully calculated goal and spasmodic reaction
to the stimulus of emergencies.
As the United States approaches the next century, two
principles should remain constant: protecting American
interests and providing American leadership. The end of the
Cold War has provided us with a historic opportunity. Such an
opportunity should not be forfeited in favor of the pursuit
of utopian multilateralism or abandoned through intentional
isolationism. We have seen the danger to America's interests,
prestige, and influence posed by both of these approaches.
Instead, we must look to the lessons of the Cold War to guide
our future foreign policy: Put American interests first and
lead the way. The future will not wait for America, but it
can be shaped by an America second to none.
____________________