[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 31 (Thursday, February 16, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E374-E375]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


               CROATIA ACTS TO REINVIGORATE PEACE PROCESS

                                 ______


                       HON. GEORGE P. RADANOVICH

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                      Thursday, February 16, 1995
  Mr. RADANOVICH. Mr. Speaker, on December 11, 1991, in response to 
Serbian aggressions against the neighboring Republic of Croatia 
resulting in Serbian occupation of one quarter of Croatia, the 
international community put forward the Vance plan, a framework to work 
toward peace in the region. Since that time, more than 3 years ago, 
Croatia has continuously cooperated with the United Nations and, along 
with Bosnia, has accepted numerous peace initiatives. The Serbian side, 
on the other hand, has rejected repeated offers of peace and remains 
recalcitrant in progress toward further peaceful negotiations.
  The Vance plan, confirmed by U.N. Resolution 724 and 740, had six 
major goals: First, the cessation of hostilities and demilitarization 
of regions where military conflict had taken place; second, the 
withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Croatia; third, the maintenance of 
public order by supervision of local police made up based on prewar 
ethnic percentages; fourth, the protection of minorities in these 
areas; fifth, the placement of military observers along Croatia's 
border with Bosnia and Herzegovina; and sixth, the facilitation of the 
return of displaced persons and refugees. Pursuant to the Vance plan, 
the United Nation created protection areas [UNPA's] in Serb-occupied 
areas of Croatia, and introduced a protection force [UNPROFOR] in those 
UNPA's in order to carry out the objectives of the Vance plan and 
reestablish peace in the region.
  During the more than 3 years since the institution of the Vance plan, 
the Republic of 
[[Page E375]] Croatia has renewed and extended the original 12-month 
mandate seven separate times. While some sort of public order has been 
maintained and the Yugoslav Army has partially departed, the UNPA's 
have not been demilitarized. Heavily armed Serbian paramilitary units 
remain, the local non-Serbian population continues to be expelled and 
in some cases killed, and it has not been possible for a single 
displaced person to return to these areas. According to the 1991 
census, there were 261,942 non-Serbs in the UNPA's. Since the arrival 
of UNPROFOR at least 39,000 non-Serbs have been forced to flee, 347 
have been killed, 26 women raped, and 1,618 tortured at the hands of 
the Serbian occupiers. This is an intolerable situation.
  With the intransigence of the Serbs to engage in serious discussions 
of peace, Crotia's mandate renewals have amounted to no less than tacit 
U.N. support for the indefinite continued Serb occupation of Croatian 
lands seized by aggression. In real terms, the positive economic 
contributions of the U.N. presence in the occupied territories have 
actually provided support for the Serbian occupiers and proven a major 
hindrance to forcing the Serbs to the negotiating table.
  In this light, I ask my colleagues to review Croatia's U.N. 
Ambassador Nobilo's discussion reprinted below about Croatia's refusal 
to renew the UNPROFOR an eighth time, and invite Members to take a good 
hard look at some of the causes of the deadlock and suffering which 
Crotia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have endured for too long. Moreover, 
my colleagues, this action by the Coratian Government is completely 
supported by the Croatian people as evidenced by two resolutions by the 
Croatian Parliament authorizing the Government's decision and a third 
binding the Government to this course.
                [From the Washington Post, Feb. 3, 1995]

                      Croatia's Move Toward Peace

           (By Mario Nobilo, Croatian Ambassador to the U.N.)

       Last month, the Republic of Croatia decided to terminate 
     the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 
     in the occupied territories of Croatia. The decision is 
     designed to reinvigorate the negotiating process and to reach 
     a peaceful settlement of the territories, which are 
     internationally-recognized as part of Croatia but illegally 
     occupied by Serbia, with the cooperation of local Serbs.
       Contrary to the views held by some, including speculation 
     in The Post's editorial of Jan. 18 (``Another Balkan War?'') 
     Croatia did not take this action in order to pursue war with 
     the local Serbs or their patrons in Belgrade. Our objectives 
     are the exact opposite.
       The departure of UNPROFOR will shift the total cost of 
     Serbian occupation from the international community to the 
     Belgrade government. The $1 billion per year cost of 
     maintaining UNPROFOR in Croatia has essentially become an 
     ``occupation fee'' paid by U.N. member nations, including the 
     United States, which itself contributes about $300 million.
       The presence of UNPROFOR provides the occupying forces with 
     economic sustenance through a continued stream of hard 
     currency, through aid deliveries, through UNPROFOR-paid 
     rents, through fuel brokering, and through infrastructure 
     maintenance and development. UNPROFOR is probably the largest 
     employer in the occupied territories.
       Because Serbia is weakened from the effect of international 
     sanctions, it cannot afford to fund both its activities in 
     Bosnia and its support of Serbs occupying parts of Croatia. 
     That makes it more likely that Serbia's President Milosevic 
     will be compelled to work with the international community 
     and Croatia to reach a negotiated settlement regarding 
     Crotia's occupied territories.
       It is clear that UNPROFOR is not a real deterrent to war, 
     in Croatia or in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If Crotia were 
     indeed intent on reintegrating its occupied territories by 
     force, it could have done so already.
       Croatia is further convinced that solving the problem of 
     its occupied territories first can greatly improve the 
     chances of a settlement in Bosnia along with the lines of the 
     internationally-accepted Contact Group proposals. Here's why: 
     A strong, reintegrated Croatia can better assist the Bosnian 
     government through the Federation of Bosnian Muslims and 
     Bosnian Croats, thus forging a more effective balance of 
     power in the region.
       Additionally, without having to maintain a 15,000-troop 
     presence in Croatia, UNPROFOR can transfer resources to 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they are badly needed. U.N. 
     Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali has recently called 
     for an additional 7,000 UNPROFOR troops for Bosnia. He is 
     unlikely to meet that need without tapping existing U.N. 
     assets.
       There are risks associated with our decision regarding 
     UNPROFOR. But Mr. Milosevic and his dependents in Croatia's 
     occupied territories have used U.N. soldiers as a buffer to 
     reaching an expeditious settlement of a situation which could 
     go unsolved for years to come under the current 
     circumstances. Croatia views such a statement as far more 
     dangerous than taking a pragmatic, albeit dramatic, action 
     that we are confident will result in an accelerated peace in 
     the entire region of southeastern Europe.
     

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