[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 39 (Thursday, March 2, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3320-S3325]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           PEACE AND FREEDOM

  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, yesterday the majority leader gave a very 
important speech at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom and outlined 
what he called the five global realities that affect our vital interest 
and dictate what it will take to maintain leadership throughout the 
world.
  First, the golden age of capitalism. From India and Latin America to 
China and Russia, 4 billion people formerly under some form of 
socialism are striving to establish market economies. This offers great 
opportunities for America and American business, but requires American 
leadership to protect our interests and ensure adherence to the rules 
of the international trading system.
  Second, the new world energy order. Senator Dole correctly noted that 
the security of the world's oil and gas supplies will remain a vital 
national interest. At the same time, Iran and Iraq remain hostile 
threats in the oil-rich gulf, while other energy rich areas in Eurasia 
are subject to disorder. He makes the insightful observation that ``in 
this new energy order, many of the most important geopolitical 
decisions--ones on which a nation's sovereignty can depend--will deal 
with the location and routes for oil and gas pipelines.'' I would add 
that we are already seeing in the case of Azerbaijan, over which Moscow 
is trying to regain effective control in order to determine the route 
through which Azeri oil will flow. Senator Dole concluded that ``our 
strategy, our diplomacy and our forward military presence need 
readjusting'' to meet this reality.
  Third, the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The majority leader 
issued a clarion call yesterday that ``we must prepare now for the 
future,'' in which weapons of mass destruction will become more 
widespread, greatly affecting our vital security interests. He wisely 
asked ``what would we have done--or not done--if Iraq had one or two 
nuclear weapons in 1990? A chilling question and one which we could 
face in just a few years as a real, not a hypothetical question, with 
regard to Iran or North Korea. In response to this threat, Senator Dole 
quite rightly focused on the possibility of preventive military action 
and the need for missile defenses to protect America and our allies.
  Fourth, increase in extremist religious and ethnic movements. The 
majority leader highlighted the many areas in which religious or ethnic 
passions have led to conflicts and identified those that pose a threat 
to American interests. America cannot become complacent he wisely 
warned his audience.
  Fifth, rivalry with Russia. In perhaps in most important 
observations, Senator Dole warned that ``geopolitical rivalry with 
Russia did not end with the demise of Soviet communism.'' Quoting Henry 
Kissinger, he noted that the Soviet threat was one of both communism 
and imperialism, and while communism was defeated the trend toward 
imperialism remains. While an early supporter of President Yeltsin, 
Senator Dole warned against ``the Clinton administration's misguided 
devotion to a ``Russia First'' policy, which has turned into a 
``Yeltsin First'' policy, and he quoted President Nixon who told the 
Duma ``when we have differences, we should not assume they will be 
overcome by a good personal relationship even at the highest level.'' 
To buttress his case, the majority leader listed numerous examples of 
how Moscow has taken actions in recent months that are in conflict with 
U.S. interests.
  To address this situation, Senator Dole prescribed a ``new realism'' 
about Russia. This would not mean a return to the cold war past, he 
noted, but would require ``developing a more honest relationship, one 
that does not paper over important policy differences with an appeal to 
personal ties.''
  In conclusion, Senator Dole reaffirmed the need for American 
leadership to secure peace and freedom for future generations of 
Americans.
  In an article just published in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, 
Senator Dole builds on these themes and defines his vision for the 
future American role in the world and 10 principles to guide our 
international relations. He also provides an incisive critique of the 
Clinton administration's foreign policy and how and why it has, in 
Senator Dole's view, failed in various respects.
  I will merely quote the final paragraph of his article:

       As the United States approaches the next century, two 
     principles should remain constant: protecting American 
     interests and providing American leadership. The end of the 
     Cold War has provided us with a historic opportunity. Such an 
     opportunity should not be forfeited in favor of the pursuit 
     of utopian multilateralism or abandoned through intentional 
     isolationism. We have seen the danger to America's interests, 
     prestige, and influence posed by both of these approaches. 
     Instead, we must look to the lessons of the Cold War to guide 
     our future foreign policy: Put American interests first and 
     lead the way. The future will not wait for America, but it 
     can be shaped by an America second to none.

  Mr. President, I think that in yesterday's speech and this new 
article with the majority leader has provided us with a clear vision 
and practical proposals for guiding American foreign policy. I would 
urge my colleagues to give the most careful attention to both these 
documents, and I would ask unanimous consent to insert them in the 
Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. COHEN. In his speech yesterday, President Clinton also reaffirmed 
that he gives very high priority to ratification of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention.
  Mr. President, there have been many supporters on this side of the 
aisle for efforts to control and ban chemical weapons--Senator Dole, 
Senator Kassebaum, Senator Hatfield, Senator McCain and others come to 
mind, and I have been pleased to work with them on different measures 
to achieve that goal.
  During the 1980's, I supported replacement of our aging chemical 
stocks with binary weapons, a necessary step to get Moscow to negotiate 
seriously.
                               Exhibit 1

 Foreign Policy--Winning the Peace: American Leadership and Commitment

                  (By Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole)

       I can't help but think back to the day in January of 1994, 
     when President Nixon made his last visit to the United States 
     Capitol.
       The occasion was the 25th anniversary of his inauguration 
     as President. And over 100 past and present Senators and 
     Congressmen--Republicans and Democrats alike--attended a 
     lunch honoring President Nixon that Bob Michel and I hosted.
       At the conclusion of the lunch, President Nixon stood--and 
     without a note in his hand--delivered one of the most 
     compelling speeches many of us could remember.
       As always, he talked politics, and he also shared some 
     personal reflections on his life and career. But the majority 
     of his remarks 
     [[Page S3321]] were devoted to his life's passion--foreign 
     policy.
       President Nixon served as our guide, leading us on an 
     around-the-world tour, offering his unique perspective on the 
     strengths and weaknesses of our allies and adversaries, and 
     on the future as he saw it.
       In his remarks, he repeated a statement that he made again 
     and again during the last year of his life. He said, ``The 
     Soviets have lost the Cold War, but the United States has not 
     yet won it.''
       Those words were true then--and are just as true today. And 
     while the title of this conference--``After Victory''--has a 
     nice ring to it, I believe the declaration may be a bit 
     premature. It is, after all, possible to win the war and lose 
     the peace--as the years between World War I and World War II 
     demonstrate.


                         world still uncertain

       Don't get me wrong. The stage is set. We are the world's 
     only superpower. And the words spoken by Nikita Khrushchev in 
     that famous ``kitchen debate'' were dead wrong. Not only will 
     America's children never live under communism--neither will 
     Russia's children. Still, there are far too many gains to 
     consolidate, and far too many uncertainties in the world to 
     say that a final peace has been won.
       For example, there is a resurgent Russia, asserting its 
     position around the globe. China has international ambitions 
     of its own, and is in the midst of a leadership transition. 
     There are international terrorists--often state-supported. 
     There are global crime syndicates. There are extremist 
     movements based on religion or ethnic origin. While none of 
     these compare to the challenge of the Soviet empire, each of 
     these can pose threats to important American interests.


            five global realities affect america's interests

       It seems to me these multifaceted threats should be viewed 
     in the context of five clear global realities which affect 
     America's fundamental interests. Only by recognizing these 
     realities--and dealing with them with the same commitment 
     which led to the defeat of Soviet Communism--will America 
     truly be able to claim victory.


            reality no. 1: the ``golden age of capitalism''

       The first new reality is that the whole world is plunging 
     headlong into what David Hale of the Kemper Organization in 
     Chicago has termed a ``new golden age of capitalism.''
       I remember when Lech Walesa told me that the definition of 
     a communist economy was ``100 workers standing around one 
     shovel.'' Now, in places like Poland, Russia, India, Latin 
     America, and
      even China--four billion people formerly under some form of 
     socialism are now fighting with everything they can lay 
     hands on to not just grab a shovel--but to build shovel 
     factories.
       There are now more than 30 stock markets in the developing 
     world, and capitalization of the four-year-old Shanghai 
     securities exchange has reached $30 billion. Deng Xiaoping 
     himself has said that no one cares any more what color the 
     cat is, as long as it catches mice. The bottom line is that 
     everyone wants to trade, and everyone wants to create and use 
     capital on a world-wide basis.
       While this new ``golden age of capitalism'' offers great 
     opportunity for America, we must remember that many of the 
     countries so eager to enjoy the benefits of membership in the 
     world trading system may not fully understand or accept the 
     rules and discipline that go with it.
       A trade war was averted with China, but other threats to 
     U.S. commercial interests will surely arise in the coming 
     months and years, and our continued vigilance and leadership 
     will be required.


             reality no. 2: the ``new world energy order''

       The second inescapable reality of the post-20th century 
     world is that the security of the world's oil and gas 
     supplies will remain a vital national interest of the United 
     States and of the other industrial powers.
       The Persian Gulf--the heartland of world energy for half a 
     century--is still a region of many uncertainties. Saudi 
     Arabia has been weakened financially. Iran and Iraq continue 
     to exhibit great hostility to the West and pose threats to 
     their neighbors. And the boundaries of the oil and gas 
     heartland are being redrawn to the north, to include the 
     great hydrocarbon deposits of the Caucasus, Siberia, and 
     Kazakhstan.
       In this ``new energy order,'' many of the most important 
     geopolitical decisions--ones on which a nation's sovereignty 
     can depend--will deal with the location and routes for oil 
     and gas pipelines. In response, our strategy, our diplomacy 
     and our forward military presence need readjusting.


          reality no. 3: spread of weapons of mass destruction

       The third inevitable reality for America--and for the 
     world--is the fact that while the Berlin Wall may have 
     crumbled, weapons of mass destruction haven't.
       Listen to just a partial roll call of countries and groups 
     that already possess nuclear, biological or chemical weapons: 
     North Korea. Iraq. Iran. Libya.
       Have any of these nations earned our trust? And given their 
     past behavior, is it any surprise that there are startling 
     signs that a world wide black market in nuclear weapons has 
     emerged?
       All this is taking place as talks to review the global 
     treaty limiting the spread of nuclear weapons will soon 
     begin. Even if the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty is 
     extended indefinitely, however, we must avoid falling into a 
     false sense of security. We must prepare now for the future.
       Iraq, Iran, and North Korea all illustrate the failures of 
     traditional non-proliferation efforts, which depend largely 
     on the cooperation of other states.
       Only after Desert Storm did the West learn just how far 
     Iraqi nuclear ambitions had progressed. And instead of 
     announcing that the United States will veto any efforts to 
     ease or end U.N. sanctions on Iraq, the administration 
     dispatches an envoy to plead with the Europeans for 
     cooperation. Where would such timidity have gotten us in the 
     Cold War?
       Iran also appears poised for a great leap forward in its 
     nuclear program--thanks to a cash-hungry Russia doing for 
     Iran what the Clinton Administration has done for North 
     Korea.
       And make no mistake about it, the Agreed Framework with 
     North Korea has little prospect of successfully addressing 
     the North Korean threat, and apparently, has already been 
     violated by Pyongyang.
       American leadership in addressing these non-proliferation 
     challenges is essential if additional states are not to 
     choose the nuclear option. It's worth asking: What would we 
     have done--or not done--if Iraq had one or two nuclear 
     weapons in 1990? Preventive military action as a non-
     proliferation policy tool cannot be ruled out.
       There are defensive options, however, that could provide 
     the United States and our allies with protection against 
     accidental and limited ballistic missile strikes. Pursuing an 
     effective
      ballistic missile defense capability should be a top 
     priority for U.S. defense policy now and for the 
     foreseeable future.


  reality no. 4: increase in extremist religious and ethnic movements

       The fourth new global reality is the increase in violence 
     due to extremist religious and ethnic movements in many parts 
     of the globe.
       Some of these movements, like the tribal warfare in Rwanda, 
     or conflicts in Burma or West Africa have little direct 
     impact on American interests.
       However, some of the instability and turmoil due to ethnic 
     and religious violence is important for American interests--
     and could lead to the disintegration of key states. Serbian 
     genocidal aggression in the Balkans, for example, threatens 
     to spill over to Macedonia, Albania, and beyond. American and 
     European inaction in the face of that aggression cannot help 
     but embolden other radical ``ethno-nationalists'' by giving 
     them a green light for ethnic cleansing.
       The Indian rebellion in Mexico coupled with financial 
     uncertainty has resulted in genuine security concerns on our 
     southern border--and make no mistake that illegal immigration 
     is a security threat.
       A key NATO ally in Turkey faces Islamic extremism and a 
     separatist ethnic movement. Violent Islamic fundamentalists 
     threaten the government in Algeria, and have launched an 
     assault on Egypt. How long would the Camp David Treaty be 
     honored if fundamentalists took power in Egypt?
       Islamic terrorists seek to destroy the peace process 
     between Israel and the PLO--and may be having some success. 
     With support from Iran and others, Islamic terrorists also 
     demonstrated at the World Trade Center that America is not 
     immune from attack.
       And ethnic turmoil in the former Soviet Union cannot be 
     ignored, as warfare has occurred in five former republics. 
     And the Chechens may be just one of many ethnic groups 
     willing to use violence to alter boundaries originally set by 
     Joseph Stalin.
       In short, the list of world ``hot spots'' is far too 
     lengthy for anyone to conclude that America can become 
     complacent.


                   reality no. 5: rivalry with russia

       And this leads to the fifth global reality we must face: 
     the fact that geopolitical rivalry with Russia did not end 
     with the demise of Soviet Communism.
       On his last trip abroad, President Nixon spoke before the 
     Russian State Duma, and he foreshadowed a change in Russian-
     American relations, saying: ``Russia is a great power, and 
     Russia as a great power must chart its own course in foreign 
     policy * * * When we have differences, we should not assume 
     they will be overcome by a good personal relationship even at 
     the highest level.''
       And as we have seen time and time again, the foreign policy 
     course that Russia is charting, is one that is often in 
     conflict with American interests.
       For example:
       Russia stepped in the middle of the North Korea agreement 
     by offering to provide nuclear reactors--which would have the 
     clear effect of killing the U.S. brokered deal.
       Russia continues to threaten prospective NATO members over 
     alliance expansion, thereby confirming the need to enlarge 
     NATO sooner rather than later.
       In December 1994, Russia vetoed a sanctions resolution on 
     Serbia in the U.N. Security Council, its first substantive 
     veto since the height of the Cold War in 1985.
       Russia persists in supplying weapons and nuclear technology 
     to the rogue regime in Iran.
       Russia continues to maintain an intelligence facility and 
     support personnel in Cuba, thereby prolonging Castro's 
     oppression.
        [[Page S3322]] Russian pressure, subversion and 
     intimidation of the sovereign states in the ``Near Abroad'' 
     follows a historical pattern set long before the Bolsheviks 
     took power in 1917.
       As Dr. Kissinger said last month before the Senate Armed 
     Services Committee, ``* * * what we dealt with in the Cold 
     War was both communism and imperialism, and while communism 
     was defeated, the trend toward imperialism still exists.''
       Let me be clear in saying that no one has been more 
     supportive of President Yeltsin than I. In June 1991, I went 
     to Andrews Air Force Base to meet President Yeltsin virtually 
     alone,
      since the United States State Department believed Gorvachev 
     was the ``only game in town.''
       But just as it was wrong to place too much focus on 
     Gorbachev in 1991, it is wrong in 1995 to ignore that fact 
     that President Yeltsin has made serious errors, has moved 
     toward authoritarian rule, and has lost the political support 
     of virtually all reform-minded Russians.
       The Clinton Administration's misguided devotion to a 
     ``Russia First'' policy--which has turned into a ``Yeltsin 
     first'' policy--resulted in the loss of a tremendous 
     opportunity to state American concerns forcefully before 
     thousands were slaughtered in Chechnya.


                        new realism about russia

       A ``new realism'' about Russia and its prospects for the 
     future does not mean a return to the Cold War past. It does 
     mean developing a more honest relationship, one that does not 
     paper over important policy differences with an appeal to 
     personal ties.
       New realism means emphasizing the significance of Russia's 
     1996 elections, and of the pivotal importance of a peaceful, 
     democratic transition of power.
       And new realism means that developments like arms sales to 
     Iran, violence in Chechnya, and U.N. vetoes on behalf of 
     aggressors should not be excused, ignored and minimized. Our 
     differences with Russia should be identified--they should be 
     negotiated when possible and condemned when necessary. Such 
     an approach would ultimately serve both the Russian and the 
     American people better than defending, denying and 
     rationalizing Russian misdeeds.


                     tests for american leadership

       Let me conclude by sharing with you words that Richard 
     Nixon spoke at the announcement of the creation of the Center 
     for Peace and Freedom in January 1994.
       ``Some are tired of leadership. They say (America) carried 
     that burden long enough. But if we do not provide leadership, 
     who will? The Germans? The Japanese? The Russians? The 
     Chinese? Only the United States has the potential . . . to 
     lead in the era beyond peace. It is a great challenge for a 
     great people.''
       Ladies and gentlemen, President Nixon was right. Leadership 
     does come with a price tag. But it is a price worth paying.
       Dealing with the five realities I have outlined will test 
     America's resolve and her leadership. If we fail those 
     tests--if we refuse the mantle of leadership--any declaration 
     of victory will be a long time coming.
       But I am an optimist. Like Richard Nixon, I believe in 
     America and In American leadership. I believe we will pass 
     our tests, and in doing so, we can claim the biggest victory 
     of all--we will have secured the future of our great 
     republic, and of peace and freedom, for generations to come.
                                                                    ____


                    Shaping America's Global Future

                             (By Bob Dole)

       It is now a cliche that America is the world's only 
     superpower. But Americans would do well to reflect on how we 
     got to this point--and on how unprecedented our status is in 
     American history. America has always been blessed with 
     security, protected by two oceans, our two land borders safe 
     from invasion since the mid-nineteenth century. Never before, 
     however, has America been so alone at the pinnacle of global 
     leadership.
       It was not always this way. America fought three major wars 
     in this century-World War I in Europe; World War II in 
     Europe, Africa, and Asia; and the Cold War across the globe. 
     In each of these conflicts, Americans were asked to give 
     their blood and treasure in support of U.S. interests and 
     ideals overseas. Three times this century, America rose to 
     the occasion.
       It is sometimes said that Americans win the war and lose 
     the peace. Clearly that was true after World War I, when 
     Wilsonian idealist ambitions overran American interests, and 
     when protectionism, isolationism, and decline were the 
     result. Yet after the defeat in 1945 of Nazism in Europe and 
     Japanese militarism in Asia, we rose to the challenge of 
     winning the peace through American leadership. New 
     multilateral institutions were established: the United 
     Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. 
     They were important, but they were insufficient. What made 
     the difference was American will and power as reflected in 
     the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and the establishment 
     of the North Atlantic Treaty
      Organization (NATO). These and other related actions 
     cemented the American commitment to Europe and signaled 
     America's determination to oppose Soviet expansionism.
       It was American leadership and commitment--supported by our 
     allies throughout the world--that led to the overwhelming 
     victories in the Cold War: the crumbling of the Berlin Wall 
     in 1989 and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. For more 
     than four decades, the central purpose and chief objective of 
     American national security policy was the containment of 
     Soviet communism. Who can doubt that U.S. policy played a 
     central role in the disintegration of Soviet communism? The 
     great success of America and its democratic allies in the 
     Cold War is something to be proud of, and the costs of the 
     victory should not be forgotten. While historic event 
     occurred barely three years ago, myths contradicting the 
     facts of why and how the Cold War was won have already 
     surfaced.
       Myth #1: Foreign policy was easier during the Cold War. 
     While a common enemy often did serve to unite the United 
     States and its allies during the Cold War, it is difficult to 
     argue that security policy was easier when the Soviet Union 
     was ready, willing, and able to oppose American interests. A 
     nuclear-armed superpower committed to undermining the West 
     created more difficult and demanding foreign policy 
     challenges than any faced since 1991. No current challenge, 
     for example, rivals the magnitude of the Cuban Missile Crisis 
     of 1962 or the Yom Kippur War of 1973--either of which could 
     have escalated to thermonuclear war.
       Myth #2: The Cold War was supported by a great bipartisan 
     consensus. In large part because of the historic partnership 
     between President Harry Truman and Senator Arthur Vandenberg, 
     the late 1940s saw considerable bipartisan cooperation in 
     creating a new international security system. But ``politics 
     stopping at the water's edge'' lasted only for two decades--
     until the Vietnam War. While there were partisan 
     disagreements in the 1950s, for example over ``who lost 
     China,'' it was the war in Southeast Asia that shattered the 
     bipartisan consensus on waging the Cold War. In the 1970s, 
     even Republicans were divided over the wisdom of pursuing the 
     Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente. Moreover, in the later 
     years of the Cold War, debates over the nuclear freeze, the 
     Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), opposing communist 
     aggression in Central America, or using force to defend U.S. 
     interests reflected very little bipartisanship. Despite the 
     broad bipartisan agreement at the beginning of the Cold War, 
     precious few ``Scoop Jackson Democrats'' were around by its 
     end.
       Myth #3: The doves were right. Unlike the revisionist 
     history written by some in the Clinton administration, the 
     ``doves'' were wrong all along in the Cold War. Why?
       The doves advocated spending less on defense and doing less 
     with American armed forces. In the end, as former Soviet 
     leaders now reveal, American defense spending and activism in 
     Afghanistan, Poland, and elsewhere were critical to the 
     Soviet demise.
       The doves argued for toning down anti-Soviet rhetoric no 
     matter how accurate it was (remember the shock at President 
     Ronald Reagan's proper characterization of the Soviet Union 
     as the ``Evil Empire''?). More significantly, they preferred 
     the resignation of U.S. policy to the permanent existence of 
     the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the doves' self-fulfilling 
     prophecy was not heeded.
       The doves opposed SDI and supported the nuclear freeze and 
     other arms control measures, arguing that weapons, not 
     ideology and intentions, posed the threat to the United 
     States.
       The doves opposed the Reagan Doctrine of supporting freedom 
     fighters opposing communist regimes around the world.
       The breakup of the Soviet empire in 1991 came faster and 
     happened more completed than virtually anyone envisioned. If 
     the doves' policies had prevailed, however, that day would 
     have been delayed for years, if not decades--and may never 
     have come. The fall of the Soviet empire was not inevitable, 
     nor was it foreordained by impersonal forces of history; 
     rather, it was the leadership, actions, and sacrifices of the 
     West that brought victory in the Cold War.
       Debunking the mythologies of the Cold War does not 
     automatically lead to prescriptions for a post-Cold War 
     foreign policy. Our Cold War victory allows the United States 
     to be more selective
      in its involvement around the world, but it is not a license 
     for America to withdraw from the world. Exhaustion after a 
     great conflict is natural, but American withdrawal would 
     jeopardize the gains of the last 40 years, and it would 
     inevitably mean less prosperity and less security for the 
     American people.
       Nevertheless, in the wake of the Soviet Union's defeat, 
     numerous observers have suggested America should withdraw 
     from the world. First, some claim America cannot be involved 
     in the world because we do not have the resources--the 
     ``declinist'' school. We won the Cold War and remain the only 
     global power but, in the perverse logic of the declinists, 
     this adds up to weakness.
       The declinists have multilateralist cousins who promote a 
     view that America must work with and within international 
     organizations because we do not have the resources to act on 
     our own. Other multilaterialists believe America does not 
     have the legal or moral authority to act without the sanction 
     of international organizations. The declinists--and their 
     multilateralist kin--ignore the strength of America and 
     underrate the power of American leadership. It is true that 
     America must be strong domestically to be strong abroad, but 
     America has the ability to do both if resources are used 
     wisely and decisions are made soundly.
       This is not necessarily the view in the current 
     administration. The declinists and multilateralists are alive 
     and well in the Clinton administration. First came the 
     [[Page S3323]] ``Tarnoff Doctrine'' of May 1993, when the 
     State Department's undersecretary for political affairs, 
     Peter Tarnoff, argued for retrenchment because the United 
     States lacked the resources, inclination, and will to lead. 
     Then there was the ``Halperin Doctrine'' expressed in these 
     pages in the Summer of 1993, in which a current National 
     Security Council staff member, Morton Halperin, argued that 
     the United States should use force to defend its interests in 
     cases like Grenada and Panama only with prior multilateral 
     approval.
       There are also protectionists who argue that America should 
     engage in trade with the world only on a one-way basis--
     shutting our doors to foreign products in the vain hope that 
     foreign doors will remain open to American products. American 
     industries do not need protection, they need competition. 
     Where there is truly free trade, U.S. businesses have 
     prospered and the U.S. economy has grown.
       Finally, some argue that America should not get involved in 
     the world. Historically, the isolationists have had adherents 
     on the Left who believe America will corrupt the world, and 
     on the Right who believe the world will corrupt America. 
     There are no serious and immediate threats to vital American 
     interests, the isolationists say. While that may be true now, 
     retreat from the world is the surest way to invite the 
     emergence of such threats in the future. The fact is that 
     America must remain firmly engaged in the world. If we do not 
     protect our interests, no one else--neither other countries 
     nor international organizations--will do the job for us. The 
     various approaches of the declinists, multilateralists, 
     protectionists, and isolationists all would make a dangerous 
     world even more so.


                         two failures of vision

       We have witnessed two efforts to ``reinvent'' American 
     foreign policy since the end of the Cold War: President 
     George Bush's New World Order and the Assertive 
     Multilateralism, or Engagement and Enlargement, of President 
     Bill Clinton. Unfortunately, neither effort has been 
     successful.
       The New World Order--whatever it was meant to be--rapidly 
     became a new world disorder; instead of strengthened 
     collective security, enhanced international organizations, 
     and a new partnership of nations, there was expansion of 
     violent ethnic and religious unrest, proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction, international aggression, and civil war. 
     The flaw of the New World Order approach was its assumption 
     that the end of the Cold War meant the end of international 
     tension that could lead to hot war. President Bush and his 
     advisers may be excused for over-optimism in the wake of the 
     stunning multilateral coalition they built--under the United 
     Nations auspices--to defeat Saddam Hussein's aggression. In 
     retrospect, however, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm may 
     have been the high point of post-Cold War U.N. collective 
     security efforts. Just as United Nations action in Korea in 
     1950 was possible only because the Soviet Union was absent 
     for the crucial authorizing vote, United Nations action in 
     the Persian Gulf was possible only because the Soviet Union 
     was inclined to cooperate with the West in the final months 
     of 1990. Such cooperation is rapidly becoming a thing of the 
     past as Russia pursues its traditional objectives in the 
     ``near abroad'' and around the globe. In this regard, the
      first substantive United Nations Security Council veto 
     exercised by Russia since 1984 (during the height of the 
     Cold War) came in December 1994 on the issue of tougher 
     sanctions against Serbia and may be the beginning of a 
     trend.
       Despite the conceptual flaws of the New World Order, to 
     hear the current administration complain about its foreign 
     policy inheritance is surprising and often merely an excuse 
     for poor performance. In my view, no administration has ever 
     received a stronger foreign policy inheritance. The legacy of 
     12 years of Reagan-Bush foreign policy included millions 
     liberated in Central and Eastern Europe, finally closing the 
     book on the post-World War II era after four decades; 15 
     independent states to replace the Soviet empire, and no near-
     term threat from Russia; a defeated Iraq in the Persian Gulf, 
     and a newly invigorated peace process in the Middle East; the 
     dramatic expansion of democratic governments around the 
     world--best illustrated in the Western Hemisphere (where only 
     Cuba and Haiti were exceptions to the democratic tidal wave); 
     free trade agreements negotiated with Canada and Mexico (the 
     North American Free Trade Agreement), nearly negotiated with 
     the world (the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on 
     Tariffs and Trade), and outlined for the Western Hemisphere 
     (Enterprise for the Americas); and a growing Asia-Pacific 
     Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum for U.S. relations with 
     Asia and the Pacific Basin. All added up to an America more 
     secure and stronger than at any time in our history, and the 
     only global power on earth.
       In the two years since the end of the Bush administration, 
     much has changed. In the minds of many, U.S. foreign policy 
     has been marked by inconsistency, incoherence, lack of 
     purpose, and a reluctance to lead. American lives have been 
     risked, and lost, in places with little or no connection to 
     American interests. From Bosnia to China, from North Korea to 
     Poland, our allies and our adversaries doubt our resolve and 
     question our commitments.


                            firm principles

       The failures of Assertive Multilateralism/Enlargement lie 
     not just in its execution or communication--they lie in its 
     very conception. The following 10 principles, which should 
     guide American foreign policy, have been ignored or 
     misapplied by the Clinton administration.


             while much has changed, much remains the same

       The successful end of the Cold War has not changed the core 
     interests of America:
       Preventing the domination of Europe by a single power,
       Maintaining a balance of power in East Asia,
       Promoting security and stability in our hemisphere,
       Preserving access to natural resources, especially in the 
     energy heartland of the Persian Gulf,
       Strengthening international free trade and expanding U.S. 
     access to global markets, and
       Protecting American citizens and property overseas.
       These interests cannot be protected without American 
     involvement in the world. Many states and many movements 
     opposed to American interests are awaiting American 
     withdrawal.
       In addition to our interests, America has core ideals that 
     we have supported throughout our history: freedom, democracy, 
     the rule of law, observance of human rights, and deterring 
     and responding to aggression. Too much has been made of the 
     tensions between American interests and American ideals. Some 
     went so far as to suggest that we should set aside our values 
     during the Cold War to follow a policy of moral relativism. 
     Nothing would have been more ill-conceived. The Cold War was 
     won precisely because of the convergence of our interests and 
     ideals. By preventing Soviet expansion into Europe, we 
     stopped the domination of the continent by a hostile power 
     and prevented the enslavement of millions more Europeans 
     under communist rule.
       Our interests and ideals converge in support for free-
     market economies and democratic pluralism as well. Capitalist 
     democracies tend to make better trading partners and stronger 
     allies, and also treat their own people and their neighbors 
     better than authoritarian, closed societies. To retain the 
     support of the American people and to protect the future of 
     our children, American foreign policy must continue to 
     combine the protection of American interests and the 
     promotion of American ideals. That is our tradition.


                    American Leadership Is Essential

       The United States, as the only global power, must lead. 
     Europe--as individual states or as a collective--cannot. 
     China, Russia, India,
      Brazil, and Japan are important regional powers, and some 
     may be potential regional threats. But only the United 
     States can lead on the full range of political, 
     diplomatic, economic, and military issues confronting the 
     world.
       Leadership does not consist of posing questions for 
     international debate; leadership consists of proposing and 
     achieving solutions. The American attempt in May 1993 to 
     discuss lifting the Bosnian arms embargo with NATO allies, 
     for example, was simply wrong: It was a discussion, not a 
     U.S. initiative, and was readily perceived by the Europeans 
     as a half-hearted attempt lacking President Clinton's 
     commitment. By comparison, if President Bush had followed a 
     similar course after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, 
     Saddam Hussein would still be in Kuwait today--if not in 
     Saudi Arabia--and he would very possibly be armed with 
     nuclear weapons.
       Leadership is also saying what you mean, meaning what you 
     say, and sticking to it. That includes a willingness to use 
     American force when required. To state that North Korea 
     ``cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb'' and then one 
     year later to sign an agreement that ignores the issue of the 
     existing arsenal is confusing to the American people and to 
     our allies. To threaten to withdraw most-favored-nation 
     trading status from China because of human rights violations 
     and then to extend such status months later--despite no 
     change in Chinese human rights practices--makes the world 
     wonder why the linkage was made in the first place. To 
     introduce a resolution in the U.N. Security Council to lift 
     the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina, while top 
     administration officials claim the war is over and the Serbs 
     have won, severs any link between the words of U.S. 
     policymakers and their deeds.


            u.s. sovereignty must be defended, not delegated

       International organizations--whether the United Nations, 
     the World Trade Organization, or any others--will not protect 
     American interests. Only America can do that. International 
     organizations will, at best, practice policymaking at the 
     lowest common denominator--finding a course that is the least 
     objectionable to the most members. Too often, they reflect a 
     consensus that opposes American interests or does not reflect 
     American principles and ideals. Even gaining support for an 
     American position can involve deals or tradeoffs that are not 
     in America's long-term interests. Acquiescence in Russian 
     activities in Georgia and other border states, for example, 
     may be too high a price for Russian acceptance of U.S. 
     positions.
       The choices facing America are not, as some in the 
     administration would like to portray, doing something 
     multilaterally, doing it alone, or doing nothing. These are 
     [[Page S3324]] false choices. The real choice is whether to 
     allow international organizations to call the shots--as in 
     Somalia or Bosnia--or to make multilateral groupings work for 
     American interests--as in Operation Desert Storm. 
     Subcontracting American foreign policy and subordinating 
     American sovereignty encourage and strengthen isolationist 
     forces at home--and embolden our adversaries abroad.


         international bureaucrats are no substitute for allies

       The United States should not look to the United Nations 
     first, but to itself and its allies--preserving alliances 
     inherited from the Cold War and leading to create new ones 
     where necessary. Who could doubt that NATO has the power to 
     address the tragic aggression against Bosnia? Instead, a 
     misnamed ``United Nations Protection Force'' provides 
     convenient ``hostages'' to the aggressors, thereby protecting 
     them from NATO power. Substituting the judgment of 
     international civil servants for NATO military professionals 
     has severely damaged the credibility of the Atlantic 
     Alliance.
       Allies will not simply do our bidding in one area and 
     ignore our policies in another. It was folly to pursue a 
     policy of economic sanctions against North Korea while 
     publicly criticizing China on human rights concerns and Japan 
     on trade issues. And after proposing sanctions and gaining 
     support from South Korea and Japan, allowing a freelance 
     mission by a former president to reverse the policy suggests 
     that America is not to be taken at its word. Alliances and 
     allies require careful attention, not just episodic 
     engagement.


       do not confuse u.s. hopes and desires with u.s. interests

       The core interests outlined above have been played down, 
     and sometimes superseded, by the desires of Clinton 
     administration policymakers. Pollution or overpopulation in 
     West Africa or South Asia are problems, but their effect on 
     American interests is peripheral, at best.
      Famine and disease in Somalia or Rwanda are tragic. America 
     should help in humanitarian disasters, consistent with our 
     resources, and in a manner that does not undermine our 
     military readiness. But events in Rwanda or Somalia have a 
     marginal--at most--impact on American interests.
       The promotion of free markets and fostering of democratic 
     institutions are in America's interest, but they are not 
     absolute goals. When democratic institutions are manipulated 
     by enemies of America--as in the case of radical Islamic 
     fundamentalists in Algeria--our long-term interests must take 
     precedence over the short-term ideal of enlarging democracy. 
     Likewise, when deviations from free-market trading principles 
     threaten a key strategic alliance in the Western Pacific, 
     such a trade dispute must be handled more carefully than one 
     with a trading partner that is not also a strategic ally.


                 allocate resources based on interests

       Just as hopes and desires about the world have clouded 
     American attention, American resources have been 
     misallocated. Sometimes dollars speak louder than words. For 
     example, nearly $2 billion will be spent on occupation and 
     nation-building in Haiti, where American interests are 
     marginal; yet only a small fraction of that amount has been 
     spent supporting a free market and democratic transition in 
     the strategically critical country of Ukraine. And defense 
     dollars are spent on environmental projects and defense 
     `'conversion,'' while military readiness, modernization, and 
     personnel lack sufficient funding. Foreign aid and defense 
     dollars should be instruments of national policy to enhance 
     American security; they should not be squandered on 
     nonessential programs.


                    use all the tools of statecraft

       Diplomacy without force is empty, and force without 
     diplomacy is irresponsible. The fundamental relationship 
     between diplomacy and force is not understood by the current 
     administration. In Somalia and in Haiti (until saved by the 
     Carter-Powell-Nunn mission), we saw force without diplomacy. 
     In Bosnia, we see a clear example of diplomacy without force: 
     Hollow threats are followed by countless concessions to the 
     aggressor.
       This administration has displayed a basic discomfort with 
     American military power--unless that power is exercised 
     pursuant to United Nations authorization. In Haiti, the 1823 
     Monroe Doctrine has been replaced with the Halperin 
     Doctrine--unilateral action only after multilateral approval. 
     An unfortunate precedent has been set in seeking prior United 
     Nations support for what an American president proclaimed was 
     in America's interests--interests that should not be second-
     guessed, modified, or subject to the approval of 
     international organizations.
       Failure by the administration to appreciate military 
     assistance as a tool of diplomacy has resulted in dramatic 
     reductions in such programs. Despite presidential doctrines 
     from Truman to Nixon to Reagan advocating help for victims of 
     aggression who are willing to help themselves, and despite 
     campaign promises to the contrary, President Clinton refuses 
     to lift the illegal and immoral arms embargo on Bosnia. One 
     need only contrast this refusal to the significant military 
     and political impact of providing Stinger antiaircraft 
     missiles to the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan. 
     Finally, covert and overt political action can 
     also further U.S. interests, providing important options 
     between diplomacy and sending to the Marines.


                    rebuild american military power

       America does not need the same defense posture in 1995 that 
     it had in 1985. But just because American defense spending is 
     a bargain does not mean that defending America is free. U.S. 
     defense spending has been cut too far, too fast. The current 
     administration initially planned to cut $60 billion in 
     defense--but then added plans to slash $127 billion over 5 
     years. Despite these deep cuts--and a recent conversion to 
     supporting higher levels of defense spending--the Clinton 
     administration's thirst to commit U.S. military forces abroad 
     has not declined. As a result, for the first time since the 
     ``hollow Army'' of the 1970s, three American divisions were 
     not ready for combat in late 1994. Soldiers who expect and 
     deserve 12 months in between overseas tours are given half 
     that. My old unit from World War II, for example, the 10th 
     Mountain Division, has spent three straight Christmases 
     overseas: deployed to Somalia in December 1992 (only weeks 
     after cleaning up from Hurricane Andrew), and deployed again 
     in September 1994 to Haiti--just six short months after 
     returning from their tragic encounter in Somalia.
       Furthermore, we cannot keep asking our men and women in 
     uniform to do more with less. It is nothing short of 
     scandalous when American enlisted soldiers have to work 
     second jobs or receive food stamps to meet the needs of their 
     families. And we cannot keep undermining our military force 
     posture for ``humanitarian operations'' that do nothing to 
     enhance American security.
       America must take both a short-term and a long-term view of 
     its military readiness. Not only must we have the ability to 
     fight and win today, we must constantly prepare to fight and 
     win future wars. The Clinton cuts to the defense budget 
     create the grave risk that we will not make the investment 
     necessary to re-equip and reorient our forces toward 
     tomorrow's challenges. During the Cold War, we concentrated 
     on blocking a Warsaw Pact invasion of Europe and deterring a 
     nuclear attack on America, which meant that our doctrine, 
     training, and equipment all were based on those threats.
       In the future we will face new threats in places and under 
     circumstances we cannot easily predict. To deal with them we 
     will need unprecedented flexibility, agility, and mobility: 
     no more gearing up for the central front in Europe with 
     lavish prepositioning of equipment and a large permanent 
     troop presence. In the future we will have to get to remote 
     theaters of conflict quickly and with the most effective 
     systems our technological prowess will enable us to field.
       But the transition to a smaller, quicker, and more 
     effective force will require a solid industrial base and will 
     cost money: for a robust and well-targeted research and 
     development program; for new weapons systems capable of 
     breathtaking accuracy; for the capability to ``stand off'' 
     and fire from safe distances, beyond the reach of enemy 
     forces; and for training American troops to be the most 
     powerful and best protected in history. If the money is not 
     there, we will be forced to make do with what remains of our 
     old Cold War force, even though it is the wrong force for the 
     future.
       Finally, we need to rely on our capabilities and not place 
     our trust solely in multilateral regimes to ensure our 
     security. For example, effective ballistic missile defenses 
     would do more to enhance American and allied security by 
     providing real protection against limited and accidental 
     strikes than would nonproliferation policies, which rely on 
     the goodwill and cooperation of others to halt the spread of 
     nuclear technology and weapons of mass destruction to rogue 
     states.


      Americans Lives Should Be Risked Only for American Interests

       Placing American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in 
     harm's way is the gravest decision a president can make. 
     After the disaster in Mogadishu on October 3-4, 1993, some 
     observers concluded the American public will no longer 
     tolerate casualties. In fact, the ``Somalia syndrome'' stems 
     from the shock of seeing American bodies dragged through the 
     dust when the American people thought that Operation Restore 
     Hope was about feeding the hungry--not about nation-building 
     or enforcing U.N. arrest warrants. American lives should not 
     be risked--and lost--in places like Somalia, Haiti, and 
     Rwanda with marginal or no American interests at stake. Such 
     actions make it more difficult to convince American mothers 
     and fathers to send their sons and daughters to battle when 
     vital interests are at stake. The American people will not 
     tolerate American casualties for irresponsible 
     internationalism. And like overreliance on the United 
     Nations, such adventures ironically end up reinforcing 
     isolationism and retreat.


          Be Creative: Do Not Cling to the Conventional Wisdom

       In June 1991, I went to Andrews Air Force base to meet a 
     Russian opposition politician arriving for an informal visit. 
     The only ``official'' representative of the U.S. government 
     there was a mid-level State Department official. The view of 
     the foreign policy establishment and the Bush administration 
     was that Mikhail Gorbachev was the ``only game in town.'' 
     That Russian politician, Boris Yeltsin, later told me that he 
     never forgot my willingness to see him.
       Especially now that the certainties of the Cold War are 
     gone, traditional views about foreign policy should be 
     reexamined; some will remain valid while others may not. The 
     conventional view of
      foreign aid, for example, is that it must be maintained in 
     about 
     [[Page S3325]] the same amounts in about the same programs to 
     demonstrate that America is not retreating from the world. 
     But it is hard to see how the billions of dollars of 
     international aid spent in Rwanda or Somalia before their 
     civil wars, for example, advanced any U.S. interest. Support 
     for the peace process in the Middle East has paid great 
     dividends, but much of the rest of the foreign aid program 
     simply feathers the nests of old-boy contractors and further 
     discredits ``development'' theories. Foreign aid should be 
     transitional, to help an ally through a crisis or to help a 
     developing country develop; it should not lead to a permanent 
     state of dependency. Reform and reductions in the U.S. aid 
     program are the overseas equivalent of welfare reform at 
     home.
       The world of 1995 and beyond is still a dangerous place. 
     There are many new and emerging threats as we approach the 
     millennium. A resurgent Russia filling a vacuum in Central 
     Europe or looking for a foreign diversion from internal 
     secessionist struggles; a revitalized Iraq threatening the 
     oil fields of Saudi Arabia; a fundamentalist Iran seeking to 
     dominate the Persian Gulf; a nuclear-armed North Korea 
     threatening South Korea and Japan with ballistic missiles--
     all are scenarios that the United States could face in the 
     near and medium terms. Islamic fundamentalism sweeping across 
     North Africa could overwhelm the successes to date in 
     achieving peace in the Middle East. A fourth conflict between 
     India and Pakistan could escalate into the world's first 
     nuclear war. Nuclear-armed terrorist states like Libya or 
     Iran, emboldened by the North Korean example and armed with 
     missiles from Pyongyang, could threaten allies in the Middle 
     East or Europe. Economic competition between Japan and China 
     could take a military turn. Radical ``ethno-nationalists,'' 
     religious militants, terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and 
     international organized crime networks all pose threats to 
     states in regions of the world where America has core 
     interests. While the collapse of Somalia or Rwanda may not 
     affect those interests, the disintegration of states like 
     Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, or Pakistan would.
       American leadership, however, can overcome the challenges 
     of building a just and durable peace after the Cold War. The 
     words of President Dwight Eisenhower's first inaugural 
     address are as true today as they were in 1953:
       To meet the challenge of our time, destiny has laid upon 
     our country the responsibility of the free world's 
     leadership. So it is proper that we assure our friends once 
     again that, in the discharge of this responsibility, we 
     Americans know and we observe the difference between world 
     leadership and imperialism; between firmness and truculence; 
     between a thoughtfully calculated goal and spasmodic reaction 
     to the stimulus of emergencies.
       As the United States approaches the next century, two 
     principles should remain constant: protecting American 
     interests and providing American leadership. The end of the 
     Cold War has provided us with a historic opportunity. Such an 
     opportunity should not be forfeited in favor of the pursuit 
     of utopian multilateralism or abandoned through intentional 
     isolationism. We have seen the danger to America's interests, 
     prestige, and influence posed by both of these approaches. 
     Instead, we must look to the lessons of the Cold War to guide 
     our future foreign policy: Put American interests first and 
     lead the way. The future will not wait for America, but it 
     can be shaped by an America second to none.
     

                          ____________________