[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 34 (Thursday, February 23, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3034-S3051]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




      COMMEMORATING THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BATTLE OF IWO JIMA

  Mr. CHAFEE. Madam President, first I want to thank the distinguished 
senior Senator from Arkansas for letting us interrupt the sequence.
  Last week, Madam President, following the inspiring remarks by that 
very senior Senator from Arkansas, there were several very eloquent and 
moving statements made on this floor regarding the battle for Iwo Jima 
and the 50th anniversary which we are commemorating currently.
  Over the next several days, there will be additional statements 
dealing with that battle which many believe was the most ferocious of 
the Pacific war. The actual invasion commenced on February 19, 1945, 
with the battle lasting 35 days. On February 22, 50 years ago 
yesterday, D-day plus 3, marines from the 4th and 5th Divisions 
continued their relentless attack against entrenched enemy positions on 
Iwo Jima. It was very difficult going.
  The first 2 bloody days on the island netted gains at a high price in 
marines killed and wounded--an indication of what was going to come in 
the succeeding 32 additional days of combat.
  The job of taking Mount Suribachi, the 556-foot high extinct volcano 
at the southern end of Iwo Jima, fell to the 28th Marine Regiment 
commanded by Col. Harry E. Liversedge.
  On the slopes of Mount Suribachi, the Japanese had constructed an 
exceedingly clever labyrinth of dug-in 
[[Page S3035]] gun positions for coast defense, artillery, mortars and 
machine gun emplacements. These defensive positions were accompanied by 
an elaborate cave and tunnel system.
  From the volcano's rim--that is the top of Mount Suribachi--
everything that went on at both sets of the invasion beaches and, 
indeed, on most of the island, could be observed. Mount Suribachi was a 
position that had to be taken by the marines.
  The men of the 28th Marine Division were the ones that did it. Just 
50 years ago today, February 23, 1945, Mount Suribachi was captured by 
those valiant marines, and so I think it is only fitting, Madam 
President, that we do take a few minutes to recall the heroism and the 
constancy and valor of those marines who seized that position.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I am particularly privileged to join my 
distinguished colleague from Rhode Island. He is too humble to mention 
he served on Guadalcanal as a rifleman.
  During the Battle of Iwo Jima, he was back in the United States being 
trained as an officer and later was deployed back to the Pacific as a 
platoon commander in the Battle for Okinawa.
  This Senator, I say humbly, had just joined the Navy at this point in 
time, and I was awaiting my first assignment. I remember so well the 
sailors--all of us--gathering around the radio--for that was the only 
communication we had--listening to the reports from Iwo Jima, and later 
we studied, of course, the films and read the detailed stories of this 
great battle.
  History records that one-third of the casualties taken by the Marine 
Corps during the entire Pacific war occurred in this historic battle. 
But I want to mention to my colleague, in furtherance, of Senator 
Chafee's observation about the flag raising, that there were two flag 
raisings on Iwo Jima. The first flag raising spontaneously occurred 
about 10:20 in the morning when a first lieutenant with a 40-man patrol 
finally scaled the heights and lifted the first flag. Fortunately, that 
flag was observed by James Forrestal, aboard a ship offshore, Secretary 
of the Navy, a position which my distinguished colleague later occupied 
and I had the privilege of following him.
  Secretary Forrestal is said to have observed to Gen. Holland Smith, 
the commanding officer of all the marines in that operation, ``the 
raising of the flag means a Marine Corps for another 500 years.''
  Later in the day, it was determined by senior officers that the first 
small flag could not be observed throughout the island. A second marine 
detail, therefore, was set up scaling the same arduous terrain to raise 
a larger flag, simply to allow our flag to be observed by a greater 
number of the marines locked in fierce combat.
  The second flag was raised by Sgt. Michael Strank, Cpl. Harlon Block, 
Pfc. Franklin Sousley, Pfc. Ira Hayes, Pharmacist's Mate Second Class 
John Bradley, and Pfc. Rene Gagnon. The more visible Stars and Stripes 
was the one that was captured by the famous photographer Rosenthal, and 
now used as a model for the famous Marine Corps War Memorial near 
Arlington Cemetery.
  So I am privileged to join my distinguished colleague, but I would 
like to add another point. Recently, we saw a very serious controversy 
about the Enola Gay, the plane that dropped the atom bomb, being a part 
of the commemorative exhibit being planned by the Smithsonian 
Institution.
  There was, unfortunately, research done and initial reports written, 
which, in my judgment, and in the judgment of many, particularly those 
who were privileged to serve in uniform in World War II, did not 
properly reflect the facts of that war.
  Fortunately, cooler heads and wiser minds have taken that situation 
now and brought it more nearly into balance, primarily as a result of 
many veterans organizations, particularly the American Legion and the 
Air Force Association.
  But I point out that this battle portrays the extraordinary losses 
incurred in the Pacific conflict, and I hope those researchers who 
wrote the initial reports questioning the mission of the Enola Gay, 
have followed the excellent coverage in remembrance of this battle and 
recognized the mistakes they perpetrated in their earlier assessments 
of the war and why this country was involved.
  My research shows that this is the last battle of World War II when 
President Roosevelt was Commander in Chief from beginning to end. He 
died early in April during the course of the battle on Okinawa, which 
Senator Chafee was in, so this was President Roosevelt's last battle. I 
think it is most appropriate that we join today with others in making 
this remembrance.
  After brief service as a sailor in World War II, I joined the Marines 
and served in Korea. I always feel that my Senate career is largely 
owing to my two opportunities to serve in the military. The military 
helped me greatly to get an education and start a career. I shall 
always be grateful.
 And I do not ever associate my career with the distinguished combat 
records of Senator Chafee, or many others in the Senate. I was simply a 
volunteer during World War II and again for Korea. I shall be forever 
grateful for the privilege of serving my country during those two 
periods of our history and being with those who distinguished 
themselves.

  I thank my colleague and long time friend for joining me on the floor 
this evening.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator Warner. In the succeeding days, I am 
sure that others will come forward with statements commemorating other 
events that took place 50 years ago in Iwo Jima as the battle 
progressed for those 35 plus days, and which, as I say, those who 
studied the wars in the Pacific--many of them, not all--say that was 
the most ferocious battle. I thank the senior Senator from Virginia and 
the Chair. Also, I would like to thank the senior Senator from 
Arkansas.
  Mr. WARNER. I talked to retired Brigadier General Hittle who served 
as an Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Senator Chafee and myself, 
and who participated in the battle of Iwo Jima. On behalf of that 
distinguished individual and dearly beloved friend, I would like to 
include a short statement of his recollections of that battle and 
particularly the performance of one of his marines in that battle.
  I ask unanimous consent that a statement by General Hittle be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                      Statement by General Hittle

       I first met Elmer Montgomery when he reported to my G-4 
     Section of the 3rd Marine Division on Guam. He was the 
     replacement for the Section's stenographer. He was older than 
     most of the men in the Division and I noticed that when he 
     had some spare time, he would lean his chair back against the 
     side of the G-4 quanset hut, take a small white Bible out of 
     his pocket, and deliberately zip it open, read, and find 
     contentment. Elmer was not a loner. He liked his fellow 
     Marines, but he would silently wince when hearing some of his 
     fellow Marines use profanity.
       In February 1945, we sailed for an island called Iwo Jima. 
     A few days after the landings of the 4th and 5th divisions, 
     the 3rd went ashore and was assigned to attack up the center 
     of the island. A couple of days later, when the front line 
     units had suffered heavy casualties, all Division Sections 
     had to send several men up to the front.
       It's no easy task to pick men, knowing that they will go 
     into the ``meatgrinder.'' As I was finishing making the 
     selections, Colonel Beyeo (later a Brigadier General USMC 
     (ret)) popped into my dugout. He said that Sergeant 
     Montgomery wanted to see me. I went out and saw Elmer 
     standing a few feet away. I thought I would put his mind at 
     ease and said ``You weren't among those picked.'' For the 
     first time, he argued with me. He said ``I want to go up 
     front, I have a lot of hunting experience in the mountains, 
     and I want to look after these kids.'' He wouldn't take no 
     for an answer. Then I relented. I told him that he was old 
     enough (35 years) to know what he was doing, and only because 
     he was insisting, he could go forward. That's the last time I 
     saw Elmer. A few hours later he was second in command of an 
     attacking platoon. All the company officers were casualties.
       As the platoon attacked, it was pinned down by machine-gun 
     fire in a saucer like depression, if any Marine stood up, he 
     was mowed down by machine-gun fire. The Japanese mortars were 
     beginning to zero in. Sensing the potential finality of the 
     platoon's position, he yelled to his men ``When I stand up, 
     move out of the depression.'' Elmer then stood up and began 
     firing from the hip and rushed the machine-gun positions.
       The platoon was saved, but Elmer's body was never found. In 
     a few minutes, our artillery pounded that ground and the 
     Japanese 
     [[Page S3036]]  positions. Elmer and his white leather-
     covered Bible became forever a part of the hallowed grounds 
     of Iwo Jima.
       Elmer was awarded post-humously the Navy Cross.
       When I was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I was 
     instrumental in having a new destroyer named in honor of 
     Sergeant Elmer Montgomery. I spoke at the keel laying, and 
     twenty years later, I spoke at the decommissioning of this 
     ship. And today, if anyone should ask me if I used my 
     position as Assistant Secretary of the Navy to influence the 
     naming of the Sergeant Elmer Montgomery, I can look him 
     squarely in the eye, and in all truth, say ``I sure did.''

  Mr. BUMPERS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
                            motion to refer

  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I send a motion to refer to the desk and 
ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] moves to refer 
     House Joint Resolution 1 to the Budget Committee with 
     instructions to report back forthwith House Joint Resolution 
     1 and issue a report, at the earliest possible date, which 
     shall include the following:
       ``Section 1. Point of order against budget resolutions that 
     fail to set forth a glide path to a balanced budget.--Section 
     301 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by 
     inserting at the end thereof the following new subsection:
       ``(j) It shall not be in order to consider any concurrent 
     resolution on the budget (or amendment, motion, or conference 
     report thereon) that fails to set forth appropriate levels 
     for all items described in subsection (a)(1) through (7) for 
     all fiscal years through 2002.''
       ``Section 2. Prohibition on budget resolutions that fail to 
     set forth a balanced budget.--Section 301 of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by inserting at 
     the end thereof the following new subsection:
       ``(k) Congressional Enforcement of a Balanced Budget.--
       ``(1) Beginning in 2001, it shall not be in order to 
     consider any concurrent resolution on the budget (or 
     amendment, motion, or conference report thereon) that sets 
     forth a level of outlays for fiscal year 2002 or any 
     subsequent fiscal year that exceeds the level of receipts for 
     that fiscal year.
       ``(2) The receipts (including attributable interest) and 
     outlays of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust 
     Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund used to 
     provide old age, survivors, and disabilities benefits shall 
     not be counted as receipts or outlays for purposes of this 
     subsection.''
       ``Section 3. Point of order against budget resolutions that 
     fail to establish a glide path for a balanced budget by 2002 
     and set forth a balanced budget in 2002 and beyond.--
       (a) Section 904 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is 
     amended by inserting ``301(j),'' after ``301(i),'' in both 
     places it appears.
       (b) Add the following new section immediately following 
     Section 904 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974:
       ``Sec.   . Section 301(k) may be waived (A) in any fiscal 
     year by an affirmative vote of three-fifths of the whole 
     number of each House; (B) in any fiscal year in which a 
     declaration of war is in effect; or (C) in any fiscal year in 
     which the United States is engaged in military conflict which 
     causes an imminent and serious military threat to national 
     security and is so declared by a joint resolution, adopted by 
     a majority of the whole number of each House, which becomes 
     law.''
                      Motion to Refer, As Modified

  Mr. BUMPERS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
permitted to modify the motion. I have discussed this with the Senator 
from Idaho. It is a motion that would require a 60-vote majority 
instead of a simple majority one place in the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right.
  Without objection, the motion is so modified.
  The motion, as modified, is as follows:

       Motion to refer House Joint Resolution 1 to the Budget 
     Committee with instructions to report back forthwith House 
     Joint Resolution 1 and issue a report, at the earliest 
     possible date, which shall include the following:
       ``Section 1. Point of order against budget resolutions that 
     fail to set forth a glide path to a balanced budget.--Section 
     301 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by 
     inserting at the end thereof the following new subsection:
       ``(j) It shall not be in order to consider any concurrent 
     resolution on the budget (or amendment, motion, or conference 
     report thereon) that fails to set forth appropriate levels 
     for all items described in subsection (a)(1) through (7) for 
     all fiscal years through 2002.''
       ``Section 2. Prohibition on budget resolution that fail to 
     set forth a balanced budget.--Section 301 of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by inserting at 
     the end thereof the following new subsection:
       ``(k) Congressional Enforcement of a Balanced Budget.--
       ``(1) Beginning in 2001, it shall not be in order to 
     consider any concurrent resolution on the budget (or 
     amendment, motion, or conference report thereon) that sets 
     forth a level of outlays for fiscal year 2002 or any 
     subsequent fiscal year that exceeds the level of receipts for 
     that fiscal year.
       ``(2) The receipts (including attributable interest) and 
     outlays of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust 
     Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund used to 
     provide old age, survivors, and disabilities benefits shall 
     not be counted as receipts or outlays for purposes of this 
     subsection.''
       ``Section 3. Point of order against budget resolutions that 
     fail to establish a glide path for a balanced budget by 2002 
     and set forth a balanced budget in 2002 and beyond.--
       (a) Section 904 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is 
     amended by inserting ``301(j),'' after ``301(i),'' in both 
     places it appears.
       (b) Add the following new section immediately following 
     Section 904 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974:
       ``Sec.   . Section 301(k) may be waived (A) in any fiscal 
     year by an affirmative vote of three-fifths of the whole 
     number of each House; (B) in any fiscal year in which a 
     declaration of war is in effect; or (C) in any fiscal year in 
     which the United States is engaged in military conflict which 
     causes an imminent and serious military threat to national 
     security and is so declared by a joint resolution, adopted by 
     a majority of the whole number of each House, which becomes 
     law.
       ``Section 4.--Section 306 of the Congressional Budget Act 
     of 1974 is amended as follows:
       (1) Immediately following ``Sec. 306.'' insert the 
     following:
       ``(a) Except for bills, resolutions, amendments, motions, 
     or conference reports, which would amend the congressional 
     budget process''.
       (2) Add the following at the end of subparagraph (a):
       ``(b) No bill, resolution, amendment, motion, or conference 
     report, which would amend the congressional budget process 
     shall be considered by either House.''

  Mr. BUMPERS. Madam President, I have more to say on this amendment 
than we have time for tonight. Besides that, the Senator from Georgia, 
Senator Nunn, wants to be recognized a little late to offer an 
amendment, and I know the Senator from Idaho has been here a long time 
and he is tired.
  Let me start off by making a few introductory comments about this 
whole process and not just about my amendment. This afternoon, as I 
reflected on the talking thoughts on the amendment, I thought, what on 
Earth is going on when we have an amendment before this body that was 
passed by the House of Representatives to amend the Constitution of the 
United States--we took it, and it is now House Joint Resolution 1, and 
we have probably voted close to 30 times. We voted about 70 times since 
we came in on January 3. We voted on amendments on this about 30 times 
and every single one of them, I believe, has been tabled. The 
distinguished floor manager on the Republican side of the aisle has 
moved to table every amendment and has prevailed almost on a straight 
party line vote on every amendment.
  Madam President, I think party discipline, at times, is a wonderful 
thing. That is what this Nation is all about. We have two parties. I 
hope we can keep it that way. I am not for third parties. I hear some 
sophistry about how that would work wonders for the country. I think we 
have done reasonably well with two political parties and I believe in 
party unity and discipline--to a point.
  But I would like to call the attention of my colleagues to how really 
bizarre this is. Here we are talking about the organic law of the 
Nation which has provided us with 205 years of unfettered freedom 
because of the brilliance of James Madison, John Jay, Alexander 
Hamilton, George Washington, and all of the other Founders who crafted 
that brilliant document. Can you imagine in Philadelphia in 1787 George 
Washington, presiding over the Constitutional Convention to craft that 
document, saying, James Madison and I have sat down and crafted this 
amendment and we will broach no changes; and somebody says, Mr. 
Chairman--or whatever his title was--I have an amendment that I think 
would improve that, and James Madison says, Mr. President, I move to 
table that. That is the end of that amendment. Alexander Hamilton, who 
believed in more central Government--and I did not particularly agree 
with him, but he was a brilliant man--says, Mr. President, I have an 
amendment to change three words here that I believe would improve 
article and amend article IV on unlawful searches 
[[Page S3037]]  and seizures; and Madison says, I move to table that. 
Voted on and that is it.
  Who here believes that the Constitution of the United States would be 
the document it is today if at the Constitutional Convention the 
Founding Fathers had carried on in such a manner? There are 100 
Senators--two from each State of the Nation--and we have a right to 
offer amendments, but they are not even being entertained. They are 
just being summarily dismissed because they say, if we change this 
document, House Joint Resolution 1, this amendment to the Constitution, 
if we change one jot or tittle, the House will not take it back.
  Deliberative body? Well, that is laughable. We are not deliberating. 
Some people here are trying to actually improve it. Others, like me, 
are trying to kill it. But everybody gets the same treatment --they get 
tabled, harassment, and out of here.
  Going back to the Bill of Rights, the first 10 amendments to the 
Constitution were submitted in 1789, the same time the Constitution was 
ratified; and the first 10 amendments, which were the Bill of Rights, 
were adopted at the same time the Constitution was. Since that time, 
Madam President, there have been 11,000 proposals offered in the U.S. 
Congress to tinker with that document--11,000. We have had almost one a 
day since we came back here January 3, 1995. The last time I checked, 
35 constitutional amendments had been proposed to the Constitution 
since January 3. That is the reason the other day--I think I mentioned 
this once before, but it is worth repeating. I went down to Wake Forest 
to speak at a convocation celebrating the 100th year of Wake Forest Law 
School. When they called me and said, ``What will your topic be?'' I 
said, ``I will call it `Trivializing the Constitution.''' That is what 
I spoke on, the trivializing the Constitution. There were 11,000 
efforts to change a document that the most brilliant minds ever 
assembled under one roof put together, which has made this country what 
it is.
  And so we come here with an amendment that is as unworkable as 
prohibition. You know, everybody in this country wanted to put a social 
policy in the Constitution. They said we want to stop people from 
drinking, so we put it in the Constitution. About 14 years later we 
took it out. Do you know why? Because we found we had made a miserable 
mistake. Regardless of how you feel about drinking, that was not the 
issue. The issue was that we were setting social policy in the 
Constitution, and all we got out of it was organized crime--Al Capone, 
the founder of rum-running in this country.
  Organized crime is still firmly in place in this country. We were 
tinkering with the Constitution, and a misguided amendment caused it. 
The figures on this thing are so staggering, people do not want to hear 
it. Senators do not want to hear it. People who watch C-SPAN do not 
want to hear it. They do not relate to it. Think about it--promising 
the American people they would balance the budget by 2002, but first we 
are going to spend $471 billion more in tax cuts and increase defense 
spending--
 If you took Social Security out of the equation, as the Republicans 
have suggested, approximately $2 trillion in spending would have to be 
cut to balance the budget by 2002. How many people in this body do you 
think, Madam President, believe we are going to cut $2 trillion in 7 
years? The answer is in the question.

  Unhappily for all of us, the constitutional amendment is popular. A 
vote against House Joint Resolution 1 will not be the first unpopular 
vote I ever cast. But, as Woodrow Wilson said in his inaugural address, 
the biggest question for every politician who is a public servant in 
the mode of a statesman, the biggest question he always has to ask 
himself, is what part of the public demand should be honored and what 
part should be rejected.
  Politicians try to provide everything on the agenda for everybody. We 
have a $4.5 trillion debt to prove that. But statesmen have to ask 
themselves, does the proposal expand individual liberties? Does it 
provide for domestic or international tranquility? Does it educate our 
people? Does it provide for more health and general welfare? Or is it 
something to run for reelection on in 1996?
  I do not intend to denigrate or debase my colleagues, but I daresay, 
Madam President, if this amendment were being voted on in secret and 
every Senator knew that not one soul would ever know how he or she 
voted, you might possibly muster 40 votes max.
  But the reason the amendment is so popular is because the people of 
this country think that if you put language in the Constitution, 
something magical happens. What they do not understand is that there is 
a real possibility that nothing would happen. For example, Congress 
might be able to ignore the constitutional requirement if the courts 
were unwilling or unable to enforce it, as some proponents of the 
balanced budget amendment suggest.
  On the other hand, Congress might blindly follow the provisions of 
this amendment in a manner that causes economic ruin. For example, say 
we are in the midst of a recession, headed for a depression. We need to 
unbalance the budget in order to spend money to create some jobs 
because the unemployment rate has skyrocketed, as occurred during the 
Depression when it was 25 percent. If you have 41 people in the Senate 
who say, ``I am not voting to unbalance the budget under any 
conditions'', you could be faced with is an apocalypse. And I am 
telling you, Madam President, that is not a farfetched idea. I have 
watched, on this floor since I have been in the Senate, people vote to 
spend money on everything they could find and then when it came time to 
raise the debt ceiling they said,

       No! I am not going to vote to raise the debt ceiling. I 
     just got through voting for $250 billion for a defense budget 
     and for the space station and everything else I could find to 
     spend money for, but I am not voting to raise the debt 
     ceiling. I am going to go back and tell my people what a 
     great fiscal conservative I am.

  The people of this country, and indeed the Congress, in their 
infinite wisdom have seen fit to tinker with the Constitution very, 
very rarely. As Norman Ornstein said amending the Constitution should 
be ``the fix of last resort''. This is a perfect description, ``the fix 
of last resort.''
  To my friends who pride themselves on being conservatives, which I do 
when it comes to fiscal matters, do you know what Robert Goldwin at the 
conservative American Enterprise Institute said? ``True conservatives 
do not muck with the Constitution.'' All you conservatives, let me 
repeat it. This great man at the American Enterprise Institute said, 
``True conservatives do not muck with the Constitution.''
  My motion would refer House Joint Resolution 1 to the Budget 
Committee with instructions that the Committee report language which 
includes the requirements of my proposed amendment. Now, Madam 
President, my proposed amendment is designed for those members who 
really do not want to muck with the Constitution. I invite my 
colleagues to look at these two charts which describes why my proposed 
amendment is designed to do what needs to be done legislatively and, in 
my opinion, has more force and effect than a constitutional amendment.
  Can you believe that we are debating an amendment to balance the 
budget, and at the same time people are saying, ``let's go on a 
spending spree until the year 2002 and pray to God that people have 
forgotten what we said in 1995''. Let us not deal with the deficit 
until the year 2002.
  I say let us start right now. My proposed amendment, if enacted into 
law, would require that we will have a balanced budget by the year 
2002. The constitutional amendment calls for a balanced budget, but 
contains no enforcement mechanism that would actually require a 
balanced budget. If that is not a dramatic difference, I do not 
understand the mother tongue, English. My amendment requires a balanced 
budget; the constitutional amendment calls for one. It does not demand 
it at all.
  My proposed amendment says you can waive the balanced budget 
requirement by a three-fifths vote. So does the constitutional 
amendment. My proposed amendment says you waive it if there is a 
declaration of war. The constitutional amendment says the same thing. 
My proposed amendment says if we are in a military conflict, a majority 
of each house can waive the requirement. The constitutional amendment 
includes the same provision.
   [[Page S3038]] My proposed amendment would require that each annual 
Budget Resolution passed by Congress between now and 2002 contain a 
glide path showing how we will get to a balanced budget by 2002. 
Everybody says we cannot balance the budget overnight. Everybody knows 
we cannot do it overnight.
  My proposed amendment is enforceable because a budget resolution 
could not be passed if it did not balance the budget in 2002. If a 
budget resolution is not passed, Congress is prohibited from enacting 
appropriations and tax bills. The constitutional amendment, on the 
other hand, may or may not be enforceable. Nobody knows for sure.
  The most beautiful thing about my proposed amendment is it is more 
enforceable than the constitutional amendment and it does not touch the 
Constitution.
  My proposed amendment also protects Social Security. The 
constitutional amendment raids the Social Security system to the tune 
of $681 billion between now and the year 2002.
  My proposed amendment says, ``Action now.'' Do you know what the 
constitutional amendment that we are debating here says? ``No 
requirement for action until the year 2002, at the earliest.''
  That is right, America; 7 years before we even start on this whole 
thing and no requirement to do otherwise.
  Madam President, I have some more things I want to say, but everybody 
wants to get out of here. My distinguished friend from Georgia has an 
amendment he wants to lay down and discuss for a moment.
  So I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to yield to the 
Senator from Georgia for that purpose, that my motion be temporarily 
laid aside, and that it become the pending business when we return to 
House Joint Resolution 1 tomorrow morning.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I thank my friend from Arkansas. I 
appreciate his yielding at this point. I do have two amendments. I 
would like to call up both amendments for the purpose of making sure 
they are eligible to be voted on, and then I will talk about one 
amendment tonight relating to judicial review.


                           Amendment No. 299

    (Purpose: To permit waiver of the amendment during an economic 
                               emergency)

  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I would like to call up an amendment 
relating to economic emergency, which is amendment No. 299, and ask it 
be sequenced.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. NUNN] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 299.

  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 2, strike lines 18 through 25 and insert the 
     following:
       ``Sec. 5. The provisions of this article shall not apply to 
     any fiscal year--
       ``(1) if at any time during that fiscal year the United 
     States is in a state of war declared by the Congress pursuant 
     to section 8 of article I of this Constitution; or
       ``(2) if, with respect to that fiscal year, the Senate and 
     the House of Representatives agree to a concurrent resolution 
     stating, in substance, that a national economic emergency 
     requires the suspension of the application of this article 
     for that fiscal year.

     In exercising its power under paragraph (2) of this section, 
     the Senate and House of Representatives shall take into 
     consideration the extent and rate of industrial activity, 
     unemployment, and inflation, and such other factors as they 
     deem appropriate.''


                           amendment no. 300

                  (Purpose: To limit judicial review)

  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that amendment be 
set aside and that I call up amendment No. 300 at this point in time. I 
ask it be sequenced.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 300.

  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 3, line 3, after the period insert ``The power of 
     any court to order relief pursuant to any case or controversy 
     arising under this article shall not extend to ordering any 
     remedies other than a declaratory judgment or such remedies 
     as are specifically authorized in implementing legislation 
     pursuant to this section.''.

  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, the amendment that is amendment No. 300 
relates to judicial review under the balanced budget amendment that is 
now pending before the Senate. I intend to offer this amendment and 
have it voted on on Tuesday, and I am very hopeful this body will agree 
to the amendment.
  My amendment would provide that the power of any court to order 
relief under the balanced budget amendment could not extend to any 
relief other than a declaratory judgment or such remedies as may be 
specifically authorized in legislation implementing the balanced budget 
amendment.
  Madam President, this amendment is identical to the Danforth 
amendment that was agreed to last year as a part of the balanced budget 
amendment which was voted on last year but not passed. I voted for that 
amendment but I did so after the Danforth amendment was incorporated in 
that amendment because I felt, and continue to feel, that this is 
absolutely essential if we are going to pass a constitutional 
amendment, if it is going to be ratified by the States, and if it is 
going to be able to function properly under our system of Government.
  In my judgment, adoption of a balanced budget amendment without a 
limitation of judicial review would radically alter the balance of 
powers among the three branches of Government that is fundamental to 
our democracy. As former Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach 
has noted:

       [T]o open up even the possibility that judges appointed for 
     life might end up making the most fundamental of all 
     political decision[s] is not only an unprecedented shift of 
     constitutional roles and responsibilities but one that should 
     be totally unacceptable in a democratic society.

  Former Solicitor and Federal Judge Robert Bork has expressed his 
grave concern that the balanced budget amendment:

       * * * would likely [result in] hundreds, if not thousands 
     of lawsuits around the country, many of them on inconsistent 
     theories and providing inconsistent results.

  Under the Constitution, the taxing and spending powers are vested in 
the two policymaking branches of Government, the legislative and 
executive branches. These branches are elected by the people. The 
powers to tax, borrow, and pay debts are expressly vested in the 
Congress under article I, section 7, 8, and 9, under the 16th 
amendment. The power to appropriate funds is expressly vested in the 
Congress under article I, section 9. The power to implement and execute 
the laws made under the powers of Congress is vested in the President, 
under article II, section 1.
  The Founders of this Nation fought a revolution in opposition to 
taxation without representation. They would have found it inconceivable 
that the power to tax might be vested in the unelected, lifetime 
tenured members of the judicial branch of government.
  As a general matter, the judiciary has treated questions involving 
the power to tax and spend as political questions that should not be 
addressed by the judicial branch. Our constituents view the balanced 
budget amendment as a means to address taxation and spending decisions 
over which they feel less and less control. They would be sorely 
disappointed if not outraged if the result of the amendment is to 
transfer the power to tax and spend from elected officials to unelected 
life tenured judges.
  Madam President, I have no doubt that a majority, a large majority of 
the people I represent in the State of Georgia, are in favor of a 
balanced budget. Many of those people, if not most, would favor the 
sort of last resort effort to balance that budget by constitutional 
amendment, if that is the only way to do it, and that is what we are 
debating now. I do not believe, however, very many constituents in the 
State of Georgia would want the Federal courts to make these crucial 
decisions. I do not believe they would want any risk of that attendant 
to a 
[[Page S3039]]  constitutional amendment that we are voting on in the 
next few days.
  One of the arguments that has been offered against the judicial 
review limitation--and of course we voted on a very similar amendment 
to my amendment, sponsored by the Senator from Louisiana, Senator 
Johnston, last week. It was defeated by 47 votes for it, 51 votes 
against it. And one of the arguments that was offered against that 
Johnston amendment which I voted for, and was very disappointed when it 
did not pass, is that it is unnecessary because the Supreme Court has 
tended to treat taxation and spending issues as political questions not 
appropriate for judicial review.
  I do not agree with this argument against the Johnston amendment and 
against the Danforth amendment. There have been unfortunate 
encroachments on the political question doctrine which demonstrate the 
potential and the high risk for an activist judiciary to assert the 
power to tax.
  In testimony on the balanced budget amendment, Assistant Attorney 
General Walter Dellinger has cited the case of Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 
U.S. 33. That was a 1990 case in which the Supreme Court considered a 
decision by a district court to order specific taxes in order to 
implement the lower court's desegregation plans. Although the Supreme 
Court in that case did not approve the district court's imposition of 
specific taxes, the Supreme Court approved a decision by the court of 
appeals mandating taxation so long as the specific details were left to 
the State.
  In other words, to those who say this is not a danger, I say look at 
the Missouri case, where the court, upheld by the Supreme Court, made 
it clear that the lower court's decision could hold, mandating taxation 
by the State.
  If that precedent holds and somebody comes in under this 
constitutional amendment and makes a case that has standing, they would 
very likely find some Federal judge who would be willing to take this 
case, the Missouri case, and act on it and perhaps even order taxation 
under that theory.
  If the Supreme Court can permit Federal courts to order the 
imposition of taxes to address nonbudgetary issues--that is what the 
Missouri case was--in my view, it is quite likely the court would 
consider it appropriate to order taxation to meet the specific 
constitutional objective of a balanced budget. It seems to me it is 
more likely that they would order it in that case than it even was in 
the Missouri case.
  Madam President, an alternative argument against this amendment is, 
because there have been relatively few cases in which the Supreme Court 
has stretched the political question doctrine, we can rely on 
legislative history of this balanced budget amendment to discourage the 
court from asserting new powers over the budget.
  Again, I do not agree. Legislative history has not been particularly 
helpful. In fact, it may even be considered harmful. The discussion in 
the committee report, for instance, on page 9, the committee report 
that brings out this amendment, expressly declines to state that the 
amendment precludes judicial review. Instead, the report states--this 
is the report before us by the Judiciary Committee:

       By remaining silent about judicial review in the amendment 
     itself, its authors have refused to establish congressional 
     sanctions for the Federal courts to involve themselves in 
     fundamental macroeconomic and budgetary questions while not 
     undermining their equally fundamental obligation to say what 
     the law is.

  Madam President, there is a vast difference between actually 
prohibiting judicial review as opposed to merely refusing to establish 
congressional sanction for judicial review. That is what this committee 
report does.
  An activist court--we have many Federal judges that are still in 
activist category in a number of appeals courts--an activist court 
faced with a lawsuit based upon the balanced budget amendment, in my 
view, will have no trouble pointing out that Congress consciously 
decided not to prohibit judicial review. Legislative history of the 
balanced budget amendment underscores the potential for such a ruling. 
Last year, the Senate adopted the Danforth amendment expressly 
restricting judicial review. This year, the Senate rejected a similar 
amendment offered by Senator Johnston. While the defeat of an amendment 
does not necessarily provide conclusive legislative intent of a desire 
to achieve the opposite result, it constitutes powerful evidence of 
intent when the issue is separation of powers and the Congress 
specifically rejects a proposal to frame a constitutional amendment in 
a manner that would protect the prerogatives of the legislative branch.
  The legislative history in the House is even more of a problem. As 
Senator Levin noted, on February 15, Representative Schaefer, a lead 
sponsor of the House amendment, said--this is one of the lead sponsors 
on the House side, Representative Schaefer:

       A Member of Congress, or an appropriate administration 
     official, probably would have standing to file suit 
     challenging legislation that subverted the amendment.

  He went on, the same Representative Schaefer, one of the prime 
authors of this amendment on the House side, quoting him again:

       The courts could invalidate an individual appropriation, or 
     attack that. They could rule as to whether a given act of 
     Congress, or action by the Executive, violated the 
     requirements of this amendment.

  In other words, Madam President, one of the prime authors of this 
amendment on the House side explicitly invites the court to get in the 
rulings on tax and spending decisions.
  I find this very troubling. The statements by a lead sponsor in the 
House represents a wide open invitation for unelected life tenure 
members of the judicial branch to make fundamental policy decisions on 
budgetary matters. I have the highest respect for the judiciary. I do 
not believe, however, that making budget decisions is a role that would 
be sought or welcomed by the American people in terms of Federal judges 
carrying this out. In fact, I think a number of Federal judges, 
probably a majority them, would not welcome this kind of responsibility 
or this kind of jurisdiction. It is certainly not a role that our 
constituents would expect to be filled by unelected Federal officials. 
If we start having unelected officials making tax and budgetary 
decisions, we are basically going to be unraveling the Boston Tea Party 
in terms of the forefathers when they did not want taxation without 
representation.
  Madam President, another argument in opposition to a limitation on 
judicial review is that cases will be dismissed because plaintiffs lack 
standing. As noted in the judiciary report, pages 9 and 10, the powers 
of the judiciary under article III of the Constitution traditionally 
have been limited by the constitutional doctrine that a lawsuit cannot 
be considered by the Federal courts unless a plaintiff can demonstrate 
that he or she has standing to bring litigation. Under current Supreme 
Court doctrine, the plaintiff must show that he or she suffered an 
injury, in fact that the injury is traceable to the alleged unlawful 
conduct, and that the relief sought would redress the injury. The 
Judiciary Committee report asserts that it would be vastly improbable 
that a litigant could meet these standards.
  Again, I do not agree with that report. Assistant Attorney General 
Walter Dellinger provided the following examples of individuals who 
would have standing.
  If a crime bill authorizes forfeitures, it thereby increases Federal 
revenue. A criminal defendant would have standing to challenge a 
forfeiture on the grounds that the bill was passed by voice vote rather 
than by a rollcall vote as required by the balanced budget amendment.
  Another example from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger is 
that if the President were to reduce Social Security benefits in order 
to address the balanced budget amendment, a Social Security recipient 
would have standing to challenge the President's decision.
  It is not too difficult to contemplate other scenarios. If welfare 
benefits are cut by the President, a welfare recipient could challenge 
the authority of the President to do so. At least that is the risk. If 
the President declines to cut welfare benefits, a State could challenge 
the President's failure to do so. If a State terminates a highway 
improvement contract because the President cut Federal funds, it is 
likely that both the State and the contractor would have standing to 
challenge the President's actions.
   [[Page S3040]] In each of these cases, the litigant, whether an 
individual, a company or a State would have standing because the 
litigant could meet all three elements of the test of standing: The 
entity suffered an injury in fact, No. 1; the injury was clearly 
traceable to the action or inaction under the balanced budget 
amendment, No. 2; and, No. 3, the relief sought, which would be 
invalidating the action or mandating a tax or expenditure, would 
redress the injury.
  As Senator Johnston noted on February 15, the experience of the 
States with balanced budget amendments demonstrates the likelihood that 
the court will find standing to institute lawsuits under the balanced 
budget amendment as reflected in litigation that is taking place in 
Louisiana, Georgia, Wisconsin, and California. Some have suggested 
that, because the States did not experience a flood of litigation, 
there is nothing to worry about. Again, I do not agree.
  As former Solicitor General and Harvard Law School Professor Charles 
Fried noted, and quoting him:

       The experience of State court adjudication under State 
     constitutional provisions that require balanced budgets and 
     impose debt limitation shows that courts can get intimately 
     involved in the budget process and that they almost certainly 
     will.

  Madam President, it would only take one or two well-placed cases a 
year to create budgetary chaos during the years that it would take from 
the time the lawsuit was initiated to the time that it was resolved by 
the Supreme Court of the United States. It does not take but one case 
to put clouds over a whole issue, such as bond issues or Treasury 
notes.
  I do not think we are thinking through what we are doing here in not 
putting an amendment in here that makes this judicial review clear and 
makes it clear where the limitations are.
  Madam President, some have contended that a constitutional provision 
governing judicial review is not necessary because Congress can 
restrict judicial review by statute in the future. Again, I dissent. I 
do not agree.
  In the first place, there is no guarantee that such limitations would 
be placed in the implementing legislation. If we believe judicial 
review should be restricted under this constitutional amendment, we 
need to say that and we need to say it now before we pass it and before 
the States vote on it.
  Second, although the courts have sustained certain statutory 
limitations on judicial review of statutory and common law rights, 
there is no case in which the Supreme Court has held that Congress 
could cut off all avenues of judicial review of a constitutional issue.
  If there is, I want someone to show it to me. Where is the case by 
the Supreme Court that says Congress can cut off the right of the 
Supreme Court to issue a ruling on the Constitution of the United 
States? I have not seen that ruling.
  As noted in the highly respected analysis of the Constitution 
prepared by the Congressional Research Service:

       [T]hat the Congress may through the exercise of its powers 
     vitiate and overturn constitutional decisions and restrain 
     the right of constitutional rights is an assertion often made 
     but not sustained by any decision of the court.

  Let me read that again. The Congressional Research Service says:

       [T]hat Congress may through the exercise of its power 
     vitiate and overturn constitutional decisions and restrain 
     the exercise of constitutional rights is an assertion often 
     made but not sustained by any decision of the court.

  Madam President, the only way to ensure the validity of legislation 
restricting jurisdiction on a constitutional matter is to expressly 
restrict judicial review in the text of the constitutional amendment. 
If we do not do that, we are inviting litigation, we are inviting 
judicial chaos, and we are inviting at least a risk of the fundamental 
overturning of the balance of powers and the separation of powers 
between our branches of Government.
  I do not believe a conservative body wants to do that. I just cannot 
believe we want to do that, particularly since we passed the same 
amendment last year and we have rejected it this year, which is even 
more of an invitation for the courts to construe that we really are 
inviting judicial review. It is inconceivable to me that we are not 
going to get 50 votes to make this clear. It is really literally 
inconceivable.
  Some have asked, ``How can we have a balanced budget amendment and 
how can it be enforced without judicial review?''
  The first thing I would say on that, Madam President, is that we all 
take an oath to abide by the Constitution. That is part of the oath 
that we subscribe to when we come into this body. I do not believe that 
Members of this body will intentionally violate that oath, nor do I 
believe they will risk the wrath of their constituents by violating the 
Constitution.
  We may have 60 Senators who decide it is not a year for a balanced 
budget under this amendment, but that is in keeping with the amendment. 
That is not in defiance of it. It is permitted under the amendment.
  If Congress finds that such judicial review is desirable, it can 
tailor a statute to meet particular requirements.
  I have heard people say, ``You don't need to propose it in this 
amendment because we can come back by statute and do this.'' It seems 
to me that that is simply not the case. I do not agree with that.
  But I do believe that if we pass this amendment and then we decide 
that we want some judicial review--I probably will not want it--but if 
some people decide it, then there is no reason they cannot propose it, 
because this amendment permits the Congress to grant judicial review by 
statute if the Congress decides to do so.
  So we can tailor a statute to meet requirements in the future. We 
will have all the flexibility we need to meet that.
  Under my amendment, Congress can decide based on experience what 
remedies are best--whether judicial review should include only 
declaratory relief or whether it should include injunctions; whether it 
should be directed only at spending or whether it should include taxes. 
On the latter, I certainly will adamantly oppose any kind of judicial 
review that gives the courts the power to set spending or to set taxes. 
These are decisions Congress should make and it should be made based on 
experience.
  The amendment in its present form, I believe, is defective because it 
fails to address these issues. It leaves the whole situation ambiguous.
  In fact, as I have said, it leaves it worse than ambiguous because we 
are now debating essentially the same constitutional amendment we had 
last year. Last year, the Danforth amendment, which precluded this kind 
of judicial review without expressed statute, was passed. It was part 
of that amendment. This year, it has been expressly defeated on the 
floor of the U.S. Senate. And I would submit that any Federal judge 
would look at that that wants to get involved and they would say, 
``There is our invitation that Congress clearly could have precluded 
it. They consciously precluded it last year, 1994, and they did not 
preclude it in 1959.'' And some of the authors of the amendment on the 
House side even invited this kind of judicial review.
  Madam President, I know that many of my colleagues have grave 
reservations about this overall balanced budget amendment because of 
its impact on congressional spending powers. I understand these 
concerns, but, frankly, I think that we are down to the point where we 
have about 40 years of experience and without a constitutional 
amendment we have simply not come to grips with our fiscal problems.
  It is my hope that I can vote for this constitutional amendment. But 
I will not be able to vote for it unless we make it clear that the 
judiciary of this country is not going to tax and spend and we are not 
going to change our form of Government back door by a constitutional 
amendment that is ambiguous on this question.
  I understand the concerns that people have, many concerns about what 
will happen in various forms of spending under this constitutional 
amendment. Those concerns are legitimate. Many of those concerns, 
however, go to the question of whether we are going to ever have a 
balanced budget at all under any such kind of provision.
  I also understand and have great identification with the view 
expressed by those who supported the Reid amendment on the Social 
Security exclusion. Some people have described that, in my view, 
certainly from my 
[[Page S3041]]  perspective, erroneously as being an amendment that 
says we are not going to touch Social Security. Far from it. My view 
and my position on that is the Social Security system has to be dealt 
with. I do not think we have to do anything that hurts people on Social 
Security now, or those about to retire. But we cannot continue to 
borrow the money from the Social Security trust fund every year, put it 
in the operating fund, and then put a Treasury bill in the Social 
Security trust fund.
  Not only are we doing that, this constitutional amendment, unless we 
deal with that--and we are not dealing with it now because the Reid 
amendment was defeated--this constitutional amendment basically 
invites, it invites raiding the trust fund. Because it defines debt as 
being debt held by the public. Trust fund debt, putting a Treasury bill 
in the trust fund, is not debt held by the public. And we have what 
probably is inadvertent--I hope it is inadvertent--we have an 
inadvertent provision here in this amendment that basically invites 
building up more surpluses in the trust fund because you can borrow 
those funds with impunity from the operating fund and it does not 
require 60 votes.
  Now I think that is another flaw that needs to be dealt with. And I 
would think the authors of this amendment would want to deal with these 
flaws. But we are about to put something in the Constitution. I know 
the argument is that if we make any amendment here it has to go back to 
the House and that causes trouble; it would cost time.
  Madam President, we are about to amend the Constitution of the United 
States. We are about to put a provision in here that may be here 50 
years from now, 100 years from now, or 200 years from now. I cannot 
conceive of passing something that we believe or a majority believe is 
flawed in an effort to get something through in a rapid fashion.
  I hope that we will deal with Social Security also, because, if we do 
not, Madam President, in spite of the fact that the 2002 date may be 
met--and I hope it is under this, if it is passed and ratified by the 
States; that is we, by the definition of this amendment, may have a 
balanced budget in 2002--and that would be an improvement, certainly an 
improvement over the present situation--it really will not be a balance 
because we will be borrowing about $100 billion that year from the 
Social Security trust fund and that will count as a balance. We will 
put a Treasury bill in the Social Security trust fund and then we will 
say that we have met the balance.
  And yet, by the year 2013 or 2014, in that neighborhood, the general 
operating fund will owe the Social Security trust fund about $3 
trillion. We will do that. We will have that kind of debt to the Social 
Security trust fund even if we meet the mandate in this balanced budget 
amendment by 2002. And even if we have a balanced budget amendment in 
2002, 2003, or 2004, if we meet it every year, we are still going to be 
rolling up debt. We are still going to have an operating budget that is 
out of balance because we are operating by borrowing from the Social 
Security trust fund.
  Not only the principal; we are borrowing the interest. What happens 
when the baby boomers retire? We will wake up in this country and we 
will find we owe $3 trillion. We no longer will have three workers for 
every retiree. We will be moving 2\1/2\ down to 2.
  At some point in the 2020's what we will have to do in order to have 
a Social Security fund be able to meet its payments, we will have to 
begin paying back that $3 trillion. Guess what happens then? We will be 
able to say for a few more years the Social Security trust fund can 
meet its obligations, but the general fund is going to have to borrow 
money, or we will have to tax people much, much greater than we are 
taxing now. In fact, the tax rates could become almost unbearable and 
almost unworkable in that situation.
  Now, I have to say that if we deal with this Social Security question 
like the Reid amendment or some other amendment, and I hope we will, in 
my opinion, in all honesty, it will take more than 7 years to get the 
budget balanced. We should not keep the 7-year provision in this bill 
because we will have to find another $110 or $120 billion in the year 
2002. It will probably take more like 10 years.
  But I cannot think of anything more disillusioning to the American 
people than to go through the whole constitutional action here, pass it 
in the Senate, pass it in the House, pass it in three-fourths of the 
States, get down do 2002, 2003, 2004 and discover we have been 
borrowing money from the Social Security every year and that we still 
do not really have a balanced operational budget.
  Only in the macro sense will we have the economic effect, but we will 
be rolling up debt after debt after debt. We will owe $3 trillion by 
the time many of our children will be getting to the point they retire. 
That is going to be very, very disturbing.
  It is my hope that we will deal with both of these matters. On the 
Social Security I know there are a lot of people who feel that way. If 
we do not deal with it here, it will come up over and over and over 
again this year. We will be caught in a catch-22. We will be caught in 
a catch-22.
  I may not vote against this amendment because of Social Security, 
although I may. I have not decided that. I certainly know that I am not 
going to be able to support this unless we deal with the judicial part 
of this judicial review.
  Assuming we pass this, we are going to be dealing with it, they will 
continue big efforts on the floor of the House and the Senate to get 
Social Security out of here--not because Social Security itself does 
not have to be addressed. It does. We will have to address it 
separately. We should be addressing the Social Security system not as a 
way of building up surpluses that mask the true size of the Federal 
deficit. We ought to be dealing with it to preserve the integrity of 
that fund over a long period of time, and to make sure that our elderly 
people are fully protected. I am afraid that is not the way we will go.
  Madam President, one final thought. The way this amendment is worded 
now where it is only debt held by the public that counts in terms of 
debt, what we have is a major enticement for a loophole in this 
amendment. The loophole is, if we create more surplus in the trust 
funds, the Social Security trust fund, the airport trust fund, the 
highway trust fund, where our gas taxes go, the more surpluses we build 
up in there, the less we are going to have to do on deficits because 
those surpluses can be borrowed under the provisions of this amendment 
with impunity.
  They will not count as deficit. They will not count as debt. I think 
that is a major mistake. I think it is a real flaw in this amendment. I 
think it will come back to haunt us. If this passes and is ratified we 
will have people--year after year, and at some point it will probably 
pass--come to the point where they say we are not going to continue to 
use these Social Security surpluses. We will stop that.
  It may happen on the budget resolution. At some point, the people of 
this country will find out and we will pass that kind of recusal. It 
may be on a budget resolution, and then we will be in the dilemma. We 
will have 7 years to get the budget balanced under this constitutional 
amendment.
  We are not going to be able to change that by statute. We will not be 
able to meet the requirements, because at some point we are going to 
come to our senses and quit borrowing that Social Security trust fund 
each and every year. Then we will be in a situation, I predict, where 
we will not be able to meet the requirements of the balanced budget 
amendment by 2002, setting off a whole other round of disillusioned 
people out there, wondering if we will ever be able to deal with our 
fiscal problems responsibly.
  Madam President, I point these flaws out because I am one who hopes 
to be able to support this constitutional amendment as a last resort. I 
think having a constitutional amendment to deal with fiscal matters and 
budgetary questions is really a tragedy. I think it is an indictment of 
our entire political process that we are at this point. But we are at 
this point.
  I am one of those who would, if we have the right provisions in this 
amendment, I will vote for it. If we do not, it will be very difficult, 
but I will have to cast my vote no. The judicial part to me is 
enormously important, as I have said over and over again in this 
presentation, and I have said it privately to my colleagues, and I have 
said it in many different forums. The 
[[Page S3042]]  last thing we need added to our budgetary difficulties 
in this country is to have Federal judges setting tax and spending 
policy.
  Madam President, I understand both of my amendments are now in order 
and are sequenced, and I will be entitled to have votes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, I have listened carefully to the comments 
of my colleague. I have to say that I am disappointed he feels the way 
he does because I believe that the amendment that he offers does not 
accomplish what he wants to accomplish anyway.
  Declaratory relief can be just as intrusive as an injunction. When a 
court declares a statute unconstitutional, it has the same effect as 
enjoining the Constitution. Exactly the same thing.
  My dear friend and colleague, who I have a great deal of admiration 
for and who I respect very much, seems to agree that the standing 
doctrine would give the courts the ability to interfere with the 
budgetary process, but because it is a possibility that the courts 
might interfere, certainly not a probability under anybody's viewpoint, 
that he would like to see that changed. Well, that may be. Others would 
like to not see it changed.
  The Senator cited Missouri versus Jenkins. I have to say Missouri 
versus Jenkins is a 14th amendment case. The 14th amendment only 
applies to States. Frankly, it does not apply to the Federal 
Government. We have never had a ruling from the Supreme Court that 
applies to budgetary policy or macroeconomic policy in that sense, 
where the courts will tell a Federal Government to tax and spend.
  The courts have maintained an aloofness from that. It is not a 
question in the mind of most who look at it. Missouri versus Jenkins is 
an example, but that case only applies to the States. As I say, it is a 
14th amendment school desegregation case. The court in Jenkins noted 
that its result does not duplicate coequal branches or implicate 
coequal branches of government. There is no way that that case applies.
  In fact, even that case is under severe questioning by almost 
everybody in law today as having gone too far, even though it was a 
desegregation case, which is considerably different from what we are 
talking about here.
  I am confident, and I have no doubt at all, that we can deal with the 
judicial activism problem through implementing legislation. Here are 
some examples, the Norris-La Guardia Act, it is in effect today where 
Congress prohibited courts from enjoining labor disputes. We abide by 
it to this day because the courts were enjoining labor disputes. In 
contract and a whole variety of other areas, the courts were 
interfering. But the Congress decided to limit the jurisdiction of the 
courts and to this day we have abided by that limitation. The Anti-
Injunction Act, prohibiting courts from enjoining collection of taxes.
  We will, in the Judiciary Committee, make it a top priority, and 
certainly it will be a top priority of mine, to draft implementing 
legislation to deal with this matter. I hope my colleague will not get 
himself in such a position that he cannot vote for this when it is the 
best he is ever going to see under those circumstances.
  Mr. President, the balanced budget amendment is a fine-tuned law. It 
manages to strike the delicate balance between reviewability by the 
courts and limitations on the court's ability to interfere with 
congressional authority. But the proposed amendment could destroy that 
balance and endanger the ability of the balanced budget amendment to 
effectuate real change in the way Congress does business.
  The Nunn amendment, which is virtually identical to Senator 
Danforth's amendment of last year to the balanced budget amendment, 
would limit judicial remedies to declaratory judgments or such remedies 
that Congress specifies in implementing legislation.
  If the purpose of the Nunn amendment is to prevent judicial activism, 
to prohibit the courts from ordering the raising of taxes, the cutting 
of spending programs, or the slashing of the Federal budget, as a 
vehicle it does not accomplish its aim. Simply put, in many 
circumstances a declaratory judgment can be as intrusive as an 
injunction. Consider a hypothetical situation where a Federal spending 
program is unconstitutional. Whether a court restrains the 
implementation of the program by injunction or declares that program 
unconstitutional, the effect is the same: The agency will not enforce 
the program.
  The intrusive nature of declaratory relief was at least implicitly 
recognized by Justice Felix Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 
549 (1946). In writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter opined 
that a declatory judgment is a statutory equitable remedy that should 
only be granted when standards for granting an injunction are met.
  Moreover, I fear that expressly permitting declaratory relief in 
House Joint Resolution 1 may be construed by some activist court as a 
constitutional invitation to interfere in the budgetary process--the 
very situation that Senator Nunn seeks to avoid.
  Finally, I believe this amendment is unnecessary. The long existing 
and well-recognized precepts of standing, justiciability, separation of 
powers, as well as the political question doctrine, refrain courts from 
interfering with the budgetary process. Furthermore, as a further 
safeguard against judicial activism, pursuant to both article III of 
the Constitution and section 6 of House Joint Resolution 1, Congress 
may limit the jurisdiction of courts and the remedies that courts may 
provide. The Judiciary Committee will study this and draft implementing 
legislation to prevent undue judicial activism. The proper
 place to do this is in implementing legislation and not in the body of 
a constitutional amendment. No constitutional provision presently 
contains a jurisdictional limitation on courts.

  Let me explain at greater length why I think the Nunn amendment is 
unnecessary:


                          judicial enforcement

  First let me state that I wholeheartedly agree with former Attorney 
General William P. Barr, who stated that if House Joint Resolution 1 is 
ratified there is:

       * * * little risk that the amendment will become the basis 
     for judicial micro- management or superintendence 
     of the Federal budget process. Furthermore, to the extent 
     such judicial intrusion does arise, the amendment itself 
     equips Congress to correct the problem by statute. On 
     balance, moreover, whatever remote risk there may be that 
     courts will play an overly intrusive role in enforcing the 
     amendment, that risk is, in my opinion, vastly outweighed by 
     the benefits of such an amendment.


                 congress' power to restrain the courts

  In order to resist the ambition of the courts, the Framers gave to 
Congress in article III of the Constitution the authority to limit the 
jurisdiction of the courts and the type of remedies the courts may 
render. If Congress truly fears certain courts may decide to ignore law 
and precedent, Congress--if it finds it necessary--may, through 
implementing legislation, forbid courts the use of their injunctive 
powers altogether. Or Congress could create an exclusive cause of 
action or tribunal with carefully limited powers, satisfactory to 
Congress, to deal with balanced budget complaints.
  But Congress should not, as the distinguished Senator from Georgia 
proposes, limit judicial review to declaratory judgments. I believe 
that House Joint Resolution 1 strikes the right balance in terms of 
judicial review. By remaining silent about judicial review in the 
amendment itself, its authors have refused to establish congressional 
sanction for the Federal courts to involve themselves in fundamental 
macroeconomic and budgetary questions. At the same time, this balanced 
budget amendment does not undermine the court's equally fundamental 
obligation, as first stated in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 
(1803), to ``say what the law is.'' After all, while I am confident 
that courts will not be able to interfere with our budgetary 
prerogatives, I am frank enough to say I cannot predict every 
conceivable lawsuit which might arise under this amendment, and which
 does not implicate these budgetary prerogatives. A litigant, in such 
narrow circumstances, if he or she can demonstrate standing, ought to 
be able to have their case heard.

  It is simply wrong to assume that Congress would just sit by in the 
unlikely event that a court would commit some overreaching act. Believe 
me, Congress knows how to defend itself. 
[[Page S3043]]  Congress knows how to restrict the jurisdiction of 
courts or limit the scope of judicial remedies. But I do not think this 
necessary. Lower courts follow precedent, and the precepts of standing, 
separation of powers, and the political question doctrine effectively 
limit the ability of courts to interfere in the budgetary process.
  Nevertheless, if necessary, a shield against judicial interference is 
section 6 of House Joint Resolution 1 itself. Under this section, 
Congress may adopt statutory remedies and mechanisms for any purported 
budgetary shortfall, such as sequestration, rescission, or the 
establishment of a contingency fund. Pursuant to section 6, it is clear 
that Congress, if it finds it necessary, could limit the type of 
remedies a court may grant or limit courts' jurisdiction in some other 
manner to proscribe judicial overreaching. This is not at all a new 
device; Congress has adopted such limitations in other circumstances 
pursuant to its article III authority.
  In fact, Congress may also limit judicial review to particular 
special tribunals with limited authority to grant relief. Such a 
tribunal was set up as recently as the Reagan administration, which 
needed a special claims tribunal to settle claims on Iranian assets.
  Beyond which, in the virtually impossible scenario where these 
safeguards fail, Congress can take whatever action it must to moot any 
case in which a risk of judicial overreaching becomes real.


        standing, separation of powers, and political questions

  There exists three basic constraints which prevent the courts from 
interfering in the budgetary process. First, limitations on Federal 
courts contained in article III of the Constitution, primarily the 
doctrine of ``standing.'' Second, the deference courts owe to Congress 
under both the political question doctrine and section 6 of the 
amendment itself, which confers enforcement authority in Congress. 
Third, the limits on judicial remedies which can be imposed on a 
coordinate branch of government--in this case, of course, the 
legislative branch. These are limitations on remedies that are self-
imposed by courts and that, in appropriate circumstances, may be 
imposed on the courts by Congress. These limitations, such as the 
doctrine of separation of powers, prohibit courts from raising taxes, a 
power exclusively delegated
 to Congress by the Constitution and not altered by the balanced budget 
amendment.

  Consequently, contrary to the contention of opponents of the balanced 
budget amendment, separation of power concerns further the purpose of 
the amendment in that it assures that the burden to balance the budget 
falls squarely on the shoulders of Congress--which is consistent with 
the intent of the Framers of the Constitution that all budgetary 
matters be placed in the hands of Congress.


                                standing

  Concerning the doctrine of ``standing,'' it is beyond dispute that to 
succeed in any lawsuit, a litigant must first demonstrate standing to 
sue. To demonstrate article III standing, a litigant at a minimum must 
meet three requirements that were enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (19920: First, Injury in 
fact--that the litigant suffered some concrete and particularized 
injury; second, traceability--that the concrete injury was both caused 
by and is traceable to the unlawful conduct; and third, 
redressibility--that the relief sought will redress the alleged injury. 
It is a large hurdle for a litigant to demonstrate the ``injury in 
fact'' requirement; that is, something more concrete than a 
``generalized grievance'' and burden shared by all citizens and 
taxpayers.
  Even in the vastly improbable case where an ``injury in fact'' was 
established, a litigant would find it nearly impossible to establish 
the ``traceability'' and ``redressibility'' requirements of the article 
III standing test. After all, there will be hundreds and hundreds of 
Federal spending programs even after Federal spending is brought under 
control. Furthermore, because the Congress would have numerous options 
to achieve balanced budget compliance, there would be no legitimate 
basis for a court to nullify or modify a specific spending measure 
objected to by the litigant.
  As to the ``redressibility'' prong, this requirement would be 
difficult to meet simply because courts are wary of becoming involved 
in the budget process--which is legislative in nature--and separation 
of power concerns will prevent courts from specifying adjustments to 
any Federal program or expenditures. Thus, for this reason, Missouri v. 
Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990), where the Supreme Court upheld a district 
court's power to order a local school district to levy taxes to support 
a desegregation plan, is inapposite. Plainly put, the Jenkins case is 
not applicable to the balanced budget amendment because section 1 of 
the 14th amendment--from which the judiciary derives its power to rule 
against the States in equal protection claims--does
 not apply to the Federal Government and because the separation of 
powers doctrine prevents judicial encroachments on Congress' bailiwick. 
Courts simply will not have the authority to order Congress to raise 
taxes.


                           political question

  The well-established political question and justifiability doctrines 
will mandate that courts give the greatest deference to congressional 
budgetary measures, particularly since section 6 of House Joint 
Resolution 1 explicitly confers on Congress the responsibility of 
enforcing the amendment, and the amendment allows Congress to ``rely on 
estimates of outlays and receipts.'' Under these circumstances, it is 
extremely unlikely that a court would substitute its judgment for that 
of Congress.
  Moreover, despite the argument of some opponents of the balanced 
budget amendment, the ``taxpayer'' standing case, Flast v. Cohen, 392 
U.S. 83 (1968), is not applicable to enforcement of the balanced budget 
amendment. The Flast case has been limited by the Supreme Court to 
establishment clause cases. Also, Flast is, by its own terms, limited 
to cases challenging taxes created for an illicit purpose.
  I also believe that there would be no so-called congressional 
standing for Members of Congress to commence actions under the balanced 
budget amendment. Because Members of Congress would not be able to 
demonstrate that they were ``harmed in fact'' by any dilution or 
nullification of their vote--and because under the doctrine of 
``equitable discretion,'' Members would not be able to show that 
substantial relief could not otherwise be obtained from fellow 
legislators through the enactment, repeal, or amendment of a statute--
it is hardly likely that Members of Congress would have standing to 
challenge actions under the balanced budget amendment.
  Mr. President, I believe it is clear that the enforcement concerns 
about the balanced budget amendment do not amount to a hill of beans. 
The fear of the demon of judicial interference is exorcised by the 
reality of over a century of constitutional doctrines that prevent 
unelected courts from interfering with the power of the democratic 
branch of Government and that bestow Congress with the means to protect 
its prerogatives.
  Madam President, I will over the weekend try to answer every question 
that he has raised because I know that he is raising sincere questions. 
We have answered some of them, but we will answer all of them.
  I hope he will keep his options open, because this is no small 
matter. We have worked on this ever since I have been in the Senate. It 
has been Democrats and Republicans. We have no way of pleasing 
everybody in this body or that body. It has taken a consensus. It has 
taken the work of literally hundreds of us to get to this point.
  I wish I could accommodate every Senator who wants to change 
something here, but I cannot. Anybody who says that Social Security 
debt is not public debt I do not think understands the budget. The fact 
of the matter is we owe that as the Federal Government, and we owe it 
to the public from whom it is borrowed. And that is every senior 
citizen in this country that will exist at the time those notes come 
due.
  But be that as it may, we have done the best we can. I believe the 
amendment will be voted up next Tuesday, but if it is voted down, so be 
it. I have lived with it as long as anybody. I have done everything I 
possibly can to satisfy everybody. So has Senator Simon and others who 
have worked on this, 
[[Page S3044]]  and there is just no way we can do that.
  Frankly, it is a choice between doing nothing, again, or doing what 
we can do. That is what it comes down to. I think when the votes are 
cast next Tuesday, we are going to do what we can do because everybody 
here knows we have to take drastic action. We can no longer afford to 
let this thing go; we just no longer can afford to do it.
  I have a lot of respect for my colleague from Georgia, and I would 
like to accommodate him in every way. I wish I could. I always try to 
do that with him because he is one of the great Senators here, and I am 
not just saying that. I know that and I feel that, and he is my friend. 
But I just plain do not believe that a constitutional case can be made 
that will allow the courts to interfere in the budgetary process of the 
Congress without the Congress slapping the living daylights out of the 
courts.
  I suppose anything is possible, but with the amendment that he has, 
declaratory judgment relief may put us in a bigger bind than not having 
it there at all. That is why I did not like that last year, to be 
honest with you. It would be a lot better for us to work on restricting 
the jurisdiction of the court, which we can do, as we did in the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and a number of other cases, and do it in a 
straight-up, intentionally good way. It would pass overwhelmingly if 
not unanimously in both bodies. We can do that and do it right without 
scuttling the one chance in history to get spending under control and 
to get our priorities under control, part of which the distinguished 
Senator from Georgia and I would fight our guts out for, and that is 
the national security interests of this country.
  The only way we are ever going to get to that point where we really 
start being concerned in the Federal Government about the real 
priorities of government, especially the Federal Government, is to have 
this consensus, have it written into the Constitution whereby we have a 
rule that requires us to do something. This is our chance.
  If I could make it perfect, I would do that. There are ways that I 
would write this differently if I were the sole arbiter or dictator in 
this body. I am sure that is true with just about everybody in this 
body. But we come to a point sometimes in this life where we have to do 
the best we can.
  Frankly, if the distinguished Senator insists on having these 
amendments added to it, we lose votes otherwise. And we lose anyway if 
his vote is the deciding vote in this matter, and it very well may be--
I suspect it is--or at least comes close to being. I am not going to 
give up no matter who votes against this.
  To make a long story short, I wish I could accommodate him. So do a 
lot of others. I would always accommodate my friend from Georgia, if I 
could. But we always have 535 people we have to accommodate around here 
if we do that.
  Look, I believe we have done the best job we can to bring an 
amendment to the floor of both Houses. This amendment has passed 
before. I believe my colleague has voted for it before. The last one 
did have this declaratory judgment in, and I did not like that and 
neither did a lot of others, but we swallowed hard and took it at that 
time because the Senate had to pass it, and we did not pass it, by the 
way. We lost by four votes. It did not work. We did get Senator 
Danforth. But the fact of the matter is, it did not pass.
  Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. HATCH. I will be glad to.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank my friend from Utah. I know how hard he has worked 
on this. I do know, having managed bills on the floor, that you cannot 
accommodate everyone. I understand that. You have to count the votes 
and make those judgments. I respect that.
  As my friend knows, I have immense respect for him and his leadership 
in this matter and on every other matter. The reason I put in the 
Danforth amendment, as you know, the Johnston amendment had nothing in 
it about declaratory judgment, and that was voted down. The Danforth 
amendment had been accepted. I would just as soon have left out the 
declaratory judgment part. That was put in because that amendment was 
accepted by the Senator from Utah and the Senate last year.
  I have another amendment here that basically says:

       The judicial power of the United States shall not extend to 
     any case or controversy arising under this article except as 
     may be specifically authorized by legislation adopted 
     pursuant to this section.

  I am perfectly willing to modify my amendment and substitute this, 
which leaves out any reference to declaratory judgment. I can do that 
now, or if you want to look it over.
  Mr. HATCH. I have to say that is preferable. But I also have to say, 
I think that my friend knows how I feel about him; I do not have a 
person I look up to more than my friend from Georgia in this whole 
body. But I am worried if my friend insists that either language has to 
go in here--I would like to accommodate him--but if he insists on it, I 
think this battle may well be over, because even if we could pass it 
here, I am not sure we can over there.
  They have done a good job. It comes down to doing the best we can. I 
have to say, I can make this amendment more perfect. I can give you a 
variety of ways of doing that, but I cannot get a consensus to go with 
me. It has been a hard thing for me, too.
  Look, I spent my lifetime, as the distinguished Senator has, in the 
law. I hold the ABA rating for Martindale-Hubbell, and I really feel 
deeply about the law. I feel deeply that we could write other things in 
here that might make it more perfect--no doubt about it--but I cannot 
get a consensus. I hope my friend will consider that because we worked 
our guts out to get this here. This is the last chance I think we may 
ever have to pass it.
  I have to say that that amendment, even if that were accepted, would 
do very little more than what we can do by doing good implementing 
legislation afterwards. And I promise my friend that I will write that 
with him to his satisfaction and help get it through both Houses of 
Congress, and I think we can do it before the summer is up.
  But let me tell you, I think it will work just as well as any other 
change where we have limited jurisdiction of the courts. I will work 
together with him to do that. I do not think my friend has any doubt 
that Congress is going to zealously guard its rights. If any court--if 
any court--tries to infringe on our budgetary process, we are going to 
slap that court down so fast their heads are going to be spinning.
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Utah, I have two problems with that 
argument. If Congress is going to zealously guard this right, this is 
the time to do it when we are amending the Constitution, because once 
you have put it in the Constitution, you have elevated the whole matter 
to the judges and the judges then decide their responsibility and their 
duties under the Constitution. And there is no case that indicates that 
the Supreme Court is willing for Congress to make the final decision 
about which jurisdiction the courts have in interpreting the 
Constitution of the United States.
  Mr. HATCH. There are a lot of cases--I will try to look them up for 
the Senator--where the court has deferred completely to Congress, and 
in every budgetary case of congressional budgetmaking, the courts have 
stayed out of them.
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend, I think he is absolutely sincere in 
that, and I hope his legal arguments will prevail both in this body and 
in the courts if this amendment becomes law.
  I also will say, those who passed the 14th amendment to the 
Constitution that resulted in an interpretation in the Jenkins versus 
Missouri case, I suspect those people would have been shocked to find 
that the Federal courts used the 14th amendment to require a State to 
raise taxes.
  I doubt very seriously if any of the authors of the 14th amendment 
anticipated that later on the Federal courts were going to require a 
State to raise taxes. I think they would have been in pretty much the 
same position you are in now. They would have argued vigorously that it 
would never happen. But it did happen. I think it could happen in this 
manner. It may even be more likely here in dealing with budgetary 
matters and putting an explicit provision into the Constitution.
  Mr. HATCH. If my friend will yield, I think that is not a great 
concern. I will 
[[Page S3045]]  tell you why. First of all, Jenkins versus Missouri was 
a desegregation case where the court decided to enforce desegregation 
the way it did, and it used the 14th amendment, which only applies to 
the States. It cannot be used to apply to the Federal Government.
  Mr. NUNN. This amendment can.
  Mr. HATCH. Not really. In section 6, it says, ``Congress shall 
enforce and implement this article by appropriate legislation.'' In 
other words, we have constitutional impetus. If my friend would work 
with me to come up with implementing legislation that would restrict 
the courts--which it will--and which will pass overwhelmingly in both 
bodies, we have the total authority and direction under this amendment 
to do that. I cannot imagine any court in the land that would ignore 
that mandate in a constitutional amendment; I just cannot.
  Mr. NUNN. My problem is, I say to my friend--and I know he is an 
eminent legal scholar, but there are other constitutional scholars, 
such as Nicholas Katzenbach, Robert Bork, Mr. Freed, Larry Tribe, and a 
number of others, who fundamentally disagree with that analysis.
  Mr. HATCH. But they cannot disagree with the fact that, look, there 
is no provision in the Constitution today, and neither will this be a 
provision, that will limit judicial review. That is a premise I think 
we have to agree with.
  Mr. NUNN. The 11th amendment to the Constitution is an explicit part 
of the Constitution, and it does limit judicial review. It says:

       ``The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
     construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 
     or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
     another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
     State.''

  Mr. HATCH. We are talking about implementing legislation mandated by 
a constitutional amendment that allows us--in fact, mandates us--to 
come up with implementing legislation to enforce this article. That is 
different from that. I agree the courts can have judicial review--I do 
not think there is any question about that--on anything they want to 
take jurisdiction of, but they have to abide by section 6. ``The 
Congress shall enforce and implement this article by appropriate 
legislation.'' And they will abide by that. I do not think Judge Bork 
or Freed or Dellinger, any of them, would say that is not going to be 
abided by if you and I and we pass it through Congress, do legislation 
implementing this that says the courts do not have the power to do so.
  Mr. NUNN. My problem is, that is a big ``if.'' If we cannot do it now 
because there are people who oppose it here, and if we cannot make this 
clear now when you and I both agree that we do not want the courts 
involved in this, what makes the Senator believe we can do it by 
statute?
  Mr. HATCH. It would be easy to do by statute because I believe----
  Mr. NUNN. Why, when one of the authors of the amendment on the House 
side says he wants judicial review? Evidently, there are people over on 
the House side that want judicial review. Otherwise, the Senator would 
not be in the box he is in, in terms of not being able to get this 
amendment accepted.
  Mr. HATCH. He was a cosponsor of the amendment. He is not even an 
attorney. He is an intelligent person but not a constitutional scholar. 
I do not think that anybody doubts that his comment that he wants 
judicial review means a doggone thing.
  Mr. NUNN. To get legislation passed, we do not have to get 50 percent 
of the constitutional scholars, we have to get 50 percent of the people 
voting.
  Mr. HATCH. Right. I do not think the Senator from Georgia doubts for 
a minute that we can get 51 percent in each body to pass implementing 
legislation that would limit the jurisdiction of the courts in this 
matter.
  Mr. NUNN. I would not have doubted it until we started debating this 
several days ago and, to my surprise, I saw the Johnston amendment 
defeated. I would not have doubted it until then. I cannot conceive a 
U.S. Senate--now a conservative majority--leaving in an ambiguity about 
whether the Federal courts are going to be given the license or 
invitation to take over taxing and spending decisions under a 
constitutional amendment. I could not conceive that until 2 weeks ago.
  Mr. HATCH. Remember that I as the manager of the bill led the fight 
to defeat that amendment. I will lead the fight to make sure the 
implementing legislation does what the Senator from Georgia wants it to 
do.
  There is no way that this amendment solves every problem with regard 
to budgeting or with regard to balancing the budget that can possibly 
come up. There is no way you can do that without writing a 300-page 
statute. And even then you cannot do it.
  So what I am saying is that I hope my colleague will at least let me 
work on answering his questions over the weekend. I hope he will look 
at the answer and keep his powder dry on this and look at the fact that 
we have done our single best--our collective best, really--to come up 
with an amendment that is the only one we can come up with. It will 
work. We can implement it.
  The implementing language can be the way the Senator would like it to 
be, I have no doubt in my mind. I do not think the distinguished 
Senator from Georgia has much doubt that we can pass the implementing 
legislation on this. I have even gotten the acquiescence of the Speaker 
of the House that he will work hard to get it passed. I do not have any 
doubt at all that we will do that.
  The Johnston amendment--even if it were accepted--would still have to 
have implementing legislation one way or the other. We can do what the 
Senator wants done, and I have no doubt that we can--and I do not think 
anybody doubts that, including the Senator from Georgia especially, if 
we all come together--and still make that giant step to try to get 
spending under control.
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend that there is a vast difference in 
having to pass implementing legislation in order to block a court from 
exercising jurisdiction and having to pass implementing legislation if 
they are going to have jurisdiction.
  If we pass this amendment, the implementing legislation would be 
required, but in the absence thereof, the courts would have no 
jurisdiction. If we do not pass this amendment, it is my great fear 
that the courts will have jurisdiction unless we pass implementing 
legislation; and even if we do, the courts can say that implementing 
legislation exceeds the powers of Congress to limit their 
constitutional review because they have jurisdiction over the 
Constitution. When we put this in there, it is an invitation to assert 
that jurisdiction. Maybe they would not do it. Maybe it would not 
happen next year or the year after or in 5 years. But we have a risk 
that at some time this amendment--without clarity on the judicial 
review provision--could change the balance of powers in this country 
and basically eliminate a whole part of the separation of powers. I do 
not think the people of this country really want that.
  Mr. HATCH. That is true in every provision in the Constitution. The 
courts have the right of judicial review if they want to exercise it. 
If we take that position, we would have to exclude them from everything 
in the Constitution that we do not want them to be involved in. The 
fact is that the courts have been scrupulous, for the most part--other 
than in Jenkins--in these areas. Jenkins does not apply because it is a 
14th amendment case. But even then it is held in disrepute by most 
scholars because it went too far. Still it was not on point, nor can it 
be used on point.
  If we are going to have runaway courts, it will not make any 
difference what we write into this amendment. The fact is that we have 
to have some faith in the courts that they are going to live within the 
constraints that the Constitution allows for. In this particular case 
we have article III, which allows us to restrain or restrict the 
jurisdiction of the courts, which I propose we can do in implementing 
legislation. And we have section 6 here of the amendment, which tells 
us we have to implement this and enforce this legislation.
  So all I am saying is that I am not sure we are arguing differently. 
I am concerned, just like my friend from Georgia is. But I think we can 
resolve 
[[Page S3046]]  it by working together to get it resolved without 
scuttling the whole effort that has now taken almost 4 solid weeks on 
the floor.
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend that I thank him for listening, and I 
thank him for his concern and leadership. I assure him that until the 
final vote, I will continue to listen to him and try to work with him. 
It is my hope, though, that there would be some revisiting going on 
between the people who are saying they could not accept this amendment 
and the Senator from Utah, because the people I talked to on the House 
side, including Republican and Democratic leadership--not all of them, 
but a number--who are leading the way on this amendment, indicate to me 
this kind of provision would be acceptable and even welcomed by them.
  Mr. HATCH. Some feel that way, and others do not. That is one of the 
problems I have.
  Mr. NUNN. There is a group of those who want the judiciary to 
basically get involved in these decisions.
  Mr. HATCH. Those who want to defeat the amendment--there are still 
some of those, and we have found in the process that there are some of 
those who even voted for it in the past but who now would like to see 
it defeated.
  Mr. NUNN. I am not one of those.
  Mr. HATCH. I am not suggesting that.
  Mr. NUNN. I would like to say that.
  Mr. HATCH. I hope it is not true. I am counting the Senator is not.
  The fact is that is the kind of problem we have been faced with. All 
I can say is I am trying to do the best I can as one inferior mortal, 
to try to bring this thing to fruition and try to do the best I can to 
get us to a point where we really have the chance to do something about 
our national debt. To me this is our only chance, and I do not think I 
am standing here alone on that. Even the Senator from Georgia has 
acknowledged that we need something like this to do it. It is just he 
wishes he could write this into it.
  Mr. NUNN. I wish we did not need it, but we do, I am afraid.
  Mr. HATCH. I thank my friend from Georgia, and we will try to bring 
more light to this subject as the week goes on.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, in my remarks yesterday I continued 
the examination of our experience since the advent of contemporary 
economics in moderating the business cycle and substantially resolving 
the crisess of capitalism which in the century before World War II was 
widely seen as implacable and unresolvable. The business cycle of the 
industrial age with its extraordinary alterations of boom and bust was 
a new experience for mankind. Many concluded it was an unacceptable 
experience--that capitalism had to go; that private ownership had to 
go. Then a learning process took place and the problem has moderated to 
the point when it can be said within reason to have been resolved.
  The swings that we experienced would be near-to-unbelievable today; 
certainly unacceptable.
  In 1906, output increased by 11.6 percent, to be followed 2 years 
later by a decline of 8.2 percent in 1908, and an increase of 16.6 
percent in 1909.
  In 1918, output increased by 12.3 percent to be followed by 3 years 
of negative growth including a drop in output of 8.7 percent in 1921.
  Then came the Great Depression. After increasing by 6.7 percent in 
1929, output fell by 9.9 percent in 1930, another 7.7 percent in 1931, 
and then a further decline of an incredible 14.8 percent in 1932.
  After World War II all this changed, following a brief adjustment 
period, as we converted from a war-time to peace-time economy. Since 
then the largest reduction in output was 2.2 percent in 1982.
  In my earlier remarks I attributed the steady growth in the post 
World War II period to ``a great achievement in social learning'' which 
we would put in jeopardy if we adopted the balanced budget amendment.
  We have learned to moderate the business cycle using the budget as a 
counter-cyclical tool. We used this knowledge in both Republicans and 
Democratic administrations. For example, George P. Shultz--one of the 
most admired public men of his generation--while OMB director in the 
Nixon administration put in place expansionary budget policies that 
stimulated the economy following the 1970-71 recession.
  In my remarks on February 10 and February 13, and again yesterday, I 
indicated that several economists, including staff working for Charles 
Shultze, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers in the Carter 
administration, have concluded that if we try to balance the budget in 
the middle of a recession that the unemployment rate could exceed 10 
percent--a level that was reached only momentarily, during the 1981-82 
recession, in all of the post-World II era.
  In today's Wall Street Journal, Al Hunt reports on a Treasury 
Department study which confirms this analysis for the 1990-92 
recession--a mild recession in which the unemployment rate rose from 
5.1 percent in June 1990 to 7.7 percent in June 1992. Analysts at the 
Treasury Department estimate that

       * * * if a balanced budget amendment had been in effect--
     and the cyclical increase in the deficit had been offset by 
     spending cuts and tax increases--the unemployment rate would 
     have peaked somewhere in the range of 8.3 to 9.4 percent.
       The implication of this analysis is that employment would 
     have been about 1.5 million lower in mid-1992 * * * if a 
     balanced budget amendment had been in effect.

  Clearly, if the recession had been deeper--in the 1979-82 period the 
unemployment rate increased from 5.6 to 10.8 percent--or if the 
unemployment rate at the beginning of the recession had been higher--
the unemployment rate last month was 5.7 percent--then the unemployment 
rate would have increased to more than 10 percent if a balanced budget 
amendment had been in effect.
  The Treasury Department study also analyzed the effects of the 
balanced budget amendment on the unemployment rate of each State. Even 
in the mild recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate could reach 
double digits in the following States, many of which are large 
industrial States:
  Alaska, 10.6 percent;
  California, 12.1 percent;
  Florida, 10.4 percent;
  Massachusetts, 10.9 percent;
  Michigan, 10.0 percent;
  New Jersey, 11.8 percent;
  My own state of New York, 11.4 percent;
  Rhode Island, 10.6 percent;
  West Virginia, 13.5 percent.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the 
Treasury Department study entitled ``The Balanced Budget Amendment and 
the Economy'' be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1)
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, and what is our reaction to the 
potential economic impact of the balanced budget amendment? According 
to Louis Uchitelle of the New York Times,

       Such estimates of the potential impact are not emphasized 
     very much, however, in the debate over the balanced budget 
     amendment. So far, the battle has focused on its value as a 
     tool to shrink government or to discipline spending. But if 
     the amendment is enacted, the side effect would be huge: a 
     system that has softened recessions since the 1930's would be 
     dismantled.

  Let me repeat part of this observation: ``if the amendment is 
enacted, the side effect would be huge: a system that has softened 
recessions since the 1930's would be dismantled.''
  To put it simply, if ratified, the balanced budget amendment would 
substitute budget policies that magnify the business cycle for policies 
that have dampened cycles in the post World War II period. In the pre-
World War II period the Federal budget, except for war years, was about 
2-3 percent of the GDP and had very little influence on macro-economic 
activity. After World War II, the Federal budget exceeds 10 percent of 
GDP and becomes an important instrument for stablizing the economy.
  The transformation is clearly discernible from this chart. After 
World War II, automatic stabilizers--which go into effect long before 
the National Bureau of of Economic Research has made a determination 
that we are in or have had a recession--and discretionary fiscal policy 
hugely moderate the business cycle.
  [[Page S3047]] Up until now the Federal budget in the post-World War 
II period has cushioned the effects of a recession. In this chart we 
have seen the result--only a few tiny declines. But now, if we tried to 
balance the budget in a recession, we would amplify the shocks and 
return the economy to the panics and depressions of the pre-World War 
II period shown on the chart.
  What happens if we undo all that we have learned over the past 60 
years? Joseph Stiglitz, a member of the President's Council of Economic 
Advisers, observes, in his comments to New York Times reporter Louis 
Uchitelle, that ``The Government would become, almost inevitably, a 
destabilizer of the economy rather than a stabilizer.''
  The Treasury study, referred to earlier in my remarks, concludes with 
a theme that I have emphasized over the past few weeks on the floor of 
the Senate, as I have reviewed the history of fiscal policy over the 
past 40 years.
  On February 8 I stated:
       * * * I make the point that there is nothing inherent in 
     American democracy that suggests we amend our basic and 
     abiding law to deal with the fugitive tendencies of a given 
     moment. I rise today to provide documentation as to how a 
     series of one-time events of the 1980's led to our present 
     fiscal disorders, even as events in the 1990's point to a way 
     out of them.

  Similarly the Treasury study concludes:
       Large deficits in the recent past have led many to believe 
     that a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution is the 
     only way to ensure fiscal discipline. The large deficits of 
     the 1930's and early 1990's, however, are an exception to the 
     general pattern since World War II * * *.
       The relatively small deficits prior to the 1980's and the 
     experience of the past two years shows that fiscal discipline 
     does not require such drastic action as amending the 
     Constitution and the severe economic consequences that would 
     result.

  The choices before us are best summed up by William Hoagland, the 
respected Republican staff director of the Senate Budget Committee. In 
the New York Times article by Mr. Uchitelle Mr. Hoagland is quoted as 
follows:

       There are risks associated with a balanced budget and I 
     don't think anyone should deny them * * * Nevertheless, the 
     debate on the floor has been dominated by what we must do to 
     get the budget in balance, not what the risks of a balanced 
     budget might be.

  Before we adopt this balanced budget amendment let's make sure we 
understand the risks. As I study the pre and post-World War II patterns 
of economic cycles, that are clearly evident on this chart, I conclude 
that the risks are too great.
                               Exhibit 1

 The Balanced Budget Amendment and the Economy: How a Balanced Budget 
        Amendment Would Have Worsened the Recession of 1990-1992


                              Introduction

       So far the debate over a balanced budget amendment has been 
     primarily a political debate. Proponents of ``cutting'' have 
     squared off against proponents of ``spending.'' The one thing 
     that has been oddly lacking is a straightforward discussion 
     of how a balanced budget amendment might affect the economy. 
     Thus, this paper examines the possible consequences of a 
     balanced budget amendment on jobs, on incomes, and on the 
     long-term standards of living of the American people.
       Simply put, a balanced budget amendment could cause 
     significant harm to the economy. The balanced budget 
     amendment currently being considered by Congress would 
     require the federal budget to be balanced by a date certain. 
     This requirement could harm the American economy and American 
     workers in two basic ways. First, the economy may have 
     trouble handling the elimination of the deficit too fast--by 
     cutting spending and raising taxes by about $1.2 trillion 
     between now and 2002 ($1.6 trillion if tax cuts proposed in 
     the Contract With America are adopted). Perhaps more 
     importantly, requiring a balanced budget in every year, 
     regardless of the economic situation, would hamper the 
     ability of the federal government to lessen the impact of 
     recessions.


                         Danger to the Economy

       A balanced budget amendment would make economic recessions 
     more severe than they otherwise would be. Currently the 
     federal budget helps to lessen the impact of recessions 
     through ``automatic stabilizers.'' These automatic 
     stabilizers allow spending to increase and revenue to fall 
     during times of economic hardship. For example, spending on 
     federal government programs like unemployment compensation 
     and food stamps automatically increase as the economy goes 
     into recession because more people become eligible for the 
     programs. In addition, as people earn less money as a result 
     of a recession, they pay less in taxes. While these changes 
     in spending and taxes increase the deficit, they serve to 
     reduce the damage done by recessions to the American economy 
     and American families.
       A balanced budget amendment would force the government to 
     raise taxes and cut spending in recessions--at just the 
     moment that raising taxes and cutting spending will do the 
     most harm to the economy and aggravate the recession.
       How do automatic stabilizers work? On average, every one 
     dollar drop in production and incomes as the economy enters a 
     recession generates a twenty-seven cent increase in the 
     deficit, as tax revenues fall and spending on programs rises.
       Thus, a one dollar fall in incomes and spending becomes a 
     fall of only 73 cents to the economy as a whole. Shocks to 
     total demand and spending would therefore be more than one-
     third larger if the federal budget were forced to be in year-
     by-year balance as the economy goes through business cycles.
       The principal benefit of the automatic stabilizers is that 
     they are automatic and take effect immediately. We lack the 
     advance notice of a recession for either Congress or the 
     Federal Reserve to react effectively. For example, as of 
     early 1991, the Federal Reserve concluded that it had adopted 
     appropriate anti-recessionary policies and expected a 
     recovery by mid-1992. It did not anticipate the further rise 
     in unemployment.
       Thus, while the Federal Reserve bears an important part of 
     the responsibility for managing the business cycle, its 
     ability to ``fine tune'' the economy is limited. Given the 
     lags with which its policies affect the economy, the Federal 
     Reserve would have difficulty compensating for the 
     elimination of automatic stabilizers during recessions and 
     the shock to the economy of reducing the deficit too fast. 
     Even with the most effective Federal Reserve policy, a 
     balanced budget amendment would amplify recessions and harm 
     the economy.


                         the recession of 1992

       To illustrate how the business cycle would change under an 
     amendment, consider the recession of 1990-1992. During this 
     recession, the unemployment rate rose from 5.1 percent in 
     June of 1990 to 7.7 percent in June of 1992. The automatic 
     stabilizers in the federal budget injected roughly $87 
     billion into the economy in 1992 relative to 1990. This 
     cyclical increase in the deficit helped to mitigate the 
     impact of the recession, making the unemployment rate between 
     0.7 and 1.7 percentage points lower in June of 1992 than it 
     otherwise would have been. Thus, if a balanced budget 
     amendment had been in effect--and the cyclical increase in 
     the deficit had been offset by spending cuts and tax 
     increases--the unemployment rate would have peaked somewhere 
     in the range of 8.3 to 9.4 percent.
       The implication of this analysis is that employment would 
     have been about 1.5 million lower in mid-1992--as shown in 
     Chart A--if a balanced budget amendment had been in effect.


                               conclusion

       Large deficits in the recent past have led many to believe 
     that a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution is the 
     only way to ensure fiscal discipline. The large deficits of 
     the 1980s and early 1990s, however, are an exception to the 
     general pattern since World War II.
       Further, while the deficit as a share of the Gross Domestic 
     Product (GDP) did rise to high levels during the 1980s, this 
     ratio is now on a downward trend. The deficit as a share of 
     GDP, which was 4.9 percent in 1992, is currently projected to 
     steadily decline to 1.6 percent of GDP in 2005. The 
     Administration and Congress have achieved this through 
     difficult decisions to reduce spending and to increase 
     revenues (see chart B).
       For example, before this Administration took office, the 
     deficit was projected to be $400 billion in 1998--current 
     projections show that this has been cut by more than half, to 
     $194 billion. In fact, the federal budget is currently in 
     primary surplus--revenues exceed the federal government's 
     spending on all federal programs combined. The deficit is due 
     solely to the cost of paying interest on the debt accumulated 
     largely during the high deficits of the 1980s--not because we 
     are overspending today (see Chart C).
       The relatively small deficits prior to the 1980s and the 
     experience of the past two years shows that fiscal discipline 
     does not require such drastic action as amending the 
     Constitution and the severe economic consequences that would 
     result.
 the impact on alabama jobs if a balanced budget amendment had been in 
                place during the recession of 1990-1992

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Alabama:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Alabama rose from 6.7 percent to a peak of 7.5 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Alabama would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 7.7 and 8.1 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 3,300 to 10,000 in Alabama 
     in the recession of 1990-1992.


                       the impact on alaska jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Alaska:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Alaska rose from 6.9 percent to a peak of 9.1 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Alaska 
     [[Page S3048]] would have peaked at a higher level: between 
     9.6 and 10.6 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 1,300 to 4,000 in Alaska 
     in the recession of 1990-1992.


                       the impact on arizona jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Arizona:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Arizona rose from 5.5 percent to a peak of 7.7 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Arizona would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 8.2 and 9.2 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 8,500 to 25,500 in Arizona 
     in the recession of 1990-1992.


                      the impact on arkansas jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Arkansas:
       During the recession of 1990-1992 the unemployment rate in 
     Arkansas rose from 6.8 percent to a peak of 7.3 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Arkansas would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 7.5 and 7.8 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 1,600 to 4,800 in Arkansas 
     in the recession of 1990-1992.


                     the impact on california jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and California:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     California rose from 5.3 percent to a peak of 9.3 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in California would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 10.2 and 12.1 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 129,400 to 388,100 in 
     California in the recession of 1990-1992.
                      THE IMPACT ON COLORADO JOBS

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Colorado:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Colorado rose from 5.0 percent to a peak of 6.2 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Colorado would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 6.5 and 7.0 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 4,700 to 14,200 in 
     Colorado in the recession of 1990-1992.


                     THE IMPACT ON CONNECTICUT JOBS

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Connecticut:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Connecticut rose from 5.0 percent to a peak of 7.7 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Connecticut would have peaked at a 
     higher level: between 8.3 and 9.6 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 10,500 to 31,400 in 
     Connecticut in the recession of 1990-1992.


                      THE IMPACT ON DELAWARE JOBS

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Delaware:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Delaware rose from 4.2 percent to a peak of 5.6 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Delaware would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 5.9 and 6.6 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 1,100 to 3,300 in Delaware 
     in the recession of 1990-1992.


                       THE IMPACT ON FLORIDA JOBS

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Florida:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Florida rose from 5.7 percent to a peak of 8.5 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Florida would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 9.1 and 10.4 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 38,800 to 116,500 in 
     Florida in the recession of 1990-1992.


                       THE IMPACT ON GEORGIA JOBS

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Georgia:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Georgia rose from 5.4 percent to a peak of 7.0 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Georgia would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 7.4 and 8.1 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 11,500 to 34,400 in 
     Georgia in the recession of 1990-1992.
                       The Impact on Hawaii jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Hawaii:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Hawaii rose from 2.7 percent to a peak of 4.7 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Hawaii would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 5.2 and 6.1 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 2,500 to 7,600 in Hawaii 
     in the recession of 1990-1992.


                        The Impact on Idaho jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Idaho:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Idaho remained stable at 6.4 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Idaho would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 6.6 and 6.9 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 700 to 2,200 in Idaho in 
     the recession of 1990-1992.


                      The Impact on Illinois jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Illinois:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Illinois rose from 6.5 percent to a peak of 8.4 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Illinois would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 8.8 and 9.7 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 24,200 to 72,200 in 
     Illinois in the recession of 1990-1992.


                       The Impact on Indiana jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Indiana:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Indiana rose from 5.1 percent to a peak of 6.8 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Indiana would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 7.2 and 8.0 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 10,300 to 31,000 in 
     Indiana in the recession of 1990-1992.


                        The Impact on Iowa jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Iowa:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Iowa rose from 4.2 percent to a peak of 4.7 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Iowa would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 4.9 and 5.2 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 200 to 600 in Iowa in the 
     recession of 1990-1992.
                       the impact on kansas jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Kansas:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Kansas fell--from 4.5 percent to 3.9 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Kansas at the time of highest nationwide 
     unemployment would have been between 4.1 and 4.4 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 1,900 to 5,600 in Kansas 
     in the recession of 1990-1992.


                      the impact on kentucky jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Kentucky:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Kentucky rose from 5.7 percent to a peak of 7.0 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Kentucky would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 7.3 and 7.9 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 4,900 to 14,700 in 
     Kentucky in the recession of 1990-1992.


                      the impact on louisiana jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Louisiana:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Louisiana rose from 6.2 percent to a peak of 7.3 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Louisiana would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 7.6 and 8.2 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 5,400 to 16,200 in 
     Louisiana in the recession of 1990-1992.


                        the impact on maine jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Maine:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Maine rose from 5.0 percent to a peak of 6.7 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Maine would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 7.1 and 7.9 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 2,400 to 7,100 in Maine in 
     the recession of 1990-1992.


                      the impact on maryland jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Maryland:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Maryland rose from 4.7 percent to a peak of 6.6 percent.
       [[Page S3049]] Had the balanced budget amendment been in 
     effect, the unemployment rate in Maryland would have peaked 
     at a higher level: between 7.0 and 9.9 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 11,000 to 32,900 in 
     Maryland in the recession of 1990-1992.


                    the impact on massachusetts jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Massachusetts:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Massachusetts rose from 6.2 percent to a peak of 9.0 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Massachusetts would have peaked at a 
     higher level: between 9.6 and 10.9 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 18,700 to 56,100 in 
     Massachusetts in the recession of 1990-1992.
                      the impact on michigan jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Michigan:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Michigan rose from 7.3 percent to a peak of 8.9 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Michigan would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 9.3 and 10.0 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 15,500 to 46,600 in 
     Michigan in the recession of 1990-1992.


                      the impact on minnesota jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Minnesota:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Minnesota rose from 4.9 percent to a peak of 5.2 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Minnesota would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 5.4 and 5.7 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 3,400 to 10,200 in 
     Minnesota in the recession of 1990-1992.


                     the impact on mississippi jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Mississippi:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Mississippi rose from 7.3 percent to a peak of 8.6 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Mississippi would have peaked at a 
     higher level: between 8.9 and 9.5 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 3,300 to 9,800 in 
     Mississippi in the recession of 1990-1992.


                      the impact on missouri jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Missouri:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Missouri was steady at 5.7 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Missouri would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 5.9 and 6.2 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 3,800 to 11,300 in 
     Missouri in the recession of 1990-1992.


                       the impact on montana jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Montana:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Montana rose from 5.6 percent to a peak of 6.7 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Montana would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 7.0 and 7.5 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 1,000 to 3,000 in Montana 
     in the recession of 1990-1992.


                      the impact on nebraska jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Nebraska:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Nebraska rose from 2.1 percent to a peak of 3.1 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Nebraska would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 3.3 and 3.8 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 1,900 to 5,600 in Nebraska 
     in the recession of 1990-1992.
                       the impact on nevada jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Nevada:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Nevada rose from 4.8 percent to a peak of 6.6 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Nevada would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 7.0 and 7.8 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 2,800 to 8,300 in Nevada 
     in the recession of 1990-1992.


                    the impact on new hampshire jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and New Hampshire:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     New Hampshire rose from 5.7 percent to a peak of 7.6 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in New Hampshire would have peaked at a 
     higher level: between 8.0 and 8.9 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 2,500 to 7,400 in New 
     Hampshire in the recession of 1990-1992.


                     the impact on new jersey jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and New Jersey:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     New Jersey rose from 4.9 percent to a peak of 9.0 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in New Jersey would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 9.9 and 11.8 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 34,400 to 103,100 in New 
     Jersey in the recession of 1990-1992.


                     the impact on new mexico jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and New Mexico:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     New Mexico rose from 6.2 percent to a peak of 6.9 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in New Mexico would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 7.1 and 7.4 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 1,100 to 3,300 in New 
     Mexico in the recession of 1990-1992.


                      the impact on new york jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and New York:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     New York rose from 5.3 percent to a peak of 8.9 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in New York would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 9.7 and 11.4 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 65,900 to 197,600 in New 
     York in the recession of 1990-1992.


                   the impact on north carolina jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and North Carolina:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     North Carolina rose from 4.4 percent to a peak of 6.4 
     percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in North Carolina would have peaked at a 
     higher level: between 6.9 and 7.8 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 15,400 to 46,200 in North 
     Carolina in the recession of 1990-1992.
                    the impact on north dakota jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and North Dakota:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     North Dakota rose from 3.9 percent to a peak of 4.8 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in North Dakota would have peaked at a 
     higher level: between 5.0 and 5.4 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 600 to 1,900 in North 
     Dakota in the recession of 1990-1992.


                        the impact on ohio jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Ohio:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Ohio rose from 5.4 percent to a peak of 7.7 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Ohio would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 8.2 and 9.3 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 26,800 to 80,300 in Ohio 
     in the recession of 1990-1992.


                      the impact on Oklahoma jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Oklahoma:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Oklahoma was steady at 5.4 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Oklahoma would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 5.7 and 6.0 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 2,100 to 6,400 in Oklahoma 
     in the recession of 1990-1992.


                       the impact on oregon jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Oregon:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Oregon rose from 5.6 percent to a peak of 7.4 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Oregon would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 7.8 and 8.6 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 5,900 to 17,700 in Oregon 
     in the recession of 1990-1992.


                    the impact on pennsylvania jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Pennsylvania:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Pennsylvania rose from 5.0 percent to a peak of 7.7 percent.
       [[Page S3050]] Had the balanced budget amendment been in 
     effect, the unemployment rate in Pennsylvania would have 
     peaked at a higher level: between 8.3 and 9.6 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 33,700 to 101,200 in 
     Pennsylvania in the recession of 1990-1992.


                    the impact on rhode island jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Rhode Island:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Rhode Island rose from 7.0 percent to a peak of 9.1 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Rhode Island would have peaked at a 
     higher level: between 9.6 and 10.6 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 2,300 to 6,900 in Rhode 
     Island in the recession of 1990-1992.
                   the impact on south carolina jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and South Carolina:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     South Carolina rose from 4.7 percent to a peak of 6.1 
     percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in South Carolina would have peaked at a 
     higher level: between 6.4 and 7.1 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 5,400 to 16,300 in South 
     Carolina in the recession of 1990-1992.


                    the impact on south dakota jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and South Dakota:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     South Dakota fell--from 3.8 percent to 3.1 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in South Dakota would have been higher in 
     June 1992: between 3.3 and 3.6 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 500 to 1,500 in South 
     Dakota in the recession of 1990-1992.


                      the impact on tennessee jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Tennessee:
       During the recession of 1990-1992. the unemployment rate in 
     Tennessee rose from 5.1 percent to a peak of 6.4 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Tennessee would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 6.7 and 7.3 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 6,900 to 20,600 in 
     Tennessee in the recession of 1990-1992.


                        the impact on texas jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Texas:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Texas rose from 6.2 percent to a peak of 7.8 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Texas would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 8.2 and 8.9 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 30,700 to 92,200 in Texas 
     in the recession of 1990-1992.


                        the impact on utah jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Utah:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Utah rose from 4.3 percent to a peak of 5.0 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Utah would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 5.2 and 5.5 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 1,300 to 3,900 in Utah in 
     the recession of 1990-1992.


                       the impact on vermont jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Vermont:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Vermont rose from 5.0 percent to a peak of 6.9 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Vermont would have peaked at a higher 
     level: between 7.3 and 8.2 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 1,300 to 3,800 in Vermont 
     in the recession of 1990-1992.
                      the impact on virginia jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Virginia:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Virginia rose from 4.3 percent to a peak of 6.4 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Virginia would have peaked at a higher 
     level between 6.9 and 7.9 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 15,400 to 46,200 in 
     Virginia in the recession of 1990-1992.


                     the impact on washington jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Washington:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Washington rose from 4.7 percent to a peak of 7.4 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Washington would have peaked at a higher 
     level between 8.0 and 9.3 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 15,200 to 45,700 in 
     Washington in the recession of 1990-1992.


                    the impact on west virginia jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and West Virginia:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     West Virginia rose from 8.1 percent to a peak of 11.3 
     percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in West Virginia would have peaked at a 
     higher level between 12.0 and 13.5 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 5,000 to 15,000 in West 
     Virginia in the recession of 1990-1992.


                      the impact on wisconsin jobs

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Wisconsin:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Wisconsin rose from 4.3 percent to a peak of 5.2 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Wisconsin would have peaked at a higher 
     level between 5.4 and 5.8 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 5,300 to 15,800 in 
     Wisconsin in the recession of 1990-1992.
 the impact of wyoming jobs if a balanced budget amendment had been in 
                place during the recession of 1990-1992

       The Balanced Budget Amendment and Wyoming:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     Wyoming rose from 5.4 percent to a peak of 5.8 percent.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate in Wyoming would have peaked at higher 
     level between 6.0 and 6.3 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to an 
     additional rise in unemployment of 300 to 1,000 in Wyoming in 
     the recession of 1990-1992.
       The Balanced Budget Amendment and the United States:
       During the recession of 1990-1992, the unemployment rate in 
     the United States rose from 5.1 percent to a peak of 7.7 
     percent in June of 1992.
       Had the balanced budget amendment been in effect, the 
     unemployment rate would have peaked at a higher level: in the 
     range of 8.3 to 9.4 percent.
       Thus the balanced budget amendment would have led to a rise 
     in nationwide unemployment of 750,000 to 2.2 million in the 
     recession of 1990-1992.
       Why Does a Balanced Budget Amendment Raise Unemployment?
       Under current law, spending on federal government programs 
     like unemployment compensation and food stamps automatically 
     increases as the economy goes into recession. In addition, as 
     people earn less money as a result of a recession they pay 
     lower taxes. These changes in spending and taxes affect the 
     federal deficit. The increases in the federal deficit during 
     recessions are ``automatic stabilizers'' that reduce the 
     damage done by recessions to the American economy and 
     American workers.
       A balanced budget amendment would force the government to 
     raise taxes and cut spending in recessions--at just the 
     moment that raising taxes and cutting spending will do most 
     harm to the economy, and aggravate the recession.


                        summary of methodology.

       From the cycle peak in June 1990 to the unemployment rate 
     peak in June 1992, the unemployment rate rose by 2.6 
     percentage points.
       Using a (low estimate of the) Okun's Law coefficient of 2, 
     and an automatic stabilizer magnitude (estimated over 1953-
     1994) of 0.27, the associated cyclical swing in the deficit 
     is some 1.4 percentage points of GDP.
       In the absence of automatic stabilizers the Keynesian 
     multiplier would be higher than we usually assume. Estimate 
     the multiplier in the absence of automatic stabilizers at 
     1.7, as opposed to 1.2 in the presence of automatic 
     stabilizers.
       Thus the downward shock to exogenous demand of 1.4 percent 
     of GDP administered by the tax increases and spending cuts 
     necessary to offset the cyclical component of the deficit 
     would have depressed GDP by some 2.4 percent.
       Using an Okun's law coefficient of 2, the central scenario 
     estimate of the extra rise in unemployment in the absence of 
     automatic stabilizers is 1.2 percentage points.
       Obtain a favorable scenario by assuming that Federal 
     Reserve action manages to offset half of the increase in the 
     size of the recession.
       Obtain an unfavorable scenario by assuming that the size of 
     automatic stabilizers has trended upward in the post-WWII 
     period, and using a higher Okun's law coefficient of 2.5.
       Distribute the rise in the unemployment rate across states 
     proportionately to their 1990-1992 recession-driven increase 
     in unemployment.
                explanation of vote on amendment no. 306

  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I wanted to take a moment to explain my 
position for the record on the vote 
[[Page S3051]]  on the Rockefeller amendment. I voted to table Senator 
John Rockefeller's amendment on the balanced budget amendment. Senators 
on the other side of the aisle would have you believe that this 
Congress is ready and willing to break a sacred obligation to care for 
our veterans and their survivors. Binding future Congresses in how we 
manage veterans' programs is counterproductive micromanagement which 
could very well harm the best interests of veterans and has no place in 
a constitutional amendment. No one should interpret my vote as waning 
in my personal commitment to veterans and their families. I have always 
worked hard to properly fund veterans' programs and I will personally 
do everything I can to ensure veterans benefits are fully funded in the 
future. The truth of the matter is that this country has a moral 
obligation to those who have paid dearly through their pain and 
suffering in defense of the freedoms that all Americans enjoy today and 
we must not and will not abdicate our responsibilities.
     protecting federal law enforcement dollars--amendment no. 301
  Mrs. MURRAY. Madam President, I rise in support of Senator Byrd's 
amendment to protect Federal outlays for law enforcement, and the 
reduction and prevention of crime.
  I am proud of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act we 
passed last year. It is a comprehensive approach to solving our 
Nation's crime problem. It includes: funds for 100,000 new police 
officers across the Nation; a ban on the manufacture, sale, and future 
possession of 19 semiautomatic assault weapons; and increased penalties 
for Federal violent crimes and sex crimes.
  However, passing tougher laws and putting more police on our streets 
will not stop the violence that is ravaging our Nation. These measures, 
while effective, are only part of the larger solution. We also must 
focus on preventive measures if we hope to find permanent solutions to 
the epidemic of violence.
  Last year's crime bill does just that. The legislation includes: the 
Violence Against Women Act, which authorizes funding for rape education 
and community prevention programs, battered women's shelters, and a 
national family violence hotline.
  The crime bill also authorizes local grants for education, after-
school safe haven programs, and other initiatives aimed at reducing 
gang membership among young people. The bill provides for grants to 
localities for crime prevention measures, including: police 
partnerships for children, supervised child visitation centers, and 
partnerships between senior citizens and police.
  In addition, the legislation provides grants to law enforcement to 
create partnerships with child and family support agencies to fight 
crimes committed against children.
  Madam President, I believe in the value and necessity of these vital 
programs. As a woman, a mother, and a former teacher I want to make 
sure we let our children know we care about them, they can trust us to 
do the right thing, and we will not turn our backs on them.
  Although I am pleased that Republican proposals to redirect these 
important prevention dollars do not target the Violence Against Women 
Act, I am disturbed about the implications for programs aimed at our 
Nation's youth.
  Our children are afraid, and sadly, they have every reason to be. 
Every day, 5,703 teenagers are victims of violent crimes. Every 2 
hours, a child is murdered. Every 5 seconds of the schoolday, a student 
drops out of public school.
  We, as adults, have a responsibility to care for our children, to 
teach them to value themselves and their communities, and not to give 
up on them. It is time for us as adults to address the issue of 
violence honestly. Violence is a symptom of deeper problems. Lets not 
restrict our attention to punishing criminals and building more 
prisons, while ignoring the causes of violence among our children.
  I have talked with young people throughout the State of Washington. 
My overwhelming conclusion is that a lot of the youth on our streets 
have been victims themselves--victims of abusive adults, victims of our 
overburdened school system, and victims of a juvenile justice system 
that cannot respond to their real needs. These disaffected kids 
invariably have kids of their own, and the cycle of violence begins 
again. Prevention and education are the keys to breaking this dangerous 
pattern of violence.
  Madam President, the dollars allocated to fund the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 are extremely important. I 
applaud Senator Byrd's effort to safeguard these crime fighting 
dollars.
                      Unanimous-Consent Agreements

  Mr. HATCH. I ask unanimous consent that the vote occur in relation to 
the pending amendment numbered 267 and the Bumpers motion and 
amendments numbered 299 and 300 on Tuesday, February 28, in the stacked 
sequence to begin at 2:15 p.m.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HATCH. I ask unanimous consent that at 11:30 a.m. on Tuesday, 
February 28, Senator Hatch be recognized to control the next 30 minutes 
for debate only.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HATCH. I ask unanimous consent that at 12 noon the next 30 
minutes be under the control of Senator Byrd for debate only.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Hearing no objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HATCH. I further ask that following the conclusion of the stacked 
votes on Tuesday, February 28, Senator Byrd be recognized for up to 15 
minutes for debate only, to be followed by 15 minutes under the control 
of Senator Hatch for debate only, to be followed by 15 minutes under 
the control of Senator Daschle for debate only, with the last 15 
minutes under the control of Senator Dole to close the debate prior to 
the final vote on House Joint Resolution 1.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  

                          ____________________