[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 31 (Thursday, February 16, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H1853-H1862]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ADDITIONAL DEBATE TIME DURING FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 7, NATIONAL
SECURITY REVITALIZATION ACT
Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Speaker, I have a unanimous-consent request.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state the unanimous-
consent request.
Mr. VOLKMER. The unanimous-consent request is that the leader of both
sides, Republican and Democratic leaders, be allowed 3 minutes each for
debate on H.R. 7.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Missouri?
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I am taking
the time to ask the gentleman if he could spell it out for us. Is that
for debate purposes only?
Mr. VOLKMER. Yes. I said, for debate only.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Notwithstanding the time limitation?
Mr. BERMAN. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, I have one
question. I assume this is not within the 10-hour limit?
Mr. VOLKMER. If the gentleman will yield, Mr. Speaker, that is
correct. This is in addition to the other time. It does not come out of
the time.
Mr. BERMAN. I withdraw my reservation of objection, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Missouri?
There was no objection.
[[Page H1854]] NATIONAL SECURITY REVITALIZATION ACT
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 83 and rule
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill,
H.R. 7.
{time} 0905
in the committee of the whole
Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the
bill (H.R. 7) to revitalize the national security of the United States,
with Mr. Linder in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Wednesday,
February 15, 1995, the amendment offered by the gentleman from Missouri
[Mr. Skelton], as amended, had been disposed of, and the bill was open
for amendment at any point.
Three hours and fifty minutes remain for consideration of amendments
under the 5-minute rule, pursuant to the order of the House today.
Are there further amendments to the bill?
amendment offered by mr. mchale
Mr. McHALE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. McHale: Page 9, after line 21,
insert the following new paragraph (and redesignate the
succeeding paragraphs accordingly):
(2) to provide for sufficient forces to meet the national
security strategy of using forward-deployed and forward-based
forces to promote regional stability, deter aggression,
improve joint/combined operations among United States forces
and allies, and ensure timely crisis response:
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. McHale] will be
recognized for 1 minute, and a Member opposed will be recognized for 1
minute.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. McHale].
Mr. McHALE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the 1 minute.
My hope is there is no Member opposed.
This amendment is being offered with the consent and approval of the
leadership on both sides. I particularly want to thank the chairman of
the committee, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence], for his
agreement in allowing me to offer this amendment. I also want to
emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that I offer this amendment with my good
friend and colleague, the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Fowler],
because on this issue, she and I absolutely see eye to eye.
Mr. Chairman, it was President Kennedy who said only when our
strength is sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that
it will never be employed. This amendment simply says that we guarantee
to particularly our naval forces the military resources necessary for
peacetime deployment so that when a crisis occurs, when our Nation must
quickly deploy forces into a combat theater, that the U.S. Navy and
embarked forces will have the opportunity for crisis response. That is
what the Navy typically does during peacetime.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time, and suggest
perhaps a few comments from my colleague, the gentlewoman from Florida
[Mrs. Fowler], would be appropriate at this time.
The CHAIRMAN. Does any Member seek the 1 minute in opposition?
Hearing none, the Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs.
Fowler] for 1 minute.
Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the 1 minute.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to cosponsor this amendment with my
colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. McHale].
As he stated, this just puts into this bill the policy that in order
to provide sufficient forces to meet our national security strategy of
using forward-deployed and forward-based forces to promote regional
stability, that it is very important that we have this policy in our
bill, because this is what our U.S. Navy does, and we want to make sure
that this language is spelled out clearly in this bill.
I am pleased to be a cosponsor with my colleague, the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. McHale].
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. McHale].
The amendment was agreed to.
amendment offered by mr. hefley
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. It is amendment No.
5.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Hefley: Strike out section 309
(page 21, lines 19 through 22) and insert the following:
SEC. 309. FUNDING.
Funds for the activities of the Commission shall be made
available to the Commission by the Secretary of Defense from
funds appropriated for activities of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Hefley] will be
recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member in opposition will be recognized
for 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Hefley].
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, as we marked up this bill in the National Security
Committee, I had concerns about spending additional money on a
commission. I did not want an additional $1.5 million being taken away
from our troops.
The chairman of our committee, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
Spence], and his staff have worked diligently to calm my fears.
My amendment would simply state that the commission shall be paid for
by funds appropriated for the Office of Secretary of Defense. This is
appropriate since the Office of the Secretary of Defense is the one
that generally has money to do studies of various kinds. It is also
appropriate because these funds will not be coming out of training or
readiness accounts, and I think that is the real key, Mr. Chairman, is
that we do not want this money coming out of the hides of our fighting
forces as we prepare them to meet whatever contingency is out there.
So we are asking that this come out of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. It is my understanding that the chairman is willing to accept
this amendment, and I would ask support for the Hefley amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone seek recognition in opposition?
Ms. HARMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California
[Ms. Harman] for 5 minutes.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise in opposition to the Hefley amendment.
First, let me thank my colleague for supporting an amendment I
offered in the National Security Committee to strike the entire
commission including its funding. I think that is the way to go, and in
just a few minutes, my colleague, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr.
Menendez], and I will offer an amendment again to do that.
I think the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Hefley] is correct in
pointing out the $1.5 million that would be appropriated for this
commission should not come from new funds, nor should it come from
existing funds. We should not spend it.
I am a supporter of the balanced budget amendment, as is he, and it
is time to get serious about cutting out unnecessary funding. This is a
point I made last night, too, as we made the difficult balance between
more funds for national missile defense and readiness.
There is no free lunch, Mr. Chairman, and unfortunately this
amendment would seem to be asking for one.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.
Mr. SKELTON. I would like to again speak for the troops: $1.5 million
will take care of a lot of taking care of their homes, their roofs,
their refrigerators, the bathrooms, the quality of life. It will take
care of a lot of ammunition for them to shoot on the rifle
[[Page H1855]] range. I think this is really a usurpation of our job
here. The Constitution tells us we are in charge, not a commission.
I speak for the troops again.
Ms. HARMAN. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, I yield to my colleague,
the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Menendez].
Mr. MENENDEZ. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
I, too, oppose the Hefley amendment.
I think it is an obvious attempt to try to deflect from the upcoming
amendment that the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] and I are
offering. The fact of the matter is $1.5 million out of the taxpayers'
money, wherever you do it, is still $1.5 million out of the taxpayers'
money, and it goes and flies against the spirit of the contract.
If you are for smaller government, you do not add another commission.
If you are for less bureaucracy, you do not add another commission. If
you are for less spending, you do not add another commission.
And so when we have the entire resources of the Congress, all the
committees that review it, and ultimately the bottom-up review that has
been had, the last thing we need to do is to continue to add another
layer of bureaucracy, another $1.5 million.
You can shift the costs. You can shift the costs, but ultimately it
is coming out of the average taxpayer's pocket.
Vote against the Hefley amendment.
Ms. HARMAN. Reclaiming my remaining time, I will just say this, let
us balance the budget. Let us vote ``no'' on the Hefley amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I would just, in response, point out that if the Office of the
Secretary of Defense has $5 million to buy Korean oil, they can
certainly have the money to do this.
I think the question which we will be debating in a few minutes of
whether or not the commission is appropriate is a different question.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to my friend, the gentleman from California
[Mr. Hunter].
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding to me.
I think he made an interesting statement there with respect to Korean
oil. It is my understanding we did make this major Korean oil purchase
out of the purse, if you will, of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. It is a massive, massive pool of money. Is that right?
Mr. HEFLEY. It is, indeed. In fact, I think the figure is about $80
million that they have for studies, and that kind of thing, in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. I am not sure what the total budget
is.
Mr. HUNTER. Let me offer to my friend that his idea that this comes
out of the Secretary of Defense's office, I think, is a good one,
because the Secretary of Defense himself commissions literally dozens
and dozens of studies from outside groups. That is where the term
``Beltway Bandit,'' I think, came into being.
{time} 0915
Those are all the thousands of consultants that live in this city
that do studies, and we are going to get into the heart of this
commission shortly. But $1.5 million coming out of the OSD pot is going
to be less, I understand, approximately 1 percent of that money that
the Secretary has to run his office and to pay for commissions.
I think it is appropriate. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HEFLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Mr. Chairman, the Secretary of Defense came before us, and he said,
``I don't want this study. Leave me alone. I don't want to spend $1.5
million.'' He did not want it. So why does the gentleman want to give
it to him?
Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman will yield further, we are going to get
into this. But the Secretary of Defense has some real problems. As my
friend, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery], knows, my
friend from Mississippi, who always has the interest of the troops at
heart and was arguing passionately and eloquently last night for more
readiness for troops, for more housing, the Secretary of Defense has to
come before our committee every time and say, ``I have enough.'' And we
know that he does not have enough money. We know that GAO just did this
report that says he is underfunded, his own plan, by $150 billion. So
we are going to get into the heart of this commission.
But my suggestion is the gentleman from Mississippi has a great
tradition, has established a tradition a lot of us have followed of not
always accepting everything the Secretary's office tells us, and having
our own ideas.
I think this is going to help the Secretary to have some outside
analysis on a number of these questions where there is so much
difference in what the Secretary's position is and what other reliable
agencies, like GAO, says. He and GAO were $150 billion apart. I think
it is appropriate to figure out why they have a big difference.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, if I might respond to my friend, the
gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery], as well, the Secretary of
Defense does not want 10 or 12 guard armories every year either. Yet I
know the gentleman feels strongly about that, as many of us do. We have
an oversight responsibility. Now, whether or not we need the
commission, the argument for the commission is there is some question
because of what the gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter] said about
the Bottom-Up Review and whether that really is a clear picture, and
how do we get a clear picture?
The answer in this bill is we get an independent kind of commission
that can look.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlemen yield further?
Mr. HEFLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thank the gentleman once again.
What we ought to be doing is not closing these military bases, which
comes under the gentleman's subcommittee. We ought to save this $1.5
million in order to keep some of the bases open.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Colorado [Mr. Hefley].
The question was taken; and the chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 211,
noes 180, not voting 43, as follows:
[Roll No. 140]
AYES--211
Allard
Archer
Bachus
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Castle
Chabot
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clinger
Coble
Combest
Cooley
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Flanagan
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Lincoln
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lucas
Manzullo
Martini
McCollum
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Moorhead
Myers
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Paxon
Petri
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce
Quillen
[[Page H1856]] Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Riggs
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stockman
Stump
Talent
Tate
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Traficant
Upton
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOES--180
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews
Baesler
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Bevill
Bishop
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant (TX)
Cardin
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
de la Garza
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Durbin
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Gordon
Gunderson
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Harman
Hayes
Hefner
Hilliard
Holden
Hoyer
Jackson-Lee
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Klink
LaFalce
Lantos
Laughlin
Levin
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy
McDermott
McHale
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Orton
Owens
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Poshard
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Rivers
Roemer
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sawyer
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Tejeda
Thompson
Thurman
Torricelli
Towns
Tucker
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Ward
Watt (NC)
Williams
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
NOT VOTING--43
Armey
Becerra
Bilbray
Chambliss
Chapman
Clay
Coburn
Collins (GA)
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Cox
Dixon
Dornan
Fattah
Green
Gutierrez
Hastings (FL)
Herger
Hinchey
Kleczka
Lewis (GA)
McDade
Meyers
Mfume
Moakley
Morella
Ortiz
Regula
Richardson
Rose
Roukema
Scarborough
Shadegg
Skeen
Thornton
Torres
Vucanovich
Wamp
Waters
Waxman
Wilson
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
{time} 0937
The Clerk announced the following pairs:
On this vote:
Mr. Armey for, with Mr. Lewis of Georgia against.
Mr. Scarborough for, with Mr. Moakley against.
Messrs. GILCHREST, NEY, BUYER, and McINTOSH changed their vote from
``no'' to ``aye.''
So, the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
personal explanation
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I was unavoidably delayed,
and I did not record my vote on rollcall No. 140, Had I been here, I
would have voted ``no.''
personal explanation
Mr. WAMP. Mr. Chairman, this morning I was attending an event away
from Capitol Hill to which I had been committed before the change in
meeting time of the House to 9 a.m. Unfortunately, when the bells rang
for the vote on the Hefley amendment, I was unable to return in time
and I would therefore ask that the Record reflect that I would have
voted ``yes'' on the Hefley amendment to H.R. 7.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the order of the House of today, it is now in
order to consider the amendment to be offered by the gentlewoman from
California [Ms. Harman].
amendment offered by ms. harman
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Ms. Harman: Strike title III (page 13,
line 1, through page 2), line 2..
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] will be
recognized for 8 minutes, and a Member opposed will be recognized for 8
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
My colleagues, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Menendez] and the
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Meehan] and I are offering an
amendment today that every deficit hawk should love. Balanced budget
supporters should unite around it because it would strike a section of
this bill, title 3, which would establish an Advisory Commission on
National Security Revitalization that we simply do not need.
Let me make three quick points:
First, the commission is a waste of money. Even if we reprogram the
money, its timetable is absurdly short, and its $1.5 million estimated
budget wastes taxpayer funds that could be better spent on readiness or
quality of life for our troops and their families.
In comparison to other Government expenditures, $1.5 million is not
much. However, the challenge is for all of us in this economic
environment to reduce wasteful Government expenditures, not increase
them. If we are serious about balancing the budget, this money must not
be spent.
Second, the commission usurps the responsibilities of the Secretary
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the congressional defense
committees. Defense Secretary Perry emphatically stated that, ``the
proposed commission usurps the responsibilities of the Secretary of
Defense.'' At the same time this independent commission would interfere
with the ability of the Committee on National Security to fulfill its
responsibilities. Secretary Perry also correctly advised that we should
not dilute the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense by turning
a key part of them over to an independent commission.
Third, the commission is redundant. I am holding up a list prepared
by supporters of this commission. This 2-page list prepared by
supporters of this commission shows 14 other commissions that are
already doing work on overlapping subjects. This commission would
duplicate tasks of the Rolls Admission Comission, the Quality of Life
Task Force, the Reserve Forces Policy Board, the Task Force on
Readiness, among others. It is a waste of time and money.
To sum up, Mr. Chairman, I agree with the recent comment of a senior
member of the other body who said, ``the commission is a real loser.''
The CHAIRMAN. Does any Member seek time in opposition?
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment
offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina
[Mr. Spence] for 8 minutes.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon].
(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to
this amendment despite my admiration for the gentlewoman from
California [Ms. Harman] in her leadership role on the Committee on
National Security.
Why do we need this commission Mr. Chairman? Well, let us look at the
facts as they are.
We have a Secretary of Defense who tells us we need one fund level
for the defense needs over the next 5 years. We have the General
Accounting Office tell us, no, we need $150 billion more than what the
Secretary said. We have the Congressional Budget Office saying, no, we
need $67 billion more than what the Secretary said. And then we have
one of the most respected Members of the minority side, the gentleman
from Missouri {Mr. Skelton], saying, no, we need $44 billion more over
the next 5 years.
[[Page H1857]] {time} 0945
No one knows what we need over the next 5 years.
Now, some would say let us let the Secretary go back and tell us. We
know what he is going to tell us. He is going to tell us what he
already told us, we are OK the way we are, which if I talk to almost
every member of the minority party on the Committee on National
Security, they will agree with us. They do not think there is enough
money in there. What we are saying is we need an independent commission
to look at that.
Now, we are not saying a political commission, because we adjusted
the makeup and markup process to suit the needs of the minority to make
sure it would be six Democrats and six Republicans appointees, and that
is in fact what this commission will be, a bipartisan effort to come
back to us and give us the real needs in terms of dollars and in line
with the problems and challenges that are out there in the next 5
years.
Some of our colleagues are saying this will be a money saver. You
want to save money? Boy, we will give you a list. Look at what the
President put out. A nice glossy color brochure in two-part form
entitled ``A Time for Peace.'' Save money? Eliminate that garbage. We
do not need it. It is a total waste of money. Eliminate the L.A. Youth
programs in the defense bill, $10 million. How about electric vehicles?
Believe it or not, it is in the defense bill, $15 million. Cancer
research, even though it is important, I would support it if it were
part of the health bill, over $200 million. This commission does not
take away the authority of the Secretary. It lets us play our rightful
role.
Now, let us look at what the minority party did when they were in
power. These are just a few of the commissions that the minority party
put into place, in many cases, in most cases, over the objections of
the then Secretary of Defense. Everything from women in the military to
bottom-up review, total force structure, everything you can think of
established through an independent commission, in some instances where
the commissioners were actually paid.
In this piece of legislation, no commissioner is paid. The only
expenses involved will be those incurred, and they will be reimbursed
for that. We are not taking the money from readiness; we are taking the
money from the Secretary of Defense's account. What part of it? He will
have a few less lunches, a little less money to go on trips overseas
maybe. That is where it will come from.
So this in fact is a vote to let us play our rightful role and to see
where we in fact can go in terms of the spending needs of the military
for the next 5 years, and I urge my colleagues to oppose the Harman
amendment and to support the need for the establishment of this.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from
Mississippi.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, does this commission you want
established have any authority; can it do anything?
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. The commission has the same authority
these commissions had, which is basically to come back to Congress and
do what the Secretary has not been able to do, and that is give us the
straight scoop on what our defense needs are.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. He is a good Secretary.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. A Secretary being misled by an
administration that does not support the facts.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. The commission does nothing. He does not want it. He
is not being misled.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. The Secretary would like to have it,
because it would end up supporting his needs for additional money for
readiness that his President will not give in to because he pulls his
defense budget number out of the air, as you know.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Meehan].
Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, is this not something? They did it when
they were in power, so we can do it. They did it, so we can do it. Let
us get serious. Here we are creating a commission to spend money to
figure out how we are going to spend more money. We pass a balanced
budget amendment, we talk about downsizing Government, we talk about
reinventing Government. And what are we doing here today? Let us create
a political commission, because we do not want to do our jobs.
We in Congress do not want to do our jobs on the Committee on
National Security. We do not want to hold the Secretary of Defense
back. Get real, If we are going to cut the size of Government, we
cannot begin to create more commissions, created by politicians to
appoint politicians to have more partisan rhetoric. National security
is more important than partisan politics. This commission is a joke and
everyone in the country knows it.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Hunter].
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, there is an enormous discrepancy between
our own institution, the GAO and the Secretary of Defense's office. The
GAO says the secretary of Defense has underfunded his own budget by
$150 billion. The Chief of Staff of the Army has made statements to the
effect that the Army is on the razor's edge of readiness, meaning they
cannot cut another dime, that they are in very difficult shape. General
Mundy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, June 1994, last year, said
that the Marine Corps was inadequately funded to carry out the
President's own Bottom-Up Review requirements. So we have questions all
over the place.
If you are satisfied with the $150 billion difference in funding
projections, then vote no on this commission. If you are not satisfied,
vote yes. We still authorize, we still legislate. But we are not going
to say we refuse to see the evidence. Let us let this commission come
up and try to resolve this $150 billion difference.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New
Jersey [Mr. Andrews], a great deficit hawk.
(Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, here is why the Harman-Menendez amendment makes sense.
When we go back to our districts this afternoon, if we stood in line at
the supermarket this weekend, and we had to say to the person next to
us ``I am going to take $20 out of your pocket to pay for this
program,'' could we look them in the eye and tell them they were
getting their $20 worth for this program?
What would we tell them when they said, ``Congressman, there were 14
other of these commissions that were supposed to do something like the
same thing.'' What would we tell them when they say, ``Congressman, do
you not have committees already set up in the House and Senate supposed
to do the same thing?'' I do not have a good answer to that, and I
think neither do you.
Let me just say this to my friends from the other side: Part of your
Contract With America is to shed lockstep allegiance to partisan
leadership and to do the right thing. The right thing is to vote for
Harman-Menendez.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would just like to point out that the reason we are
setting up this commission is to reveal the flaws in the previous
commission that was set up, the Bottom-Up Review, and point out how
wrong it was. That is simply what is going to be. In other words, how
can the other side say it is all right for them to have a commission
set up and for us not to do the same thing?
Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from
Indiana [Mr. Buyer].
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Buyer] is recognized
for 2\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, it is amazing how we can debate an issue of
$1.5 million and interject all the rhetoric as if it is $1.5 billion.
Well, gentleman that have particular defense contractors in their
districts may be asking for particular things, but come to the House
floor and then want to talk about what things are particular, what
things are a joke, and what is not a joke.
[[Page H1858]] Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BUYER. No, not at this particular time. If you became sensitive,
that is your particular problem.
In regard to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman], I have
great respect for you, and you have been a hawk with us on a lot of
issues. But on this particular issue I am in agreement with the
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
The Bottom-Up Review became suspect. It became suspect because of how
it came about. We have talked about this on the Committee on National
Security often. And that is, and I have to say it again, when Bush-
Powell put together the numbers for defense cuts, they cut the $50
billion. Les Aspin said I can go $60 billion further on top of the $50
billion. Then all of a sudden Bill Clinton is a candidate for
President, endorses Les Aspin's $60 billion in cuts. None of us were
surprised when Les Aspin became the Secretary of Defense. Low and
behold, when we did the 5-year budget resolution, it was $127, $128
billion, on top of the existing $50 billion.
Then all of a sudden, quickly, to cover themselves, Les Aspin comes
to our committee and talks about having to do the Bottom-Up Review, a
review of how to justify the numbers after the fact. That then made the
Bottom-Up Review a very politically suspect document, and those of us
then in the committee of the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton] last
year then had to deal with the difficult decisions about the open
secret in this town.
The open secret is, my friends, and to those in our country, it is
that we do not have a force structure to even meet the national
security objectives and being able to fight and win two nearly
simultaneous major regional conflicts.
So what we are saying is right now, time out. Let us not deal with
the politics. Let us have the independent commission to give a real
assessment. I understand the politics between the White House and the
Secretary, and those are the chiefs that must salute constitutionally.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BUYER. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the compliment and thank the
gentleman for it. I would just say this: That our committee and its
composition are competent to do what you are suggesting. Why do we need
to interpose a commission between us and the policymakers and the
executive branch? Why do not we do this ourselves?
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, we have many advisory
committees and task forces to help us through the process, and that is
exactly what this is. I think it is an excellent compliment to how we
want to govern.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] has 4
minutes remaining.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Ohio, [Mr. Brown].
Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, the Republican Contract on America
mandates Congress to spend $1.5 million on a new commission to study
our Nation's military needs. Great. A new idea for more government. Do
not we already have people studying the Nation's military needs and
reporting to the legislative branch and the executive branch? Is not
that what the Pentagon does? Is not that what the House Committee on
Armed Services under the gentleman from South Carolina, Chairman
Spence, has been doing? Is not that what the Committee on International
Relations has been doing under the gentleman from New York, Chairman
Gilman?
Why do we need to spend $1.5 million on a commission to do what the
Pentagon and Congress already should be doing and already are doing?
Why do we need to spend money so we can find ways to spend more money?
It is the full employment act for unemployed defense consultants. It is
a bad idea. Vote for the Menendez-Harman amendment.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Dellums], one of the most honorable and impressive
Members of this House, and the ranking member of the Committee on
National Security.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, let me make one point of why I oppose this
commission. It is not just that it is something we can do. The Framers
of the Constitution gave us this responsibility. From time to time, Mr.
Chairman, it is wholly appropriate that we establish commissions to
engage until giving their expertise with respect to discrete items.
This commission goes far beyond that. This commission attempts to
establish the totality of our national security policy.
Set up a commission on roles and missions. But this is something far
beyond that. We are being paid, my colleagues, in excess of $130,000
per annum to do this job fundamentally required by the Constitution of
the United States. The Framers of the Constitution said do your job. Do
not give it to an independent commission for the purposes of
establishing the totality of our national security policy. That is our
job.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Menendez], the cosponsor of this
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New Jersey is recognized for 3
minutes.
(Mr. MENENDEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, if the Contract With America means
anything, it means we do not want to waste the taxpayers' money by
establishing an unneeded commission to tell us what Republicans both in
the bill and on their language on the floor already know they wanted to
save. The amendment we offer seeks to strike this unnecessary money for
the taxpayers. Whether you spend it out of the Secretary of Defense's
budget or through an appropriation, it is still taxpayers' money, and I
challenge my Republican colleagues to honor your contract vows to cut
wasteful spending, to cut bureaucracy, to make Government smaller and
eliminate the commission.
During the last Congress, the House of Representatives spent nearly
$20 million on the budgets of congressional committees with oversight
over this issue--Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, Government
Operations, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Do you think you can tell the constituents back home that $20 million
was not enough? And if you add the Members who in fact have served on
those committees and who have great experience, offer 200 Members, it
comes to $40 million in the House alone, without the Senate. If that is
not enough to determine what it is that we need for national defense
and security, I do not know what is. And as it relates to the
secretary, let us hear what he had.
So to say. He said, ``You are my commission,'' meaning the committee.
``I do not need an independent commission interposing itself between
myself and you, and you do not need to have an independent commission
interposing yourself with me.''
If you want to vote for smaller Government, if you want to have less
spending, if you want to have less bureaucracy, if you want to save the
taxpayers money, you will be voting yes on this amendment, you will
vote for the Harman-Menendez amendment, and in fact you will be living
with the Contract.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired. The question is on the amendment
offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 207,
noes 211, not voting 16, as follows:
[Roll No. 141]
AYES--207
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews
Bachus
Baesler
Baker (LA)
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Barton
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Bevill
Bishop
Blute
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
[[Page H1859]] Brownback
Bryant (TX)
Cardin
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Condit
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
de la Garza
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Duncan
Durbin
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Gordon
Gunderson
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Harman
Hayes
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Holden
Hoyer
Jackson-Lee
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kleczka
Klink
Klug
LaFalce
Lantos
Laughlin
Leach
Levin
Lincoln
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Martini
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy
McDermott
McHale
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Morella
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Orton
Owens
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pomeroy
Porter
Poshard
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Rivers
Roemer
Rose
Roth
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sanford
Sawyer
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Tejeda
Thompson
Thurman
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Tucker
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Ward
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
NOES--211
Allard
Archer
Baker (CA)
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Bryant (TN)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clinger
Coble
Coburn
Collins (GA)
Combest
Cooley
Costello
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Flanagan
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lucas
Manzullo
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Metcalf
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Moorhead
Myers
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Paxon
Pombo
Portman
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Regula
Riggs
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Salmon
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Seastrand
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stockman
Stump
Talent
Tate
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Traficant
Upton
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Williams
Wolf
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOT VOTING--16
Armey
Becerra
Chapman
Clay
Collins (MI)
Conyers
Green
Gutierrez
Hastings (FL)
Kennelly
Lewis (GA)
Mfume
Roberts
Thornton
Wilson
Young (AK)
{time} 1016
The Clerk announced the following pair:
On this vote:
Mr. Armey for, with Mr. Lewis of Georgia against.
Mrs. ROUKEMA and Mr. WILLIAMS changed their vote from ``aye'' to
``no.''
Messrs. ROTH, WARD, and LAUGHLIN changed their vote from ``no'' to
``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
personal explanation
Mr. MFUME. Mr. Chairman, I was unfortunately detained in my
congressional district in Baltimore earlier today and thus forced to
miss two record votes. Specifically, I was not present to record my
vote on rollcall vote No. 140, the amendment offered by Mr. Hefley of
Colorado and rollcall vote No. 141, the amendment offered by Ms. Harman
of California.
Had I been here I would have voted ``nay'' on rollcall No. 140 and
``yea'' on rollcall No. 141.
personal explanation
Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, on vote No. 141 I am recorded as voting
``no.'' My intention was to vote in favor of the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the order of the House previously agreed to, it
is now in order to consider the amendment of the gentleman from Iowa
[Mr. Leach].
amendment offered by mr. leach
Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Leach: On page 28, strike line 4
and all that follows through line 12 and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
``(g) Interpretation.--Subject to the power of the Congress
to declare war under article I, section 8, clause 11 of the
Constitution of the United States, nothing in this section
shall be construed to derogate or limit the authority of the
President as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed
Forces under article II, section 2, clause 1 of the
Constitution of the United States.''
Beginning on page 28, strike line 16 and all that follows
through page 29, line 2.
ON page 29, line 3, strike ``(c)'' and insert in lieu
thereof ``(b)''
{time} 1020
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Leach] will be recognized
for 10 minutes, and a Member in opposition will be recognized for 10
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Leach].
Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
This is a self-explanatory amendment. It is designed to protect the
constitutional authority and responsibility of the President as
Commander in Chief from unprecedented and improper congressional
tampering with the separation of powers doctrine.
The Commander in Chief clause of the Constitution supports two key
policy precepts. First, it gives the President broad authority to
command the military forces of the United States, thereby securing
civilian command over the military. Second, and most relevant to this
debate, the framers also sought to ensure that one commander had sole
authority to direct the Nation's fighting forces.
The colonists had learned the difficulties of prosecuting war via
committee during the American Revolution. Naming the President
Commander in Chief was intended to assure consistent orders, plans, and
decisions.
The President was not given the authority to make the political
decision to declare war, but he was granted the authority to command
the troops in day-to-day operations.
In its present form, this bill, with unbridled gall, undercuts the
separation of powers doctrine by limiting the well-established
constitutional authority of the President to decide upon the command
arrangements for U.S. military personnel.
Title IV, for instance, attempts to prevent the expenditure of funds
for any element--even an individual soldier--of U.S. Armed Forces under
the command or operational control of a foreign national acting on
behalf of the United Nations unless certain commitments are made to
Congress.
As a matter of constitutional law, I believe that the Constitution
does not permit the President to derogate his power as Commander in
Chief to another body. Period. Certification requirements are
inappropriate; indeed, they are constitutionally unseemly.
[[Page H1860]] Here, let me stress, there is a distinction between
U.S. command, which no President can give up, and operational control,
which both constitutionally and as a matter of established military
practice, the President may delegate to others.
Yet this bill brazenly attempts to strip the President of his
constitutional authority and responsibility for deciding upon the
command arrangements for U.S. military personnel lawfully participating
in U.N. operations.
Indeed, this bill would deny the President the authority to place
U.S. troops under the operational control of another country even a
NATO ally for U.N. operations.
In this regard, a fair reading of the Constitution and any
understanding of history suggests that the Commander-in-Chief should
properly retain the flexibility to place troops temporarily under the
operational control of officers of another nation when it serves U.S.
interests, as we have done in a number of military conflicts since the
American Revolution.
Accordingly, my amendment strikes the existing interpretation section
found on page 28 of title IV to the bill and inserts instead a new
clause recognizing that subject to the power of the Congress under
article I of the Constitution to declare war, nothing in this section
of the bill shall be construed to derogate or limit the President's
article II powers as Commander-in-Chief.
Title IV, as currently crafted, is poor constitutional law; it is
also doubtful policy.
The principle of collective security has been a linchpin of U.S.
national security policy of every administration since Franklin
Roosevelt.
The effect of title IV, unless amended, is to diminish U.S.
leadership in the U.N. and elsewhere and force Presidents in emergency
settings to either do nothing or rely exclusively on unilateral
actions.
At issue is whether we want to be the policeman for the world or the
leading member of an international highway patrol. The second option,
in more than a few instances, is more realistic and, I might add,
cheaper.
So that there is no misunderstanding, this title is more constraining
than the War Powers Resolution.
The War Powers Resolution, passed over President Nixon's veto, deals
with Congressional assertions of power to declare war.
Because of modern practices of prosecuting but not declaring war, the
war powers resolution was offered to check the President's authority as
Commander-in-Chief to direct U.S. Armed Forces in the event of imminent
hostilities which might lead to war.
But this bill goes beyond the reach of the war powers resolution by
attempting to trench upon and limit the command authority of the
President before hostilities are threatened and in instances of actions
designed to deter conflict rather than lead to war.
On this point, let me quote from a recent Wall Street Journal
editorial:
Yes we should check the exorbitant costs of U.N.
peacekeeping by rectifying the accounting and limiting the
U.S. share of the burden. But diminishing the legitimate
powers of the presidency, even in this particular way, is
poor precedent.
In the background of this debate is Somalia. In this Members' view it
is a widely misunderstood circumstance. In earlier debate on this bill
the minority pointed out that the problem was not command and control
of U.S. Armed Forces, in that U.S. military personnel at all points
were under U.S. command. This is true, but it begs the larger policy
questions.
What happened in Somalia, and it was by no means a totally failed
operation, was that President Bush called upon the U.S. military to
take part in one of the most idealistic foreign policy interventions in
the history of the world. The U.S. military because of its
extraordinary organization and logistic capabilities was sent to a
foreign country to feed a people whose social infrastructure had broken
down. In a high-risk environment, a succeeding U.S. administration
chose out of frustration to take sides in a civil war. This decision,
made without intellectual rigor, profoundly changed American policy
because it caused United States forces in the field to become diverted
from the professionalism of their original mission and enmeshed in the
history and sociology of internal Somalian politics.
Responsibility for the change of mission rests in the White House.
This Congress has every reason in retrospect to be critical, but care
should be taken to hold decision-makers, not the system, accountable.
What is warranted is consideration of the need for new leadership, not
a change in the constitutional framework of decision-making.
The character of modern international affairs is that decision need
to be made quickly. What, for instance, would happen if when Congress
was out of session a peace agreement were signed between Israel and
Syria which included United States participation in peacekeeping in the
Golan? Would a President be hamstrung by legal niceties in authorizing
the movement of several hundred U.S. troops?
More consequentially, the character of modern Congressional politics
is an unwillingness to share accountability with the executive branch.
I don't know which is more remarkable: the fact Congress barely
authorized the gulf war, giving President Bush much less of a mandate
than he received from assorted rivals in the Security Council, or the
fact that Congress almost didn't vote at all. The obvious conclusion
that has been reached in modern Congresses is that there are no
liabilities in standing by and many for taking sides in controversial
questions of foreign affairs. Congress simply can't be relied on to
share executive authority. Our Founding Fathers had it right then and
now.
Finally, a personal note. When I signed the Contract With America
last fall, I publicly made clear that I differed with several parts,
particularly that which applied to a prospective bill on this subject.
The Republican commitment was to raise the issues of the contract in a
measured way. But the oath we all take is to uphold the Constitution.
Just because we have little confidence in this President, just because
we now control the Congress is insufficient rationale to turn the
Constitution upside down.
A strong Presidency is in the national interest whether or not we
have divided government.
Let's be measured and reasonable. I urge adoption of this amendment
which conforms this title to constitutional stricture, historical
experience, and the requirements of future national security.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] will be
recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter].
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Nebraska rises in
strong opposition to the Leach amendment. It is not what the gentleman
from Iowa [Mr. Leach] adds that is the problem. It is what he deletes.
As the gentleman may recall, I did something like this in the committee
without success, but without deleting language. The amendment would
take out of the statement in section 401 the phrase ``that nothing in
this section may be construed, one, as authority for the President to
use any element of the Armed Forces in any operation, two as authority
for the President to place any element of the Armed Forces under the
command and operational control of a foreign national, or, three, as an
unconstitutional infringement on the authority of the President as
Commander in Chief.''
The third element in this phrase is exactly what the Committee on
National Security added to assure that we are not infringing upon the
constitutional rights of the President as Commander in Chief.
Without these statements, it would be argued that section 401 is
intended by Congress as a grant of authority to the President to place
U.S. forces under foreign operational control in those circumstances
where it has not been forbidded. I for one do not ever want my vote on
this legislation to be criticized as a vote in favor of authorizing the
President to place U.S. forces under foreign command. It is to ensure
that our approval of this measure is never interpreted as an
authorization of foreign command that this language is found in section
401. But the Leach amendment will delete it. He will also delete the
report requirement which is in a following subsection.
[[Page H1861]] I would point out that this report language is not a
gratuitous requirement. There is a serious question whether foreign
command arrangements can ever be constitutional.
A recent article in the Washington Times by distinguished former
officials in the U.S. Justice Department, Mr. Casey and Mr. Rivkin, set
forth the constitutional problems with foreign command, and I will add
that op-ed piece for the Record.
The reporting requirements which the amendment would delete provide
us further insulation from the charge that we are authorizing something
in section 401 that is unconstitutional.
{time} 1030
I would say to the gentleman respectfully that his arguments, while
learned, do not go to what the gentleman is really doing through his
amendment, because what the Armed Services Committee or National
Security Committee has done is put in the phrase to assure that we are
not violating the constitutional powers of the President, again it is
the following:
Nothing in this section may be construed as an
unconstitutional infringement on the authority of the
President as commander in chief.
I urge my colleagues to reject the Leach amendment.
(The article referred to follows:)
[From the Washington Times, Jan. 30, 1995]
Congress, the President and the United Nations
(By Lee A. Casey and David B. Rivkin Jr.)
When American troops began to arrive in France in 1917, the
Allied High Command demanded that they be immediately
assigned to fill the gaps (created by the kaiser's machine
guns and the Allies' own idiocy) in the French and British
formations on the Western Front.
Gen. John ``Black'' Jack Pershing said no. As commander of
the American Expeditionary Force, he insisted that American
troops would fight under American officers, in American
formations, pursuant to the direction of the American
president. American troops were in Europe as the
representatives of a great power, fighting to make the world
safe for democracy, not as modern-day Hessians.
Pershing's decision was both politically wise and
constitutionally correct. It is a precedent that has been
honored in the observance more than the breach, and Sen. Bob
Dole would like to keep it that way. The new Senate majority
leader is so concerned with President Clinton's affection for
U.N. peacekeeping missions (and suggestions that American
troops may actually be assigned to serve under U.N.
commanders) that he has introduced legislation to require
congressional approval of any such arrangement.
Ironically, Mr. Dole's bill--S. 5 the ``Peace Powers Act of
1995''--has provoked criticism from usually sympathetic
quarters. For example, The Washington Times suggested that
the bill would unwisely limit the president's power to deploy
American troops as necessary around the world. More broadly,
a number of senior Republicans (including former Secretary of
State James Baker) have admonished the Republican-controlled
Congress not to continue their Democrat predecessors'
destructive policy of interfering with the president's
foreign policy powers. In principle, these admonitions are
well-placed. However, as applied to S.5, they miss the mark.
Mr. Dole's bill might well tie the president's hands in
certain instances, but it does not interfere with his
constitutional prerogatives. In fact, Mr. Dole's instinct--to
try to limit the president's ability to place American troops
under foreign command--is constitutionally sound, and the
bill has much to recommend it. As a start, it would repeal
the War Powers Resolution, replacing that provision's
constitutionally impermissible limits on the president's use
of American forces abroad with simple consultation and
reporting requirements.
Contrary to the claims of its critics, the bill's major
flaw is not that it would prohibit the president from
assigning American forces to U.N. command, but that it
purports to allow such arrangements if Congress gives its
consent. Under the Constitution the president does not have
the authority, either as commander-in-chief or as chief
executive, to subordinate American troops to foreign
command--and Congress cannot vest him with that authority.
The president's authority as chief executive to make
foreign policy is broad (in the Curtiss-Wright Export case
the Supreme Court called it ``plenary''), and the
Constitution admits of few limits on his ability to command
the armed forces as commander in chief. The Supreme Court
also has made clear that these powers are at their height
when the president acts with the specific authorization of
Congress. These powers are not, however, entirely without
limit. (It was not the Framers' habit to grant absolute
power, with respect to any subject, to any branch of
government.) In this instance, the president's authority over
the armed forces (and the authority of Congress) is limited
by the Constitution's requirement that anyone exercising the
legal authority of the United States must be an ``officer''
of the United States, appointed in accordance with the
``Appointments Clause.''
The Constitution's Appointments Clause (Article II, section
2, clause 2) provides that the president ``shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States.'' Congress may vest the authority to appoint
less important or ``inferior'' officers in the president
alone, the courts of law, or with the heads of federal
agencies. ``Principal'' officers, however, must be appointed
by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The Supreme Court made clear in the landmark case of Buckley
vs. Valeo that only individuals appointed in accordance with
this provision may exercise ``significant'' federal
authority.
Although the Appointments Clause is more often analyzed in
terms of civilian appointments, it is fully applicable to
military appointments--a point the Supreme Court reaffirmed
only last term in a case styled Weiss vs. United States.
Indeed, it is difficult to think of a more significant
federal authority than the right to command American troops
and, unlike the civilian service, Congress has required that
even very junior military officers be appointed by and with
the consent of the Senate. Neither the president nor Congress
can waive the applicability of the Appointments Clause. As a
result, no individual, whether the secretary general of the
United Nations or a U.N. commander in the field, who is not a
properly appointed officer of the United States can direct
the actions of American troops.
There have, of course, been instances when American troops
did indeed serve under foreign command. Pershing himself was
forced to relent--for a time--in the face of a massive German
offensive, and allow American troops to serve under Allied
command. GIs also fought--again for a time--under British
Field Marshal Montgomery during World War II. These are,
however, exceptions to the rule, expedients undertaken in the
very gravest circumstances of world war. Such instances do
not alter the Constitution's clear requirement that only
officers of the United States may command U.S. troops; that
document cannot be amended by its own violation. Nor do they
justify further violation of the Constitution's requirements.
Naturally, there are many possible arrangements for
cooperation with the United Nations, and between American and
allied troops on the ground, that would not violate the
Appointments Clause. A prime example is NATO's practice,
where the Supreme Allied Commander Europe--the Alliance's top
military officer--has always been a U.S. general, an
arrangement that is fully consistent with the Appointments
Clause. In this respect, as in other military and foreign
policy areas, the president has very great discretion in
making agreements with the United Nations, or other
international organizations. He is free to consult with the
U.N. hierarchy in formulating American foreign policy. He can
dispatch American forces to trouble spots at the request of
the United Nations, and he can instruct those forces to
cooperate fully with the U.N. command structure and with any
other forces U.N. members contribute. He can subordinate the
interests of the United States to those of the international
community if he chooses.
The president is answerable for each of these actions to
the electorate, and may well face congressional retaliation
in the form of slashed budgets, legislative gridlock or even
impeachment, if Congress objects. The Constitution, however,
does not forbid any of these actions. What the president
cannot do is to interpose a U.N. (or any other foreign)
official into the chain of command. The president can
delegate his authority only to a duly appointed officer of
the United States. Any arrangement for international
cooperation that includes the actual subordination of
American military command to individuals who are not duly
appointed officers of the United States, interposing those
officials between the president and American troops, must
fail.
If Mr. Clinton persists in placing American troops under
U.N. command, Congress would be perfectly within its rights
to remind the president that the Constitution forbids such an
arrangement. Congress cannot, however, remove the
constitutional impediment simply by giving its consent. The
branches of government cannot among themselves agree to
ignore the Constitution's mandates.
Congress could, of course, remove the constitutional
impediment in accordance with the terms of Appointments
Clause itself, by allowing the president to commission U.N.
officials into the federal service. Senior officers (and
junior ones if Congress chooses) would have to undergo Senate
confirmation, but there is no constitutional requirement
(although there currently is a statutory one) that officers
of the United States also must be U.S. citizens. Under these
circumstances, U.N. or foreign military officers could
command American forces. They would, of course, be subject to
the direction of the president, to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and accountable for their actions as are
other American officers.
Such an arrangement might or might not be acceptable to the
United Nations (probably not), and it is likely that there
would be considerable congressional opposition (snowballs in
hell come to mind). But Congress
[[Page H1862]] does have the authority to accomplish this
within the bounds of the Constitution. What it cannot do is
to agree with the president to ignore the Constitution's
requirements--and the accountability they ensure--by allowing
him simply to assign American troops to foreign command.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman
from New York.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Bereuter) having assumed the chair, Mr. Linder, Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 7) to
revitalize the national security of the United States, had come to no
resolution thereon.
____________________