[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 25 (Wednesday, February 8, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E296-E297]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


            THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ACCORD--DOES IT MATTER?

                                 ______


                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                       Wednesday, February 8, 1995
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like my colleagues to turn their 
attention today to the nuclear accord signed last October with North 
Korea.
  As Members know, this is a complex agreement that will be implemented 
in stages over a 10-year period. At its simplest, this agreement 
constitutes a trade. On one side, North Korea will halt and eventually 
dismantle its nuclear weapons program, accepting extensive 
international inspections to verify its compliance. In exchange, the 
international community has agreed to provide the North with 
alternative energy sources, initially in the form of heavy fuel oil, 
and later with proliferation-resistant light-water reactor technology.
  The agreement also provides for movement toward the normalization of 
relations between the United States and North Korea, and for resuming a 
dialog between the two Koreas.
  In evaluating this accord, it is instructive to compare what we get 
from this agreement with what we have agreed to give North Korea. On 
the positive side of the ledger, the benefits to us and our friends, 
including South Korea and Japan, are substantial. The agreement calls 
for:
  An immediate freeze on the North Korean nuclear weapons program--a 
step the North has already taken.
  Immediate international and United States inspections of the North's 
principal nuclear facilities--which are now being carried out on a 
continuing basis.
  The promise of the eventual elimination of the entire North Korean 
nuclear weapons program.
  A commitment by North Korea not only to live up to its obligations 
under the Nuclear 
[[Page E297]] Nonproliferation Treaty, but to accept restrictions that 
go well beyond the treaty.
  The beginnings of a process that could dampen tensions along the 
demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas and reduce the chances of 
the outbreak of a new Korean war.
  A North Korean commitment to resume a political dialog with South 
Korea.
  And what does North Korea get in return for these significant 
concessions?
  Interim shipments of heavy oil in quantities equal to the energy it 
has given up by shutting down its graphite moderated nuclear reactors--
roughly 3.5 percent of its electrical generation capacity.
  Two light-water reactors, to replace the graphite moderated reactors 
it has forsworn.
  The gradual lifting of United States sanctions against North Korea.
  Political dialog and the beginnings of a process that could 
eventually lead to the normalization of diplomatic relations with the 
United States.
  Certainly this agreement does not address every concern we have about 
North Korea--its conventional military might, ballistic missile 
program, or deplorable human rights record. Even in the nuclear sphere, 
we will have to wait some 5 years before we are permitted to carry out 
the special inspections that will reveal whether the North has secret 
stocks of plutonium.
  What this agreement does is provide us with an opening--one that did 
not exist before--to lift the specter of a nuclear arms race from the 
Korean Peninsula, begin a process of meaningful dialog between the two 
Koreas, and come to grips with the other problems that continue to 
concern us.
  Mr. Speaker, four decades ago more than 30,000 brave Americans gave 
their lives in Korea for the cause of freedom. They succeeded in 
turning back North Korean aggression. But their larger purpose--to lay 
the groundwork for a Korean Peninsula free from the threat of war--
remains unfulfilled.
  This agreement represents a giant step toward the achievement of that 
larger purpose. It does not resolve all outstanding issues between 
North Korea and the rest of the world. It does not guarantee that 
future relations with the North will be without tensions and 
difficulties.
  But, if fully implemented, the Geneva accord will advance our 
national interests and those of our allies, while holding out the 
promise of a better, more peaceful life to the people of Korea, both 
South and North.


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