[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 38 (Wednesday, March 1, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H2444-H2458]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 REQUESTING INFORMATION FROM THE PRESIDENT CONCERNING ACTIONS TAKEN TO 
    STRENGTHEN THE MEXICAN PESO AND STABILIZE THE ECONOMY OF MEXICO

  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Banking and 
Financial Services, and pursuant to the order of the House, I call up 
House Resolution 80 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                               H. Res. 80

       Resolved, That the President is hereby requested to provide 
     to the House of Representatives, not later than 14 days after 
     the adoption of this resolution, the following documents:
       (1) Any document concerning the assured source of repayment 
     to the United States for any short-, intermediate-, or long-
     term credit facility made available to Mexico after December 
     31, 1994.
       (2) Any document concerning the net worth of Pemex, the 
     historical annual revenues of Pemex, the projected annual 
     revenues during the 5-year period beginning on the date of 
     the adoption of this resolution, and the extent to which the 
     proceeds from the sale of Mexican oil to customers within 
     Mexico or outside of Mexico--
       (A) are required to be paid to the Government of Mexico as 
     taxes or as payments in lieu of taxes; or
       (B) have been pledged as collateral for the repayment of 
     any loans or other extensions of credit to the Government of 
     Mexico or to Pemex other than any credit facility described 
     in paragraph (1).
       (3) Any document concerning the value of any oil the 
     proceeds from the sale of which are pledged to assure the 
     repayment of any financial assistance provided by the United 
     States to Mexico, the documentation received by the United 
     States in connection with such pledge, and the manner in 
     which the United States may exercise any rights under such
      pledge to obtain the proceeds as repayment for losses 
     incurred.
       (4) Any document concerning any assurances given by the 
     Government of Mexico to the United States Government with 
     respect to changes in past economic policies or the adoption 
     of a new economic plan.
       (5) Any document concerning the decision by the President 
     to use the assets of the exchange  stabilization  
     fund  established under section 5302 of title 31, 
     United States Code, in connection with any short-, 
     intermediate-, or long-term credit facility made available to 
     Mexico after December 31, 1994.
       (6) Any document concerning the criteria used by the 
     President or the Secretary of the Treasury in making any 
     decision to use the assets of the exchange stabilization fund 
     to respond to any economic, balance of payments, or exchange 
     crisis in any country and the facts on which such 
     determinations were made with respect to Poland, in 1989, and 
     to Mexico in December of 1994 and early 1995.
       (7) Any document concerning how the use of the assets of 
     the exchange stabilization fund as a source of credit to 
     Mexico compares with all prior uses of the assets of the fund 
     since 1945 for all other countries under section 5302 of 
     title 31, United States Code, with regard to--
       (A) the dollar amount of each transaction;
       (B) the type of the transaction, such as loan, loan 
     guarantee, or swap agreement (as defined in section 
     11(e)(8)(D)(vi) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act);
       (C) the purpose of the transaction, such as whether it was 
     to support the United States dollar, to support a foreign 
     currency, or any other purpose;
       (D) the duration, in years, of the transaction during which 
     any credit was or is permitted to remain outstanding;
       (E) any security or collateral pledged to assure repayment 
     with respect to each such transaction; and
       (F) the existence of any agreement involving the 
     International Monetary Fund or the Board of Governors of the 
     Federal Reserve System in connection with each such 
     transaction and the terms of each agreement by such Fund or 
     Board.
       (8) Any document concerning debts owed by the Government of 
     Mexico and any entity owned or controlled
      by the Government of Mexico to United States public or 
     private creditors which are outstanding as of the date of 
     the adoption of this resolution, the status of each such 
     debt (including whether such debt has been refinanced), 
     and the collateral or security pledged to assure repayment 
     of such debt.
       (9) Any document concerning an accounting of all the fund 
     flows through the exchange stabilization fund established 
     under section 5302 of title 31, United States Code, during 
     the 24-month period ending on the date of the adoption of 
     this resolution, including the identification of the amount 
     of and purpose for each transaction involving such fund 
     during such period.
       (10) Any document concerning the balance of available 
     assets in the exchange stabilization fund as of the date of 
     the adoption of this resolution.
       (11) Any document concerning the amount by which the total 
     principal amount of loans, loan guarantees, and other 
     extensions of credit which the President has announced will 
     be made available to Mexico exceeds the total amount of 
     available assets in the exchange stabilization fund 
     established under section 5302 of title 31, United States 
     Code, and the means for covering the shortfall, if any.
       (12) Any document concerning the departure of the 
     International Monetary Fund from the Fund's customary 
     guidelines for country assistance, including any 
     recommendation made by the President or any other officer or 
     employee in the executive branch to the Fund regarding the 
     amount of financial assistance the Fund was preparing to make 
     available to Mexico, and any reciprocal agreement made by the 
     executive branch to the Fund for making such assistance 
     available in any amount greatly in excess of the customary 
     guidelines.
       (13) Any document concerning the factual circumstances 
     pursuant to which the Bank for International Settlements has 
     become a lender to individual countries beyond the Bank's 
     customary role as a clearinghouse for central banks.
       (14) Any document concerning the financial obligations of 
     the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the 
     Bank for International Settlements.
       (15) Any document concerning the relationship among the 
     Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Bank 
     for International Settlements,
      and the central banks of other countries which are 
     affiliated with such Bank in any manner with regard to 
     assigning or apportioning the ultimate liability for any 
     loss incurred in connection with the extension of credit 
     by such Bank to the Government of Mexico.
       (16) Any document, including minutes, concerning any 
     meeting between the President and any Members of Congress 
     concerning the proposed actions of the President, as 
     announced on January 31, 1995, to strengthen the Mexican peso 
     and support economic stability in Mexico.
       (17) Any document concerning any discrepancy between the 
     amount the President announced is available in the exchange 
     stabilization fund established under section 5302 of title 
     31, United States Code, and the amount shown as being 
     available in such Fund in the monthly statement of the public 
     debt of the United States on December 31, 1994.

  Mr. LEACH (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent 
that the resolution be considered as read and printed in the Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Iowa?
  There was no objection.


           committee amendment in the nature of a substitute

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Goodlatte). The Clerk will report the 
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Committee amendment in the nature of a substitute: Strike 
     out all after the resolving clause and insert in lieu thereof 
     the following:
       That the President is hereby requested to provide to the 
     House of Representatives (consistent with the rules of such 
     House), not later than 14 days after the adoption of this 
     resolution, the following documents in the possession of the 
     executive branch, if not inconsistent with the public 
     interest:
       (1) Any document concerning--
       (A) the condition of the Mexican economy; and
       (B) any consultations between the Government of Mexico and 
     the Secretary of the Treasury (or any designee of the 
     Secretary), the International Monetary Fund, or the Bank for 
     International Settlements.
       (2) Any document containing--
       (A) a description of the activities of the central bank of 
     Mexico, including the reserve positions of such central bank 
     and data relating to the functioning of Mexican monetary 
     policy;
       (B) information regarding the implementation and the extent 
     of wage, price, and credit controls in the Mexican economy;
       (C) a complete documentation of Mexican tax policy and any 
     proposed changes to such policy;
     [[Page H2445]]   (D) a description of all financial 
     transactions, both inside and outside of Mexico, directly 
     involving funds disbursed from the exchange stabilization 
     fund and the International Monetary Fund, including 
     transactions with--
       (i) individuals;
       (ii) partnerships;
       (iii) joint ventures; and
       (iv) corporations;
       (E) a list of planned or pending regulations of the 
     Government of Mexico affecting the private sector of the 
     Mexican economy; and
       (F) any efforts to privatize public sector entities in 
     Mexico.
       (3) Any document concerning any legal analysis with regard 
     to the authority of the President or the Secretary of the 
     Treasury under section 5302 of title 31, United States Code, 
     the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, the Special Drawing Rights 
     Act, the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, or any other law or legal 
     authority to use the stabilization fund to implement the 
     President's proposed Mexican support package.
       (4) Any document concerning any legal opinion regarding the 
     applicability or nonapplicability of the provisions of the 
     Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 to the exchange 
     stabilization fund.
       (5) Any document concerning any agreement between the 
     United States and the Government of Mexico (or any other 
     appropriate Mexican entity) to provide assured sources of 
     repayment for all payments by the United States in connection 
     with any short-, intermediate-, or long-term credit facility 
     made available to Mexico after December 31, 1994.
       (6) Any document concerning the implementation by the 
     President and the Secretary of the Treasury (or any designee 
     of the Secretary) of the authority under section 5302 of 
     title 31, United States Code, with respect to any credit 
     facility described in paragraph (5).
       (7) Any document concerning efforts by the international 
     community to stabilize the economy of Mexico and the current 
     status of negotiations with other countries to improve the 
     capacity of international institutions to handle similar 
     crises.
       (8) Any document concerning the extent to which Mexico is 
     complying with the terms and conditions agreed to in 
     connection with the exercise of the authority under section 
     5302 of title 31, United States Code, with respect to any 
     credit facility described in paragraph (5), including any 
     document concerning the extent to which--
       (A) the Government of Mexico has agreed to use the proceeds 
     of any loan which has been made, or any security for which 
     any guarantee has been issued, through any such facility to 
     help strengthen the Mexican peso and help stabilize financial 
     and exchange markets by facilitating the refinancing or 
     redemption of short-term debt instruments issued by the 
     Government of Mexico;
       (B) the Government of Mexico has agreed to provide--
       (i) a comprehensive financial plan which includes a 
     description of the intended use of any such loan or security; 
     and
       (ii) ongoing reports on the implementation of the financial 
     plan while any such loan or security is outstanding;
       (C) the Government of Mexico is respecting the autonomy of 
     the central bank of Mexico and the mandate of such bank to 
     seek stability with respect to the purchasing power of the 
     Mexican peso;
       (D) the central bank of Mexico is pursuing a 
     noninflationary monetary and credit policy
      that controls credit expansion and the growth of the Mexican 
     money supply in order to maintain the Mexican peso as a 
     strong currency;
       (E) the central bank of Mexico is providing on a periodic 
     basis to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
     and other appropriate governmental entities information 
     necessary to make an assessment with respect to the policy 
     described in subparagraph (D), including central bank money 
     supply and monetary policy data;
       (F) the Government of Mexico is implementing the 
     privatization policy established by such Government to 
     transfer enterprises currently owned or controlled by the 
     Government to private ownership;
       (G) the Government of Mexico continues to permit entry of 
     foreign direct investment into Mexico and the repatriation of 
     investments from Mexico by United States nationals; and
       (H) the Government of Mexico is pursuing market-oriented 
     measures to stem the flow of domestically owned capital from 
     Mexico.
       (9) Any document concerning any analysis of the resources 
     which the International Monetary Fund has agreed to make 
     available in response to the Mexican financial crisis.
       (10) Any document concerning--
       (A) the percentage of the resources which the International 
     Monetary Fund has agreed to make available in response to the 
     Mexican financial crisis which are attributable to capital 
     contributions to such Fund by the United States; and
       (B) the extent to which the participation of the 
     International Monetary Fund in international efforts to 
     strengthen the Mexican peso and stabilize the economy of 
     Mexico is likely to require additional contributions to such 
     Fund by the member states of the Fund, including the United 
     States.
       (11) Any document concerning any agreement between the 
     United States and the Government of Mexico detailing the fee 
     structure and the terms and conditions under which loans, 
     loan guarantees, and other financial support may be made 
     available to Mexico through the stabilization fund 
     established under section 5302 of title 31, United States 
     Code, including--
       (A) any document concerning background materials on the 
     assessment of the Mexican economy and any United States 
     Government rationalization for pressing the central bank of 
     Mexico to increase interest rates from 40 percent to 50 
     percent;
       (B) any document concerning the framework agreement entered 
     into on or about February 21, 1995, which serves as the 
     umbrella accord for the provision of any such loan, loan 
     guarantee, or other financial support;
       (C) any document concerning the medium-term exchange 
     stabilization agreement entered into on or about February 21, 
     1995, which specifies the terms and conditions for medium-
     term swap transactions between the United States and Mexico;
       (D) any document concerning the guarantee agreement entered 
     into on or about February 21, 1995, which specifies the terms 
     and conditions for the issuance of guarantees by the United 
     States of debt securities issued by Mexico; and
       (E) any document concerning the oil proceeds facility 
     agreement entered into on or about February 21, 1995, which 
     establishes a mechanism to provide an assured source of 
     repayment of United States resources.
       (12) Any document concerning the assured source of 
     repayment to the United States for any short-, intermediate-, 
     or long-term credit facility made available to Mexico after 
     December 31, 1994.
       (13) Any document concerning the net worth of Pemex, the 
     historical annual revenues of Pemex, the projected annual 
     revenues during the 5-year period beginning on the date of 
     the adoption of this resolution, and the extent to which the 
     proceeds from the sale of Mexican oil to customers within 
     Mexico or outside of Mexico--
       (A) are required to be paid to the Government of Mexico as 
     taxes or as payments in lieu of taxes; or
       (B) have been pledged as collateral for the repayment of 
     any loans or other extensions of credit to the Government of 
     Mexico or to Pemex other than any credit facility described 
     in paragraph (12).
       (14) Any document concerning the value of any oil the 
     proceeds from the sale of which are pledged to assure the 
     repayment of any financial assistance provided by the United 
     States to Mexico, the documentation received by the United 
     States in connection with such pledge, and the manner in 
     which the United States may exercise any rights under such 
     pledge to obtain the proceeds as repayment for losses 
     incurred.
       (15) Any document concerning any assurances given by the 
     Government of Mexico to the United States Government with 
     respect to changes in past economic policies or the adoption 
     of a new economic plan.
       (16) Any document concerning the decision by the President 
     to use the assets of the exchange stabilization fund 
     established under section 5302 of title 31, United States 
     Code, in connection with any short-, intermediate-, or long-
     term credit facility made available to Mexico after December 
     31, 1994.
       (17) Any document concerning the criteria used by the 
     President or the Secretary of the Treasury (or any designee 
     of the Secretary) in making any decision to use the assets of 
     the exchange stabilization fund to respond to any economic, 
     balance of payments, or exchange crisis in any country and 
     the facts on which such determinations were made with respect 
     to Poland, in 1989, and to Mexico in December of 1994 and 
     early 1995.
       (18) Any document concerning how the use of the assets of 
     the exchange stabilization fund as a source of credit to 
     Mexico compares with all prior uses of the assets of the fund 
     since 1945 for all other countries under section 5302 of 
     title 31, United States Code, with regard to--
       (A) the dollar amount of each transaction;
       (B) the type of the transaction, such as loan, loan 
     guarantee, or swap agreement (as defined in section 
     11(e)(8)(D)(vi) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act);
       (C) the purpose of the transaction, such as whether it was 
     to support the United States dollar, to support a foreign 
     currency, or any other purpose;
       (D) the duration, in years, of the transaction during which 
     any credit was or is permitted to remain outstanding;
       (E) any security or collateral pledged to assure repayment 
     with respect to each such transaction; and
       (F) the existence of any agreement involving the 
     International Monetary Fund or the Board of Governors of the 
     Federal Reserve System in connection with each such 
     transaction and the terms of each agreement by such Fund or 
     Board.
       (19) Any document concerning debts owed by the Government 
     of Mexico and any entity owned or controlled by the 
     Government of Mexico to United States public or private 
     creditors which are outstanding as of the date of the 
     adoption of this resolution, the status of each such debt 
     (including whether such debt has been refinanced), and the 
     collateral or security pledged to assure repayment of such 
     debt.
       (20) Any document concerning an accounting of all the fund 
     flows through the exchange stabilization fund established 
     under section 5302 of title 31, United States Code, during 
     the 24-month period ending on the date of the adoption of 
     this resolution, including the identification of the amount 
     of and purpose for each transaction involving such fund 
     during such period.
       (21) Any document concerning the balance of available 
     assets in the exchange stabilization fund as of the date of 
     the adoption of this resolution.
       (22) Any document concerning the amount by which the total 
     principal amount of loans, loan guarantees, and other 
     extensions of credit which the President has announced will 
     be made available to Mexico exceeds the total amount of 
     available assets in the exchange stabilization fund 
     established under section 5302 of title 31, United States 
     Code, and the means for covering the shortfall, if any.
     [[Page H2446]]   (23) Any document concerning the departure 
     of the International Monetary Fund from the Fund's customary 
     guidelines for country assistance, including any 
     recommendation made by the President or any other officer or 
     employee in the executive branch to the Fund regarding the 
     amount of financial assistance the Fund was preparing to make 
     available to Mexico, and any reciprocal agreement made by the 
     executive branch to the Fund for making such assistance 
     available in an amount greatly in excess of the customary 
     guidelines.
       (24) Any document concerning the factual circumstances 
     pursuant to which the Bank for International Settlements has 
     become a lender to individual countries beyond the Bank's 
     customary role as a clearinghouse for central banks.
       (25) Any document concerning the financial obligations of 
     the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the 
     Bank for International Settlements.
       (26) Any document concerning the relationship among the 
     Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Bank 
     for International Settlements, and the central banks of other 
     countries which are affiliated with such Bank in any manner 
     with regard to assigning or apportioning the ultimate 
     liability for any loss incurred in connection with the 
     extension of credit by such Bank to the Government of Mexico.
       (27) Any document concerning any discrepancy between the 
     amount the President announced is available in the exchange 
     stabilization fund established under section 5302 of title 
     31, United States Code, and the amount shown as being 
     available in such Fund in the monthly statement of the public 
     debt of the United States on December 31, 1994.
       (28) Any document concerning conditions which were put on 
     the credit facilities made available to Mexico through the 
     exchange stabilization fund or the Board of Governors of the 
     Federal Reserve System that were requested by members of the 
     investment community.
  Mr. LEACH (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent 
that the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute be 
considered as read and printed in the Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Iowa?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Leach] is 
recognized for one hour.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, under the Rules and the rule of the House, I 
have been granted as chairman of the committee of jurisdiction 60 
minutes for purposes of debate only. It is my intention to divide the 
time equally with my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Flake].
  Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. LEACH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, the House of Representatives has before it 
House Resolution 80, a privileged resolution of inquiry introduced by 
the gentlewoman from Ohio, Ms. Kaptur, and modified by the committee of 
jurisdiction, particularly under the leadership of Mr. King, who 
introduced a resolution of similar intent.
  House Resolution 80 requests the President to provide the House with 
documents relating to the administration's use of the Exchange 
Stabilization Fund [ESF] and the administration's proposal to stabilize 
the Mexican peso.
  The documents are to be provided no later than 14 days after the 
adoption of the resolution by the House.
  According to rule 22, clause 5, of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives, House Resolution 80 is considered to be a resolution 
of inquiry, which requires the committee of jurisdiction to act on the 
resolution within 14 legislative days after its introduction. House 
Resolution 80 was introduced and referred to the Committee on Banking 
and Financial Services on February 10, 1995, with action taken on 
February 23, 1995.
  Under the rules and precedents of the House, a resolution of inquiry 
is the means by which the House requests information from the President 
of the United States or the head of one of the executive departments.
  According to ``Deschler's Procedure'' it is a ``simple resolution
   making a direct request or demand of the President or the head of an 
executive department to furnish the House of Representatives with 
specific factual information in the possession of the executive 
branch.''

  The effectiveness of a resolution of inquiry derives from the comity 
extended by one branch of government to another, and not from any legal 
obligation.
  Under Rule 22, the practice of the House gives a resolution of 
inquiry a privileged status. To enjoy the privilege a resolution should 
call for facts rather than opinions, should not require investigations, 
and should not present a preamble.
  Turning from procedure to substance and the implicit policy question 
at issue in the resolution--the President's decision to utilize up to 
$20 billion in resources from the ESF to help stabilize the Mexican 
currency and financial system--it is my view that the U.S. government 
has sufficient legal authority to enter into the framework agreements 
signed with the Government of Mexico on February 21. Nevertheless, 
Members on both sides of the aisle have reflected differing views on 
this sensitive issue of judgment.
  Whatever one's perspective on the legal basis of Administration 
decision-making, the scale of the proposed ESF swap and guarantee 
arrangements with Mexico are of such an unprecedented magnitude that 
unprecedented accountability is in order. It is therefore the 
obligation of Congress and the Committee of jurisdiction in particular 
to review how Mexico got into this dilemma and what obligations the 
U.S. Government has undertaken to resolve the crisis. It is also the 
obligation of this Congress to assess why and how Mexico lost its way 
and whether the U.S. government failed to recommend or insist that 
Mexican officials follow a less bumpy road.

       In this regard, let me stress this resolution of inquiry is 
     of a fact-finding nature. It looks to the basis of policy 
     without having the effect of changing administration 
     commitments. Nothing, in other words, in this approach 
     jeopardizes the stabilization package itself. But there 
     should be no doubt that many citizens of the United States as 
     well as of Mexico wonder if their governments let them down 
     and question whether, in a new interrelated financial world, 
     elitist decisions beyond effective citizen control hold 
     consequences for their families' standards of living.

  There also should be no doubt that if the U.S. Government had failed 
to act, an international economic crisis could have been precipitated 
which would have had extraordinary job loss consequences in America and 
around the world.
  Hence the rationale for this resolution, as well as language in the 
Committee report suggesting bipartisan Member interest in ongoing, 
detailed reporting by the Executive Branch on implementation of the 
United States and international financial package for Mexico.
  Here it is the view of this Member that in Mexico a government of 
thoughtful economists made thoughtless economic mistakes. While Mexican 
policymakers were thoroughly correct in pursuing fiscal and 
macroeconomic reforms designed to foster an open market economy, the 
government of Mexico also chose to ignore economic reality throughout 
most of 1994 in order to put off tough economic decisions which might 
have included a higher interest rate or more restrained money supply 
environment or, lack thereof, devaluation of the peso prior to a 
presidential election.
  In this context, one of the lessons of the Mexican financial crisis 
would appear to be that putting off resolution of economic problems of 
a potentially systemic nature generally increases economic costs, in 
this case dramatically. Mexico's attempt to protect the value of what 
the markets determined to be an overvalued peso cost their treasury 
approximately $25 billion, and substituting (dollar-indexed) tesebonos 
for (peso-denominated) cetes cost Mexico a comparable sum. Using public 
monies to protect the pride and ambitions of Mexican politicans thus 
cost the Mexican people almost $50 billion, and precipitated a run on 
the peso that has unfortunate consequences for real personal purchasing 
power and broader economic growth.
  Here in Washington, post mortem assessments of the Mexican crisis 
have featured a clash of two divergent economic perspectives.
  One group of eminent economists has argued that Mexico's decision to 
devalue the peso was inappropriate and should have been avoided at all 
costs.
  While most Americans as well as Mexicans favor a strong Mexican 
currency, the trouble is the government of Mexico squandered some $25 
billion in foreign reserves and incurred another $25 billion liability 
defending the peso against market forces. The U.S. government might 
well have incurred similar liabilities in December 1994 if it had also 
attempted a desperate defense of a fixed peso valuation of 3.5 to the 
dollar, in the aftermath of the Mexican government's decision to 
increase, to the extent that it did, the money supply in 1994.
  The establishmentarian economic view, on the other hand, is far more 
congenial to a floating or flexible exchange rate policy. But here too 
there is a problem for policymakers, in that officials in Mexico City 
refused to allow greater exchange rate flexibility on a timely basis, 
presumably out of concern for electoral backlash. Washington, it would 
appear, capitulated to 
[[Page H2447]] the Mexican government's perspective: perhaps out of a 
desire to subtly influence the Mexican election; perhaps out of a 
desire to avoid destabilizing shocks in the context of consideration of 
NAFTA, ratification of the Uruguay Round, and the December 1994 summit 
of the Americas in Miami; or perhaps because Washington simply didn't 
know that the Mexican central bank had increased the peso supply in 
1984 at a far greater clip than the Federal Reserve had allowed the 
money supply in the United States to grow.
  Whatever the reason and whatever economic camp one is in, Washington 
clearly erred in turning a blind eye or flinching before Mexican 
decision-making. Any defense of the Mexico City-Washington policy in 
1994 with respect to the peso is rooted in a catch-22: a policy of 
fixed exchange rates failed, while a policy of flexible exchange rates 
was implemented in such an untimely and confidence-shattering manner as 
to precipitate a financial crisis.
  The reason this discourse matters and the reason this resolution of 
inquiry is in order is to make clear that abstract macroeconomic 
decision-making holds real consequences for real people, in this case 
the American taxpayer as well as the Mexican public. When the American 
taxpayer is made liable, especially by decisions made outside the 
normal legislative process, it is incumbent that disclosure of all 
relevant facts and perspectives be full and complete. Accordingly, I 
urge passage of the King-Kaptur resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. FLAKE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I commend the Chairman of the Banking Committee, as well 
as the many Members on both sides of the Committee and in the House who 
tirelessly worked on the issue of the Mexico loan guarantee.
  House Resolution 80, the Mexico loan guarantee inquiry, was reported 
out of the Banking Committee last week and has been agreed to by the 
leadership on both sides of the aisle and both sides of the Capitol.
  I must say that some members of the Banking Committee felt that the 
resolution was not necessary in light of the current monthly reporting 
requirements to the Committee. For instance, the Committee is provided 
with a monthly activity report on the Economic Stabilization Fund which 
any Member may access.
  However, on the whole, I believe that the Committee was able to reach 
an agreement that may be acceptable to most Members. Therefore, as the 
ranking member of the Subcommittee on Domestic and International 
Monetary Policy, I support the resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from New Jersey [Mrs. Roukema].
  (Mrs. ROUKEMA asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
here remarks.)
  Mrs. ROUKEMA. Mr. Speaker, the Clinton administration's use of the 
Economic Stabilization Fund to aid the Mexican economy is unprecedented 
and demands oversight and accountability, especially in light of recent 
revelations about the political and economic corruption permeating the 
country of Mexico. Sailing into these unchartered waters with 
guarantees of $20 billion in loans is a rather daunting responsibility. 
However, Congress held numerous hearings on how the United States 
Government should handle the economic crisis in Mexico and could
 not reach any consensus on how to resolve the situation. I firmly 
believe that the executive branch had very little choice but to use the 
Economic Stabilization Fund to ease growing tensions in the global 
financial markets and to restore confidence in the Mexican economy and 
other emerging economies.

  Although the administration's use of the ESF to aid Mexico is 
unusual, I believe that there is sufficient legal authority for it to 
do so and I am pleased that this is an issue that the resolution 
addresses by specifically requiring a legal opinion from the Treasury 
Department. The resolution also seeks a range of documentary materials, 
from the President including those that concern the status of the 
Mexican economy, contacts between the Mexican Government and the 
Treasury Secretary or international lending organizations, 
disbursements from the Exchange Stabilization Fund, and the oil revenue 
guarantees offered by the Mexican Government.
  Given the large amount of money that is being committed by our 
Government to aid Mexico, it is not unreasonable to ask the executive 
branch to account for how the funds are being disbursed to calm any 
suspicions that the American public has over the administration's 
package.
  I support House Resolution 80 because it gives Congress the tools to 
ensure the accountability of the executive branch as it implements its 
plan to stabilize the Mexican economy. Finally, I believe that it is 
critical to the more than 700,000 United States citizens that rely on 
jobs related to exports to Mexico.
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 5 
minutes to the gentlewoman from Ohio [Ms. Kaptur] a former member of 
the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, who is the underlying 
sponsor of this resolution.
  Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York for 
yielding time to me, Mr. Speaker, I also thank the gentleman from Iowa 
[Mr. Leach] and I rise in strong support of House Resolution 80, our 
resolution of inquiry to investigate the $52 billion Mexican rescue 
package.
  Members of Congress should not have had to fight this hard nor wait 
this long to achieve this first vote on a matter of such profound 
economic and political consequence to our people and to our continent.
  Having gotten this far, Mr. Speaker, despite fierce opposition from 
the leadership of this House and the administration is a clear initial 
victory for the American people and our tax-paying public over 
powerful, monied interests who would wish to muzzle our voices.
  I will be entering in the Record an article that appeared in the 
Washington Post today on page C-1, in confirmation of what I am saying.
  Today's vote will be a victory for every working family that obeys 
the laws, pays the taxes, and fights the wars. Today's vote should 
signal a political change to those powerful special interests that have 
for too long written the rules of banking and trade, who have given 
away our jobs, and then had to call on our U.S. Treasury to bail out 
their mistakes.
  Let me remind my colleagues, this is a first vote. We must continue 
our efforts and pass other bills strictly proscribing the authority of 
the executive branch over the Exchange Stabilization Fund, so that it 
can no longer be used as an unauthorized form of back door foreign aid.
  I am proud that this House and this Committee on Banking and 
Financial Services will go on record today as the first branch to begin 
doing its job. The recent action by the U.S. Treasury is absolutely 
unprecedented in both magnitude and duration. It is 20 times larger 
than the largest prior use of this particular fund.
  Never has it been the will of Congress to provide the Executive 
Branch with unlimited authority of this sort. In the past, we have used 
the fund for intervention in exchange markets and for very short-term 
loans, usually bridged to a guaranteed repayment in hard currency.
  No amount of United States taxpayer money will solve Mexico's 
problems, which are rooted in deep-seated political corruption, as 
today's papers remind us, the lack of rule of law, and mismanaged 
economic programs for decades.
                              {time}  1815

  Thus Congress through this resolution must demand answers for our 
people to questions like, what is the full extend of United States 
taxpayers' exposure to the deepening crisis in Mexico?
  Since Mexico owes nearly $200 billion, how deep can the United States 
promise extend?
  Which United States creditors will benefit from the rescue package 
with which Mexico still holds outstanding debts?
  [[Page H2448]] How solid is Mexico's oil pledge as collateral and how 
solvent is Pemex?
  Will there be new U.S. appropriations required to the IMF and the 
Bank for International Settlements?
  The American people have a right to know how their money is being 
risked and spent. Nothing is more important than the integrity of our 
Constitution, the prerogatives of this House which protect the 
interests of all Americans rather than the rich and powerful few.
  Let me say there, four men do not make a House of Representatives.
  If this rescue package is as necessary as we are being told it is, 
then we deserve to have our questions answered.
  As economist Jeff Faux reminds us, there have been other moments in 
our history when Washington's best and brightest led the Nation step by 
step into a disaster. Remember the Vietnam war, when we were assured at 
each stage of the escalation that the new expansion would solve the 
problem?
  With Mexico first came the Brady debt buyout plan, then came NAFTA, 
now comes the bailout.
  As with Vietnam, we have a domino theory. If the peso is not propped 
up, investor confidence will collapse throughout the world, throughout 
Latin America.
  As in Vietnam, commonsense questions go unanswered. If the loan is so 
secure, why are private banks not willing to put up the money?
  As in Vietnam, the mistakes of elites are being paid for by the 
ordinary people of both countries, lost jobs, lost incomes, lost hopes, 
lost business.
  And as with Vietnam, we have had to fight a war in this Chamber to 
even get this vote.
  I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on this resolution requesting 
the executive branch to provide the House not later than 14 days after 
the adoption of this resolution the information we are seeking.
  We must work the will of the people here today. Vote ``yes'' on House 
Resolution 80.
  Mr. Speaker, I include the following for the Record:

               [From the Washington Post, March 1, 1995]

                   Fund Used for Peso Faces Scrutiny

                           (By Clay Chandler)

       When Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin and Federal Reserve 
     Board Chairman Alan Greenspan went to Congress in January 
     asking approval for a $40 billion, U.S.-led bailout for 
     Mexico, several Republican lawmakers offered what they 
     thought was a better idea: Rather than risk a messy political 
     brawl, why not tap the Exchange Stabilization Fund, a little-
     known Treasury Department reserve over which Rubin had almost 
     sole control?
       At a late-afternoon meeting in the office of House Speaker 
     Newt Gingrich (R-Ga), Rubin, Greenspan, and Treasury 
     Undersecretary Lawrence H. Summers dismissed the suggestion 
     as impossible, participants recall.
       But three weeks later, with its bailout proposal mired on 
     Capitol Hill and the Mexican government hurtling toward 
     bankruptcy, the administration abruptly changed its view.
       On Jan. 31, President Clinton announced he was extending 
     the Mexican government an unprecedented $20 billion in loans 
     and loan guarantees--some of them for as long as 10 years--by 
     drawing on the very Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) Rubin 
     had said could not be used.
       Now lawmakers are calling for hearings over whether the 
     administration's use of the obscure Treasury fund violates 
     the law. The Exchange Stabilization Fund ``is not the 
     president's personal piggy bank,'' Senate Banking Committee 
     Chairman Alfonse M. D'Amato (R-N.Y.) thundered in a Senate 
     speech last week.
       On that January afternoon and in subsequent discussions, 
     Rubin, Greenspan and Summers argued that using the fund would 
     stretch the limits of the law and precedent, participants 
     recall. The fund's primary purpose, they said, was for short-
     term currency transactions to bolster the dollar--not to 
     rescue cash-strapped foreign governments. In any case, they 
     calculated the $25 billion fund was too small to address 
     Mexico's problem by itself.
       But as events unfolded, administration officials 
     reconsidered. A last-minute $18 billion offer from the 
     International Monetary Fund, along with the money in the ESF, 
     provided the credit administration officials deemed necessary 
     to stabilize the peso.
       ``They needed a way out . . .'' a House Republican involved 
     in the discussions said of the change: ``They obviously 
     looked at the ESF at the outset and said, `There's no way.' 
     But when pressed, they went back and said, `We haven't been 
     sufficiently creative in our interpretation of the law.'''
       The night before Clinton announced the new rescue plan, 
     Gingrich, House Banking Committee Chairman Jim Leach (R-
     Iowa), Senate Majority Whip Trent Lott (R-Miss.) and Sen. 
     Robert F. Bennett (R-Utah) met and agreed that the 
     administration's bailout plan was in deep trouble. One of the 
     lawmakers telephoned Rubin and raised use of the fund again, 
     according to Treasury and congressional sources.
       Rubin said Greenspan and others had advised him it would be 
     politically unwise to tap the fund without congressional 
     approval. ``What if I told you that no one in Congress is 
     going to complain?'' the lawmaker asked.
       ``That would change things entirely,'' Rubin replied, the 
     sources said.
       But now, members of Congress are complaining. D'Amato has 
     vowed to make the fund's legal status a focus of hearings 
     later this month.
       Last night, a Treasury Department official lamented that 
     ``many members of Congress are now criticizing us for what 
     [other] members asked us to do'' earlier.
       Most of the past fund loans to foreign governments have 
     been for less than $1 billion. The 1934 law establishing the 
     fund restricts loans to foreign governments to six months 
     unless the president ``gives Congress a written statement 
     that unique or emergency circumstances require the loan or 
     credit be for more than six months.''
       Clinton has deemed the Mexican case an emergency, arguing 
     the Latin nation has broad commercial and social links to the 
     United States and a Mexican default might have triggered a 
     global financial meltdown.
       Many legal experts doubt opponents could overturn the 
     administration's decision to lend ESF money to Mexico on 
     strictly legal grounds. The fund is ``under the exclusive 
     control of the secretary,'' the statute states, adding, 
     ``decisions of the secretary are final and may not be 
     reviewed by another officer or employee of the government.''
       That is not likely to silence congressional critics. 
     D'Amato is likely to use hearings to question whether the 
     funds for Mexico are really foreign aid--a use expressly 
     prohibited by law.
       In a 14-page brief to D'Amato's committee, Treasury 
     Department General Counsel Edward S. Knight said, ``Treasury 
     has taken steps to assure that there is a source of 
     repayment'' of the Mexican loans. But the lending agreement 
     Rubin signed with Mexico's government last week describes the 
     Mexican oil proceeds that secure the U.S. loans as ``assured 
     sources of repayment'' rather than collateral--an artful turn 
     of phrase opponents say reflects the shakiness of U.S. claims 
     on Mexico should the country fail to repay its debts.
       Last week, Senate Majority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.), 
     who initially endorsed the use of the ESF, expressed concern 
     about using the fund to prop up the Mexican banking system. 
     ``The Treasury Department needs to be very careful in the use 
     of funds from the Exchange Stabilization Fund,'' Dole said in 
     a statement. ``I am not convinced that thrusting the United 
     States into the middle of a Mexican banking crisis is prudent 
     or necessary.''

  Mr. LEACH. I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from 
Wisconsin [Mr. Roth].
  Mr. ROTH. I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.
  Let me say this. This is one small step in the right direction, one 
very small step. I think it is important for us to get the information 
from the administration. This is a $20 billion bailout. The Republicans 
made a Contract With America and Clinton made a contract with Mexico. 
But I guess what really bothers me is that this is going to be tough on 
the American taxpayer and the people of Mexico. It is a win-win for the 
billionaires. There are more billionaires per capita in Mexico than any 
other country in the world and they are coming out in great shape. They 
took $3 billion out of Mexico before the devaluation. We also find out 
that Templeton, the day before the collapse, took their money out of 
Mexico. All the smart money left Mexico. But Clinton put American 
taxpayers' dollars into Mexico. That is what bothers me. I think it is 
important to point out that this is working Americans' taxpayer 
dollars.
  Mr. Speaker, all the smart money got out of Mexico. Then our 
Government went into Mexico. It is like rowing out to the Titanic and 
getting onto the ship and wondering why everybody else is going the 
other way. This is not smart policy. We are never going to see this $20 
billion. This is a stabilization fund. What happens if our dollar gets 
into trouble? We could have used these billions of dollars to shore up 
our dollar. What happens when our dollar goes down as it has gone down 
in the past? What are we going to do to shore up the dollar? This is 
going to have far-reaching implications.
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 3 
minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Vento].
  Mr. VENTO. I thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. Flake] for 
yielding me the time. I rise in support of House Resolution 80 
introduced by our colleague, the gentlewoman from Ohio.
  [[Page H2449]] Mr. Speaker, earlier in this session we had the 
opportunity to in fact uphold the Speaker's ruling that this measure 
and debate, should be considered by the committee, should be worked on 
and deliberated on by the committee, and I think the committee product 
has improved the measure and reviewed the contents of it.
  The plain intent of this particular inquiry resolution is to deliver 
information to the House of Representatives and to the American people. 
I think that is appropriate.
  I think in the past when Members have asked questions in committee, I 
have found that there often is a rather careless attitude with regard 
to the response of those questions from the members of the committee 
and specifically even when asked at open hearings, that the answers 
come back frankly in a fashion that does not provide timely information 
to the Members.
  Mr. Speaker, I support the actions of the administration in terms of 
attempting to deal with the solution or find a solution to the problem 
with regards to the Mexican economy. I was no fan of NAFTA. I was no 
fan of some of the interventionist activities. But I think what this 
intervention points out is the dynamic nature and the related nature of 
the global economy. Certainly one that is south of our border in 
Mexico, with significant ramifications on the United States economy 
that demands our attention.
  Whether this is the best way to go, through the Exchange 
Stabilization Fund, Mr. Speaker, or through some other international 
facility, I think that really needs to be explored. It is clear to me 
that this was not the first solution proposed. In fact, they tried, and 
that is to say, the administration and the other economic entities, the 
Federal Reserve Board at the Federal level, tried a number of solutions 
to solve this serious problem.
  One solution would have been a loan guarantee proposal acted upon by 
the Congress, and Congress would have had a debate upon that measure. 
But the necessity of acting, the urgency of acting, and the importance 
to the American people eclipsed this proposal. Literally hundreds of 
thousands of jobs depend upon the economic success of Mexico in the 
United States, work in the United States depends upon the viability of 
the Mexican economy.
  I am well aware, and I would agree with my colleagues that point out 
the political instability and the social problems in Mexico. In fact, 
it was the very nature of those concerns that we would like to have 
seen structured in any type of loan guarantee and agreement. But I am 
hopeful that these issues will be taken into consideration.
  This is not only about monetary policy and the peso. It is about 
people in Mexico. It is about human rights. It is about labor. It is 
about the myriad of other issues that affect the Mexican country. We 
all want to see Mexico be successful and to play a positive role.
  The problem with Mexico is not that it is unable or does not have a 
sound economy. It has serious, serious problems as a growing and 
developing nation. It is a sound economy. Mexico has a liquidity 
problem in terms of short-term debt that has caused this crisis, and I 
am confident based on the type of agreement that has been reached that 
we will get our dollars back and these will be legitimate loans.
  I think Congress is entitled to the information requested in this 
resolution of inquiry. We ought to have such data. I commend the 
gentleman, the chairman Leach and the ranking member Flake for their 
work on this matter and urge support for the resolution.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Barr].
  Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, from one end of this deal to the other, it 
does not pass the smell test. It just does not fit, it does not work, 
the pieces do not fit, and what we have heard from this administration 
is just a lot of double talk.
  This resolution, if it passes, will force this administration to 
answer the questions about this deal from the very beginning. Does it 
even have basis in fact? Does it even have basis in law? And at the 
other end, Mr. Speaker, where are the guarantees, where is the road map 
that leads us to recover these moneys when and if this deal goes bad?
  Mr. Speaker, this is an essential first step in forcing this 
administration to come clean on the Mexican bailout. Now, not tomorrow, 
not manana, but now. They have to come clean and let this Government 
and this American people know what they are doing, why they have done 
it, why and on what basis they are proceeding.
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Vermont [Mr. Sanders], a distinguished member of the Committee on 
Banking and Financial Services.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Speaker, as cosponsor of the original Kaptur 
resolution and as somebody who offered I think a very important 
amendment as a part of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services 
markup for this bill, I strongly support this resolution.
  There are three basic points that I would like to make:
  No. 1, at a time when Members of Congress are proposing cutbacks in 
School Lunch Programs, in Breakfast Programs, in programs which hurt 
the most vulnerable people in our society, because the claim is we do 
not have enough money to provide those programs, it seems to me to be 
absolutely irresponsible to put one penny at risk in attempting to bail 
out the unstable Mexican economy and the unstable Mexican Government. 
We have more than enough problems here at home. Let us pay attention to 
those problems.
  Second of all, not only is the concept of the bailout wrong, it is an 
absolute outrage that the President and the Republican leadership would 
suggest that they can make the bailout going through the Exchange 
Stabilization Fund and not come to the U.S. Congress for a debate and a 
vote. It is no secret why they did not come to Congress for a vote, and 
the reason is, they would have lost that vote.
  The third point that I would want to make is, as important as this 
resolution of inquiry is, it is only, and must be understood to be only 
a first step. We have got a long way to go.
  My sincere hope is that the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Leach] will 
allow my legislation, H.R. 867, to be considered by the Committee on 
Banking and Financial Services and come to a vote on the floor. What 
that bill would require is that this bailout package and other uses of 
the Exchange Stabilization Fund must be approved by the U.S. Congress 
and the people before one penny could be spent.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Arizona [Mr. Kolbe] who as always has exerted enormous leadership on 
every issue that affects the state of Mexico.
  Mr. KOLBE. I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support and thank the gentleman the chairman 
of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services for the outstanding 
work that he has done on this. I rise in support of this resolution of 
inquiry. We should know the facts, we should get the information. We 
can make policy only when we have good information in front of us and 
this should be a necessary step.
  But there has been a lot of I think loose facts thrown around on this 
floor, a lot of misinformation in the last few days on this subject, 
and I would like to just concentrate my remarks on one area tonight 
rather than talking specifically about the loan guarantees or the 
package that has been negotiated, the suggestions of the connection 
between what we are doing here or what has happened in Mexico and that 
of free trade itself or the North American Free-Trade Agreement.
  The peso crisis in Mexico was caused by bad monetary policy in that 
country, not by free trade, not by NAFTA. Mexico has been running a 
trade deficit for a number of years. Trade deficits do not cause a 
currency to fall in value. Mexico could finance a trade deficit just as 
we have been financing a trade deficit for 20 years now, because 
foreign investment continues to flow into the country in order to 
finance it.
  Unfortunately, what happened in 1994 was a series of three political 
crises, boom, boom, boom, which hit Mexico, and caused the problem, 
combined with the rise of interest rates in this country which caused 
investment to stop flowing into Mexico, to start flowing out.
  [[Page H2450]] There obviously was a solution to it. The correct but 
the difficult choice for the Mexican Central Bank would have been to 
contract the Mexican money supply to reflect the fall in investment. 
However, that would have caused a recession, a big recession during an 
election year. I am sure it is not unknown to Members of this body that 
we, or the administration, have jawboned the Fed from time to time to 
try to hold down interest rates in an election year.
  There is more independence perhaps for our Fed than there is for the 
Central Bank in Mexico though it now has constitutional guarantees of 
independence, but in any event for political reasons, they did not 
bring down the interest rates. They should have. The answer to the 
problem in Mexico is that they should depoliticize the monetary policy 
as they have their trade policy.

                              {time}  1830

  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Watt], a member of the Committee on 
Banking and Financial Services.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I voted against NAFTA and 
might therefore be expected to be upset about the United States being 
in this predicament and about the administration bailing out Mexico. I 
am upset. I do think the administration ought to give Congress the 
facts about this bailout, but I think this resolution goes too far.
  There is a delicate balance between the branches of Government. The 
executive branch is required to give us facts but the precedents do not 
give us the right to demand opinions. This resolution does that in 
several respects.
  While it is important for us to get the facts, it is also important 
for someone to stand up for our Constitution and to remind us that the 
separation of powers is an important part of our form of government.
  As usual, I will stand for our Constitution, even though I agree with 
the spirit of this resolution. This resolution simply goes too far.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
distinguished gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Bartlett].
  (Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of 
House Resolution 80.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Stearns].
  (Mr. STEARNS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Speaker, does an economy exist to serve a society or 
vice versa? Argentina's Minister for Finance put it well when he said 
that each unit of currency is an explicit contract between the 
government and the ordinary holder of currency. It is supposed to 
remain stable through a specified period of time.
  Following that logic, a purposeful devaluation breaks that contract. 
If that is so, Mexico has breached this contract and I submit some 
questions should be answered. And I compliment the chairman of the 
Committee on Banking and Financial Services for his resolution.
  The Mexican Government should not get any more money, not one cent 
because they have broken their contract with their people. Please take 
a look at my chart and see how the rate of the peso to dollar has 
dropped every month since 1994, including a significant plunge from 
3.45 to 4.0 in December alone. In January it dropped 5.58 and on 
February 21, after the announced signing of the President's loan 
package of $20 billion. The Mexican markets tumbled still lower, and 
frankly, my friends, I have a little ribbon at the bottom there because 
I think the market is going to go even further.
  Officials in Mexico concede now there has been no indication of a 
turnaround in investor confidence since last week's signing of the 
United States $20 billion loan guarantee package. The Government of 
Mexico must be charged with addressing the irregularities in its own 
contract before asking the United States, American citizens to support 
any further bailout.
  The President of Mexico might find it convenient to blame the 
devaluation on the rebels, investor pullout, political instability or 
some other factor, but it has become evident that there were clear 
signs of deficits indicated early in 1994. The administration should 
have known that. For whatever reason, be it political gain for whatever 
reason or the financial gain of Wall Street, now the average working 
American and the average working Mexican now must pay for this 
devaluation.
  So I support the resolution, and I am glad it finally came to the 
House floor.
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Oregon [Mr. DeFazio].
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  No relationship to NAFTA? I heard it early on the floor. The United 
States has entered into an agreement to ship $20 billion to Mexico. We 
are propping them up through the Bank for International Stabilization, 
the International Monetary Fund.
  How much taxpayer money is at risk? No relationship to NAFTA? This is 
all about the failed NAFTA, and a bunch of people trying to cover their 
derrieres because the things we predicted would come about if we 
entered into this agreement have come about.
  What authority was used to enter into this agreement? Never before in 
the history of the Economic Stabilization Fund, 60 years, has this kind 
of credit been extended to a foreign power. In fact, when it was first 
suggested by the Republican leadership to the administration that they 
use the Economic Stabilization Fund they said it was impossible. It was 
only later that the administration switched its position.
  What terms? Twenty billion dollars. How much of the BIS money is our 
money? How much of the IMF money is our money? How much are the U.S. 
taxpayers on the line in this backdoor bailout?
  What security? The oil security, the oil funds that are already 
totally pledged by the company that has no money even to make capital 
investments because they are so oversubscribed to meet other 
obligations in Mexico? That is security?
  Who benefits? We need the names of each and every business and 
individual who receives a disbursement that is related to these bailout 
funds. The American taxpayers have that right.
  We will begin to answer some of those questions, only begin with this 
resolution of inquiry. We must go further. We need to restrict the use 
of this fund in the future to supporting the U.S. currency and the 
interests of the United States of America, not foreign authoritarian 
regimes that are creating billionaires and disasters south of our 
border.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from New York [Mr. King], who has probably contributed as 
much to this resolution as anybody, along with the gentlewoman from 
Ohio [Ms. Kaptur].
  Mr. KING. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  At the very outset I want to commend Chairman Leach for his 
leadership in this and the gentlewoman from Ohio, Ms. Kaptur, for the 
leadership she has shown, indeed, the bipartisan spirit of the 
Committee on Banking and Financial Services which brought this 
resolution to the floor.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a critical time in America's history and if you 
are on one side of NAFTA or the other the fact is this resolution is 
imperative, because this will allow the American people to see exactly 
what went on, to see exactly what American policy has been toward 
Mexico, what Mexican policy has been, what the role of the IMF has 
been, what the role of the Treasury Department has been, and also 
exactly what authority the President had to use the funds. These are 
very real, serious questions.
  I think the President should have shown more leadership. If he 
thought this was in the national interest then the President of the 
United States had the obligation to go to the American people and make 
sure they understood where he was coming from. The fact was he did make 
an arrangement which the American people see to be behind closed doors, 
so it is absolutely imperative this resolution be adopted so all 
documents and all data are made available to the American people.
  I urge adoption of the resolution.
  [[Page H2451]] Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Visclosky].
  Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of House Resolution 80.
  As an original cosponsor of the Kaptur resolution of inquiry, I am 
very concerned about maintaining the balance of power between the 
executive and legislative branches of government. I am also very 
concerned about safeguarding this institution's prerogative of the 
purse.
  Today's vote is our first real opportunity to protect America's 
wallets and reclaim our constitutional authority regarding the Mexican 
bailout. Given the magnitude of the Mexican bailout and the exposure of 
the American taxpayers I believe that congressional approval should 
have been sought originally. Sure, it would have been a tough sell. But 
coming in after something goes wrong will be impossible.
  Barring that, the disclosure called for in this resolution of inquiry 
is eminently reasonable.
  I urge passage of the resolution so that we can find out what the 
Mexican bailout really means for the American taxpayers.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Fox].
  Mr. FOX. Mr. Speaker, this resolution is certainly vital to all of 
the interests of individuals in every single State. The fact is that we 
saw an action by the President without any kind of congressional 
involvement regarding the problems dealing with Mexico and with the 
drug trafficking and with the immigration problems. This resolution 
will give us for the first time the information behind the President's 
request for the funds, behind the President's $20 billion guarantee of 
funds for Mexico.
  Frankly, it is appropriate. We need to know on what basis the 
President has made these assertions, why he has used the money, and 
what is really happening with it and in fact what is happening with 
Mexico and what is going forward.
  Congress deserves to have the answers, and by moving forward with the 
resolution, the American people will have those answers to go about our 
business.
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
  (Mr. TRAFICANT asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, the Treasury was there, the Federal 
Reserve was there, the International Monetary Fund was there, the Bank 
of International Settlement was there, the Exchange Stabilization Fund 
was there. The banks of Mexico and their representatives were there. 
Basically, Wall Street and their representatives were there. Everyone 
was there at that table except the American people, because the 
Congress of the United States keeps turning the other cheek and the 
White House just keeps servicing all of the cheeks they can in 
Congress.
  Beware, Congress, a new autocracy is emerging in what was once a 
democracy in America. Think about it.
  A President declared war in Vietnam, a President enacted two major 
trade agreements, NAFTA and GATT, without a two-thirds vote of the 
Senate, and now a President is bailing out another sovereign country, 
and I do not blame the President. I blame Congress, from Johnson 
through Clinton, for taking the power of the people and the 
Constitution and handing it to the White House, giving it to the White 
House, and then complaining for what they do.
  Thomas Jefferson is rolling over in his grave. We are not Members of 
Congress. We are nothing more than trustees. Now we are going to give 
him a line-item veto. He makes book with 34 Senators, he does not even 
call Mr. Flake, he does not call Mr. Leach. He does not need to 
anymore.
  We have gone too far, Congress, and I do not blame the President. I 
blame Congress, and this should not have happened without the people's 
representatives, duly elected, being there to approve it. And that 
President was going to ask, but our congressional leaders, both 
Republican and Democrat, gave him the wink, gave him the nod, and said 
go ahead on it because it is too hot for us.
  Well, let me tell you what is so hot, folks. We are just turning over 
the Constitution and shredding it about as good as they did in Iran-
Contra.
  I am just one voice here but I will not have any congressional 
leaders giving a wink and a nod with my vote, and I am not going to 
surrender my voting card to anybody around here.
  This new autocracy within our democracy is real. I think it is time 
that we get down to business. I want to commend the gentlewoman from 
Ohio who has done a great job, and the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Leach],
 who has been very fair. I am going to support this resolution, but it 
is not enough. In the future, ladies and gentlemen, the President 
should be scared not to confer with the Congress of the United States 
and get its blessing through a duly recorded vote. If we learned 
anything about Vietnam that is the lesson we should have learned.

  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton], chairman of the Latin American 
Subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me this time. Let me just say I concur with much of what my 
colleague from Ohio just said. The fact of the matter is none of this 
should have happened in the first place. It should have been brought 
before the Congress for an up or down vote right from the get-go, but 
unfortunately the President found that he did not have the votes to 
pass it. Eighty percent of the American people did not want this to 
take place. And so what did they do? They did an end run around the 
Congress of the United States and they used the Exchange Stabilization 
Fund, I believe illegally, to bail out Mexico. As has been said here 
before, the peso continues to drop.
  Let me just tell Members something. I believe, and I think I have 
heard today, that $7 billion has already been sent to Mexico, and while 
this resolution today, this resolution of inquiry is absolutely 
essential so we can get the facts for the American people, it certainly 
is not enough and we need to act very expeditiously in this Chamber to 
cut off additional funds from going down there.
  What I am afraid is going to happen is this resolution of inquiry is 
going to go on for weeks and months before we get all of the facts, and 
more and more and more of American taxpayer dollars are going to go 
down there during the interim.
  We need to bring legislation to this floor immediately, cutting off 
any more money going to Mexico until we get the answers to these 
questions. We have got it backward. We should stop the money from going 
down there first, then get the answers to the questions before we send 
one more dime down there.

                              {time}  1845

  I fear the $7 billion that has already been sent is down a rat hole, 
and we are talking about another $45 billion on top of it, not $45 
million, folks, 45 thousand-million-American dollars. The taxpayers of 
this country do not want it.
  That country is in real economic turmoil, and we simply cannot afford 
to use taxpayers' dollars to bail them out, especially when we do not 
have all the facts.
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Missouri [Ms. Danner].
  Ms. DANNER. Mr. Speaker, this agreement to provide $20 billion 
dollars of taxpayer money for loans and loan guarantees to Mexico is 
simply an end-run around the wishes of the American people. In fact, if 
the United States' share of the total $50 billion package is included, 
the amount of our financial exposure is substantially higher than $20 
billion.
  Unless there is a fundamental change in the stability of Mexico, this 
package will, at best, delay the final day of reckoning. Each time the 
United States comes to Mexico's rescue, it encourages the Mexican 
Government to continue to make irresponsible economic decisions.
  Just as some see welfare as encouraging reckless behavior, so too 
does this $20 billion welfare check given to Mexico. Unlike welfare, 
however, this 
[[Page H2452]] money will ultimately go to the Wall Street and 
international investors who, until this crisis erupted, were receiving 
handsome returns on their investments. These individuals did not share 
their profits with the American taxpayers, but they wish to shift any 
losses!
  The American people know when their pocket is being picked and they 
resent it, as do many of us in the Congress.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Funderburk].
  Mr. FUNDERBURK. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of House 
Resolution 80 and I urge the House to quickly get to the bottom of the 
deal between Wall Street and the PRI regime in Mexico City.
  Mr. Speaker, on November 8, the American people voted for less taxes 
and smaller more efficient government. They expect no less in our 
conduct of foreign policy. The people of my district instinctively 
recognize that the proposed bailout of Mexico is a massive subsidy for 
the disastrous economic decisions made by Wall Street and dishonest 
Mexican politicians.
  Mr. Speaker, this is not the first time we have ``rescued'' Mexico. 
Each time we have ``saved'' the Mexican economy, the Mexican government 
refused to reform itself. Remember, the same party has ruled Mexico for 
80 years. The government is rife with corruption, just yesterday the 
brother of the last President of Mexico was arrested for masterminding 
the assassination of a reform presidential candidate. What there is of 
a modern economy is dominated by state owned monopolies. The latest 
Mexican administration promised it would never turn its back on its 
investors. But what did it do. One week into office, the Mexican 
Government pulled the plug on the peso, sending its value plummeting by 
30 percent and leaving Wall Street holding the bag. Rather than pay for 
their mistakes, the financiers now demand that the taxpayers bail out 
Mexico to pay off their own bad investments.
  Mr. Speaker something is seriously wrong here. What sort of message 
is sent when Washington insists that holders of high risk securities 
are bailed out by the taxpayers? When the Secretary of the Treasury 
worked for Goldman Sachs, his firm didn't share with the people the 
massive profits it earned when it was making a fortune speculating in 
Mexico in the 1980's. The same system which rewarded his old firm 
should also work to penalize his former colleagues who gambled and 
lost--once again--on the Mexican government. And I ask Mr. Speaker, why 
was a man whose former company is the largest underwriter of Mexican 
stocks allowed the keys to the people's treasury.
  Mr. Speaker, if Mexican corruption was not enough, what does this 
administration have to say about the PRI's ties to Cuba. According to 
the Wall Street Journal, Mexico's state run communications, textile, 
and oil monopolies have invested billions in Castro's economy. The 
Mexican government is rushing to buy into everything Castro has to 
sell. Mexico's investments in Cuba appear to be all that is keeping 
Castro afloat and yet there are many in this town who see nothing wrong 
with letting Mexico City off the hook while it conducts business as 
usual with Havana.
  Mr. Speaker, we have had enough of broken Mexican promises on trade, 
monetary, and free market reforms. I have heard from the people in my 
district. They are angry. I say this respectfully but, they tell me 
that if the new Republican majority quietly goes along with the Clinton 
bailout, it should be prepared to suffer a backlash from the voters. As 
I have noted on this floor, Main Street Dunn, North Carolina has had 
enough of picking up the cost for other peoples' rashness. It is 
finally time to end the folly of taxpayer funded giveaways to regimes 
which do nothing but thumb their noses at the American people.
  There must be a vote in this Chamber on the White House unilateral 
action to fund the bailout, but today, Mr. Speaker, let us support the 
King-Kaptur resolution as the first step in the process of getting to 
the bottom of the bailout.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Foley].
  (Mr. FOLEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, in 1920 Will Rogers said, ``Let Wall Street 
have a nightmare, and the whole country has to help them get back in 
bed again.'' Well, Wall Street had a nightmare in December. The 
nightmare started as poor monetary policy in Mexico. The peso plunged, 
bond prices dropped. Wall Street speculators were left holding bad 
investments, and now, just like Will Rogers said 75 years ago, we are 
going to help get them back in bed.
  We are bailing out Mexican bankers and Wall Street millionaires. But 
what are we doing for the people in America?
  In Washington, the symbolic center of our country, we tell our Mayor, 
Marion Barry, to go up to New York and borrow money for himself; Orange 
County, CA, we tell them, ``Sorry, folks, the administration is too 
busy helping things south of the border.'' Never mind Orange County 
faces a $3 billion loss, or a thousand county-funded jobs at risk, jobs 
and services for American citizens. Our own people struggle while we 
plead special interests and bail out Mexico.
  What has Mexico become? The 51st State? What conditions have been 
made a part of this agreement?
  Let me tell you one of them. We are requiring Mexico to have a 
surplus by 1995. The same administration failed to do that and 
criticizes a balanced budget in this country.
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Klink].
  Mr. KLINK. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time and for his kindness in this matter.
  As an original cosponsor of this resolution, I rise today in strong 
support of House Resolution 80. I join my dear friend, the gentleman 
from the State of Ohio [Mr. Traficant], in stating it is high time 
Congress step forward and do what duty demands of Congress. It is high 
time that we on the floor of this House debate the Mexican bailout.
  It is not up to the President of the United States to have the 
ability to commit billions upon billions of dollars as he has done in 
this instance without congressional approval. This, ladies and 
gentlemen, is a reverse Robin Hood action. This is stealing from the 
poor to give to the rich. This is taking from poor taxpayers, giving to 
rich Wall Street investors, who went down to Mexico after NAFTA was 
approved, and when the peso was devalued, they lost some of their 
investment. Now we are being asked to go down there and bail them out.
  But at the same time, as the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] 
pointed out a little bit earlier, we are saying we have to cut back on 
educational funds, we have to cut down on school lunches, and we have 
to cut down on veterans' benefits, but we have got all kinds of 
billions of dollars to take down to Mexico.
  I ask, where was all this money, where was this concern from 
Washington, DC, when the steel industry collapsed in this Nation? When 
was there as American bailout when the glass industry, the electronics 
industry, and many other industries across this country went down? When 
was there an American bailout? When did we bail our the American people 
of this country?
  Yet we are being told this is for the benefit of the American 
taxpayers.
  We are now willing to provide all of this money to a country that is 
rife with human-rights abuses. It has a banking industry that appears 
to be heavily involved in international drug trade, and may well be on 
the brink of civil war and whose national leaders, according to the 
front page of today's paper, are going around plotting each other's 
assassination.
  This resolution today is the first step in answering some very 
important questions. Will Mexico be able to make good on their end of 
the deal? What will Mexico do to prevent another crisis? Who is really 
benefiting from this bailout?
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Chabot].
  Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose President Clinton's Mexican 
bailout schemes and to support this factfinding resolution.
  [[Page H2453]] It is time the White House came clean. What did the 
Clinton administration know about Mexico, and when did they know it? 
Who are the private speculators who benefit from this deal?
  The American taxpayers have a substantial interest in this bailout, 
and they deserve some honest answers from this administration.
  As a member of the Committee on International Relations, I frankly 
was appalled when high administration officials ducked our hearings on 
this scandal, but apparently they wanted to keep the public in the 
dark. The administration's handling of this matter smacks of a backroom 
deal. In fact, it stinks.
  President Clinton has tried to go behind our backs. So it is time to 
go over his head right to the American people. This House represents 
the taxpayers. We are responsible for spending decisions, or at least 
that is what the Constitution says.
  Let us win one for the American people. Pass this resolution.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from California [Mr. Rohrabacher].
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I support this resolution.
  But let us not kid ourselves. We do not need more information., We 
need to stop this bailout. We have the power in Congress to stop it, 
and we are not. Instead, we are asking for information.
  The American people see what we are trying to do here in the last few 
weeks. We have been trying to balance the budget. Here we are, we are 
struggling. We are struggling to cut spending here and cut spending 
there, trying not to hurt our own people, trying to cut down on some 
programs, knowing that our people have come to depend upon them, but 
realizing that a balanced budget is so important both to our own people 
but to their children. It is important for us to balance our budget, 
yet we are cutting programs on which our people and their children 
depend.
  It is a betrayal of the interest of our own people, the American 
people, for us to cut spending here in the Congress of the United 
States while sending other funds in the tens of billions of dollars to 
Mexico or to give it to Wall Street speculators. The American people 
have a right to expect more from us.
  If we are not watching out for their interests, who is watching out 
for their interest?
  Spending tens of billions of dollars without so much as a vote of 
Congress is a violation of everything that this democratic government 
is supposed to be about, and it is a violation and betrayal of the 
trust that has been put in us by the American people. Our people have 
borne the burden for other people in this world for far too long. Now 
we insult them after the cold war is over, after they bore the burden 
of the cold war, after they bore the burden of stopping Nazism and 
Japanese fascism, and now we insult them by asking for information 
instead of asking for a direct vote in stopping this bailout and the 
use of tens of billions of dollars that should be going to the benefit 
of our people, but instead are going to Wall Street speculators and 
foreigners.
  It is a disgrace.
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman 
from Ohio [Ms. Kaptur].
  Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I would ask the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Rohrabacher] if he would be kind enough to take a microphone. I 
would like to enter into a colloquy with him, and perhaps the gentleman 
from Texas [Mr. Stockman].
  I think it is maybe perhaps important for us to explain to the 
membership and to the listening public that the only way we could get 
any vote on this matter was to enter a privileged resolution 2 weeks 
ago asking the Committee on Banking and Financial Services to discharge 
this bill to the floor. They had 14 days in which to do that, and we 
thank the chairman, the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Leach], and the 
ranking member, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Flake], for doing 
that.
  Our wish would be to have a straight vote on disallowing the use of 
the Exchange Stabilization Fund for this purpose and to stop 
appropriated moneys and those funds from outflowing without a vote of 
Congress. We want a vote.
  The fact is our own leadership on both sides of the aisle have not 
agreed to give us that vote. So I think it is important for the 
membership to understand this is a base hit. It is not a home run, but 
at least we are at first base.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. KAPTUR. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. I agree with you. There is an elite in the United 
States of America who think that they own this country, and they do not 
own this body.
  We may be spending tens of billions of dollars right now, but the 
people will be heard. This is the first step toward making sure that 
the people's voice holds sway in Washington, DC, and the Nation's 
Capital.
  Those Americans who are listening to us right now should make sure 
that they contact their Representative and write the White House and 
make sure that the leaders here in Congress and in the executive branch 
get the message that we have got to stop shoveling money south of the 
border, stop paying off Wall Street speculators.
  They want a balanced budget. The American people want a balanced 
budget. And we are betraying everything that they want.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Members are advised to address the 
Chair, not the listening audience.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Just to finish this, they should be contacting their 
representative in the White House. We can get a vote on this, and we 
can turn it around.

                              {time}  1900

  Ms. KAPTUR. I yield the remaining time to the gentleman from Texas 
[Mr. Stockman].
  However, prior to that, I mention on page C-1 of the Washington Post 
today House Speaker Newt Gingrich, Treasury Secretary Rubin, Alan 
Greenspan, Undersecretary Lawrence Summers were heavily involved in 
this agreement. We need to know what their involvement was, as well.
  Mr. STOCKMAN. Mr. Speaker, I just want to tell the gentlewoman from 
Ohio [Ms. Kaptur] how grateful we are to her to get this ball rolling. 
I think for many Members of Congress it has been a real frustration, 
and the gentlewoman has taken the lead in that effort.
  Mr. LEACH. I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss].
  (Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GOSS. I thank the gentleman from Iowa for yielding time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution of inquiry on the 
President's aid package to Mexico, and I urge support for the 
resolution of the gentleman from Iowa.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution of inquiry into the 
President's aid package to Mexico. Immediately following the 
announcement of the first $40 billion proposal, I notified
 Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin of some specific concerns I 
have with regard to the implementation of NAFTA, the bailout proposal, 
and United States relations with Mexico. These included the question of 
having adequate guarantees to protect United States taxpayers and 
interests, the question of why a $40 billion aid package for Mexico and 
Mexicans took a higher priority than NAFTA casualties in the United 
States, and the concern that Americans were being asked to bail out 
Mexico so that Mexico can continue to bail out Fidel Castro's brutal 
regime in Cuba. While Secretary Rubin has responded to my letter, his 
response failed to directly address the specific points I raised. In 
fact, there are a lot of unanswered questions about this deal and many 
Americans, myself included, remain deeply troubled by the fact that the 
administration did not make its case for the bailout to the Congress. 
While the executive branch has the authority to make the bailout deal 
with Mexico, I support Chairman Leach's resolution because there is a 
clear need for congressional oversight of the process. Mr. Speaker, it 
is time for some real answers from the Clinton administration.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
chairman of the Committee on International Relations, the gentleman 
from New York [Mr. Gilman].
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  [[Page H2454]] Mr. Speaker, I rise in support House Resolution 80 
requesting the President to submit information to the House concerning 
the actions of this administration to support the Mexican peso.
  Its adoption will ensure that we will have the documents we need to 
evaluate the condition of the Mexican economy and the use of the funds 
from the Treasury Department's Exchange Stabilization Fund.
  With this information, the Congress and the American people can be 
the judge of whether this unprecedented financial support package is 
warranted in light of our close relations with Mexico.
  Opponents and proponents alike of the $20 billion economic support 
package for Mexico agree that this measure is needed to determine what 
other institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, and the 
Bank for International Settlements are doing to assist the United 
States in bringing Mexico back to financial health.
  Next week, the International Relations Committee will hold its third 
round of hearings on the Mexican economic crisis with high-level 
officials from the Treasury and the State Department with the goal of 
requiring this administration to put on the record the results of its 
intensive discussions with the Mexican Government in such areas 
immigration, democratic reform, law enforcement, drug interdiction and 
the extent of Mexico's commercial relations with Cuba.
  Our efforts in this hearing will further the same goals advanced by 
the authors of this legislation. They will both lead to a broad public 
inquiry into the proposed economic package to Mexico. I urge the 
adoption of this resolution.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Sanford].
  Mr. SANFORD. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution because I think it 
is an appropriate first step in our beginning to correct this 
misallocation of U.S. taxpayer funds.
  I think at the core, what we are dealing with is a constitutional 
issue because, in the past, Congress has made other loans, whether to 
Lockheed, Chrysler or New York City or Israel, but in every instance we 
came on down to the floor of this House and argued that point.
  Now, for the first time, we are talking about having the President go 
out and appropriating funds. If you look at the Exchange Stabilization 
Fund, what you find is that in the past it has been used for about 2\1/
2\ months. Now a longer period, 40 times longer, of 10 years.
  Now, in the past we have seen loan amounts of about $250 million. In 
this case, it is something like 80 times greater than that, with a loan 
of $20 billion.
  It does not pass the commonsense test, and I think this resolution 
moves us in the right direction.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stockman].
  Mr. STOCKMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I am very happy that this bill is here today, but I 
think it was so eloquently stated that this is only the first base. 
This Congress is responsible to the American people, and we have been 
left out of the process.
  When people call us and tell us how they feel and we turn our backs, 
they know the institution is broken. Yet time and time again we are 
called upon to do the right thing, and we run and hide. We have been 
working very hard to get this vote, an up or down vote, to cut off 
funding, and yet they are not allowing us to vote. That is wrong.
  We need to do the right thing here and the right thing for America 
and allow us to speak the will of the people. I think the will of the 
people will say no money for a country in which its president's brother 
was willing to participate in an assassination. The government is 
corrupt, the system is corrupt, and we do not need to subsidize it with 
American dollars.
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to myself for the purpose 
of yielding to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Vento].
  Mr. VENTO. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I had spoken earlier, and I again reiterate my support 
for this resolution of inquiry. I think it is important that this House 
of Representatives, with this new majority on this day, is standing up 
for the prerogatives of the House of Representatives and for the 
Congress in general.
  I think many of us have been concerned that the actions, while maybe 
well-intentioned, have tended to, in fact, question or limit or shed 
the powers of Congress which are so necessary as such powers come from 
the people we represent and provide us the opportunity to exercise the 
responsibilities that we have sworn to uphold.
  I think the issue here, Mr. Speaker, is one of great concern with 
regard to the Exchange Stabilization Fund. This fund, as Members know, 
the dollars there have been appropriated in years past, and those 
dollars obligated at the prerogative of the administration and other 
executive officers who in fact, expend and use these funds. The United 
States/Mexican agreement is a use of the E.S.F. fund that is 
unprecedented. However, going back some 20
 years, Congress has granted this utilization to deal with exchange and 
other types of economic problems that are occurring in global markets 
around the world.

  These issues, what happens south of the border, are very important to 
our economy. Upholding the U.S. economy in this manner is a legitimate 
and significant concern to the administration and the American people. 
The administration, in this particular case, had sought to have a less 
far reaching initiative to deal with Mexican peso crisis. In one 
instance, the President did submit a request for guaranteed loan for 
the Government of Mexico and for this particular problem.
  I think it should be pointed out that none of these dollars, many of 
these dollars will not, in fact, be outstanding, that they are loans, 
they are safeguarded with Mexican assets. We are hopeful. According to 
the agreement signed, or the intention signed, by President Clinton, 
Senate Majority Leader Dole, Speaker Gingrich, Leader Gephardt, and by 
Leader Daschle, these issues will, in fact-- and they do agree that the 
provisions of this agreement--will be workable.
  I would hope many of my colleagues are going to be satisfied with the 
information and answers from the questions they pose.
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished 
committee chairman for the purpose of yielding to the gentleman from 
Tennessee [Mr. Duncan].
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the distinguished gentleman from 
Tennessee [Mr. Duncan].
  Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank both gentlemen for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the President's bailout 
of Mexico and in strong support of this resolution. I am proud to be an 
original cosponsor.
  I especially want to commend the work of the gentlewoman from Ohio 
[Ms. Kaptur] on this resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, our first obligation should be to the American 
taxpayers, not to the taxpayers of Mexico.
  Mr. Speaker, Lawrence Kudlow, the economics editor for National 
Review, wrote recently:

       Voters who want smaller and more frugal government at home, 
     with a new emphasis on personal responsibility, expect no 
     less in our policy dealings abroad. Broken Mexican promises 
     on trade, money, and free market reforms should not be 
     rewarded with a big government bailout. Sound money and sound 
     fiscal policies are the only lasting answers.

  Mr. Speaker, A.M. Rosenthal, the New York Times columnist, who would, 
I am sure, classify himself as a political liberal, said:

       Could it be that the Administration had so enthusiastically 
     promoted Mexico that it would have been terribly 
     embarrassing--an election coming up and all--to disclose that 
     Mexico suddenly could not go on backing up its pesos and 
     bonds unless the United States offered heavy loans to bail 
     out investors?
       This mess was created by the cowardice of bureaucrats and 
     the mistakes of investors, theirs and ours. Americans would 
     be foolish--I am being exquisitely polite today--if they 
     agreed to any loan before they found out which American and 
     Mexican investors would be the big beneficiaries.

  I say let us stand up for the taxpayers of this country and not bail 
out the billionaires on Wall Street and in Mexico.

[[Page H2455]]

  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
distinguished gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. Bunning].
  (Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in very reluctant support of this resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in very reluctant support of this 
resolution which amounts to after-the-fact oversight of Mr. Clinton's 
end run around the Congress. I only wish that Members of Congress had 
an opportunity to vote on a bill to force Mr. Clinton to cancel his 
dictator-style use of the taxpayers' money.
  Unfortunately, we are forced to settle for this too little, too late 
resolution that is even less than a slap on the wrist for an 
unprecedented power grab by the President. It sickens me that this body 
is going along quietly with it.
  For anyone who was not watching, the President could not get enough 
support in Congress to go along with his scheme to put the American 
taxpayer on the line to bail out the Mexican Government. So, he went 
ahead on his own and raided the exchange stabilization fund to the tune 
of $20 billion to subsidize the bad decisions of the Mexican Government 
and big Wall Street investment firms.
  Now, after the dirty deed has been done, we offer up a resolution to 
request a few documents from the White House and the Treasury. We will 
go through the motions of reviewing what Mr. Clinton and Treasury 
Secretary Rubin have done and in the meantime the American taxpayer is 
left holding the IOU.
  I am certain that Secretary Rubin had no concern for the financial 
interests of his old partners at Goldman, Sachs & Co., one of the big 
Wall Street investment firms, when this deal was brokered. I am sure 
that his only motive was to serve his country.
  Mr. Speaker, I will be interested to see the President's explanation 
of how he has the authority to obligate billions of dollars without 
congressional approval. His actions seem to fly directly in the face of 
the Constitution and they undoubtedly are not what the Congress and the 
American people wanted.
  In fact, the President would seem to have many questions to answer. 
How can he justify raiding the exchange stabilization fund which was 
designed to protect the dollar? What does he intend to do if, after 
taking $20 billion of the $27 billion in the fund, the dollar gets into 
trouble in the foreign exchange markets? How does he intend to 
replenish the fund? What actions will he take to make sure that Mexico 
changes its economic practices to insure that there is no repeat of the 
peso disaster? The list could go on ad nauseam.
  As representatives of the American people we are entitled to answers 
to these questions. The President may well have broken the law in 
obligating the funds from the exchange stabilization fund and Congress 
is obliged to raise the issue and thoroughly investigate.
  I applaud my good friend from Alabama, Spencer Bachus, the chairman 
of the Banking Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, for calling 
for hearings into this matter. This little half-hearted resolution 
should not be the end of the inquiry. It is barely the beginning.
  Good intentions are not the same as good results no matter how much 
Mr. Clinton and his followers wish that it was so. His supposedly good 
intentions appear to this Kentuckian to be a bold-faced grab at 
congressional power. We cannot and must not let that challenge to 
congressional control of the purse go unanswered.
  I will vote for this feeble resolution but only in anticipation that 
it is the first step toward resolving this constitutional conflict, not 
the last.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, and I yield 30 seconds 
to the distinguished gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Coble].
  Mr. COBLE. I thank the gentleman from Iowa for yielding this time to 
me.
  Mr. Speaker, I just came onto the floor. I have heard none of the 
debate, but I say to you that many people have blamed this chaos on 
NAFTA. NAFTA has nothing to do with it. This involves sloppy fiscal 
mismanagement in Mexico and should be cleaned up there.
  I have referred to this episode as Pesogate. And I think the time has 
come to open wide Pesogate to allow us to closely examine every minute 
detail surrounding it.
  I thank the gentleman from Iowa for yielding, and I thank the 
gentlewoman from Ohio for her work in this effort.
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, recognizing the majority's right to close, I 
would like to yield the remaining time to myself for closing debate.
  Mr. Speaker, today I realize why so many people have risen and made, 
in spite of their support for this particular resolution, have also 
stated correctly that there are many problems in America that need to 
be resolved. It is my hope that, as we have been able to come together 
and put together a bipartisan bill for purposes of moving ourselves to 
the point of the right position for those of us who are Members of 
Congress, we might also do the same thing as we look at the many 
problems which are endemic to the communities here in America.
  I think, as we talk about loan guarantees in particular and we look 
at ways by which we might be able to solve and resolve many of the 
crises existing in our urban communities, which is America's Third 
World country, and some of them even in our rural communities, there is 
a necessity for us to also have the same kind of aggressiveness and 
same kind of vigilance as we try to solve the problems here at home.
  I think most Americans would be more than willing to support any 
enterprise that we develop that would assist our neighbors. But I think 
good charity indeed begins at home, and because of that many of our 
citizens would be more comfortable in supporting even an endeavor like 
this if they were not losing jobs, if they did not see their 
communities deteriorating, if they did not see their children starving, 
if they did not see educational systems that are in a state of 
shambles, if they did not see all around the criminal element which has 
been allowed to run rampant in our streets.
  If we make the best uses of our resources, it seems that we ought to 
start at home, which means providing a level of stability for every 
citizen so they understand that the responsibility of government is to 
try to bring them the quality of life that is consistent with our 
talking about our being a democracy.
  More importantly, even as we export that democracy to other countries 
abroad, we ought to do all in our power to make sure that it is the 
essence of a quintessential nation which understands the process by 
which all citizens are included.
  If we can do that, I believe we can move forward better supporting 
other nations. I would support this resolution along with others, Mr. 
Speaker, and I would hope that the day will come when we take the same 
attitude as it relates to our own country.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Blute].
  (Mr. BLUTE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BLUTE. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I rise in support 
of the resolution.
  Mr. LEACH. I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from 
South Carolina [Mr. Graham].
  (Mr. GRAHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GRAHAM. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  [Mr. GRAHAM addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in 
the Extensions of Remarks.]
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Oklahoma [Mr. Istook].
  Mr. ISTOOK. I thank the gentleman for yielding so that I may engage 
in a colloquy with the gentleman from Iowa.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to confirm the intent of some disclosure 
requirements under this legislation. Currently, monthly reports by the 
Treasury Department do not detail ``all transactions,'' as stated in 
Federal law, but limit the reporting to balance sheet information.
  My question is: Does the gentleman concur that paragraph 20 of this 
legislation is intended to secure for all Members of this House the 
details of all Exchange Stabilization Fund transactions during the past 
24 months?
                              {time}  1915

  Mr. LEACH. I would respond, yes, that is the clear intent of 
paragraph 20.
  Mr. ISTOOK. And further inquiry, Mr. Speaker, different official 
reports show a $4.5 billion discrepancy between the assets and 
liabilities reported of the exchange stabilizing fund as of the 
[[Page H2456]] close of the last fiscal year on September 30, 1994. My 
question is, do you concur that resolving any discrepancy as of the end 
of the calendar year 1994, as stated in paragraph 27, will necessarily 
require that the Treasury Department also provide us with documents 
that we hope will explain and resolve the $4.5 billion discrepancy as 
of September 30, 1994?
  Mr. LEACH. I would fully concur with the gentleman's assessment.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentlewoman from 
Idaho [Mrs. Chenoweth].
  (Mrs. CHENOWETH asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
her remarks.)
  Mrs. CHENOWETH. While the Clinton administration attempts to placate 
congressional and befuddlement through oil collateral and independent 
banks and other financial mismanagement and financial considerations, 
no talk is heard about breaking monopolies. There are many unanswered 
questions that we have about this package, and while this resolution is 
a resolution that I not only support, but I was honored to cosponsor 
and will vote for it, we also need to forge ahead and pass H.R. 807, 
the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stockman] resolution, which would put a 
halt to this subversion of the Constitution and prevent any more money 
going south to Mexico. An economy should serve the people, not bound 
it. The United States ought not to be supporting this debacle, and 
funds should be stopped immediately.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. de la Garza].
  (Mr. de la GARZA asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  [Mr. de la GARZA addressed the House. His remarks will appear 
hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, in conclusion let me state that an original 
cosponsor of this resolution, the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Hunter] had hoped to be here today, but he is, unfortunately, in San 
Diego tending to an illness of his wife.
  Mr. Speaker, let me just conclude by saying this resolution 
represents a desire for greater accountability related to one of the 
first crises of the new economic order. In the background of this 
debate is macroeconomic decisionmaking as it relates to the 
intertwining of global economies. In the background also is the refusal 
of this Congress in a timely fashion to respond to the administration 
request to act on a bipartisan basis to this particular crisis.
  Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House 
Resolution 80 and urge my colleagues to do the same.
  This legislation is quite straightforward. It simply requests the 
President to provide to Congress, within 14 days of the adoption of 
this resolution, documentation comprehensively detailing the facts 
behind the $20 billion United States bailout of the Mexican economy. Is 
it really too much to ask that the American people be fully informed of 
how their hard-earned dollars are about to be used and what methods 
have been employed to secure this deal? It think not.
  This body was never allowed to debate the Mexican-aid package, never 
allowed to fully consider the supposed need for this aid or the 
ramifications of relief actions on the part of the United States, never 
allowed to bring this issue to a vote. In short, Mr. Speaker, the 
Congress and the American people were never given the ability to decide 
what really is in the best interests of our Nation in this matter.
  At a time when some members of this institution are drastically 
slashing discretionary spending and placing Social Security, Medicare, 
and Medicaid and vital safety-net programs on the chopping block, the 
United States is providing a security blanket abroad. When the GOP 
alleges that we supposedly cannot afford to provide a hot lunch for our 
grade school youngsters, when loans for our own children to attend 
college or resources for our blighted urban areas to be revitalized are 
in jeopardy, this country is nonetheless floating a check to Mexico 
without revealing what safeguards and conditions are in place, if 
any. How about investing these billions in 
targeted funds to our cities, our children, our unemployed, 
sick, and elderly? I seriously question the priorities outlined by this 
deal, Mr. Speaker.
  I strongly suggest that my colleagues vote for accountability, vote 
for openness, vote for the right of this body to exercise its full 
constitutional authority on behalf of the American people we 
represent--vote for House Resolution 80.
  We need to let the sun shine on the Mexico bailout once and for all, 
Mr. Speaker. The American people demand and deserve it.
  Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support the resolution 
before the House which would ask the President to provide, within 14 
days, a broad range of documents relating to the financial rescue 
package the President is extending to Mexico.
  I have opposed the Mexico loan bailout since the day it was proposed 
by President Clinton and endorsed by Speaker Gingrich and Senate 
majority leader Dole. I still believe there is significant evidence 
Mexican officials improperly inflated the peso to ensure positive 
economic results from our passage of the North American Free-Trade 
Agreement. This was just one of the reasons I opposed NAFTA. 
Unfortunately, it could now mean that U.S. taxpayers' dollars are at 
risk.
  This resolution will enable the appropriate committees to examine the 
documents the Clinton administration and Mexican officials recently 
signed through the Treasury Department's exchange stabilization fund. 
It is important that Congress, in its oversight role, have an 
opportunity to closely examine the documents involved in the $20-
billion assistance package.
  Mr. POSHARD. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution to 
ascertain the facts with respect to the bailout of the Mexican 
Government after the devaluation of the peso.
  Only when we have the appropriate facts will we be able to determine 
whether this was in the best interest of our own country. This country, 
through the NAFTA, has inextricably bound itself to the well-being of 
the Mexican economy.
  We are now so heavily invested in Mexico with American taxpayer 
pension and retirement funds that we can not afford to let the Mexican 
economy fail.
  We should never have allowed ourself to get into this position. Only 
through a complete reevaluation of the facts can we be able to 
determine an appropriate course for the future.
  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Speaker, let me discuss this Kaptur resolution 
and why I think it is unwise. It is not necessary because it embarasses 
the President and the executive branch unnecessarily.
  The United States took the lead in developing a support package for 
Mexico in order to protect United States jobs, exports, immigration 
concerns, and security interests that would be threatened if Mexico 
collapsed.
  Mexico is our third largest export market.
  More than 700,000 United States jobs depend on sales to Mexico.
  A Mexican collapse would probably send illegal immigration up 
sharply--that's what happened when Mexico experienced economic troubles 
in 1982, and apprehensions along the border rose by 30 percent.
  A Mexican collapse could spill over to harm emerging financial 
markets. These are the fastest growing markets for our exports--we 
don't want them to pull back on the economic reforms they've gone 
through over the past decade. America's hopes for increased demand in 
these markets for U.S. products and the good jobs this would bring 
would be disappointed.


                             the agreements

  The United States negotiated good, viable agreements based on strong 
Mexican commitments to pursue economic reforms, solid safeguards to 
ensure we are fully repaid, and controls to make sure our support does 
what it's supposed to do--restore Mexican financial stability to 
protect United States jobs, exports, immigration concerns and security 
interests threatened by a Mexican collapse.
  Some claim that the agreements put U.S. money at risk. But, in fact, 
the United States is only offering support in a way that is financially 
prudent, to make sure we get our money back.
  First, United States support is contingent on Mexico's own commitment 
to pursuing the rigorous economic policies needed for Mexico to regain 
financial stability.
  Mexico is now committed to a stringent program, based on a tight 
monetary policy with negative real money growth, budget cuts that will 
move them into surplus, and further privatization and reform to set the 
stage for strength.
  Our agreements with Mexico build upon and add to those commitments, 
by spelling out many of the steps they will take--assuring the 
independence of their central
 bank, and using monetary policy to stabilize their currency, so that 
they regain their access to market finance quickly.

  Second, the United States will not disburse resources without careful 
controls on how our support would be used, and without a system for 
assuring repayment of all Mexican obligations to the United States.
  The United States will be disbursing support in stages, and will not 
disburse any tranche of 
[[Page H2457]] support unless we agree with how the Mexicans plan to 
use it, and are confident that Mexico is meeting all its obligations.
  Mexico must live up to important transparency and reporting 
requirements. The United States Government will have all the 
information necessary to know how Mexico's economy is doing and whether 
our support is in jeopardy.
  Other controls have been built into the agreements. In some cases, 
Mexico's obligations can be accelerated if we determine that they are 
not complying with key terms and conditions.
  Most important, no United States support will go out unless it is 
backed by proceeds of Mexican crude oil and oil products exports.
  Finally, Mexico will pay fees that should provide more than enough 
cover for risk. In fact, fees and interest rates charged to Mexico will 
rise the more support we disburse, to encourage them to turn to market 
sources of finance first.
  It is in our best interest to make sure that these agreements work. 
That means that Congress must have the information it needs to be 
confident that Mexico is meeting its obligations and fulfilling its 
commitments.
  At the same time, we must be careful not to pursue access to 
information so zealously that we jeopardize the success of these 
agreements, limit the ability of the United States to conduct important 
international financial transactions or impose onerous reporting 
requirements.


                         the kaptur resolution

  The administration is clearly committed to keeping Congress informed 
about the status of the agreements with Mexico, Mexico's record of 
compliance to these agreements, and information on the use of the 
Exchange Stabilization Fund.
  Treasury has already proposed that it provide us, on a regular basis, 
documents that meet those objectives. These
 include augmented monthly financial statements of the ESF and detailed 
quarterly reports on the implementation of the Mexican program. 
Administration officials are also willing to provide briefings upon 
request to any member of Congress.

  Treasury has already provided Members with copies of the four 
agreements signed on February 21 and an opinion of Treasury's General 
Counsel concerning the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to 
use the ESF for the Mexican support package.
  We should continue to work with the administration toward a 
reasonable and realistic policy of disclosure because the proposed 
resolution is neither.
  First, the Kaptur resolution is directed to the President rather than 
the Secretary of the Treasury. Questions of principle are much more 
likely to arise if the resolution is directed to the President.
  The Treasury Department has been the center of activity within the 
United States Government for the Mexican program. Thus, the resolution 
would be more likely to result in more documents being produced if it 
were directed to the Secretary of the Treasury rather than the 
President.
  Second, is not at all clear that the extensive document request 
contained in the resolution is consistent with the ESF statute.
  This statute vests exclusive control of the ESF in the Secretary of 
the Treasury subject to the approval of the President.
  And, it provides that decisions of the Secretary are final and may 
not be reviewed by another officer or employee of the Government.
  Third, the breadth and scope of the current request is extremely 
burdensome and would demand considerable resources at taxpayer expense, 
without improving our oversight.
  It is not realistic to expect that such a vast array of documents be 
assembled in a 14-day timeframe.
  In particular, what appears to be a request for all documents related 
to the use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund since 1945 seems 
extremely onerous and smacks of a fishing-expedition mentality rather 
than a reasonable request for useful information.
  Finally, the Kaptur resolution would limit the ability of the United 
States to engage in transactions vital to the
 orderly movements on international exchange operations in the future 
because this depends on protecting the confidential nature of 
information provided by foreign financial officials.

  The resolution does not contain any assurances that the 
confidentiality of documents provided to the House will be maintained.
  Congress has affirmed the need for a confidential component to the 
ESF on a number of occasions.
  In order to use ESF resources effectively, the Secretary of the 
Treasury must be able to obtain confidential and highly sensitive 
financial information from foreign government officials.
  If the Secretary loses access to confidential information, efforts to 
address instability could be undermined.
  This inability to address exchange market problems could subsequently 
put the U.S. economy at risk and threaten U.S. jobs.
  Since the creation of the ESF in 1934, Congress has considered on a 
number of occasions, even as recently as 1990, whether to curtail the 
Secretary of the Treasury's discretion with respect to the ESF. On each 
such occasion, the Congress decided not to take action.
  Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, there is no doubt that the House could 
obtain all the information requested in this resolution, through the 
normal processes employed by our committees. However, there are some 
who apparently feel the need to stress their opposition to the efforts 
to stabilize Mexico's economy, through means of this resolution. In 
other words, the real agenda here is not a request for information, but 
a protest by some against actions that had to be taken, in our own 
national interest, despite the kind of opposition that such leadership 
always seems to inspire.
  What comes to mind is the immense opposition that President Roosevelt 
faced when he recognized the reality that the United States would have 
to help its allies in their fight against Nazi Germany. It was a case 
of necessity, and his proposals to provide aid, modest as they were, 
gave rise to the most militant, the most blind, and the most zealously 
hateful opposition that can be imagined. But he was right, and he 
prevailed. America had no choice but to accept its responsibility.
  That is the case today. We are not, thank God, fighting a war. But 
what we are fighting against is international economic instability. 
What we are fighting against is a needless loss of jobs in our own 
country, a needless deterioration of our own living standards, and a 
needless surge in illegal immigration. That is what we are fighting 
against, through the President's actions to stabilize and strengthen 
the economy of Mexico.
  I do not expect the know-nothings and Clinton haters to heed this, 
any more than the Roosevelt haters heeded his patient calls to wake up 
to the dangers all around. But this is the truth: The lower the peso 
falls, the more jobs we lose. The more the peso falls, the less we can 
sell to Mexico, so we lose jobs. And the more the peso falls, the less 
Mexico can do for its own people, whose living standards will in turn 
tumble. And in desperation, those people will flee across our borders, 
no matter what we do to try and stop it. Moreover, the greater the
 desperation is within Mexico, the more likely it is that open 
conflicts will break out there--again, causing people to flee to this 
country, as we have seen so many times before, whether it was Hitler's 
programs, the Irish potato famine, or the civil war in El Salvador, or 
any one of the conflicts that have driven people to these shores. And 
finally, the lower the peso falls, the harder it is for American goods 
to compete against Mexican exports--and so we lose jobs again.

  Stabilizing Mexico helps that country--but it also helps us. And this 
help is a low risk proposition that is more likely than not to return a 
profit to the Treasury. It is a policy that helps us, and it is a 
policy that we had better hope works--for ourselves, for our own 
standard of living and for our own markets.
  I understand the strong feelings that the opponents of this program 
have. But I deplore the personal attacks that some have lodged against 
the Secretary of the Treasury, and I am saddened by the short-
sightedness of those who do not comprehend what the stakes are in this 
matter, nor the vital importance that the success of this stabilization 
effort has for us and our people. I feel certain the administration 
will provide all the information it can, in response to the resolution. 
Let us go ahead and pass this, but let us also understand that it 
reflects the inability of some people to understand the situation, and 
the unwillingness of others to support a policy that they know is 
right, even though they have said it is right. History remembers the 
little minds who railed against Roosevelt's international leadership; 
it will also remember the little minds that rail against a policy that 
is necessary, makes sense, and in the long run, very much in our 
national interest.
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support 
of House Resolution 80, the inquiry into the President's aid package to 
Mexico.
  It is regrettable that President Clinton decided to bypass Congress 
after Members of Congress refused to act quickly on the loan guarantees 
for Mexico. You see, Mr. Speaker, the President may know this but let 
me remind him. As Members of Congress, we are directly accountable to 
our constituents. Admittedly, the 104th Congress has moved quickly 
since receiving its November 1994 mandate, but I assure you that 
neither Congress nor the President received a mandate from the American 
people to express mail a $20 billion check to Mexico with no return 
address.
  [[Page H2458]] What is most frustrating about the President's action 
is that he made another defective foreign policy decision without 
addressing the very questions that were first raised. House Resolution 
80 is the first step to answering questions about the bailout, 
including who will actually benefit from these loans, what collateral 
Mexico can use to secure their payments, what economic reforms Mexico 
will institute to ensure that this does not happen again, and how a 
Mexican bailout will affect American taxpayers.
  I support this important resolution because I will continue to oppose 
this donation to Mexico, let us call it what it is, until we have 
appropriate guarantees from their country and until we know everything 
that the White House knew before the collapse regarding Mexico's 
economic situation. I take pride in representing my constituents, who 
are adamantly opposed to this bailout and I resent that the President 
preempted my opportunity to vote accordingly.
  Mr. Speaker, the President supplied so few details when he first 
asked Congress to bailout Mexico it was as if he wanted the American 
public to blame Congress for the conception of this poor foreign policy 
decision. Even after he told the Mexicans that the check was in the 
mail, President Clinton made little attempt to give Members of Congress 
the information addressing our concerns and those of our constituents. 
Well, after today Mr. Speaker when constituents question the bailout, I 
no longer have to respond to them like school-boy trying to convince 
the teacher that my dog really did eat my homework. If President 
Clinton will not volunteer these answers, then we will force him to 
provide us with the cheat-sheet, because the American people deserve 
answers.
  I urge Members of Congress to support House Resolution 80.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, in this context I move the previous question 
on the committee amendment and on the resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Goodlatte). The question is on the 
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution, as 
amended.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 407, 
noes 21, not voting 6, as follows:
                             [Roll No. 188]

                               AYES--407

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Bono
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bryant (TX)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clinger
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coburn
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooley
     Costello
     Cox
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Ensign
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Fields (TX)
     Filner
     Flake
     Flanagan
     Foglietta
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Frost
     Funderburk
     Furse
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, Sam
     Johnston
     Jones
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lantos
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Lincoln
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Longley
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Martinez
     Martini
     Mascara
     McCarthy
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McDermott
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mfume
     Mica
     Miller (CA)
     Miller (FL)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Parker
     Paxon
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Reed
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riggs
     Rivers
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sanders
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stump
     Stupak
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thornberry
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Tucker
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Ward
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                                NOES--21

     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Berman
     Conyers
     de la Garza
     Dixon
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Gephardt
     Johnson, E. B.
     Matsui
     Moran
     Pastor
     Rangel
     Richardson
     Roybal-Allard
     Serrano
     Torres
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--6

     Dooley
     Gonzalez
     Hunter
     Moakley
     Peterson (MN)
     Rush

                              {time}  1944

  Mr. RANGEL, Mr. RICHARDSON, Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD, Mr. BEILENSON, and Mr. 
MATSUI changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. FAZIO changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the resolution, as amended, was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  

                          ____________________