[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 31 (Thursday, February 16, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2892-S2893]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                         ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

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             EROSION OF U.S. ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITY

 Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, the Air Force and Navy are quietly 
scrapping our electronic warfare [EW] squadrons. At best, the Services 
are making penny wise and pound foolish decisions. At worst, the Air 
Force and Navy are attempting to force Congress into funding an all-
stealthy tactical aviation fleet. Either way, America is on the verge 
of losing its decisive edge in EW.
  Reviewing the ``Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,'' one is struck by 
the crucial role EW played in achieving air superiority:

       The attacks on the Iraqi electronic order of battle [EOB] 
     affected every aspect of [the] air supremacy operation. 
     Coalition aircraft conducting air defense suppression 
     missions saturated Iraqi airspace with jammers, shooters, and 
     bombers. Iraqi defense that attempted to engage were 
     disrupted, and risked being destroyed. EF-111A's and EA-6B's 
     were used in stand-off and close-in orbits to jam early 
     warning, acquisition, and [Ground Control Intercept] GCI 
     radars. EC-130H Compass Call aircraft jammed radio 
     communications, data links, and navigation systems. F-4G's, 
     F-16's, EA-6B's, A-6E's, A-7E's, and F/A-18's used [High-
     Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles] HARMs to destroy acquisition, 
     GCI, and target tracking radars. Various aircraft dropped 
     bombs on air defense emplacements and control facilities. 
     [Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses] SEAD forces and bomb 
     droppers caused confusion, hesitation, and loss of 
     capability, which degraded Iraqi air defense capability.

  This confusion, hesitation, and loss of capability was directly 
responsible for the spectacular success of our air and ground 
campaigns. More importantly, air superiority was a key element in 
reducing Coalition losses in men and material. Yet, a mere 4 years 
since Desert Storm, our EW capability is rapidly wasting away for lack 
of funds.
  The most immediate dilemma facing Congress is the proposed 
termination of the EF-111A System Improvement Program (SIP). EF-111 
performance, pre-SIP, was described in glowing terms in the ``Conduct 
of the Persian Gulf War:''

       [EF-111As] were part of the initial surge of aircraft 
     across the Iraqi border the first night of the war, and 
     established orbits to escort strike packages into the H-3 and 
     Baghdad areas. They jammed EW, height finder, GCI, and 
     target-acquisition radars, and were effective in tricking the 
     enemy into opening fire at fake radar returns in areas where 
     there were no Coalition aircraft.

  It should be noted that only F-117's were cleared for Baghdad, a 
point that I will return to in a moment.
  The SIP will significantly enhance the effectiveness, reliability, 
and maintainability of the already proven EF-111. Unfortunately, the 
Air Force proposed, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
accepted, the termination of the SIP in fiscal year 1996 for budgetary 
reasons preparatory to retiring the aircraft in fiscal year 1997.
  To compensate for the loss of EW capability that will result from the 
termination of the SIP and retirement of the EF-111A, the Air Force has 
suggested a number of alternatives:
       [[Page S2893]] Navy EA-6B's can handle EW duties: Jointness 
     at its most cynical. The EA-6B Advanced Capability (ADVCAP) 
     upgrade was cancelled by the Navy in February 1994. The 
     future of Navy EW is in disarray, and it is likely that EA-6B 
     modernization will be limited to safety of flight 
     improvements until the retirement of the aircraft;
       Stealthy aircraft require less EW support: Perhaps, but, as 
     mentioned before, F-117's benefited from EW support in the 
     skies over Baghdad. Stealth is actually an EW force 
     multiplier, because the jamming power and techniques needed 
     to hide an aircraft with the radar cross section (RCS) of a 
     B-52 will be many times more effective hiding an aircraft 
     with the RCS of a sparrow; and,
       Jamming pods can replace stand-off jammers: This is, at 
     best, only a partial solution. Pods provide only self-
     protection, frequencies, power output, and techniques are 
     limited, man-in-the-loop responsiveness is lost, and aircraft 
     maneuverability, payload, speed, and range are reduced.

  The menu of options presented by the Air Force is hardly ideal, and, 
taken separately, or in some combination, represent a significant 
diminution of U.S. EW capability. Worse yet, the use of prior year EF-
111A SIP funds as a source for the supplemental by the House 
Appropriations Committee may foreclose our opportunity to debate the 
wisdom of the EF-111A SIP cancellation. If prior year EF-111A SIP funds 
are rescinded, the termination of the program will be irreversible.
  So what do we do? First, drop EF-111A SIP funds as a source for the 
supplemental. Second, pry loose the congressionally mandated Joint 
Tactical Electronic Warfare Study. Third, if the study says what I 
think it will, ensure that the fiscal year 1996 defense authorization 
and appropriations bills include funds to maintain and modernize the 
EF-111A, EA-6B, and F-4G (``Wild Weasel'') fleets.
  The alternative is to let the services have their way, and let 
America's EW advantage erode. This erosion will have profound 
implications for Congress. Without proper EW support, conventional 
aircraft are almost immediately obsolete. For Members vaporlocking over 
the cost of the F-22, it is worth considering that the 442 F-22's 
proposed will only fill out 4 of the 20 Fighter Wing Equivalents 
(FWE's) in the Bottom Up Review Force. That means one of two things: 
First, we buy 17 more FWE's worth of stealthy tactical aircraft, or 
second, we accept considerably higher losses among conventional 
aircraft in the next conflict. For Congress, an ugly choice.


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