[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 33 (Wednesday, February 22, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2977-S2978]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                      U.S. POLICY VIS-A-VIS SERBIA

 Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I would like to express my 
strong disapproval at the latest developments in the administration's 
approach to Bosnia. The national press reported last week the 
administration's decision to concur with a Contact Group proposal to 
offer Serbia a complete lifting of U.N. sanctions if it would recognize 
the independence of Croatia and Bosnia and cut off arms to rebel 
Serbian armies in both countries.
  This might have been a reasonable proposal if, as the New York Times 
put it, ``Serbia's President, Slobodan Milosevic, had a record of 
honoring his commitments, or if the five-power group had a record of 
insisting on compliance with its deals. Neither is true.''
  This latest step in United States compliance with the Contact Group's 
policy of appeasement followed the decision just 1 month ago to extend 
for another 100 days a partial easing of U.N. sanctions on Serbia with 
the understanding that it would deny assistance to rebel Serbs in both 
Croatia and Bosnia. During the previous 100-day, sanctions-easing 
period last fall, SAM 6 missiles mysteriously appeared at Serbian 
positions in Bosnia and regular soldiers of the Serbian army 
participated in the Serb attack on Bihac. But since there was no proof 
of Serbian complicity, the sanctions easing was extended.
  Two weeks ago, U.N. monitors were temporarily barred from a Serbian 
airfield during a time when U.N. troops in northern Bosnia observed 
helicopters travel from Serbia to Bosnian Serb positions in Bosnia. 
Once again, Serbia created a fact--continued assistance to the Bosnian 
Serbs--for which there was no documentary proof.
  Now it appears from press reports that Milosevic has rejected this 
latest Contact Group offer, just as the Serbs have refused earlier 
offers--in which the United States has concurred--to effectively 
legitimize Serbian gains from aggression in exchange for promises to 
cease fighting.
  But even if Milosevic were to agree, there is no reason to believe 
that he would honor a new pledge to cease supporting Serbian aggression 
in Bosnia now any more than he has any previous similar promise. And 
even if Milosevic were to accept the Contact Group offer, this would 
not necessarily persuade the Croatian or Bosnian Serbs to accept the 
peace plans. Both are well supplied at the moment. They need only wait 
for a few months until Milosevic finds a way to renew his support, as 
he has always done.
  The Contact Group's offer to Milosevic was objectionable from the 
[[Page S2978]] outset because it was immoral. It was an expression of 
weakness and indecision on the part of five of the strongest and most 
principled nations on Earth. It remains wrong on the grounds of realism 
and practicality, not just because Milosevic rejected it, but because 
it would not work even if he changed his mind.
  The further we go down the path of appeasement in the Balkans, the 
more obvious it becomes that not only does this policy offer no hope of 
resolving the Bosnian tragedy, it demeans the role of the United States 
in the world. I am more convinced than ever that we must abandon the 
policy of weakness and appeasement and return to the lift-and-strike 
policy President Clinton brought into the Oval Office in 1993.


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