[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 29 (Tuesday, February 14, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E347-E348]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


        REPRESENTATIVE TORRICELLI--PERSPECTIVE ON NATO EXPANSION

                                 ______


                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, February 14, 1995
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, last week the Los Angeles Times ran an 
excellent article by 
[[Page E348]] our colleague Robert Torricelli on the question of NATO 
expansion. He points out that the Contract With America's National 
Security Revitalization Act, H.R. 7, proposes the most significant 
expansion of U.S. military commitments in 40 years. I agree with him 
that ``the American people should insist that swift expansion of NATO 
is a pledge that should not be kept.'' The text of Mr. Torricelli's 
article follows:
               [From the Los Angeles Times, Feb. 9, 1995]

         Perspective on NATO Expansion--A Promise Best Not Kept

                       (By Robert G. Torricelli)

       The Republican ``contract with America'' contains a 
     proposal for the expansion of NATO to include the Czech 
     Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary by 1999. The Baltic 
     states and Ukraine would follow. This represents the most 
     significant potential expansion of United States military 
     commitments in 40 years. It is one promise by the new 
     congressional majority that is best forgotten.
       The central feature of the NATO treaty is Article V, which 
     commits each signatory to regard an attack on any one state 
     to be an attack on each state. It is an unequivocal pledge of 
     war.
       The success of NATO during the Cold War was a result of the 
     credibility of the signatories. World Wars I and II 
     demonstrated that the United States regarded the security of 
     Western Europe as central to its own freedom and prosperity. 
     It was not a difficult commitment for a potential adversary 
     to understand. With $200 billion in transatlantic trade, 
     there is no separating the economic futures of the United 
     States and our allies. Similar political institutions gave 
     the treaty meaning and military capabilities gave it 
     credibility.
       An arbitrary expansion of our NATO obligations to these 
     Eastern European nations would not conform to the original 
     treaty objectives. A future adversary would never believe 
     that the United States would risk its own survival to extend 
     the nuclear umbrella in defense of nations where it has 
     little economic, political or security interests.
       Conventional military assistance would be no more credible. 
     The Balkans war has set the precedent with the United States' 
     refusal to become involved and our allies' rejection of 
     military force to defend interests on their own frontiers 
     against a comparatively weak opponent.
       This is not to suggest that the United States does not 
     sympathize with the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. 
     We welcome their freedom, and their success is in our 
     national interest. We should give them substantial economic, 
     trade and security assistance. But a commitment to wage war 
     requires a vital national interest of a different dimension.
       Central to the arguments against the ``contract with 
     America'' pledge of NATO expansion are the contradictions 
     that it represents. Republican promises of a strong national 
     defense would be undermined by rapid NATO expansion. Great 
     powers make impossible or insincere military commitments at 
     great risk. A commitment of assistance to a small European 
     state that is not fulfilled might lead an adversary to 
     conclude that a genuine interest protected by the same pledge 
     also will not be defended.
       Underlying the policy debate is the question of capability. 
     The ability of the United States to defend the current 15 
     NATO nations in a prolonged conflict with Russia was always 
     arguable. Now Republicans contend that, having reduced our 
     own forces by 25% and withdrawn 200,000 troops from Europe, 
     the United States should rapidly expand our commitments to 
     four additional nations and 73 million people. The 
     credibility of their proposal is further compromised by their 
     assurance that such an expansion can be achieved at no cost 
     to the American taxpayer.
       None of these potential allies offers any serious military 
     ability to contribute to its own security. None is equipped 
     with weapons or ordnance compatible with our own. Opposing 
     Russian military forces, while diminished, include 72 
     divisions totaling 2.4 million men in adjoining regions. 
     Their potential under some future authoritarian government 
     commanding a nation of 150 million is obviously considerable.
       Concern with the impracticability of broadening our 
     military obligations is inevitability leading some to 
     compromise. They propose that some nations join NATO while 
     those more proximate to Russia be excluded. This represents 
     the worst of all outcomes. NATO would still be left with 
     responsibilities that it cannot fulfill, and the excluded 
     states would implicitly fall into a new Russian sphere of 
     influence. A new line would be drawn across Europe.
       Missing from arguments for NATO expansion is an 
     understanding that the central element in the maintenance of 
     Eastern European security is the strengthening of Russian 
     democracy. The ultimate maintenance of Eastern European 
     sovereignty will be decided by the struggle for power within 
     Russia. NATO expansion would strengthen Russian nationalist 
     forces and, ironically, undermine the very Russian 
     institutions and leaders that offer the principal opportunity 
     to maintain Eastern European security.
       The Clinton Administration's ``partnership for peace'' 
     offers a far more balanced approach. Joint training exercises 
     in the Netherlands and Poland are an example of the 
     alliance's ability to increase capabilities. The promise of 
     increase capabilities. The promise of eventual NATO 
     membership sends a signal of our interest without recklessly 
     committing ourselves to a future conflict.
       The Republican leadership is determined to restore 
     electoral confidence in Congress by maintaining campaign 
     promises. The American people should insist that swift 
     expansion of NATO is a pledge that should not be kept.
     

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