[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 31 (Thursday, February 16, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H1853-H1862]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


ADDITIONAL DEBATE TIME DURING FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 7, NATIONAL 
                      SECURITY REVITALIZATION ACT

  Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Speaker, I have a unanimous-consent request.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state the unanimous-
consent request.
  Mr. VOLKMER. The unanimous-consent request is that the leader of both 
sides, Republican and Democratic leaders, be allowed 3 minutes each for 
debate on H.R. 7.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Missouri?
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I am taking 
the time to ask the gentleman if he could spell it out for us. Is that 
for debate purposes only?
  Mr. VOLKMER. Yes. I said, for debate only.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Notwithstanding the time limitation?
  Mr. BERMAN. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, I have one 
question. I assume this is not within the 10-hour limit?
  Mr. VOLKMER. If the gentleman will yield, Mr. Speaker, that is 
correct. This is in addition to the other time. It does not come out of 
the time.
  Mr. BERMAN. I withdraw my reservation of objection, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Missouri?
  There was no objection.
          [[Page H1854]] NATIONAL SECURITY REVITALIZATION ACT

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 83 and rule 
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, 
H.R. 7.

                              {time}  0905


                     in the committee of the whole

  Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole 
House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the 
bill (H.R. 7) to revitalize the national security of the United States, 
with Mr. Linder in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Wednesday, 
February 15, 1995, the amendment offered by the gentleman from Missouri 
[Mr. Skelton], as amended, had been disposed of, and the bill was open 
for amendment at any point.
  Three hours and fifty minutes remain for consideration of amendments 
under the 5-minute rule, pursuant to the order of the House today.
  Are there further amendments to the bill?
                    amendment offered by mr. mchale

  Mr. McHALE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. McHale: Page 9, after line 21, 
     insert the following new paragraph (and redesignate the 
     succeeding paragraphs accordingly):
       (2) to provide for sufficient forces to meet the national 
     security strategy of using forward-deployed and forward-based 
     forces to promote regional stability, deter aggression, 
     improve joint/combined operations among United States forces 
     and allies, and ensure timely crisis response:

  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. McHale] will be 
recognized for 1 minute, and a Member opposed will be recognized for 1 
minute.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. McHale].
  Mr. McHALE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the 1 minute.
  My hope is there is no Member opposed.
  This amendment is being offered with the consent and approval of the 
leadership on both sides. I particularly want to thank the chairman of 
the committee, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence], for his 
agreement in allowing me to offer this amendment. I also want to 
emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that I offer this amendment with my good 
friend and colleague, the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Fowler], 
because on this issue, she and I absolutely see eye to eye.
  Mr. Chairman, it was President Kennedy who said only when our 
strength is sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that 
it will never be employed. This amendment simply says that we guarantee 
to particularly our naval forces the military resources necessary for 
peacetime deployment so that when a crisis occurs, when our Nation must 
quickly deploy forces into a combat theater, that the U.S. Navy and 
embarked forces will have the opportunity for crisis response. That is 
what the Navy typically does during peacetime.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time, and suggest 
perhaps a few comments from my colleague, the gentlewoman from Florida 
[Mrs. Fowler], would be appropriate at this time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does any Member seek the 1 minute in opposition?
  Hearing none, the Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. 
Fowler] for 1 minute.
  Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the 1 minute.
  Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to cosponsor this amendment with my 
colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. McHale].
  As he stated, this just puts into this bill the policy that in order 
to provide sufficient forces to meet our national security strategy of 
using forward-deployed and forward-based forces to promote regional 
stability, that it is very important that we have this policy in our 
bill, because this is what our U.S. Navy does, and we want to make sure 
that this language is spelled out clearly in this bill.
  I am pleased to be a cosponsor with my colleague, the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. McHale].
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. McHale].
  The amendment was agreed to.


                    amendment offered by mr. hefley

  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. It is amendment No. 
5.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Hefley: Strike out section 309 
     (page 21, lines 19 through 22) and insert the following:

     SEC. 309. FUNDING.

       Funds for the activities of the Commission shall be made 
     available to the Commission by the Secretary of Defense from 
     funds appropriated for activities of the Office of the 
     Secretary of Defense.

  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Hefley] will be 
recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member in opposition will be recognized 
for 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Hefley].
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, as we marked up this bill in the National Security 
Committee, I had concerns about spending additional money on a 
commission. I did not want an additional $1.5 million being taken away 
from our troops.
  The chairman of our committee, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. 
Spence], and his staff have worked diligently to calm my fears.
  My amendment would simply state that the commission shall be paid for 
by funds appropriated for the Office of Secretary of Defense. This is 
appropriate since the Office of the Secretary of Defense is the one 
that generally has money to do studies of various kinds. It is also 
appropriate because these funds will not be coming out of training or 
readiness accounts, and I think that is the real key, Mr. Chairman, is 
that we do not want this money coming out of the hides of our fighting 
forces as we prepare them to meet whatever contingency is out there.
  So we are asking that this come out of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. It is my understanding that the chairman is willing to accept 
this amendment, and I would ask support for the Hefley amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone seek recognition in opposition?
  Ms. HARMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California 
[Ms. Harman] for 5 minutes.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise in opposition to the Hefley amendment.
  First, let me thank my colleague for supporting an amendment I 
offered in the National Security Committee to strike the entire 
commission including its funding. I think that is the way to go, and in 
just a few minutes, my colleague, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. 
Menendez], and I will offer an amendment again to do that.
  I think the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Hefley] is correct in 
pointing out the $1.5 million that would be appropriated for this 
commission should not come from new funds, nor should it come from 
existing funds. We should not spend it.
  I am a supporter of the balanced budget amendment, as is he, and it 
is time to get serious about cutting out unnecessary funding. This is a 
point I made last night, too, as we made the difficult balance between 
more funds for national missile defense and readiness.
  There is no free lunch, Mr. Chairman, and unfortunately this 
amendment would seem to be asking for one.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.
  Mr. SKELTON. I would like to again speak for the troops: $1.5 million 
will take care of a lot of taking care of their homes, their roofs, 
their refrigerators, the bathrooms, the quality of life. It will take 
care of a lot of ammunition for them to shoot on the rifle 
[[Page H1855]] range. I think this is really a usurpation of our job 
here. The Constitution tells us we are in charge, not a commission.
  I speak for the troops again.
  Ms. HARMAN. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, I yield to my colleague, 
the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Menendez].
  Mr. MENENDEZ. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  I, too, oppose the Hefley amendment.
  I think it is an obvious attempt to try to deflect from the upcoming 
amendment that the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] and I are 
offering. The fact of the matter is $1.5 million out of the taxpayers' 
money, wherever you do it, is still $1.5 million out of the taxpayers' 
money, and it goes and flies against the spirit of the contract.
  If you are for smaller government, you do not add another commission. 
If you are for less bureaucracy, you do not add another commission. If 
you are for less spending, you do not add another commission.
  And so when we have the entire resources of the Congress, all the 
committees that review it, and ultimately the bottom-up review that has 
been had, the last thing we need to do is to continue to add another 
layer of bureaucracy, another $1.5 million.
  You can shift the costs. You can shift the costs, but ultimately it 
is coming out of the average taxpayer's pocket.
  Vote against the Hefley amendment.
  Ms. HARMAN. Reclaiming my remaining time, I will just say this, let 
us balance the budget. Let us vote ``no'' on the Hefley amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I would just, in response, point out that if the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense has $5 million to buy Korean oil, they can 
certainly have the money to do this.
  I think the question which we will be debating in a few minutes of 
whether or not the commission is appropriate is a different question.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to my friend, the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Hunter].
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding to me.
  I think he made an interesting statement there with respect to Korean 
oil. It is my understanding we did make this major Korean oil purchase 
out of the purse, if you will, of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. It is a massive, massive pool of money. Is that right?
  Mr. HEFLEY. It is, indeed. In fact, I think the figure is about $80 
million that they have for studies, and that kind of thing, in the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. I am not sure what the total budget 
is.
  Mr. HUNTER. Let me offer to my friend that his idea that this comes 
out of the Secretary of Defense's office, I think, is a good one, 
because the Secretary of Defense himself commissions literally dozens 
and dozens of studies from outside groups. That is where the term 
``Beltway Bandit,'' I think, came into being.

                              {time}  0915

  Those are all the thousands of consultants that live in this city 
that do studies, and we are going to get into the heart of this 
commission shortly. But $1.5 million coming out of the OSD pot is going 
to be less, I understand, approximately 1 percent of that money that 
the Secretary has to run his office and to pay for commissions.
  I think it is appropriate. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HEFLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  Mr. Chairman, the Secretary of Defense came before us, and he said, 
``I don't want this study. Leave me alone. I don't want to spend $1.5 
million.'' He did not want it. So why does the gentleman want to give 
it to him?
  Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman will yield further, we are going to get 
into this. But the Secretary of Defense has some real problems. As my 
friend, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery], knows, my 
friend from Mississippi, who always has the interest of the troops at 
heart and was arguing passionately and eloquently last night for more 
readiness for troops, for more housing, the Secretary of Defense has to 
come before our committee every time and say, ``I have enough.'' And we 
know that he does not have enough money. We know that GAO just did this 
report that says he is underfunded, his own plan, by $150 billion. So 
we are going to get into the heart of this commission.
  But my suggestion is the gentleman from Mississippi has a great 
tradition, has established a tradition a lot of us have followed of not 
always accepting everything the Secretary's office tells us, and having 
our own ideas.
  I think this is going to help the Secretary to have some outside 
analysis on a number of these questions where there is so much 
difference in what the Secretary's position is and what other reliable 
agencies, like GAO, says. He and GAO were $150 billion apart. I think 
it is appropriate to figure out why they have a big difference.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, if I might respond to my friend, the 
gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery], as well, the Secretary of 
Defense does not want 10 or 12 guard armories every year either. Yet I 
know the gentleman feels strongly about that, as many of us do. We have 
an oversight responsibility. Now, whether or not we need the 
commission, the argument for the commission is there is some question 
because of what the gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter] said about 
the Bottom-Up Review and whether that really is a clear picture, and 
how do we get a clear picture?
  The answer in this bill is we get an independent kind of commission 
that can look.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlemen yield further?
  Mr. HEFLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thank the gentleman once again.
  What we ought to be doing is not closing these military bases, which 
comes under the gentleman's subcommittee. We ought to save this $1.5 
million in order to keep some of the bases open.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
Colorado [Mr. Hefley].
  The question was taken; and the chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 211, 
noes 180, not voting 43, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 140]

                               AYES--211

     Allard
     Archer
     Bachus
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clinger
     Coble
     Combest
     Cooley
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Lincoln
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     Martini
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Moorhead
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Paxon
     Petri
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce
     Quillen
     [[Page H1856]] Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Riggs
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tate
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Traficant
     Upton
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wolf
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                               NOES--180

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Baesler
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bishop
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant (TX)
     Cardin
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Danner
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Gunderson
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hayes
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Holden
     Hoyer
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Klink
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Laughlin
     Levin
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Orton
     Owens
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Tucker
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Ward
     Watt (NC)
     Williams
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--43

     Armey
     Becerra
     Bilbray
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Clay
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Cox
     Dixon
     Dornan
     Fattah
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Herger
     Hinchey
     Kleczka
     Lewis (GA)
     McDade
     Meyers
     Mfume
     Moakley
     Morella
     Ortiz
     Regula
     Richardson
     Rose
     Roukema
     Scarborough
     Shadegg
     Skeen
     Thornton
     Torres
     Vucanovich
     Wamp
     Waters
     Waxman
     Wilson
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                              {time}  0937

  The Clerk announced the following pairs:
  On this vote:

       Mr. Armey for, with Mr. Lewis of Georgia against.
       Mr. Scarborough for, with Mr. Moakley against.

  Messrs. GILCHREST, NEY, BUYER, and McINTOSH changed their vote from 
``no'' to ``aye.''
  So, the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
                          personal explanation

  Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I was unavoidably delayed, 
and I did not record my vote on rollcall No. 140, Had I been here, I 
would have voted ``no.''
                          personal explanation
  Mr. WAMP. Mr. Chairman, this morning I was attending an event away 
from Capitol Hill to which I had been committed before the change in 
meeting time of the House to 9 a.m. Unfortunately, when the bells rang 
for the vote on the Hefley amendment, I was unable to return in time 
and I would therefore ask that the Record reflect that I would have 
voted ``yes'' on the Hefley amendment to H.R. 7.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the order of the House of today, it is now in 
order to consider the amendment to be offered by the gentlewoman from 
California [Ms. Harman].


                    amendment offered by ms. harman

  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Ms. Harman: Strike title III (page 13, 
     line 1, through page 2), line 2..

  The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] will be 
recognized for 8 minutes, and a Member opposed will be recognized for 8 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  My colleagues, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Menendez] and the 
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Meehan] and I are offering an 
amendment today that every deficit hawk should love. Balanced budget 
supporters should unite around it because it would strike a section of 
this bill, title 3, which would establish an Advisory Commission on 
National Security Revitalization that we simply do not need.
  Let me make three quick points:
  First, the commission is a waste of money. Even if we reprogram the 
money, its timetable is absurdly short, and its $1.5 million estimated 
budget wastes taxpayer funds that could be better spent on readiness or 
quality of life for our troops and their families.
  In comparison to other Government expenditures, $1.5 million is not 
much. However, the challenge is for all of us in this economic 
environment to reduce wasteful Government expenditures, not increase 
them. If we are serious about balancing the budget, this money must not 
be spent.
  Second, the commission usurps the responsibilities of the Secretary 
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the congressional defense 
committees. Defense Secretary Perry emphatically stated that, ``the 
proposed commission usurps the responsibilities of the Secretary of 
Defense.'' At the same time this independent commission would interfere 
with the ability of the Committee on National Security to fulfill its 
responsibilities. Secretary Perry also correctly advised that we should 
not dilute the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense by turning 
a key part of them over to an independent commission.
  Third, the commission is redundant. I am holding up a list prepared 
by supporters of this commission. This 2-page list prepared by 
supporters of this commission shows 14 other commissions that are 
already doing work on overlapping subjects. This commission would 
duplicate tasks of the Rolls Admission Comission, the Quality of Life 
Task Force, the Reserve Forces Policy Board, the Task Force on 
Readiness, among others. It is a waste of time and money.
  To sum up, Mr. Chairman, I agree with the recent comment of a senior 
member of the other body who said, ``the commission is a real loser.''
  The CHAIRMAN. Does any Member seek time in opposition?
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment 
offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina 
[Mr. Spence] for 8 minutes.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon].
  (Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to 
this amendment despite my admiration for the gentlewoman from 
California [Ms. Harman] in her leadership role on the Committee on 
National Security.
  Why do we need this commission Mr. Chairman? Well, let us look at the 
facts as they are.
  We have a Secretary of Defense who tells us we need one fund level 
for the defense needs over the next 5 years. We have the General 
Accounting Office tell us, no, we need $150 billion more than what the 
Secretary said. We have the Congressional Budget Office saying, no, we 
need $67 billion more than what the Secretary said. And then we have 
one of the most respected Members of the minority side, the gentleman 
from Missouri {Mr. Skelton], saying, no, we need $44 billion more over 
the next 5 years.
                      [[Page H1857]] {time}  0945

  No one knows what we need over the next 5 years.
  Now, some would say let us let the Secretary go back and tell us. We 
know what he is going to tell us. He is going to tell us what he 
already told us, we are OK the way we are, which if I talk to almost 
every member of the minority party on the Committee on National 
Security, they will agree with us. They do not think there is enough 
money in there. What we are saying is we need an independent commission 
to look at that.
  Now, we are not saying a political commission, because we adjusted 
the makeup and markup process to suit the needs of the minority to make 
sure it would be six Democrats and six Republicans appointees, and that 
is in fact what this commission will be, a bipartisan effort to come 
back to us and give us the real needs in terms of dollars and in line 
with the problems and challenges that are out there in the next 5 
years.
  Some of our colleagues are saying this will be a money saver. You 
want to save money? Boy, we will give you a list. Look at what the 
President put out. A nice glossy color brochure in two-part form 
entitled ``A Time for Peace.'' Save money? Eliminate that garbage. We 
do not need it. It is a total waste of money. Eliminate the L.A. Youth 
programs in the defense bill, $10 million. How about electric vehicles? 
Believe it or not, it is in the defense bill, $15 million. Cancer 
research, even though it is important, I would support it if it were 
part of the health bill, over $200 million. This commission does not 
take away the authority of the Secretary. It lets us play our rightful 
role.
  Now, let us look at what the minority party did when they were in 
power. These are just a few of the commissions that the minority party 
put into place, in many cases, in most cases, over the objections of 
the then Secretary of Defense. Everything from women in the military to 
bottom-up review, total force structure, everything you can think of 
established through an independent commission, in some instances where 
the commissioners were actually paid.
  In this piece of legislation, no commissioner is paid. The only 
expenses involved will be those incurred, and they will be reimbursed 
for that. We are not taking the money from readiness; we are taking the 
money from the Secretary of Defense's account. What part of it? He will 
have a few less lunches, a little less money to go on trips overseas 
maybe. That is where it will come from.
  So this in fact is a vote to let us play our rightful role and to see 
where we in fact can go in terms of the spending needs of the military 
for the next 5 years, and I urge my colleagues to oppose the Harman 
amendment and to support the need for the establishment of this.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from 
Mississippi.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, does this commission you want 
established have any authority; can it do anything?
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. The commission has the same authority 
these commissions had, which is basically to come back to Congress and 
do what the Secretary has not been able to do, and that is give us the 
straight scoop on what our defense needs are.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. He is a good Secretary.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. A Secretary being misled by an 
administration that does not support the facts.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. The commission does nothing. He does not want it. He 
is not being misled.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. The Secretary would like to have it, 
because it would end up supporting his needs for additional money for 
readiness that his President will not give in to because he pulls his 
defense budget number out of the air, as you know.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Meehan].
  Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, is this not something? They did it when 
they were in power, so we can do it. They did it, so we can do it. Let 
us get serious. Here we are creating a commission to spend money to 
figure out how we are going to spend more money. We pass a balanced 
budget amendment, we talk about downsizing Government, we talk about 
reinventing Government. And what are we doing here today? Let us create 
a political commission, because we do not want to do our jobs.
  We in Congress do not want to do our jobs on the Committee on 
National Security. We do not want to hold the Secretary of Defense 
back. Get real, If we are going to cut the size of Government, we 
cannot begin to create more commissions, created by politicians to 
appoint politicians to have more partisan rhetoric. National security 
is more important than partisan politics. This commission is a joke and 
everyone in the country knows it.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Hunter].
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, there is an enormous discrepancy between 
our own institution, the GAO and the Secretary of Defense's office. The 
GAO says the secretary of Defense has underfunded his own budget by 
$150 billion. The Chief of Staff of the Army has made statements to the 
effect that the Army is on the razor's edge of readiness, meaning they 
cannot cut another dime, that they are in very difficult shape. General 
Mundy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, June 1994, last year, said 
that the Marine Corps was inadequately funded to carry out the 
President's own Bottom-Up Review requirements. So we have questions all 
over the place.
  If you are satisfied with the $150 billion difference in funding 
projections, then vote no on this commission. If you are not satisfied, 
vote yes. We still authorize, we still legislate. But we are not going 
to say we refuse to see the evidence. Let us let this commission come 
up and try to resolve this $150 billion difference.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
Jersey [Mr. Andrews], a great deficit hawk.
  (Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, here is why the Harman-Menendez amendment makes sense. 
When we go back to our districts this afternoon, if we stood in line at 
the supermarket this weekend, and we had to say to the person next to 
us ``I am going to take $20 out of your pocket to pay for this 
program,'' could we look them in the eye and tell them they were 
getting their $20 worth for this program?
  What would we tell them when they said, ``Congressman, there were 14 
other of these commissions that were supposed to do something like the 
same thing.'' What would we tell them when they say, ``Congressman, do 
you not have committees already set up in the House and Senate supposed 
to do the same thing?'' I do not have a good answer to that, and I 
think neither do you.
  Let me just say this to my friends from the other side: Part of your 
Contract With America is to shed lockstep allegiance to partisan 
leadership and to do the right thing. The right thing is to vote for 
Harman-Menendez.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would just like to point out that the reason we are 
setting up this commission is to reveal the flaws in the previous 
commission that was set up, the Bottom-Up Review, and point out how 
wrong it was. That is simply what is going to be. In other words, how 
can the other side say it is all right for them to have a commission 
set up and for us not to do the same thing?
  Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Buyer].
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Buyer] is recognized 
for 2\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, it is amazing how we can debate an issue of 
$1.5 million and interject all the rhetoric as if it is $1.5 billion. 
Well, gentleman that have particular defense contractors in their 
districts may be asking for particular things, but come to the House 
floor and then want to talk about what things are particular, what 
things are a joke, and what is not a joke.
  [[Page H1858]] Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BUYER. No, not at this particular time. If you became sensitive, 
that is your particular problem.
  In regard to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman], I have 
great respect for you, and you have been a hawk with us on a lot of 
issues. But on this particular issue I am in agreement with the 
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
  The Bottom-Up Review became suspect. It became suspect because of how 
it came about. We have talked about this on the Committee on National 
Security often. And that is, and I have to say it again, when Bush-
Powell put together the numbers for defense cuts, they cut the $50 
billion. Les Aspin said I can go $60 billion further on top of the $50 
billion. Then all of a sudden Bill Clinton is a candidate for 
President, endorses Les Aspin's $60 billion in cuts. None of us were 
surprised when Les Aspin became the Secretary of Defense. Low and 
behold, when we did the 5-year budget resolution, it was $127, $128 
billion, on top of the existing $50 billion.
  Then all of a sudden, quickly, to cover themselves, Les Aspin comes 
to our committee and talks about having to do the Bottom-Up Review, a 
review of how to justify the numbers after the fact. That then made the 
Bottom-Up Review a very politically suspect document, and those of us 
then in the committee of the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton] last 
year then had to deal with the difficult decisions about the open 
secret in this town.
  The open secret is, my friends, and to those in our country, it is 
that we do not have a force structure to even meet the national 
security objectives and being able to fight and win two nearly 
simultaneous major regional conflicts.
  So what we are saying is right now, time out. Let us not deal with 
the politics. Let us have the independent commission to give a real 
assessment. I understand the politics between the White House and the 
Secretary, and those are the chiefs that must salute constitutionally.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BUYER. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the compliment and thank the 
gentleman for it. I would just say this: That our committee and its 
composition are competent to do what you are suggesting. Why do we need 
to interpose a commission between us and the policymakers and the 
executive branch? Why do not we do this ourselves?
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, we have many advisory 
committees and task forces to help us through the process, and that is 
exactly what this is. I think it is an excellent compliment to how we 
want to govern.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] has 4 
minutes remaining.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Ohio, [Mr. Brown].
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, the Republican Contract on America 
mandates Congress to spend $1.5 million on a new commission to study 
our Nation's military needs. Great. A new idea for more government. Do 
not we already have people studying the Nation's military needs and 
reporting to the legislative branch and the executive branch? Is not 
that what the Pentagon does? Is not that what the House Committee on 
Armed Services under the gentleman from South Carolina, Chairman 
Spence, has been doing? Is not that what the Committee on International 
Relations has been doing under the gentleman from New York, Chairman 
Gilman?
  Why do we need to spend $1.5 million on a commission to do what the 
Pentagon and Congress already should be doing and already are doing? 
Why do we need to spend money so we can find ways to spend more money? 
It is the full employment act for unemployed defense consultants. It is 
a bad idea. Vote for the Menendez-Harman amendment.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums], one of the most honorable and impressive 
Members of this House, and the ranking member of the Committee on 
National Security.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, let me make one point of why I oppose this 
commission. It is not just that it is something we can do. The Framers 
of the Constitution gave us this responsibility. From time to time, Mr. 
Chairman, it is wholly appropriate that we establish commissions to 
engage until giving their expertise with respect to discrete items. 
This commission goes far beyond that. This commission attempts to 
establish the totality of our national security policy.
  Set up a commission on roles and missions. But this is something far 
beyond that. We are being paid, my colleagues, in excess of $130,000 
per annum to do this job fundamentally required by the Constitution of 
the United States. The Framers of the Constitution said do your job. Do 
not give it to an independent commission for the purposes of 
establishing the totality of our national security policy. That is our 
job.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Menendez], the cosponsor of this 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New Jersey is recognized for 3 
minutes.
  (Mr. MENENDEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, if the Contract With America means 
anything, it means we do not want to waste the taxpayers' money by 
establishing an unneeded commission to tell us what Republicans both in 
the bill and on their language on the floor already know they wanted to 
save. The amendment we offer seeks to strike this unnecessary money for 
the taxpayers. Whether you spend it out of the Secretary of Defense's 
budget or through an appropriation, it is still taxpayers' money, and I 
challenge my Republican colleagues to honor your contract vows to cut 
wasteful spending, to cut bureaucracy, to make Government smaller and 
eliminate the commission.
  During the last Congress, the House of Representatives spent nearly 
$20 million on the budgets of congressional committees with oversight 
over this issue--Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, Government 
Operations, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Do you think you can tell the constituents back home that $20 million 
was not enough? And if you add the Members who in fact have served on 
those committees and who have great experience, offer 200 Members, it 
comes to $40 million in the House alone, without the Senate. If that is 
not enough to determine what it is that we need for national defense 
and security, I do not know what is. And as it relates to the 
secretary, let us hear what he had.
  So to say. He said, ``You are my commission,'' meaning the committee. 
``I do not need an independent commission interposing itself between 
myself and you, and you do not need to have an independent commission 
interposing yourself with me.''
  If you want to vote for smaller Government, if you want to have less 
spending, if you want to have less bureaucracy, if you want to save the 
taxpayers money, you will be voting yes on this amendment, you will 
vote for the Harman-Menendez amendment, and in fact you will be living 
with the Contract.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 207, 
noes 211, not voting 16, as follows:
                             [Roll No. 141]

                               AYES--207

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (LA)
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Barton
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bishop
     Blute
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     [[Page H1859]] Brownback
     Bryant (TX)
     Cardin
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Condit
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Danner
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Gunderson
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hayes
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Holden
     Hoyer
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Klug
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Laughlin
     Leach
     Levin
     Lincoln
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Martini
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Owens
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Poshard
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Rose
     Roth
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Tucker
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                               NOES--211

     Allard
     Archer
     Baker (CA)
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clinger
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Cooley
     Costello
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Moorhead
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Paxon
     Pombo
     Portman
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Regula
     Riggs
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Salmon
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Seastrand
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tate
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Traficant
     Upton
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Williams
     Wolf
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Armey
     Becerra
     Chapman
     Clay
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Kennelly
     Lewis (GA)
     Mfume
     Roberts
     Thornton
     Wilson
     Young (AK)

                              {time}  1016

  The Clerk announced the following pair:
  On this vote:

       Mr. Armey for, with Mr. Lewis of Georgia against.

  Mrs. ROUKEMA and Mr. WILLIAMS changed their vote from ``aye'' to 
``no.''
  Messrs. ROTH, WARD, and LAUGHLIN changed their vote from ``no'' to 
``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
                          personal explanation
  Mr. MFUME. Mr. Chairman, I was unfortunately detained in my 
congressional district in Baltimore earlier today and thus forced to 
miss two record votes. Specifically, I was not present to record my 
vote on rollcall vote No. 140, the amendment offered by Mr. Hefley of 
Colorado and rollcall vote No. 141, the amendment offered by Ms. Harman 
of California.
  Had I been here I would have voted ``nay'' on rollcall No. 140 and 
``yea'' on rollcall No. 141.
                          personal explanation
  Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, on vote No. 141 I am recorded as voting 
``no.'' My intention was to vote in favor of the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the order of the House previously agreed to, it 
is now in order to consider the amendment of the gentleman from Iowa 
[Mr. Leach].


                     amendment offered by mr. leach

  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Leach: On page 28, strike line 4 
     and all that follows through line 12 and insert in lieu 
     thereof the following:
       ``(g) Interpretation.--Subject to the power of the Congress 
     to declare war under article I, section 8, clause 11 of the 
     Constitution of the United States, nothing in this section 
     shall be construed to derogate or limit the authority of the 
     President as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed 
     Forces under article II, section 2, clause 1 of the 
     Constitution of the United States.''
       Beginning on page 28, strike line 16 and all that follows 
     through page 29, line 2.
       ON page 29, line 3, strike ``(c)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(b)''

                              {time}  1020

  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Leach] will be recognized 
for 10 minutes, and a Member in opposition will be recognized for 10 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Leach].
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. 
This is a self-explanatory amendment. It is designed to protect the 
constitutional authority and responsibility of the President as 
Commander in Chief from unprecedented and improper congressional 
tampering with the separation of powers doctrine.
  The Commander in Chief clause of the Constitution supports two key 
policy precepts. First, it gives the President broad authority to 
command the military forces of the United States, thereby securing 
civilian command over the military. Second, and most relevant to this 
debate, the framers also sought to ensure that one commander had sole 
authority to direct the Nation's fighting forces.
  The colonists had learned the difficulties of prosecuting war via 
committee during the American Revolution. Naming the President 
Commander in Chief was intended to assure consistent orders, plans, and 
decisions.
  The President was not given the authority to make the political 
decision to declare war, but he was granted the authority to command 
the troops in day-to-day operations.
  In its present form, this bill, with unbridled gall, undercuts the 
separation of powers doctrine by limiting the well-established 
constitutional authority of the President to decide upon the command 
arrangements for U.S. military personnel.
  Title IV, for instance, attempts to prevent the expenditure of funds 
for any element--even an individual soldier--of U.S. Armed Forces under 
the command or operational control of a foreign national acting on 
behalf of the United Nations unless certain commitments are made to 
Congress.
  As a matter of constitutional law, I believe that the Constitution 
does not permit the President to derogate his power as Commander in 
Chief to another body. Period. Certification requirements are 
inappropriate; indeed, they are constitutionally unseemly.
  [[Page H1860]] Here, let me stress, there is a distinction between 
U.S. command, which no President can give up, and operational control, 
which both constitutionally and as a matter of established military 
practice, the President may delegate to others.
  Yet this bill brazenly attempts to strip the President of his 
constitutional authority and responsibility for deciding upon the 
command arrangements for U.S. military personnel lawfully participating 
in U.N. operations.
  Indeed, this bill would deny the President the authority to place 
U.S. troops under the operational control of another country even a 
NATO ally for U.N. operations.
  In this regard, a fair reading of the Constitution and any 
understanding of history suggests that the Commander-in-Chief should 
properly retain the flexibility to place troops temporarily under the 
operational control of officers of another nation when it serves U.S. 
interests, as we have done in a number of military conflicts since the 
American Revolution.
  Accordingly, my amendment strikes the existing interpretation section 
found on page 28 of title IV to the bill and inserts instead a new 
clause recognizing that subject to the power of the Congress under 
article I of the Constitution to declare war, nothing in this section 
of the bill shall be construed to derogate or limit the President's 
article II powers as Commander-in-Chief.
  Title IV, as currently crafted, is poor constitutional law; it is 
also doubtful policy.
  The principle of collective security has been a linchpin of U.S. 
national security policy of every administration since Franklin 
Roosevelt.
  The effect of title IV, unless amended, is to diminish U.S. 
leadership in the U.N. and elsewhere and force Presidents in emergency 
settings to either do nothing or rely exclusively on unilateral 
actions.
  At issue is whether we want to be the policeman for the world or the 
leading member of an international highway patrol. The second option, 
in more than a few instances, is more realistic and, I might add, 
cheaper.
  So that there is no misunderstanding, this title is more constraining 
than the War Powers Resolution.
  The War Powers Resolution, passed over President Nixon's veto, deals 
with Congressional assertions of power to declare war.
  Because of modern practices of prosecuting but not declaring war, the 
war powers resolution was offered to check the President's authority as 
Commander-in-Chief to direct U.S. Armed Forces in the event of imminent 
hostilities which might lead to war.
  But this bill goes beyond the reach of the war powers resolution by 
attempting to trench upon and limit the command authority of the 
President before hostilities are threatened and in instances of actions 
designed to deter conflict rather than lead to war.
  On this point, let me quote from a recent Wall Street Journal 
editorial:

       Yes we should check the exorbitant costs of U.N. 
     peacekeeping by rectifying the accounting and limiting the 
     U.S. share of the burden. But diminishing the legitimate 
     powers of the presidency, even in this particular way, is 
     poor precedent.

  In the background of this debate is Somalia. In this Members' view it 
is a widely misunderstood circumstance. In earlier debate on this bill 
the minority pointed out that the problem was not command and control 
of U.S. Armed Forces, in that U.S. military personnel at all points 
were under U.S. command. This is true, but it begs the larger policy 
questions.
  What happened in Somalia, and it was by no means a totally failed 
operation, was that President Bush called upon the U.S. military to 
take part in one of the most idealistic foreign policy interventions in 
the history of the world. The U.S. military because of its 
extraordinary organization and logistic capabilities was sent to a 
foreign country to feed a people whose social infrastructure had broken 
down. In a high-risk environment, a succeeding U.S. administration 
chose out of frustration to take sides in a civil war. This decision, 
made without intellectual rigor, profoundly changed American policy 
because it caused United States forces in the field to become diverted 
from the professionalism of their original mission and enmeshed in the 
history and sociology of internal Somalian politics.
  Responsibility for the change of mission rests in the White House. 
This Congress has every reason in retrospect to be critical, but care 
should be taken to hold decision-makers, not the system, accountable. 
What is warranted is consideration of the need for new leadership, not 
a change in the constitutional framework of decision-making.
  The character of modern international affairs is that decision need 
to be made quickly. What, for instance, would happen if when Congress 
was out of session a peace agreement were signed between Israel and 
Syria which included United States participation in peacekeeping in the 
Golan? Would a President be hamstrung by legal niceties in authorizing 
the movement of several hundred U.S. troops?
  More consequentially, the character of modern Congressional politics 
is an unwillingness to share accountability with the executive branch. 
I don't know which is more remarkable: the fact Congress barely 
authorized the gulf war, giving President Bush much less of a mandate 
than he received from assorted rivals in the Security Council, or the 
fact that Congress almost didn't vote at all. The obvious conclusion 
that has been reached in modern Congresses is that there are no 
liabilities in standing by and many for taking sides in controversial 
questions of foreign affairs. Congress simply can't be relied on to 
share executive authority. Our Founding Fathers had it right then and 
now.
  Finally, a personal note. When I signed the Contract With America 
last fall, I publicly made clear that I differed with several parts, 
particularly that which applied to a prospective bill on this subject. 
The Republican commitment was to raise the issues of the contract in a 
measured way. But the oath we all take is to uphold the Constitution. 
Just because we have little confidence in this President, just because 
we now control the Congress is insufficient rationale to turn the 
Constitution upside down.
  A strong Presidency is in the national interest whether or not we 
have divided government.
  Let's be measured and reasonable. I urge adoption of this amendment 
which conforms this title to constitutional stricture, historical 
experience, and the requirements of future national security.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] will be 
recognized for 10 minutes.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter].
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Nebraska rises in 
strong opposition to the Leach amendment. It is not what the gentleman 
from Iowa [Mr. Leach] adds that is the problem. It is what he deletes. 
As the gentleman may recall, I did something like this in the committee 
without success, but without deleting language. The amendment would 
take out of the statement in section 401 the phrase ``that nothing in 
this section may be construed, one, as authority for the President to 
use any element of the Armed Forces in any operation, two as authority 
for the President to place any element of the Armed Forces under the 
command and operational control of a foreign national, or, three, as an 
unconstitutional infringement on the authority of the President as 
Commander in Chief.''
  The third element in this phrase is exactly what the Committee on 
National Security added to assure that we are not infringing upon the 
constitutional rights of the President as Commander in Chief.
  Without these statements, it would be argued that section 401 is 
intended by Congress as a grant of authority to the President to place 
U.S. forces under foreign operational control in those circumstances 
where it has not been forbidded. I for one do not ever want my vote on 
this legislation to be criticized as a vote in favor of authorizing the 
President to place U.S. forces under foreign command. It is to ensure 
that our approval of this measure is never interpreted as an 
authorization of foreign command that this language is found in section 
401. But the Leach amendment will delete it. He will also delete the 
report requirement which is in a following subsection.
  [[Page H1861]] I would point out that this report language is not a 
gratuitous requirement. There is a serious question whether foreign 
command arrangements can ever be constitutional.
  A recent article in the Washington Times by distinguished former 
officials in the U.S. Justice Department, Mr. Casey and Mr. Rivkin, set 
forth the constitutional problems with foreign command, and I will add 
that op-ed piece for the Record.
  The reporting requirements which the amendment would delete provide 
us further insulation from the charge that we are authorizing something 
in section 401 that is unconstitutional.

                              {time}  1030

  I would say to the gentleman respectfully that his arguments, while 
learned, do not go to what the gentleman is really doing through his 
amendment, because what the Armed Services Committee or National 
Security Committee has done is put in the phrase to assure that we are 
not violating the constitutional powers of the President, again it is 
the following:

       Nothing in this section may be construed as an 
     unconstitutional infringement on the authority of the 
     President as commander in chief.

  I urge my colleagues to reject the Leach amendment.
  (The article referred to follows:)

               [From the Washington Times, Jan. 30, 1995]

             Congress, the President and the United Nations

               (By Lee A. Casey and David B. Rivkin Jr.)
       When American troops began to arrive in France in 1917, the 
     Allied High Command demanded that they be immediately 
     assigned to fill the gaps (created by the kaiser's machine 
     guns and the Allies' own idiocy) in the French and British 
     formations on the Western Front.
       Gen. John ``Black'' Jack Pershing said no. As commander of 
     the American Expeditionary Force, he insisted that American 
     troops would fight under American officers, in American 
     formations, pursuant to the direction of the American 
     president. American troops were in Europe as the 
     representatives of a great power, fighting to make the world 
     safe for democracy, not as modern-day Hessians.
       Pershing's decision was both politically wise and 
     constitutionally correct. It is a precedent that has been 
     honored in the observance more than the breach, and Sen. Bob 
     Dole would like to keep it that way. The new Senate majority 
     leader is so concerned with President Clinton's affection for 
     U.N. peacekeeping missions (and suggestions that American 
     troops may actually be assigned to serve under U.N. 
     commanders) that he has introduced legislation to require 
     congressional approval of any such arrangement.
       Ironically, Mr. Dole's bill--S. 5 the ``Peace Powers Act of 
     1995''--has provoked criticism from usually sympathetic 
     quarters. For example, The Washington Times suggested that 
     the bill would unwisely limit the president's power to deploy 
     American troops as necessary around the world. More broadly, 
     a number of senior Republicans (including former Secretary of 
     State James Baker) have admonished the Republican-controlled 
     Congress not to continue their Democrat predecessors' 
     destructive policy of interfering with the president's 
     foreign policy powers. In principle, these admonitions are 
     well-placed. However, as applied to S.5, they miss the mark.
       Mr. Dole's bill might well tie the president's hands in 
     certain instances, but it does not interfere with his 
     constitutional prerogatives. In fact, Mr. Dole's instinct--to 
     try to limit the president's ability to place American troops 
     under foreign command--is constitutionally sound, and the 
     bill has much to recommend it. As a start, it would repeal 
     the War Powers Resolution, replacing that provision's 
     constitutionally impermissible limits on the president's use 
     of American forces abroad with simple consultation and 
     reporting requirements.
       Contrary to the claims of its critics, the bill's major 
     flaw is not that it would prohibit the president from 
     assigning American forces to U.N. command, but that it 
     purports to allow such arrangements if Congress gives its 
     consent. Under the Constitution the president does not have 
     the authority, either as commander-in-chief or as chief 
     executive, to subordinate American troops to foreign 
     command--and Congress cannot vest him with that authority.
       The president's authority as chief executive to make 
     foreign policy is broad (in the Curtiss-Wright Export case 
     the Supreme Court called it ``plenary''), and the 
     Constitution admits of few limits on his ability to command 
     the armed forces as commander in chief. The Supreme Court 
     also has made clear that these powers are at their height 
     when the president acts with the specific authorization of 
     Congress. These powers are not, however, entirely without 
     limit. (It was not the Framers' habit to grant absolute 
     power, with respect to any subject, to any branch of 
     government.) In this instance, the president's authority over 
     the armed forces (and the authority of Congress) is limited 
     by the Constitution's requirement that anyone exercising the 
     legal authority of the United States must be an ``officer'' 
     of the United States, appointed in accordance with the 
     ``Appointments Clause.''
       The Constitution's Appointments Clause (Article II, section 
     2, clause 2) provides that the president ``shall nominate, 
     and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
     appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
     Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the 
     United States.'' Congress may vest the authority to appoint 
     less important or ``inferior'' officers in the president 
     alone, the courts of law, or with the heads of federal 
     agencies. ``Principal'' officers, however, must be appointed 
     by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
     The Supreme Court made clear in the landmark case of Buckley 
     vs. Valeo that only individuals appointed in accordance with 
     this provision may exercise ``significant'' federal 
     authority.
       Although the Appointments Clause is more often analyzed in 
     terms of civilian appointments, it is fully applicable to 
     military appointments--a point the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
     only last term in a case styled Weiss vs. United States. 
     Indeed, it is difficult to think of a more significant 
     federal authority than the right to command American troops 
     and, unlike the civilian service, Congress has required that 
     even very junior military officers be appointed by and with 
     the consent of the Senate. Neither the president nor Congress 
     can waive the applicability of the Appointments Clause. As a 
     result, no individual, whether the secretary general of the 
     United Nations or a U.N. commander in the field, who is not a 
     properly appointed officer of the United States can direct 
     the actions of American troops.
       There have, of course, been instances when American troops 
     did indeed serve under foreign command. Pershing himself was 
     forced to relent--for a time--in the face of a massive German 
     offensive, and allow American troops to serve under Allied 
     command. GIs also fought--again for a time--under British 
     Field Marshal Montgomery during World War II. These are, 
     however, exceptions to the rule, expedients undertaken in the 
     very gravest circumstances of world war. Such instances do 
     not alter the Constitution's clear requirement that only 
     officers of the United States may command U.S. troops; that 
     document cannot be amended by its own violation. Nor do they 
     justify further violation of the Constitution's requirements.
       Naturally, there are many possible arrangements for 
     cooperation with the United Nations, and between American and 
     allied troops on the ground, that would not violate the 
     Appointments Clause. A prime example is NATO's practice, 
     where the Supreme Allied Commander Europe--the Alliance's top 
     military officer--has always been a U.S. general, an 
     arrangement that is fully consistent with the Appointments 
     Clause. In this respect, as in other military and foreign 
     policy areas, the president has very great discretion in 
     making agreements with the United Nations, or other 
     international organizations. He is free to consult with the 
     U.N. hierarchy in formulating American foreign policy. He can 
     dispatch American forces to trouble spots at the request of 
     the United Nations, and he can instruct those forces to 
     cooperate fully with the U.N. command structure and with any 
     other forces U.N. members contribute. He can subordinate the 
     interests of the United States to those of the international 
     community if he chooses.
       The president is answerable for each of these actions to 
     the electorate, and may well face congressional retaliation 
     in the form of slashed budgets, legislative gridlock or even 
     impeachment, if Congress objects. The Constitution, however, 
     does not forbid any of these actions. What the president 
     cannot do is to interpose a U.N. (or any other foreign) 
     official into the chain of command. The president can 
     delegate his authority only to a duly appointed officer of 
     the United States. Any arrangement for international 
     cooperation that includes the actual subordination of 
     American military command to individuals who are not duly 
     appointed officers of the United States, interposing those 
     officials between the president and American troops, must 
     fail.
       If Mr. Clinton persists in placing American troops under 
     U.N. command, Congress would be perfectly within its rights 
     to remind the president that the Constitution forbids such an 
     arrangement. Congress cannot, however, remove the 
     constitutional impediment simply by giving its consent. The 
     branches of government cannot among themselves agree to 
     ignore the Constitution's mandates.
       Congress could, of course, remove the constitutional 
     impediment in accordance with the terms of Appointments 
     Clause itself, by allowing the president to commission U.N. 
     officials into the federal service. Senior officers (and 
     junior ones if Congress chooses) would have to undergo Senate 
     confirmation, but there is no constitutional requirement 
     (although there currently is a statutory one) that officers 
     of the United States also must be U.S. citizens. Under these 
     circumstances, U.N. or foreign military officers could 
     command American forces. They would, of course, be subject to 
     the direction of the president, to the Uniform Code of 
     Military Justice and accountable for their actions as are 
     other American officers.
       Such an arrangement might or might not be acceptable to the 
     United Nations (probably not), and it is likely that there 
     would be considerable congressional opposition (snowballs in 
     hell come to mind). But Congress 
     [[Page H1862]] does have the authority to accomplish this 
     within the bounds of the Constitution. What it cannot do is 
     to agree with the president to ignore the Constitution's 
     requirements--and the accountability they ensure--by allowing 
     him simply to assign American troops to foreign command.

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman 
from New York.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Bereuter) having assumed the chair, Mr. Linder, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 7) to 
revitalize the national security of the United States, had come to no 
resolution thereon.

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