[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 31 (Thursday, February 16, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2777-S2804]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            CALL OF THE ROLL

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the quorum call has been 
waived.
                          [[Page S2778]] VOTE

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate 
that debate on House Joint Resolution 1, the balanced budget amendment 
to the Constitution, shall be brought to a close? The yeas and nays are 
required.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Kansas [Mrs. Kassebaum] is 
necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
who desire to vote?
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 57, nays 42, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 74 Leg.]

                                YEAS--57

     Abraham
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brown
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Dole
     Domenici
     Faircloth
     Frist
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Kempthorne
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pressler
     Roth
     Santorum
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                                NAYS--42

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Harkin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Johnston
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nunn
     Pryor
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Wellstone

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Kassebaum
       
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 57, the nays are 
42. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn, not having 
voted in the affirmative, the motion is rejected.
  Under the previous order, the Senator from West Virginia is 
recognized to offer an amendment.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, it is my understanding 
that the Senator from Nevada [Mr. Bryan] wishes to speak for not to 
exceed 7 minutes. I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the 
distinguished Senator for that purpose, not to exceed 7 minutes, and 
that I retain my right to the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from Nevada is recognized for 7 minutes.
  Mr. BRYAN. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Bryan pertaining to the introduction of S. 429 
are located in today's Record under Statements on Introduced Bills and 
Joint Resolutions.)
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hutchison). The Senator from West 
Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I thank the Chair.
  May I take just a moment here to compliment the Republican Senators 
who have been sitting in the chair from the very beginning of this 
session. In the main, I think they have done very well. They have 
presided over the Senate with dignity, except in a few cases when there 
probably ought to be a little less talking up there at the desk because 
the cameras are often focused right on that desk. State legislators, 
professors, students, and the people at large expect this Senate to be 
the premier deliberative body in the world. It is not a State 
legislature. And I do not say that to cast any aspersions on State 
legislatures. I have been a member of both houses many years ago in 
West Virginia.
  Generally speaking, the presiding officers have been alert and have 
been paying attention to the debate, as they should.
  Madam President, the original Constitution and the amendments 
heretofore adopted serve two basic functions: One, they create a 
structure of government and establish three departments thereof: the 
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial, and they allocate the 
powers of government among the three branches of the Federal Government 
and between the two Houses of Congress.
  The Constitution also prohibits the States from taking certain 
actions, and all powers that are not delegated to the Congress by the 
Constitution shall be reserved to the States or the people.
  So this is a Constitutional system, with checks and balances and a 
separation of powers, thus establishing an equilibrium between and 
among the three departments--the Legislative, the Executive, and the 
Judicial.
  Two, the original Constitution and the amendments thereto, protect 
the most fundamental individual rights, such as life, liberty, and 
property; free speech; freedom of assembly; freedom of religion; 
freedom of the press; and equal justice under law.
  So the Framers wisely left the determination of fiscal policy to the 
elected representatives of the people. Deciding when or whether to 
balance the budget, and whether and when to risk a deficit, calls for a 
judgment of policy, the kind of political judgment left by the Founding 
Fathers to the majoritarian processes of representative democracy. The 
Constitution and the amendments thereto do not undertake to resolve 
questions of fiscal policy. And for 206 years, that Constitution has 
not been amended to include fiscal policy.
  Under the constitutional amendment that the Senate has been debating, 
such a judgment of fiscal policy, and when or whether to apply 
countercyclical measures would, to a considerable degree, be inhibited. 
Section 3 of the amendment, for example, would fetter and hamstring the 
President in the proper exercise of his powers.
  Let me read section 3 of the proposed amendment to the Constitution.
  I quote. This is section 3, from the constitutional amendment to 
balance the budget.

       Section 3. Prior to each fiscal year, the President shall 
     transmit to the Congress a proposed budget for the United 
     States Government for that fiscal year in which total outlays 
     do not exceed total receipts.

  I think it is important that we recognize that this amendment to the 
Constitution, by virtue of section 3, would, if adopted, hamper the 
President. It would fetter the President. It would hamstring the 
President in the proper exercise of his powers by requiring him to 
submit a balanced budget even though he may consider a deficit to be 
necessary as a countercyclical measure to combat a recession that may 
be already underway. Countercyclical stabilizers are rendered even more 
difficult in a period of economic decline by the requirement of a 
supermajority vote to waive the section 1 mandate for a balanced budget 
in every fiscal year. Such requirement for a supermajority can prove to 
be a very troubling recipe for gridlock.
  The amendment now being debated by the Senate provides that outlays 
in any given year shall not exceed receipts; that Congress may 
appropriate money in excess of anticipated revenues only by a three-
fifths vote of the full membership of both Houses, and not by lesser 
majorities; that Congress may enact revenue increases only by majority 
votes of the full membership of both Houses on rollcall votes, and not 
by lesser majorities.
  Let me state that again.
  The constitutional amendment that is before the Senate requires that 
Congress may enact revenue increases only by majority votes of the full 
membership of both Houses--of both Houses--on rollcall votes.
  In other words, in the Senate that would mean by no less than 51 
votes and in the House that would mean no less than 218 votes.
  The amendment also provides that Congress may raise the ceiling on 
the national debt, but only by a three-fifths vote of the full 
membership of both Houses, and not by lesser majorities.
  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was right when he warned that the 
Constitution ought not ``embody a particular economic theory.'' In 
keeping with that wisdom, the Framers remitted Federal fiscal policy, 
not to special supermajorities, but rather to the crucible of ordinary 
majoritarian democratic politics. Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, gives 
Congress the power to tax and spend for the common defense and general 
welfare, and to borrow money on the credit of the United States--all 
obviously by simple majorities.
  [[Page S2779]] So basic is the majoritarian premise of Article I of 
the United States Constitution that it is barely mentioned, except for 
the statement in Article I, Section 5, Clause 1, that ``a majority of 
each House shall constitute a quorum to do business.'' The 
contemporaneous history supports the majoritarian premise, for the 
Framers entertained, but rejected, the idea requiring that ordinary 
legislation on any particular subject matter be passed by a 
supermajority. For example, Alexander Hamilton, in the Federalist No. 
22, warned:

       To give a minority a negative upon the majority--

  Which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a 
decision--

     is, in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greater 
     number to that of the lesser number. . . . The public 
     business must in some way or other go forward.

  This is Hamilton speaking.

     If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a 
     majority respecting the best mode of conducting it--

  Meaning the public business.

     the majority, in order that something may be done, must 
     conform to the views of the minority; and thus--

  Says Hamilton.

     the sense of the smaller number will overrule that of the 
     greater, and give a tone to the national proceedings. Hence, 
     tedious delays--continual negotiation and intrigue--
     contemptible compromises of the public good. . . . For upon 
     some occasions, things will not admit of accommodation; and 
     then the measures of government must be injuriously suspended 
     or fatally defeated. It is often, by the impracticability of 
     obtaining the concurrence of the necessary number of votes--

  This is Hamilton speaking. Let me begin again that sentence.

     It is often, by the impracticability of obtaining the 
     concurrence of the necessary number of votes, kept in a state 
     of inaction. Its situation must always savour a weakness--
     sometimes border upon anarchy.

  That was Alexander Hamilton. Where are all these Senators who are 
proponents of this amendment? It would not hurt them to hear the 
Constitution read today, from the beginning to the end. I do not intend 
to inflict that kind of punishment on them, but they certainly would do 
well to read and to hear read those portions of the Constitution which 
impact upon this constitutional amendment on the balanced budget.
  Madison added his warning against supermajorities, in the Federalist 
No. 58:

       It has been said that more than a majority ought to have 
     been required for a quorum, and in particular cases, if not 
     in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision. . . 
     . [But] . . . In all cases where justice or the general good 
     might require new laws to be passed, or active measures to be 
     pursued, the fundamental principle of free government would 
     be reversed. It would be no longer the majority that would 
     rule;

  This is Madison speaking.

     the power would be transferred to the minority. Were the 
     defensive privilege limited to particular cases, an 
     interested minority might take advantage of it to screen 
     themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or 
     in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable 
     indulgences.

  That is Madison.
  That is James Madison. He referred to particular emergencies and the 
supermajorities that are included in this nefarious constitutional 
amendment to balance the budget to deal with ``particular 
emergencies.'' I am using Madison's words--``particular emergencies.''.
  Let me read again what Madison said.

       Were the defensive privilege limited to particular cases, 
     an interested minority might take advantage of it to screen 
     themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or 
     in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable 
     indulgences.

  Where are the proponents of this amendment? Why do they not 
interrogate James Madison? Why do they not hearken to his words and 
Hamilton's words? No. They do not want to hear. As was said in Homer's 
Iliad, ``Not if I had 10 tongues and 10 mouths, a voice that could not 
tire, lung of brass in my bosom,'' would they hear me. They have eyes 
that cannot see and ears that cannot hear, and minds that are unwilling 
to comprehend the warnings of the Framers of the Constitution. Should 
one conclude that they pretend to be wiser men than those who wrote the 
Constitution?
  Mr. President, the balanced budget amendment would reject the wisdom 
both of Hamilton and Madison by adopting supermajority requirements 
that would transfer power from majorities to minority factions. And 
George Washington in his Farewell Address warned against parties and 
factions. Sections 1 and 2 of the constitutional amendment to balance 
the budget would require that deficit spending and increases in the 
statutory debt limit be approved by three-fifths of the whole number of 
each House. Section 4 would impose a minisupermajority requirement, in 
that revenue increases must be authorized by a majority of the whole 
number of each House. Meaning in the Senate, 51 votes would be required 
to increase revenues, and in the House 218 votes would be required, 217 
would not be enough, 218 votes would be required to pass legislation in 
the House to increase revenues--rather than, as is usual, by a majority 
of Members present and voting. Were the Framers wise? To ask the 
question is to answer it. This minisupermajority that is required for 
revenue increases flies in the face of Madison's warning against a 
requirement of ``more than a majority of a quorum for a decision.''
  Defenders of the balanced budget amendment often say, what is so bad 
about supermajority requirements? After all, the Senate in its own 
rules requires a supermajority for cloture on filibusters. So why is it 
so bad to have in the Constitution a requirement of a supermajority? 
The proponents also refer to the supermajorities that are mentioned in 
the Constitution and the amendments thereto. But these existing 
supermajority requirements furnish no precedent for those in the 
balanced budget amendment, for they are fundamentally different in 
kind.
  Rules on parliamentary procedures that the Senate adopts for its own 
governance are surely no model for an alteration of the Nation's 
fundamental charter. Anybody who argues that point simply does not, and 
has not stopped to think, knows very little about the Senate rules, and 
very little, in all likelihood, about the Constitution. Such rules of 
the Senate can be changed by the Senate acting itself alone, and are 
not comparable to an amendment to the Constitution, which requires the 
support of both Houses of Congress by a two-thirds vote and three-
fourths of the State legislatures for adoption.
  Although the Constitution does impose some supermajority 
requirements, it does so quite sparingly, and only for good reasons, 
namely, to provide one branch a check upon another branch --for 
example, treaty ratification and veto overrides. In the case of a 
treaty approval, the legislative branch--one component thereof; namely, 
the Senate--acts as a check upon the executive, in the ratification of 
treaties that bind this Nation in its relations with other nations. It 
is a check and balance. A supermajority is also required for a veto 
override, and again provides a check and balance between the executive 
and the legislative branch. One of the Framers stated that the one 
reason for the veto itself was that the President, the Executive, could 
provide protection for himself and his office, against the legislative 
branch.
 So he was given the veto. That is check and balance. Other 
supermajorities in the original Constitution were to protect individual 
rights. For example, in the case of the expulsion of a Member of the 
Senate or of the House, a Member cannot be expelled by a simple 
majority. It requires two-thirds of the Senate to expel a Senator, two-
thirds of the House to expel a House Member. These supermajorities are 
provided for the protection of individual rights, the individual rights 
of the Members of the two bodies, else a simple majority could expel 
Members of the minority, get rid of them, send them home, expel them by 
a simple majority. A supermajority is there for the protection of the 
individual rights of the elected representatives of the people.

  The same is the case with impeachment. Were there not a supermajority 
required, then an impulsive and partisan majority in the Senate could 
convict a President in an impeachment trial. That almost happened with 
Andrew Johnson, as we all know. So that supermajority is required to 
protect individual rights, the rights of a President, the rights of 
other officers who 
[[Page S2780]] may be impeached, the rights of Federal judges who may 
be impeached. The supermajority required in article V is to insure that 
the fundamental charter of this Republic not itself be too freely 
amended.
  Amending the Constitution is provided for, but the Framers wisely 
established that amendments not be adopted and ratified too freely. 
Thus, we have only seen 17 amendments added to the original 
Constitution and Bill of Rights. They were wise men.
  Then there are certain other supermajorities. Amendment XII of the 
Constitution deals with the election of a Vice President by the Senate. 
In the 14th amendment, a supermajority is required to waive the 
disability upon individuals who, having previously taken the oath of 
office to support the Constitution, later engage in rebellion against 
the United States. It requires a supermajority in both Houses to lift 
that disability from such individual. I am not against amending the 
Constitution. Our forefathers provide for that situation, and I have 
voted for five constitutional amendments to the Constitution.
  Hence, there are nine supermajorities of one kind or another in the 
original Constitution and the amendments thereto. I think it is very 
unwise, however, to provide a constitutional amendment that requires a 
supermajority in the enactment of a fiscal policy.
  There is one other supermajority, and that is the supermajority 
written into the original Constitution that dealt with the matter of a 
quorum in the election of a President when such election is thrown into 
the House of Representatives.
  So there you have it. These are all structural concerns or, as I say, 
they provide basic protections for individual rights. They are 
structural concerns that deal with the structure of this form of 
government as established by the original Framers--and the States and 
people thereof, who ratified the Constitution--or they deal with rights 
of individuals.
  The supermajority requirements of this balanced budget amendment 
embody no such structural concerns and no protections of individual 
rights. Rather, the supermajority requirements to the balanced budget 
amendment would for the first time in our constitutional history--the 
first time in 206 years--inject a minority veto into the ordinary 
processes of the determination of fiscal policy within the legislative 
branch. The danger of supermajority requirements in this policymaking 
context is that a minority of either House can hold the legislative 
agenda hostage, blocking majority choices until the minority factions 
obtain the policy concessions that they want. James Madison described 
this very danger in Federalist No. 58, where he warned that 
supermajority requirements permit the minority--permit the minority--to 
``extort unreasonable indulgences'' from the majority. In the business 
of budget balancing, permitting such minority vetoes might actually be 
counterproductive if it fostered minority demands for expensive pet 
programs as the price of deficit spending authorizations.
  The rules laid down, therefore, are those of parliamentary procedure, 
which may belong in the rules of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, but not in the Constitution.
 To insert parliamentary rules into the Constitution cheapens--
cheapens--that basic charter and erodes the respect upon which its 
vitality and usefulness depend.

  There would be years in which three-fifths majorities of the full 
membership of both Houses of Congress authorized spending in excess of 
receipts, and there would be years in which expenditures outran 
receipts because actual receipts fell short of honest and careful 
estimates, or because actual expenditures exceeded the best and most 
careful estimates. As these deficit years occur down the road, what 
would be the reaction of the citizens who supported this amendment and 
who were told that the amendment would produce a balanced budget each 
year? The result surely would be disillusionment, cynicism, distrust of 
those who govern, and loss of confidence in our basic, fundamental, 
organic law: the Constitution of the United States.
  The operation of the budget, appropriations, and revenue processes 
are so highly complex that disputes are bound to arise. Forecasts with 
regard to both receipts and outlays vary so widely that violations of 
the requirement that outlays shall not exceed receipts in a given year 
are bound--bound--to occur.
  I have shown that. I have shown charts that demonstrate that fact 
time and time again.
  Old disputes about the separation of powers, reminiscent of the 
impoundment controversy of the Nixon administration, would be reopened.
  How many Senators here today were Members of this body when that 
controversy occurred? Very few.
  The powers of the executive vis-a-vis the legislative branch will, in 
all likelihood, be substantially enlarged.
  Who are the proponents of this balanced budget amendment? Are they 
monarchists? Are they monarchists who want to see the power shifted to 
the executive? Do they want an all-powerful, imperial President?
  To rivet into the Constitution this amendment calling for a balanced 
budget annually would be to Constitutionalize fiscal policy, and would 
give rise to disputes cast in Constitutional terms, which must either 
go unresolved or bring the courts into the determination of fiscal 
policy. Few judges, if any, have expertise in such matters as fiscal 
policy, budgets, and appropriations, and lack the experience to guide 
their decisions. The courts would lack judicially manageable standards 
to guide their decisions, and drawing the Judiciary into budgetary, 
appropriations, revenue and other fiscal matters would mean an 
intrusion--an intrusion--into an area that Congress and the President 
have long regarded as their--their--exclusive domain. As a result, the 
stage would be set to injure the prestige and authority of the courts, 
as well as to impair the effectiveness of the Judiciary in preserving 
the ancient framework of republican government and protecting the 
Constitutional liberties of the nation's citizens. The people's faith 
in both the Judiciary and the Constitution would be seriously damaged.
  Hence, the implications of an amendment for the constitutional 
structure of our Government and for the status of our Constitution as 
partisan law would be very, very serious.
  That is what this amendment is. It is a partisan amendment. It is a 
political amendment supported by a political party. It is the 
Republican Party as of today in the Senate and the House that is 
pressing for this amendment. And they want to do it now, do it here--
``Do it now; do it here; we can't wait''--because they have it in their 
so-called Contract With America. That so-called contract is supposed to 
supplant the Constitution when it comes to this amendment.
  Should the measure be enforced by the judiciary, it would produce an 
unprecedented restructuring of the balance of power among the three 
branches of Government. There are no two ways about it. It would 
produce an unprecedented restructuring of the balance of power among 
the three branches of Government.
  To crucify the Constitution upon the cross of the so-called Contract 
With America is of little consequence, provided you will give us the 
Barabbas of temporary partisan and political gain!
  That Constitution bears the stains of blood from thousands of men and 
women throughout the history of this Nation--men and women who gave 
their lives at Valley Forge, at Saratoga, at Yorktown, at Lexington, 
and Concord.
  Nathan Hale. Who is he? Never heard of him. Who was Nathan Hale?
  Well, Nathan Hale was a young man, 21 years of age, who was a 
schoolteacher.
  He responded to General George Washington's request for a volunteer 
to go behind the British lines and to bring back the drawings of 
fortifications. Nathan Hale responded as that old patriarch did in 
biblical times, ``Speak Lord, thy servant heareth.'' Nathan Hale 
responded, knowing that that task was fraught with danger and might 
cost him his life.
  He went behind the British lines, disguised as a Dutch schoolmaster. 
His mission was almost finished when, on the night before he was ready 
to return to the American lines, he was discovered with notes and 
letters on his person, and he was arrested. The next morning, on 
September 22, 1776, he was 
[[Page S2781]] brought before the gallows. He saw before him the 
gallows. He saw to one side, the wooden coffin which would soon claim 
his lifeless body. He requested a Bible. His request was refused.
  The British officer, who was a major by the name of Cunningham said, 
``Do you have anything to say?'' Nathan Hale replied, ``I regret that I 
have only one life to lose for my country.'' The British officer 
angrily commanded, ``String the rebel up,'' and Nathan Hale died. He 
only had one life to give for his country.
  Yet, there are some who are unwilling to give one vote for their 
country--one vote. Not everybody sees this as I do, of course. I see it 
through the context of many, many years of dedicated service to this 
institution, having sworn 13 times to support and defend the 
Constitution--13 times over a period of 48 years. Some of those who 
support this amendment are undoubtedly--undoubtedly--sincere, and they 
conscientiously believe that this is the only way to get deficits under 
control.
  But not all, I would say--and I attempt to be the judge of no man and 
no woman, but I have talked with many Senators around here on this 
matter, and some have expressed strange reasons for not supporting this 
amendment. Some think that we ought to just wash our hands of it, let 
it go to the States. ``The States will not ratify it,'' they say. Some 
say if the States ratify it, the backlash will destroy the Republican 
Party in time.
  Madam President, we cannot say, ``Let this cup pass from me.'' Harry 
Truman, even if he were in the White House today, could not say, ``The 
buck stops here.'' This constitutional amendment does not stop on its 
way to the President. It does not go to the President's desk. So where 
does the buck stop? The buck stops here--right here in the Senate.
  I hope that Senators will think again, those who may be guided by 
political motives to vote for this amendment. I hope they will think 
again. Nathan Hale gave one life, and thousands have given their lives 
to sustain the freedoms that are guaranteed by the Constitution of the 
United States. That Constitution, as I say, is stained with the blood 
of thousands.
  There is not one proponent of this amendment to the Constitution 
against whom the blood of that Constitution will not cry out as loudly 
as did the blood of Abel against Cain, if it is adopted. Not one!
  There are those who say, ``Well, he is the chairman of the 
Appropriations Committee. He is the chairman of the Appropriations 
Committee. You would not expect him to do anything else. He is the 
`king of pork.' No wonder he is against this amendment.''
  Fie on such little men who think in such little terms, who have 
themselves, in all likelihood, never taken an oath to support and 
defend the Constitution of the United States. I have taken that oath, 
and every other Member here--man and woman--has taken that oath.
  Montesquieu said when it came to the oath, the Romans were the most 
religious people on Earth. Marcus Atilius Regulus, a Roman consul, 
captured by the Carthaginians in the year 258 B.C., was sent by the 
Carthaginians with an embassy to Rome to plead the case of the 
Carthaginians before the Roman Senate and to attempt, if possible, to 
arrange for an exchange of prisoners, also, to endeavor to bring about 
a truce on terms that would be favorable to the Carthaginians. Marcus 
Atilius Regulus, however, when he spoke to the Roman Senate, advised 
the Senate against entering into any such arrangement or agreement or 
treaty with the Carthaginians, because such an arrangement would not be 
beneficial to Rome.
  Regulus said, ``I know that they will know what I have said here and 
that I will pay with my life.'' The Roman Senate offered to protect 
Regulus against his being returned to Carthage. But Regulus said, ``No, 
I gave them my word. I swore an oath to them, which they made me do. I 
swore an oath to them that I would return.'' And he said, ``I will keep 
my oath, even when given to the enemy.''
  Against the pleadings and the tears of his wife and children, Marcus 
Atilius Regulus returned to Carthage, and he was tortured. He was 
forced to lie on spikes in a specially-built enclosure from which he 
could only see the Sun. The Carthaginians cut off his eyelids, and he 
was forced to look at the Sun all day long. He soon perished!
  He was a Roman who believed in keeping his oath. So we can understand 
what Montesquieu meant when he said that when it comes to the oath, the 
Romans are the most religious people in the world. I, too, am from a 
generation that believed in keeping its oath, when sworn before God and 
with one hand on the Bible.
  Mr. President, if this constitutional amendment proves to be 
unenforceable, it would create an equally troubling hazard; namely, by 
inscribing an empty promise into the fundamental charter of our 
Government, thus breeding cynicism both toward our Government and the 
Constitution as well for the rule of law.
  Before I diverted my thoughts to the Romans, I talked about what our 
constitutional form of Government would suffer in the event that the 
balanced budget amendment were to be ratified and enforced.
  But now I say, on the other hand, if the amendment proved to be 
unenforceable, it would create an equally troubling hazard; namely, by 
inscribing an empty promise into the fundamental charter of our 
Government, thus breeding cynicism both toward our Government and the 
Constitution, as well as for the rule of law.
  Keep in mind that not only would Federal judges--keep in mind that 
not only would Federal judges--become involved in fiscal policy, but 
State judges would also be required to make fundamental decisions about 
taxing and spending. And these are issues, I say to my friend from 
Georgia, these are issues that judges on both the State and Federal 
levels lack the institutional capacity to decide in any remotely 
satisfactory manner.
  Some proponents of the amendment may be of the opinion that the 
``political question'' doctrine or limitations on standing would 
preclude litigation that would ensnare the judiciary in the thicket of 
budgetary politics.
  Some recent decisions of the Supreme Court, however, suggest that the 
Court is prepared--is prepared--to resolve questions that might once 
have been considered political. For example, in Missouri v. Jenkins, 
1990, the Supreme Court upheld the power of a Federal district court to 
order a local board of education to levy higher taxes to build magnate 
schools in order to promote desegregation. And the Court even held open 
as a last resort the possibility that the district court might itself 
levy the taxes.
  Now get that. ``Oh,'' they say, ``the courts won't enter that 
political thicket.'' It is not so much that it is a thicket, it is 
political. It is political. Judges are not elected by the people. 
Judges are not out there rubbing shoulders and elbows with the American 
people and hearing from them as to their advice on making law. But it 
is otherwise with the elected representatives of the people, who daily 
work and move in a political thicket.
  It might not happen, but if the proposed amendment is adopted and 
ratified, no one, no man, no man--it reminds me, may I say to my good 
friend, one of the fine Senators who is on the ``Republican response 
team''--and I love him, I think a lot of the senior Senator from New 
Hampshire, I really do--but it reminds me of Odysseus.
  Odysseus, Senators will recall from that great story, the 
``Odyssey,'' written by Homer, who supposedly lived circa 800 years 
before Christ, was blind, blind like Milton who wrote ``Paradise 
Lost.'' Homer was blind. But he went around singing songs and poetry. 
Perhaps Homer's words have come down to us through the centuries, the 
early, early centuries, by repetition, by other men relating, speaking, 
and conveying the thoughts and words of Homer.
  But let us say it was ``written'' by Homer. I think that is fair 
enough. The ``Odyssey.'' In the ``Odyssey,'' we will remember that 
Odysseus found himself imprisoned in a cave by the Cyclops, the giant 
with one eye in the middle of his forehead. He probably still had more 
vision than some of the proponents of this amendment. In any event, the 
Cyclopean giant asked Odysseus his name. Odysseus said, ``No Man.'' His 
name was Noman. No-man.
  Well, I will not proceed with the story, but let me just say that no 
man, and no woman, no one should be very surprised to find a Federal 
court made 
[[Page S2782]] up of unelected judges, appointed for life, enjoining 
expenditures selected by the court or requiring the levy of a tax. 
People up in New Hampshire would not stand still for that, for 
unelected judges levying a tax. We fought one war over taxation without 
representation, and the people of New Hampshire know about that.
  Even if taxpayers and Members of Congress were not granted standing, 
the amendment could lead to litigation by recipients whose benefits, 
mandated by law, were curtailed by the President through impoundment of 
funds or a line-item veto, in reliance upon the amendment. The 
President might well conclude that the Constitutional command that 
``total outlays for any fiscal year shall not exceed total receipts'' 
must take precedence over mere statutes, including appropriation bills, 
entitlement laws, and the Impoundment Act of 1974.
  If a Presidential decision were made to order a reduction in pension 
payments, or in social security payments, or in Medicare payments, or 
in veterans compensation payments, the President could argue in defense 
of his action that there was a conflict between the statutes requiring 
these outlays and the Constitutional provision commanding that ``total 
outlays shall not exceed total receipts,'' and that to execute the 
spending statutes would result in the Constitution's being violated.
  Assuming that a President concludes that his duty to comply with the 
Constitutional amendment implicitly includes the impoundment power or 
enhanced rescissions power or a line-item veto power necessary to 
ensure that the budget is in fact balanced, the result would be an 
inevitable shift of power from the Legislative Branch to the Executive 
Branch. At the very heart of our Constitutional system of government is 
the proposition that power over the raising of revenues and the 
appropriation of funds rests with the people's elected representatives 
in Congress. The shift to unrestrained Presidential impoundment and 
line-item veto or rescissions authority would effectively take from 
Congress the ``power over the purse'' and confer that power on the 
President.
  The placing of the power of the purse in the hands of the Legislative 
Branch--and not in the hands of the Executive or Judicial Branches--was 
a decision that was not lightly made by the Framers of the 
Constitution. James Madison wrote in the 58th Federalist:

       This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the 
     most effectual weapon with which any Constitution can arm the 
     immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a 
     redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect 
     every just and salutary measure.

  That was Madison. Let me state it again. James Madison wrote in the 
58th Federalist:

       This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the 
     most effectual weapon with which any Constitution can arm the 
     immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a 
     redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect 
     every just and salutary measure.

  So the Framers, Mr. President, explicity rejected the notion that 
such a crucial power should rest either with the Executive or with the 
Judiciary.
  As I have already stated, the Courts lack not only the experience and 
the resources, but also the close link to the general public needed for 
responsible budgetary decisions. It would be a profound--a profound--
mistake for Congress to adopt an amendment to the Constitution that 
could transfer such a vital Legislative power to an unelected 
Judiciary.
  The Framers were well acquainted with the history of England. They 
were very familiar with the long and bloody struggle in which the 
English people had wrested from tyrannical monarchs the power of the 
purse and vested that power in the elected representatives of the 
people in Parliament. The Framers, consequently, considered that the 
appropriations of money were a bulwark against Executive usurpations, 
and they, therefore, carefully wrote into the organic law the 
provisions of Article I, Section 9, which guarantee that no monies 
shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations 
made by the laws of Congress. It is hard to imagine that the 
possibility of such a dramatic reform of the basic structure of our 
government would be contemplated in this amendment, by the Members of 
both Houses of Congress, all of whom have sworn an oath to support and 
defend the Constitution of the United States.
  On the other hand, if the amendment is to be only an empty promise 
welded into the fundamental charter of our government, only to have 
this new provision of the Constitution routinely violated, it would 
inevitably make all other provisions of the Constitution seem far less 
inviolable. Let us soberly reflect on that.
  As Alexander Hamilton noted in Federalist No. 25:

       Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the 
     government with restrictions that cannot be observed, because 
     they know that every breach of the fundamental laws, though 
     dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which 
     ought to be maintained in the breast of rulers toward the 
     Constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other 
     breaches where the same plea of necessity does not exist at 
     all, or is less urgent and palpable.

  Mr. President, unless a Senator has a question of me, I am prepared 
to yield to the Senator from Arkansas for not to exceed 15 minutes 
without losing my right to the floor. I do not intend to hold the floor 
all afternoon, but I do have some other things that I wish to say in 
opposition to the amendment to balance the budget.
  Do not forget, I support a balanced budget. I supported lowering the 
deficits in the 1993 deficit reduction bill. So I support the goal of 
achieving balanced budgets. But I do not support the prostitution and 
rape of the Constitution of the United States by a Constitutional 
amendment that will not achieve a balanced budget but will destroy the 
very form of our government with its separation of powers and checks 
and balances.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the 
Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Pryor], for not to exceed 15 minutes without 
losing my right to the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kempthorne). Is there objection? The Chair 
hears none, and it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Arkansas is recognized.
  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I thank the Chair, and I thank the 
distinguished Senator from West Virginia for yielding this amount of 
time to me.
  The other afternoon I was down visiting on the steps, the steps in 
the Senate where the pages sit. I gathered up four or five of the pages 
who diligently serve us around here and perform many, many wonderful 
duties for this institution and for us individually and collectively. I 
gathered them up and I said:

       Ladies and gentlemen, I want you to remember something. 
     When I speak, or when a lot of us speak in the Senate, maybe 
     from time to time you do not have to listen too carefully to 
     what some of us have to say. But remember that when Senator 
     Byrd of West Virginia speaks, you take time, and you listen, 
     and listen intently to what he has to say, because you will 
     learn something. You will learn something about this body, 
     you will learn something about this country, you will learn 
     something about the Constitution, and you will learn 
     something about what makes the Senate one of the unique 
     institutions in the world. I learn from the Senator 
     constantly.

  I thank him not only for his message today but his continuing message 
on this issue, relative to the balanced budget amendment.
  When I was young and growing up in Camden, AR, I remember at birthday 
parties we used to play a game. In fact, when I raised my sons, they 
played the same game. Perhaps other Members of this body played a game 
called pin the tail on the donkey. One of us would be blindfolded, and 
we would be given the donkey's tail and someway or another we would try 
to go up to the wall or the board and find the proper place to attach 
the tail on the donkey. Sometimes, because we could not see it--we were 
blindfolded--we would not even be near our destination, or near our 
target.
  In the last several weeks, relative to this debate--not only in this 
Chamber but in the other body and on the talk shows, in the media, in 
the public, wherever--somehow or another I am reminded of that game 
once again, of pin the tail on the donkey.
  I think there is a lot of blame being passed around--the Democrats 
blame the Republicans, the Republicans blame the Democrats. We might 
blame this Senator or that Congressman, we 
[[Page S2783]] blame this act or this particular time or effort or law 
or regulation as to why we got to this point and how we got to this 
point at this time in our country's history.
  We are in trouble. We are in deep trouble. And this morning I heard 
the distinguished majority whip, Senator Lott, as he quoted a statement 
that Senator Daschle had made 1 year ago in this debate on the 
constitutional amendment. At that time, Senator Daschle voted for that 
amendment, and Senator Daschle was quoted as giving the reasons why he 
was supporting that amendment.
  Mr. President, I invite the distinguished Republican whip to go back 
to 1982, to go back to 1986, and he can find some statements of this 
Senator from the State of Arkansas who at that time also not only spoke 
on this floor but back in my home State, as to why at that moment in 
our history, that window of opportunity, that I thought we had to 
support a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution. I believed it 
then. I believed it in 1982. I believed it in 1986.
  Not long after those votes, I also voted for two extremely far-
reaching, extremely strict, you might say, proposals that would have 
frozen spending across the board. In the early 1980's, I supported 
those particular freezes.
  But, Mr. President, something has happened since that period of time. 
Something has happened to have dramatically and drastically changed the 
economic and fiscal landscape of America. What has happened is very 
simple, and I will use the analogy that after the mid-1980's we let the 
horse get out of the barn.
  The horse got out of the barn, and today, we are being asked for 
support by our wonderful friends, like Senator Simon of Illinois, who 
believes with all of his heart that this constitutional amendment is 
the way to get this horse back in the barn.
  Mr. President, I respect my friend from Illinois. I respect my friend 
from New Hampshire. I respect my friend from Utah--in their belief that 
a constitutional amendment, where we would balance the budget in the 
next 7 years is the proper way to get the horse back in the barn. I 
truly believe it is wrong to attempt to amend the Constitution to bring 
the horse back in the barn. I think what we are doing, if I may use 
this analogy, is we are attempting with a constitutional amendment to 
lasso an elephant with a piece of thread. It cannot be done.
  The trouble is not in the Constitution. This is not where the trouble 
is. It is not in the Constitution that was passed in Philadelphia over 
200 years ago. The trouble is in us. That is where the problem lies.
  The problem is in me, Senator Pryor from Arkansas. In 1981, I voted 
for then-President Ronald Reagan's proposal to increase spending and to 
decrease taxes. There were 11 Members of the U.S. Senate who voted 
against that package, and I wish I could say today I had been one of 
those 11, or that I had made number 12. I was not. I bought on to the 
idea: We have a new President, let us give him an opportunity to show 
us what he can do. And I supported President Reagan's package.
  In retrospect, I was wrong. So I would like to stand here today and 
take blame. I will take the blame for making a mistake that helped 
cause these massive deficits and this gargantuan, absolutely awesome 
national debt.
  So here we are, almost on the eve of voting whether or not we want to 
refer to the States an amendment to cause, demand, and mandate a 
balanced budget.
  Last Friday morning, I happened to be in this body, fortunately 
enough, as the Senate was opened with a prayer by Rev. Richard C. 
Halverson, Jr. I thought the prayer was timely, and I thought it was 
poignant. I would like to quote, if I might, Mr. President, from that 
prayer of Dr. Halverson.

       Once again, in the urgency of this hour, we beseech Thee 
     for divine assistance. We pray for a hedge of enlightened 
     restraint around this ``necessary fence'' of the Senate. For 
     through this body, regulations must pass that will either 
     strengthen or weaken our country.

  Dr. Halverson's ``necessary fence,'' of course, is a reference to 
James Madison who called the Senate, this body, this institution, ``a 
necessary fence to protect the rights and property of its citizens 
against an impetuous public.''
  Mr. President, James Madison feared that the Congress from time to 
time might act impetuously to please the public. Reverend Halverson 
continued in his prayer last Friday morning, and once again I quote.

       As pressures mount for instant solutions to complex 
     problems, grant those who hold this ``senatorial trust'' the 
     calm resolve to be not driven by public restlessness, nor 
     drifting in stubborn idleness, but drawn by Thy vision of 
     righteousness--which upholdeth the Nation.

  That was an insightful prayer, Mr. President. I hope that Dr. 
Halverson's prayer are the words that set the tone for this debate. The 
public is restless. They are demanding instant solutions. They are 
demanding action, and one instant answer is this very imperfect 
balanced-budget amendment is before us today.
  It is like a bottle of snake oil because it promises to solve all of 
our budget problems. But what it delivers are loopholes and false 
hopes. It gives politicians the easy and the temporary cover to go back 
home and to say we have voted to balance the budget.
  There are loopholes, Mr. President, throughout this proposal. And 
their inclusion assures that false hopes will be created and this is 
just what our country and just what Americans do not need right now.
  Loophole No. 1. Right at the top of this balanced-budget amendment is 
the three-fifths loophole. Section 1 says that three-fifths of the 
House and three-fifths of the Senate can vote to completely waive the 
balanced-budget requirement for a year. I believe the framers of the 
Constitution placed provisions in the Constitution which they held 
inviolate.
  For example, in the first amendment of the Constitution, it does not 
say that ``Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of 
religion unless three-fifths of each House passes legislation 
specifying otherwise.''
  The 13th amendment, for example, does not provide that slavery or 
involuntary servitude shall exist in the United States unless three-
fifths of each House passes legislation specifying otherwise.
  Mr. President, the reason that the three-fifths requirement sounds 
ridiculous is because it is ridiculous.
  I do not believe that we should pass this amendment. I do not believe 
we should pass it with or without this particular loophole. But if the 
supporters of the balanced budget amendment think it is the panacea to 
all of our problems, why create a three-fifths loophole? Why not, if we 
are going to require a balanced budget? Why do we not require a 
balanced budget, period?
  This is the second loophole, Mr. President. That loophole is the 
definitions game. Section 6 of the balanced budget amendment provides 
that estimates of outlays and receipts may be used by Congress when 
drafting legislation to enforce and implement the provisions of this 
amendment. Nowhere in this amendment before this body today, and 
nowhere in the Constitution, are the words ``outlays or receipts'' 
defined.
  Why would the word ``outlays'' need to be defined? Because outlays 
are the moneys that the Government spends. And without an airtight 
definition of what constitutes spending we had better realize that 
clever lawyers are going to find many ways to circumvent the intention 
of this amendment, whatever it may be.
  The same goes for the definition of ``receipts.''
  Take the example of sales of Government assets. If someone were to 
propose that we sell Mount Rushmore, would the money collected when we 
sold Mount Rushmore represent a receipt under this amendment? It might 
and it might not.
  How about user fees? Will moneys collected from new user fees be 
considered a receipt? They might. But they might not.
  It is no wonder that Judge Bork has recently said that we had better 
anticipate not only hundreds but perhaps thousands of lawsuits and 
other forms of litigation in this particular area.
  Mr. President, I wonder if the distinguished Senator will yield me 
perhaps 5 additional minutes?
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield an 
additional 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. 
Pryor] 
[[Page S2784]] under the same terms as heretofore agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. PRYOR. The Senator is very generous. I thank him.
  Mr. President, what we are doing today is looking at a possibility of 
adopting perhaps the greatest sea change in the relationship between 
the judiciary, the executive branches of Government, and the 
legislative branches of Government that we have ever concerned 
ourselves with. The definitional games are going to be played 
necessarily on what is or is not an outlay or what is or is not a 
receipt. But the definition games will not be limited to just these 
issues. And I can say, in my opinion, there are not going to be any 
winners in this definitional game under these false promises.
  Mr. President, there is a third loophole. There are many loopholes. 
But No. 3 is, I think, one of the more serious--determining what an 
estimate is.
  Who makes those estimates? If one estimator's ``estimate'' comes out 
one way, the budget may be in balance. If we use another estimator's 
estimate, we will no doubt have different estimates and then be out of 
balance. More lawsuits will ensue.
  It sounds like estimators, not Congress, would control the measure of 
our outlays and receipts, and ultimately, the decisions effecting our 
lives.
  The point is that estimates can differ, and they can differ 
drastically. Estimates can be flat wrong. Human nature being what it 
is, estimates can also be manipulated. In any case, do we really want 
something as unreliable as economic estimates to become the 
underpinning of the United States Constitution? I do not believe, 
notwithstanding that the people of our country want us to balance the 
budget, that they want to underpin the U.S. Constitution with something 
this illusory.
  The estimation game is one more loophole through which runaway 
Government spending is going to continue. It will take the 
decisionmaking process out of the hands of the people and the Congress, 
and place it in the hands of the economists and the estimators who 
seldom agree on anything.
  The fourth loophole, Mr. President--Let us assume that all of our 
numbers, estimates, statistics and forecasts are correct, and we are 
struggling to meet the requirement of a balanced budget. Then what 
Congress will do is probably start playing budget games.
  Is there not one of us who has been here for any length of time who 
has seen the game of putting certain functions of Government on budget 
or off budget? Mr. President, I predict under this constitutional 
amendment, if it were a part of our Federal Constitution, that we would 
spend the majority of our time not balancing the budget, but figuring 
out which Government programs were on budget and off budget, which 
programs raise money, and which programs cost money. And we will have 
many, many heated debates on what should and should not be included in 
that budget.
  The temptation to take deficit programs ``off budget'' is going to be 
great. For example, today under section 13301 of the Budget Enforcement 
Act, we forbid the use of Social Security trust fund surpluses to 
offset the Federal deficit.
  However, under this constitutional amendment, we are going to 
apparently use Social Security surpluses for that purpose. Many, many 
experts are predicting that in the year 2013, Social Security will 
begin to run its own deficit. At that point, the temptation will be to 
put Social Security off budget in order to meet the balanced budget 
constitutional requirement.
  Nothing in this amendment prevents this chicanery, and we all know it 
will occur. Will this inspire confidence? No. Will it balance the 
budget? No.
  Mr. President, there are big questions about this amendment. I have 
discussed just a few loopholes and gimmicks. This amendment to the 
Constitution deserves as much time as necessary to clear the air.
  I am almost out of time. But I want to simply state that I think this 
has been a splendid debate. I think that we have not, in any way, 
caused anyone to truly believe that we are attempting a filibuster on 
this side of the aisle. We have had very few quorum calls. We have had, 
in my opinion, a debate that is one that will go down in the record 
books. I truly believe it is one of the better debates that the U.S. 
Senate has ever engaged in.
  Once again, Mr. President, I do not feel that our situation today 
with regard to these awesome Federal deficits is the fault of the 
Constitution. It is our fault and it is our obligation to cure those 
problems by making the hard decisions, the tough decisions that all of 
us know we have to make to balance the budget.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the distinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Pryor] 
for his lucid, incisive observations.
  Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from New 
Hampshire, [Mr. Smith] with the understanding that I do not lose my 
right to the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I do appreciate the Senator yielding 
briefly to me. In the spirit of friendly debate, I ask the Senator if 
there was any significance to the fact that when I happened to come on 
the floor to give relief to Senator Hatch, who has been out here many 
hours during this debate, he mentioned Cyclops. I wondered whether 
there was any significance to that fact that when he saw me on the 
floor, immediately the debate went to Cyclops. I think he is a better 
expert on history than I am, for sure, but the Cyclops had one eye, as 
I remember. I suppose there is some relevance here, because it is going 
to take more than one eye to stay focused on where this debate is going 
and where this debt is going in this country.
  I do not know if the Senator wishes to respond, but I did take notice 
of that fact that immediately, Cyclops became the topic of discussion 
when I came on the floor.
  Mr. BYRD. If the Senator will indulge me briefly.
  Mr. President, I will try to answer the Senator's question. Indeed, 
the Senator's appearance did not have any part in my reference to the 
Cyclopean giant. I just wish that, if I ever became involved in a 
street brawl in this city, the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire 
would be around close by. If I could have him and Senator Hollings 
there to help me, I would feel like fighting rather than running. He is 
a genuinely congenial Senator and I have enjoyed my service here with 
him. We have often talked and discussed matters together. I value his 
friendship and his advice and counsel. I do not always follow it, but I 
certainly listen to what he has to say. I will say that I really was 
pleased to see him come on the floor, because he is one of those 
distinguished Members of the ``Republican response team,'' and he is a 
very worthy one. He has been around here a while. I consider him as a 
formidable and respectable protagonist of the constitutional amendment 
to balance the budget.
  I think that answers the question, except there is one further matter 
he mentioned, the matter of having one eye. The giant in the story by 
Homer had one eye, and the distinguished Senator referred to the 
national debt, namely that an individual would need more than one eye 
to see the national debt because it is so high.
  I remember that during the early first administration of President 
Reagan, I saw the President on television. He was very effective. He 
had a chart and he pointed to that chart which had a line drawn to 
represent the national debt at that time, in terms of $1,000 bills. He 
said, if I recall, that if one had $1,000 bills stacked 4 inches high, 
the stack of $1,000 bills would represent $1 million. Mr. Reagan 
indicated by the chart that the stack of $1,000 bills necessary to 
reach the then sum of the national debt, which at that time was just a 
little under $1 trillion, would require a stack of $1,000 bills 63 
miles high.
  That was the last time Mr. Reagan ever appeared on television using 
that chart, because when he left office at the conclusion of his second 
administration, that stack of bills, using his chart, would by then 
have reached about 237 or 240 miles into the stratosphere--because the 
Nation had added to its debt almost an additional $3 trillion during 
his 8 years in office. And then, of course, under the administration of 
Mr. Bush, the debt continued to grow.
  I thank the Senator for reminding me of that chart.
   [[Page S2785]] Mr. SMITH. Will the Senator continue to yield to me?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. SMITH. The Senator mentioned he might like to have me on his side 
in a fight at some point. This is my fifth year in the Senate. It does 
not come anywhere near the number of years the distinguished Senator 
has served here, but I am hoping that someday before either one of our 
terms is over in the Senate we might be on the same side on an issue, 
as he is a very worthy adversary.
  The Senator referred to a comment that I made a few days ago that 
made the national press; that it was our goal to wear the Senator from 
West Virginia out so we could get the balanced budget amendment to a 
vote. And the Senator is a very worthy adversary, because we have not 
been able to do that yet. Even though we have had a number of us out 
here relieving one another, the Senator still stands on his feet and 
still continues to debate, which is really the great thing about the 
Senate.
  Over behind my desk, there is the desk of Daniel Webster, one of the 
greatest orators in the Senate. The Senator from West Virginia 
certainly ranks up there in oratorical skills with those great Senators 
of that time--Clay, Webster, Calhoun, and so many others.
  But it does remind you that the time we spend here is very fleeting; 
that we are only temporary stewards of this country.
  But I think, in that perspective, if the Senator would continue to 
yield just for a moment, it is important to realize the significance of 
this debate. I think this is a debate of historical significance.
  The Senator from West Virginia and the Senator from Arkansas 
mentioned the fact that the debt went up significantly during the 
Reagan years when Reagan was President. That is accurate.
  However, during those years, there were a lot in the Senator's party 
in Congress who certainly contributed to that. All of the Reagan 
budgets, at least from when I was here from 1985 through 1988-89 during 
the Reagan years, they were always dead on arrival and so predicted 
before they got here. And then they were increased by the party in 
power in the Congress. So the debt went up, true, while Reagan was 
President, but whether or not it went up all because of Ronald Reagan I 
think is something that I would take pretty sharp issue on with the 
Senator.
  Mr. BYRD. Will the Senator yield on that point?
  Mr. SMITH. It is the time of the Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Number one, the Senator has stated that all of the Reagan 
budgets were dead on arrival. I call the distinguished Senator's 
attention to the fact that some of those budgets were subjected to a 
vote in this body or the other body or both and the Republican Members 
did not vote for those Reagan budgets. I believe I am correct in that. 
If I am not, I will be glad for someone to correct me.
  Second, the Senator is in error--I know this to be a fact--when he 
indicated, as I thought I understood him to so indicate, that in the 
case of all of Mr. Reagan's budgets the Congress increased those 
budgets. That is not the case, if I understood the Senator correctly.
  Mr. SARBANES. The Congress reduced them.
  Mr. BYRD. The Congress reduced Mr. Reagan's budgets in some of those 
years, in some of the Reagan years.
  Going back to 1945, the accumulated requests of all the Presidents 
exceeded the accumulated appropriations by the Congress--exceeded the 
accumulated appropriations by the Congress--over that same period.
  But precisely under Mr. Reagan, I say again, the Congress did not 
exceed his budgets in every year. In fact, in some years Congress 
appropriated less than the budget requests.
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the leader yield?
  Mr. SMITH. But the Senator knows, as an expert on the Constitution, 
that the Congress of the United States controls the purse strings. The 
President does not spend any money without the approval of Congress.
  So I think, to be fair about it, it would be fair to say that 
Congress is ultimately responsible, not the President, for increasing 
the debt. The President's budget is purely advisory. We do not have to 
agree to it. We can increase it, decrease it, ignore it, kill it, do 
whatever we want to do with it. But the Congress appropriates the 
money. The Congress authorizes the spending. And it is the spending 
that drove the debt up over that period of years.
  And I would accept that there is certainly enough blame to go around 
between the two parties. But my point is, I think it is unfair to say 
that Ronald Reagan alone was responsible for the debt that we have 
today.
  Mr. BYRD. As the Senator says, there is enough blame to go around. 
But the President, Mr. Reagan, never once submitted a balanced budget 
to the Congress.
  Mr. SMITH. That is accurate. He should have, but he did not. The 
Senator is right. And neither did the Congress.
  Mr. BYRD. Pardon?
  Mr. SMITH. Neither did the Congress.
  Mr. BYRD. Well, President Carter did. President Carter once submitted 
a balanced budget.
  I sat right over here in room 211. I was then the majority leader of 
the Senate. I sat over in room 211 on a weekend, brought my little 
paper bag, with some coal miner's ``steaks''--slices of baloney--in 
that little paper bag. We had the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and others. We had the 
President's men in that room, and we sat through Saturday and Sunday--
and I believe Senator Sarbanes of Maryland, who is now on the floor, 
was there at that time--and we hammered out a balanced budget.
  But, the President also has a veto pen. And Mr. Reagan never once 
vetoed any appropriation bill for that reason, in particular. He vetoed 
some bills for other reasons.
  Mr. SMITH. Will the Senator yield for just a brief response to that?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. SMITH. That is true. But, as the Senator knows, the Congress 
during those years rolled these huge continuing resolutions in to the 
President with everything from Social Security to defense and every 
little program that could possibly hurt anybody in America all rolled 
into one, essentially saying, ``Well, Mr. President, if you veto this, 
then we will shut the Government down and stop the Social Security 
checks.''
  So, as I say, I think the reason we are here today is because of the 
irresponsibility, essentially, of the Congress, not any President, over 
the years.
  As we debate today right now on the floor of the Senate, $9,600 a 
second the national debt increases. It increases $576,000 a minute, 
$34,560,000 an hour, and $829 million a day--almost a $1-billion-a-day 
increase as this debate continues.
  Mr. BYRD. Senator, ``You cram these words into mine ears against the 
stomach of my sense.''
  The Senator spoke of the omnibus continuing resolution. I have a 
little grandson who would say, ``Do you know what?''
  Well, do you know what? On that continuing resolution that was so 
heavy and that Mr. Reagan dropped on the table before a joint session 
of the Congress, do you know what? He asked that those appropriations 
be sent to him in one bill. I was here. I know. He asked that they be 
given to him in one bill.
  Any further questions?
  Mr. SMITH. Well, you did not give him any choice.
  (Mr. KYL assumed the chair.)
  Mr. BYRD. Oh, yes. He asked for it.
  Mr. SMITH. Not really. If Congress controls the purse strings, I say 
to the Senator from West Virginia, and the national debt increased $3 
trillion during those years, how can we blame the President? I mean, 
whose responsibility is it?
  Mr. BYRD. Well, there is enough to go around, but in the case of the 
1993 budget deficit reduction package,
 I would shift the blame in large measure, to those who did not support 
that deficit reduction package.

  They sat here in the Senate. They sat in the House. We had a 1993 
deficit reduction package that reduced the deficit over a period of 5 
years by $482 billion. Somewhere between $450 and $500 billion. Not one 
Republican Senator 
[[Page S2786]] voted for that deficit reduction package.
  Actually, the deficits have been reduced more than that. They have 
come down 3 consecutive years. Not one Republican Senator voted for 
that package. Why?
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I would be happy to answer on behalf of the 
Senator from New Hampshire. The Senator from New Hampshire voted 
against that package for a number of reasons.
  One, $250 billion in increased taxes on the American people was in 
it. No. 2, the projections beyond the 5 years in that budget that the 
Senator mentioned, the deficits go up. As we see from the follow-on 
budget that the President has sent, we are looking at an annual average 
increase of $200 billion a year. And the deficits will add $1.5 
trillion more to the debt by the turn of the century. He did not take 
the corrective action that was necessary to continue the downward 
spiral.
  True, deficits went down for over a 5-year projected period, largely 
due to the tax increases, not a lot of spending cuts. When we look at 
the outyears, the six, seventh, the eighth, they go like this, and 
under the President's projections those deficits will be over $350 
billion as we turn into the 21st century.
  That is not making the corrective decisions that need to be made to 
turn the country around, which is why we need the amendment. If 
Congress had the discipline we would not be here. They do not have the 
discipline. This chart proves it.
  There are a number of attempts at balancing the budget of 
congressional action over the years that were taken but they never got 
the job done. One of the more recent ones is Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Lot 
of fanfare. What happened? We walked away from it because Congress did 
not have the discipline to do it.
  A comparison or analogy would be the Base Closing Commission. 
Congress did not have the courage to close bases that we did not need, 
so they created a commission. Some said we should create a commission 
to balance the budget. The point is the amendment forces us. It is 
unfortunate, I agree with the Senator. I wish we would not have to be 
here saying we needed a balanced budget amendment to clutter the 
Constitution to balance the Federal budget. We should do it. But we do 
not do it, and we will not do it until we have the amendment.
  That is why we have to have it. If we do not, I would say to the 
Senator, our grandchildren are going to have a country that I cannot 
imagine. I can imagine a press conference by a President in the future, 
maybe not too many years, where he comes on television and says, ``My 
fellow Americans, I have some very dismal news to share. We cannot meet 
our fiscal obligations, and I will go to Mexico and Japan and China, 
who knows where, and see if I cannot borrow some money to meet our 
obligations.''
  That is going to happen, I say to the Senator from West Virginia, 
because he knows we have to meet obligations. We are going to get to 
the point where we cannot. Interest is consuming us. Interest is now 16 
percent of our budget. Sixteen percent of our budget, and defense is 16 
percent of our budget. Interest is going this way and defense is going 
this way.
  I would say to the Senator, where do we stop it?
  Mr. BYRD. Will the Senator allow me to answer the question?
  Where do we stop? We have to, in order to stop it, we will have to 
swallow some tough medicine. We have already seen the Republican 
Senators turn tail and run when it came to tough medicine in the 1993 
budget deficit reduction package.
  Well, that was tough medicine. I assume, by what my friend has said, 
it was tough medicine because it raised taxes. The Senator must come to 
a conclusion at some point in time that this budget cannot be balanced 
simply by cutting, cutting, cutting. Discretionary spending has been 
cut to the bone.
  There has to be at some point in time, a combination of cuts and tax 
increases. There has to be.
  I heard a Senator on the Republican side of the aisle the other day 
say he would never, never vote for a tax increase. Well, he has the 
right to take that position if that is the way he feels.
  That kind of an attitude is never going to get this budget in 
balance. The Senator talks about our children and grandchildren. I 
suppose then, that rather than vote for a tax increase we should just 
put this burden of debt over on our children and grandchildren. I have 
children, I have grandchildren. Are we going to stand here and say to 
them, ``You children, you future generations will have to raise taxes 
because we do not have the guts to do it''?
  We have been on a national credit card since 1981. I can remember 
those good-feel messages that used to be issued during the Reagan years 
from the oval office. Every morning. ``Good morning in America, 
everything is fine.'' There really is a free lunch.
  But we say we will not raise taxes. We have more than one tool by 
which to bring budgets into balance. That effort must not be limited 
simply to cutting programs. I have voted to cut spending programs. I 
will vote further to cut spending programs. But we cannot put aside the 
tool of revenue increases. The men who framed the Constitution provided 
for revenues to be increased to pay the debts to provide for the common 
defense and the general welfare.
  But if we are going to take the position that the only thing we will 
support is to cut, cut, cut, programs but we will not raise taxes, then 
we are cheating our children and grandchildren.
  I say we have to combine these tools if we really, really, really 
mean business.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, would the Senator yield for one more point?
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, let me first yield to Mr. Sarbanes. He has 
been asking me to yield, and then I will be happy to yield to the 
Senator.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I wanted to direct an inquiry to the 
distinguished Senator from West Virginia with respect to the 
supermajorities that are provided for in this amendment.
  As the distinguished Senator has very ably pointed out, the Founding 
Fathers rejected supermajorities. Both Hamilton and Madison are very 
explicit in the Federalist Papers about the dangers of supermajorities 
and the power we place in the hands of minorities.
  The argument has been made here on the floor by proponents of this 
amendment that they have certain waiver provisions in the amendment and 
if we ever found ourselves in the difficult circumstance clearly a 
waiver would be obtained and we would be able to address issues of 
national importance.
  The Senator earlier talked about the fiscal provisions, but I wanted 
to direct his attention to another section, and that is the national 
security section. I submit to my colleagues that this is very serious 
business and it is time to stop playing games. The Senator from West 
Virginia just pointed out one game. People are for the balanced budget 
amendment but they will not vote for the deficit reduction package. 
There is a tough deficit reduction package and they say, ``No, I cannot 
vote for that but I am for amending the Constitution to require a 
balanced budget.''
  Let me leave that for a moment and let me talk about the national 
security section which is section 5. I want Members to stop and think 
about this very carefully because we obviously need to stop, look, and 
listen before we place ourself into any framework that could 
conceivably endanger the national security of our country.
  The provision says that Congress may waive the provisions of this 
article for any fiscal year in which a declaration of war is in effect.
  We do not have many declarations of war. We can get involved in a 
situation we have to deal with, but we do not have a declaration of 
war. It then goes on to say:

       The provisions of this article may be waived for any fiscal 
     year in which the United States is engaged in military 
     conflict which causes an imminent and serious military threat 
     to national security and if so declared by a joint 
     resolution, adopted by a majority of the whole number of each 
     House, which becomes law.

  In other words, if you are facing a threat, an imminent threat the 
amendment may be waived. The amendment 
[[Page S2787]] does not even address the situation in which we are not 
yet engaged in military conflict.
  I ask the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire, who is on the 
floor, suppose we are not engaged in a military conflict, there is just 
the danger of a military conflict breaking out which requires us to 
take action involving the expenditure of moneys. Could you waive that 
with a joint resolution? I ask the Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to 
the distinguished Senator from Maryland for the purpose of his engaging 
in a colloquy, if they so wish, with the Senator from New Hampshire, 
without my losing the right to the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SARBANES. I ask the Senator. It says, if engaged in military 
conflict, you may waive it. Suppose you are not engaged in military 
conflict but you need to prepare for a possible engagement in military 
conflict; you need to take actions which will cost money, which will 
unbalance your budget, in order to deter the potential of a forthcoming 
military conflict. Can you waive that under this provision?
  Mr. SMITH. Would the Senator like me to respond to that?
  Mr. SARBANES. Certainly.
  Mr. SMITH. The Senator knows very well that this debate is simply an 
attempt to divert attention from the real problem. You just mentioned a 
moment ago the tough deficit reduction----
  Mr. SARBANES. No, no, I yield to the Senator to respond to my 
question. The question is on the national security issue. The question 
is specifically addressed to section 5 of House Joint Resolution 1, and 
it specifically goes to the question of whether you could have a waiver 
where we were not engaged in military conflict but needed to take 
action in order to address a potential military conflict.
  Mr. SMITH. Well, since the Senator wants me to respond to certain 
parameters rather than the parameters I prefer to respond, I say: 
``Declaration of war is intended to be construed in the context of the 
powers of the Congress to declare war under article I, section 8. The 
committee intends that ordinary and prudent preparations for a war 
perceived by Congress to be imminent would be funded fully within the 
limitations imposed by the amendment, although the Congress could 
establish higher level of spending or deficits for these or any other 
purposes under section 1.''
  Mr. SARBANES. I know the Senator from New Hampshire is reading the 
report, but it does not really answer the question. The first provision 
says that Congress may waive it for any fiscal year in which a 
declaration of war is in effect. I am addressing a situation in which a 
declaration of war is not in effect.
  Mr. SMITH. I can read it----
  Mr. SARBANES. I am addressing a situation in which we are not 
actually engaged in military conflict, but we want to take actions to 
forestall a military conflict. Can you waive it?
  Mr. SMITH. Is that not ordinary and prudent preparations for war? 
Yes, that is ordinary and prudent.
  Mr. SARBANES. You can waive it?
  Mr. SMITH. It did not say waive it. ``The committee intends that 
ordinary and prudent preparations for a war perceived by Congress to be 
imminent would be funded fully * * *'' There is nothing to waive.
  Mr. SARBANES. Fully funded; in other words, you can violate the 
requirements of the balanced budget amendment.
  Mr. SMITH. Not at all. That is not what this says. The truth of the 
matter is, there will not be any funds even to conduct war if we 
continue along the lines that the Senator from Maryland would like to 
go, which is literally to bankrupt the United States of America. We 
will not have any money to spend on defense.
  Mr. SARBANES. What does the Senator make of this waiver provision? 
What is its intention to be in section 5?
  Mr. SMITH. This is the time of the Senator from West Virginia. I am 
not going to engage the Senator on the time of the Senator from West 
Virginia.
  Mr. SARBANES. I see. I regret the Senator does not want to respond. 
If the Senator from West Virginia will continue to yield?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. SARBANES. I regret the Senator from New Hampshire does not want 
to address that question. Let me just point out to the Senate that when 
you really get down to some of these hard questions, the proponents of 
this amendment just slide off them and they say, ``Oh, well, we would 
get a waiver.''
  The waiver that is required here is declared by joint resolution 
adopted by a majority of the whole number of each House and, as the 
very able Senator from West Virginia has pointed out, this is contrary 
to what the Constitution now requires.
  What this waiver means is that you would have to have 51 votes in the 
Senate and 218 votes in the House. I have heard the proponents stand on 
the floor and say, ``Don't worry, no problem. If a situation arises, 
clearly the Members will vote for the waiver and we will be able to 
address it, we will get these votes, there is no problem.''
  I just want to recount one story, because this is very serious 
business, I suggest to the Members.
  On August 12, 1941, the House of Representatives was confronted with 
the issue of extending the time of service of those members of the 
armed services who had been drafted the year before.
  In the summer of 1940, the Congress had passed the Selective Training 
and Service Act, and, under it, people called up were to serve for 1 
year--the President could extend the period indefinitely if Congress 
declared that the national interest is in peril.
  On July 21, 1941, with the prospect of war increasing, President 
Roosevelt acted. In a special message to Capitol Hill, he asked 
Congress to declare a national emergency that would allow the Army to 
extend the service of draftees. The President came to the Congress and 
asked them to make this extension. Everyone is telling us that ``if we 
had a national emergency, surely the Congress would act.'' The measure 
regarding the draft for World War II passed the House of 
Representatives by a vote of 203 to 202. It passed the Senate by a vote 
of 45 to 30.
  Now, just think of this. We are literally a few months away from the 
outbreak of World War II. The President has said to the Congress, 
``There is a national emergency. I ask you to extend the time of duty 
of those who had been drafted the previous year for a 12-month period. 
The storm clouds are on the horizon for all to see. We need to take 
action.''
  In many ways, it is comparable to envisioning a waiver situation for 
national security under this amendment for which the proponents say, 
``Oh, if there is a real problem, we'll get the waiver and we'll 
address our national security situation.''
  At that time, the vote in the Senate was 45 to 30; in the House of 
Representatives, 203 to 202. Neither of those votes meets the 
requirement of section 5 of this balanced budget amendment proposal.
 Even though in both instances a majority of those voting on this draft 
question voted to extend it, 45 to 30 in the Senate, 203 to 202 in the 
House, with Speaker Rayburn going into the well of the House in order 
to bring about that vote, neither of those votes is a majority of the 
whole number of each House, which is what this amendment requires.

  So I ask my friends, the proponents of this proposition, how have 
they provided for the national security of the Nation? I am giving you 
an absolute, specific demonstration of an instance in which anyone 
looking back upon it would say clearly there was an important national 
security question that needed to be addressed and yet the vote to 
address it would not carry the day under the requirements of section 5 
of this balanced budget amendment. The section states ``So declared by 
a joint resolution adopted by a majority of the whole number of each 
House,'' which means you have to have 218 votes in the House--it 
carried in the House 203 to 202; it did not have 218 votes--and means 
you would have had to have 49 votes in the Senate. It carried in the 
Senate 45 to 30, but it did not have the necessary 49 votes in the 
Senate. There were 48 states in the Union during World War II and 96 
Senators; therefore, the whole number would be 49.
  [[Page S2788]] Now, this is the absolute harm which supermajorities 
can potentially do to the national security of our Nation.
  Mr. SMITH. Will the Senator allow me to respond to that?
  Mr. SARBANES. Sure.
  Mr. SMITH. The point is, it is very clear in the language that I have 
just indicated on the amendment as well as article I of the amendment. 
The Senator is correct that it does take a three-fifths vote. Now, the 
point is----
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield at that point? This requirement, 
as I understand it, does not take a three-fifths vote.
  Mr. BYRD. Right, it does not.
  Mr. SARBANES. This requirement requires the supermajority in the 
sense that it required that it be adopted by a majority of the whole 
number of each House.
  You see, this is very important, and I am glad we are having this 
discussion because it is important to know exactly what this resolution 
provides and how it would work in real-life situations. There is a 
great tendency to just brush it all aside, and in fact I think this 
exchange illustrates that because I am not now focusing on the three-
fifths requirement. That is a different issue.
  Mr. SMITH. It is not a different issue.
  Mr. SARBANES. I am focusing on the section 5 provision, and its 
supermajority requirement of the majority of the whole number of each 
House.
  Mr. SMITH. But the Senator is focusing on that and ignoring article 
I, which allows you to raise the debt if you need to raise the debt in 
order to deficit spend, in order to deal with the emergency that the 
Senator is talking about.
  Mr. SARBANES. By a three-fifths vote.
  Mr. SMITH. That is what the Senator chooses to ignore, because that 
answers his question.
  Mr. SARBANES. By a three-fifths vote.
  Mr. SMITH. That is right.
  Mr. SARBANES. That underscores my point even more. If the Senator's 
answer to me is you can waive it on a three-fifths vote, then in 
neither of these instances in the Senate or the House for the extension 
of the draft did they come anywhere close to the three-fifths vote. 
They did not have the three-fifths vote.
  Mr. SMITH. It goes right back to the issue of priorities, which is 
why we are dealing with a balanced budget amendment to begin with, I 
say to the Senator from Maryland. Priorities are, if you are at war or 
need to go to war to defend the national interest of the United States 
of America, and you need a three-fifths vote to do it and you cannot 
get it, you will cut spending somewhere else; you will take out some 
pork or some wasteful spending that we never can get out of this 
budget, which is the reason we are in this mess.
  You set priorities. What is more important, the national security of 
the United States or funding the Education Department or funding the 
Commerce Department or HUD? You make decisions, just like everybody 
else has to do in America.
  That is the problem. The Senator has gone right to the heart of it. 
That is exactly why we are here today, because of this mess, because of 
the point the Senator makes. Nobody wants to set priorities anymore.
  You set priorities. If I am a Senator and this happens, and the 
President of the United States, whoever he or she may be, needs money, 
needs forces, needs to protect the national security of the United 
States or the troops in the field, I am going to cut somewhere; you bet 
I am going to cut somewhere, and I am going to do it quickly if I 
cannot get the three-fifths.
  I say to the Senator, I think we would get the three-fifths because 
the Senate and the House of Representatives, speaking on behalf of the 
American people, with our Armed Forces in jeopardy, are certainly not 
going to deny them the protection they need and the materials they need 
to protect themselves in the field or the national security interests 
of the United States.
  It is a weak argument, and the Senator knows it. It is just a way to 
obfuscate this issue, to deny those who are out here saying we need 
this amendment. We do need it, and that is exactly why we do need it, 
because nobody wants to set priorities. No priorities can be set here--
only in the household budgets, only in business, only in the cities of 
America, only in the States but not in the Congress of the United 
States. Oh, no; we have to spend more than we take in, year after year 
after year after year, $18,500 per American. That is the share of the 
national debt. It goes up, up, up, up.
  The Senator talked about the guts to support the President's budget. 
The President's budget did not resolve it. If it resolved it, why are 
we looking at $200 billion more in annual deficits? How are you going 
to defend America when we get $20 trillion in debt? Where do you draw 
the line? Where do you draw the line?
  The Senators talked about taxes. We can raise the tax rate, the 
Senator from West Virginia said--36 percent, 50 percent, 70 percent, 
100 percent? That is what is going on in Washington, DC, right now. The 
taxes are so high they cannot pay them anymore. They are asking the 
Federal Government to come in and take over the city.
  Mr. SARBANES. Let me bring the Senator back to the very real-life 
problem that I wish to discuss with him based on a very clear example 
in history, because what the Senator has just done is what is 
consistently done here. If we try to focus, in a tough-minded way, on a 
particular problem they say, ``Oh, well, don't worry about it; somehow 
or other it is going to be taken care of.''
  Now, I want the Senator to come with me for just a moment or two and 
to look at some history, and I want to read from this article that 
appeared in the summer of 1991.

       Fifty years ago last Monday, on August 12, 1941, House 
     Speaker Sam Rayburn saved the draft from legislative defeat 
     and kept the U.S. Army intact to fight a war that was only 4 
     months away.

  The reason I am citing this story is because we are constantly told 
that if we have an emergency situation, we will get this waiver. The 
Senator from New Hampshire has just told me we are going to get a 
three-fifths waiver. He left the section I was focusing on that 
required a majority of the whole number, namely you had to actually 
have 218 votes in the House or actually have 51 votes in the Senate, 
and he has now gone to three-fifths of the whole number. So you have to 
have 290 votes in the House and 60 votes in the Senate in order to 
address the crisis. He says if we have a crisis, we obviously will 
address it. I am going to point to a lesson in history in which I think 
people would now agree we had a crisis that had to be addressed. We did 
address it. But if we had been operating with these requirements, 
either one of them, we would not have addressed it because we would not 
have gotten the vote that was necessary to do it.
  Let me read on from the article.

       The margin of victory was a single vote. And the battle 
     could have been lost as easily as won except for Rayburn's 
     personality and leadership and mastery of parliamentary 
     procedure. If Rayburn had failed, the Army stood to lose 
     about two-thirds of its strength and three-fourths of the 
     officer corps. At issue was whether to extend the 12-month 
     service obligation of more than 600,000 draftees already in 
     the Army, thousands of others being inducted every day, and 
     the active-duty term of several thousand National Guardsmen 
     and Reservists who had been called up for 1 year. Without an 
     extension, the obligations of both the draftees and the 
     Guardsmen and Reservists would begin expiring in the fall. 
     The United States had adopted its first peacetime draft 
     during the previous summer after weeks of heated and 
     acrimonious debates in both congressional Chambers.

  The article then goes on to point out:

       Although the legislation limited the draftees' terms of 
     service to 12 months, it provided that the President could 
     extend the period indefinitely if Congress declared that the 
     national interest is imperiled.
       On July 21, 1941, with the prospect of war increasing, 
     Roosevelt acted. In a Special Message to Capitol Hill, he 
     asked Congress to declare a national emergency that would 
     allow the Army to extend the service of draftees, guardsmen 
     and reservists for whatever period the legislators deemed 
     appropriate.
       Despite the measure's unpopularity and strong lobbying by 
     isolationist forces, the Senate approved a joint resolution 
     on August 7, declaring the existence of a national emergency 
     and authorizing the President to extend the service of most 
     Army personnel by 18 months.

  The vote was 45 to 30, I say to my good friend from New Hampshire; 45 
to 30. That vote would not have qualified 
[[Page S2789]] under the amendment that he is proposing. That vote was 
inadequate. You needed 49 now you would need 51, if you did it by the 
whole number, or 60 if you are doing the three-fifths. I am now quoting 
the article.

       In the House it was a different story. The Republican 
     leadership viewed opposition to draft extension as a 
     political opportunity too good to ignore. Others had their 
     own reasons for opposing the measure.

  It then discusses what Rayburn went through, and of course the final 
vote was 203 to 202. Mr. President, I say to the distinguished Senator 
from New Hampshire, 203 votes is not enough under the provisions of the 
proposal that he is now seeking to place in the Constitution of the 
United States.
  So, here we have a real situation. This is not hypothetical. This was 
a critical issue. It was carried under the provisions of the Founding 
Fathers, which the very distinguished Senator from West Virginia has 
been expounding. Under the provisions of the Founding Fathers, the 
Congress was able to make a decision. You had a majority in both Houses 
for it, 45 to 30 in the Senate, 203 to 202 in the House of 
Representatives. They addressed the situation. Under this proposal, we 
would not have been able to address that crisis.
  Mr. SMITH. If I might just respond to the Senator, his point is well 
taken. However we have a situation where I think we are mixing apples 
and oranges. The Senator is assuming--we did not have an amendment at 
the time, we did not have a $5 trillion national debt in 1941. We did 
not have a situation where the Members who were debating knew that they 
would need a certain number of votes to get over the top to be able to 
declare war. It is an entirely different situation. You cannot compare 
1941 with 1995--you can, but I do not believe it is a fair comparison.
  I think things were different then. The situation was different. The 
debate was different. The issues were different. I think in this 
particular case if the emergency was such, under the amendment--if the 
emergency were such that we needed to do something in the area of 
national security, it could be done either by a three-fifths vote of 
both parties to deficit spend to take care of it--which is one option. 
If they do not want to do that, then they have other options. But I 
think to say 1941 when Roosevelt declared war is the same as it is 
today is simply wrong.
  The issue is, we can deficit spend. That is the first option. Or we 
can cut spending somewhere else. And that is exactly what most 
responsible people would do in the future, who are here on the floor of 
the Senate or in the House, wherever the debate takes place--in both 
places. They would make the responsible decision, surely, to protect 
the national security of the United States. They would cut something if 
they did not agree to go the three-fifths route to deficit spend to do 
it. I think that is very well protected under the Constitution. It 
makes complete sense. It is common sense. We are the representatives of 
the American people. If we decide we cannot muster three-fifths votes 
then I assume the American people do not feel it is a national security 
problem for us.
  If we still believe that they are wrong, we can then cut spending 
somewhere else with a simple majority. I do not see what the Senator's 
problem is.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I say to my colleague we are just being 
given these kind of bland assurances. ``Surely this would happen. No 
question this would be done. It is common sense that we would 
respond.'' Yet I am giving you a real, live, historical example. There 
was nothing hypothetical about it, nothing conjectural about it. It 
happened at a critical time in American history. We were faced in the 
Congress with a very fateful decision. We are talking literally months 
before Pearl Harbor. Literally months. And the Congress was faced with 
this difficult decision.
  The Congress reacted, I think, appropriately. But by very narrow 
margins. And neither of the margins in the Senate nor the House are 
adequate to meet the requirements contained in your proposal, which 
only dramatizes the point that the Senator from West Virginia has made 
so effectively here this morning about the danger of going against the 
Founding Fathers, against Madison and Hamilton, and writing in these 
supermajority requirements.
  The real danger to the Republic is that you will not be able to deal 
with crisis situations when they emerge.
  The Senator says, ``Oh, no, we will take care of those. Do not worry 
about it. Do not worry about it. Surely we would respond.''
  I am saying to the Senator: I am giving an example right out of 
history where we, under his standards, would not have taken care of it. 
Fortunately the standard was the one laid down by the founders, the one 
that the Senator from West Virginia propounded here. In other words, we 
decide things by majority. We were able to address the situation. But 
with your provisions here that situation could not have been addressed. 
It is clear on its face.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield for a response, 
there are a couple of points here. First of all, the Senator is 
assuming something he does not know to be the fact. In 1941 we did not 
have a three-fifths situation. In 1941, I would assume that the 
American people would have wanted us to support the President of the 
United States, which we did, to go to war when we were attacked.
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield on that? Is the Senator telling 
me that on a measure that passed the House 203 to 202, that if at the 
time there had been a three-fifths requirement of the entire membership 
of the House of Representatives--which would be 261 votes?
  Mr. SMITH. I did not do the math. I will take the Senator's word for 
it.
  Mr. SARBANES. It is 261.
  Mr. BYRD. Let me tell the Senator, 175 votes could defeat it; two-
fifths could defeat it.
  Mr. SARBANES. It is 261. Are you telling me that a good number of the 
202 who voted against it then would have voted for it, so you would 
have had 261 votes? Where are you going to come up with these? You 
barely got 203 votes. It almost lost. It passed by one vote. And now 
you are telling me, ``They did not have the three-fifths requirements 
then. If they had the three-fifths requirement somehow, miraculously 
they would have gotten the other votes in order to do it when they 
voted against it at the time?'' They almost beat it. They almost beat 
it on a straight up or down vote: 203 to 202. And now you are telling 
me, ``Well, they did not have the three-fifths requirements. If they 
would have had the three-fifths requirement, namely that he had to get 
261 votes then a big chunk of these 202 who voted against it then, to 
prevent it from happening, would have switched over and voted for it?'' 
Is that what the Senator is telling me? I cannot believe it.
  Mr. SMITH. The Senator did not listen to me very carefully. That is 
not exactly what I said. What I said is there are two options. One, 
those people, if they had the three-fifths provision, I think, would 
have looked at it a lot differently, and they may have gotten more 
votes.
  Let us assume the Senator's position and say that did not happen. If 
it did not happen and this amendment were, in 1941, part of the 
Constitution, we then would have gone and spent money by taking money 
from someplace else in the budget because we would have believed that 
the national security interests of the United States should come first 
ahead of subsidies to apples or whatever else.
  Mr. SARBANES. How do you know they would have done that?
  Mr. SMITH. Because it takes 51 percent to do it. That is why.
  Mr. SARBANES. My dear friend.
  Mr. SMITH. That is exactly why. It is the same numbers.
  Mr. SARBANES. The Senator from New Hampshire is my dear friend. But 
how can the Senator stand here and say, ``We easily would have gone 
somewhere else and found the money'' when at the time, on the very 
issue itself without that constraint, without that additional 
complication in terms of getting support for the measure, without the 
further complication of the dynamics of trying to achieve a majority 
vote, when at the time they only passed it by one vote, 203 to 202? 
That was the vote.
  Mr. HATCH. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. SARBANES. Speaker Rayburn walked the Halls of the Congress. I am 
now quoting this article.
       [[Page S2790]] The vote was set for Monday, August 11. But 
     Rayburn put it off for one day out of respect for a 
     Republican Member who had died over the weekend.

  I must say those were the days when there was a degree of civility 
that prevailed in the workings of the Congress.

       With the President out of town meeting secretly in New 
     Foundland with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to 
     frame the Atlantic Charter, Rayburn spent the additional day 
     roaming the corridors of Capitol Hill trying to win over 
     recalcitrant Democrats and wavering Republicans. His lobbying 
     style was like the man himself, honest, direct and intensely 
     personal without a hint of intimidation. The debate went on 
     for 10 hours in the House. Finally at 8:05 p.m. the reading 
     clerk began calling the roll.

  I reach back into history to try to bring you a real, live example.
  Mr. HATCH. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. SARBANES. Certainly.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield for 
such colloquy without losing my right to the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HATCH. I apologize. I did not realize my distinguished friend 
from West Virginia had the floor.
  Let me just say this. That is what was created 203 to 202. There were 
times when that could have happened. It was extraordinary. In the 
Senate, there were only 96 Senators sitting at that time. The vote was 
45 to 30. So there were 21 Senators that were missing. We could have 
had a constitutional majority in this case.
  Mr. SARBANES. How could you have had it? Those votes could not 
qualify under your amendment. Is that correct? Neither of those votes 
qualifies under your amendment.
  Mr. HATCH. You could not with those two votes.
  Mr. SARBANES. Either in the Senate or the House.
  Mr. HATCH. The Senator was talking about Senators walked. They walked 
there. There were 30 that walked in the House. There were 21 in the 
Senate; 96 in the Senate; only 75 voted. So even under a minority vote, 
people can walk, if they want to.
  But the point is we have a constitutional majority in here for one 
reason, and it has been accepted by both Democrats and Republicans in 
the House and the Senate; and that is so that we would have tax-
limiting effect. I think it is going to be a tax-limiting effect. That 
is the purpose of it.
  Mr. SARBANES. If the Senator will yield, you have it in section 5 to 
do a waiver for a military conflict you require a whole number of each 
House.
  Mr. HATCH. That is right.
  Mr. SARBANES. The whole number.
  Let me go back. There were only 48 States then. So there were 96 
Senators.
  Mr. HATCH. Right.
  Mr. SARBANES. The whole number would be 49 in that circumstance. Is 
that correct?
  Mr. HATCH. That is right.
  Mr. SARBANES. The vote in the Senate was 45 to 30. That does not 
qualify. Correct?
  Mr. HATCH. Right.
  Mr. SARBANES. In the House, they had 218.
  Mr. HATCH. 203 to 202.
  Mr. SARBANES. 218.
  Mr. HATCH. No. It was 203 to 202.
  Mr. SARBANES. In any event, it will not qualify there either.
  Mr. HATCH. It would have, had they not walked.
  My point is the Senator is saying they might walk under this 
constitutional majority. They walked then under a regular majority 
vote.
  Mr. SARBANES. That is right.
  Mr. HATCH. But in both cases, had they not walked, you could have had 
a constitutional majority. I think these votes are going to be 
heightened votes, and nobody is going to miss them.
  Mr. SARBANES. If I could say to my dear friend from Utah, the 
Founders specifically discussed this. They debated whether the quorum 
should be more than a majority of the body and they rejected the notion 
that it should be more than a majority. They said then that you would 
prevail on a measure by majority of those present and voting.
  Mr. HATCH. That is right.
  Mr. SARBANES. Assuming you had a quorum. You have escalated the 
number, and you have done it in such a way as to negatively effect very 
critical decisions, as I have indicated by the history of World War II. 
A measure that was before the body that I would argue very strenuously 
was needed to provide for the national security of our Nation would 
have failed, not because a majority of those present and voting did not 
support it--they did support it--but because you have introduced 
supermajority requirements. And these votes would not have met your 
supermajority requirements.
  Mr. HATCH. Will the Senator from West Virginia yield once more to me?
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, yes. I do.
  Mr. HATCH. Keep in mind, I do not think that we can use votes in 
1941. There was not a constitutional amendment in effect then. Keep in 
mind, one of the other things our Founding Fathers did--they did it 
very carefully--was to put article V into the Constitution which 
provides for constitutional amendments, and for changes that are 
needed. We are asserting that this change is needed because of the way 
Congress has been profligate over the last 60 years.
  But let us say the last 26 years during which time we have--could I 
finish? Let me finish this one thought. The point is that one of the 
most important aspects of the balanced budget amendment is that these 
two votes, if they are taken every year, are going to be the votes 
nobody is going to be able to miss. If you vote on increasing taxes, 
there are going to have to be 100 Senators here because it is going to 
be a vote that everybody in the country is going to pay attention to. 
If you vote on increasing the deficit, there had better be 100 Senators 
here. There are not going to be any walks. Anybody who walks is not 
going to be there in the next Congress.
  That is one thing this amendment will do.
  Mr. SARBANES. Let us assume that. Let us assume in 1941 in the House 
of Representatives that everyone who walked would have voted for the 
measure. It is a big assumption. Let us assume that. Everyone who did 
not vote would have voted for it.
  Mr. HATCH. You would have had a constitutional majority----
  Mr. SARBANES. No, you would not have had the three-fifths----
  Mr. HATCH. Not to increase spending.
  Mr. SARBANES. Which the Senator from New Hampshire was making 
reference to.
  Mr. HATCH. I said a constitutional majority for increasing taxes.
  Mr. SARBANES. The point I want to get across to my colleague is that 
there is the assumption that issues of national security will not be a 
matter of controversy. In other words, he is saying clearly, if there 
is a problem, we are going to get these supermajorities in order to do 
what needs to be done. I am demonstrating that we had an instance in 
which there was clearly a national security question and you are not 
commanding the supermajority.
  Mr. HATCH. The fact that you cannot command a supermajority is part 
of what is going to happen here. What we are saying is, look.
  I think a better illustration, if the Senator wants me to substitute 
one for him, would be the vote last year on the tax package which the 
President brought up here. It is an interesting constitutional question 
that I know will intrigue my dear friend from West Virginia who has 
spent a lifetime studying the Constitution--for whom I have a lot of 
respect--in that area, among many others. That is, that vote last year 
did not have one Republican. We have been excoriated by Members of the 
other side of the floor as Republicans because we did not vote for that 
tax increase, or the deficit reduction part of it either. We did not 
because we did not want taxes to increase. And some stood up and said, 
``We stood up and did something about the deficit.'' Well, I suspect 
that is true. We just did not happen to agree. But now that vote was a 
50-50 tie in the Senate.
  I want the attention of my dear friend from West Virginia. It was a 
50-50 tie. Had this constitutional amendment been in effect, would that 
bill have become law today? Or would it have become law at that time? 
We did not have a majority of the whole number of the U.S. Senate. It 
took the Vice President to break the tie.
  There are two ways of looking at that. One is that 50 of us could 
have thwarted the tax increase. I think that would have been a terrific 
thing to do, 
[[Page S2791]] and that is what we tried to do. We lost because of the 
fact that under the Constitution the Vice President could vote. But the 
other point would be--
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. HATCH. Let me finish and I will be glad to. The other point--with 
the delegation given to me from our colleague--is that, from your 
standpoint, a simple majority was not allowed to win, and that this 
would make it even more difficult because you would have to have 51 
actual votes of the whole number here.
  Mr. SARBANES. Is that your reading of section 4 of this balanced 
budget amendment?
  Mr. HATCH. Not necessarily. I am raising--
  Mr. SARBANES. What is your interpretation? What does it mean? Section 
4 says, ``No bill to increase revenue shall become law unless approved 
by a majority of the whole number of each House by a rollcall vote.'' 
Take the situation you just described. It is a 50-50 split. The Vice 
President is entitled to cast his vote. Would this negate the vote-
casting power of the Vice President?
  Mr. HATCH. No. He could cast his vote, but since you did not have 51 
votes of the majority of the whole number, the tax bill would have gone 
down to defeat.
  Mr. SARBANES. That is your understanding of the meaning of that?
  Mr. HATCH. That is my interpretation. I thought I would give you a 
good illustration.
  Mr. SARBANES. I wanted to have that on the record.
  Mr. HATCH. We would not have had that highest tax increase in history 
had this amendment been in effect.
  Mr. SARBANES. That is right. You are saying if this amendment were 
passed, the August vote would have been negated.
  Mr. HATCH. That is my interpretation. It would have meant that we 
would have had to have gotten that 51 votes to increase taxes, and we 
probably would have been faced with having to reduce the deficit more.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, what it also means is that in a situation 
such as the distinguished Senator from Maryland has raised--and he has 
focused on a section which I am going to reach a little later, but he 
has done it much better than I would have done it. What my Republican 
friends are saying--and I hope I will have the attention of both of my 
friends--what our friends here have just said is that in the event we 
are in a situation which jeopardizes the national security----
  Mr. HATCH. No, that is not what I said.
  Mr. BYRD. Wait. That is, in essence, what you are saying. You have 
not let me finish what I am going to say. How do you know what I am 
going to say? Be a little patient.
  Mr. HATCH. I will.
  Mr. BYRD. What they are, in essence, saying is that you have to have 
51 votes in the Senate--no matter how many take a walk; you have to 
have 51 Senators, not including the Vice President, who would be 
willing to stand up and vote for a resolution which authorizes the 
Commander in Chief in a situation where there is a declaration of war 
or----
  Mr. HATCH. No, no----
  Mr. BYRD. Just let me finish. This is one Senator who is not going to 
be befuddled or frustrated by interruptions. I will be very happy to 
yield to my friend when I have finished.
  Let me start again. We will learn over a period of time that there 
are some Senators who will just not be rushed.
  ``Congress may waive the provisions of this article for any fiscal 
year in which a declaration of war is in effect.'' In the last 48 
years, this country has fought three wars and engaged in several 
military conflicts that were of a lesser nature. Not one time was there 
a declaration of war. Not one time.

       The provisions of this article may be waived for any fiscal 
     year in which the United States is engaged in military 
     conflict which causes an imminent and serious military threat 
     to national security and is so declared by a joint resolution 
     adopted by a majority of the whole number of each House which 
     becomes law.

  Therein lies a tale--many tales, as a matter of fact. First, there 
has to be a resolution passed. There has to be a joint resolution 
passed, even considering the fact that we might have a filibuster 
conducted on such a resolution because the opposition could be very 
strong in the Senate on that occasion There could be a filibuster. The 
President could veto the resolution when it reaches him. How much time 
do we have? My friend from New Hampshire--I believe, if I did not 
misunderstand him--said in that kind of a situation, we would make 
cuts, we would make cuts from other programs. We would adjust 
priorities.
  We do not have time to make cuts when the Nation is faced with a 
military threat. We do not have time to search through various programs 
and come up with cuts. And besides, the domestic discretionary programs 
have already been pared to the bone. When the Nation is put in 
jeopardy, there must be a resolution passed. It must be enacted into 
law by the President's signature, and the Nation's security is in the 
balance. We do not have time to make cuts. It takes time.
  Secondly, in the event there is a 50-50 tie, under the Constitution 
as it is written, the Vice President could cast a vote breaking the 
tie. Under this section of the amendment, the Vice President, 
representing the President and his administration, is not permitted to 
cast a vote to break a tie, while the Nation's security is in the 
balance. No, it has to be a Senator. The amendment says you have to 
have 51 Senators.
  Mr. President, this section 5, plays Russian roulette with the 
national security of this country. You do not have the time to look at 
some programs providing research on apples, or mushrooms, or whatever 
it may be. You do not have time for that. And that is small chicken 
feed, that is small; you are talking about pennies in comparison with 
the billions of dollars that military threats to our security will 
cost. It puts the Nation's security into a gamble.
  Mr. President, does the distinguished Senator wish me to yield to him 
again?
  Mr. HATCH. I would appreciate it. I appreciate what the Senator is 
saying. This amendment is not going to allow business
 as usual. It is going to require a constitutional majority to increase 
taxes, which is a tax-limiting approach. I suspect that that will be 
more difficult to get than a three-fifths majority to increase the 
debt. I really suspect that that is so.

  The distinguished Senator from West Virginia--as he always is--was 
very accurate in stating that section 5 says that during a declared 
war, Congress can waive this provision. That only takes a majority 
vote. However, if you get into a military conflict which causes an 
imminent and serious military threat, then it will take a 
constitutional majority.
  I cannot imagine any Congress that would not grant a constitutional 
majority under those circumstances. But be that as it may, if it does 
not, then that will be the right of the Congress.
  (Mr. GREGG assumed the chair.)
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. HATCH. Yes, I will.
  Mr. SARBANES. The people who are against it do not even have to show 
up; is that correct?
  Mr. HATCH. Yes.
  Mr. SARBANES. Now the way the Constitution is written, if a matter is 
put to a vote, let us say four or five Members are missing, they may be 
ill, they may be in the hospital, they may be sick, they may have gone 
to a family funeral, so they cannot be here. It is not unheard of. In 
fact, it has happened on occasion. You take a vote amongst those that 
are here. It passes 47 to 46, and that is that. Under your provision 
you need 51 votes.
  Mr. HATCH. Right.
  Mr. SARBANES. Suppose you had a vote 50 to nothing, just to draw the 
most extreme hypothetical, 50 are for, zero against. The rest are all 
absent. That does not carry; is that correct?
  Mr. HATCH. You would wait until the next day when you had 51. You can 
come up with hypotheticals in every situation, but that does not change 
reality. This body has increased the debt ceiling.
  Mr. SARBANES. But the people that are against do not have to vote; 
right?
  Mr. HATCH. That is right.
  Mr. SARBANES. They are not required to be here to make a difference. 
Because the standard is not between 
[[Page S2792]] those that are for and those that are against, you have 
to get so many affirmative votes; is that correct?
  Mr. HATCH. You could use the same logic. It does not---
  Mr. SARBANES. Or it could be the three-fifths where you have ---
  Mr. HATCH. You have to have 51 here to constitute a quorum, so it 
would not have passed anyway. That could be under any hypothetical.
  Mr. BYRD. No, no, no. You can have 51 here, which is a quorum, under 
the constitutional amendment that presently obtains and 26 Senators 
would be a majority.
  Mr. SARBANES. If you had 51 present so you had a quorum and the vote 
was say 48 to 3.
  Mr. HATCH. Then you would not have the requisite number.
  Mr. SARBANES. It would not pass; right?
  Mr. HATCH. No.
  Mr. SARBANES. You would have a quorum and you would not pass it.
  The more you probe into this, the more of a Rube Goldberg contraption 
it is.
  Actually what happens is, the more we debate this section, the more 
you come to understand and a appreciate the perceptions and the wisdom 
of the drafters of the Constitution.
  It is incredible that we are out here playing games with a document 
that has withstood 206 years of scrutiny and was put together by a 
group of men whom Gladstone, the great British Prime Minister, regarded 
as the greatest assemblage of statesmen in the history of the world. 
That was his comment about them in framing the Constitution of the 
United States. Yet, we are playing games with it all throughout here.
  You have a three-fifths of the whole number requirement, you have a 
majority of the whole number requirement, you have a waiver 
requirement. You are negating the tie-breaking vote given to the Vice 
President of the United States, as I understand it, under another 
provision of the Constitution.
  Mr. HATCH. Not really.
  Mr. SARBANES. The Senator told me on a vote of 50 to 50, in which the 
Vice President sought to cast the tie-breaking vote, would not qualify 
under your proposal.
  Mr. HATCH. Only under that instance. In other instances it who 
qualify.
  Let me make this point. The game that is being played is business as 
usual. We are running this country right into bankruptcy.
  Mr. SARBANES. No, that is not the case.
  Mr. HATCH. Let me finish.
  Mr. SARBANES. No, I am going to reclaim my time. I am not going to 
let the Senator----
  Mr. HATCH. He yielded to me.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from West Virginia yield the 
floor?
  Mr. BYRD. Let me get it perfectly clear. I yielded to both Senators 
for a colloquy, with the understanding that I would not lose my right 
to the floor, into which colloquy I presume I can intervene at any 
point I wish.
  Mr. HATCH. That is right.
  If I could finish my remarks, I would be happy to allow the Senator 
from Maryland to respond.
  My problem is, you can find fault with almost anything. The reason we 
brought this balanced budget amendment before us is because we have a 
runaway train of Federal spending. We have a runaway train that is not 
treating our taxpayers fairly. The answers always seem to be more 
spending and more taxing.
  This amendment is an amendment that does not require a balanced 
budget, but it does require us to at least make priority choices.
  If we are going to spend, then we are going to have to stand up and 
vote to do so. You have to vote. We do not have to now. If we are going 
to tax, then you have to stand up and vote to tax. We do not have to do 
that right now. We can do it through voice votes.
  I just want to add this to it: If you are going to tax more, by gosh, 
I think you are going to find these two votes--a vote to increase 
taxes, a vote to increase the deficit--from this point on, if this 
balanced budget amendment passes both Houses and becomes ratified, you 
are going to find that those two votes are going to have 100 Senators 
every time, because nobody could fail to vote on them. And if they do, 
they are in jeopardy of losing their seat. It is going to highlight the 
importance of these votes around here. We will not have any more of 
these 51 votes or 26 to 25. We have not had any of those as long as I 
have been here.
  The point is that when the Senator mentioned that in his 
hypothetical, he said 50 votes. I am saying that would not have been 
acceptable; 51, if you have 26 votes, yes.
  Mr. SMITH. Will the Senator from West Virginia yield?
  Mr. SARBANES. If I could just engage in this colloquy further.
  The game that is being played, I say to my friend, is very clear 
today because the other side has been very clear that they have drafted 
this in a way that would have knocked out the deficit reduction package 
of August 1993.
  Now, I understand that the Senator was not for that. I was for it. I 
disagree with him. The Senator portrays it as a tax increase on all the 
American people. The fact of the matter is, it was a tax cut on the top 
2 percent of the income, other than the gasoline tax. But the income 
tax rates affected the top 2 percent.
  Now, I understand the Senators on the other side have a very soft 
spot for the top 2 percent, but it seemed to me reasonable to do this 
and to try to address some of our Nation's problems.
  In any event, the situation could have been reversed. You could have 
been trying to push through a deficit reduction package that I opposed 
for one reason or another.
  The question is whether you are going to skew the Constitution in a 
way that a majority is not going to be able to make decisions. The 
Founding Fathers very carefully constructed this document and they are 
very explicit, both Madison and Hamilton in the Federalist Papers, in 
pointing out in the documents about a supermajority.
  Let me just read what Madison said in Federalist 58. Because he is 
the father of our Constitution and a man of great reason and fairness. 
He would recognize the other arguments and try to deal with them 
rationally, which is what we are trying very hard to do here today. Let 
me just quote him.
  This is Madison now, in the Federalist 58:

       It has been said that more than a majority ought to have 
     been required for a quorum; and in particular cases, if not 
     in all, more than a majority of the quorum for a decision. 
     That some advantages might have resulted from such a 
     precaution cannot be denied. It might have been an additional 
     shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle 
     generally to hasty and partial measures. But these 
     considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences in the 
     opposite scale. In all cases where justice or the general 
     good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures 
     to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free Government 
     would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority that 
     would rule: the power would be transferred to the minority.
      Were the defensive privilege limited to particular cases, an 
     interested minority might take advantage of it to screen 
     themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, 
     or, in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable 
     indulgences.

  Now, I agree with Gladstone's evaluation of the Founding Fathers. 
This amendment is fraught with peril. The more we go into it and the 
more we develop it and the more we measure it against historical 
experience, the more I find wrong with the amendment.
  The Senator asserted earlier that surely three-fifths would vote to 
raise the debt limit. I invite my colleague to go back through the 
votes on raising debt limits in the past to spot the ones where three-
fifths did not. It is not so obvious.
  In many of these issues it is a struggle to get the simple majority 
to make the decision. These are controversial issues. They are 
recognized as controversial. The August 1993 package was controversial. 
You disagreed with it. I supported it. I think it has proven itself 
out. I think all the subsequent history supports a decision to have 
passed it.
  Those decisions ought to be made by majority vote. That is what the 
Founding Fathers intended. That is what I think we should stick with.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, will the Senator from West Virginia yield?
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield.
   [[Page S2793]] Mr. SMITH. The Senator has been very generous for all 
Members here on his time for which this Senator is grateful.
  I would like to pick up on something that Senator Hatch said, and say 
to the Senator from Maryland, the Senator has pointed out some points 
which are well taken regarding this debate and this amendment. I would 
also say to the Senator that Winston Churchill once said, ``Democracy 
is not perfect, but it is the best thing going.''
  The issue here is the Founding Fathers were not infallible. We are 
not infallible. There are reasonable decisions that have to be made 
from time to time. The Dred Scott decision in 1857 when a Supreme Court 
said a slave was property and therefore could not sue in Federal court. 
That came in under the Constitution. Is that right? No. But it 
happened. So we are an infallible people.
  So my point is, what Senator Hatch was alluding to, if we look at 
what is happening we are talking about a situation where a national 
emergency might emerge. The Senator is correct. He made some very good 
points about what might happen if that national emergency were to come 
about.
  The other point is, if we are looking at where the debt is going and 
how much of the debt is being consumed, how much of the budget is being 
consumed by interest on the debt, and looking at where it is today, 16 
percent roughly of that budget is interest on the debt and 16 percent 
is national defense.
  I would say to the Senator, with all due respect, if we did not stop 
it, if we do not stop this runaway train of debt and deficit spending, 
we are not going to have any money for national defense. We are not 
going to have any money for any emergency under any situation because, 
and the Senator knows, that the commission, which was a bipartisan 
commission, on entitlements headed by Senator Bob Kerrey, Democrat, and 
Senator Jack Danforth, Republican, said by the year 2013 at the latest, 
this country will be spending 100 percent of its budget on interest on 
the debt and entitlements. There is not going to be any money for 
defense.
  I would just say to the Senator if this is fallible, this amendment, 
then tell me what the alternative is when we get to 2013 and we do not 
have any money-- none, zero--to defend our national security or our 
national interests.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I will tell the Senator. First of all, 
it boggles the imagination that we are hearing this argument from 
someone who voted against the 1993 deficit reduction package. All of 
the situation that the Senator is talking about would be far worse had 
the Senator prevailed on that vote.
  There are tough decisions to be made. Everyone recognizes that. 
Because they are tough to make it is very difficult to get a majority 
for them. What the Senator is doing is escalating the standard from a 
majority to a supermajority. So the Senator is making it even tougher 
to make the tough decisions, not easier. The Senator is putting more 
power into the hands of the minority to frustrate or to thwart the 
effort.
  Where I disagree with the Senator is, in his assumption, that all of 
these waivers will be granted in a time of crisis. If we go back 
through our history, it does not support the Senator. Historically, 
when we come up against these situations they are often very divisive 
and very controversial and action in the end is taken by a bare 
majority. I went through at great length earlier the example of the 
extension of the service requirement under the draft in 1940.
  Clearly, that was important to the national security of the country. 
I am quoting from that article:

       In an effort to depoliticize the issue as much as possible, 
     Roosevelt and Secretary of War Henry Stimson designated Army 
     Chief of Staff George Marshall as the administration's point 
     man on the Hill. Marshall worked tirelessly but found 
     converts difficult to come by despite his tremendous prestige 
     on Capitol Hill. ``You put the case very well,'' one 
     Republican Congressman told him, ``but I will be damned if I 
     am going to go along with Mr. Roosevelt.''
       The vote was set for Monday August 11, but Rayburn put it 
     off for one day out of respect for a Republican Member who 
     had died over the weekend. With the President out of town 
     meeting secretly in Newfoundland with British Prime Minister 
     Winston Churchill, to nail the Atlantic Charter, Rayburn 
     spent the additional day roaming the corridors of Capitol 
     Hill trying to win over recalcitrant Democrats and wavering 
     Republicans. His lobbying style was like the man himself, 
     honest, direct, and intensely personal without a hint of 
     intimidation.

  Here is Rayburn himself, walking the corridors. Here is General 
Marshall, one of the really great statesmen of American history, a man 
for whom I have enormous respect and admiration, working--as they say 
here ``Worked tirelessly but found converts difficult to come by 
despite his tremendous prestige on Capitol Hill.'' When the vote came, 
it was 203-202. That vote would not qualify under the provisions of 
your balanced budget amendment proposition here.
  We would not have been able to respond to this national crisis. The 
Senator earlier said to me if they had known they needed a three-fifths 
requirement they would have gotten more votes. I said to the Senator, 
it defies belief that a sizable chunk of the 202 who voted against it 
would switch over because they knew there was a three-fifths 
requirement. They voted against it when there was a simple majority 
requirement and the thing would have gone down, and it would have been 
a disaster for the Nation had it happened.
  All I am saying is that these tough decisions need to be made by 
majority vote just as is provided for in the Constitution. The Founding 
Fathers could foresee these things and that is why they provided it. 
This is, as the distinguished Senator from West Virginia said, playing 
Russian roulette with the national security of the United States.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, if I could have a last response, I promise 
the Senator from West Virginia.
  The Founding Fathers also provided for an amendment process to the 
Constitution because they knew that it would need that flexibility, 
because it could not predict the future nor foresee the future. The 
Senator knows that. That is why we are here.
  I also would respond to the Senator on the point of the budget 
agreement of 1993. This debate is, essentially, a nonpartisan debate on 
the issue of whether or not we need an amendment, constitutional 
amendment, to balance the Federal budget. But the Senator introduced a 
partisan matter on the issue of the budget agreement.
  Just because this Senator and the remaining Republican Senators in 
the Senate at the time did not agree with the Senator from Maryland 
that the way to bring the deficit down was to increase taxes $250 
billion, but rather bring spending down $250 billion to move the budget 
deficit down, that does not make me opposed to bringing the deficit or 
the debt down.
  The truth of the matter is, those on this side who voted against that 
wanted to cut spending, not raise taxes.
  The second point is, which we have already gone into on the floor 
many times before, not only during this debate, but the truth of the 
matter is the correction that needed to be taken to reduce the debt was 
not taken with that budget agreement, for the same reason it was not 
taken with any of these other agreements that are on this chart from 
1921 all the way up to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the budget agreement 
of 1993. The truth of the matter is, Congress walks away from them.
  The President of the United States, President Clinton, just submitted 
a budget, the follow-on to this budget, which increases the national 
debt by $1.6 trillion over the next 5 years. Since this agreement has 
been passed, we have increased the national debt another one-half 
trillion dollars. So where is the progress?
  This Senator fails to understand where the progress is being made. I 
hear about all these great agreements, we have had all these budget 
agreements, we are bringing the debt down, bringing the deficit down. 
We are not bringing it down. It is going up, up, up, up, and the reason 
why is because we need this amendment because Congress will not do it 
without it. That is absolutely evident.
  The Senator talks about a national emergency. I do not know whether 
he has a commission out there somewhere that defines a national 
emergency or whether he has to read it in the newspaper that it is a 
national emergency. If the Congress of the United States 
[[Page S2794]] does not think it is a national emergency or the 
President does not think it is, I do not know how you define a national 
emergency.
  So I assume, by definition, if the Congress does not vote to say it 
is a national emergency and provide the funding to go to war, maybe 
they do not think we should go to war. That is the prerogative of the 
U.S. Congress. That is the prerogative. That is exactly what the 
Founding Fathers meant that ``Congress shall have the power to declare 
war.''
  This argument that somehow we are going to defend the right of the 
United States to protect itself by voting against the balanced budget 
amendment is the most nonsensical thing I heard since I have been here.
  By the time this debate is over, we are going to add tens of 
billions, hundreds of billions of dollars to the national debt; $9,600 
per second as we debate the debt goes up. Interest on the debt is now 
going to pass defense. What we spend on defense and interest is going 
this way, just like that, and defense is going this way. And by the 
year 2013, by most admissions of a bipartisan commission, we will be 
spending 100 percent on interest and 100 percent on entitlements.
  Mrs. BOXER. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. SMITH. That is what is going to threaten the national security of 
the United States of America, not a constitutional amendment to balance 
the budget.
  Mrs. BOXER. Will the Senator yield to me to ask a question?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia has the time.
  Mrs. BOXER. If the Senator will yield for a short period of time.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask that I may continue to yield with the 
understanding that I not lose the floor for the purpose of a colloquy 
to include now the distinguished Senator from California [Mrs. Boxer].
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. BOXER. I thank you very much. I was not planning to participate, 
but something the Senator said makes me want to, and that is during the 
discussion with the Senator from Maryland on the vote on the deficit 
reduction package, which the Senator from New Hampshire says is, in 
fact, not working, every expert in the country says that the deficit 
would have been $500 billion higher. But let us not even get into that 
because what I want to ask the Senator are two basic questions.
  First of all, the Senator said at that time he did not like the 
package that the President sent over, the deficit reduction package, 
because it contained some tax increases of which he did not approve. We 
also know it contained a large tax cut for the working poor and far 
many more people are affected in a positive way from that tax cut. But 
let us put that aside.
  The Senator said he would have preferred instead of raising taxes--
and he puts it at $250 billion--he would have cut spending $250 
billion.
  So my question is, did the Senator offer an amendment to cut $250 
billion and show us how he was going to cut $250 billion from the 
deficit? I do not recall it.
  Mr. SMITH. If the Senator will allow me to respond, you know the 
situation as well as I do with regard to the debate and the politics, 
what was going on. The truth of the matter is, there were many 
discussions on our side, many attempts to redirect that in committee. 
The distinguished Senator from New Hampshire, who is in the chair, was 
involved in a number of efforts in the Budget Committee to reprioritize 
that whole budget, and the Senator from California knows that.
  The truth of the matter is, the position of the President and the 
majority in the Senate at the time, and in the House, was that the best 
way to deal with the deficit was to raise taxes on the American people. 
My point is, the best way to deal with the deficit would be to reduce 
spending and to continue that spending on a downward trend.
  Mrs. BOXER. So the answer to my----
  Mr. SMITH. My final point. My only point is we did not do what we 
needed to do to correct it. Even with the tax increase you did not 
correct it. If you want to take the position, which I happen to 
disagree with, that we can continue to raise taxes forever until we 
balance the budget, you have a right to that position. But there is 
only so much you can get.
  Mrs. BOXER. My question to the Senator was, he said at the time he 
would have preferred to cut spending $250 billion instead of raising 
the taxes. The President's plan did raise taxes on the wealthy, and it 
also cut taxes much more broadly on the working poor.
  Mr. SARBANES. It also cut spending.
  Mrs. BOXER. And it cut spending the other $250 billion. But the point 
I want to make, in conclusion, and then I will yield back the time to 
the good Senator and thank him once again for his leadership on this: 
The Senator himself said he was working on some plans. I am sure he is. 
I have never seen that plan.
  I wrote to every single Republican who is in the leadership, heads 
committees when this debate started. I said, ``Show me your plan. You 
want this balanced budget to go into effect. I want to know if it is 
going to hurt the people of California, the people I represent. I want 
to know what is going to happen if there is a disaster or a war.''
  You have a three-fifths super- majority built into this, 
as the Senator from West Virginia and the Senator from Maryland have 
stated. They do not agree with it. I do not agree with it. I think it 
shows a mistrust for the people, that is what I think about 
supermajorities. They show a mistrust for the people. They give too 
much power to the minority, and I do not think that is what America is 
all about.
  But putting all that aside for this conversation, I have to stand up 
and say to my friend from West Virginia that when Senators on that side 
criticize those of us on this side for voting for deficit reduction, 
which was the largest package in history and it is working, for them 
not to show what their plan is and to hide behind this figleaf of a 
balanced budget amendment, trying to tell the American people, because 
of that, they are going to be the ones to balance the budget, I find it 
very problematical. And I rose today to add my voice.
  They did not vote for the right to know. They did not vote to exclude 
Social Security. I think this is a dangerous, dangerous balanced budget 
amendment.
  By the way, I wanted to vote for a balanced budget amendment. I 
wanted to vote for one over on the House side, I say to my friend from 
West Virginia. He would not have agreed with me. I did, in fact, do 
that because it was flexible, it took Social Security off the table, it 
did not have a supermajority, and we tried to fix this amendment.
  As the Senator from Maryland has stated so eloquently, the more you 
look at this amendment--and that is why I appreciate the time we have 
here in the Senate to do that--the worse it gets for the American 
people and the people that I came here to fight for, the people of 
California.
  Mr. SMITH. May I ask the Senator one question?
  Mrs. BOXER. Does the Senator continue to yield?
  Mr. SMITH. One final question. Under your definition of 
``exemption,'' if Social Security and other entitlements get to 100 
percent of the budget, do you still support the exemption?
  Mrs. BOXER. Let me say to----
  Mr. SMITH. Answer yes or no.
  Mrs. BOXER. I will answer it. I agree with the Republicans who have 
said over and over again by vote, ``You're not going to touch Social 
Security.''
  Mr. SMITH. But when you exempt it----
  Mrs. BOXER. The answer is I am not for touching Social Security 
either, and because I believe that, I think it is a compact with the 
people who paid into it.
  Mr. SMITH. You are going to destroy it without the----
  Mrs. BOXER. No.
  Mr. SMITH. You certainly are.
  Mr. SARBANES. If the Senator will yield, the Social Security System 
is paying its way.
  Mrs. BOXER. Exactly right.
  Mr. SARBANES. The Social Security System is not only paying its way, 
it is, in fact, running a surplus.
  Mr. SMITH. And the Treasury is borrowing all the money to fund the 
debt, and the Senator knows it.
  Mr. SARBANES. That has nothing to do with the Social Security System. 
It is terribly important for the American 
[[Page S2795]] people to understand this because a game may well be 
played with the Social Security trust fund, as was just indicated, in 
effect, by my colleague from New Hampshire, if they do not understand.
  The Social Security trust fund is more than paying for itself. People 
receiving Social Security owe no apology on the deficit question, 
because the trust fund currently is not only paying its way, it is 
running surpluses, which in an accounting sense are used to offset the 
size of the deficit.
  Now, the other side would obviously want to use those, and many of us 
feel that should not be done. In the 1980's, when the Social Security 
trust fund ran into some difficulties, we took the measures of reducing 
benefits and raising Social Security taxes in order to put the Social 
Security trust fund back into a healthy position.
  That is exactly what we did. This is an effort to raid the Social 
Security trust fund. It is implicit in this balanced budget amendment, 
and to some extent was made explicit the other day with the tabling of 
the Reid amendment, which sought to make it very clear that it could 
not be tapped or drawn on. It needs to be understood the Social 
Security system is paying its way. We have other so-called entitlements 
that are not, but the Social Security trust fund is more than paying 
its way. That needs to be understood, and this assault on the Social 
Security system needs to be repudiated.
  Mrs. BOXER. I say to my friend--and I thank him for continuing to 
yield--the reason I answered the question the way I did to my friend, 
the good Senator from New Hampshire, is because the Republicans are 
trying to have it both ways.
  It is really extraordinary, and I am glad we have this chance, 
because on the one hand they have passed motion after motion stating 
that they will never touch Social Security or the benefits and it is 
off the table and they are not going to look at it. On the other hand, 
they vote against the Reid amendment, the Reid-Feinstein amendment, 
which would have clearly taken Social Security out of this balanced 
budget requirement.
  So they are talking two ways. And what was so interesting right here 
this afternoon just a few minutes ago is the good Senator from New 
Hampshire says to me, Senator, are you saying that even if Social 
Security and the other entitlements are 100 percent of the problem, 
that you are not going to touch them?
  Well, that is what they have been saying. They have been saying they 
are not going to touch them. But if you listen very carefully, it is a 
very clear threat to Social Security, as clear as the nose on your 
face.
  I say that this amendment is very dangerous. It is very dangerous to 
the stability of this Nation because it is so inflexible, and my 
Republican friends have voted almost unanimously--we came close on the 
Johnston amendment on the Court issue, but basically they have walked 
down the aisle with this rigid supermajority requirement amendment that 
puts Social Security in jeopardy, it puts our States in jeopardy, and 
it puts our people in jeopardy.
  I wish to thank the Senator from West Virginia for his generosity in 
yielding to me.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the distinguished Senator from California [Mrs. 
Boxer].
  Mr. President, when all is said and done, our friends on the other 
side of the aisle have not answered the question put to them by Senator 
Sarbanes. He brought up the language in Section 5 of the constitutional 
amendment to balance the budget:

       The Congress may waive the provisions of this article for 
     any fiscal year in which a declaration of war is in effect. 
     The provisions of this article may be waived for any fiscal 
     year in which the United States is engaged in military 
     conflict which causes an imminent and serious military threat 
     to national security and is so declared by a joint 
     resolution, adopted by a majority of the whole number of each 
     House, which becomes law.

  Of course, then the proponents of the amendment, not wishing to focus 
on section 5 and the questions asked by the distinguished Senator from 
Maryland related thereto, wish to talk about the seriousness of the 
budget deficits and the seriousness of the debt, and so on.
  We are all concerned about those deficits and the debt. There is no 
disagreement as to the desired goal to reach a balanced budget and to 
reduce the deficits and ultimately to begin paying the principal on the 
debt and hopefully reducing the interest that is paid on that debt.
  The proponents do not want to focus on this section 5. I will ask the 
question: If the country ``is engaged in a military conflict,'' short 
of a war that has been declared, ``engaged in a military conflict that 
causes an imminent and serious military threat to national security and 
is so declared by a joint resolution, adopted by a majority number of 
the whole number of each House, which becomes law,'' does that language 
mean that once the joint resolution referred to in that section is 
adopted by a majority of the whole number of each House and becomes 
law, and in the event that the military conflict which causes an 
imminent and serious military threat to national security continues 
over a period of another year or 2 years or subsequent years, does this 
language mean that Congress will have to waive the provisions of this 
article by way of a joint resolution in each and every subsequent 
fiscal year in which that threat to the national security exists? Does 
that mean we have to do it over and over again?
  I am waiting on the Republican response team to respond. Does that 
mean that we have to go through this obstacle course every year, every 
subsequent year after that first year, or that first occasion in which 
the joint resolution is adopted by a majority of the whole number of 
each House? Do we have to do that over and over again?
  Suppose the support for the Commander in Chief's position, suppose 
the national support wavers?
  Initially, people having been supportive, through their 
representatives, of adopting the joint resolution are--suppose that 
threat to the national security continues into a subsequent fiscal 
year, and then again into another fiscal year? Does this language make 
it incumbent upon the Congress to continue, with each new fiscal year, 
to pass a joint resolution by a majority of the whole number of each 
House? What does this mean?
  The Commander in Chief and the military forces which he may have 
committed as he did in Desert Storm, or as President Truman did in 
Korea--suppose that initial support of the people lessens? What does 
the Commander in Chief do? He is left out there hanging. He has men on 
distant battlefields. He has ships plying the waves of the several 
seas. He has planes transporting Marines and soldiers. He has an Air 
Force out there that is flying in various areas of the world. What does 
it mean? Do we have to pass another joint resolution in the next fiscal 
year?
  Suppose this emergent situation should arise in August, with the 
close of the fiscal year imminent on September 30. There is not time to 
pass a joint resolution and look for cuts in other areas of the budget, 
to which my friends on the other side of the aisle have alluded. What 
happens? The fiscal year is closed on September 30 and the total 
outlays have exceeded the total receipts for that fiscal year. You have 
men out there in the field facing danger. Their lives are on the line, 
their lives are in jeopardy, and the security of this country is in 
jeopardy. What are we going to do? Are we going to be entertained by a 
wide-ranging debate in both Houses on a joint resolution every fiscal 
year that that situation continues? And, in addition, we have to have a 
majority of the whole number elected to each House for passage.
  Mr. THOMAS. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes, I yield.
  Mr. THOMAS. Senator, I am not as familiar as you are with the 
process, but it seems to me that now there has to be approval, there 
has to be approval annually for the budget, there has to be approval 
for the President's move in terms of military activities.
  Mr. BYRD. There was not any approval in the case of his invasion of 
Haiti. The invasion actually started.
  Mr. THOMAS. There was in Desert Storm, as you will recall.
  Mr. BYRD. Wait just a second. The invasion of Haiti started. The 
President called it off--in midair, almost. I was not supportive of 
that invasion.
  Mr. THOMAS. Nor was I.
  [[Page S2796]] I guess further I would say, I am not sure I am 
confounded by the Congress each year approving this. I do not think 
that is an unusual kind of thing. Do you not think the Congress 
represents the people----
  Mr. BYRD. When the Senator is around here long enough he may find 
himself confounded. If we get into a situation where the Nation's 
security is in the balance, we may all feel confounded by the necessity 
of acting expeditiously, because we have the lives of men and women in 
dire peril. And then, under this amendment, we are going to require a 
majority of the Senators who are chosen and sworn to pass a resolution 
in a situation like that--we are going to explain that away by talking 
about the budget deficits?
  Mr. THOMAS. I have a little more confidence in the Members of this 
body than to ignore an issue of that kind. It just seems to me that the 
evidence is that we need to do something different than we have been 
doing. I constantly hear we cannot change things. But the record is, we 
have to if we want different results.
  Mr. BYRD. Senator, I am talking about section 5.
  Mr. THOMAS. I understand.
  Mr. BYRD. Let us stay with it. Let us not talk about, at the moment--
I will be glad to yield later to the Senator, if he wants to broaden 
the discussion.
  We are talking about section 5. As Napoleon said, there were men on 
his council who were far more eloquent than he, but that he won every 
argument simply by saying 2 plus 2 equals 4. It is pretty simple.
  So I want to say to my friend, as Napoleon might have, he would say 
let us stick with the question. Let us stick with section 5. That is 
the question that has been raised this afternoon, in the main, on this 
floor.
  So, is the Senator telling me that we should run the risk of adopting 
a joint resolution each fiscal year in which our national security is 
in jeopardy? We should run the risk of adopting a joint resolution and 
that he is willing to subject this country's security to the necessity 
of a supermajority vote--a mini-supermajority vote, a majority of those 
Senators chosen and sworn?
  Mr. THOMAS. I have, I guess--and I do not suggest I know the 
answers--but I have a good deal of confidence. What does it say? It 
says, ``* * * this article may be waived for any fiscal year in which 
the United States is engaged in military conflict which causes an 
imminent and serious militarily threat * * *'' I have a hunch that most 
of us, a supermajority of us, would respond to that.
  Mr. BYRD. Is that the Senator's answer?
  Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir.
  Mr. BYRD. Well, Mr. President, that is the kind of answer that the 
proponents of this ill-advised constitutional amendment continue to 
make. ``Well, I have confidence that the Congress would do thus and 
so.'' Or ``The intent of the proponents of this constitutional 
amendment is thus and so--the intent.'' Or ``That would never happen.'' 
Or ``I am sure that the Senate and House will rise to meet the needs of 
providing--by providing supermajorities.''
  Senators do not know that. Senators do not know what the intent of a 
future Congress may be. Senators do not know with enough certitude to 
give me confidence that Congress will act in a given situation that may 
be years away, as it might act at this moment or in this year of Our 
Lord 1995.
  Mr. President, this is the typical response: ``I have confidence.'' 
That is it. ``I have confidence. I am willing to trust our 
colleagues.'' Well, I am willing to trust colleagues also. I am willing 
also to trust the good judgment of a majority of the representatives of 
the people, if the people are adequately informed. I am willing to 
trust the opinions of the American people if they are properly 
informed. But we cannot cavalierly push away this sobering question nor 
the serious questions that arise with respect to this Constitutional 
amendment simply by saying, ``Well, I am sure it won't happen,'' or ``I 
am willing to trust'' so and so and ``a future Congress'' and ``this is 
not the intent.''
  Read what the amendment says. That is what the court is going to go 
by. It is going to first look at the four corners of the document.
  Section 1:

       Total outlays for any fiscal year shall not exceed total 
     receipts for that fiscal year.

  Then in section 5:

       The provisions of this article--

  Meaning section 1.

     may be waived for any fiscal year in which the United States 
     is engaged in military conflict which causes an imminent and 
     serious military threat to national security.

  Who is going to determine what is an ``imminent and serious military 
threat'' to the national security? Obviously, there are going to be 
differences of opinion.
  Mr. THOMAS. That is what I am suggesting; that is, that is the role 
of Congress, and I think it is a legitimate role and one that is not 
unusual, one that I have perceived has been done for a number of years.
  Mr. BYRD. Absolutely. But for a number of years it has not been 
required.
  Mr. THOMAS. It should be required.
  Mr. BYRD. For 206 years it has not been required that there be a 
majority of the whole number in each House to pass a resolution.
  Mr. THOMAS. Where does the President get the money, if the majority 
of the Congress does not agree?
  Mr. BYRD. Where does he get the money?
  Mr. THOMAS. Yes.
  Mr. BYRD. Let me ask the Senator. Suppose the President needs a new 
tax. Suppose he needs to raise taxes to meet that serious military 
conflict, that serious military threat to the United States. Suppose he 
needs to increase taxes. Then what? Would the Senator be willing to 
raise taxes?
  Mr. THOMAS. The President does not raise taxes.
  Mr. BYRD. That is not the question which I asked the Senator.
  Mr. THOMAS. I think there is a system in which the President can 
move. But the President then comes to the Congress for either a 
declaration or for the money, or he, as he is doing now, comes for a 
supplemental budget. The Congress has to be involved to make this 
decision.
  Mr. BYRD. Of course. This Senator has never said the Congress should 
not be involved. This Senator is saying simply that the Congress ought 
to continue to be involved under the present Constitution which has 
provided very well for congressional actions to meet all emergencies 
that have occurred throughout the 206-year history of this country.
  Mr. THOMAS. I understand that.
  Mr. BYRD. But now we are going to be in a very different situation if 
this Constitution is going to be amended. And it will not be amended 
for just a year or so; it will be changed from now until kingdom come, 
unless the American people and Congress repeal this amendment once it 
is in the Constitution. The Senator knows that. It is not easy once it 
is in there. It is not like a statute which can be repealed by the same 
Congress that enacted it in the first place.
  I am asking the Senator. Suppose we get into a situation where this 
Nation's security is in peril and more money is needed and the 
necessity arises for an increase in taxes. Then what are my friends on 
the other side going to do in that situation?
  Mr. THOMAS. That is why this provision is there to waive.
  Mr. BYRD. Yes. By what vote?
  Mr. THOMAS. By a supermajority vote.
  Mr. BYRD. Yes. That is just the question. Why subject this country's 
security to the necessity of a supermajority vote when the Nation's 
very life is in danger, the security of the American people are in 
danger, the security of the troops in the field are in danger, and the 
security of the planes in the air is in danger? Why subject a decision 
at that critical moment to a supermajority? The Framers, in their 
wisdom, did not do it. And we have fought a good many wars.
  Mr. THOMAS. I understand. This is the basis of what we are talking 
about. Of course, the Senator says leave it as it is. Others say we 
need to change it. That is what it is, whether we change or whether we 
do not. Many people think that there needs to be a change. Many people 
think the performance is such that there needs to be a change. And I 
respect greatly the Senator's wisdom and knowledge. But that is the 
issue. And the Senator does not want it 
[[Page S2797]] changed. I understand that. Others do. That is what it 
is all about.
  Mr. BYRD. It is about more than that. That is why we need to take the 
time to probe and to explore these provisions that are in this 
amendment to balance the budget. We are all in agreement, I say to the 
Senator, with the goal of a balanced budget. We are all in agreement. I 
am in agreement that we need to reduce the deficits. And I agree that 
it is going to require some pain. I also am of the opinion that we do 
not need to wait 7 years. We started in 1990. We took a great step 
beyond that in 1993. We need to do more.
  Why cannot we continue on that course of enacting multiyear budget 
deficit reduction bills? Do you know why? Because of the pain, and part 
of that pain may just have to be an increase in taxes. I do not like to 
vote to increase taxes. I have been in political office 48 years, and I 
know it is not easy to vote to increase taxes. It is always easy to cut 
taxes. It was easy to cut taxes in 1981 when Mr. Reagan asked for a tax 
cut in one package involving 3 successive years of cuts, 5 percent the 
first year, 10 the next, and 10 the next. It does not take courage to 
vote to cut taxes.
  But in a situation--I keep getting back to this section 5. What is 
the Senator's answer? Is he willing to put this Nation's security in 
peril by requiring a supermajority consisting of a majority of the 
Senators and House Members elected? The Framers did not think that was 
wise. We had just come through the Revolutionary War. We had still 
ahead of us the War of 1812. We had ahead of us the Mexican War of 
1848, the Civil War, the war with Spain in 1898, the First World War, 
the Second World War, Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf. In addition 
to these, there were several military conflicts that were not wars,
 of that magnitude, by any stretch of the imagination.

  There was never, until this amendment comes along, any thought of 
requiring a mini-supermajority to pass a resolution in a moment of dire 
peril to deal with our Nations's security. We get nothing from the 
proponents when we direct the question at them, ``Would you be willing 
to raise the revenues to meet the needs in that moment of peril?'' 
``Would you be willing to raise taxes?''
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a question.
  Mr. BYRD. Yes, shortly. What we get is what the Senator from Maryland 
got a while ago when he tried to pin Senators down on the other side of 
the aisle with his questions concerning section 5. Section 5 has not 
been talked about much in the Senate. It needs to be talked about. What 
we get are speciocities, irrelevancies, platitudes, well-wishes, and 
expressions of good intent. We do not know what the ``intent'' of the 
Senators who sit at these desks will be 2 years form now, 3 years from 
now. Perhaps they will be the same Senators. How can we say what their 
intent will be? We need to read the words of the amendment. They speak 
for themselves when they say ``total outlays shall not exceed total 
receipts in any fiscal year.'' That does not leave any wiggling room. 
The proponents say, yes, it does, because you can waive that by a 
three-fifths majority.
  It is a dangerous amendment. Section 5--I would not want to risk the 
lives of my grandsons on that kind of language, requiring 51 Senators 
in this Chamber to pass such a resolution, denying the Vice President 
of the United States his vote to break a tie, if there should be a tie. 
This amendment would deny the Vice President of his vote that is 
accorded him in the current Constitution----
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BYRD. To vote to break a tie. I yield.
  Mr. LEVIN. I understand that the Senator from Utah said that the Vice 
President would be denied, in his opinion, a vote to break a 50-50 tie. 
But he also said it was an ``open question.'' I do not think we ought 
to have an open question in a constitutional amendment, because this is 
a life and death matter.
  Mr. BYRD. You have a constitutional crisis when you have this open 
question.
  Mr. LEVIN. It will, in fact, plunge this constitutional amendment 
into the courts to interpret as to whether or not he Vice President can 
break a tie. It should not be left open. It should be resolved in this 
amendment as to whether or not the Vice President's vote counts to 
break a 50-50 tie. I think it is irresponsible to write a 
constitutional amendment knowing that that question is left open.
  By the way, that is not some theoretical question. Last year's 
deficit reduction bill, as it has been debated here this afternoon, was 
a 51-50 vote, based on the Vice President's vote. So this is not some 
theory that we are arguing here in a civics class. This is the reality 
of the U.S. Senate, and life and death matters can be resolved on 
whether or not the Vice President's vote counts to break a tie.
  It was the opinion of the Senator from Utah, as I understand it, 
stated earlier this afternoon, that the Vice President's vote would not 
count in this provision. And yet, the chief sponsor of this language 
that is in front of us, Representative Dan Schaefer of Colorado, says 
the Vice President's vote would count. Yesterday, we had the same 
problem. We had, on this side, the chief sponsor saying that there 
would be no standing, do not worry about it. We had the chief sponsor 
on the other side--this is the Schaefer-Stenholm substitute. 
Representative Schaefer has said that there would be standing for 
Members of Congress to sue. I had a big board up, and my friend from 
Pennsylvania who is managing the bill now saw where we had the prime 
sponsor of this language quoted in a very formal document, by the way. 
These were not casual comments. These were questions and answers he 
submitted for the Record, in the House Congressional Record, where he 
made statements which were exactly contrary to what the opinion of the 
Senator from Utah is--exactly contrary on critical issues on the role 
of the court.
  Representative Schaefer said, in a formal answer, that a court could 
throw out an appropriations bill or a tax bill, as being 
unconstitutional. But we were told by the Senator from Utah that it was 
his opinion that a court could not involve itself in the budgetary 
process.
  My question of my friend from West Virginia is this--and I want to 
read now into the Record the statement of Representative Schaefer on 
the question of whether or not the Vice President's vote counts. It is 
on page 758 of the Congressional Record of January 26. This is a formal 
interpretation of section 4. And, again, this is a formal question and 
answer presentation that was supplied for the Record by Representative 
Schaefer:

       This language is not intended to preclude the Vice 
     President in his or her constitutional capacity as President 
     of the Senate from casting a tie-breaking vote that would 
     produce a 51-50 result.

  He goes on to say:

       Nothing in section 4 of the substitute takes away the Vice 
     President's right to vote under such circumstances.

  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LEVIN. I do not have the floor, but----
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the courts are going to decide that. It does 
not make any difference what my intent is or what the intent of the 
House Member was who was addressing himself to that question, or what 
he intent of any other Senator is. It is the court, and it will be a 
constitutional crisis. Once we constitutionalize this fiscal policy by 
writing this amendment into the Constitution, it is an open invitation 
to the courts to come into this equation. There is nothing in this 
amendment that prohibits or forbids the courts from intervening.
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield on that point?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. SARBANES. I think the Senator from West Virginia is absolutely 
correct. But what is going to draw the court in even more is the fact 
that two principal sponsors of this measure give absolutely contrary 
views as to the meaning of this clause, as the Senator from Michigan 
has pointed out. One of the chief House sponsors says that under 
section 4 the Vice President would have the tie-breaking vote. The 
distinguished Senator from Utah, chairman of the Judiciary Committee 
and the lead manager for this bill, very explicitly stated on the floor 
of the Senate not too long ago that you would have to produce 51 votes 
out of 100 in 
[[Page S2798]] this body in order for section 4 to apply. A 50-50 vote 
with the Vice President supposedly casting a tie-breaking vote would 
not work. In effect, you have negated the tie-breaking vote of the Vice 
President.
  This is important in underscoring all of the pitfalls that are 
contained in this provision. I am certain it will bring about what the 
Senator from West Virginia has just stated, and that is the involvement 
of the courts, because the legislative history on this is absolutely 
contradictory on the part of its proponents.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator from Maryland. My point here is that 
this is being left----
  Mr. BYRD. I ask unanimous consent that I may continue to yield the 
floor, retaining my rights to the floor, for colloquies. I do not 
intend to hold the floor all afternoon. My feet are getting tired.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. I call attention to the fact that we have a fresh new 
Member here from the Republican response team. They are sending them in 
in relays.
  Yes, I would be glad to yield.
  Mr. LEVIN. The Senator has eloquently pointed out the reasons why we 
should not require majorities, and on that there is a difference of 
opinion. I happen to share the opinion of the Senator from West 
Virginia for the reasons that he has given that we should not require a 
supermajority.
  But the issue that I raise, the Senator from Maryland has raised, and 
the Senator from Utah has raised relates to that question. It is, what 
is a supermajority and whether the Vice President's vote counts? And on 
that one, I think 100 of us ought to agree.
  Maybe there is a disagreement as to whether or not we should have a 
supermajority--and there is a disagreement--but there should be no 
disagreement, there ought to be absolute unanimity on a determination 
that this constitutional amendment be clear on the question as to 
whether or not the Vice President can break a tie and count towards the 
51 votes. We should not leave that ambiguous.
  This is not a matter where there is a difference of opinion as to 
whether or not a supermajority is appropriate in order to raise 
revenues or not. This is a question of writing a constitutional 
amendment, knowing that a question, a critical question, is left open. 
It should not be left open.
  Because if it is, this constitutional crisis, which the Senator from 
West Virginia and the Senator from Maryland talked about, is something 
that we are inviting. And we should not only not invite it, we should 
close the door on any such constitutional crisis by making that clear.
  That will not resolve the question that the Senator from West 
Virginia has raised as to whether or not it is desirable that there be 
a requirement for a supermajority, and I happen to, again, share his 
view on that. But, again, we should clarify the question.
  I ask unanimous consent at this point, Mr. President, that the 
statement of the prime sponsor of the joint resolution in front of us, 
Representative Schaefer, that appears on page H758 of the Congressional 
Record of January 26 of this year, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       This language is not intended to preclude the Vice 
     President, in his or her constitutional capacity as President 
     of the Senate, from casting a tie-breaking vote that would 
     produce a 51-50 result. This is consistent with Article I, 
     Section 3, Clause 4, which states: ``The Vice President of 
     the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall 
     have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.'' Nothing in 
     Section 4 of the substitute takes away the Vice President's 
     right to vote under such circumstances.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I do not have the floor, but I think it 
would be very desirable for the Senator from Pennsylvania to respond, 
should the Senator from West Virginia so yield.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, of course, I would not want to shut out from 
this electrifying moment in this very illuminating debate a Member of 
the ``Republican response team.''
  I ask unanimous consent that my previous request include the Senator 
from Pennsylvania and any other Member of the response team.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SANTORUM. I thank the Senator and I thank the Chair.
  I was going to refer you to the 12th amendment that uses the same 
language that is used in section 5 and section 2, which refers to the 
whole number of the Senate. In one case, it says the whole number or 
two-thirds of the whole number of the Senators, the same language that 
we use here only we say in each House.
  If you have questions about the ability of the Vice President to cast 
votes with respect to this, then I suspect you have questions as to 
whether the Vice President can cast votes under the 12th amendment, 
because it is word for word what is put in this document.
  Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator will yield, I do not have a question about 
it.
  The Senator from Utah, who is the principal sponsor on that side, 
said that the Vice President's vote would not count. Now that is coming 
from a pretty authoritative source here.
  Senator Hatch said--and I was not on the floor, but I understand that 
he said--two things about this question. Number one, it is an open 
question. That means what it says. It is an open question, presumably 
left for the courts or left for somebody to decide. But then Senator 
Hatch said--it was reported to me, and I was not on the floor; I 
believe the Senators from West Virginia and Maryland were here--Senator 
Hatch apparently then said that, in his opinion, in his opinion, the 
Vice President's vote would not count toward the 51 votes. And I think 
that is what the Senator from West Virginia reflected in his statement.
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. LEVIN. So it is not the Senator from Michigan who is raising the 
question--I think we ought to button down the issue--it is the 
principal sponsor of the amendment here in the Senate who has rendered 
that opinion.
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield to me? Because the analogy--
  Mr. BYRD. Before I yield, may I point out to the Member of the 
response team who just, I believe, indicated that the supermajority in 
amendment No. 12 would be a parallel to the situation which we have 
been discussing--namely, as the Vice President's vote would be 
involved--I point out to the junior Senator from Pennsylvania, who 
perhaps has not read the 12th amendment lately, that that is what that 
amendment is all about. There is no Vice President.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Right.
  Mr. BYRD. There is no Vice President to cast a vote under the 12th 
Amendment. The reason for that amendment is to provide for the election 
of a Vice President by the U.S. Senate when the Vice President's seat 
is vacant.
  Mr. SARBANES. If the Senator will yield, that was exactly the point I 
was going to make.
  The Senator from Pennsylvania got up and said, ``Well, if you want to 
know what this language means here of the majority of the whole number, 
just refer to amendment 12.''
  Now, amendment 12 has to deal with picking the Vice President. There 
is not a Vice President. And it says----
  Mr. SANTORUM. Does that not make it obvious.
  Mr. SARBANES. It says:

       The Senate shall choose the Vice President; a quorum for 
     the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number 
     of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be 
     necessary to a choice.

  But the choice is picking the Vice President. It does not answer the 
question that the Vice President can cast the tie-breaking vote.
  Mr. SANTORUM. If the Senator will yield, I think it makes that very 
point. Obviously, the Vice President is not considered part of it 
because there is no Vice President. So the whole number must mean that 
it is the Members of the Senate, absent the Vice President. Otherwise, 
this would make no sense. I mean, I think that is the reason I used it, 
because it is apparent.
  Mr. SARBANES. Once a Vice President has been chosen----
  Mr. SANTORUM. The Vice President is a Member of the Senate.
  Mr. SARBANES. Once the Vice President has been chosen----
  Mr. BYRD. He is not a Member of the Senate. The Vice President is 
never a Member of the Senate.
   [[Page S2799]] Mr. SANTORUM. I rest my case.
  Mr. SARBANES. We take a vote----
  Mr. BYRD. That is not the case.
  Mr. SARBANES. Once the Vice President is chosen and we take a vote, a 
50-50 vote, can the Vice President break the tie?
  Mr. LEVIN. Under this amendment.
  Mr. SANTORUM. If we compare it to the language in the amendment it 
parallels, my opinion would be no.
  Mr. LEVIN. He cannot?
  Mr. SANTORUM. Correct.
  Mr. LEVIN. So you disagree with Congressman Schaefer?
  Mr. SANTORUM. I do.
  Mr. LEVIN. Then in that case, we have the prime sponsors in the 
Senate and we have the prime sponsor in the House, whose name is on top 
of this constitutional amendment--this is the Schaefer amendment--we 
have the sponsors here and the sponsor there in total disagreement on 
an absolutely fundamental question as to whether or not the Vice 
President's vote can be counted to break a 50-50 tie. And that 
determines the outcome of the whole deficit reduction package last 
year.
  That should not be an open question. Whatever side of this issue you 
are on, whether or not you believe in supermajorities or you do not, we 
should not leave an ambiguity that huge in the Constitution as to 
whether or not the Vice President's vote counts. And I think it ought 
to be clarified. It ought to be clarified one way or the other, but it 
ought to be clarified because, otherwise, it is an invitation for a 
constitutional crisis.
  I yield the floor and I thank my friend.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have been unable to get a question 
answered here, and perhaps the Senator from Pennsylvania can answer it.
  My question being: If the threat to our national security should 
continue into the next fiscal year, or the next calendar year after the 
year in which the joint resolution referred to in this section is 
adopted by a minimajority of a majority of all the Members of the 
Senate and all the Members of the House chosen and sworn, if that 
threat continues, and we are in a second fiscal year does such a joint 
resolution have to be passed again by both Houses?
  If not, do both Houses have to waive the requirements of section 1, 
which requires a three-fifths majority? Does Congress have to continue 
to waive for each fiscal year during which we have the military threat? 
Does that mean that every new fiscal year in which the threat 
continues, we have to have three-fifths to waive the requirements of 
section 1? Or does it require that every fiscal year we pass another 
joint resolution requiring a majority of the total membership of both 
Houses as referred to in section 5? Or does it require that both 
sections be waived?
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may propound a question 
to the Senator, even though I hold the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, section 5 reads: ``The Congress may 
waive the provisions of this article for any fiscal year in which a 
declaration of war is in effect.'' So it would seem very obvious to me 
the Congress has the availability to raise it for the fiscal year or 
any subsequent fiscal year in which the war is in effect.
  That is pretty much what it says.
  Mr. BYRD. I am glad we are going by what the amendment says for once.
  Now, what do you think it says? What does the Senator think it says?
  Mr. SANTORUM. I think that is what it says.
  Mr. SARBANES. I ask the Senator, what does it mean? What is your 
understanding of the meaning? Would you have to have a waiver for each 
fiscal year?
  Mr. SANTORUM. I am stupefied that the plain reading of this language 
is not apparent to the Senator from Maryland. I think it is very 
serious.
  Mr. SARBANES. I have to say to the Senator from Pennsylvania perhaps 
I am not as quick as he is to pick up the plain language. I thought the 
question was a good question. The question, as I understood it is, must 
you have a waiver in each fiscal year since?
  Mr. SANTORUM. It says, ``The Congress may waive in any year.''
  Mr. SARBANES. For any fiscal year in which the United States is 
engaged.
  So, we may waive it for that fiscal year.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Or next fiscal year.
  Mr. SARBANES. The next fiscal year comes along. Then what?
  Mr. SANTORUM. It says we may waive for any fiscal year. It does not 
say we have to waive for this fiscal year. We could pass--it says ``any 
fiscal year.'' It could be for next fiscal year, the one afterward, as 
long as the declaration of war is in effect, we can raise for any 
fiscal year.
  Mr. SARBANES. So you think it means any and all?
  Mr. SANTORUM. As long as the declaration of war is continuing, I 
assume that is what the Congress can do.
  Mr. SARBANES. What about the next sentence?
  Mr. BYRD. There are two different situations there.
  Mr. SARBANES. What about the next sentence? Same interpretation.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Obviously, in one case we have declaration of war. That 
is, a declaration of war has a certain time limit, then the declaration 
of war ceases.
  In this case----
  Mr. BYRD. Would the Senator say that again?
  Mr. SANTORUM. The declaration of war at some point ends.
  Mr. BYRD. What causes it to end? What terminates a war?
  Mr. SANTORUM. A signing of a treaty to end the war.
  Mr. BYRD. What terminates the declaration of war?
  Mr. SANTORUM. I ask the Senator, since I was not around the last time 
we declared war, I assume it would be some act of Congress to end the 
declaration.
  Mr. SARBANES. But it was the Senator that asserted that the 
declaration of war would end. How does that happen?
  Mr. SANTORUM. I just responded.
  Mr. BYRD. The Senator was responding to a question. His response, I 
do not understand.
  Mr. SANTORUM. As long as a declaration is in effect, however long 
that may be, that Congress can, under this provision, waive this 
amendment.
  Mr. BYRD. How long was the declaration of war in World War II in 
effect?
  Mr. SANTORUM. I yield to the Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. I am asking a question. I want to be informed.
  Mr. SANTORUM. I do not know the answer.
  Mr. BYRD. The ready response team should have all the answers.
  How long was the declaration of war in World War I in effect? The war 
is over. Suppose declaration of war is still in effect. What happens in 
a situation like this?
  Mr. SANTORUM. I think it would be apparent that at some point the 
Congress would rescind the declaration of war and then this article 
would no longer be operative.
  Mr. BYRD. Congress did not rescind all previous declarations of war. 
Why does the Senator not help me find the answer to that question?
  Mr. SANTORUM. I will do my best.
  Mr. SARBANES. Would the Senator address the second question? Let us 
move beyond the declaration of war. What is your understanding of the 
second sentence? This is not a declaration of war in which the United 
States is engaged in military conflict, so declared by a joint 
resolution. Would we have to get a joint resolution the following year?
  Mr. SANTORUM. My opinion on that is that the--according to the plain 
reading of the constitutional amendment--Congress would have to, each 
year, go through the process of exempting itself from this provision 
because of that conflict.
  Mr. SARBANES. How can the phrase ``for any fiscal year,'' which is 
identically the same phrase in sentence 1 and sentence 2, be given 
diametrically opposite definitions?
  You just told me that the phrase ``for any fiscal year'' in sentence 
1, linked to a declaration of war, means that it can be waived for not 
only the current fiscal year but fiscal years beyond that.
  Now the Senator tells me in sentence 2, ``waive for any fiscal year'' 
means only the fiscal year in which you find yourself and not 
subsequent fiscal years.
  Now, how can the Senator give that phrase an entirely different 
interpretation?
   [[Page S2800]] Mr. SANTORUM. Let me give you the committee report 
which says: ``For any fiscal year, in effect, is intended in the first 
sentence of this section to require a separate waiver of the provisions 
of any amendment each year.''
  Mr. SARBANES. For which sentence?
  Mr. SANTORUM. For the first usage.
  Mr. SARBANES. In section 5.
  That is not what you told me a few minutes ago.
  Is that right?
  Mr. SANTORUM. That is correct.
  Mr. SARBANES. Which is correct then, your answer or the committee 
report?
  Mr. SANTORUM. I refer to the committee report.
  Mr. SARBANES. So, the answer you gave me earlier is not correct?
  Mr. SANTORUM. According to the committee report, that is correct.
  Mr. SARBANES. Well, what is your view? Is your view the committee's 
report or is your view the answer which you gave yourself just a couple 
minutes ago?
  Mr. SANTORUM. My view is that the committee report, having had the 
time to study it longer than I, is probably the accurate view.
  Mr. BYRD. Was there a minority view on this particular question in 
that report?
  Mr. SANTORUM. Not that I am aware. I will have someone check.
  Mr. BYRD. Let me ask the Senator.
  Mr. SANTORUM. By the way, I would further read that the meaning in 
the second sentence, the second use, is also the same, that in every 
fiscal year the Congress would have to extend this waiver.
  Mr. SARBANES. I say to the Senator that is certainly a consistent 
reading of the meaning ``for any fiscal year.'' At least it is being 
read the same way in the second sentence as it was read in the first 
sentence according to the committee report.
  Now, that is not the answer the Senator was giving us because he was 
giving a completely opposite view of the meaning ``any fiscal year'' in 
sentence 1 and in sentence 2. But it only underscores the problems with 
this amendment.
  The distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania came to manage the bill 
during this time period. The Senator had--I assume now it has changed--
a perception of the meaning of this proposed amendment to the 
Constitution which I am now told he is withdrawing.
  Mr. SANTORUM. If the Senator will yield, that is why it is very 
important to have committee reports and implementing legislation that 
is called for in the article; that we have implementing legislation to 
clear up these kinds of doubts that may exist with respect to specific 
provisions of the act.
  So I suggest to the Senator that a lot of this debate is useful. In 
fact, it is illuminating. I find it to be such, not just on this point, 
but on many others.
  But what is important to note is the ability of this Senate to come 
back, as it will, and implement this act and further specify the 
meanings of how this constitutional amendment will be implemented.
  Mr. SARBANES. I ask the Senator from Pennsylvania, do you think that 
the implementing legislation could be used to clarify the discrepancy 
in view that was outlined here earlier on the floor as to whether a 
Vice President has the power to break a tie? Could that be clarified by 
the implementing legislation?
  Mr. SANTORUM. I guess I would defer to answer on that. I do not know 
whether the implementing legislation would do that or not, to be 
honest. I think that would be a matter of interpretation.
  Mr. SARBANES. Let me just carry the question a step further. Do you 
think that implementing legislation can rewrite provisions of a 
constitutional amendment?
  Mr. SANTORUM. Obviously not, but they certainly can clarify points of 
a constitutional amendment. Obviously, constitutional amendments, 
particularly of this nature, are not meant to stand on their own. There 
has to be some legislation that is going to allow this to be complied 
with.
  Mr. BYRD. Will the Senator allow me on that point?
  Mr. SARBANES. Certainly.
  Mr. BYRD. Implementing legislation may be repealed in the very same 
session--for that matter, in the very same month--in which the original 
legislation was enacted. Does this mean then that we are going to trust 
to the hands of shifting opinions in the country and in this body the 
interpretation of the amendment if we are going to do it by 
implementing legislation?
  Does this mean that we are going to put at risk the Nation's security 
by leaving this up to the implementing legislation, which can be 
changed, as I say, by even the same Senators in a subsequent year? Are 
we going to place the Nation's security at risk by falling back on the 
language that talks about implementing legislation?
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. SARBANES. He is making an extremely important point. Suppose one 
Congress comes along and passes implementing legislation saying that 
the Vice President cannot cast a tie-breaking vote. Then a new Congress 
comes in and they pass implementing legislation saying the Vice 
President can cast a tie-breaking vote.
  I say to the Senator from Pennsylvania, I do not see how this 
particular provision can bounce back and forth with the implementing 
legislation. I just do not understand how that could happen. It is 
obvious that a court would have to come in to decide it if it is not 
decided here, and we have directly conflicting views.
  Let me just read you--I do not know whether the Senator is acquainted 
with what Congressman Schaefer on the House side said about this.
  Mr. SANTORUM. If the Senator will yield, again, I am a little bit 
perplexed. I look at, for example, section 8 powers under article I 
that are given to the Congress to borrow money, to regulate commerce. 
Does it say how we regulate commerce or do we leave that to 
implementing legislation? And if we do change that, does that mean we 
somehow violate the Constitution, or is that somehow dangerous upon our 
society? The Constitution, as the Senator will tell you, is a contract 
of principles, not as to how to.
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield on that very point?
  Mr. SANTORUM. We continually change how to.
  Mr. SARBANES. That is absolutely wrong. That is absolutely wrong. The 
Constitution is very specific in describing how, in terms of the 
process, decisions will be made. It is not specific about the substance 
of the decision to be made, but it is very specific about how we are to 
do our business. The Framers were very careful about that. They spelled 
out what would be a quorum, then a majority of the quorum could pass 
the legislation. It is all laid out.
  I want to give you a real-life situation. A bill is before this body. 
It is a controversial, closely fought bill. We take a vote on it. The 
vote is 50-50, and the Vice President is sitting in the chair.
  Now, it is very clear under current procedure in that circumstance, 
the Vice President can cast a tie-breaking vote. It does not have to be 
50-50, it can be 48-48, whatever. And I have been in this body when 
that has happened, not only on the 1993 deficit reduction bill, but on 
other measures as well. I have seen the Vice President in the chair 
casting a tie-breaking vote.
  What is the outcome in that situation?
  Let me read to you what Congressman Schaefer says the outcome would 
be. This is the Republican lead sponsor on the House side:

       This language is not intended to preclude the Vice 
     President in his or her constitutional capacity as President 
     of the Senate from casting a tie-breaking vote that will 
     produce a 51-to-50 result. This is consistent with article I, 
     section 3, clause 4 which states: ``The Vice President of the 
     United States shall be President of the Senate but shall have 
     no vote unless they be equally divided.'' Nothing in section 
     4 of the substitute takes away the Vice President's right to 
     vote under such circumstances.

  The Senator, I take it, has told us that he disagrees with that; is 
that correct? That is not his view of the meaning of article 4.
  Mr. SANTORUM. It is apparent from the committee report that refers 
to, as I did, the 12th amendment and refers to that being similar to 
what the 12th amendment would be. That would be my answer.
  Mr. BYRD. In the 12th amendment there is no Vice President----
  [[Page S2801]] Mr. SANTORUM. It is obvious as to what----
  Mr. BYRD. To cast any kind of vote, whether it is a deciding vote or 
anything else. That is why we have the 12th amendment, to fill the 
vacancy in the Vice Presidency.
  Mr. SARBANES. What is the reference in the committee report to which 
the Senator is referring?
  Mr. SANTORUM. Page 15, about three-quarters of the way down, ``the 
whole number of each House.''
  Mr. SARBANES. That does not answer the question. That just makes a 
statement.

       The whole number of each House is intended to be consistent 
     with the phrase ``the whole number of Senators'' in the 12th 
     amendment to the Constitution * * *

  But that does not answer my question, since the 12th amendment to the 
Constitution was a situation in which there was no Vice President. It 
addresses a situation in which you are choosing a Vice President, not 
the situation after which the Vice President has been chosen. And once 
the Vice President is chosen under article I, section 3, clause 4 of 
the Constitution, he has a vote in an equally divided situation.
  So what the Senator from Pennsylvania is doing is drawing an analogy 
from a situation that governs circumstances in which a Vice President 
has not been picked and you are picking a Vice President. It does not 
then answer the question of the vote-casting power of the Vice 
President once he has been chosen.
  Mr. SANTORUM. If the Senator will yield, I think the Senator from 
West Virginia, in fact, helped me answer this question when, if you 
look at, again, what the committee report says, ``The whole number of 
each House is intended to be consistent with the phrase `the whole 
number of Senators * * *'''
  The Vice President is not a Senator. I quote the Senator from West 
Virginia, just a few minutes ago. So it would be obvious to any reader 
that a whole number of Senators must be 51, assuming there are 100 
Senators.
  Mr. SARBANES. I just make this observation to my friend.
  You must be desperate about the 1993 legislation to be so driven that 
you want to deny the Vice President of the United States his tie-
breaking power to cast a vote which has been in the Constitution from 
the very beginning.
  Now, I know Members on the other side are unhappy about that 
legislation, but it seems to me it is carrying your differences over 
the substance of a piece of legislation much too far when you start 
tinkering, really assaulting, the Constitution of the United States in 
this fashion. We end up getting two completely differing 
interpretations of the application of this provision as interpreted by 
the lead House Republican sponsor of this measure and by the answers 
that I am now receiving in the Chamber of the Senate.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that notwithstanding 
the fact that I have the floor, I may propound a question to another 
Senator without losing my right to the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. Let me ask the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, in 
a situation in which in a given fiscal year the United States is 
engaged in military conflict which causes an imminent and serious 
military threat to national security, and that threat continues into 
the next fiscal year, is it section 1 that would have to be waived in 
the subsequent fiscal year or years? Would section 1 have to be waived 
in the subsequent fiscal year or years?
  Mr. SANTORUM. I am not too sure--if the Senator is asking for an 
answer, I am not too sure I understand what the question is. Is he 
suggesting that the second year would be treated differently than the 
first year of the conflict?
  Mr. BYRD. Why would it not? It is a new fiscal year. And the 
constitutional amendment on the balanced budget requires that the 
outlays not exceed receipts in any fiscal year. So we are into a new 
fiscal year. And yet the threat to the security of this country is 
still in effect. What do we do? Do we have to waive section 1 again in 
the new fiscal year?
  Mr. SANTORUM. According to the committee report, a joint resolution 
of Congress would be required in order to have this provision be 
eligible to be waived, this amendment to be waived.
  Mr. BYRD. The Senator is talking about two things there. The Senator 
is talking about the joint resolution in section 5 that would have to 
be enacted into law which would require a majority of the whole number 
of Members in each House. But section 1 requires a vote, in order to be 
waived, of three-fifths of the whole number of each House.
  Mr. SANTORUM. And section 5 provides an exception to section 1.
  Mr. BYRD. To section 1.
  Mr. SANTORUM. In other words, section 1 binds us with the exception 
of, as outlined in section 5, when we have a declaration of war or----
  Mr. BYRD. But my question is, if that military threat continues into 
a second fiscal year----
  Mr. SANTORUM. We would be required then to pass a separate waiver of 
this amendment.
  Mr. BYRD. Congress would have to pass a joint resolution in each and 
every fiscal year that ensued following the fiscal year of the first 
joint resolution?
  Suppose there is not a declaration of war in effect. The first 
sentence of section 5 addresses the situation in which there is a 
declaration of war. Now, I will read it:

       Congress may waive the provisions of this article--

  Meaning section 1----

     for any fiscal year in which a declaration of war is in 
     effect.

  Now, the country has fought three major wars and engaged in several 
military conflicts during the past 48 years without declaring any war. 
Suppose there is not a declaration of war in effect. Then let us see 
what it says.

       Provisions of this article may be waived for any fiscal 
     year in which the United States is engaged in military 
     conflict which causes an imminent and serious military threat 
     to national security and is so declared by joint resolution, 
     adopted by a majority of the whole number of each House, 
     which becomes law.

  Now, I have two or three questions I wish to ask the Senator. I will 
ask them singly or I will ask them en bloc.
  One. Does this mean that in each subsequent fiscal year--let us 
imagine that a military threat develops in August, which is only 2 
months preceding the close of the fiscal year. A threat is imminent. 
The Commander in Chief asks for a resolution, and Congress, 
notwithstanding the rules providing for unlimited debate in the United 
States Senate, quickly passes such a joint resolution for that fiscal 
year.
  Then let us imagine that the threat continues over into the next 
fiscal year, January, February, March, April. Is another joint 
resolution required by the Congress?
  Third question. Suppose that the response of the Congress to the 
President's request is favorable and the President launches his planes 
and ships, his troops, and vast expenditures of money are entailed. The 
fiscal year ends. The outlays exceed the receipts. The threat continues 
throughout the next fiscal year. There is no declaration of war but 
expenditures run into the billions of dollars--billions. What are we 
going to do?
  This amendment says outlays shall not exceed receipts in any fiscal 
year. What are we going to do about the fact that the deficits rose 
greatly in the previous fiscal year, the one in which the threat first 
made itself clear and the deficit of the second year amounted to 
billions of dollars? What are we going to do? And suppose that passions 
within the Congress and in the country in the early-on support for the 
war dwindled away and left the Commander in Chief out there with his 
men in far-flung seas and lands, with their lives on the line. What do 
we do? No war has been declared.
  Do we require that in order to waive--in order to waive section 5 
there must be a majority of the Members elected in both bodies to 
waive. And you do not have that majority. What are you going to do? You 
have already run in excess, many--$10 billion, $15--who knows what? It 
cost billions, the Persian Gulf War, what do you do, Senator?
  Mr. SANTORUM. I would answer the question----
  Mr. BYRD. Are you going to raise taxes?
   [[Page S2802]] Mr. SANTORUM. I would answer that question the same 
as I would with any war. The Congress has the responsibility of funding 
the war and appropriating the dollars. The President cannot continue to 
execute a war if the Congress does not provide the funds to do so by a 
majority vote. So we already have, already, an existing requirement 
that Members of Congress vote by a majority to fund the war.
  So I guess I do not see the complication. If we are going to go ahead 
by a majority vote and fund the war through an appropriations process, 
and we have the support to do that, why would we not continue very 
consistently, almost an afterthought, to go ahead and waive this 
provision of the Constitution, recognizing the imminent threat to our 
national security?
  Mr. BYRD. Except that a majority is not a majority is not a majority, 
under this new amendment to the old Constitution. A majority under the 
current Constitution is not a majority under this constitutional 
amendment to balance the budget.
  So the deficits have been increased, the debt has gone through the 
stratosphere, and we have people overseas with their lives on the line. 
What are we going to do?
  You have an administration under the control of one party and the 
leadership of the Congress under the control of the other. You are 
putting our Nation's security in peril----
  Mr. SANTORUM. Senator, what you are suggesting----
  Mr. BYRD. Requiring a mini-supermajority for such a critical time.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Is what the Senator is suggesting that this body or the 
other body would pass appropriations bills to fund the conflict, our 
participation in the conflict, and then not come back and waive the 
requirement for a balanced budget to allow us to do that? Is that what 
the Senator is suggesting?
  Mr. BYRD. I am not suggesting it. The Senator----
  Mr. SANTORUM. Same vote----
  Mr. BYRD. The amendment the Senator is so avidly supporting requires 
that in each fiscal year----
  Mr. SANTORUM. As we do with appropriations----
  Mr. BYRD. Outlays shall not exceed receipts.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Except----
  Mr. BYRD. Suppose that in order to make that work, we had to have a 
tax to fund this threat--to protect us against the threat to the 
security of the Nation. I have heard Senators on that side of the aisle 
say they will not vote for a tax, ever. What about the deficits that 
have already been run up in the previous fiscal years, for which a 
majority of the Members chosen and sworn have voted to waive? Does that 
mean we have to go back and put on a retroactive tax? How would the 
Senator feel about that?
  Mr. SANTORUM. How I would feel about it is, as you know, every year 
we have to appropriate money for the Defense Department. Particularly 
in time of war we would have to appropriate money through an 
appropriation process; we would have to go through both sides, it would 
have to be passed by a majority vote. In addition, we have put an 
additional hurdle--yes, of this section--which requires a simple 
majority, not a three-fifths or constitutional majority, but a majority 
of the whole number of each House----
  Mr. BYRD. That is not a simple majority.
  Mr. SANTORUM. A majority of the whole number of each House.
  Mr. BYRD. Which is not a simple majority.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Which would be slightly higher, possibly slightly 
higher burden in the House, and potentially higher, depending on 
interpretation, vote here in the Senate. But certainly consistent with 
the passage of the appropriations bill.
  Mr. BYRD. Slightly higher, but it does not necessarily mean it would 
be slightly easier.
  Would the Senator recommend that in order to deal with the deficits 
that had been built up as a result of the waiver of the article in 
previous fiscal years--does he suggest there might have to be a 
retroactive tax?
  Mr. SANTORUM. There is nothing here in this constitutional amendment 
that requires us to pay back deficits that have been incurred since the 
enactment of this constitutional amendment, that have occurred as a 
result of a waiver of this amendment. So there is no requirement in the 
constitutional amendment to require the payment of existing debt.
  Mr. BYRD. Oh, there is not? There is not?
  The other day, the Senator from Pennsylvania stated with reference to 
dealing with the deficit for a year that has ended, the Senator stated: 
``We could, as has been done here, retroactively tax.'' I do not 
believe the Senator would have made that statement without having given 
it long and serious thought. So the question that naturally occurred to 
me today, again, is would the Senator be willing, in that situation, to 
vote for a retroactive tax? We are talking about a fiscal year or 
fiscal years that have ended and the estimate for the deficits for that 
year or those years have gone wrong by virtue of the sudden imminence 
of a serious military threat to our national security.
  Is the Senator willing--he would not be willing, I do not believe, to 
vote for a package to reduce the deficits, such as the one we enacted 
in 1993. But in a situation like this, in which the Nation's security 
is imperiled, would he be willing to vote to increase taxes? I heard a 
Republican Senator stand over there on the floor and say he would not 
vote to increase a tax, ever.
  I do not believe the Senator from Pennsylvania's feet are in such 
concrete. But I am just wondering, in the light of what he said about a 
retroactive tax the other day, whether or not he would suggest that, in 
a situation like this? In order to go back and wipe out those deficits?
  Mr. SANTORUM. Would I in fact vote for a retroactive tax? If we 
needed to tax in order to meet the needs of war, I think we would have 
broad bipartisan support, as we would--as we do now, with 
appropriations bills.
  Mr. BYRD. And he would vote for a retroactive tax?
  Mr. SANTORUM. I do not know what the need would be for a retroactive 
tax but if that is what would be required, I would certainly consider 
it, if our country was at war. Certainly.
  Mr. BYRD. How would the taxpayers of this country ever know how to 
fill out an income tax form, if we are going to go back and enact 
retroactive taxes? How are they going to know what the tax requirements 
are when they fill out their income tax forms and whether they may have 
to pay back taxes?
  Mr. SANTORUM. That was our argument against the retroactive tax in 
1993.
  Mr. BYRD. But the other day--I am talking about the Senator's 
statement the other day, when he suggested there might be a retroactive 
tax.
  SANTORUM. I said that is an option available to future Congress, if 
necessary.
  Mr. BYRD. And I am asking the Senator.
  Mr. SANTORUM. I would not recommend that option.
  Mr. BYRD. But you would be willing----
  Mr. SANTORUM. In a time of war, Senator, I would be willing to do 
things that otherwise I would not be willing to do at other times.
  Mr. BYRD. What I am concerned about is in a time of serious military 
threat to this country, under this amendment a majority of the Senators 
and House Members elected and sworn would be required in order to waive 
the requirements of this amendment, under such dire extremities, and 
could not do so by a simple majority vote.
  May I say, for the information of the Senate, I have an amendment 
which is at the desk.
  I would be willing to agree to a vote on that amendment on the day 
that the Senate returns following this weekend--be willing to agree to 
a vote on or in relation to the amendment. I say ``in relation'' 
because the amendments around here to this constitutional amendment do 
not get up-or-down votes. Motions to table are made. There have been 
several amendments offered and debated to this constitutional 
amendment. There have been no up-or-down votes, and all of the 
amendments succumbed to the motion to table. That certainly is within 
the right of Senators to move to table.
  I would be willing to offer my amendment, and it will be germane, if 
cloture is invoked. I would be willing to offer that amendment today, 
and agree to a time on it for debate and vote on or in 
[[Page S2803]] relation to it, which includes the tabling motion, to 
take place on next Wednesday. I have not offered the amendment yet. So 
it cannot be tabled today. But I can offer it. So if the manager of the 
bill would like to respond, I will yield.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, will my dear friend yield?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes. I am happy to yield.
  Mr. HATCH. As I understand it, the Senator from West Virginia is 
willing to lay down his amendment as long as it is not tabled today, 
and willing to have the vote on it at a time certain when we get back 
on Wednesday.
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. HATCH. Can the Senator tell me what time the distinguished 
Senator would desire? Could we keep it short?
  Mr. BYRD. Let me modify my request. Let me offer this modification, 
or possible modification. I believe a unanimous-consent order was 
entered for the recognition of the Senator from West Virginia 
immediately upon the disposition of the cloture vote today to call up 
amendment No. 252, and that amendment would eliminate the three-fifths 
supermajority contained in section 1.
  I would like to have the privilege of calling up that amendment, 
laying it down today, or calling up instead an amendment which is 
equally germane, in the event cloture is invoked, to deal with section 
5, which the Senators from Maryland and Michigan and I and other 
Senators have been discussing this afternoon--with the understanding 
that there would be no tabling motion offered today, and that the vote 
on or in relation to that amendment, whichever of the two it is, would 
not occur until next Wednesday.
  There is a cloture vote, I believe, that will occur, possibly even 
two of them, on that day. As I understand it, the majority leader laid 
down two cloture motions last night--say 2 hours of debate, equally 
divided. Of course, if cloture is invoked, we will operate under the 
rule.
  Mr. HATCH. Will the Senator be willing, if our side takes only 15 
minutes, to reduce that time to an hour? He would almost have the same 
amount of time as 2 hours equally divided. It would be 15 minutes less. 
But I would be 45 minutes less.
  Mr. BYRD. The Senator is most generous.
  Mr. HATCH. I have tried. What I am trying to do with my dear 
colleague is get moving on the amendment process, face whatever we have 
to face on this amendment, and try to bring this matter to a close 
sometime within the near future so that we can alleviate delays as much 
as possible. We are willing. As the Senator from West Virginia can see, 
we have been willing to take very little time on our side and allow 
plenty of time on the opposite side of this issue as an accommodation 
to try to move things along.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, accommodations do not matter to this 
Senator----
  Mr. HATCH. I understand that. It is just a request.
  Mr. BYRD. --when it comes to amending the Constitution. There is 
probably too much accommodation around here, in any event. But, 
nevertheless, it is characteristic of the distinguished Senator to want 
to accommodate.
  What I was amused about was the offer to let the proponents of my 
amendment have 1 hour of debate and the opponents have 15 minutes. That 
is an indication to me that there is not much serious thought being 
given to my amendment. It is going to suffer the same fate as have 
other amendments around here--that they have been debated a little bit, 
and a motion to table is then made. They are not accorded serious 
debate.
  Mr. HATCH. Will the Senator yield on that?
  Mr. BYRD. I am not directing this at the Senator. I am simply saying 
that it says something about the debate on this constitutional 
amendment.
  Mr. HATCH. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. HATCH. No, it does not, because the amendment the Senator is 
going to call up we are fully cognizant of. We spent a lot of time 
analyzing it. We believe we can answer it in a reasonable period of 
time. I feel we can answer it in 15 minutes. If we cannot, I would be 
happy to--but I think we can.
  On the second amendment, I do not know what amendment that would be. 
So we might have to grant some more time on that. But our problem is 
not so much that we do not want to give enough time on this. We have 
been giving hours and hours. We have given. It is now 14 days of Senate 
floor time; long hours. I am not complaining. I am willing to be here 
as long as the distinguished Senator wants to debate any of these 
issues. But we have spent 14 days, which is 3 more than was spent on 
any balanced budget amendment in history.
  Like I say, I am willing to spend more, but it is to accommodate my 
colleagues who are on the other side of this issue. So it is not a 
matter of giving a short shrift. We believe some of the amendments in 
the past have not deserved a lot of consideration from a constitutional 
standpoint. And we felt as though we had full debate, even with the 
limited amount of time we have allocated to ourselves, and we felt as 
if we made the case enough. But so far, we have been successful in 
tabling motions.
  One last thing. Every amendment that has been brought forth has been 
a significant amendment, in my eyes.
  I have wondered why some were brought forth, perhaps, but I still 
hope that they are substantively significant amendments. We cannot 
constitutionally answer some of them in less time than it takes for 
others. We are hopeful that on the amendment that we believe the 
Senator will call up before the end of today we can shorten the time. 
If the Senator wants 2 hours equally divided, I am not sure that the 
majority leader would not grant him that. But I am trying to 
accommodate the Senate and accommodate the opponents so they can bring 
up their amendments and yet still make sure that the record is made 
constitutionally on these important issues.
  I add that the distinguished Senator from West Virginia always brings 
up important, substantive issues that are important not only to himself 
but to others as well, and they are certainly important to me. I admire 
and appreciate his desire to at all times uphold the Constitution and 
at all times do what is right, in his view, under the Constitution. 
That is all we are trying to do here--to do what is right.
  We have spent 14 days of full Senate floor time, and compared to 
other balanced budget amendment debates, we have had far less 
amendments. So we have given adequate time to these amendments, and we 
have spent far more time than on prior amendments. But we cannot be 
governed just by prior debates. I am happy to spend whatever time it 
takes. I am sure the Senator understands the majority leader is asking 
me to try to move it along as fast as I can.
  Mr. BYRD. Let me say----
  Mr. HATCH. I am trying to accommodate the Senator. I will have to ask 
the majority leader. I felt like it was an attempt to accommodate by 
giving the Senator most of the time, almost as much as he would get 
with 2 hours equally divided, while we would try to make our 
arguments--as feeble as they might be--in a shorter time.
  Mr. SARBANES. Why could the Senator not--if the request was 2 hours 
equally divided and the Senator's suggestion is that the Senator from 
West Virginia have 1 hour and he have 15 minutes, why would the Senator 
not agree to the 2 hours and not use all his time if it was not 
necessary in the debate? I mean, give the Senator from West Virginia 
time to debate at the time, and you might discover on that occasion 
that you might need more than 15 minutes. You can always yield back 
your time.
  Mr. HATCH. This is not a demand. This is a suggestion. If the Senator 
from West Virginia does not agree----
  Mr. SARBANES. I was just seeing a way where you could get where you 
want to go.
  Mr. HATCH. Anything that will move the debate forward I am happy to 
try to do. In any event, we will have to see what the majority leader 
wants to do next Wednesday. We have that cloture vote, and I am not 
sure when he is going to have that cloture vote; I am not aware. But we 
will have to put in a quorum call and decide. I understand the 
Senator's request, that he would like to bring up one of two 
amendments----
  Mr. BYRD. At this point.
   [[Page S2804]] Mr. HATCH. Could the Senator inform us what the other 
amendment is? I believe you said it is No. 252.
  Mr. BYRD. I said it pertained to section 5. That has been discussed 
all afternoon here.
  Mr. HATCH. I thought you mentioned there might be two amendments and 
you would make your choice between the two.
  Mr. BYRD. I mentioned amendment No. 252 and an amendment No. 256. 
Amendment No. 256 deals with section 5. I believe I have 7 or 8 or 9 or 
10 amendments at the desk.
  Mr. HATCH. You would choose whichever one you want, but there would 
be no amendments to the amendment in order by either side?
  Mr. BYRD. Well, if cloture is invoked, I suppose if I were able to 
qualify, or if other Senators were able to qualify, they could have 
second-degree amendments at the desk.
  Mr. HATCH. Unless we agree to a time agreement with those terms. That 
is what I am asking.
  Mr. BYRD. I am not quarreling with the hour that I am to be given. I 
have had a good bit of time this afternoon. But I think it is 
indicative of the lack of interest on the part of the proponents in 
seriously trying to improve the constitutional amendment that is before 
the Senate when they say, well, we will take 15 minutes, you can have 
your hour. I know what is going to happen; the amendment is going to be 
tabled. That is certainly the right of the manager of the resolution, 
or the leader, or any other Senator.
  Mr. HATCH. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. HATCH. Surely, I do not believe the Senator is suggesting that I 
am not taking his amendment seriously or that I have not taken any 
amendment seriously, is he? I have taken them all extremely seriously. 
This is the Constitution we are working on and nobody takes it more 
seriously than the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, unless it 
is the Senator from Utah. I would not claim to take it more seriously 
than the Senator, but I do not think anybody takes it more seriously 
than either of us. I will try to do my best to answer.
  Mr. SARBANES. If the Senator will yield, can I be included in that 
duo, to make it a trio of people who take the Constitution seriously?
  Mr. HATCH. We just do not feel that people on the east coast--I am 
kidding. Yes.
  Mr. SARBANES. Let us make it a trio.
  Mr. HATCH. Let us make it 100 of us. We are all serious. The fact of 
the matter is let us see what we can do to get Senator Dole to resolve 
this.
  Will the Senator yield for a unanimous-consent request?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.

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