[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 36 (Monday, February 27, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H2261-H2288]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




              RISK ASSESSMENT AND COST-BENEFIT ACT OF 1995

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. McHugh). Pursuant to House Resolution 96 
and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of 
the bill, H.R. 1022.

                              {time}  1817


                     in the committee of the whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of 
the bill (H.R. 1022) to provide regulatory reform and to focus national 
economic resources on the greatest risks to human health, safety and 
the environment through scientifically objective and unbiased risk 
assessments and through the consideration of costs and benefits in 
major rules, and for other purposes, with Mr. Hastings of Washington in 
the chair.
  The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today, all 
time for general debate had expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read for 
amendment under the 5-minute rule.
  The text of H.R. 1022 is as follows:
                               H.R. 1022

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Risk Assessment and Cost-
     Benefit Act of 1995''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds that:
       (1) Environmental, health, and safety regulations have led 
     to dramatic improvements in the environment and have 
     significantly reduced human health risk; however, the Federal 
     regulations that have led to these improvements have been 
     more costly and less effective than they could have been; too 
     often, regulatory priorities have not been based upon a 
     realistic consideration of risk, risk reduction 
     opportunities, and costs.
       (2) The public and private resources available to address 
     health, safety, and environmental concerns are not unlimited; 
     those resources need to be allocated to address the greatest 
     needs in the most cost-effective manner and so that the 
     incremental costs of regulatory alternatives are reasonably 
     related to the incremental benefits.
       (3) To provide more cost-effective and cost-reasonable 
     protection to human health and the environment, regulatory 
     priorities should be based upon realistic consideration of 
     risk; the priority setting process must include 
     scientifically sound, objective, and unbiased risk 
     assessments, comparative risk analysis, and risk management 
     choices that are grounded in cost-benefit principles.
       (4) Risk assessment has proven to be a useful decision 
     making tool; however, improvements are needed in both the 
     quality of assessments and the characterization and 
     communication of findings; scientific and other data must be 
     better collected, organized, and evaluated; most importantly, 
     the critical information resulting from a risk assessment 
     must be effectively communicated in an objective and unbiased 
     manner to decision makers, and from decision makers to the 
     public.
       (5) The public stake holders must be fully involved in the 
     risk-decision making process. They have the right-to-know 
     about the risks addressed by regulation, the amount of risk 
     to be reduced, the quality of the science used to support 
     decisions, and the cost of implementing and complying with 
     regulations. This knowledge will allow for public scrutiny 
     and promote quality, integrity, and responsiveness of agency 
     decisions.
       (6) Although risk assessment is one important method to 
     improve regulatory decision-making, other approaches to 
     secure prompt relief from the burden of unnecessary and 
     overly complex regulations will also be necessary.
     SEC. 3. COVERAGE OF ACT.

       This Act does not apply to any of the following:
     [[Page H2262]]   (1) A situation that the head of an affected 
     Federal agency determines to be an emergency. In such 
     circumstance, the head of the agency shall comply with the 
     provisions of this Act within as reasonable a time as is 
     practical.
       (2) Activities necessary to maintain military readiness.
       (3) Any individual food, drug, or other product label, or 
     to any risk characterization appearing on any such label, if 
     the individual product label is required by law to be 
     approved by a Federal department or agency prior to use.
       (4) Approval of State programs or plans by Federal 
     agencies.
     SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS

       For purposes of this Act:
       (1) Costs.--The term ``costs'' includes the direct and 
     indirect costs to the United States Government, to State, 
     local, and tribal governments, and to the private sector, 
     wage earners, consumers, and the economy, of implementing and 
     complying with a rule or alternative strategy.
       (2) Benefit.--The term ``benefit'' means the reasonably 
     identifiable significant health, safety, environmental, 
     social and economic benefits that are expected to result 
     directly or indirectly from implementation of a rule or 
     alternative strategy.
       (3) Major rule.--The term ``major rule'' means any 
     regulation that is likely to result in an annual increase in 
     costs of $25,000,000 or more. Such term does not include any 
     regulation or other action taken by an agency to authorize or 
     approve any individual substance or product.
       (4) Program designed to protect human health.--The term 
     ``program designed to protect human health'' does not include 
     regulatory programs concerning health insurance, health 
     provider services, or health care diagnostic services.
               Title I--Risk Assessment and Communication

     SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Risk Assessment and 
     Communication Act of 1995''.

     SEC. 102. PURPOSES.

       The purposes of this title are--
       (1) to present the public and executive branch with the 
     most scientifically objective and unbiased information 
     concerning the nature and magnitude of health, safety, and 
     environmental risks in order to provide for sound regulatory 
     decisions and public education;
       (2) to provide for full consideration and discussion of 
     relevant data and potential methodologies;
       (3) to require explanation of significant choices in the 
     risk assessment process which will allow for better peer 
     review and public understanding; and
       (4) to improve consistency within the executive branch in 
     preparing risk assessments and risk characterizations.

     SEC. 103. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY; SAVINGS PROVISIONS.

       (a) Effective Date.--Except as otherwise specifically 
     provided in this title, the provisions of this title shall 
     take effect 18 months after the date of enactment of this 
     title.
       (b) Applicability.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (3), this 
     title applies to all significant risk assessment documents 
     and significant risk characterization documents, as defined 
     in paragraph (2).
       (2) Significant risk assessment document or significant 
     risk characterization document.--(A) As used in this title, 
     the terms ``significant risk assessment document'' and 
     ``significant
      risk characterization document'' include, at a minimum, risk 
     assessment documents or risk characterization documents 
     prepared by or on behalf of a covered Federal agency in 
     the implementation of a regulatory program designed to 
     protect human health, safety, or the environment, used as 
     a basis for one of the items referred to in subparagraph 
     (B), and--
       (i) included by the agency in that item; or
       (ii) inserted by the agency in the administrative record 
     for that item.
       (B) The items referred to in subparagraph (A) are the 
     following:
       (i) Any proposed or final major rule, including any 
     analysis or certification under title II, promulgated as part 
     of any Federal regulatory program designed to protect human 
     health, safety, or the environment.
       (ii) Any proposed or final environmental clean-up plan for 
     a facility or Federal guidelines for the issuance of any such 
     plan. As used in this clause, the term ``environmental clean-
     up'' means a corrective action under the Solid Waste Disposal 
     Act, a removal or remedial action under the Comprehensive 
     Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
     1980, and any other environmental restoration and waste 
     management carried out by or on behalf of a covered Federal 
     agency with respect to any substance other than municipal 
     waste.
       (iii) Any proposed or final permit condition placing a 
     restriction on facility siting or operation under Federal 
     laws administered by the Environmental Protection Agency or 
     the Department of the Interior.
       (iv) Any report to Congress.
       (v) Any regulatory action to place a substance on any 
     official list of carcinogens or toxic or hazardous substances 
     or to place a new health effects value on such list, 
     including the Integrated Risk Information System Database 
     maintained by the Environmental Protection Agency.
       (vi) Any guidance, including protocols of general 
     applicability, establishing policy regarding risk assessment 
     or risk characterization.
       (C) The terms ``significant risk assessment document'' and 
     ``significant risk characterization document'' shall also 
     include the following:
       (i) Any such risk assessment and risk characterization 
     documents provided by a covered Federal agency to the public 
     and which are likely to result in an annual increase in costs 
     of $25,000,000 or more.
       (ii) Environmental restoration and waste management carried 
     out by or on behalf of the Department of Defense with respect 
     to any substance other than municipal waste.
       (D) Within 15 months after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, each covered Federal agency administering a 
     regulatory program designed to protect human health, safety, 
     or the environment shall promulgate a rule establishing those 
     additional categories, if any, of risk assessment and risk 
     characterization documents prepared by or on behalf of the 
     covered Federal agency that the agency will consider 
     significant risk assessment documents or significant risk 
     characterization documents for purposes of this title. In 
     establishing such categories, the head of the agency shall 
     consider each of the following:
       (i) The benefits of consistent compliance by documents of 
     the covered Federal agency in the categories.
       (ii) The administrative burdens of including documents in 
     the categories.
       (iii) The need to make expeditious administrative decisions 
     regarding documents in the categories.
       (iv) The possible use of a risk assessment or risk 
     characterization in any compilation of risk hazards or health 
     or environmental effects prepared by an agency and commonly 
     made available to, or used by, any Federal, State, or local 
     government agency.
       (v) Such other factors as may be appropriate.
       (E)(i) Not later than 18 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the President, acting through the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall 
     determine whether any other Federal agencies should be 
     considered covered Federal agencies for purposes of this 
     title. Such determination, with respect to a particular 
     Federal agency, shall be based on the impact of risk 
     assessment documents and risk characterization documents on--
       (I) regulatory programs administered by that agency; and
       (II) the communication of risk information by that agency 
     to the public.

     The effective date of such a determination shall be no later 
     than 6 months after the date of the determination.
       (ii) Not later than 15 months after the President, acting 
     through the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 
     determines pursuant to clause (i) that a Federal agency 
     should be considered a covered Federal agency for purposes of 
     this title, the head of that agency shall promulgate a rule 
     pursuant to subparagraph (D) to establish additional 
     categories of risk assessment and risk characterization 
     documents described in that subparagraph.
       (3) Exceptions.--(A) This title does not apply to risk 
     assessment or risk characterization documents containing risk 
     assessments or risk characterizations performed with respect 
     to the following:
       (i) A screening analysis, where appropriately labeled as 
     such, including a screening analysis for purposes of product 
     regulation or premanufacturing notices.
       (ii) Any health, safety, or environmental inspections.
       (iii) The sale or lease of Federal resources or regulatory 
     activities that directly result in the collection of Federal 
     receipts.
       (B) No analysis shall be treated as a screening analysis 
     for purposes of subparagraph (A) if the results of such 
     analysis are used as the basis for imposing restrictions on 
     substances or activities.
       (C) The risk assessment principle set forth in section 
     104(b)(1) need not apply to any risk assessment or risk 
     characterization document described in clause (iii) of 
     paragraph (2)(B). The risk characterization and communication 
     principle set forth in section 105(4) need not apply to any 
     risk assessment or risk characterization document described 
     in clause (v) or (vi) of paragraph (2)(B).
       (c) Savings Provisions.--The provisions of this title shall 
     be supplemental to any other provisions of law relating to 
     risk assessments and risk characterizations, except that 
     nothing in this title shall be construed to modify any 
     statutory standard or statutory requirement designed to 
     protect health, safety, or the environment. Nothing in this 
     title shall be interpreted to preclude the consideration of 
     any data or the calculation of any estimate to more fully 
     describe risk or provide examples of scientific uncertainty 
     or variability. Nothing in this title shall be construed to 
     require the disclosure of any trade secret or other 
     confidential information.

     SEC. 104. PRINCIPLES FOR RISK ASSESSMENT.

       (a) In General.--The head of each covered Federal agency 
     shall apply the principles set forth in subsection (b) in 
     order to assure that significant risk assessment documents 
     and all of their components distinguish scientific findings 
     from other considerations and are, to the extent feasible, 
     scientifically objective, unbiased, and inclusive of all 
     relevant data and rely, to the extent available and 
     practicable, on scientific findings. Discussions or 
     explanations required under this 
      [[Page H2263]] section need not be repeated in each risk 
     assessment document as long as there is a reference to the 
     relevant discussion or explanation in another agency document 
     which is available to the public.
       (b) Principles.--The principles to be applied are as 
     follows:
       (1) When discussing human health risks, a significant risk 
     assessment document shall contain a discussion of both 
     relevant laboratory and relevant epidemiological data of 
     sufficient quality which finds, or fails to find, a 
     correlation between health risks and a potential toxin or 
     activity. Where conflicts among such data appear to exist, or 
     where animal data is used as a basis to assess human health, 
     the significant risk assessment document shall, to the extent 
     feasible and appropriate, include discussion of possible 
     reconciliation of conflicting information, and as relevant, 
     differences in study designs, comparative physiology, routes 
     of exposure, bioavailability, pharmacokinetics, and any other 
     relevant factor, including the sufficiency of basic data for 
     review. The discussion of possible reconciliation should 
     indicate whether there is a biological basis to assume a 
     resulting harm in humans. Animal data shall be reviewed with 
     regard to its relevancy to humans.
       (2) Where a significant risk assessment document involves 
     selection of any significant assumption, inference, or model, 
     the document shall, to the extent feasible--
       (A) present a representative list and explanation of 
     plausible and alternative assumptions, inferences, or models;
       (B) explain the basis for any choices;
       (C) identify any policy or value judgments;
       (D) fully describe any model used in the risk assessment 
     and make explicit the assumptions incorporated in the model; 
     and
       (E) indicate the extent to which any significant model has 
     been validated by, or conflicts with, empirical data.

     SEC. 105. PRINCIPLES FOR RISK CHARACTERIZATION AND 
                   COMMUNICATION.

       Each significant risk characterization document shall meet 
     each of the following requirements:
       (1) Estimates of risk.--The risk characterization shall 
     describe the populations or natural resources which are the 
     subject of the risk characterization. If a numerical estimate 
     of risk is provided, the agency shall, to the extent 
     feasible, provide--
       (A) the best estimate or estimates for the specific 
     populations or natural resources which are the subject of the 
     characterization (based on the information available to the 
     Federal agency); and
       (B) a statement of the reasonable range of scientific 
     uncertainties.

     In addition to such best estimate or estimates, the risk 
     characterization document may present plausible upper-bound 
     or conservative estimates in conjunction with plausible lower 
     bounds estimates. Where appropriate, the risk 
     characterization document may present, in lieu of a single 
     best estimate, multiple best estimates based on assumptions, 
     inferences, or models which are equally plausible, given 
     current scientific understanding. To the extent practical and 
     appropriate, the document shall provide descriptions of the 
     distribution and probability of risk estimates to reflect 
     differences in exposure variability or sensitivity in 
     populations and attendant uncertainties.
       (2) Exposure scenarios.--The risk characterization document 
     shall explain the exposure scenarios used in any risk 
     assessment, and, to the extent feasible, provide a statement 
     of the size of the corresponding population at risk and the 
     likelihood of such exposure scenarios.
       (3) Comparisons.--The document shall contain a statement 
     that places the nature and magnitude of risks to human 
     health, safety, or the environment in context. Such statement 
     shall, to the extent feasible, provide comparisons with 
     estimates of greater, lesser, and substantially equivalent 
     risks that are familiar to and routinely encountered by the 
     general public as well as other risks, and, where appropriate 
     and meaningful, comparisons of those risks with other similar 
     risks regulated by the Federal agency resulting from 
     comparable activities and exposure pathways. Such comparisons 
     should consider relevant distinctions among risks, such as 
     the voluntary or involuntary nature of risks and the 
     preventability or nonpreventability of risks.
       (4) Substitution risks.--Each significant risk assessment 
     or risk characterization document shall include a statement 
     of any significant substitution risks to human health, where 
     information on such risks has been provided to the agency.
       (5) Summaries of other risk estimates.--If--
       (A) a commenter provides a covered Federal agency with a 
     relevant risk assessment document or a risk characterization 
     document, and a summary thereof, during a public comment 
     provided by the agency for a significant risk assessment 
     document or a significant risk characterization document, or, 
     where no comment period is provided but a commenter provides 
     the covered Federal agency with the relevant risk assessment 
     document or risk characterization document, and a summary 
     thereof, in a timely fashion, and
       (B) the risk assessment document or risk characterization 
     document is consistent with the principles and the guidance 
     provided under this title,

     the agency shall, to the extent feasible, present such 
     summary in connection with the presentation of the agency's 
     significant risk assessment document or significant risk 
     characterization document. Nothing in this paragraph shall be 
     construed to limit the inclusion of any comments or material 
     supplied by any person to the administrative record of any 
     proceeding.

      A document may satisfy the requirements of paragraph (3), 
     (4) or (5) by reference to information or material 
     otherwise available to the public if the document provides 
     a brief summary of such information or material.

     SEC. 106. RECOMMENDATIONS OR CLASSIFICATIONS BY A NON-UNITED 
                   STATES-BASED ENTITY.

       No covered Federal agency shall automatically incorporate 
     or adopt any recommendation or classification made by a non-
     United States-based entity concerning the health effects 
     value of a substance without an opportunity for notice and 
     comment, and any risk assessment document or risk 
     characterization document adopted by a covered Federal agency 
     on the basis of such a recommendation or classification shall 
     comply with the provisions of this title.
     SEC. 107. GUIDELINES AND REPORT.

       (a) Guidelines.--Within 15 months after the date of 
     enactment of this title, the President shall issue guidelines 
     for Federal agencies consistent with the risk assessment and 
     characterization principles set forth in sections 104 and 105 
     and shall provide a format for summarizing risk assessment 
     results. In addition, such guidelines shall include guidance 
     on at least the following subjects: criteria for scaling 
     animal studies to assess risks to human health; use of 
     different types of dose-response models; thresholds; 
     definitions, use, and interpretations of the maximum 
     tolerated dose; weighting of evidence with respect to 
     extrapolating human health risks from sensitive species; 
     evaluation of benign tumors, and evaluation of different 
     human health endpoints.
       (b) Report.--Within 3 years after the enactment of this 
     title, each covered Federal agency shall provide a report to 
     the Congress evaluating the categories of policy and value 
     judgments identified under subparagraph (C) of section 
     104(b)(2).
       (c) Public Comment and Consultation.--The guidelines and 
     report under this section, shall be developed after notice 
     and opportunity for public comment, and after consultation 
     with representatives of appropriate State, local, and tribal 
     governments, and such other departments and agencies, 
     offices, organizations, or persons as may be advisable.
       (d) Review.--The President shall review and, where 
     appropriate, revise the guidelines published under this 
     section at least every 4 years.

     SEC. 108. RESEARCH AND TRAINING IN RISK ASSESSMENT.

       (a) Evaluation.--The head of each covered agency shall 
     regularly and systematically evaluate risk assessment 
     research and training needs of the agency, including, where 
     relevant and appropriate, the following:
       (1) Research to reduce generic data gaps, to address 
     modelling needs (including improved model sensitivity), and 
     to validate default options, particularly those common to 
     multiple risk assessments.
       (2) Research leading to improvement of methods to quantify 
     and communicate uncertainty and variability among 
     individuals, species, populations, and, in the case of 
     ecological risk assessment, ecological communities.
       (3) Emerging and future areas of research, including 
     research on comparative risk analysis, exposure to multiple 
     chemicals and other stressors, noncancer endpoints, 
     biological markers of exposure and effect, mechanisms of 
     action in both mammalian and nonmammalian species, dynamics 
     and probabilities of physiological and ecosystem exposures, 
     and prediction of ecosystem-level responses.
       (4) Long-term needs to adequately train individuals in risk 
     assessment and risk assessment application. Evaluations under 
     this paragraph shall include an estimate of the resources 
     needed to provide necessary training.
       (b) Strategy and Actions To Meet Identified Needs.--The 
     head of each covered agency shall develop a strategy and 
     schedule for carrying out research and training to meet the 
     needs identified in subsection (a).
       (c) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the head of each covered agency shall 
     submit to the Congress a report on the evaluations conducted 
     under subsection (a) and the strategy and schedule developed 
     under subsection (b). The head of each covered agency shall 
     report to the Congress periodically on the evaluations, 
     strategy, and schedule.

     SEC. 109. STUDY OF COMPARATIVE RISK ANALYSIS.

       (a) In General.--(1) The Director of the Office of 
     Management and Budget, in consultation with the Office of 
     Science and Technology Policy, shall conduct, or provide for 
     the conduct of, a study using comparative risk analysis to 
     rank health, safety, and environmental risks and to provide a 
     common basis for evaluating strategies for reducing or 
     preventing those risks. The goal of the study shall be to 
     improve methods of comparative risk analysis.
       (2) Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, the Director, in collaboration with the heads of 
     appropriate Federal agencies, shall enter into a contract 
     with the National Research Council to provide technical 
     guidance on approaches to 
      [[Page H2264]] using comparative risk analysis and other 
     considerations in setting health, safety, and environmental 
     risk reduction priorities.
       (b) Scope of Study.--The study shall have sufficient scope 
     and breadth to evaluate comparative risk analysis and to test 
     approaches for improving comparative risk analysis and its 
     use in setting priorities for health, safety, and 
     environmental risk reduction. The study shall compare and 
     evaluate a range of diverse health, safety, and environmental 
     risks.
       (c) Study Participants.--In conducting the study, the 
     Director shall provide for the participation of a range of 
     individuals with varying backgrounds and expertise, both 
     technical and nontechnical, comprising broad representation 
     of the public and private sectors.
       (d) Duration.--The study shall begin within 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act and terminate within 2 
     years after the date on which it began.
       (e) Recommendations for Improving Comparative Risk Analysis 
     and Its Use.--Not later than 90 days after the termination of 
     the study, the Director shall submit to the Congress the 
     report of the National Research Council with recommendations 
     regarding the use of comparative risk analysis and ways to 
     improve the use of comparative risk analysis for decision-
     making in appropriate Federal agencies.
     SEC. 110. DEFINITIONS.

       For purposes of this title:
       (1) Risk assessment document.--The term ``risk assessment 
     document'' means a document containing the explanation of how 
     hazards associated with a substance, activity, or condition 
     have been identified, quantified, and assessed. The term also 
     includes a written statement accepting the findings of any 
     such document.
       (2) Risk characterization document.--The term ``risk 
     characterization document'' means a document quantifying or 
     describing the degree of toxicity, exposure, or other risk 
     posed by hazards associated with a substance, activity, or 
     condition to which individuals, populations, or resources are 
     exposed. The term also includes a written statement accepting 
     the findings of any such document.
       (3) Best estimate.--The term ``best estimate'' means a 
     scientifically appropriate estimate which is based, to the 
     extent feasible, on one of the following:
       (A) Central estimates of risk using the most plausible 
     assumptions.
       (B) An approach which combines multiple estimates based on 
     different scenarios and weighs the probability of each 
     scenario.
       (C) Any other methodology designed to provide the most 
     unbiased representation of the most plausible level of risk, 
     given the current scientific information available to the 
     Federal agency concerned.
       (4) Substitution risk.--The term ``substitution risk'' 
     means a potential risk to human health, safety, or the 
     environment from a regulatory alternative designed to 
     decrease other risks.
       (5) Covered federal agency.--The term ``covered Federal 
     agency'' means each of the following:
       (A) The Environmental Protection Agency.
       (B) The Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
       (C) The Department of Transportation (including the 
     National Highway Transportation Safety Administration).
       (D) The Food and Drug Administration.
       (E) The Department of Energy.
       (F) The Department of the Interior.
       (G) The Department of Agriculture.
       (H) The Consumer Product Safety Commission.
       (I) The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
       (J) The United States Army Corps of Engineers.
       (K) The Mine Safety and Health Administration.
       (L) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
       (M) Any other Federal agency considered a covered Federal 
     agency pursuant to section 103(b)(2)(E)
       (6) Federal agency.--The term ``Federal agency'' means an 
     executive department, military department, or independent 
     establishment as defined in part I of title 5 of the United 
     States Code, except that such term also includes the Office 
     of Technology Assessment.
       (7) Document.--The term ``document'' includes material 
     stored in electronic or digital form.
        Title II--Analysis of Risk Reduction Benefits and Costs

     SEC. 201. ANALYSIS OF RISK REDUCTION BENEFITS AND COSTS.

       (a) In General.--The President shall require each Federal 
     agency to prepare the following for each major rule within a 
     program designed to protect human health, safety, or the 
     environment that is proposed or promulgated by the agency 
     after the date of enactment of this Act:
       (1) An identification of reasonable alternative strategies, 
     including strategies that--
       (A) require no government action;
       (B) will accommodate differences among geographic regions 
     and among persons with different levels of resources with 
     which to comply; and
       (C) employ performance or other market-based mechanisms 
     that permit the greatest flexibility in achieving the 
     identified benefits of the rule.

     The agency shall consider reasonable alternative strategies 
     proposed during the comment period.
       (2) An analysis of the incremental costs and incremental 
     risk reduction or other benefits associated with each 
     alternative strategy identified or considered by the agency. 
     Costs and benefits shall be quantified to the extent feasible 
     and appropriate and may otherwise be qualitatively described.
       (3) A statement that places in context the nature and 
     magnitude of the risks to be addressed and the residual risks 
     likely to remain for each alternative strategy identified or 
     considered by the agency. Such statement shall, to the extent 
     feasible, provide comparisons with estimates of greater, 
     lesser, and substantially equivalent risks that are familiar 
     to and routinely encountered by the general public as well as 
     other risks, and, where appropriate and meaningful, 
     comparisons of those risks with other similar risks regulated 
     by the Federal agency resulting from comparable activities 
     and exposure pathways. Such comparisons should consider 
     relevant distinctions among risks, such as the voluntary or 
     involuntary nature of risks and the preventability or 
     nonpreventability of risks.
       (4) For each final rule, an analysis of whether the 
     identified benefits of the rule are likely to exceed the 
     identified costs of the rule.
       (5) An analysis of the effect of the rule--
       (A) on small businesses with fewer than 100 employees;
       (B) on net employment; and
       (C) to the extent practicable, on the cumulative financial 
     burden of compliance with the rule and other existing 
     regulations on persons producing products.
       (b) Publication.--For each major rule referred to in 
     subsection (a) each Federal agency shall publish in a clear 
     and concise manner in the Federal Register along with the 
     proposed and final regulation, or otherwise make publicly 
     available, the information required to be prepared under 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 202. DECISION CRITERIA.

       (a) In General.--No final rule subject to the provisions of 
     this title shall be promulgated unless the agency certifies 
     the following:
       (1) That the analyses under section 201 are based on 
     objective and unbiased scientific and economic evaluations of 
     all significant and relevant information and risk assessments 
     provided to the agency by interested parties relating to the 
     costs, risks, and risk reduction and other benefits addressed 
     by the rule.
       (2) That the incremental risk reduction or other benefits 
     of any strategy chosen will be likely to justify, and be 
     reasonably related to, the incremental costs incurred by 
     State, local, and tribal governments, the Federal Government, 
     and other public and private entities.
       (3) That other alternative strategies identified or 
     considered by the agency were found either (A) to be less 
     cost-effective at achieving a substantially equivalent 
     reduction in risk, or (B) to provide less flexibility to 
     State, local, or tribal governments or regulated entities in 
     achieving the otherwise applicable objectives of the 
     regulation, along with a brief explanation of why alternative 
     strategies that were identified or considered by the agency 
     were found to be less cost-effective or less flexible.
       (b) Effect of Decision Criteria.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     Federal law, the decision criteria of subsection (a) shall 
     supplement and, to the extent there is a conflict, supersede 
     the decision criteria for rulemaking otherwise applicable 
     under the statute pursuant to which the rule is promulgated.
       (2) Substantial evidence.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of Federal law, no major rule shall be promulgated 
     by any Federal agency pertaining to the protection of health, 
     safety, or the environment unless the requirements of section 
     201 and subsection (a) are met and the certifications 
     required therein are supported by substantial evidence of the 
     rulemaking record.
       (c) Publication.--The agency shall publish in the Federal 
     Register, along with the final regulation, the certifications 
     required by subsection (a).
       (d) Notice.--Where the agency finds a conflict between the 
     decision criteria of this section and the decision criteria 
     of an otherwise applicable statute, the agency shall so 
     notify the Congress in writing.

     SEC. 203. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND THE BUDGET GUIDANCE.

       The Office of Management and Budget shall issue guidance 
     consistent with this title--
       (1) to assist the agencies, the public, and the regulated 
     community in the implementation of this title, including any 
     new requirements or procedures needed to supplement prior 
     agency practice; and
       (2) governing the development and preparation of analyses 
     of risk reduction benefits and costs.
                         Title III--Peer Review

     SEC. 301. PEER REVIEW PROGRAM.

       (a) Establishment.--For regulatory programs designed to 
     protect human health, safety, or the environment, the head of 
     each Federal agency shall develop a systematic program for 
     independent and external peer review required by subsection 
     (b). Such program shall be applicable across the agency and--
       (1) shall provide for the creation of peer review panels 
     consisting of experts and shall be broadly representative and 
     balanced and to 
      [[Page H2265]] the extent relevant and appropriate, may 
     include representatives of State, local, and tribal 
     governments, small businesses, other representatives of 
     industry, universities, agriculture, labor, consumers, 
     conservation organizations, or other public interest groups 
     and organizations;
       (2) may provide for differing levels of peer review and 
     differing numbers of experts on peer review panels, depending 
     on the significance or the complexity of the problems or the 
     need for expeditiousness;
       (3) shall not exclude peer reviewers with substantial and 
     relevant expertise merely because they represent entities 
     that may have a potential interest in the outcome, provided 
     that interest is fully disclosed to the agency and in the 
     case of a regulatory decision affecting a single entity, no 
     peer reviewer representing such entity may be included on the 
     panel;
       (4) may provide specific and reasonable deadlines for peer 
     review panels to submit reports under subsection (c); and
       (5) shall provide adequate protections for confidential 
     business information and trade secrets, including requiring 
     peer reviewers to enter into confidentiality agreements.
       (b) Requirement for Peer Review.--In connection with any 
     rule that is likely to result in an annual increase in costs 
     of $100,000,000 or more (other than any rule or other action 
     taken by an agency to authorize or approve any individual 
     substance or product), each Federal agency shall provide for 
     peer review in accordance with this section of any risk 
     assessment or cost analysis which forms the basis for such 
     rule or of any analysis under section 201(a). In addition, 
     the Director of the Office of Management and Budget may order 
     that peer review be provided for any major risk assessment or 
     cost assessment that is likely to have a significant impact 
     on public policy decisions.
       (c) Contents.--Each peer review under this section shall 
     include a report to the Federal agency concerned with respect 
     to the scientific and economic merit of data and methods used 
     for the assessments and analyses.
       (d) Response to Peer Review.--The head of the Federal 
     agency shall provide a written response to all significant 
     peer review comments.
       (e) Availability to Public.--All peer review comments or 
     conclusions and the agency's responses shall be made 
     available to the public and shall be made part of the 
     administrative record.
       (f) Previously Reviewed Data and Analysis.--No peer review 
     shall be required under this section for any data or method 
     which has been previously subjected to peer review or for any 
     component of any analysis or assessment previously subjected 
     to peer review.
       (g) National Panels.--The President shall appoint National 
     Peer Review Panels to annually review the risk assessment and 
     cost assessment practices of each Federal agency for programs 
     designed to protect human health, safety, or the environment. 
     The Panel shall submit a report to the Congress no less 
     frequently than annually containing the results of such 
     review.
                       Title IV--Judicial Review

     SEC. 401. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

       Compliance or noncompliance by a Federal agency with the 
     requirements of this Act shall be reviewable pursuant to the 
     statute granting the agency authority to act or, as 
     applicable, that statute and the Administrative Procedure 
     Act. The court with jurisdiction to review final agency 
     action under the statute granting the agency authority to act 
     shall have jurisdiction to review, at the same time, the 
     agency's compliance with the requirements of this Act. When a 
     significant risk assessment document or risk characterization 
     document subject to title I is part of the administrative 
     record in a final agency action, in addition to any other 
     matters that the court may consider in deciding whether the 
     agency's action was lawful, the court shall consider the 
     agency action unlawful if such significant risk assessment 
     document or significant risk characterization document does 
     not substantially comply with the requirements of sections 
     104 and 105.
                             Title V--Plan

     SEC. 501. PLAN FOR ASSESSING NEW INFORMATION.

       (a) Plan.--Within 18 months after the date of enactment of 
     this Act, each covered Federal agency (as defined in title I) 
     shall publish a plan to review and, where appropriate revise 
     any significant risk assessment document or significant risk 
     characterization document published prior to the expiration 
     of such 18-month period if, based on information available at 
     the time of such review, the agency head determines that the 
     application of the principles set forth in sections 104 and 
     105 would be likely to significantly alter the results of the 
     prior risk assessment or risk characterization. The plan 
     shall provide procedures for receiving and considering new 
     information and risk assessments from the public. The plan 
     may set priorities and procedures for review and, where 
     appropriate, revision of such risk assessment documents and 
     risk characterization documents and of health or 
     environmental effects values. The plan may also set 
     priorities and procedures for review, and, where appropriate, 
     revision or repeal of major rules promulgated prior to the 
     expiration of such period. Such priorities and procedures 
     shall be based on the potential to more efficiently focus 
     national economic resources within Federal regulatory 
     programs designed to protect human health, safety, or the 
     environment on the most important priorities and on such 
     other factors as such Federal agency considers appropriate.
       (b) Public Comment and Consultation.--The plan under this 
     section, shall be developed after notice and opportunity for 
     public comment, and after consultation with representatives 
     of appropriate State, local, and tribal governments, and such 
     other departments and agencies, offices, organizations, or 
     persons as may be advisable.
                          Title VI--Priorities

     SEC. 601. PRIORITIES.

       (a) Identification of Opportunities.--In order to assist in 
     the public policy and regulation of risks to public health, 
     the President shall identify opportunities to reflect 
     priorities within existing Federal regulatory programs 
     designed to protect human health in a cost-effective and 
     cost-reasonable manner. The President shall identify each of 
     the following:
       (1) The likelihood and severity of public health risks 
     addressed by current Federal programs.
       (2) The number of individuals affected.
       (3) The incremental costs and risk reduction benefits 
     associated with regulatory or other strategies.
       (4) The cost-effectiveness of regulatory or other 
     strategies to reduce risks to public health.
       (5) Intergovernmental relationships among Federal, State, 
     and local governments among programs designed to protect 
     public health.
       (6) Statutory, regulatory, or administrative obstacles to 
     allocating national economic resources based on the most 
     cost-effective, cost-reasonable priorities considering 
     Federal, State, and local programs.
       (b) Biennial Reports.--The President shall issue biennial 
     reports to Congress, after notice and opportunity for public 
     comment, to recommend priorities for modifications to, 
     elimination of, or strategies for existing Federal regulatory 
     programs designed to protect public health. Within 6 months 
     after the issuance of the report, the President shall notify 
     the Congress in writing of the recommendations which can be 
     implemented without further legislative changes and the 
     agency shall consider the priorities set forth in the report 
     when preparing a budget or strategic plan for any such 
     regulatory program.

  The CHAIRMAN. The bill will be considered for amendment under the 5-
minute rule for a period not to exceed 10 hours.
  Are there any amendments to the bill?


    amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by mr. brown of 
                               california

  Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment in the 
nature of a substitute.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. 
     Brown of California:
       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     following:
     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Regulatory Reform Act of 
     1995''.

     SEC. 2. PURPOSES.

       The purposes of this Act are the following:
       (1) To direct the head of each covered agency to establish 
     appropriate regulatory priorities among regulatory 
     initiatives based on the seriousness of the risks to be 
     addressed and available resources, and other appropriate 
     factors.
       (2) To require the head of each covered agency to conduct a 
     risk assessment and cost benefit analysis for all major 
     rules.
       (3) To require the head of each covered agency to--
       (A) oversee the development, periodic revision, and 
     implementation of risk assessment guidelines throughout the 
     covered agency, which reflect scientific advances;
       (B) provide for appropriate scientific peer review of and 
     public comment on risk assessment guidelines and for peer 
     review of risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses 
     throughout the process of development and implementation;
       (C) develop risk characterization guidance and oversee its 
     implementation in order to communicate an accurate 
     description of the full range of risks and uncertainties; and
       (D) identify, prioritize, and conduct research and training 
     needed to advance the science and practice of risk assessment 
     and cost-benefit analysis.
       (4) To establish a study to improve comparative risk 
     analysis and to direct the Office of Science and Technology 
     Policy to establish an interagency coordinating process to 
     promote more compatible risk assessment procedures across 
     Federal agencies.

     SEC. 3. ESTABLISHING AGENCY PRIORITIES.

       (a) Priorities for Regulation.--Each covered agency shall 
     establish, after notice and opportunity for comment, 
     priorities for regulatory purposes among threats to human 
     health, safety, and the environment according to--
       (1) the seriousness of the risk they pose;
       (2) the opportunities available to achieve the greatest 
     overall net reduction in those risks with the public and 
     private resources available; and
       (3) other factors as appropriate.
     [[Page H2266]]   (b) Report.--Each covered agency shall 
     submit an annual report to Congress setting forth the 
     agency's regulatory priorities. The report shall recommend 
     priorities, consistent with otherwise applicable law, for the 
     use of resources available to the agency to reduce those 
     risks in accordance with the priorities established under 
     subsection (a), including strategic planning and research 
     activities of the agency. The report shall also explain any 
     statutory priorities which are inconsistent with the 
     priorities established according to the factors set forth in 
     this section.

     SEC. 4. ANALYSIS OF RISKS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS.

       For all major rules protecting human health, safety, or the 
     environment, the head of each covered agency shall--
       (1) conduct a risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis 
     that uses sound scientific, technical, economic, and other 
     data. Such an analysis shall be conducted with as much 
     specificity as practicable, of--
       (A) the risk to human health, safety, or the environment, 
     and any combination thereof, addressed by the rule, 
     including, where applicable and practicable, the health and 
     safety risks to persons who are disproportionately exposed or 
     particularly sensitive, including children, the elderly, and 
     disabled individuals;
       (B) the costs, including the incremental costs, associated 
     with implementation of, and compliance with, the rule;
       (C) the quantitative or qualitative benefits of the rule, 
     including the incremental benefits, reduction or prevention 
     of risk, or other benefits expected from the rule; and
       (D) where appropriate and meaningful, a comparison of that 
     risk relative to other similar risks, regulated by that 
     Federal agency or another Federal agency, resulting from 
     comparable activities and exposure pathways (such comparisons 
     should consider relevant distinctions among risks, such as 
     the voluntary or involuntary nature of risks, and the 
     preventability and nonpreventability of risks); and
       (2) include with the rule a statement that, to the extent 
     consistent with otherwise applicable law--
       (A) the rule will substantially advance the purpose of 
     protecting against the risk referred to in paragraph (1)(A);
       (B) the rule will produce benefits and reduce risks to 
     human health, safety, or the environment, and any combination 
     thereof, in a cost-effective manner taking into account the 
     costs of the implementation of and compliance with the rule, 
     by local, State, and Federal Government and other public and 
     private entities;
       (C) the benefits, quantitatively or qualitatively, will be 
     likely to justify the costs; and
       (D) the most cost-effective option allowed by the statute 
     under which the rule is promulgated has been employed, or if 
     such option has not been employed, the head of the agency 
     shall include a summary of the analysis justifying why it is 
     not employed.

     SEC. 5. RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES.

       (a) Functions of the Agency Head.--The head of each covered 
     agency shall ensure that any risk assessments conducted by 
     the agency are performed in accordance with risk assessment 
     guidelines issued by the agency head under subsection (b) and 
     use relevant, reliable, and reasonably available data.
       (b) Issuance of Risk Assessment Guidelines.--
       (1) In general.--The head of each covered agency shall 
     develop and publish in the Federal Register risk assessment 
     guidelines that provide appropriate consistency and technical 
     quality among risk assessments performed by the agency.
       (2) Procedures for publishing guidelines.--Before issuing 
     guidelines under this subsection, the head of a covered 
     agency shall--
       (A) publish notice of intent to revise as appropriate 
     existing guidelines or to develop new guidelines and a list 
     of the issues the agency head intends to address and upon 
     which the agency head seeks public comment;
       (B) publish all proposed guidelines for the purpose of 
     seeking public comment; and
       (C) conduct scientific peer review of such guidelines.
       (3) Review and updates.--Not less than once every 3 years, 
     the head of a covered agency shall review and, as necessary, 
     update guidelines issued under this subsection.
       (4) Procedures for review of risk assessments.--Within 1 
     year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of 
     each covered agency shall develop and publish procedures for 
     the review of significant new information made available to 
     the agency relative to risk assessments performed by the 
     agency that are (or if this Act had been in effect would have 
     been) covered by section 4.
       (c) Use of Guidelines.--The agency head shall ensure--
       (1) consistency in the use of such guidelines to the extent 
     such consistency is appropriate;
       (2) that risk assessments are scientifically supportable; 
     and
       (3) that significant uncertainties regarding facts, 
     scientific knowledge, and the validity of analytical 
     techniques, or numerical risk estimates are clearly disclosed 
     in terms readily understandable to the public.
       (d) Contents.--Risk assessments conducted by the Agency 
     should be carried out at a level of effort and accuracy 
     appropriate to the decision being made and the need for 
     accuracy of the risk estimate and should be conducted 
     according to risk assessment guidelines that include:
       (1) An explanation of the scope and applicability of the 
     guidelines, including appropriate limitations or restrictions 
     on their use.
       (2) Criteria for accepting and evaluating data.
       (3) A complete description of any mathematical models or 
     other assumptions used in the risk assessment, including a 
     discussion of their validation, limitations and plausibility.
       (4) A description of the default options, the scientific 
     justification supporting the default options, and an explicit 
     statement of the rationale for selecting a particular default 
     option, in the absence of adequate data, based on explicitly 
     stated science policy choices and consideration of relevant 
     scientific information.
       (5) The technical justification for, and a description of 
     the degree of conservatism each model selection, default 
     option, or assumption imposes upon the risk assessment.
       (6) Criteria for conducting uncertainty analysis during the 
     course of the risk assessment, and an explanation of the data 
     needs for such analysis.
       (e) Regional Compliance.--The regional offices of each 
     agency shall comply with, and follow, the risk assessment 
     guidelines and policies established by the head of the 
     agency. Where credible information has been received from an 
     affected party that a region is violating such guidelines, 
     the head of the agency shall examine the information and 
     resolve the matter.

     SEC. 6. RISK CHARACTERIZATION.

       (a) In General.--The head of each covered agency shall 
     ensure that all risk assessments required by section 4, and 
     the risk characterizations that are components of such 
     assessments, make apparent the distinction between data and 
     policy assumptions to facilitate interpretation and 
     appropriate use of the characterization by decisionmakers.
       (b) Contents.--
       (1) In general.--As scientifically appropriate, such risk 
     characterizations shall contain the following:
       (A) Relevant information on data selection and rejection in 
     the risk assessment, including a specific rationale 
     justifying the basis for the selection or rejection, and the 
     influence of the selection or rejection on the risk estimate.
       (B) Identification of significant limitations, assumptions, 
     and default options included in the risk assessment and the 
     rationale and extent of scientific support for their use.
       (C) A discussion of significant uncertainties and data gaps 
     and their influence upon the risk assessment.
       (2) Quantitative estimates of certain risks.--As 
     scientifically appropriate, any such risk characterization 
     that includes quantitative estimates of carcinogenic risk 
     shall contain the following:
       (A) The range and distribution of exposures derived from 
     exposure scenarios used in the risk assessment of which the 
     risk characterization is a component, including upper bound 
     estimates and central estimates and, when appropriate and 
     practicable, the identification of susceptible groups, 
     species, and subpopulations, including children, the elderly, 
     and disabled individuals, or groups whose exposure exceeds 
     the general population.
       (B) A description of appropriate statistical expressions of 
     the range and variability of the risk estimate, including the 
     population or populations addressed by any risk estimates, 
     central estimates of risk for each such specific population, 
     any appropriate upper bound estimates, the reasonable range, 
     or other description of uncertainties in the risk 
     characterization which is contained in the risk assessment.

     To the extent the types of information referred to in 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B) are scientifically appropriate for 
     risk characterizations other than for carcinogenic risks, 
     such characterizations shall include such information. As 
     other scientifically appropriate methods are developed for 
     quantitatively estimating carcinogenic risks, such methods 
     may be used in lieu of the methods described in subparagraphs 
     (A) and (B).

     SEC. 7. PEER REVIEW.

       (a) Establishment.--For regulatory programs addressing 
     human health, safety, or the environment, the head of each 
     Federal agency shall develop a systematic program for peer 
     review of risk assessments used by the agency. Such program 
     shall be applicable across the agency and--
       (1) shall provide for peer review by independent and well-
     qualified experts;
       (2) to the extent a peer review panel is used, the panel 
     shall be broadly representative and balanced to the extent 
     feasible;
       (3) may provide for differing levels of peer review 
     depending on the significance or the complexity of the 
     problems or the need for expeditiousness;
       (4) shall exclude peer reviewers who are associated with 
     entities that may have a financial interest in the outcome 
     unless such interest is disclosed to the agency and the 
     agency has determined that such interest will not reasonably 
     be expected to create a bias in favor of obtaining an outcome 
     that is consistent with such interest;
     [[Page H2267]]   (5) shall result in the appointment of peer 
     reviewers who are qualified on the basis of their 
     professional training or expertise as reflected in their 
     record of peer-reviewed publications or equivalent;
       (6) may provide specific and reasonable deadlines for peer 
     review comments; and
       (7) shall provide adequate protections for confidential 
     business information and trade secrets, including requiring 
     peer reviewers to enter into confidentiality agreements.
       (b) Requirement for Peer Review.--Each Federal agency shall 
     provide for appropriate peer review of scientific information 
     used for purposes of any risk assessment required by section 
     4. For any such risk assessment, the head of a covered agency 
     shall provide a written response to comments made by the peer 
     reviewers. The response shall indicate that the agency head 
     explicitly considered the comments, the degree to which such 
     comments have been incorporated into the risk assessment 
     guidelines or risk assessment, as applicable, and the reason 
     why a comment has not been incorporated.
       (c) Availability to Public.--For all peer review to which 
     this section applies, a summary of all peer review comments 
     or conclusions and any response of the agency shall be made 
     available to the public.
       (d) Previously Reviewed Data and Analysis.--No peer review 
     shall be required under this section for any data or analysis 
     which has been previously subjected to peer review or for any 
     component of any evaluation or assessment previously 
     subjected to peer review.
       (e) Reports.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the head of each covered agency shall 
     submit to the Congress a report on a plan for conducting peer 
     review under this section, and shall also report to the 
     Congress whenever significant modifications are made to the 
     plan.

     SEC. 8. REVIEW OF AGENCY COMPLIANCE.
       During the 3-year period beginning 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the 
     United States shall annually conduct a review to determine 
     the extent of compliance by each covered Federal agency with 
     the provisions of this Act and shall annually submit to 
     Congress a report on such review.

     SEC. 9. RESEARCH AND TRAINING IN RISK ASSESSMENT.

       (a) Evaluation.--The head of each covered agency shall 
     regularly and systematically evaluate risk assessment 
     research and training needs of the agency, including the 
     following:
       (1) Research to reduce data gaps or redundancies, address 
     modelling needs (including improved model sensitivity), and 
     validate default options, particularly those common to 
     multiple risk assessments.
       (2) Research leading to improvement of methods to quantify 
     and communicate uncertainty and variability throughout risk 
     assessment, and risk assessment reporting methods that 
     clearly distinguish between uncertainty and variability.
       (3) Research to examine the causes and extent of 
     variability within and among individuals, species, 
     populations, and, in the case of ecological risk assessment, 
     ecological communities.
       (4) Emerging and future areas of research, including 
     research on comparative risk analysis, exposure to multiple 
     chemicals and other stressors, noncancer endpoints, 
     biological markers of exposure and effect, mechanisms of 
     action in both mammalian and nonmammalian species, dynamics 
     and probabilities of physiological and ecosystem exposures, 
     and prediction of ecosystem-level responses.
       (5) Long-term needs to adequately train individuals in risk 
     assessment and risk assessment applications. Evaluations 
     under this paragraph shall include an estimate of the 
     resources needed to provide necessary training and 
     recommendations on appropriate educational risk assessment 
     curricula.
       (b) Strategy and Actions To Meet Identified Needs.--The 
     head of each covered agency shall develop a strategy, 
     schedule, and delegation of responsibility for carrying out 
     research and training to meet the needs identified in 
     subsection (a) consistent with available resources.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the head of each covered agency shall 
     submit to the Congress a report on the evaluations conducted 
     under subsection (a) and the strategy and schedule developed 
     under subsection (b). The head of each covered agency shall 
     report to the Congress whenever the evaluations, strategy, 
     and schedule are updated or modified.

     SEC. 10. STUDY OF COMPARATIVE RISK ANALYSIS.

       (a) In General.--The Director of the Office of Science and 
     Technology Policy shall conduct, or provide for the conduct 
     of, a study of the methods for conducting comparative risk 
     analysis of health, safety, and environmental risks, and to 
     provide a common basis for evaluating strategies for 
     reducing, or preventing those risks. The goal of the study 
     shall be to survey and rigorously evaluate methods of 
     comparative risk analysis.
       (b) Study Participants.--In conducting the study, the 
     Director shall provide for the participation of a range of 
     individuals with varying backgrounds and expertise, both 
     technical and nontechnical, comprising broad representation 
     of the public and private sectors.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the termination 
     of the study, the Director shall submit to the Congress a 
     report on the results of the study referred to in subsection 
     (a).

     SEC. 11. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.

       To promote the conduct, application, and practice of risk 
     assessment in a consistent manner under Federal and to 
     identify risk assessment data needs common to more than one 
     Federal agency, the Director of the Office of Science and 
     Technology Policy shall--
       (1) periodically survey the manner in which each Federal 
     agency involved in risk assessment is conducting such risk 
     assessment to determine the scope and adequacy of risk 
     assessment practices in use by the Federal Government;
       (2) provide advice and recommendations to the President and 
     the Congress based on the surveys conducted and 
     determinations made under paragraph (1);
       (3) establish appropriate interagency mechanisms to promote 
     coordination among Federal agencies conducting risk 
     assessment with respect to the conduct, application, and 
     practice of risk assessment and to promote the use of state-
     of-the-art risk assessment practices throughout the Federal 
     Government;
       (4) establish appropriate mechanisms between Federal and 
     State agencies to communicate state-of-the-art risk 
     assessment practices; and
       (5) periodically convene meetings with State government 
     representatives and Federal and other leaders to assess the 
     effectiveness of Federal-State cooperation in the development 
     and application of risk assessment.

     SEC. 12. SAVINGS PROVISION.

       Nothing in this Act shall be construed to modify any 
     statutory standard or requirement designed to protect health, 
     safety, or the environment or shall delay any action required 
     to meet a deadline imposed by a statute or a court.

     SEC. 13. DEFINITIONS.

       For the purposes of this Act:
       (1) The term ``major rule'' means any rule (as that term is 
     defined in section 551(4) of title 5, United States Code) 
     that is likely to result in an annual effect on the economy 
     of $100,000,000 or more.
       (2) The term ``risk assessment'' means a process that uses 
     a factual base to--
       (A) identify, characterize, and to the extent practicable 
     and appropriate, quantify or describe the potential adverse 
     effects of exposure of individuals, populations, habitats, 
     ecosystems, or materials to hazardous pollutants or other 
     stressors; and
       (B) to the extent practicable and appropriate, identify and 
     characterize important uncertainties.
       (3) The term ``risk characterization'' means the final 
     component of a risk assessment, that qualitatively or 
     quantitatively (or both) describes the magnitude and 
     consequences of that risk in terms of the population exposed 
     to the risk and the types of potential effects of exposure.
       (4) The term ``covered agency'' means each of the 
     following:
       (A) The Environmental Protection Agency.
       (B) The Consumer Product Safety Commission.
       (C) The Department of Labor (including the Occupational 
     Health and Safety Administration).
       (D) The Department of Transportation.
       (E) The Department of Energy.
       (F) The Department of Agriculture.
       (G) The Department of the Interior.
       (H) The Food and Drug Administration.

     SEC. 14. EXCEPTIONS.

       This Act does not apply to risk assessments or risk 
     characterizations performed with respect to either of the 
     following:
       (1) A situation that the head of the agency considers to be 
     an emergency.
       (2) A situation the head of the agency considers to be 
     reasonably expected to cause death or serious injury or 
     illness to humans, or substantial endangerment to private 
     property or the environment unless prompt action is taken to 
     avoid death or to avoid or mitigate serious injury or illness 
     to humans, or substantial endangerment to private property or 
     the environment.

     SEC. 15. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

       Nothing in this Act creates any right to judicial or 
     administrative review, nor creates any right or benefit, 
     substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a 
     party against the United States, its agencies or 
     instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other 
     person. If an agency action is subject to judicial or 
     administrative review under any other provision of law, the 
     adequacy of any document prepared pursuant to this Act, and 
     any alleged failure to comply with this Act, may not be used 
     as grounds for affecting or invalidating such agency action, 
     but statements and information prepared pursuant to this Act 
     which are otherwise part of the record, may be considered as 
     part of the record for the judicial or administrative review 
     conducted under such other provision of law.

     SEC. 16. UNFUNDED MANDATES.

       Nothing in this Act shall create an obligation or burden on 
     any State or local government or otherwise impose any 
     financial burden any State or local government. Nothing in 
     this Act shall force a State to change its laws.

  Mr. BROWN of California (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask 
unanimous consent that the amendment be 
 [[Page H2268]] considered as read and printed in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, I will use a very brief 
portion of the time and then yield to my cosponsor, the gentleman from 
Ohio [Mr. Brown].
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment was drafted after considerable 
discussion of the major problems of this bill which have been pointed 
out during general debate. It seeks to reflect the views of those who 
have expressed concerns about the workability of the bill, including 
Members on both sides, and we believe that the substitute is a 
considerable improvement over the original bill, and we elaborate on 
that during further debate.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BROWN of California. I yield the remainder of my time to the 
gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the 
Brown-Brown substitute amendment to H.R. 1022. This substitute provides 
a common sense approach to risk assessment without creating a lawyers' 
paradise. It ensures that public health and safety will continue to be 
protected. At the same time it enhances the decision-making process to 
ensure that our resources are spent on our most critical prioritized 
needs.
  Risk assessment and management provide valuable tools with which we 
can identify the most critical threats to health and safety of 
Americans and establish a system of priorities to address these 
problems. In time of scarce resources, it is essential that we plan 
appropriately and demand sufficient information to make decisions based 
on sound science. Risk assessment can help us do that.
  Risk assessment practices, however, must not in and of themselves 
become a burdensome process. This bill as currently drafted is loaded 
with unintended consequences and will effectively derail the last 25 
years of accomplishments in protecting the public's health and safety.
  I remember when parts of Lake Erie were dead. Today my daughter can 
swim in Lake Erie. I remember when the Cuyahoga River was on fire. 
Today it is an essential water route for interstate commerce.
  We have in this country the cleanest air, the safest drinking water, 
the purest food, the safest consumer products in the world. It is not 
an accident we were able to do that by working together with Government 
and business and regulations and making sure that those products were 
safe, the water was clean, the food was pure and the air was clean. 
Citizens of northeast Ohio continue to be concerned about the high 
rates of breast and prostate cancer in that part of the State. They 
believe the cause could be the pollutants of a previous day. Did we 
address the most serious concerns when we cleaned up Lake Erie or 
cleaned up the Cuyahoga River? We do not know. We should find out. Risk 
assessment and analysis can help us do that without it becoming the 
lawyers' for employment act.
  Listen to some of the comments, Mr. Chairman, that have been made 
about this legislation. A former Republican chairman of the Senate 
Environment and Public Works Committee said this legislation would 
shift the financial, legal and moral burden of dealing with pollution 
from the polluters to the victims.
  A former Republican EPA Administrator under Presidents Bush and 
Reagan said the proposal would render the Nation's environmental laws 
by and large unworkable and unpredictable by creating a procedural 
nightmare and endless litigation. More bureaucracy, more lawyers, more 
government.
  The Natural Resources Defense Council report said the bill would 
dismantle laws that have worked, would block improvements to public 
health, would pay polluters to bloat the deficit and would dramatically 
increase bureaucracy and litigation.
  Mr. Chairman, the evidence is overwhelming that this legislation 
would have enormous unintended consequences for the public health and 
safety of all Americans. Twenty-four Members of the House, a dozen 
Republicans and a dozen Democrats signed a ``Dear Colleague'' letter to 
urge Members to think this legislation through and to address three 
major concerns about the bill. Our substitute addresses these concerns 
in a way that does not diminish the science of risk assessment, which I 
support, or create endless bureaucracies or litigation.
  Our substitute is patterned after a Republican proposal of 2 years 
ago. It is a reasonable alternative. It is a strong risk assessment 
bill without bureaucracy, without more lawyers, without more 
government, and without the unintended consequences that the authors of 
this bill have not foreseen because of the quick way in which it passed 
the committee.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask Members of the House to look carefully at the 
substitute. The substitute makes sense. It is a reasonable middle-of-
the-road, down-the-middle approach. I ask support for the Brown-Brown 
substitute.
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I am glad we got this amendment out here first because 
it is a good way of kind of delineating the debate.
  This is the status quo amendment. This is keep things as they are, do 
not change regulations.
  The gentleman from Ohio has just given Members this explanation. He 
thinks the things that have been done in the name of regulation have in 
fact been beneficial to the country. In fact, there are some things 
that have been done in the name of regulation have in fact been 
beneficial to the country. In fact, there are some things that have 
been beneficial, but the fact is that we have regulations run amok at 
the present time too that need to have some handle on them, and we need 
to get the good science, and we need to have common sense prevail.
  Under the Brown substitute what we have is an opportunity for the 
regulators to continue to do exactly what they have been doing. Since 
we had such a discussion about process out here a few minutes ago with 
the gentleman from Michigan and the gentleman from California 
criticizing the process, I must say we have not had much of a chance to 
review this substitute, since I only got it at 6 o'clock, which means 
about 25 minutes ago we actually got a chance to see this amendment in 
the nature of a substitute. In other words, this is the whole bill, 
folks. We are trying to take one whole bill and substitute it. At least 
even under their scenario we gave them a couple of hours. We got 25 
minutes.
  But let me say that we have had a chance to look at a few things 
here, and it does give one a little bit of cause to be suspicious if in 
fact we had had the idea that we were going to really change 
regulations. For example, it changes a major rule from an annual impact 
of $25 to $100 million. Guess what that does? That wipes out virtually 
all of the business of finding regulation. One hundred dollars' worth 
of impact means you have $100 million dollars' worth of impact in the 
economy. No small business is likely to have something that is 100 
million dollars' worth of impact. Service station operators, dry 
cleaners, all of these folks across the country that have been hit hard 
by Federal regulation would not even qualify under this bill. All the 
big businesses like General Motors and so on, yes, they might come 
under, and their lobbyists will not be all that unhappy with all of 
that by the big lobbying community. But the little guy, the little guy 
is going to be affected by this.
  So guess what? This bill that they have brought before us now is the 
big guys versus the little guys, and the little guys come down on the 
side of our amendment that says $25 million worth of impact.
  I also was interested to look at the language that dealt with how we 
were going to compare risk. In other words, what our bill says is you 
ought to compare risk to the thing that the general public has 
knowledge of, drinking a glass of orange juice, riding in a car, things 
that the public really understands, you ought to compare that.
  Here is the language they substitute though for that kind of thing, 
listen to this language, Members will love it. If 
 [[Page H2269]] this is not a regulator's dream or a litigator's dream, 
I do not know what is. Listen to this:

       Where appropriate and meaningful, a comparison of that risk 
     relative to other similar risks, regulated by that Federal 
     agency or another Federal agency, resulting from comparable 
     activities and exposure pathways (such comparisons should 
     consider relevant distinctions among risks, such as the 
     voluntary or involuntary nature of risks, and the 
     preventability and nonpreventability of risks).

  Now what the devil does that mean? I do not know. No one knows. It is 
just one more way of making certain that regulation stays right where 
it is.
                              {time}  1830

  You know, you put in a bill risk ought to be compared to that that 
the public knows. Then they come up with that kind of junk.
  Now, it seems to me that what you want to do is just turn down this 
substitute flat.
  The other thing that is does is it says that we are not going to have 
any judicial or administrative review. Now, what that means is that if 
in fact you have a regulation issued that the Department thinks is 
fine, you have no appeal after that. The Department issues the 
regulation, and nothing can be done about it because, in their 
substitute, they wipe out the ability to have any kind of 
administrative or judicial review.
  You know, even under the Administrative Procedures Act at the present 
time there is at least a process for doing this. They wipe that out. 
Here is the language. They say, ``Nothing in the title creates any 
right to judicial or administrative review.'' You cannot even do what 
people can do now in terms of going back to the agencies under what 
they have created here. This is really a bad bill. This is the kind of 
thing that says, ``Regulators, do whatever you want. If you have been 
down there regulating an industry and so on, if you have been 
regulating people out of business, you go right ahead and keep doing 
it.''
  All of this talk that we heard during the general debate, ``We agree 
with the intent of this legislation, and we would love to do something 
that would help,'' this is their idea of what it is. This is their 
substitute. This substitute makes the situation worse. It does not help 
the situation. This destroys exactly what we are attempting to do with 
the bill here on the floor.
  So I would suggest that if ever you wanted to cast a big ``no'' vote, 
if ever you wanted to stand up and say, ``Let us stop regulation from 
batting down the American people,'' vote ``no'' on this substitute. 
This substitute is really bad news.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.
  (Mr. DINGELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I would just note for the benefit of the 
last speaker that this bill was gotten to the House more quickly than 
any of the various and sundry substitutes which the gentleman was 
presenting to us after moonlight discussions with other Members on that 
side of the aisle. So if you are concerned about the time that we have 
had in terms of having this available to us, we have done better than 
has the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Now, the gentleman complains about the language he read. That is 
language out of legislation that passed the House last year relative to 
exactly the kind of thing we are trying to do, and that is to set in 
place risk assessment. It also is language which is very close to the 
language that is in the bill that the gentleman has submitted to us, 
and I can understand, with the haste that the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania has crafted these different sundry substitutes that we 
have been confronting over time without opportunity to read them, that 
he may not have had full enough time to read his own bill so he really 
does not understand what is there.
  Having said that, the effects of the basic legislation will be seen 
in many ways. One is with regard to a final rule which is anticipated 
by December 1995 with regard to safety on commuter airlines. As we all 
know, commuter airline safety is open to question, and that a fatal 
commuter accident in North Carolina caused the Secretary of 
Transportation to announce a commuter safety program would be fast-
tracked. The fast-tracking of that commuter safety airline legislation 
or, rather, regulation which will address very specifically pilot 
training and crew rest requirements would be sidetracked by the 
language of the bill but not by the amendment which is put forward.
  FAA has plenary authority to take actions necessary for airline 
safety. But that plenary authority will be effectively delayed by this 
matter.
  Having said those things, the airline safety rule will exceed the 
$100 million cost threshold established in title III. FAA will have to 
peer review any risk or cost analysis which forms the basis for action 
under this.
  Never before have we had risk assessment or cost-benefit in rules of 
these kinds, and the reason was very important. FAA exists to assure 
that there be safety of the American airline traveling public. That 
safety will be substantially denigrated and severely jeopardized by the 
bill unless the amendment is adopted.
  Similar situations with regard to PCB control regulations, those 
which are actively sought by legislation, will be sidetracked and will 
cost industry and the American economy billions of dollars in 
additional disposable costs and will rob industry of flexibility and 
opportunity to become more competitive through relaxation of current 
situations which they find unacceptable.
  H.R. 1022 is a very simple thing. It is a political campaign 
statement which is now being turned into bad law, and it is being done 
so in the most extraordinary of haste, the idea being to meet some 
curious 100-day deadline which relates not to the well-being of the 
American people but to simply the keeping of some kind of political 
statement.
  The amendment should be adopted, or the bill should be rejected, and 
the safety and the well-being of the American people, the protection of 
their environment will, indeed, be better served by that course.
  I urge my colleagues to adopt the amendment.
  Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DINGELL. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, I ask the gentleman from 
Michigan [Mr. Dingell], did I understand you correctly that the 
language on comparative risk assessment is the same language that 
passed the House and Senate and was signed into law last year in the 
Agricultural Reorganization Act?
  Mr. DINGELL. The gentleman is correct in that statement.
  Mr. BROWN of California. And the $100 million cap the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] referred to is the same in the Reagan and 
Bush Executive orders?
  Mr. DINGELL. That is also correct. The $100 million is exactly the 
same as was in the Executive orders brought forward by Presidents Bush 
and Reagan.
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I am particularly concerned about providing a double 
standard, one for the regulators and another for everybody else.
  Let me read to you and the Members the language on compliance in the 
Brown squared substitute. It says:

       During a 3-year period beginning 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this act, the Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall annually conduct a review to determine the 
     extent of compliance by each covered Federal agency with the 
     provision of this act and shall annually submit to Congress a 
     report on such review.

  Essentially what we are saying is that the regulators can have their 
usual run at regulating with only apparently a drive-by windshield 
effort by the Comptroller to do that. That double standard, coupled 
with the lack of judicial review in the Brown squared substitute, would 
indicate that this is a very weak provision at best.
  Judicial review in the Brown substitute:

       Nothing in this act creates any right to judicial or 
     administrative review or creates any right or benefit, 
     substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a 
     party against the United States, its agencies 
      [[Page H2270]] or instrumentalities, its officers or 
     employees or any other person. The adequacy of any document 
     prepared pursuant to this act, and any alleged failure to 
     comply with this act may not be used as grounds for affecting 
     or invalidating such agency action.

  It is business as usual, folks, with all the regulators. They are 
just free and wild.
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. OXLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. WALKER. The gentleman makes an excellent point. If you go down 
and look in the contents section on page 7 of the substitute, you find 
exactly the same thing the gentleman is talking about. It says here,

       Risk assessments conducted by the agency should be carried 
     out on a level of effort and accuracy appropriate to the 
     decision being made and the need for accuracy of the risk 
     assessment and should be conducted according to risk-
     assessment guidelines.

  What that means is the bureaucrats are going to decide whether or not 
the bureaucrats are right. The regulators are going to decide whether 
or not the regulators are right. You know, it is really an attempt here 
to say whatever the regulators want, the regulators get.
  Mr. OXLEY. I thank the gentleman for his comments, because that is 
exactly right, and it is the same old story, and the same old game, and 
the regulators will continue to regulate, and nobody is going to be 
able to check them unless we defeat this substitute.
  Now, Mr. Chairman, I have a list here of the Alliance for Reasonable 
Regulation, and I have a list of 35 organizations and companies 
throughout this country, everybody from Goodyear all the way down to 
small operations, and this includes the National Federation of 
Independent Business, NFIB. that supports our legislation and opposes 
any weakening efforts like the Brown substitute.
  I want to make certain that the Members understand that it is not 
just the major companies but small businesses throughout this country 
that are finally coming to realize that they are being put upon by 
these massive regulatory burdens that have cost us jobs and our 
competitiveness throughout the world, and that is really important to 
understand.
  I also want to point out, Mr. Chairman, that we want to maintain the 
$25 million threshold. We think that one of the major weaknesses in the 
Brown provision is to raise this threshold to $100 million.
  Now, I do not know about the Members on the other side of the aisle, 
but I know to a lot of people that we represent in small businesses and 
the like, $25 million is an awful lot of money, and while we may spill 
that much before breakfast around here in Washington, the fact is that 
is an important threshold that we want to maintain in the legislation 
that came out of our committee as well as came out of the committee of 
the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker].
  Mr. WALKER. If the gentleman will yield further, I was interested to 
hear the discussion on the other side that the Executive orders of the 
Bush and Reagan administrations were at the $100 million level. I 
wonder if there is anybody who in this Chamber believes that the Bush 
and Reagan administrations got the regulatory process under control. I 
mean, the fact is the $100 million did not work. It did not result in 
the regulatory process being gotten under control.
  In fact, we had a discussion out here earlier today about the mess 
that was made during the 1980's of the asbestos policy, and that was 
done under the Reagan administration, and it may, in fact, be a perfect 
example of why the $100 million limit of those executive orders was the 
wrong limit.
  Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. OXLEY. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to impose on the 
gentleman's time. I can get someone on our side to do it. If the 
gentleman would like to have me comment as he proceeds, I would like to 
do it.
  I wanted to point out that the $100 million figure which exists in 
all past Executive orders captures 97 percent of all the economic 
impact of regulations on the American public.
  Mr. OXLEY. Reclaiming my time, the gentleman from Pennsylvania had it 
right, that is, it just did not get the job done. One hundred million 
dollars is not going to get the job done. There are a lot of people in 
my district and other districts around here who are very concerned 
about $100 million. They think $25 million makes a lot of sense and so 
do I.
  Mr. MANTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Brown substitute.
  Mr. Chairman, the Brown substitute offers Members a chance to vote 
for meaningful regulatory reform without endangering the public's 
health and safety. Furthermore, unlike H.R. 1022, this substitute would 
not expand judicial review of agency decisionmaking.
  My colleagues who historically have expressed concerns that 
legislation passed by this Congress is ill-suited to real world 
applications should be troubled that H.R. 1022 would implement a one-
size fits all risk assessment scheme. By contrast, the Brown substitute 
would require each agency to issue scientifically sound risk assessment 
guidelines with criteria specifically tailored to fit the agency's area 
of expertise. Thus, in contrast to H.R. 1022, the Brown substitute 
would require federal agencies to use the most useful scientific data 
available to complete risk assessment.
  I strongly believe we should establish a balanced approach to 
environmental concerns. I have tried to represent the views of my 
constituents who have told me they want a clean environment but also 
less government regulation. I also share the frustration of many of my 
colleagues about ill-conceived and unduly burdensome regulations which 
have been issued by the EPA as well as other agencies. It is therefore 
tempting to support this bill because it will slow down the regulatory 
process and perhaps lead to less regulation.
  However, simply reducing the amount of regulations promulgated by the 
Government is not the answer to our current problems.
  We need a regulatory process that better reflects simple common sense 
and that is carefully targeted to protect public health and promote 
free market competition.
  That is why I believe risk assessment and cost benefit analysis can 
play a meaningful and useful role in developing environmental 
regulations.
  Finally, I want to inform my colleagues who may be considering voting 
for H.R. 1022 because they support the general concept of risk 
assessment that this bill is dangerously overbroad.
  H.R. 1022 would impact many federal regulations designed to protect 
health and safety. The Brown substitute cures this defect in the 
registration by specifying that no existing health, safety or 
environmental laws may be overridden through passage of H.R. 1022.
  While certain Federal regulations designed to protect safety or 
public health are counterproductive, the vast majority are not.
  A scattershot approach is not the way to correct this problem.
  As children, most of us were told that ``it is better to be safe than 
sorry.''
  Our parents who gave us this advice were trying to pass along the 
wisdom of their years. It is good advice that we in the House should 
consider today.
  I urge my colleagues to support scientifically sound cost benefit and 
risk assessment analysis, and support the Brown amendment.
                              {time}  1845

  Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, I speak in opposition to the substitute 
motion. I am sure my colleagues on the other side of the aisle are 
really well intentioned in thinking that environmental and regulatory 
mandates from the Federal Government somehow always protect the public, 
always defend the little guy. I am here, though, representing a 
district which has been severely impacted by Federal regulations. The 
public health of my citizens has been severely impacted by government 
and Federal regulations.
  Mr. Chairman, I happened to have the privilege of going back to my 
district and being able to enjoy the beautiful southern California 
climate. I was able to take my 8- and 9-year-olds to the beach, and 
this is what we were greeted with, Mr. Chairman. ``Contaminated'' signs 
that have been there for 
 [[Page H2271]] so long that they are not made out of paper, they are 
made out of weather-resistant plastic because the contaminated beaches 
of southern California have been allowed to perpetuate for a long time.
  My colleague from Ohio [Mr. Brown] continually points out how great 
the successes have been on Lake Erie. I appreciate that his children 
can swim in their water. My children cannot. My children cannot or 
should not be swimming in our water, not because of some business or 
because the government has not done its job under the existing rules, 
but because under the existing rules our government regulations have 
done a job on the environment. I point out the fact, Mr. Chairman, that 
there have actually been environmental rules interpreted by 
bureaucracies to state that because the area has been polluted for so 
long that there is a possibility that a sewage-based ecology has been 
created and thus is protected under environmental regulations. And that 
may stand in the way of diverting sewage away from this area and into a 
sewage treatment system as we all know it should be.
  At the same time, this same problem has been going on, the same area 
has a mandate coming down from EPA to treat our sewage in a manner that 
both Scripps Institute of Oceanography and the Academy of Sciences say 
are inappropriate and actually damaging to the environment. But these 
regulations are taking precedence over the environment, Mr. Chairman.
  What the substitute will say is that those of us who are the victims 
of inappropriate government regulation will not be able to go to court, 
will not be able to use the justice system to be able to straighten out 
the insensitivity of the bureaucracy.
  I stand here as somebody who has worked almost two decades trying to 
take care of the pollution problems in my neighborhoods and in my 
district, and at the same time trying to keep the EPA from requiring us 
to spend over $3 billion to $6 billion on so-called improvements that 
will not benefit the environment or the public health.
  Mr. Chairman, I stand in opposition to this amendment because it will 
not allow the citizens of my district to stand up and demand that they 
get preferable and fair treatment from the Federal Government and that 
government regulations will not continue to constitute one of the 
greatest public health risks southern California has seen, not the lack 
of environmental regulations but the inappropriate application thereof. 
That is why I stand in opposition to this substitute motion.
  Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike 
the requisite number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Brown substitute. I have some 
serious concerns about H.R. 1022, which is before us today. It started 
out with the best of intentions: reforming the Federal regulatory 
system. We all agree that change is needed in this system and change is 
starting to occur, in the Clinton Executive Order No. 12866, in the 
Reinventing Government work, and on a number of fronts in individual 
agencies.
  I think that most of us agree that any legislative measure to speed 
this change in a constructive direction is welcome. What is not welcome 
is the bill that has emerged from Committee consideration. Somewhere 
between the original intent of this bill, something has gone wrong. The 
problems with this bill are so extensive that only a substitute measure 
can correct them, and for that reason I am supporting the Brown 
Substitute.
  Let me give you a single example of the problems with H.R. 1022. The 
bill, in Section 201(b)(1) states:

       Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law, the 
     decision criteria of section (a) shall supplement and, to the 
     extent there is a conflict, supersede the decision criteria 
     for rulemaking other wise applicable under the statute 
     pursuant to which the rule is promulgated.

  This single sentence overrides every existing statute and imposes the 
risk analysis and benefits calculation process outlined in this bill. 
Where is the list of these statutes that are being overridden? It does 
not exist. During committee markup, the comprehensive list of statutes 
was requested, but was not available. The report accompanying H.R. 9, 
the original legislation from which this bill was derived, has a simple 
table outlining some of the statutes overridden. But it is not 
complete, nor do we know today what the impact of approving this 
sentence will be.
  And this is not a partisan concern. Republican Members of the Science 
Committee observed in the report on H.R. 9, which contains this same 
preemptive language:

       (T)itle III may undermine landmark laws that were enacted 
     only after years of work and discussion to create a delicate 
     balance of interested and affected parties--laws that range 
     from protection of food and drinking water quality, to 
     aviation safety, to hazardous waste management, and 
     preservation of wildlife. (Supplemental Views, Report # 103-
     33, Part 2.)

  The Brown substitute contains a savings clause that makes its 
provisions in addition to and not in place of the provisions of 
existing law. That is the sane way to legislate. I urge my colleagues 
to support this substitute.
  Mr. CRAPO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I think it is important for us to understand precisely 
what this debate is about. The legislation we are discussing today 
would require that under the existing Federal system of law under which 
the regulations are now implemented, that we look at whether what we 
are doing is cost-beneficial. It requires first that we assess the 
risks which our regulations seek to reduce and then we assess the cost 
of what the regulations are requiring us as a society to pay in order 
to reduce those risks.
  If it is determined that we are getting only a very minute increase 
in the reduction of the risk at a very expensive cost, then it is 
expected that the agency will say that this is not a cost-beneficial 
decision and we as a society can better spend our limited resources in 
another way.
  Yet there are previous statutes that often set absolute requirements 
that the Federal agency will then say they must meet. The central 
debate here is: If we determine after a cost-benefit analysis that 
moneys can be expended, better for the environment, better for our 
health, better for our safety in another way, should we let a prior 
statute tell us that that cannot be done? Should we let a prior set of 
laws tell us that we cannot conduct a cost-benefit analysis, that we 
cannot find a better way, that we cannot go forward and use common 
sense in application of Federal regulations and must continue to follow 
old approaches?
  No. This legislation does not change by itself any previous law; this 
legislation says we are going to look at the regulations that come out 
and we are going to see what new efforts by the agencies do and compare 
what the costs of those regulations, whether it is justified by this 
benefit.
  The current costs of our Federal regulatory programs are estimated to 
be between $430 billion and $700 billion every year, and are increasing 
every day.
  Yet Congress has never in a significant way reformed our regulatory 
program to consider meaningful risk assessment and incremental cost-
benefit analysis. We have to reform the way our Federal Government 
operates and take the burden of unreasonable regulations off the backs 
of the American people.
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CRAPO. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I think he went 
to the heart of the problem when he suggested that we are in fact 
trying to make certain new regulations written even under old rules 
actually make sense and are based upon good science.
  What amazes me is to hear the opposition to this bill suggest we do 
not want to do that. If in fact there is no benefit to the costs being 
incurred under the Clean Air Act, should we not know that? Is it not 
something that should be evaluated?
  The point is, if there is a benefit, then we go ahead and do it, even 
under this bill. But to suggest, as they are suggesting, that you 
should not even do the cost-benefit analysis to find out what the case 
is, is, I think, a monument to the position that they are taking: That 
the status quo works just fine.
  The other point I would like to make to the gentleman is we are 
having a chance more and more to review the 
 [[Page H2272]] substitute that we had not seen heretofore.
  But it strikes me very odd, for instance, that the substitute drops 
out the Corps of Engineers from coverage, which is covered under our 
bill.
  Now, I do not know any Federal agency that has had more of an impact 
on the country, and some adverse environmental impact, than the Corps 
of Engineers. And yet, under their substitute, the Corps of Engineers 
is specifically dropped from coverage.
  One has to wonder who got to them. Why in the world would you drop 
out this huge agency, which has this massive environmental impact, from 
a bill that is forcing us to look at cost-benefits? If there is any 
place we ought to look at cost-benefits analysis, it is some of the 
work that the Corps of Engineers have done over the years.
  I am just puzzled as to why that particular agency is one that is 
dropped from coverage under this bill.
  I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?
  Mr. CRAPO. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. WAXMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I do want to clarify for my friend from Pennsylvania 
[Mr. Walker], the way the Clean Air Act works. The Clean Air Act has 
health-based standards so that people can breathe the air and know that 
their health is not going to be damaged. Then we have to figure out the 
strategies to achieve that.
  This bill would take the health-based standards and weaken it because 
they would have a cost-benefit analysis of what the health standards 
are. Otherwise, in the Clean Air Act we have technology standards on 
toxic air pollutants, and those technology standards are important. If 
you want to go through the risk assessment, you can go on for years and 
years and years. We ought to at least use the best technology we have 
to reduce the pollutants that cause cancer, birth defects, and 
environmental damage.
  I did want to clarify that for the gentleman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Idaho [Mr. Crapo] has 
expired.
  (On request of Mr. Walker and by unanimous consent, Mr. Crapo was 
allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. CRAPO. I yield further to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. 
Walker].
  Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Chairman, I understand full well what the case is. But the fact 
is that some of the things that have been done under the bill have 
proven to have absolutely no benefit. Now, in fact, if they meet health 
standards that have some benefit, then they will certainly be able to 
go forward under this bill, But if, in fact, they cannot meet the cost-
benefit analysis under the bill, then they would not go forward.
  It seems to me that even under the health standard, we ought to be 
assured people are actually going to be benefited from the costs. That 
is what the gentleman cannot stand. He cannot stand the idea that we 
would actually have to have a benefit at the end of all of this and 
that the costs should justify the benefits.
  Mr. CRAPO. I thank the gentleman for his comments. The point is very 
clearly made. This bill does not change any standard. It requires us to 
look at what is done under existing statues and any new regulations 
that seek to impose further requirements under that statute we must 
first assess under that statute what kind of a risk, how big is that 
risk, and what benefit will it give us and at what cost to society to 
get to that point?
  Mr. BURR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CRAPO. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.
  Mr. BURR. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  Mr. Chairman, if I understand it, we could go through a cost-benefit 
analysis and judge something as not worthy of the attention of the 
Federal agency and in fact there might be something else that is 
prioritized out there that actually is in the best benefit of the 
American people.
  Mr. CRAPO. That is exactly right. The point is we have limited 
resources in this society, and we must place them and use them most 
effectively.
  If we are spending the last 80 percent of our money on a very minor 
increase in the safety to our people when we could use that money for 
significant safety and environmental and health increases, we need to 
know that and we need to function in that way.
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CRAPO. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. WAXMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, the issue is not whether you are going to look at a 
cost-benefit analysis or risk assessment or supersede all existing 
laws.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Idaho [Mr. Crapo] has 
again expired.
  (On request of Mr. Waxman and by unanimous consent, Mr. Crapo was 
allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
  Mr. WAXMAN. If the gentleman would yield further, I would like to 
finish my statement on this issue because we do cost-benefit analysis 
when we develop the strategies to achieve health standards.
  But what this bill would do is to supersede the Clean Air Act 
completely and not even have health standards that would be required to 
be met.
  I think that is offensive because it weakens the exact purpose of the 
law, which is to protect the public health from pollutions.
  Mr. CRAPO. This bill does not eliminate any health standard.
  Mr. WAXMAN. The gentleman is incorrect.
  Mr. CRAPO. What it says is: If the health benefit standard is not 
beneficial, then we must find a more cost-beneficial use for the funds.
  Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CRAPO. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BILBRAY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I think I want to point out the gentleman from 
California is aware of the fact that we are not talking about static 
standards here. The fact is there are conflicts that have not been 
addressed when we go to decommission a fuel tank. But the public health 
exposure of the air pollution created by that regulation is never fully 
considered under the existing system. In areas where you may have a 
saltwater aquifer, implementing the Federal law may actually expose the 
public to more than not doing anything.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Idaho [Mr. Crapo] has 
again expired.
  (On request of Mr. Walker and by unanimous consent, Mr. Crapo was 
allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CRAPO. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

                              {time}  1900

  I think one of the things that needs to be looked at here is the fact 
that under the clean air standards one of the tests that many 
industries have had to meet is an opacity standard even though the 
smokestack was cleaned up to a point that there was no health risk. EPA 
went on and suggested that they had to achieve an opacity standard 
which then says that it has to be completely clean coming out of the 
stack.
  Well, what we are suggesting is that maybe the cost-benefit of 
achieving the opacity standard, which has nothing to do with health, is 
too great, and it ought to be looked at as a part of doing the work.
  Mr. CRAPO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman. Let me just make one 
example, and then I will yield back my time.
  I think that maybe we could look at an example. Right now we have a 
Federal standard, the Delaney clause, that basically has been 
interpreted to say that we must, in that particular health area, reach 
a zero tolerance, a zero risk standard. That is what the law says, as 
the gentlemen over here have said, and we had significant agreement 
last year in this Congress that we should address that so that we can 
use our resources 
 [[Page H2273]] more intelligently. This act would allow us to do that.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Idaho [Mr. Crapo] has 
expired.
  (On request of Mr. Brown of Ohio and by unanimous consent, Mr. Crapo 
was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CRAPO. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, in the committee report on page 36, 
Mr. Walker's Committee on Science talks about the Clean Air Act as 
superseded, the Resource Conservation Recovery Act, RCRA, superseded. 
One issue, after another, after another. I say, If you don't like the 
Clean Air Act, let's debate the Clean Air Act. It passed this Chamber 
overwhelmingly, passed the Senate overwhelmingly. If we want to 
dismantle clean air, as apparently people on the other side of the 
aisle do, let's debate it. Let's not try a back door approach where 
people don't really quite understand exactly what's happening when you 
supersede these laws. Let's come out. Let's have hearings. Let's have 
longer hearings than we had in committees on this legislation where 
both sides come out, both sides can talk about it. We can hear what the 
issues are and really decide.
  Does the public want us to undo the Clean Air Act? I do not really 
believe that.
  Mr. CRAPO. Reclaiming my time, I think it is very important to point 
out this act does not eliminate the Clean Air Act, and any impression, 
indication, of that is wrong.
  What this act says is that a cost-benefit analysis must be done and 
that if a cost-benefit analysis done by the very agency that manages 
the Clean Air Act shows that what we are doing is costing us much more 
than the benefits that it is yielding, then we have got to look at that 
law and find a better way to approach it.
  Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CRAPO. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BILBRAY. I do not know why everybody is so scared of just 
bringing some reasonable application to law.
  I say to my colleagues, you're not destroying the law by making sure 
that it's applied reasonably. You're reinforcing it. You're making sure 
that the intention is finally executed.
  The frustration out there is the fact that the reasonable application 
of the law has been lost, and this brings back a dose of reality, a 
little reality in the application of these regulations which will 
fulfill the law, not destroy it.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CRAPO. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. When the cost-benefit displaces clean air, when 
the cost-benefit displaces--when those calculations displace public 
health issues, public health standards, when my area of Ohio has some 
of the highest breast cancer rates in the country and we do not know 
why, and we only are going to look for cost-benefit analysis, and yet 
it is superseded by this law, it simply does not make sense.
  Let us get out and debate these issues so we know what we are really 
doing----
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Idaho [Mr. Crapo] has 
expired.
  (On request of Mr. Walker and by unanimous consent, Mr. Crapo was 
allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?
  Mr. CRAPO. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman referred to a chart in our 
committee report. The gentleman, I think, ought to read beyond just the 
chart because when the word ``supersede'' is used, it is used when 
existing legislation does not permit risk assessment cost analysis or 
peer review.
  In other words, they passed this legislation, it passed, and the 
gentleman just admitted now we do not know. We have a lot of stuff we 
do not know as a result of, as a result of, a lot of this legislation. 
He made the statement himself.
  What we are saying is that we are now putting in place a mechanism 
whereby we can have cost-benefit analysis and we can have risk 
assessment, and they do not wipe out the present law. They simply add 
on a case-by-case basis an ability to do these kinds of assessments in 
the future as new regulations come forward.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for an 
explanation?
  Mr. CRAPO. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. If I could ask the gentleman from Pennsylvania to 
explain on page 29 of the bill, notwithstanding any other provision of 
Federal law, the decision criteria of subsection A shall supplement 
and, to the extent there is a conflict, supersede----
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Idaho [Mr. Crapo] has 
expired.
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I worked on the clean air law for 10 years before it 
was adopted in 1990, and let me tell all my colleagues that this bill 
that is before us today would supersede the clean air law, and it would 
supersede it in terms of the health base standards. That is exactly 
what is intended, and what would happen when it says that this bill 
will supersede the rulemaking under any other existing law. This 
legislation would take laws like clean air, clean water, safe drinking 
water and supersede them, take the guts out of the bill, of the laws, 
that are in there to protect the public health, and they take away the 
flexibility on the parts of the States to make them work. They do not 
add a streamlining or cost-benefit analysis that we never had before. 
They put in so many roadblocks that the laws just will not work.
  Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. WAXMAN. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BROWN of California. Would the gentleman concur with me that the 
Brown substitute remedies this defect?
  Mr. WAXMAN. Absolutely.
  Mr. BROWN of California. And that it would allow us then to go ahead 
and conduct the cost-benefit analysis and the risk assessments that the 
gentlemen are so happy to see?
  Mr. WAXMAN. I do not think anyone disagrees with the idea of doing a 
cost-benefit analysis, a risk assessment, trying to get the information 
that will help us make the right decision when we adopt regulations to 
enforce the laws, but there were some laws that were designed to 
protect the public health, and to say to protect the public health is 
really not going to be the objective any longer because this bill is 
going to supersede it, and we are going to look at whether the standard 
ought to be subject to some kind of analysis, which would mean it is a 
weakened standard, and then the strategy to develop that standard is 
also weakened as well, what we have is a mush. What we have is a 
rejection of laws that have been on the books since 1970; in the case 
of the Clean Air Act, signed by President Nixon, with a great deal of 
pride by Members of the Congress on both sides of the aisle, that we 
would try to protect the public health from pollutants that injure, and 
to a great extent millions of people now live in areas where they can 
breathe safer air because of all this work.
  Mr. CRAPO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. WAXMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Idaho.
  Mr. CRAPO. I think that the point that we are trying to make is that 
the only circumstances in which this statute would supersede any other 
statute is in that case where an agency has made a cost-benefit 
analysis and a risk assessment and has determined that the increment of 
increased safety, or increased health or increased environmental 
protection that is obtained is not justified by the cost.
  Mr. WAXMAN. If that were true, if I can reclaim my time, we would not 
be arguing about it, but that is not the way I read the law because the 
way I read the law that is being proposed is it will subject existing 
laws to a whole new analysis to redo them again, and not only that, the 
elevation of the least cost-effective way to achieve the results would 
mean that other factors could not be taken into consideration.
  Let me give my colleagues an example of what that would mean: Carol 
 [[Page H2274]] Browner, the head of the Environmental Protection 
Agency, testified before our committee, and she said that, if this were 
the law, she would have to put an inspection and maintenance program on 
automobiles all over the country. Why? Because that is a very cost-
effective way to reduce pollutants from cars. But it is not the best 
political way to do it. The better way would be to have new cars to 
reduce pollutants by being made to pollute less. That means that the 
auto industry would bear the cost rather than the individual consumers 
having to spend a lot of money to get their cars inspected, to have the 
changes in the way the cars work, to achieve those standards for many 
years thereafter.
  Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. WAXMAN. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, does the gentleman realize what he just 
said?
  Mr. WAXMAN. I think so.
  Mr. BILBRAY. We are talking public health, and now the gentleman is 
talking the fact that it is the political answer that he wants to make 
sure is still on the table.
  That is fine, but let me just say we for 20 years--the gentleman has 
worked on this; I understand that. I administered it. I say to the 
gentleman, ``You got to understand for 20 years we were pushing people 
towards the use of diesel. We thought that that was a great health 
standard. The fact is diesel has a toxicity above benzene.''
  But what we are saying is, ``Let's go back and check. Let's look at 
these things from reality.''
  Mr. Chairman, I know when they passed these laws they meant them to 
be health based, but, God forbid, let us not make the health based 
strategy somehow subservient to some kind of political whim.
  What we are saying is that environmental protection is a science, not 
a religion and not politics, and what we are trying to talk about is, 
``Let's put science ahead of politics when it comes to environmental 
protection.''
  Mr. WAXMAN. I do not disagree with that statement at all, but what 
this bill says is, ``You have to, no matter what, take the least cost-
effective way to achieve the result.'' That sounds fine except when we 
get into the reality that some States would like to have flexibility.
  I asked Governor Wilson from my State when he testified before our 
committee would he favor a bill that would repeal the clean air 
standards as ambient standards based on health, and he said, 
``Absolutely not.''
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Waxman] 
has expired.
  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the substitute amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the Brown substitute because I do 
believe it achieves the basic purpose of risk assessment, which is to 
safeguard public health and the environment without wasting limited 
resources.
  The laws Congress has passed to protect public health and safety are 
on the books for a reason. United States citizens deserve to know that 
the food they eat, the air and water in the surrounding environment and 
the power plants they live alongside are safe, and I believe that H.R. 
1022 in its current form will do more harm than good.
  First and foremost, I have serious doubts about the bill's approach 
to regulating different types of risks. While the legislation was 
conceived with the EPA in mind, it has been expanded to apply to nearly 
all Federal agencies with health and safety responsibilities. At best 
this approach may solve problems that do not actually exist; at worst 
it may undermine effective agency programs already in place.
  If I could take a bit from the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. 
Walker] in what he was saying before, part of the problem I see with 
the legislation and why I prefer the substitute is because I believe 
that the substitute allows more flexibility. There are certain agencies 
which are included under the rubric of the bill but which are exempted 
in the substitute, and I believe the reason for that is because many of 
those agencies that are exempt from the substitute are already carrying 
out valid risk assessment cost-benefit analysis, and I am fearful that 
with the bill in its current form it will simply be superseded by a 
new, more rigorous procedure. I think we need flexibility with these 
agencies. A lot of them are already carrying out good risk assessment.
  If I could give an example with the NRC, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission for years has conducted 
cost-benefit analyses of all proposals to upgrade nuclear reactor 
safety under the so-called backfit rule. This standard has been in 
effect since 1985, and has been upheld by the courts and is familiar to 
all those who come before the agency. It is not clear to me to what, if 
any, safety gain would be achieved by making the NRC adapt to H.R. 
1022's new cost-benefit approach. The Brown substitute exempts the NRC 
because the agency already performs risk assessment tailored to its 
specific needs.
  I would argue that the same is true in a different way for the Army 
Corps of Engineers which the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] 
mentioned. The Army Corps of Engineers conducts very extensive cost-
benefit analyses before any water project begins.
  Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. PALLONE. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, I should point out that the 
reason we have left the Corps of Engineers out, at least I am informed 
by the staff, is because they modeled after the H.R. 9, which had left 
it out, which was part of the contract that we thought, ``Well, at 
least here's part of the contract we can follow,'' so we left it out 
also.
  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Chairman, my point is that many agencies are already 
carrying out good risk assessment, good cost-benefit analysis, and I 
think that is the type of flexibility we need. There may be some 
instances where we need to do it, but we do not want to supersede the 
risk assessment that is valid and is already being done.
  Second, I am also worried about the burdens H.R. 1022 in its current 
form may impose in terms of money and delay, whether they fall on the 
Government, industry or the public. I fear that this will only 
intensify regulatory gridlock since it will spawn new layers of 
bureaucracy to carry its prescriptive procedural requirements. As we 
all know, more bureaucracy slows the pace of agency action, and, while 
this may sound attractive to some, delay for its own sake will neither 
improve Government efficiency nor help the average citizen.
  Now, if we look at the Brown substitute, I believe it is preferable 
because it allows each agency more flexibility in the way it performs 
risk assessment, and I believe it will result in less cost and less 
bureaucracy.

                              {time}  1915

  My third and final overriding concern is that this bill may undermine 
safety protections embodied by current law because the bill contains a 
supermandate which would override existing law. While there certainly 
may be some problems associated with some of the regulations issued 
pursuant to such laws, should we really be using a supermandate to 
revise our major health, safety and environmental laws overnight? I do 
not think so. I do not think so. The Brown substitute basically 
eliminates the mandate and declares that nothing in this legislation is 
intended to modify existing health, safety, or environmental laws. I 
believe that this legislation in its current form rushed through two 
committees in a lot of haste. It shows. We can see the haste. I urge my 
colleagues to reject it and adopt the Brown substitute.
  Mr. BURR. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, what we have had is a continuation of the rhetoric that 
we heard already in committee. The reason that there is so strong 
opposition to this bill is the fact that many of the rules that are on 
the books today, if they were to go through a cost-benefit analysis, 
would not pass. They would be judged not in the best benefit of the 
American people.
  It is time that we speak up for what is in the best interests and 
benefit for not only the health, but for the taxpayers out there. It is 
this bill that will allow the risk analysis, that risk 
 [[Page H2275]] assessment to be done, and a cost-benefit analysis to 
be performed on it.
  The fact is that we should go back and we should look at things that 
are already on the books to determine are they in the best interests of 
the American people. But if we do not pass this legislation, that will 
not happen.
  Mr. CRAPO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BURR. I yield to the gentleman from Idaho.
  Mr. CRAPO. Mr. Chairman, I would like to respond to some of the 
points that were made earlier with regard to whether this statute 
supersedes all other health codes or requirements and requires us to 
look at only cost. In the statute itself, under decisional criteria, it 
talks about the fact that the agencies promulgating rules subject to 
this statute must certify, and then in subsection 3 on page 29, that 
they are to be the less cost-effective at achieving a substantially 
equivalent reduction in risk, or B, to provide less flexibility to 
state, local, and tribal governments or regulated entities in achieving 
the otherwise applicable objectives of the regulation.
  What it says is flexibility at state and local level as well as cost 
effectiveness are written into the statute. The point I make is as we 
address the question of the Federal regulatory burden that faces this 
country, this statute says let us look at what benefits these 
regulations are giving us and what the cost of those benefits is.
  The point is that every time we take a societal resource and allocate 
it to one benefit, that means we cannot use it on another benefit. If 
we find that we can save one or two lives by spending a million dollars 
here and save 100 lives by spending it over here, this statute says let 
us find that out and let us put our money where it will do us the best 
good.
  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BURR. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.
  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Chairman, my concern is, when you talk about 
flexibility, that the bill in its current form is not more flexible. I 
understand what the gentleman is saying. You are saying you think there 
is going to be more flexibility for the States or whatever. But when 
you establish one set of procedures about how you are going to go about 
risk assessment, and essentially ask agencies that are already doing 
risk assessment, such as the NRC, that they have to retool and go 
through a new procedure, the danger I think is that you have good risk 
assessment procedures on the books that are being used by some of these 
agencies that are going to actually be eliminated, and they are going 
to be asked to retool and come up with a new way of doing the risk 
assessment or the cost-benefit analysis that may not be as flexible and 
as good for those things that come under the rubric of their agency. So 
I see less flexibility, and that is one of my concerns.
  Mr. CRAPO. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, the 
whole point of the purpose behind this statute is, and I am willing to 
work with everybody in this body, is to find the most effective and 
best way to conduct risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis. If we 
need to refine this over the years and make sure it works the best, 
that is fine. But the problem we face now is that many of the 
regulators say to us, let us go back to the Delaney clause, the Delaney 
clause standards make us do this, regardless of what our risk 
assessment says. Regardless of whether this is cost beneficial, the 
previous statutory standards make us do this.
  When they say they will make us do this, they say we under our own 
risk analysis or own cost-benefit analysis, we believe there is a 
better way we can spend our resources. But the regulations and the 
statutes that we are dealing with have a requirement in them that we 
cannot ignore because of our own approach to the statute. The point 
here is that the sole time that this statute would supersede something 
that has been developed previously by this Congress is when the agency 
determines that the increase in benefit that it provides to society is 
not justified by the cost of society. I do not see how you can object 
to having that kind of common sense put into our law.
  Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BURR. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, my colleague from California pointed out 
the inspection and maintenance of the vehicles as being an issue. But I 
think if you look at page 29, section 3, you will see right in there is 
a vehicle to be able to carry this kind of reasonable application.
  In California we got into this issue and a major conflict between the 
State of California and the 30 million people thereof and the U.S. 
Government over what is the best way to go. What we were able to do is 
not abandon the cost-effective aspect, but prove that we had a better, 
more cost-effective, more socially acceptable way to be able to address 
it.
  We run into these conflicts all the time, to where you have unique 
situations in certain areas, and that part of reality is not allowed to 
be included; where you will have the Federal Government requiring that 
we talk about reducing pollution by maybe 3 percent by requiring ride 
sharing, and then at the same time the same Federal Government is 
allowing foreign commuters to come in that constitute 14 percent of the 
pollution. But that is ignored.
  Through this process we will be able to have a give-and-take to 
develop these rules, rather than what we had in California, which was a 
major conflict.
  Ms. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, throughout the course of today we have heard a lot of 
criticism of H.R. 1022. Unfortunately, the way that criticism has been 
met is with the accusation that the only way anyone could possibly 
oppose this particular piece of legislation is if they support entirely 
the regulation climate as it stands right now.
  This is just not true. Most of the people in this Chamber, Members of 
this body, want to see a change in the regulatory climate in this 
country. What we are disagreeing over is how to do it.
  I think a good way to explain the differences is to recognize this 
overregulation for what it is, which is a cancer which has spread 
across the face of this Nation. When we have a cancer patient, there 
are lots of ways you can treat this individual. If your only focus is 
on killing the cancer, probably the most simple, easy way to do that is 
to kill the patient and the cancer dies with the patient.
  If, however, you are hoping to have a healthy, safe, productive 
patient at the end, you need a skillful surgeon who will come in and 
cut only that which needs to be cut, to leave the healthy systems 
intact, to leave the important organs available to do their work. That 
is the difference between the approaches that are going on here.
  Our side of the aisle is not arguing that the status quo should 
remain. Our side of the aisle is not arguing that we like regulations. 
It appears that the other side of the aisle has chosen to use the best 
defense is a good offense as their strategy, and I resent it. I want to 
see a system put in place that makes sense legislatively, that works 
practically, and that will allow us to have clean water, clean air, 
safe food, safe cosmetics, and all of those things that we take for 
granted.
  Frankly, the bill that is being proposed does not meet that criteria. 
We need to reject it.
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. DOGGETT. Really, I think it is confession time. I think that we 
need to confess on this side of the aisle that an error has been made, 
that really the distinguished Member from California has committed a 
grave sin with this substitute. The sin, of course, of moderation. The 
sin of reasonableness. The sin of balance. The sin of gentlemanliness 
in trying to fashion good public policy.
  There was a time in this House when the idea of balance, when the 
idea of reason, when the idea of trying to reach some agreement between 
conflicting interests, when that was of value. But no longer. Because 
we have had the Gingrich revolution, and revolutionaries do not have 
time for working out the differences between conflicts in public 
policy. Revolutionaries 
 [[Page H2276]] do not have time for reason. They have only quick 
fixes. And that is what we have before us tonight. Not an attempt to 
get through risk true risk-benefit analysis. Rather, an attempt to put 
the risk as far as public health and safety, to put all that risk on 
the backs of the American working families and to take all the benefits 
and give the benefits to the special vested interests who want the 
authority to do whatever they please without any oversight from public 
authorities.
  That is the problem with this risk-benefit. Some might say it is 
balanced, but the only balance is to balance that burden on the backs 
of families across this country. And I think that is an imbalance.
  The problem with this whole risk-benefit assessment is that it is the 
American people who are being assessed with all the risk of threats to 
their health and safety under this piece of legislation, and the 
distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Brown] has erred, has 
sinned, because what he suggested is that we need to reason together 
and work out reasoned, balanced public policy. But that is out the door 
now. Now we have to have a revolution.
  At least there are some Republicans who speak up against this. In 
fact, I think the most effective and specific comment on this piece of 
legislation that we are debating tonight has come not from the 
Democratic side of the aisle, but has come from the Republican side, in 
fact on the other side of the Capitol, when the distinguished Senator 
from Rhode Island, a Republican Member, Senator Chafee, has described 
this very piece of legislation as ``a prescription for gridlock.'' 
Because what is at stake here is not risk-benefit analysis, but a piece 
of legislation time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from Michigan [Ms. Rivers] 
has expired.
  (At the request of Mr. Brown of California and by unanimous consent, 
Ms. Rivers was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. DOGGETT. What is at stake here is not cost-benefit analysis, but 
a weird kind of system to gum up the whole regulatory process, not to 
analyze the cost or benefits, but to ensure that no regulation on the 
public health and safety will ever get out of a regulatory agency 
unless it has been so watered-down until we have the least of the least 
of the common denominators and something is put out in the name of 
protecting the public health and safety, which probably only serves to 
protect the vested interests that want it in there in the first place.
  Let me give you an example of just one provision in this bill which 
the wise gentleman from California had the bad judgment to try to 
reason with. And that is the provision concerning conflict of interest. 
Because perhaps for the first time in the history of this country, 
instead of trying to prevent conflict of interest, this piece of 
legislation that we debate tonight does not prevent it; it says we have 
got to have it.
  It says we need conflict of interest. We have got to mandate that 
when we have peer review of each of these new regulations, that the 
people who have an economic interest, that have a financial interest, 
they are not excluded. No, if they have got an ax to grind, the 
regulatory agency cannot exclude them. They have got to be included.
  Think about what that means. It means if we are trying to do 
something, as another distinguished Member of this body from California 
has struggled so ably to deal with, the problem of tobacco, that when 
an issue concerning tobacco is before a regulatory agency it is 
essential that they have tobacco company scientists, people bought and 
paid for by the tobacco companies, to be there, to advise on whether it 
is good science.
  This is not putting science ahead of politics. It is putting 
lobbyists and people who are bought and paid for by vested interests 
ahead of both. And that is wrong.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from Michigan [Ms. Rivers] 
has expired.
  (At the request of Mr. Waxman and by unanimous consent, Ms. Rivers 
was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, when I have always heard the term ``peer 
review'' before this bill, I guess as a former judge I have always 
thought about a jury of one's peers, a jury of one's equals. Well, what 
kind of scientific equals, what type of scientific peers are included 
under the bill without the Brown substitute?
  Well, it is just about like the jury that we see right now in the 
O.J. Simpson trial. If we took O.J.'s lawyers and put them on the jury, 
we would have the kind of peer review that is proposed under this piece 
of legislation. Because it mandates those who have an economic interest 
in the matter, that they be the jury. And that is just one of many 
provisions that is wrong with this bill. It is not about good science, 
it is about good lobbying, it is about good vested interests, it is 
about ensuring that we do not protect the public health and safety 
unless we turn it over to the people that created the problem and the 
threat and the danger to the people of this country in the first place.
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. WAXMAN. This bill is one of the most poorly drafted, thought 
through pieces of legislation I have ever seen.

                              {time}  1930

  It is being rushed through this House without due consideration. We 
had a hearing for a day or two, a markup that went on for 10 hours. We 
had to do it with 1 day for only one purpose, because it is in the 
Contract for America.
  This bill is going to pass because a lot of Members figure, well, 
they will vote for it and the Senate will clean it up or the President 
will veto it.
  But it is an irresponsible piece of legislation. It supersedes 
existing law. If we wanted to supersede laws, the gentleman made 
reference to tobacco, there is nothing that is a greater risk than 
tobacco. When we look at the actual causes of death, according to the 
Centers for Disease Control, tobacco is No. 1. Then you get poor diet 
or exercise, alcohol, infectious agents, pollutants, and toxics way 
down there. They should have superseded the laws that prevent agencies 
doing anything to protect kids from tobacco. Tobacco companies are 
pushing their products on these kids. People who breathe in secondhand 
smoke suffer a health risk. But they did not supersede that.
  They superseded the laws that are on the books to protect public 
health like the Clean Air Act, the drinking water law, and the others. 
I think that the American people ought to know really what is involved 
here. This is a pretty cynical bill. It is not well thought out and 
certainly does not do what it is claimed to do.
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, to be entirely fair about it, I cannot 
exactly say that this bill was rushed through our committee, because as 
the distinguished chairman indicated, we had a whole 2 hours, a whole 2 
hours to consider the substitute. So there was time to reason about 
risk benefit. In fact, there was so much reasoning that during much of 
the questioning of the general counsel of our committee to explain this 
bill, he had to continue to turn around and whisper and talk to the 
lobbyist that were behind him to provide the answers to answer the 
members of the committee.
  That is the problem with these peer review committees, as we have set 
them up, because we are going to have those agencies turning around and 
whispering to whatever special interest is out there that wants to 
block the protection of the public health and welfare.
  The American people may not understand very much about this bill. It 
is a lot of gobbledygook about risk benefit and science this and that. 
But there is one thing they can understand. That is that this bill 
mandates a conflict of interest, and I say it is a pretty sad time in 
the history of this country, a tragic time, at a time that there are a 
lot of things going on around this House and around this city about 
conflict of interest, about ethics problems, and this is 
 [[Page H2277]] part of a broader pattern where we come in under a 
rushed piece of legislation and we mandate and demand a conflict of 
interest be included in the way our regulations are set.
  I say to the gentleman from California, I appreciate the fact that he 
is on this matter and he continues to demand that we approach things in 
moderation instead of giving in to the special interests that think 
they can write everything up here.
  Ms. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time to finish my remarks, I 
said that we are all interested in eradicating the cancer that is found 
in overregulation. This side of the aisle, however, wants the patient, 
the American public, to survive healthy, safe, and productive. Under 
1022, they will not.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  In case my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have not seen, 
our country is being strangled by overregulation. This is coming not 
from the actions of people who have just now achieved some sort of 
influence because of the last election but because of actions that have 
taken place over the last 20 years when Members on that side of that 
aisle had all the time in the world to act, and the Members on the 
other side of the aisle did not act.
  People have been thrown out of work. We have seen billions of dollars 
of resources wasted. We have seen fundamental concepts of freedom that 
were always part of the American system just totally negated by this 
rush for regulation that we have seen in the last two decades.
  My liberal colleagues have given such power to the bureaucracy to 
regulate that it has become a major threat not only to the freedom but 
to the well-being of this country. That is why in the last election, in 
November, the people turned away from those who had been making the 
rules before, the people who are making the arguments tonight.
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me, 
because he was a part of the process that we went through in the 
committee that the gentleman from Texas rather cavalierly noted lacked 
integrity. But I think that the gentleman from Texas ought to probably 
read the bill before he makes statements that are completely erroneous 
with regard to any mandate for people with financial interests to be a 
part of peer review.
  The fact is there is no such thing in the legislation. The gentleman 
knows that and yet misrepresented it.
  Let me read the language which is in the bill. Let me suggest that 
the language in the bill that creates the peer review panel says this:

       Shall provide for the creation of peer review panels 
     consisting of experts and shall be broadly representative and 
     balanced and to the extend relevant and appropriate, may 
     include representatives of state, local, and tribal 
     governments, small businesses, other representatives of 
     industry, universities, agriculture, labor, consumers, 
     conservation organizations and organizations.

  That does not sound like a mandate for special interests to me. That 
is the language that creates the peer review panels. The gentleman from 
Texas had it absolutely wrong.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, what that is is a 
formula for including the public. What was created by the liberal 
Democrats when they controlled both Houses of Congress was a regulatory 
dictatorship. And the reason power has shifted in this House is because 
the American people have felt oppressed, and they see that their 
standard of living is declining because there has been no balance to 
the regulatory process. And their rights have been trampled upon by 
unelected officials.
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, the reason I will not yield is because 
we were very, very gracious in providing the gentleman the extra time 
he needed. But at a time when we wanted to ask him questions, he was 
not gracious, even after we had granted him extra time to open up for 
questions.
  If I might finish my statement, I will move forward.
  What we have in the United States today is far from the freedom that 
we had years ago and the American people understand that by granting 
the bureaucracy the powers that the liberal Democrats granted, it has 
not made us appreciably better off and, in fact, is detracting from our 
economic well-being
  Certainly, some lakes were polluted and they have been corrected. 
There were problems in the past. But what we went on in this regulatory 
power grab in the last few decades was a situation where the 
regulators, who were given power to solve some problems, expanded and 
expanded and expanded their authority to the point that it, indeed, 
threatened the freedom and well-being of the country.
  We plan to turn that around. That is what this is all about.
  When we talk about peer review, as my colleague from Pennsylvania 
demonstrated, we are talking about opening up the process so that the 
American people will be able to effect the regulations that are heaped 
upon them by unelected officials.
  Our bill has judicial review, which is also a protection of our 
citizens. Their substitute has no judicial review. We talk about a new 
way of doing things, because it is necessary now to change the way this 
government has been acting in order to ensure the well-being of our 
people. That is what this bill is all about. That is what this 
substitute is against.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words, and I rise in support of the Brown substitute.
  Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the poetry of the last speaker. I do, my 
colleague from California, but now maybe it is time for a little prose.
  Over the past 2 years, many of us on this side of the aisle have 
supported legislation to reform the federal regulatory process. Last 
month this Member voted for the unfunded mandates bill to help reduce 
the burden of federal regulations on state and local governments, and 
last week this member voted to simplify and declare a moratorium on 
regulatory action. I support the concept of risk assessment and last 
year I joined with you, I believe, to vote against the rule on 
elevating EPA to cabinet level status because risk assessment and cost-
benefit amendments were not even allowed to be considered.
  I also supported the bipartisan Committee on Science risk assessment 
bill that was proposed by Members Zimmer and Klein in the last 
Congress.
  But, Mr. Chairman, to me the issue is not whether risk assessment 
legislation must be enacted. It is what is a responsible way to achieve 
a risk assessment program?
  I have a number of concerns about H.R. 1022. First, I am worried that 
the bill's judicial review provisions will cause a litigation explosion 
in federal courts and could turn into the full employment for lawyers 
act. Any special interest group, including environmentalists and 
businesses alike, would be able to cause regulatory gridlock by 
subjecting interim agency processes to judicial scrutiny.
  Second, like many Members on both sides of the aisle, I am concerned 
about H.R. 1022's provisions which would override any conflicting 
substantive requirement in federal law.
  I agree that many existing environmental health and safety laws are 
broken. However, to fix these problems, we must address these issues 
head on through a statute by statute examination.
  And finally, while H.R. 1022 purports to ease the sting of federal 
regulations, I am concerned that the legislation will create too much 
new federal bureaucracy and red tape.
  The bill would create a regulatory maze that could end up wasting 
hard-earned taxpayer dollars.
  Mr. Chairman, the Brown substitute is a strong risk assessment and 
cost-benefit bill without the problems in H.R. 1022.
  I urge the House to accept the Brown substitute and, therefore, to 
adopt a responsible risk assessment cost benefit bill.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words. I rise in opposition to the substitute.
  Mr. Chairman, I think Members should pay attention to page 16 of the 
bill in which it says the document shall 
 [[Page H2278]] contain a statement that places the nature and 
magnitude of risk to human health, safety and the environment in 
context, in context. Such statements shall, to the extent feasible, 
provide comparisons with estimates of great or lesser and substantially 
equivalent risks that are familiar to and routinely encountered by the 
general public as well as other risks.
  The reason I bring that up is this. Several speakers have indicated 
we are rushing to judgment. For 14 years and even years before that, 
the gentleman from California [Mr. Brown] and I have served on the 
sometimes powerful House Committee on Agriculture in an effort to ride 
this animal called FIFRA out of the chute and finally get some 
legislation with regard to food safety and finally repeal the clause 
called the Delaney clause that called for zero risk. Everybody agrees 
that has to be done.
  We have tried and tried and tried to forge a coalition between 
industry, agriculture, and the environmental groups, all to no avail.
  Part of the problem is the climate that we have had in reference to 
the whole pesticide issue and the whole business of risk assessment. 
That is what this bill is all about.
  The gentleman from California, and his knowledge about this issue is 
second to none of anybody in the Congress, referred to the alar 
situation and the fact that it was concerned about children that led to 
that dispute. It is my recollection that the 60 Minutes story on alar 
just did not happen.
  In fact, it was carefully planned by the Natural Resources Defense 
Council with the aid of a very savvy public relations firm called 
Fenton Communications.
  In fact, in a memo published by the Wall Street Journal it was 
indicated as that report was being finalized, Fenton began contacting 
the media all throughout the country and that agreement was made with 
60 Minutes to break the story. And later in that memo Mr. Fenton 
stated, a modest investment by NRDC repaid itself many fold in 
tremendous media exposure and submitted his campaign was a model for 
other such efforts.
  What we had was a proven formula for really raising controversy and 
manipulating the public opinion. And it sure was not sound science. 
This was a strategy of manipulation that had serious implications for 
agriculture. In the food safety policy arena, the Congress was left 
out. The EPA, as a regulator, was left out. The scientific community in 
its research function was left out. Everybody in agriculture was left 
out, except the apple producer and they lost $400 million.
                              {time}  1945

  What we need is an approach to have risk assessment put in a common 
language that everybody can understand. Accurate science today lies in 
the eyes of the beholder, and today we have reached the point where 
risk assessment, based on so-called accurate science, is a shotgun 
marriage between science and politics. We have in chemical detection 
technology today the resources to detect parts per trillion, parts per 
trillion, so we can find a little bit of chemical everywhere we look. 
Almost everything is contaminated by something else.
  Mr. Chairman, let us put this issue into perspective. The cancer risk 
in regard to aflatoxin, what we find in peanut butter sandwiches we 
feed our children that is 75 times greater than the dietary risk from 
minute amounts of the chemical EDB that has already been banned as a 
grain fumigant.
  The reason I brought that up is I can remember in past debates on 
this issue, when people were worried about the amount of daminozide, 
which is the same thing, in peanut butter, and what was safe for our 
kids.
  We come to find out that if everybody in this body had to consume the 
same amount of peanut butter and aflatoxin that the poor lab rat did 
before he went legs up, everybody here would have to consume 600 pounds 
of peanut butter a day.
  Judging from the debate, I know some people over there that I would 
like to feed 600 pounds of peanut butter a day to, and it would 
certainly gum up the debate, or at least maybe shed a little bit of 
light.
  A swimming pool, a child swimming in a swimming pool for an hour may 
be exposed to chloroform, that is a by-product of the chlorination we 
have, at levels that exceed the risk by EDB, which again was a grain 
fumigant that was banned, I am not for bringing it back, but we 
chlorinate the pool because the risk of disease and infection from 
bacteria is much greater than the risk in regard to the chloroform. 
That is what risk-benefit is all about.
  We have a pesticide law, I mentioned it before, FIFRA, and we have 
the Federal Food and Drug and Cosmetic Act.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Roberts] has 
expired.
  (At the request of Mr. Brown of California and by unanimous consent, 
Mr. Roberts was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. ROBERTS. Basically what this law says is that these products 
should only be used when the benefits really exceed the risk. If they 
do not, if the risks are greater, then the EPA should and does have the 
authority to ban the use of any kind of product on an emergency basis.
  In regard to risk-benefit, and I will sum up, and this is the whole 
issue, my word, when we talk about gridlock, when we talk about time 
consumed on this issue, 14 years; more than that, 15 or 20 years? 
People crawl out of train wrecks faster than we handle the food safety 
laws around here.
  We have a good bill, H.R. 1627. We need to move on it. I think we 
have good bipartisan support. However, this bill will, at least by peer 
review, describe risk assessment so the American public knows what the 
real risk is.
  I think common sense would tell us and the American people should 
understand that in this debate what we are in far greater danger of, 
harm in regard to these kinds of risks, are from lightning, dog bites, 
drowning, falling down, too much sunshine, certainly smoking, certainly 
if we get into the smart juice; or getting in our cars to drive to the 
grocery store to eliminate the products that some say are unsafe, you 
are in greater danger of having a car wreck going down to the grocery 
store in regards to the products. I find it incredible that some in our 
country would legalize drugs and ban apples.
  The whole point is I think if we had a cost-benefit yardstick here, 
or a description that every American could understand, we could put the 
food safety debate in proper perspective. We could get to risk 
assessment that would not endanger the apple industry or anybody else 
that would be in the barrel in regards to these unmitigated attacks on 
agriculture, and the risk-benefit or the risk assessment would be 
based, certainly, on sound public opinion.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I would simply ask the question as to whether or not we 
are listening to each other. It is good to engage in eloquent prose and 
poetry and debate, which it seems we have been doing. I wonder whether 
or not we are hearing. What we are saying on both sides of the aisle, 
Democrats and Republicans, is that we believe in risk assessment and 
cost-benefit analysis.
  I rise to support the Brown-Brown substitute to H.R. 1022. Because we 
are saying the same thing, I would hope that we would be able to listen 
to what is actually the best way to do what we are all trying to do. I 
prefer to accomplish that reform in an open and honest way that does 
not overreach and cause more problems than the existing system.
  Banning apples, making drugs legal, none of that reaches the point. 
The point is if we want cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment to 
work, we must make it work in an open and fair way so that the States 
and local jurisdictions can work along with us.
  H.R. 1022 envisions a complicated and detailed
   system of actions, all set out in statute and without a judicial 
review disclaimer, all reviewable in the courts. The reform process in 
this bill will add another $250 billion to the Federal cost of 
regulation.

  We are all talking about reinventing government, bringing down the 
cost of government, and yet this legislation adds $250 billion to that 
cost. In addition, the provisions of this bill will cost industry 
millions more in the cost of developing the data that this bill 
requires.
  [[Page H2279]] Finally, which is a point that is very important, 
State governments will be saddled with these costs as well, since these 
provisions apply to State permitting decisions made under Federal laws, 
such as the Clean Water Act permits.
  If the State and local agency that tries to modify this process to 
better suit their jurisdictional needs does this, remember that they 
can be taken to court by anyone and made to comply with every phrase 
and sentence in the bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to just speak about this for a moment. 
Coming from local government, making every effort to comply with 
Federal regulations under State guidance, the idea that we would be 
susceptible at every turn to judicial review is overwhelming. The costs 
would be burdensome. It would be unimagineable.
  If we are trying to emphasize unfunded mandates, why would we have 
legislation that would then ultimately impact negatively the State, 
counties, and cities?
  If this is such good regulatory process, why is it so costly and 
convoluted? The supporters of H.R. 1022 claim that the existing system 
is convoluted and costs many millions of dollars, and that the cost of 
H.R. 1022 is justified when the reduction of the burden on the private 
sector is factored in.
  I do not think that washes. I want to reemphasize the impact it would 
have on States who would try to be creative and comply with the 
regulations, and then be hauled into court. We all agree that the 
existing system needs to be changed. Most of us would agree that the 
existing system is convoluted and inflexible.
  Again I emphasize, we are saying the same thing. Let us have 
effective legislation. Therefore, the Brown-Brown substitute amendment 
indicates we can do this in a fair manner. It would force major Federal 
health, safety and environmental regulations, those with an impact of 
$100 million or more, to comply with a revised system of regulation, 
providing for independent peer review, cost-benefit analysis, worst-
first regulatory priority setting, and a host of other reforms; again, 
an honest and open process.
  These major rules account for 97 percent of the costs imposed on 
industry by Federal regulations, so these provisions represent a 
significant reform. Is that not what we are asking for? Is that not 
what we are talking about, Republicans and Democrats alike? We are 
talking about positive reform in order to make this country work.
  Mr. Chairman, the Brown substitute does not expand judicial review. 
It does not frighten me, as someone who had been in local government 
and State government, that at every turn I would be subject to costly 
litigation.
  It does not contain a broad override of existing law, and explicitly 
states there would be no unfunded mandate imposed on the States in the 
substitute, for counties and cities as well.
  Mr. Chairman, I support sane regulatory reform, and therefore support 
the Brown substitute, so we can do this in an honest and fair manner, 
but more importantly, to listen to each other and to provide the kind 
of legislation that will make this reform work.
  Mr. FIELDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, the debate over the last number of years has revealed 
strong differences among some Members about the role of the Federal 
Government and risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis. The view from 
outside the Washington Beltway, from Governors, mayors, school boards 
and small and large businesses, is that there is a serious problem 
concerning the credibility and impact of Federal regulatory programs.
  A number of Members, however, believe that rules which increase 
annual costs between $25 and $100 million should not be subject to 
cost-benefit requirements. Many of these same Members advocate that 
risk and cost-benefit legislation should essentially be unenforceable. 
In my view, such an approach would shield the Federal bureaucracy from 
real accountability and effectively neuter the legislation.
  I am further reminded of how those who oppose judicial review for the 
Federal bureaucrats were eagerly prepared to impose penalties under the 
Toxic Substances Control Act on ordinary homeowners during real estate 
transactions. Last year I opposed radon legislation which placed 
requirements on ordinary home sellers and even those who rented out 
rooms. Republicans argued that such an approach intruded on State law 
and would swamp the Federal courts with millions of violations during 
ordinary real estate transactions.
  We asked EPA to justify its support when the possible penalties were 
as high as $10,000 for failing to hand out a hazard information 
pamphlet. An amendment to remove this provision was offered, but the 
administration and the Democratic leadership prevailed. Moreover, the 
League of Conservation Voters scored the amendment as an anti-
environmental vote.
  I think I can guarantee that such an approach to expand the Federal 
regulatory octopus to ordinary homeowners will not occur this Congress.
  I am struck, however, by the double standard and the passionate 
defense of the Federal bureaucracy by the same Members who are so 
willing to impose Federal penalties and litigation on ordinary 
homeowners. Congress has simply added new regulatory program upon new 
regulatory program. America is long overdue for real change.
  I strongly support H.R. 1022, the Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit 
Act. The bill provides a strong, enforceable system of accountability, 
disclosure, peer review, and careful analysis of regulatory 
alternatives. This is a critical building block for Federal regulatory 
programs to ensure that our national resources reduce real risks and 
set realistic priorities.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the bill.
  Mr. KLINK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, as I listened to the debate, like the gentlewoman from 
California who spoke a few moments ago, I would like to remind my 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle, I joined many of them in 
voting against the rule that would make EPA a Cabinet-level position, 
because we did not have the opportunity to take a vote on any 
amendments that had to do with risk-cost assessment. I think risk 
assessment is a good idea.
  However, that said, I think 1022 is a bad bill, and I think the 
process that brought us to this point is a bad process. Mr. Chairman, I 
was elected not for 100 days but for 2 years. We have time to do this 
bill and do it correctly. I think that the Brown substitute takes us 
one huge step in that direction.
  The OMB reports that 97 percent of the total cost of Government 
regulation occurs as a result of regulations with an economic impact of 
$100 million or more.
  We need to do risk assessment on H.R. 1022, because what are we 
spending? How many millions of dollars are we spending to go back and 
get a portion of that remaining 3 percent, and to take that figure from 
$100 million down to $25 million?
  The substitute that is offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Brown] and the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Brown] sets the limit of major 
rule at $100 million. I think that is a very important step.
  Under H.R. 1022, hundreds of Federal employees would have to be hired 
to do risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis, and arrange for peer 
review of regulations that have a financial impact of as little as 
$500,000 for each State. That is the level that is set in the current 
H.R. 1022 language, going back to the $25 million figure.
  Mr. Chairman, we have to wonder, as we put all of this legislation 
in, the kind of order that we are passing it. First of all, we come out 
here after only being in town for 3 weeks and we pass a Balanced Budget 
Amendment. Then we come in and we want to talk about risk assessment 
that CBO says could cost the Federal Government a minimum of $250 
million per year.
  We are in the process of trying to cut down on the size of Federal 
Government. The reinventing government that has been headed up by Vice 
President Gore is designed to cut 252,000 Federal workers out of the 
Government.

                              {time}  2000

  Yet we understand, Mr. Chairman, that under this bill we might have 
to 
 [[Page H2280]] hire as many as 5,000 additional Federal workers to do 
risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis.
  Mr. Chairman, again I have to wonder about the consensus. That as we 
are passing legislation that says unfunded mandates, how much of an 
unfunded mandate is this bill going to pass on to the States and to the 
cities as they are our partners in handling these regulations? I think 
the Brown and Brown substitute makes a huge step in that direction.
  I think that the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Brown] also in a Dear 
Colleague that he put out talking about his substitute made a great 
point when he said:

       This amendment was drafted based on the very language that 
     was included in the majority Science Committee report. It 
     would expand section 3 to eliminate the 23-step risk 
     assessment process for those situations where prompt action 
     is necessary to avoid death, illness or serious injury.

  I think that we have to take a very serious look at this amendment.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield.?
  Mr. KLINK. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. 
Klink] for yielding.
  May I inquire of the other side, because of time constraints on the 
total time we are allowed to debate, how many more Members are planning 
to speak on the other side? I would ask the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
[Mr. Walker] if someone can let us know how many Members are speaking.
  We have several other amendments to offer. I imagine your side has a 
few. We would like to bring this to a close as quickly as possible if I 
can inquire how many Members you have. We have 2 or 3 left on this 
side.
  Mr. WALKER. If the gentleman will yield, I have 2 that I know of on 
my side.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Can we make an agreement of no more than 3 on each 
side so that we can bring this to a vote?
  Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to end all debate at 8:30 on 
this substitute. We have debated the substitute for 2-plus hours 
already and in the total of 10 hours to consume, we have about seven or 
eight more amendments on our side.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Ohio?
  Mr. WALKER. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, as I 
understand what the gentleman is proposing here, we would have a half-
hour more of debate, that we would go until 8:30 and we would divide 
the time equally between the two sides?
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. If the gentleman will yield, sure. That is fine.
  Mr. WALKER. And that would include any amendment to this amendment, 
is that correct?
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. We do not plan any. That is correct.
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to that.
  Mr. KLINK. Reclaiming my time, and I will end with this, Mr. 
Chairman.
  Mr. CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will suspend.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 
debate be concluded by 8:30 and both sides share equally in the time 
between now and 8:30.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Ohio.
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, is the time 
of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Klink] going to be included in 
this now?
  Mr. KLINK. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I have about 30 seconds 
and I will be done.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Klink] is 
recognized.
  Mr. KLINK. Mr. Chairman, I will wrap up very quickly. I just want to 
make the final point on the peer review.
  The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman would suspend, in order to settle this 
unanimous-consent request, is it the Chair's understanding that the 
time limit covers any amendments thereto?
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the request until the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr.
 Klink] has concluded his remarks.

  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania has 90 seconds 
remaining.
  Mr. KLINK. Mr. Chairman, I will not take all of it. I just wanted to 
make one mention. That is, as I said earlier on, the process is what 
has bothered me. It is the process not only where we have come with 
drawing up this legislation but the period of time that we are dealing 
with in moving this legislation forward. It also relates to the peer 
review panel and it has been talked about. I just want to go to page 31 
of the bill and item 3 at the bottom.
  It says the peer review panel ``shall not exclude peer reviewers with 
substantial and relevant expertise merely because they represent 
entities that may have a potential interest in the outcome, provided 
that interest is fully disclosed to the agency.''
  So we are not talking about excluding anybody but we are talking 
about the fact that these people most likely are going to be taking 
part in the peer review panels, they have helped to draft the 
legislation, they have helped to draft the Contract for America and I 
think that that is up to the Members of Congress, not up to special 
interests and lobbyists.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that each 
side have 3 more speakers for 5 minutes each.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Ohio?
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, that was not 
what we agreed to. We agreed to the fact that we would have a half-hour 
more of time controlled equally on each side, 15 minutes on each side. 
That is the agreement.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, is he 
proposing, I ask the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] that each 
side control 15 minutes?
  Mr. WALKER. That is right.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Fine.
  Mr. WALKER. And that includes all amendments thereto.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that debate 
be concluded on this amendment and all amendments thereto at 8:35.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Ohio?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Brown] will have 15 
minutes, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] will have 15 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker].
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Georgia [Mr. Norwood].
  Mr. NORWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise to answer some very interesting statements that 
were made earlier by the gentleman from Texas on the other side of the 
aisle. When I hear him talk about the sin of reasonableness, the sin of 
balance, the sin of moderation, I have to ask, where has 
reasonableness, balance and moderation been over the last 14 years when 
that side of the aisle controlled this Congress?
  We are here today basically to discuss not just cost analysis. When 
we hear the other side speak, we really hear only of cost analysis. We 
are here to allow and ask Federal agencies to do a cost-benefit 
analysis. We, too, want them to look at the benefit for the American 
people in terms of safety and health.
  The problem is, you take situations that have occurred over and over 
in this country like the example where the EPA forced Columbia, 
Mississippi to clean an 81-acre piece of land that was contaminated 
with small amounts of hazardous chemicals. Who can be against that if a 
risk assessment is done? We all want those chemicals cleaned up if need 
be.
  But what does the EPA do? They order the removal of 12,500 tons of 
dirt. Why could they not simply have just covered over that hazardous 
chemical with other dirt? Because the EPA based its cleanup standard on 
a theoretical child by eating half a teaspoon of dirt per month for 7 
years?
  [[Page H2281]] The standard is based on a child eating more than half 
a gallon of dirt, so we spend $20 million to remove that dirt rather 
than covering it over for the cost of $1 million?
  That is what is driving the American people crazy out there. They 
know we owe $5 trillion. They know we are borrowing a half a trillion 
dollars every 2 years. Yet we continue to allow a Federal agency to 
pass down rules and regulations that have absolutely no conflict of 
interest.
  I notice that the gentleman from Texas talks about conflict of 
interest. He cannot believe that people with an economic interest could 
actually be invited to the table to discuss the problem.
  I find that unbelievable that people who have been done to over the 
years with rules and regulations that are not necessarily reasonable 
cannot be invited to the table of the Federal agencies that are not 
elected
 to office to discuss the right and wrong of every regulation.

  I know that the American people must not understand this bill, 
because I have been told that. But I am absolutely certain that the 
American people understand what has been done to them over the last 5 
and 10 years in terms of excessive rules and regulations where so many 
are not necessary, where every time they lose another freedom.
  I ask you all to please support our bill and vote against this 
amendment.
  Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. NORWOOD. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.
  Mr. GANSKE. I really think that we ought to talk about the 
substantial differences between the Brown-Brown substitute and the 
bill. Really the substitute is full of language such as reasonable, and 
reasonable, and reasonable. But the real difference is in whether there 
is judicial review. It is as simple as that. Do you want to have the 
Federal agencies judicially reviewed, or do you not?
  The Federal agencies I think for a long time have reviewed the 
actions of private citizens and would require them to submit to their 
regulations. I personally think it is time for the Federal agencies to 
have to justify, create a paper trail and to be under this realm of 
judicial review.
  If we look at the Brown substitute, in section 15 under judicial 
review, ``Nothing in this Act creates any right to judicial or 
administrative review.''
  A distinct difference between the substitute and the bill itself 
which in section 401 says, ``The court with jurisdiction to review 
final agency action under the statute granting the agency authority to 
act shall have jurisdiction to review, at the same time, the agency's 
compliance with the requirements of this Act.''
  It is a distinct difference and that is what we have been talking 
about. We all agree, for instance, that cost-benefit analysis and risk 
assessment are important things. It is simply a matter of whether you 
want to go further and require the agencies to be under judicial review 
among other things. I do. I think that that is a good provision.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman 
from Missouri [Mr. Volkmer].
  (Mr. VOLKMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. VOLKMER. Here we go again, Mr. Chairman. We have got a new little 
wrinkle here this evening, today and tomorrow. Something that has not 
happened before again. I will have to admit that the majority have come 
up with a way to get around some rules.
  As has been mentioned before in debate here, this bill will cost by 
CBO a minimum of $250 million. We have in our budget act under present 
law a provision called pay-as-you-go, or pay-go. And you are supposed 
to pay for that. But I do not see any paying for that. And how do you 
get around it? It was a pretty cute move.
  You now have before you a bill that has never been reported by a 
committee. You have before you a bill that was introduced and brought 
out of thin air, put in the Committee on Rules and sent to the floor in 
order to get around pay-go. That is all it is.
  I have heard the gentleman from Pennsylvania many times, his time 
here, as long as I have been here yell and holler about waiving the 
budget. He did not waive the budget. He just circumvented the budget 
act, snuck around it. That is all he did.
  Where are we going? We are going to spend $250 million to do this? To 
bring this about? Where does the money come from? It is not in here. 
Not in here at all.
  It appears to me by looking at this bill that is before us and the 
substitute, I find some things that--is the gentleman from California 
not on the floor?
  We had a big time passing legislation, and I had hoped that the 
gentleman from Kansas who is the chairman of the committee would have 
yielded to me because I wanted to talk to him a little bit about it, 
but he did not.
  If the gentleman from California could come up here for a few 
minutes, I want to do a little colloquy if I could. While we were 
passing legislation, we worked through the Committee on Agriculture, 
the House and the Senate, spent well over a year working on 
reorganization, restructuring the USDA. We put a provision in there for 
a cost-benefit analysis for all regulations in the future by USDA. Is 
that not correct, I ask the gentleman from California [Mr. Brown]?
  Mr. BROWN of California. If the gentleman will yield, that is 
correct.
  Mr. VOLKMER. And the substitute that you now have before us basically 
follows the language that we incorporated, this House unanimously 
passed, both Republicans and Democrats just last year? Is that correct?
                              {time}  2015

  Mr. BROWN of California. That is correct.
  Mr. VOLKMER. Now, what has gotten so bad with it all of a sudden? All 
of a sudden that substitute is not any good anymore. People who 
overwhelmingly voted for it now condemn it, say it is terrible, say it 
does not do anything. Yet last year they were praising it. They were 
saying what a great thing it was.
  Mr. BROWN of California. If the gentleman will yield further, this 
bill is somewhat more comprehensive than the one we passed last year, 
but the language, as the gentleman points out, is identical on subjects 
like comparative risk assessment, for example.
  Mr. VOLKMER. I admit this bill goes further and your substitute goes 
further. But basically it is.
  Mr. BROWN of California. Yes.


                         parliamentary inquiry

  Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Chairman, now, the other thing that I find in the 
principal legislation that is ironical to make is that just recently we 
are moving things here so fast I cannot remember, we did a moratorium 
on regulations, if I remember right, that passed.
  I would like to perhaps make a parliamentary inquiry to the Chair. 
Maybe the Chair can enlighten me a little bit. I think I know the 
answer to the question I am going to propose, and maybe the Chair can, 
if it is not a parliamentary inquiry, can say so, and then I will give 
the answer, and if they disagree with it, they can disagree with it.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
  Mr. VOLKMER. We passed a moratorium-on-regulations bill. Let us 
assume that that bill is passed by the Senate day after tomorrow and 
goes into conference, and in the meantime the Senate takes this bill, 
which is going to pass this House by tomorrow, they take this bill up 
and pass it and send it directly the way it is to the President. the 
President signs it. It becomes law. The moratorium bill 2 weeks from 
now comes out of conference, passes the House and Senate, goes to the 
President, becomes law.
  Is it not true that the moratorium legislation on all regulations 
would affect the proposed regulations under this bill?
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair cannot interpret what the enactment of that 
legislation would do.
  Mr. VOLKMER. I did not think the Chair would know the answer. I 
agree.
  Just one quick move to prove, to show, the point that if that 
happens, you cannot do what is proposed to be done in this bill in the 
15 or 18 months, folks. It cannot be done, because you have a 
moratorium on all regulations including these regulations that are to 
implement the pay-as-you-go.
  [[Page H2282]] Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the 
gentleman from Maine [Mr. Longley].
  Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Chairman, judicial review, what a radical idea that 
the regulatory bureaucracy should be accountable. My district was one 
of the first districts in the country to adopt, to implement, the 
enhanced air emissions testing under the Clean Air Act, and did so with 
a good spirit and the intention of hopefully being able to clean the 
air.
  It did not take the people of my district more than 6 weeks to figure 
out the program was flawed and, frankly, was not based on science, and 
as we dug into it, we found out that not only had the EPA forced, 
threatened, sanctions on the State's economy, the adoption of this 
system, but that agency itself had not even complied with the Federal 
law requiring scientific studies that were supposed to be done.
  So we had seven counties and 600,000 men and women who again 
attempted to comply with this and took all of 6 weeks to decide that 
the program should be canned. It was not only suspended, but we had a 
petition campaign in my State that will probably lead to its ultimate 
repeal.
  But what about the actions that have been taken by the State? As we 
speak this evening, the Maine senate and the legislature in Augusta is 
debating what to do about a $15 million contract that was entered into 
in good faith with a testing service that was the mandatory choice 
under the EPA's plan, and at the same time that we are doing this, in 
the last 4 months, in fact, barely 2 weeks ago, the EPA on its own 
volition came in and said, ``Surprise, surprise, we don't really need 
to test in four of the seven counties, that, in fact, they are now in 
attainment whereas, before, they were in nonattainment.''
  If you go back into the Record, you are going to discover the EPA 
cannot as of this date even verify where the pollution was coming from 
that they were requiring the people in my State to test for. In fact, 
there were two different versions offered by different officials within 
the bureaucracy. One official testified that if we took every car in 
the State and drove it into Casco Bay that the State of Maine could 
still be in noncompliance with the Clean Air Act. Another official said 
that the estimate of pollution coming from out of State and anywhere 
between 30 percent and 70 percent, and again, coming back to the 
fundamental requirement of the law, the EPA did not conduct the 
scientific studies it was required to conduct so there was any 
scientific basis whatsoever for the actions that were forced onto my 
State.
  And as if that were not enough, many of the towns and cities in my 
State, in my district, are evaluating compliance with the sewer 
overflow requirement under the Clean Water Act, and I met with 
officials of the city of Augusta barely 10 days ago who are now staring 
in the face of a $30 million expenditure based on the scientific 
determination, or regulatory determination, by the EPA that water 
overflow as a result of a once-a-year rain event or the spring melt 
were creating bacteria counts that were excessively high, and so based 
on the fact that the Kennebec River is not swimmable during a heavy 
downpour or during spring melt, the citizens of the city of Augusta are 
going to be faced with the expenditure of $30 million. I do not know 
anyone in this city, but I know that the citizens of Augusta are smart 
enough to know they do not need to swim in the Kennebec River during a 
downpour, let alone during spring melt, at least in Maine.
  Not only that, other towns and cities, the town of Bridgton water 
district is now going from testing routinely for 10 to 20 contaminants 
that, in their professional opinion, were scientifically appropriate to 
testing for over 280 different contaminants, most of which have no 
known presence in my State.
  I think the provisions of our legislation providing judicial review, 
providing for a scientific assessment of the need and making sure that 
the costs are appropriate to the benefits that we can obtain are 
entirely consistent with what the citizens in my district expect us to 
do as their representatives.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman 
from California [Mr. Mineta].
  (Mr. MINETA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. MINETA. Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1022 mandates a uniform set of 
regulatory procedures for Federal agencies without flexibility.
  Now, while the model used to develop the risk-assessment principles 
and guidelines included in the bill may fit some cancer risks, it is 
entirely inappropriate for regulating highway safety, and yet the 
Department of Transportation is required to follow the same rigid and 
appropriate procedure to evaluate risks as at EPA, and that simply does 
not make sense to me.
  What I see is that the bill is sacrificing the Federal Government's 
ability to protect human health and safety or the environment for the 
sake of maintaining regulatory uniformity. It will produce bad 
regulations and will create an inflexible process that produces nothing 
but extra paperwork.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Brown squared substitute to 
H.R. 1022. The Brown substitute proposes a reasoned regulatory reform 
that expands the use of risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis to 
all major rules with an impact of $100 million or larger.
  Now, those rules account for 97 percent of the compliance costs for 
Federal regulations. So nearly all of the Federal regulatory problem is 
brought under these reforms.
  In addition, the Brown substitute does not expand the right of 
judicial review, preventing long litigious process to further delay 
regulatory reform. The substitute establishes a worst-first regulatory 
priority system so that the highest risks are the focus of regulatory 
action, not minor risks.
  The Brown substitute was worked out between the Commerce and Science 
Committees and represents a rational approach to reform.
  H.R. 1022, on the other hand, moves us in directions we should not be 
going if our goal is true regulatory reform. The scope of this bill is 
unknown. It sweeps in so many statutes and programs that even the 
sponsors of this bill cannot detail all of the current Federal statutes 
that will be affected or superseded. It allows expanded judicial review 
of the provisions of this bill and permits anyone with the money to 
hire a lawyer to take the Federal Government to court for noncompliance 
with the detailed processes described in the underlying bill.
  Worst of all, H.R. 1022 actually adds hundreds of millions of dollars 
in costs to Federal regulatory efforts. The Federal Government pays 
more, State governments issuing permits under Federal laws will pay 
more, and industry will pay more as they have to develop more data to 
feed the reformed system described in H.R. 1022.
  The Brown substitute does not add these costs and specifically states 
that there will be no unfunded mandate contained in this bill.
  And it is my hope that my colleagues will join me in supporting the 
Brown squared substitute and the real regulatory reform that it 
proposes.
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Mica].
  (Mr. MICA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, I have been slightly 
involved in this issue during the past year, and again we hear the 
whines and complaints from the other side.
  We had an opportunity last year. We begged, we pleaded, we requested 
politely to bring this issue before the Congress, and at every juncture 
our pleas were not heard, and here tonight we have an opportunity to 
make some of these changes.
  They did not hear us on the other side, but the Amercian people heard 
us, and they said they are tired of being tied up in regulations that 
make no sense, that put our people out of jobs, that do not address the 
risks to life, health, safety, and welfare of our people. We want to 
protect the environment, and we can do a better job protecting the 
environment, and the money we spend can be spent wisely if we adopt 
this bill.
  I urge you, let us try something new around here. Try something new. 
Take a minute and read the bill. The bill is a good, well-thought-out 
measure, and it will protect us. It will do a better job in protecting 
the environment, and I urge the defeat of the Brown substitute.
  [[Page H2283]] We had a chance for that last year, and no one spoke 
to that. No one gave us that opportunity.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
from Hawaii [Mr. Abercrombie].
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, while we were discussing these issues 
in here this evening, it was interesting to observe some of the 
newscasts tonight. Airline regulation on icing, 68 people dead, going 
over what needs to be done. People on television saying, ``Oh, if we 
only had the regulations, and after the experiments are over, we will 
do the regulations.''
  Pesticides for home use, causing cancer in children. We need to have 
the regulations. It is on the news right now. It is not abstract, the 
way we are speaking here this evening. It is not anecdotal. These are 
things happening in our Nation.
  Carpal tunnel syndrome, back injuries, ergonomics, the science of 
physical mechanics: How are we going to prevent increased workers' 
compensation, increased costs to business, hurting our people, our 
health care? These are the kinds of things that will be addressed if we 
taken up the Brown--Brown substitute.
  This is what was happening realistically in our world tonight, not 
the overblown hyperbole that some of which was on the floor tonight.
  I want to say I respect the admonitions of my old friend, the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker], earlier today about speaking 
about the little guy, and my new friend, the gentleman from Georgia 
[Mr. Norwood]. who said he came here to fight and issued some of the 
anecdotal examples.

                              {time}  2030

  I can have those as well in Hawaii. We have an absolute intolerance 
in Hawaii for contamination of our water supply. We cannot afford it. 
Where I live any contamination of the water supply has immediate 
disastrous consequences for us. So, these are issues that have to be 
addressed at the very time when we are supposedly diminishing 
regulations.
  I believe that H.R. 1022 will hurt the little guy, will not address 
some of the issues that have been presented by some of our good friends 
on the other side. Now is the time to move toward the kind of 
regulatory reform as embodied in the Brown substitute and address the 
real world, the real world of icing on airplanes, pesticides for home 
use, carpal tunnel syndrome in the work force that exists today, and 
the kind of regulations for health and safety we have to provide for 
them.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman 
from California [Mr. Brown].
  (Mr. BROWN of California asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, one final point:
  I try not to be too sensitive, but my good friend, the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker]. read some language earlier in the day having 
to do with comparative risk analysis which I will quote in which he 
said:

       * * * where appropriate and meaningful, comparisons of 
     those risks with other similar risks regulated by the Federal 
     agency resulting from comparable activities and exposure 
     pathways. Such comparisons should consider relevant 
     distinctions among risks, such as the voluntary or 
     involuntary nature of risks and the preventability or 
     nonpreventability of risks.

  As I recall, he kind of ridiculed that language, and I would not 
mention it except that is the same identical language contained in his 
bill, and it is the language essentially that was passed by the House 
last year, and I would hope that he would not use his superior debating 
skills, which we all acknowledge, to take advantage of a poor old guy 
like me.
  Now, having said that, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that our 
amendment is much more consistent than H.R. 1022 with some themes heard 
with some frequency around here, cutting redtape, et cetera.
  Over the last hour or so, we have tried to explain some of the 
problems that many of us on this side of the aisle have with H.R. 1022. 
As we have said before, there is a bipartisan consensus that regulatory 
reform is needed and that risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis are 
two critical tools that can lead to more reasonable regulations.
  Unfortunately, we were not given the time to try to perfect H.R. 
1022. Members on both committees had little opportunity to review the 
bill before markup. The bill itself is a moving target, changing at 
every new iteration, making it even more difficult for Members to 
understand what is in it.
  But it is clear that H.R. 1022 is fundamentally flawed. If this 
amendment is defeated, we will be offering other amendments to try to 
correct some of the more egregious problems in H.R. 1022. No one should 
be misled into believing, however, that those amendments, if adopted, 
would cure the faults of H.R. 1022. For that reason, we are offering 
this substitute to attempt to illustrate what a rational regulatory 
reform bill could look like.
  Make no mistake: This amendment does represent real regulatory 
reform. It incorporates the best of ideas from a number of bills, 
including H.R. 650, introduced earlier this year by Mr. Zimmer. Like 
H.R. 1022, the amendment would require agencies issuing major rules to 
conduct risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses. Unlike H.R. 1022, 
we define major rules as those rules that are likely to result in $100 
million or more in annual effects on the U.S. economy--the same 
threshold chosen by President Reagan over 10 years ago. According to 
OMB, that threshold captures 97 percent of the economic impact of all 
Federal rules.
  Like H.R. 1022, the amendment also directs each of the major 
regulatory agencies to: Set regulatory priorities based on the 
seriousness of the risk and availability of resources, consistent with 
law; publish peer-reviewed guidelines for conducting scientifically 
sound risk assessments throughout the agency and ensure regional 
compliance with those guidelines; provide for independent peer review 
of the scientific information in risk assessments used in major rules; 
and describe fully and accurately the range of risks, with disclosure 
of important assumptions and limitations.
  But more important is what this amendment does not do.
  It does not override existing health, environment, and safety laws. 
Congress passed those laws after due consideration and debate. If any 
changes are to be made, Congress should make them directly to those 
laws, not through a back-door procedural gimmick.
  Unlike H.R. 1022, the amendment does not expand judicial review, 
leading to endless and wasteful litigation. Courts will be able to 
review
 risk assessments and cost-benefit analysis relied on by the agencies 
in their rules.

  Unlike H.R. 1022, the amendment is focused on the rules that truly 
impact the economy, and will not cost the taxpayers hundreds of 
millions of dollars every year to do studies on hundreds of regulations 
that have little impact. We won't need an army of new bureaucrats to 
carry out the requirements of this amendment.
  Unlike H.R. 1022, the amendment does not purport to tell scientists 
how to do science. Phrases like ``central estimates'' and ``most 
plausible and unbiased assumptions'' may sound logical, but I can 
assure you that they have no agreed-upon scientific meaning. After an 
exhaustive review of EPA risk assessment practices, a congressionally 
mandated study released last year by the National Research Council of 
the National Academy of Sciences concluded that EPA's use of 
conservative default assumptions was sound. At the same time, the NAS 
encouraged EPA to disclose a range of risks and the limitations and 
assumptions used. That is precisely what this amendment does. It does 
not tell scientists how to do risk assessments, but rather requires 
them to disclose more openly and completely what they have done so that 
decisionmakers and the public can more easily understand the limits of 
risk assessments. It is also consistent with the recommendations of the 
National Commission on Risk Assessment, the congressionally appointed 
panel preparing recommendations on risk assessment practices.
  The amendment would achieve real regulatory reform, but without the 
costly regulatory morass that would be created by H.R. 1022, and 
without overriding existing health, environment, and safety laws.
  It seems to me that this amendment is much more consistent than H.R. 
1022 with some themes heard with some frequency around here these days: 
cutting redtape, ending unfunded Federal mandates, reducing burdens on 
industry, cutting the size of the bureaucracy, improving the scientific 
basis of regulation, and limiting unnecessary litigation.
  I urge my colleagues to join me and my distinguished colleague from 
Ohio, the other Mr. Brown, in supporting this amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is recognized to close 
debate with 4 minutes remaining.
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Brown] for pointing out the language in our bill, but he left out the 
most important point which is the point I was 
 [[Page H2284]] making, and that is that under our bill we say, ``You 
have to use the risk assessment based upon those things which are 
familiar to and routinely encountered by the general public.'' That is 
what he left out, and that is the point. It is that one gets 
bureaucratic gobbledegook instead of things which are routinely 
available to the public and which they understand.
  Now I was interested a little while ago when the gentleman from 
Missouri lectured us on the business of the budget. The fact is that 
the gentleman would check a little bit further on the rules, what he 
would find out is that there are no Budget Act requirements for 
discretionary spending. PAYGO does not apply to discretionary spending. 
We are talking about discretionary spending here. We solve this problem 
by having less regulations.
  I say, ``You wouldn't have $250 million of expenditures if you simply 
did less regulation; problem solved.''
  Now the thing is, the problem for the other side, that they are 
absolutely right with regard to the brown amendment. The Brown 
amendment would incur absolutely no additional costs. As a matter of 
fact, my guess is that the CBO would not even bother to score the Brown 
amendment because all of the agencies are going to be able to go on 
doing exactly what they are doing now under the Brown amendment.
  For example, the hundred million dollar rule means that EPA, which in 
1993 issued about 170 regulations, only about 1 or 2 percent of those 
would be covered under the Brown amendment. In other words, practically 
nothing would be done under the Brown amendment. We would end up with 
the situation just as it is now.
  What does that mean? Well, we have heard about $250 million in costs. 
Two hundred fifty million dollars in costs has to be compared to $490 
billion in costs that are being incurred by the economy as a result of 
regulation, $490 billion being imposed upon middle-class Americans by 
what the Government does. That is 2,000 times more than what they are 
talking about in terms of costs of this amendment.
  Now, my colleagues, it seems to be that what the American people are 
worried about is 2,000 times more being done to them than what we do 
here. They are worried about $490 billion worth of costs that are 
destroying our ability to compete in the world. We look at global 
competition, and those regulations are undermining and destroying our 
ability to compete.
  What does the Brown amendment say to $490 billion worth of regulatory 
costs?
  ``Keep it, just keep it. Don't do anything. Stop. Status quo. Do what 
we have done for 40 years, do nothing.''
  Defeat the Brown amendment and make certain that as we go toward 
regulatory reform we do it for real.
  Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the 
Brown-Brown substitute. The substitute perfects the bill by recognizing 
the need to incorporate the concepts of risk assessment and cost-
benefit analysis into the regulatory rulemaking process.
  Regulations must be made in a commonsense manner that recognizes our 
limited financial resources. Put another way, we cannot implement 
regulations as if we have an unlimited pot of money to deal with these 
problems. We have to recognize our fiscal limitations and prioritize 
the hazards facing us.
  The measure requires agencies to set priorities based on the 
seriousness of the risk and the viability of resources. Using a ``worst 
first'' approach, the substitute directs each agency to establish 
regulatory priorities based on the seriousness of the risks to human 
health, safety, and the environment.
  The substitute requires assessments and cost-benefit analysis for all 
major rules. It requires agencies to compare risks to other comparable 
risks. It also specifically calls on agencies to state that benefits 
are likely to justify the costs and that the remedies chosen are cost-
effective.
  Peer review is essential to the public's faith in agency action. The 
substitute requires agencies to publish peer-reviewed guidelines for 
conducting risk assessments and sets forth a mechanism to ensure that 
the guidelines are enforced uniformly in each region.
  Section 7 of the substitute requires each agency to establish a 
systematic program for independent peer review of risk assessment and 
economic impact projections of each agency. The agencies are required 
to respond to this independent peer review. To maintain the integrity 
of the peer review process, peer reviewers with direct conflicts of 
interest are excluded.
  Finally, the substitute ensures that the right to judicial review is 
not expanded. It provides much needed certainty by reiterating existing 
law and emphasizing that it does not give new right to judicial review.
  Mr. Chairman, I am proud to support this measure that represents true 
reform to the regulatory process.
  Mr. VENTO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the substitute offered 
by the gentlemen from California and Ohio.
  The substitute amendment before the House is a rational well reasoned 
response to the need to better judge the efficiency of Federal Rules 
and Regulations. Frankly, the basic bill H.R. 1022 is a poorly 
conceived measure which would paralyze the Federal Government's ability 
to implement a host of environmental, health, safety and energy laws.
  Rules and regulations are the wheels that laws are put into effect 
and H.R. 1022 as presented proposes to slash the tires and immobilize 
the laws as vehicles to implement the basic policy objectives inherent 
in the measure passed by the Congress and signed into laws by numerous 
Presidents.
    
    
  The measure H.R. 1022 actually increases the complexity of the 
regulatory process by adding risk assessment and cost benefit analysis. 
These concepts and models are not some off the shelf material that can 
be applied in a cook book fashion to the problem at hand a proposed 
regulatory framework for action to implement a law.
  Rather cost benefit and risk assessment exist in vague conceptual 
terms which will lend themselves to wide interpretation. The measure 
H.R. 1022 then subjects the entire regulatory process including these 
controversial new charges to judicial review. This is a formula for 
expense, controversy and gridlock.
  I find it difficult to interpret this as a good faith attempt to deal 
effectively with red tape and the problems presented by the regulatory 
process. Rather this basic proposal seems designed to undercut the laws 
it embraces and to frustrate the implementation of sound policy. 
Certainly federal regulations and law are in numerous instances in need 
of change and sometimes counter productive, but this effort to 
circumvent the application and effectiveness of law is very 
troublesome.
  The Brown-Brown substitute eliminates most of the defects of the 
basic bill, raising the threshold, making clear that this law is 
regulatory reform not a wholesale assault of environment, safety health 
and energy law. Furthermore the substitute eliminates the conflicts of 
interest on the peer review section by excluding special interests from 
drafting the studies and the rules themselves.
  The substitute builds upon regulatory reform supported by and 
instituted by the past three administrations and enacted in the 
Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994. Judicial review 
is limited to the basic provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act 
making certain and predictable the flow of regulations rather than a 
rush for the court house when an interested party wants to delay a 
regulatory decision.
  Many features of the substitute respond to the need for regulatory 
reform by setting rule making priorities, including risk assessment and 
cost benefit, but the substitute recognizes the difference between 
agencies and permits rules and analysis unique to such process. Most 
importantly the substitute permits the scientists to do science rather 
than super-imposing a political frame work and models upon the work 
that they are required to do by the law as is advanced in the basic 
measure H.R. 1022.
  The basic measure H.R. 1022 is estimated to cost over 250 million 
dollars and frankly it would be taxpayer money poorly expended because 
it will be purchasing more red tape, more controversy and delay with 
regards to the implementation of law.
  The basic measure seems a thinly veiled attempt to undercut a myriad 
of federal law that the proponents lack the overt support to achieve 
directly, but rather have chosen to put up a straw man argument of 
regulatory red tape and expense behind which they will achieve the 
gutting of basic environmental, safety, health, and energy policy which 
are in the public interest.
  The Brown and Brown substitute answers the call for regulatory reform 
while preserving, not undercutting the basic laws; the existing 
problems that we face today are complex--certainly the environment, 
health, safety and energy laws must reflect that, we as a Congress must 
not sacrifice sound policy to the politically motivated that would 
undercut basic law. I urge my colleagues to support the substitute and 
oppose the basic bill, H.R. 1022.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. Brown].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
                      [[Page H2285]] recorded vote

  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 174, 
noes 246, not voting 14, as follows:
                             [Roll No. 176]

                               AYES--174

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bishop
     Boehlert
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant (TX)
     Cardin
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Danner
     de la Garza
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Durbin
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gilchrest
     Gilman
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Holden
     Hoyer
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klink
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lincoln
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     McHale
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Moran
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Rose
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shays
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Tucker
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates
     Zimmer

                               NOES--246

     Allard
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brewster
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clinger
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooley
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis
     Deal
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gillmor
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     Martini
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Portman
     Poshard
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Riggs
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Royce
     Salmon
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Upton
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Williams
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff

                             NOT VOTING--14

     Becerra
     Dicks
     Flake
     Gallegly
     Gibbons
     Gonzalez
     Hunter
     Lipinski
     McKinney
     Mfume
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Rush
     Wilson

                              {time}  2053

  Mr. HALL of Texas changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  So the amendment in the nature of a substitute was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments?


                     amendment offered by mr. crapo

  Mr. CRAPO. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Crapo: page 5, after line 18, 
     insert:
       (5) Emergency.--As used in this Act, the term ``emergency'' 
     means a situation that is immediately impending and 
     extraordinary in nature, demanding attention due to a 
     condition, circumstance, or practice reasonably expected to 
     cause death, serious illness, or severe injury to humans, or 
     substantial endangerment to private property or the 
     environment if no action is taken.

  Mr. CRAPO. Mr. Chairman, we have just had a significant debate about 
the importance of cost-benefit analysis. But there is one concern with 
this legislation that I think needs to be addressed. The legislation 
provides that the requirements of this act do not apply if the director 
of any agency subject to the act or the head of any such agency 
declares an emergency to exist.

                              {time}  2100

  The problem is that there is no definition in the act of what 
constitutes an emergency. Those of us who have had experience, whether 
it be in the legislative arena or in a regulatory arena, with a 
declaration of an emergency, know that it is very easy to declare an 
emergency. This leaves a loophole in the act that is probably big 
enough to drive a truck through.
  The purpose of this amendment, which is very short and 
straightforward, is to provide a very carefully crafted, tight 
definition of what an emergency is. It requires the head of an agency 
to determine that there is some situation that is immediately 
impending, extraordinary in nature, and that it demands attention due 
to a condition, circumstance, or practice reasonably expected to cause 
death, serious illness, or severe injury to humans, or substantial 
endangerment to private property or the environment if no action is 
taken.
  The purpose of this is to make it clear that agencies are not 
entitled under this legislation and under the emergency provisions of 
this legislation to simply declare an emergency without good, 
substantial justification.
  In the committee report, on page 28, it says that
   ``The mere existence of the usual kind and level of risk which any 
statute subject to this title is designed to regulate does not 
constitute an emergency.''

  Again, the purpose of this is to make it so that the requirements of 
this act in all cases except a true emergency, where there is an 
immediately impending danger, extraordinary in nature, demanding 
immediate attention, under the circumstances designated in this 
amendment. In only those circumstances can the head of an agency 
declare an emergency and avoid the application of this statute.
  Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important that we impose this kind 
of control over the statute, and require that the agencies not use this 
provision as a loophole.
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I have worked on this bill in both the Committee on 
Science and in the Committee on Commerce. The gentleman from Idaho, Mr. 
Crapo, is absolutely correct, there is no definition of emergency.
  I think the gentleman's definition is well within the spirit and the 
intent of the legislation. It is well crafted, it is tightly drawn, it 
is very concise. Any member who plans to support the legislation would 
certainly not go against any other option if they vote for this 
amendment. I would hope that we will adopt it.
  [[Page H2286]] In the interests of time, I would hope we would adopt 
it by a voice vote.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment because it narrows the 
definition of ``emergency.'' During the hearings that we had, as brief 
as they may have been, as uncomplete as they were, we heard witness 
after witness come in front of the committee concerned about the lack 
of flexibility given to the agencies to be able to deal with an 
emergency. This narrows the language even more by constructing a very 
narrow definition of ``emergency.''
  Let me give two or three examples. When the Centers for Disease 
Control receive information about severe outbreaks of illness related 
to chryptosporidia, it can act to ensure that the outbreak of the 
illness is limited.
  Prompt action is essential; not more lawyers, not more bureaucracy, 
not more government, not more Rube Goldberg ways to stop these agencies 
from acting quickly in an emergency basis, in imminent endangerment of 
the public.
  When contaminated blood, another example, can be removed from 
hospitals and blood banks before it is used, before it infects some 
unsuspecting victim with
 HIV, the public health is protected, people's safety is protected.

  Mr. Chairman, let me give another example. When a local nuclear 
reactor is not running quite right, should the NRC have to wait for a 
meltdown before it can react? Obviously not. They ought to be able to 
anticipate prior to an emergency, again to protect the health and 
protect public safety. It simply makes sense.
  This amendment takes away any flexibility, and is one more example of 
adding to bureaucracy, meaning more lawyers, more government, more 
litigation, going in the exact opposite direction that people in this 
country want.
  I ask for a defeat of the amendment. Tomorrow there will be an 
amendment to make sure that they have the authority, that agencies have 
the flexibility, to act to prevent an emergency situation to protect 
people's public health and public safety.
  Mr. SCHAEFER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Crapo amendment to the 
Risk and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995, and I would commend the gentleman 
from Idaho for offering it.
  Mr. Chairman, the emergency situation provisions is an important part 
of this legislation. It provides flexibility for unforeseen threats to 
public health and safety. However, an ill-defined standard of what 
actually constitutes an emergency creates a gaping loop-hole for 
improperly opting out of the review requirements. Without a standard 
definition, agency heads could be confused as to when they can exercise 
their authority.
  The emergency situation provision delegates a great deal of authority 
of the Federal agencies in carrying out the spirit of this important 
legislation. However, this delegated authority should not be 
misinterpreted by agencies as giving them wide latitude in applying the 
provision. Consequently, it is imperative that lawmakers make the 
definition of the emergency situations provision very clear. The Crapo 
amendment achieves this goal.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment provides a very reasonable gauge of an 
emergency situation for Federal agencies to know when they can 
abbreviate the risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis requirement. I 
urge my colleagues to support this well thought out modification to the 
bill.
  Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Crapo amendment. Mr. Chairman, 
the argument is made that the Crapo amendment defining what an 
emergency is in the bill is too tightly drawn, perhaps too restrictive 
of the word ``emergency.''
  Let me argue the contrary. The bill provides an exception to the act. 
It says that an agency that is undertaking a rulemaking does not 
necessarily have to do risk analysis, risk characterization, when an 
emergency exists in the making of a rule.
  It does not say that risk analysis cost-benefit performance must be 
conducted on every agency action, carrying out an existing rule. To 
carry out a rule that already exists, the agency simply performs its 
function. It is in the new rulemaking, in the execution of new 
rulemaking decisions, that the act requires a risk assessment, risk 
characterization, and cost-benefit analysis.
  It provides an exception even in that case. Even when it needs to 
move swiftly on a rule, if in fact it finds an emergency, it can avoid 
the very necessary requirements of looking at cost, looking at risk, 
and doing a relative analysis of the two.
  The bill says that ``You can avoid this bill any time the agency head 
declares an emergency.'' I remember we had a rule in the sessions in 
Louisiana that you could only pass taxes in an off year, but the 
Governor wanted to pass it one year and it was not the right year.
  He asked his advisor ``What can I do?'' He said ``You can declare an 
emergency.'' He said ``What is going to be the emergency?'' The 
emergency was that it was the wrong year to pass taxes, so he declared 
the emergency and proceeded. It was, of course, contested in court. 
Here the effort is to define ``emergency'' in a clear and concise way.
  I want to call Members' attention to the words chosen by the 
gentleman from Idaho [Mr. Crapo] in his amendment. If this amendment 
were restrictively written, we would probably see a lot of ``ands'' in 
it: ``you have to find this and that and this and that'' before you 
find an emergency.
  However, look at the words. It says that ``It is immediately 
impending.'' What is an emergency if it is not immediately impending? 
It says it is extraordinary in nature. That indeed is the nature of an 
emergency. It says that it demands attention due a condition, 
circumstance, or practice reasonably expected to cause death, serious 
illness, or severe injury to humans, or substantial endangerment to 
private property or the environment if no action is taken.
  On the contrary, this amendment is drawn to cover all of the real 
emergencies that should be useful in avoiding the real necessities of 
risk assessment cost-benefit analysis, when there is a real impending 
emergency.
  Without this language, Mr. Chairman, any agency head can use that 
term ``emergency'' to avoid this act. With this language, with all of 
the ``R''s in it, you have to find something real that is present, that 
is pending, that is extraordinary, and can in fact cause damage to 
health or environment or to humans or to private property or to the 
environment itself before the agency can avoid this bill.
  If this bill is worth passing, this amendment is necessary to make 
sure that agency heads abide by it. Remember, we are talking about 
rulemaking, not agency action. We are talking about rulemaking, and to 
make a new rule, you ought to follow this bill. If you do not want to 
follow this bill, there ought to be a real, impending, extraordinary 
emergency why, to make a new rule, you will not follow this bill.
  I urge adoption of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Idaho.
  Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment.
  Mr. CRAPO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BLILEY. I yield to the gentleman from Idaho.
  Mr. CRAPO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Virginia for 
yielding to me.
  I would just like to respond on some of the issues that have been 
raised. It is very easy to raise the specter of a big problem that will 
occur if we do not have a very broad emergency language, but the 
examples given just do not fit it.
  First of all, it says that serious illnesses that were considered 
would come under the jurisdiction of the Centers for Disease Control, 
which is not covered by this legislation; the same situation, at least 
to the contaminated blood issue; the nuclear reactor situation that was 
raised.
  I would like to take each of these, whether we are talking about a 
threat to contamination of the blood supply, whether we are talking 
about a serious illness that is threatening the public, 
 [[Page H2287]] or whether we are talking about a danger with a nuclear 
reactor.
  What does this provision provide? It says that if you can find that 
there is a problem that is immediately pending, that is what we are 
talking about with those examples. It says it is extraordinary in 
nature; that is exactly what we are talking about, and that it presents 
a threat to the environment or is reasonably expected to cause death or 
serious illness, or severe injury to humans, substantial endangerment 
to private property or the environment. Any of those examples will 
trigger this.
  As the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin] has said, we have plenty 
of opportunity in here for an emergency to be declared in a real 
emergency. What we are trying to do is tighten that loophole so it is 
not so big that the exclusion eats the rule; so that this legislation, 
which is carefully crafted to address meaningful problems in our 
society, is not simply swept aside each time the agency head feels that 
there is a difficulty in facing the problem, and that they have to 
declare an emergency.
  We have to put parameters on what constitutes an emergency. We have 
to make this bill mean it when we say we want to have real cost-benefit 
analysis.
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of the amendment. I simply would point 
out that the language that the gentleman has offered tracks language on 
page 28 of the committee report. The committee report was very specific 
in not wanting to have emergencies defined as being something that is 
manufactured at the agencies, but that emergencies should be real 
emergencies, so the committee report language makes that clear.
  The gentleman has tracked in his amendment that language in a very 
close fashion, and it is, therefore, acceptable to us.
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the 
requisite number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this very common sense bill and 
this very common sense amendment. This is just the kind of legislation 
that the American people anticipated when they went to the polls last 
November 8.
  There are a couple of axioms from our heritage that I think are 
applicable to situations like this.

                              {time}  2115

  It has oft been said by our fathers and grandfathers that the cure 
should not be worse than the disease.
  If we look back at many of our regulations which are now in effect, 
the cure has very often been worse than the disease, and one can cite 
as a good example of this the asbestos cleanup in our schools, costing 
billions of dollars and creating more environmental hazard than if it 
had been contained and left alone.
  There is another observation made by an old country sage that put 
into very few words what this institution has sometimes had difficulty 
in understanding. His remark when trying to express his concern that 
the effort was not justified by the results, he would say, ``The juice 
ain't worth the squeezing.''
  I suggest that there are a great many of our regulations of which 
this could be said.
  I think that the American people expect that in any of these 
regulations, that the juice should be worth the squeezing, and this 
very commonsense bill and this very commonsense amendment will make 
sure of that.
  As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, it might be retitled, the cost-
benefit analysis bill to assure that in all future regulations, the 
juice is going to be worth the squeezing.
  Mr. VENTO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, this is an interesting amendment that my colleague 
makes because the presumption that you have to make is that somehow the 
administers, those at the executive branch of our Government somehow 
are not going to operate in good faith in terms of the emergency 
declaration. I suppose a further definition of that will help my 
colleagues so that we can be sure to get cost-benefit analysis and risk 
assessment.
  I understand my colleagues want a lot more information with regards 
to these issues before we take action. I notice, though, Mr. Chairman, 
on page 12 of this bill, under the exceptions, this title does not 
apply to the risk assessment or risk characterization document 
containing risk assessment or risk characterization performed with 
respect to the following.
  On page 12, what do we have? The sale or lease of Federal resources 
or regulatory activities that directly result in the collection of 
Federal receipts.
  Like what? Well, perhaps like mining receipts, or grazing receipts, 
or timber receipts, or oil receipts. In other words, a cost-benefit 
analysis and risk assessment, that is wonderful for all of the 
regulations that are conjured up as causing all sorts of difficulty in 
this country, but apparently when it comes to timber roads, when it 
comes to mining, when it comes to exploitation and the government not 
being able to meet the bottom line when it comes out red with regards 
to a timber sale or when it comes out red with regards to mining when 
we are left with the cleanup and the cyanide and all the other problems 
that are associated with that, as long as it comes in in terms of 
bringing back some receipt from those water projects, you know, we may 
be losing $5 for every $1 we pick up, but the fact is then we do not 
want any cost-benefit analysis or risk.
  When we have oil spills, we do not want any cost-benefit analysis. In 
fact, the gentleman from Pennsylvania that is rising to his feet 
implied earlier today that the Brown amendment did not cover the Corps 
of Engineers. I do not know if that was the case or not.
  He was suggesting why was the Corps of Engineers excluded from this 
amendment? After all, we know the Corps of Engineers is responsible for 
significant water projects and activities across the land. He 
proclaimed broadly how important it was and that that was excluded.
  Well, under the precepts that we have here, as I understand the 
gentleman's bill, now, this amendment was not put in in either 
committee, the Commerce Committee or the Science Committee, but all of 
a sudden it appears in this final version of the bill.
  I would just suggest to the gentleman under the provisions of the 
bill that he has so artfully worked on, he has excluded many of those 
same water projects because they are involved in the collection of 
Federal receipts.
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. VENTO. I yield briefly to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. WALKER. The gentleman said that this had something to do with 
cost-benefit. It does not.
  The language that he refers to is only with regard to risk 
assessment. Cost-benefit analysis would be covered, so the gentleman 
would stand corrected.
  Mr. VENTO. That is not the way I understand the gentleman's bill as I 
look at the gentleman's bill.
  Mr. WALKER. The language on page 12 only applies to title I. It does 
not apply to title II.
  Mr. VENTO. The gentleman is suggesting that we will do cost-benefit 
analysis of the leasing and of the water projects and we will do a 
cost-benefit of those under the provisions of the gentleman's bill?
  Mr. WALKER. As long as it has a $25 million impact, I would tell the 
gentleman.
  Mr. VENTO. I thank the gentleman, and I will continue to read this. 
But it seems to me that the provisions in this does exclude the risk 
analysis and the other provisions of the bill from these very projects 
that the gentleman suggests that he covers.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Idaho [Mr. Crapo].
  The amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. 
Kingston] having assumed the chair, Mr. Hastings of Washington, 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, 
reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill, 
(H.R. 1022) to provide regulatory reform and to focus national economic 
resources on the greatest risks to human health, safety, 
 [[Page H2288]] and the environment through scientifically objective 
and unbiased risk assessments and through the consideration of costs 
and benefits in major rules, and for other purposes, had come to no 
resolution thereon.

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