[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 28 (Monday, February 13, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2537-S2538]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


             THE UNITED STATES-NORTH KOREA AGREED FRAMEWORK

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, as the chairman of the Senate Subcommittee 
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs I intend to share with my colleagues 
my views on a specific area within the jurisdiction of the subcommittee 
every Monday. Today I rise to briefly address the current status of 
relations between the United States and North Korea [DPRK].
  Since the division of the Korean Peninsula, we have not maintained 
diplomatic relations with the DPRK. While South Korea has prospered and 
grown into one of the strongest economic engines in Asia, the DPRK has 
become increasingly isolated, paranoid, and violent. If any country has 
come to epitomize a rogue regime, it is North Korea. In the 1960's the 
DPRK seized the U.S.S. Pueblo and its crew, and staged a violent attack 
on the residence of the South Korean President. In the 1970's Pyongyang 
perpetrated several acts of violence along the Demilitarized Zone, 
including the unprovoked ax murder of an American solder within the DMZ 
in 1977. In the 1980's the North orchestrated a bombing attack on the 
South Korean cabinet during a state visit to Burma, and in 1987 was 
responsible for blowing up a South Korean airliner with the loss of all 
aboard. The DPRK has constructed numerous tunnels under the DMZ into 
South Korea territory to facilitate invasion, some of which have been 
discovered and some of which, undoubtedtly, have not. Finally, as noted 
in a story last week in the Washington Times, the Russian intelligence 
agencies have implicated the North Korean Government in a plan to 
distribute some 8 tons of heroin in Russia. And these are just the 
incidents we know about; I do not doubt but that this is, as the Korean 
would say, subak keot halkki--just ``licking the outside of the 
watermelon.''
  Despite this, since 1988 the United States has begun a process of 
establishing a limited relationship with North Korea in an effort to 
draw that country out of its self-imposed isolation. The United States 
political counselor at our Embassy in Beijing has met dozens of times 
with his North Korean counterpart to discuss increased North-South 
dialog and a variety of other issues. However, since the early 1990's 
the DPRK's suspected nuclear weapons program has overshadowed all other 
issues.
  Although a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, DPRK-ROK 
joint declaration on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and an 
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, North Korea is 
suspected of violating--and in some cases in known to have violated--
all three. In late 1992, the IAEA discovered evidence that the DPRK has 
reprocessed more plutonium that it had disclosed. This worrisome 
because it may indicate that North Korea is reprocessing nuclear 
material for the purpose of developing military nuclear capabilities.
  North Korea rejected a subsequent demand by the IAEA that it be 
allowed to inspect several nuclear sites to confirm or disprove its 
suspicions, and announced on March 12, 1993, its intention to withdraw 
from the NPT. The administration responded by initiating direct 
negotiations with the DPRK on the nuclear issue. Two meetings were 
held--one in New York
 in June 1993, and in Geneva in July of that year--at which time North 
Korea suspended its withdrawal from the NPT and agreed to negotiate 
with the IAEA and the ROK. The two governments also agreed to discuss 
the conversion of the North's nuclear reactors to light-water 
reactors--a reactor from which it is more difficult to manufacture 
weapons-grade nuclear material.

  However, the DPRK continued to reject IAEA inspection of its 
facilities, and reneged on its promise to resume talks with the ROK. 
After several weeks of continued negotiations, in February 1994 the 
North eventually accepted the IAEA's suggested inspections. The 
administration agreed to suspend U.S.-ROK military training exercises 
for 1994 and begin a new round of talks in March as a quid pro quo for 
the North's agreement to implement the inspections and begin high-level 
negotiations with the ROK.
  True to form, Pyongyang prevented the IAEA from completing the 
inspections and disavowed any obligation to begin talks with the ROK. 
As a result, the United States began discussions with members of the 
U.N. Security Council with an eye toward imposing sanctions on North 
Korea in order to encourage the DPRK to comply with its agreement. The 
North backed down, and completed the March inspection in May.
  But before the United States could restart comprehensive 
negotiations, the North precipitated a new crisis in late May by 
removing some 8,000 spent fuel rods from its 5 Mw(e) Yongbyon reactor. 
The rods contained spent uranium from which plutonium could be 
separated out through reprocessing. The DPRK allowed IAEA inspectors to 
be present, but prevented them from sampling any of the rods--a process 
that would have allowed the agency to determine whether prior to 1992 
North Korea had removed enough fuel rods from the reactor to produce 
weapons-grade plutonium.
  Revisiting what had become a familiar scenario, the United States 
called North Korea's bluff and announced that it would again seek U.N. 
sanctions against that country, and circulated a draft resolution among 
the members of the Security Council. When the DPRK learned that the 
People's Republic of China would not veto the resolution, it quickly 
resumed negotiations.
  Over the ensuing months, the parties worked out a final agreement 
which was signed in Geneva on October 21, 1994. I will not go into any 
great detail about the specifics of the agreed framework as they were 
recently discussed at length in two hearings before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. Although in the end I saw little alternative but 
to support the administration's deal, I will say that certain portions 
of it made me somewhat uncomfortable. Principal among those is the 
requirement that the United States supply North Korea with 500,000 tons 
of heavy oil annually until the first light-water reactor called for 
under the agreement is up and running. We agreed to supply the DPRK 
with this, and the two light-water reactors, in return for North Korea 
halting the development of its nuclear program.
  I was not convinced at that time, nor am I now, that we got the best 
end of the deal. North Korea is receiving a shot in the arm that will 
go a long way toward forestalling what will certainly be North Korea's 
economic implosion. We, on the other hand, only received an intangible 
promise on the DPRK's part that I do not believe we have the means 
adequately to verify. Moreover, it was my view at that time that we had 
been too quick to reward a tantrum by a spoiled child, since such a 
move almost invariably results in another tantrum.
  In the last week, I believe we have seen my views validated. During 
talks in Berlin last week the North Koreans demanded another $500 
million to $1 billion as part of the bargain to which they had already 
agreed. In addition, they refuse to allow South Korea to supply the 
reactors as the United States has agreed. Considering their negotiating 
style, and the speed with which we have seemingly met their demands, 
this should not have come as any great surprise to anyone.
  I believe that the administration will see this move for what it is, 
simply a ploy of brinksmanship, and dismiss it clearly and directly. 
But should that not be the case, let me be very clear on my position 
for the North Koreans, who appear to be confused as to our resolve in 
this area. I will not support 
[[Page S2538]] the provision by the United States of one scintilla more 
than is called for in the agreed framework without substantial 
concessions from the DPRK; nor will I accept any diminution of the 
central role that has been set out for the ROK. South Korea is making a 
huge contribution to implementing the agreement, and it is their 
national interest that is clearly most at stake. To accede to any 
demands by the DPRK in this regard is to assist it in its ongoing 
attempts to increase the United States-DPRK relationship at the expense 
of any North-South dialog.
  Mr. President, I trust that the administration will resist this 
latest round of inane demands, and refrain from allowing the DPRK to 
use this issue to turn us into a cash cow. My subcommittee will be 
watching this area closely to ensure that it does so. I intend to hold 
a regular series of hearings to afford the administration the 
opportunity to keep us up to date on developments in this area.


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