[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 24 (Tuesday, February 7, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H1314-H1325]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                  EXCLUSIONARY RULE REFORM ACT OF 1995

  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, 
I call up House Resolution 61 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                               H. Res. 61

       Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this 
     resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule 
     XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 
     Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of 
     the bill (H.R. 666) to control crime by exclusionary rule 
     reform. The first reading of the bill shall be dispensed 
     with. General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall 
     not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the 
     chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the 
     Judiciary. After general debate the bill shall be considered 
     for amendment under the five-minute rule. The bill shall be 
     considered as read. During consideration of the bill for 
     amendment, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may 
     accord priority in recognition on the basis of whether the 
     Member offering an amendment has caused it to be printed in 
     the portion of the Congressional Record designated for that 
     purpose in clause 6 of rule XXIII. Amendments so printed 
     shall be considered as read. At the conclusion of 
     consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall 
     rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as 
     may have been adopted. The previous question shall be 
     considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to 
     final passage without intervening motion except one motion to 
     recommit.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Diaz-Balart] 
is recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 
the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Beilenson] pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. 
During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the 
purpose of debate only.
  (Mr. DIAZ-BALART asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 61 is an open rule 
providing for the consideration of H.R. 666, legislation to control 
crime by means of reforming the exclusionary rule.
  This rule provides for 1 hour of general debate, equally divided 
between the chairman and ranking minority member of the Judiciary 
Committee, after which time any Member will have the opportunity to 
offer an amendment to the bill under the 5-minute rule. Finally, the 
rule provides for one motion to recommit, with or without instructions.
  As with the rule for H.R. 665, which we recently debated, this rule 
also includes a provision allowing the Chairman of the Committee of the 
Whole to give priority in recognition to Members who have printed their 
amendments in the Congressional Record prior to their consideration.
  I feel that this option of pre-printing is a common courtesy that 
enables Members to see what amendments their colleagues may be 
offering. Any Member's amendment, pre-printed or not, will still have 
the opportunity to be offered and heard on its merits.
  Mr. Speaker, the fourth amendment to the Constitution provides:

       The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
     houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
     and seizures, shall not be violated * * *

  The Founding Fathers did not provide that law enforcement officers 
could not rely on their common sense and reasonable judgment to fight 
crime. But, that is what has happened 
 [[Page H1315]] unfortunately in our society. Something is profoundly 
wrong when, in a State where 2 license plates on automobiles are 
required, a policeman stops a car with only one plate, finds 240 pounds 
of cocaine in the car, and the evidence is thrown out--excluded under 
the ``exclusionary rule''--because the judge says that the car was 
registered in a State that only issues one license plate. Who gets hurt 
when that drug dealer walks? The
 police officer? No, the children of that community, the people, 
society gets hurt.

  In 1984, in United States versus Leon, the Supreme Court created the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. In Leon, the Court held 
that even if a search warrant was ultimately held to be invalid, the 
evidence gathered by police using that warrant could be permitted at 
trial, so long as the prosecution could demonstrate that the police 
believed, in good faith, at the time of the search, that the warrant 
was valid. The Court stated that since the exclusionary rule had been 
created to deter law enforcement officials from violating the fourth 
amendment, excluding evidence gathered by those who believed in good 
faith that they were acting in accordance with the Constitution served 
no legitimate purpose.
  H.R. 666 would limit the effect of the exclusionary rule, and give 
Federal judges more latitude to admit evidence seized from those 
accused of crimes, so long as the search and seizure in question took 
place under circumstances providing the law enforcement officer 
conducting the search with an objectively reasonable belief that his 
actions were in fact lawful and constitutional. Moreover, H.R. 666 
establishes a shift in the burden of proof. If a search is conducted 
within the scope of a warrant, the defendant will have the burden of 
providing that the law enforcement officer could not have reasonably 
believed that he was acting in conformity with the fourth amendment.
  H.R. 666 builds upon Leon by codifying its holding. A Federal judge 
may still suppress evidence if it was seized in knowing or negligent 
violation of the Constitution.
  Evidence gathered in violation of any statute, administrative rule or 
regulation, or rule of procedure would be admissible unless a statute 
specifically authorizes exclusion of evidence. But, the good faith 
exception would apply and may render such evidence usable.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly support the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act of 
1995 and urge adoption of this open rule for its consideration.

                              {time}  1440

  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my colleague's, the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Diaz-Balart], yielding the customary 30 
minutes of debate time to me, and I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  House Resolution 61, the provisions of which the gentleman from 
Florida has well explained, is an open rule. I support it, and I urge 
my colleagues to do the same.
  I am, However, as are others, concerned about the wisdom of the 
provisions of H.R. 666, the bill for which this rule has been granted. 
As my colleagues on the Judiciary Committee have written, H.R. 666 
``commits affirmative harm to the Constitution.''
  It breaks our Constitution's promise, as expressed in the fourth 
amendment, and which has been maintained for over 200 years, that all 
Americans have the right to be protected from arbitrary and unfounded 
governmental invasions of their homes.
  The protections of the fourth amendment have been enforced through 
the exclusionary rule, which prohibits prosecutors from using evidence 
in criminal cases that has been obtained in violation of the 
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
  We should not only question the provisions of H.R. 666 which allow 
the use of evidence obtained without a warrant as going beyond 
permissible police search and seizure powers, but we must also question 
whether Congress has the power to change the exclusionary rule by 
simple legislation rather than by a constitutional amendment. Along 
with many of my colleagues, Mr. Speaker, I am confident that the 
constitutionality of H.R. 666 will be challenged and, I suspect, 
successfully.
  We have to be particularly careful when we deal with an issue as 
highly charged and emotional as crime to legislate with as much 
thoughtfulness and as much care as possible. That is especially true in 
cases such as this when changing the law necessarily raises questions 
of abridging constitutional protections that were adopted with good 
cause to protect the innocent.
  I fear that in our desire to prove to our constituents that we are 
not soft on crime we have forgotten that certain procedures such as the 
exclusionary rule were instituted to protect the innocent--in this 
case, those who may be subjected to illegal searches and seizures.
  Because of these very serious problems with the provisions of H.R. 
666, I am pleased, as are Members on our side, that the majority on the 
Committee on Rules has recommended this open rule.
  Mr. Speaker, to repeat, while I have strong and serious reservations 
about H.R. 666, and even about our considering it as written, I support 
the rule and urge my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. Speaker, we have no requests for time, and I reserve the balance 
of my time.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my good friend and 
colleague from the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. 
McInnis].
  Mr. McINNIS.  Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for 
yielding time to me so I may have the opportunity to address the floor 
for a couple of minutes.
  First of all, I think it is appropriate once again to address the 
fact that this is going to be a very controversial bill. We are going 
to have some very interesting debate on both sides of the aisle, and I 
think it should be highlighted that the chairman of the Rules Committee 
chose that an open rule would be appropriate.
  In the last couple of weeks I have heard some comments about ``Gee, 
we see the open rule really when it is a noncontroversial bill.'' Well, 
today is a good example of when we have a controversial bill and we see 
an open rule through the Speaker of the House and through the chairman 
of the Rules Committee. I think that fact should be noted.
  Let us talk about the substance of the bill. Obviously, the substance 
of the exclusionary rule, I think, has merit and will prove to be 
constitutional in a court of law. Every time we pass some kind of 
criminal statute in these chambers they are always challenged on a 
constitutional basis. A defense lawyer's job is to challenge it in any 
way he can. But I am confident that the constitutionality of the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule will be upheld.
  What is the exclusionary rule? We have a lot of people today, perhaps 
some who are observing this action, who do not understand what we mean 
by an exclusionary rule. Very simply, let me explain it in this way:
  I used to be a police officer, and let us say that I stopped someone 
incorrectly and in the process of that error in judgment in stopping, 
say, a motor vehicle, I confiscated or found evidence that led to 
charges being filed against a defendant. Then the court could come in 
and say that because of my error of judgment in stopping the person, 
they are going to exclude any evidence or any fruits of my search that 
resulted because of my improper stopping.
  I think the gentleman from Florida gave an excellent example in that 
particular case. I do not want to be repetitive, but I think it is 
important. In that particular case a police officer stopped a car; the 
car only had to have one license plate. The police officer was in 
error. He thought the car
required two license plates. So when he stopped the car, he was in 
error. But in the process of going up and checking the driver's 
license, he noticed in the back seat of the car a certain amount of 
cocaine. I think there were 240 pounds of cocaine there. The court 
threw out the cocaine as evidence in the criminal trial because the 
  officer improperly stopped the person for missing a license plate.Now,
 there is not a person on the Main Street of America who would agree 
with that finding, and there is not a person on the Main Street of 
 [[Page H1316]] America, other than defense attorneys, who is not going 
to say that we should have a good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule.
  So, Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman from Florida for the open 
rule that he has helped to facilitate. I think the substance of the 
issue is on our side. I think we are going to have bipartisan support, 
and I predict the bill will pass.
  Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, we have no requests for time, and I yield 
back the balance of my time.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I grant such time as he may consume to 
the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Dreier], a member of 
the Committee on Rules.
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding me this time, 
and I would like to congratulate him on his management of the rule. It 
is really quite easy to manage an open rule. It has always been 
somewhat of a challenge to take on what is known as a restrictive rule.
  My friend from Woodland Hills raised some very valid questions about 
the exclusionary rule, and I think that as we look at this legislation, 
it is going to be considered under a process that will allow amendments 
to be offered and debated. We will be able to discuss it openly here, 
as was the case in the Committee on the Judiciary and as were the case 
when we heard testimony from the chairman and the ranking minority 
member of that committee.
  So basically the institution will be able to work its will on this 
legislation. Some will vote for it, some will vote against it, and I 
hope very much we will be able to see the House overwhelmingly pass 
this open rule and move ahead with this critically important 
legislation.
                              {time}  1450

  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, at this time, again commending Chairman 
Solomon and all of the members of the Committee on Rules for bringing 
forth this very important piece of legislation, with the opportunity of 
all Members of this House to bring forth all amendments they wish to be 
considered on behalf of their constituents, I yield back the balance of 
my time, and move the previous question on the resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The resolution was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Cunningham). Pursuant to House 
Resolution 61 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the 
consideration of the bill, H.R. 666.

                              {time}  1451


                     in the committee of the whole

  Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole 
House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
666) to control crime by exclusionary rule reform, with Mr. Hobson, 
Chairman pro tempore, in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is 
considered as having been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] will be 
recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. 
Conyers] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum].
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, today we are considering the exclusionary rule 
exception called the good faith exception. It is perhaps of all of 
those things we are considering today the one that has as much import 
as any that we will consider in the whole series of crime legislation 
over the next week. It is one which will break down some of the 
barriers that many have been waiting for us to do for a long time and 
allow more evidence to come in in search and seizure cases in order 
that we may get more convictions and not have people get off on 
technicalities.
  The public is tired of people getting off on technicalities. We want 
to see those who have committed the crimes that they have committed be 
prosecuted, convicted, sentenced and put away for a reasonable period 
of time; of course, in the case of violent crimes, for a very long 
period of time.
  The problem has been in part because the courts a few years ago 
decided to carve out a so-called exclusionary rule to protect us as 
citizenry from unwarranted intrusions into our constitutional rights of 
privacy and freedom from search and seizure in terms of police officers 
committing those kinds of intrusions.
  The court thought in its infinite wisdom in this process of creating 
this rule a few years ago of excluding evidence that is gotten from 
illegal searches and seizures by police that we could deter the police 
officers from making those kinds of decisions that would violate our 
rights, and the courts felt that this was the only way they could go 
about making sure that the constitutional protections were honored by 
the police around the country.
  Well, obviously when the police do not intend to violate your rights, 
when it is done without any kind of malice or forethought on their 
part, there is no deterrent effect. The rule does not have any meaning 
in the sense that it was intended to be in those kinds of situations.
  So a few years ago the U.S. Supreme Court said that in cases where 
there are search warrants, there can be certain exceptions called the 
good faith exception, in common parlance, to this rule of procedure and 
that we will then let evidence in and allow convictions to take place.
  Unfortunately, the Court did not rule in the
   non-search-warrant cases where there are other rights that police 
have in those cases to go in and do certain searches and seizures, so 
we have had a lot of litigation going on around the country and many 
questions raised in various Federal circuits as to whether or not 
evidence in admissible with a good faith exception in non-search-
warrant cases.

  That is what brings us here today. The proposal before us would carve 
out this good faith exception and broaden it to include not just cases 
that involve search warrants, but involve all of the cases of search 
and seizure where the police officer acted as we call it in good faith.
  Now, specifically the bill would provide for an exception to the rule 
in situations where law enforcement officers obtained evidence 
improperly, yet do so in the objectively reasonable belief that their 
actions comply with the protection of the fourth amendment to the 
Constitution.
  It is the role of Congress to determine the rules of evidence and 
procedure that apply in Federal courts. In drafting these rules, we 
should strive to ensure that unreliable evidence is excluded from the 
finder of fact, but that trustworthy evidence is not excluded. It 
should be our guiding principle that evidence of truth should be 
admissible in a court of law as often as possible.
  The exclusionary rule, as I stated earlier, is a judicially crafted 
rule of evidence that prevents evidence of the truth from being 
admitted into evidence at trial. The rationale of this rule is 
excluding truthful evidence obtained in violation of our Constitution 
will discourage law enforcement officials from acting improperly. Of 
course, in some cases application of this rule allows guilty persons to 
go free because truthful evidence is excluded from their trial.
  In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in the Leon case that 
evidence gathered pursuant to a search warrant that proved to be 
invalid under the fourth amendment could nevertheless be used at trial 
if the prosecution demonstrated that the law enforcement officials who 
gathered the evidence did so under an objectively reasonable belief 
that their actions were proper. This bill codifies the so-called good 
faith exception of that case.
  H.R. 666 also expands the good faith exception to situations where 
law enforcement officials improperly
gather evidence without a warrant, yet still have acted with the 
  objectively reasonable belief that their actions are proper.Specifical
ly H.R. 666 provides that evidence obtained through a search or seizure 
that is asserted to have been in violation of the fourth amendment will 
still be admissible in Federal Court if the persons gathering the 
evidence did 
 [[Page H1317]] so in the objectively reasonable belief that their 
actions were in conformity with the fourth amendment. The bill makes it 
clear that it is the Federal judge who will determine whether the 
persons who gathered the evidence were reasonable in believing that 
their actions were appropriate under the circumstances.
  Mr. Chairman, I wish to point out that the standard that the judge is 
to apply is an objective one. It does not involve an inquiry into the 
subjective intent of the law enforcement officials. In other words, 
just because a law enforcement official thought he or she was acting in 
proper fashion is not enough. The bill requires that a detached Federal 
judge view that mistake to have been reasonable.
  The bill also provides that the exclusionary rule shall not be used 
to exclude evidence that may have been gathered in violation of a 
statute, administrative rule or regulation, or a rule of procedure; 
that is, where no constitutional violation is asserted. Congress could 
still authorize exclusion of this type of evidence by passing a statute 
or procedural rule that specifically authorized the exclusion of that 
evidence. Even in that situation, however, the evidence in question 
would still not be admitted if the Court found that the persons who 
gathered the evidence did so in the objectively reasonable belief that 
their actions were proper.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill does not limit the fourth amendment, nor does 
it reverse any Supreme Court precedent. This bill simply codifies the 
principles of the Leon holding and applies it to similar situations, 
ones that have yet to be presented to the Supreme Court for review. It 
is appropriate for Congress to determine by statute the evidentiary 
procedures that will be used in Federal courts. H.R. 666 does exactly 
that.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, this is an exceedingly important debate, 
one that I feel very privileged to be the ranking member on the 
Democratic side to advance, because we are now talking about a part of 
the so-called Contract With America that now inflicts affirmative harm 
to the Constitution. This so-called Exclusionary Rule Reform Act of 
1995 attempts to keep its promise made in the Contract With America by 
eradicating our Constitution's higher covenant with the American people 
that it has maintained for over 200 years.

                              {time}  1500

  Let us review the exclusionary rule. Started in 1914 by court 
decision that made no exceptions but applies only to the Federal 
jurisdiction, it rolled along without event until 1961, when Mapp 
versus Ohio then created another exception that included States as well 
as Federal in the application of the exclusionary rule. Then in the 
1970's came two very, very important additional modifications: the 
plain-view doctrine, which allowed that evidence or activity going on 
in plain view of the officers was a reason that one would not have to 
go to the magistrate to get a warrant; then came the exigent-
circumstances doctrine, which rationally concluded that evidence that 
was either in danger of being destroyed or eliminated or that put the 
officers at great bodily risk were also exceptions to the exclusionary 
rule that had been created.
  Notice that all of these modifications were positive and supportable 
for those of us, like me, who view this constitutional protection to be 
absolutely important. And then in 1981 came Leon versus the United 
States that created yet another reception, in which it dictated through 
the Supreme Court majority, incidentally, a Republican Supreme Court, 
that if good faith was used by the officer in seeking a warrant and 
that for reasons unknown to him at that time the warrant was invalid or 
defective, that the exclusionary rule would not be obtained and the 
evidence would be admissible into court anyway.
  And so today we meet here with our new majority, which are here to 
tell us that we are now going to codify the Leon case and make it 
merely a continuing part of the exclusions to the exclusionary rule 
that I have just recited.
  Well, my colleagues, this is not a codification of Leon versus the 
United States. I want to repeat that one more time. This bill before 
us, H.R. 666, is not a codification of Leon versus United States. For 
anyone who looks at the case will find that in Leon the officers sought 
and were given a warrant. They went to a magistrate and got a warrant. 
It turned out later that it was not a good one, and Leon said that even 
so, if the officer in good faith went to get a warrant and got one that 
was subsequently invalid for any reason, then he would be held, the 
evidence would be admissible and he would be held to have been 
operating in good faith.
  But the measure before us does not do that. The measure before us now 
permits the officer to declare on his own that he believes that he is 
operating in good faith, having not ever gone to a magistrate.
  My friends in the Committee on the Judiciary are now suggesting that 
this is a codification of Leon. Well, I suggest that anyone in or out 
of law school examining the Leon case will quickly come to the 
conclusion that this is not the case at all, and I think it makes a 
very important argument.
  What we are doing is going far, far beyond Leon and are moving now to 
dispense with the exclusionary rule in its entirety.
  What we are saying now is that law officers, Federal or local, that 
operate on their perception that they are operating in good faith will 
now be let off beyond the purview of the exclusionary rule. I think 
that this is the most dangerous damage and harm that we could work to a 
rule that has been a part of our Constitution for 200 years. I suggest 
to my colleagues that the amendment that I will offer is the only 
codification of Leon.
  What we will do is codify Leon by saying where a warrant turns out to 
be invalid or defective, given by a magistrate to a police officer who 
operates on the basis that he had a perfectly legal document, that he 
will be excused and his evidence will be allowed to be offered. Nothing 
more. And it is on that basis that I want everyone to realize that this 
is far more than codification. It is a complete wiping out of the 
exclusionary rule as we have known it throughout American history.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  I would just like to comment on the fact that this bill does not in 
any way, as the gentleman from Michigan, implied, allow for a court to 
look into the mind of the police officer and make a subjective 
determination or base its determination on the thought pattern of the 
police officer. It is an objectively reasonable standard.
  We would never want to do what the gentleman suggested. I suppose 
that is the subject of the debate here, but is the way the wording of 
the statute is written.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary.
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  I just want to disagree with my good friend, the gentleman from 
Michigan [Mr. Conyers].
  The exclusionary rule is not wiped out. It is changed from the way it 
is presently administered. But if the evidence is offered and an 
unreasonable search and seizure has been made that was not in good 
faith, I am sure the exclusionary rule in all its glory will be 
enforced. This does no violence to the fourth amendment.
  The exclusionary rule is judge-made. It was not made by this 
Congress. It is a rule the judges thought up to deter the policeman 
from making unreasonable searches and seizures. And their idea of 
deterring that was just not to admit the evidence.
  What happens is, the policeman is not punished. He walks out of the 
courtroom and the accused walks out of the courtroom. And the evidence 
of his or her guilt is suppressed. The people who lose on that one, the 
victims, 
 [[Page H1318]] still end up with the dirty end of the stick. So this 
does not codify Leon.
  I agree with the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers]. It codifies 
the principle of Leon, which applies to warrants and may well apply to 
warrantless searches.
  If the search was done in good faith, as determined by the court, not 
by the policeman, by an objectively reasonable standard, then the 
evidence, the heroin that they got in the trunk of the car, gets 
admitted, not suppressed. And the judge makes that judgment.
  Yes, this is a change in emphasis. Heretofore in criminal law, the 
rights of the criminal, the rights of the accused have been paramount. 
In the last bill we suddenly awoke to the fact that victims have rights 
and are entitled to restitution, regardless of the financial solvency 
or insolvency of the criminal.
  Now we are saying, with Justice Cardozo, who famously pronounced that 
a trial should be a search for the guilt or innocence of the accused, 
not a determination as to whether the constable blundered, if 
constables are going to blunder, then punish the constables, but do not 
suppress the evidence.
  The public out there is also an important factor in this equation. I 
hope this bill passes unmended, and I thank the gentleman again for 
yielding time to me.

                              {time}  1510

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, I am reminded by my colleagues on the other side not to 
worry about what we are doing here today, that we are merely changing 
law that was made by the courts.
  However, Mr. Chairman, the Supreme Court can make the laws of the 
land unless we modify them. That is how the whole exclusionary rule 
came into the law. Therefore, let us not put some pejorative effect on 
Supreme Court law. Thank goodness they came up with the exclusion.
  The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] says ``Don't worry, the courts 
will eventually catch up with illegal actions,'' but that, again, is 
not the point. What we are saying is that illegally seized evidence 
should not be part of a trial.
  We are not saying that people should walk out of courts. If you can 
make a case legally, fine. If you cannot make a case legally, that is 
precisely why the fourth amendment has been here for 200 years.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Schumer], the former chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal 
Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a few points about 
this.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 666, which is 
appropriately numbered. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that there are two 
points I guess I would make here. The first is, there have been many 
instances where judges, defense lawyers, and others have hung on 
technicalities, and it seems, when we hear the result, that the 
technical change is overruling common good sense and what is good for 
the people of this country. That has happened, basically, in search 
warrant cases.
  However, I must say that the Supreme Court in the Leon case dealt 
with that issue and dealt with it well. They said ``When you get a 
warrant and the warrant is technically deficient, for some reason that 
is no one's fault and there was no real attempt to make that warrant 
technically deficient, we will allow the evidence to be admitted, the 
seized evidence to be admitted.''
  That is a good decision. It was done by a very conservative court, 
and it makes a good deal of sense.
  However, Mr. Chairman, what the other side wants us to do now is take 
the rule of good faith and extend it to warrantless searches. That is 
taking what Leon did, which was a change that was needed, and falsely 
extending that logic to an area where there is no place for it.
  Most Americans, Mr. Chairman, feel very strongly that police officers 
should not be allowed, unless there are exceptions, emergencies, in 
plain view, and there are lots of exceptions to the exclusionary rule, 
should not be allowed to knock on the door of their house and enter and 
search and seize. That is one of our more fundamental rights, just like 
free speech and freedom of religion.
  Mr. Chairman, to undo that when, first of all, the evidence is that 
there are very few cases where this would apply that this would make a 
difference, as I heard the two gentleman from Florida get up and talk 
about cases with automobiles, I would remind my colleagues, we are not 
talking about automobiles here, because there is a much more lenient 
standard under the Terry case for automobiles. We are talking about 
people's homes. In that situation, we find almost no egregious cases.
  Mr. Chairman, when we talk to law enforcement
   people, they indicate that they think that they can live with this.

  I guess my first point, Mr. Chairman, and let me sum up that one 
here, to fix technicalities is one thing. To avoid getting a warrant 
altogether when there are none of the recognized exceptions, I think if 
that happens, Americans are going to shudder, including Americans like 
myself who are very much afraid of crime, and Americans like myself who 
think that in many instances the pendulum has swung too far for 
individual rights and against societal rights.
  The second point, Mr. Chairman, that I would make, that is equally 
relevant, is that when I learned about the exclusionary rule in law 
school I scratched my head. I said ``This doesn't quite fit.'' A law 
enforcement officer steps over the line, and we punish them by not 
allowing what might well be good evidence. It does not fit.
  As I learned more and more about it, both in law school and 
afterwards, there was one major problem with the logic of those who say 
it does not fit and we should repeal it. They do not come up with a 
good alternative. That is the problem.
  The only alternative I have seen proposed in the law books, et 
cetera, is to punish the police officer. That side is not going to vote 
for that. This side is not going to vote for that. Our police officers, 
God knows, have enough burdens on them that we are not going to punish 
them when they go over a line.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SCHUMER. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, does the gentleman think suppressing the 
evidence punishes the policeman who had made an unreasonable search?
  Mr. SCHUMER. No, Mr. Chairman, I do not.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I am 
just saying the present exclusionary rule does not accomplish anything 
but let the accused go free.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, what I would say to 
the gentleman, the one thing it does accomplish is that there is care 
before making a search of one's home. I would like there to be a better 
way to create that level of care, Mr. Chairman. I agree with the 
gentleman. However, the gentleman has not shown it.
  What the gentleman has shown in his amendment, or what H.R. 666 does, 
which is not the gentleman's amendment, there is no alternative 
standard proposed. There is simply something that says ``If you are in 
good faith, you do not need a warrant.'' To me that crosses the line we 
ought not to cross.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 4 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 666.
  First of all, Mr. Chairman, I have to point out, with respect to that 
statement that the exclusionary rule has applied within the courts of 
the United States of America as a congressional doctrine for all 200 
years plus of our existence, that that is incorrect.
  The exclusionary rule was first, I believe, announced in Federal 
court in Federal cases in 1914. It was not applied to the States, at 
least not through Federal doctrine, until all the way to 1961.
  However, I want to say that I do support the broad purpose of the 
exclusionary rule. I think, as the Supreme Court said in Mapp versus 
Ohio, cited by the gentleman from Michigan, that the exclusionary rule 
was a necessary device to encourage police officers not 
 [[Page H1319]] to flagrantly disregard the Constitution of the United 
States, and in particular the 4th and 14th amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States, in terms of their search and seizure 
practices.
  I think the exclusionary rule, even though it is opposed by some, I 
think implied in some of the remarks we have already heard, because it 
does represent a fact that evidence sometimes is not allowed in cases, 
is still an important device in terms of protecting constitutional 
rights. If there were a bill, if there were a bill that proposed to 
totally eliminate the exclusionary rule completely, I would not support 
it.
  However, that is not what it does. What it does is broaden the 
exception already announced by the U.S. Supreme Court for a good-faith 
error in terms of search and seizure.
  The whole purpose of the exclusionary rule, and it is a rule, it is 
not in the Constitution itself--one cannot find it in the 
Constitution--the whole purpose of this rule is to encourage officers 
to observe our rights under the fourth amendment in terms of their 
putting together criminal cases.
  Again, I have said I agree with that. The penalty, of course, the 
deterrence intended, is evidence cannot be used if officers 
deliberately or for any reason, as of right now, violate the fourth 
amendment.
  The point is, Mr. Chairman, this rule makes sense in terms of 
encouraging officers to comply with the fourth amendment to the best of 
their ability. It makes no sense--it makes no sense under the theory of 
the exclusionary rule--to exclude evidence from a court where an 
officer has acted in good faith; that is, has acted on an objectively 
reasonable standard and in the belief that the search was legal.
  I can recall, Mr. Chairman, during the years when I was general 
counsel for the Albuquerque Police Department, and also when I was 
district attorney of the Albuquerque area, that certain areas of search 
and seizure without a warrant were changing so rapidly in court 
decisions that it was hard to even advise the police officers what the 
standards were.
                              {time}  1520

  It seems to me that it accomplishes nothing to exclude evidence in a 
particular case where an officer has seized that evidence and later a 
court says this was in fact a good faith error but was an error when 
that officer has to try to be a lawyer out on the street. It seems to 
me that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is not accomplished when 
an officer in good faith, under the standards announced here in 
objectively reasonable good faith, makes an error.
  That is the reason why I support H.R. 666. It is true that 
``objectively reasonable'' has to be determined in each case, but that 
is no different than the fact that probable cause has to be determined 
in each case. It is no different than the fact that the term ``beyond a 
reasonable doubt'' must be determined in each case. The legal system 
has handled that in the past on a case-by-case basis and, I am 
confident, is capable of doing so in the future.
  For that reason, I urge passage of this bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. Chairman, to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], our 
chairman, I would have him remember that the exclusionary rule was put 
in place to make sure that the police behave rather than allowing 
``anything goes,'' and then we have years later a court decision that 
finds out that they did not conduct themselves in the manner that they 
should. That is the importance of the exclusionary rule.
  Mr. Chairman, to my friend from Arizona who said we want an 
objectively reasonable standard, but not the police officer's 
objectively reasonable standard. We want the magistrate's objectively 
reasonable standard at the front end. We do not want policemen applying 
court doctrine unilaterally.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina 
[Mr. Watt], a member of the committee.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I am beginning to wonder what happens when the 
Republicans' 1995 political contract comes into conflict with the 
people's 1791 contract with the American people, the Constitution.
  I thought the conservative approach was to uphold the people's 
contract under all circumstances. What I have found recently is that 
the Republicans are not willing to be conservative in their approach. 
They talk about being conservative but when it comes time to be 
conservative, they throw the most conservative document in the world 
out the window.
  When the Constitution conflicts with their beliefs, they are willing 
to either violate it or amend it, because they think they are smarter 
than the Founding Fathers of this country were.
  The 1791 contract leaves no equivocation. It says the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and so on shall 
not be violated. it does not say if we find some objectively reasonable 
standard, we will violate it. It says ``shall not be violated.'' ``No 
warrant should issue but upon probable cause.'' It does not say 
probable cause if there is
 some objective belief that there was probable cause. It says 
``probable cause.'' Yet here we are trying to undermine that document.

  Since 1791 when this fourth amendment was put into the Constitution, 
there has been litigation. Case after case after case we have litigated 
what this fourth amendment means. Notwithstanding that, what did they 
come back with? Some more language, objectively reasonable standard, 
that we will have to litigate for 200 more years before we find out 
what it means.
  Mr. Chairman, this makes no sense. The gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. 
Schiff] says it is not in the Constitution. I beg to differ with him. 
My Constitution says, ``The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated.''
  Nobody can tell me that there is any objectively reasonable standard 
in this Constitution. It says ``shall not be violated.'' And here we 
are, claiming that we are conservatives and all the while treading on 
the most conservative document we have in this country, treading on the 
rights of the people.
  This document was not written for the protection of the guilty. This 
document was written for the protection of the innocent. They can tell 
me all they want that only 1 percent or 2 percent of the cases that 
come up under this amendment are won by the defendant. Those are the 
people that this language was designed to protect.
  If we believe in the Constitution, we will leave it exactly like it 
is. In fact, we will vote for the amendment I plan to offer when the 
time for amendment comes on this bill.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. Chairman, the exclusionary rule is what is not in the 
Constitution. It was not imposed upon the States as a mandatory Federal 
doctrine until the year 1961. And somehow the Republic made it all that 
way from the 18th century until 1961 without the exclusionary rule. 
Nevertheless, I support it as enunciated in the case Mapp versus Ohio 
and the circumstances they were talking about, an outrageous ignorance 
of following constitutional prescription, and the reason they imposed 
it on the States. But it makes no sense to impose it in a situation 
where an officer is in objective good faith.
  Although the last speaker said we should not change anything, the 
Supreme Court has already made a modification in the exclusionary rule 
by allowing this very good faith exception in the case where a warrant 
is obtained by police officers and the warrant is later held to be 
invalid, and that has not caused a wholesale violation of 
constitutional rights through that exception.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina 
[Mr. Heineman].
  Mr. HEINEMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Chairman, we hear the talk about the exclusionary rule, and I do 
not think we have had much dialog about the warrant search, the search 
under the authority of a warrant, other than having Leon explain to us 
on two occasions. What we are really talking about is we are really 
talking about the warrantless search. Leon did not 
 [[Page H1320]] speak to the warrantless search, but warrantless search 
is basically what this exclusionary rules points up. Warrantless 
searches are searches performed by police officers at the scenes of a 
provocation, so to speak, a situation where the exigencies of the 
service require a police officer to act.
  Police officers do not have with them the luxury of a law library to 
look up in the library as to what is legal and what is illegal. They 
have their own instincts, they have their own practices, and they have 
their own good common sense. Nor do they have a boardroom to caucus 
their contemplated actions before making an arrest or a search. They 
have to again rely on their experience and precedent.
  Of course we can talk about officers in 1910 or we could talk about 
officers in 1995, the training and those that are not trained. I submit 
that officers in 1995 are better trained than officers at any other 
time in the history of law enforcement in this country.

                              {time}  1530

  But it all comes down to an arrest and evidence being seized and it 
all comes down to the courtroom where defendants have a right to an 
attorney present. Those attorneys, if they are worth their salt, and in 
Federal cases and I have great respect for Federal attorneys and people 
that ply their wares in Federal court and the judges, at that point the 
attorneys have an obligation to make a motion to suppress, a motion to 
suppress the evidence that was seized, and the attorney, and if he does 
not do that, then that is something else, then that is another motion 
to make to get rid of the attorney.
  But the judges present, listening to the probable cause that was 
offered by the police officer that generated his action, will make a 
determination as to whether to suppress that evidence or not to 
suppress the evidence. And if that evidence was not seized under 
probable cause, then I am sure that the evidence will be suppressed.
  If it was not, if the evidence, if the probable cause that was laid 
before the judge would have been probable cause to issue a warrant, 
then the judge has an obligation not to suppress that evidence, and I 
think that the Constitution, yes, the Constitution which gives the 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, protects the victim.
  We are not talking about specifically protecting the criminal, we are 
talking about in this day and age protecting the victims of crime. And 
I as a citizen, and I 2 months ago was a citizen, not a legislator, I 
want to know that the courts, I want to know that the Constitution, I 
want to know that law enforcement is out to protect me, because 
determination of the evidence seized and suppressed has to go to 
someplace. And if it is a pound of cocaine or if it is a gun in a room 
or whatever, it is going to come down to the citizens of this country 
one way or another.
  I am for law enforcement officers and I urge the passage of the 
exclusionary rule, H.R. 666.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli].
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time.
  The right of persons to be secure in houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, the 
fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
  Today we are told it is an inconvenience, it is in the way of the 
police, it did not apply to the States until 1961 anyway. It is the 
Bill of Rights, and every Member comes to this floor every day and 
pledges allegiance to that Constitution and has sworn an oath to it.
  It is not always going to be convenient and sometimes it is going to 
cause problems. And yes, I say to the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. 
Schiff], it did not apply to the States in these cases until 1961.
  But the Supreme Court of the United States, the people of this 
country, had decided in each generation, in each decade to expand its 
powers, because for 200 years we have understood that the principal 
danger to the freedom of the people of this country was expanding 
Government power. For 200 years we have understood the very cause of 
our revolution, that we wanted to be secure in our homes, that we 
feared the criminal and lawlessness, but we also feared a government so 
content in its own powers that it would enter our own homes and violate 
our own rights.
  It is a great irony that a new conservatism, believing that 
government robs people of their freedom, believing in the right and the 
sanctity of private property, would now cause a new exclusion, the 
exclusion of the right of the person to be free of government power.
  It is, of course, worth noting that many of those things that we are 
told that need to be protected for law enforcement are already 
protected. A fleeing felon, the police can already enter under the 
fourth amendment. The destruction of evidence, the police can already 
enter under the fourth amendment. The possibility of escape, the police 
can already enter under the fourth amendment.
  Indeed, the very things the police need for practical law enforcement 
for the dangers of our times are already protected. We achieve nothing 
but lowering the standard that we apply to law enforcement, a standard 
which will be lowered and lowered if this measure succeeds.
  My colleagues, we must make compromises, but if today we violate the 
fourth amendment, then the criminals have already won. Our Constitution 
will have been compromised.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Georgia [Mr. Barr].
  Mr. BARR. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, we are really talking here today not about thousands 
upon thousands of court decisions, not about tens of thousands of pages 
of court documents, but about two documents, the Constitution of the 
United States of America, and H.R. 666.
  Is it not interesting, Mr. Chairman, that both of these documents 
talk about reasonableness? They complement each other, they are not 
antagonistic, they do not fight with each other as the other side would 
have us believe they are doing here today. We are simply taking that 
standard of reasonableness embodied in this document, the Constitution 
of the United States, which includes the word ``reasonable,'' which 
many Members on the other side conveniently disregard in their quotings 
from the Constitution, the fourth amendment today as does H.R. 666.
  We are not saying we do not believe in the Constitution. No Member on 
this side of the aisle needs to allow those on the other side of the 
aisle impugn our motives or with regard to the Constitution of the 
United States of America. What we are talking about here today, Mr. 
Chairman, is strengthening that document and saying we pay attention to 
the entire document, including that language which says in the 
preamble:

       We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more 
     perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
     Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the 
     general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to 
     ourselves and our Posterity.

  Mr. Chairman, today that preamble, the ability of our Constitution is 
in danger, it is in danger because we have drifted, drifted through 
decisions over the years that do not pay attention to the specific 
wording of the fourth amendment.
  This bill today, H.R. 666, gets us back to the root, the heart of 
what our Constitution was intended to do, and that is to apply a 
reasonable standard to protect all people, including those of us who 
may be victims of crime, those of us such as myself as a former U.S. 
attorney who seek to promote and protect the welfare as well as the 
rights of the accused.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 666 which 
supports our Constitution, which follows in recent cases and says that, 
yes, to the people of the United States, reasonableness, as embodied in 
our Constitution but has been forgotten in recent years, is there, 
should be there. And this proposed statute that we are debating today 
simply contradicts that and says to the people of this country who 
spoke very loudly on November 8 that yes, we want our Constitution, but 
we want it to apply with reasonableness to our police officers who are 
there to protect 
 [[Page H1321]] the good and to carry out this great document.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased now to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Volkmer].
  (Mr. VOLKMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
                              {time}  1540

  Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Chairman, I just want to alert the Members that I 
will be having an amendment to this bill that would exempt the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agencies from the provisions of this 
bill.
  BATF has been the biggest rogue, Rambo outfit that has taken guns 
away from innocent people, and this will permit them to break into 
houses, break into business houses, without a warrant. It is bad enough 
now with a warrant.
  The gentleman from Georgia talked a minute ago about the fourth 
amendment. Well, he had better start looking at the second amendment, 
because this bill, as it is written right now, lets BATF, if somebody 
tells somebody, ``Hey, that guy has got an illegal gun down there in 
his house,'' they can go in and bust the door down and get it. If it is 
not there, they just say, ``Tough luck, buddy,'' just like they have 
said to many people in this country. I have fought BATF since the 
1970's since I first came here. What do you think happened at Waco? Who 
was that? What happened in Idaho? Who was that?
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  I just want to respond and point out that if any agency breaks down a 
door looking for evidence and it is not there and they say, ``tough 
luck,'' that is true under the exclusionary rule today. The 
exclusionary rule only applies if something illegal is in fact found.
  One of its detriments is the fact it offers by itself no protection 
in those situations where someone, an innocent's rights are 
transgressed.
  Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SCHIFF. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.
  Mr. VOLKMER. If they have a warrant; if they have a warrant. If they 
do not have a warrant, as your bill permits it, they do not have to 
have a warrant to break into that house, and if the warrant is 
defective, even under the Supreme Court, which I disagree with, the 
evidence can possibly be used.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Reclaiming my time, the example given by the gentleman 
from Missouri was, if nothing illegal is found, tough luck. That is 
true under the exclusionary rule today. That is my point. The 
exclusionary rule, since it suppresses evidence that is found that the 
police officers seek to use has no effect if nothing is found.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina 
[Mr. Coble].
  Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I had not planned to speak on this matter. I sit with 
the gentleman from New Mexico and the gentleman from Michigan on the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, I am proud to say, but I heard other 
speakers come to the podium, and I feel obliged to insert my oars into 
the water, if you will.
  Mr. Chairman, no one on this floor is trashing the Constitution, as 
far as I am concerned. I intend to vote in favor of H.R. 666. In doing 
so, am I guilty of trashing the fourth amendment? Indeed not.
  The gentleman from Georgia, I believe, who preceded me here, he used 
a key word that many are either conveniently or unintentionally 
avoiding, ``reasonableness,'' and ``good faith.'' Those are words you 
do not hear kicked around too much.
  Now, I am not suggesting that every police officer and every law 
enforcement officer in this country is a model citizen.
  I am suggesting, however, Mr. Chairman, that most police officers and 
most law enforcement officers in this country are good people, and most 
of them do their jobs orderly and properly and most of them do their 
jobs, in my opinion, at least speaking for the law enforcement 
officials in my district, they do their jobs laced very generously with 
good faith.
  I think it is a shame that we are hearing those of us who are 
speaking in favor of this piece of legislation as being guilty of 
trashing the Constitution. I resent such charges. They are not well 
founded.
  I urge passage of H.R. 666.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Rhode Island [Mr. Reed].
  (Mr. REED asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. REED. Mr. Chairman, we all want to see criminals convicted and 
serve prison sentences for their crimes. No one wants to hinder the 
police in their dangerous and difficult effort to protect all of us and 
to combat crime.
  However, this bill is not about merely eliminating legal 
technicalities. It is about removing the requirement for a warrant 
prior to a search and seizure, and the Founders of our country believed 
that our citizens should be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.
  The words of the Constitution, the fourth amendment, ``The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, and papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated.'' I am not talking about the rights of defendants or the 
rights of prosecutors. We are talking about a fundamental right of the 
people of this country, and that is what we want to protect here today.
  I do not think we should chip away at that fundamental right. The 
warrant requirement is not a burden on law enforcement. Police can get 
a warrant by telephone. In fact, it takes sometimes only 2 minutes to 
get a warrant.
  Warrantless searches are permissible under exigent circumstances. I 
do agree that officers who rely on a warrant that later turns out to be 
invalid should not be penalized. I support that part of the bill that 
codifies that good-faith exception.
  I also support extending this exception to cases where the police 
relied upon a statute that later turned out to be unconstitutional.
  However, I am reluctant to leave behind the presumption that in the 
ordinary course a police officer should obtain a warrant.
  The majority would have you believe that this technicality results in 
many cases being thrown out. The evidence is contrary to that. The 
Comptroller General, in a report, indicated that suppression motions, 
those motions to eliminate evidence, succeed only in 1.3 percent of 
Federal cases. In fact, in those cases, 50 percent of the individuals 
are convicted anyway.
  In fact, under the majority's formulation, more evidence may be 
thrown out as police officers have to justify after the fact their 
constitutional compliance.
  I suggest we maintain the protections of the Constitution for the 
people.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/4\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Virginia [Mr. Scott].
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I think we need to go back to exactly what 
we are talking about. What we are talking about in this discussion is 
illegal searches.
  Legal searches are not affected by this legislation.
  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, said the fourth 
amendment protects an individual's legitimate expectation to privacy. 
``The right to be let alone, the most comprehensive right and the most 
valued by civilized men.'' The fourth amendment, Mr. Chairman, allows 
the State to breach an individual's right to privacy only when the 
amendment's rules are followed.
  The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to protect innocent people 
from illegal searches, because it removes all incentives the police 
officer may have to conduct illegal searches. If an officer conducts 
illegal searches, a search of innocent people, those for whom he has no 
probably cause that there is evidence of a crime, if he conducts 
illegal searches, he could not use the evidence anyway if he happened 
to find some evidence.
  So police officers do not conduct illegal searches.
  This bill would remove the incentive to obey the law and gives the 
incentive to police officers to break the law, because if they break 
the law in good faith, then they can still use the evidence.
  [[Page H1322]] Mr. Chairman, the police officers always act in good 
faith. I believe that the officers who beat Rodney King were acting in 
good faith. If they act in good faith, they act in good faith when they 
develop racial profiles to target certain ethnic groups for arrests. 
For example, there is the drug courier profile. If you have a black or 
Hispanic young male driving a Florida rental car up Interstate 95, they 
are targeted for arrest.
  Those kinds of profiles ought to be illegal. If the police find 
something in an illegal arrest, they can always come up with an excuse 
for the search.
  The exclusionary rule removes the incentive for illegal searches. It 
protects innocent people from those searches. It is the exclusionary 
rule that first causes complications, but now is being complied with. 
We should not dilute the Constitution. We should uphold the 
Constitution.
  We should not encourage police misconduct.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder].
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I just am pleased to come to the well 
right at this point, because I think it helps show why we feel H.R. 666 
is a radical diversion from the Constitution and really is trashing it.
  The gentleman from Virginia who spoke before me asked some very 
serious questions in the committee, and that brought it all right down 
to where we are.
                              {time}  1550

  Right now Americans are basically protected from illegal searches and 
seizures by the fact that, yes, or course, today the FBI or the BATF or 
the local police could come and go through your house, your car, 
whatever, without a warrant. But if they find anything, they could not 
use it against you. Therefore, that is a real inhibitor. Why would you, 
as a FBI agent or BATF or a police officer, go running through, 
stopping people illegally or searching homes illegally if you could not 
use it to prosecute? The idea being now, if you want to prosecute 
someone and you have cause, you go get a warrant and then you go get 
it. If you take away that, which is what this bill does--this bill says 
if they come through your house, if they come through your car, if they 
do not have a warrant and the find anything, they could still use it--
why would anybody go get a warrant?
  Why would anybody go get a warrant? This is Monday morning 
quarterbacking, then. They will say, ``Oh, but the way you are 
protected is the court will see whether or not they have an objective 
standard to illegally search your house without a warrant.'' If they 
could not figure out something by then to say, they are not worth their 
pay, they are not worth their salary.
  So what we are really doing as we adopt this bill is just totally 
doing away with the requirement to have a search warrant, because there 
is not penalty paid, no penalty at all paid if they illegally search.
  Therefore, I hope everybody takes a great, sober second look at H.R. 
666.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield the balance of my 
time to the gentleman from California [Mr. Mineta].
  (Mr. MINETA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. MINETA. I thank our very fine ranking Democrat on this committee 
for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong opposition to H.R. 666, 
exclusionary rule reform.
  Mr. Chairman, this legislation in its present form is an affront to 
the fundamental principles upon which our great Nation was established. 
It hollows-out the fourth amendment and severely curtails one of our 
most basic civil liberties.
  The exclusionary rule was designed to protect the fourth amendment 
right of all Americans to be free from unlawful persecution by the 
government. It ensures that evidence illegally obtained cannot be used 
in a trial.
  This legislation would make a mockery of the fourth amendment. It 
would expand the good faith exception to say that evidence illegally 
obtained, in instances where law enforcement officers did not even try 
to get a warrnt, could be admitted in court if the officers were acting 
in good faith.
  If we could depend on ``good faith'', Mr. Chairman, then we would not 
need a Constitution. But our founders adopted the Bill of Rights 200 
years ago because they wanted civil liberties to be the foundation upon 
which this Nation was built.
  We needed that protection 200 years ago, Mr. Chairman, and we need it 
more than ever today.
  Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge my colleagues to oppose this 
legislation.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this debate today indicates some woeful belief, I 
think, of the wrong direction of what we are about. My judgment on the 
debate I have been hearing today is that there are some Members, 
particularly on the other side of the aisle, who think somehow there is 
a constitutional right that we are undermining today, that we are doing 
something radical--I have heard that word used--we are making a major 
change that would undermine the basic rights for the protection against 
unlawful search and seizure in our homes. I think this needs to be put 
in perspective. There was no exclusionary rule of evidence prior to 
1914, when the Supreme Court made the decision to enact such a rule to 
discourage police officers from carrying out unlawful searches and 
seizures. It is not a constitutional matter. It is a matter of 
procedure, and the courts thought this was the best way to go about 
doing it whenever they could do it, trying to discourage police from 
knowingly and intentionally doing something wrong.
  There have been exceptions to this rule in order
  to make it more likely to get convictions in those cases where there 
was no reason to have this rule. That is in cases where the police 
  officers are not going to be deterred from doing something unlawful.Th
at is the whole exception that was carved out in cases of search 
warrants. One needs to note that this particular question of just 
keeping it to the search warrants has never been decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. In fact, in the fifth and 11th circuits of our system, 
our Federal court system, they have for quite some time allowed the 
good-faith exception we want to adopt today on the floor of the House. 
They have allowed it to be the law in those two circuits. There has 
been no ill that I know of that comes from that broader interpretation. 
And there have been a few cases where we have gotten some convictions 
with search and seizure evidence that we otherwise would not have 
gotten against the bad guys. I cannot find any instance where any harm 
has come from this looser interpretation that the fifth and 11th 
circuit courts have given to the rule that we want to adopt here today.
  I would cite that there is a case going before the Supreme Court in 
Arizona that illustrates the absurdity of the situation we are in.
  On Jan. 5, 1991, two Phoenix police officers stopped Isaac Evans for 
driving the wrong way on a one-way street. After obtaining Mr. Evans' 
identification, one of the officers ran a computer check from his car, 
which showed an outstanding arrest warrant for Mr. Evans. As the 
officers arrested Mr. Evans, he dropped a marijuana cigarette, which, 
along with more marijuana found in his car, was seized as evidence.
  However, 17 days earlier, the Central Phoenix Justice Court had 
quashed the Evans arrest warrant. It is unclear whether a check in the 
Justice Court had failed to notify a police clerk or whether a police 
clerk, after receiving notice, had failed to remove the warrant from 
the police computer. The trial court concluded that the arrest was 
invalid since the warrant had been quashed and, applying the 
exclusionary rule, suppressed the evidence of Mr. Evans' guilt. The 
Arizona Supreme Court agreed, with that interpretation.
  I would suggest that if the recordkeeping efficiency of the Phoenix 
criminal justice system was what was wrong, that is what should have 
been corrected, not throwing out the evidence. The better solution 
obviously if it is the clerk who was at fault, to fire the clerk, not 
to exclude the evidence and deny the public the right to convict 
somebody who actually committed a crime we all know he committed.
  We are going overboard, and to the excess, in our law enforcement 
process today to protect the innocent, if you 
 [[Page H1323]]  will, protect us from unlawful searches and seizures. 
We need to have a balance in the system, one that says, ``Yes; the 
rights of the individual under the Constitution are protected, but we 
also have a right, as the general public, to be safe and secure in our 
homes and on our streets of this Nation.''
  We cannot be safe and secure if we go to the extremes to protect the 
rights of the individual under the Constitution with the created rule 
that we have developed in the court systems today that excludes 
evidence when somebody is clearly guilty, evidence of their guilt, in 
cases where it would not deter the police at all from doing whatever 
acts that they did to have excluded that evidence.
  I submit that we are not doing anything complicated in this bill if 
we pass H.R. 666. We are simply taking what two circuit courts in the 
Federal system today already have adopted as the rule of evidence and 
apply that rule, that good-faith exclusionary rule, throughout the 
Nation, throughout all the circuits, to obviate the necessity of 
protracted litigation and the potential for more Supreme Court rulings 
coming down over the years in the future and that undoubtedly will 
gradually expand the rule to encompass all these possible cases as the 
fifth and 11th circuits have already done. That is all we are doing, 
nothing really profound, but something the law enforcement community 
and the general public can be very important because we need to get 
more convictions and do not need to let criminals get off on 
technicalities. That is what it is all about, pure and simple.
  That is what the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is all 
about. Again I would urge my colleagues to proceed through the 
amendment process and keep that in mind and that in the end we have an 
overwhelming vote to pass this bill, as we have twice before done in 
this body and previous Congresses, only to see it fail because the 
other body did not act on it. But we have passed it overwhelmingly here 
this good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in two previous 
Congresses in recent years.
  I would urge my colleagues, before the day is out or by tomorrow if 
it goes to tomorrow, to pass this bill.
  Mr. LAZIO. Mr. Chairman, what does the fourth amendment say? It is 
illuminating to read the text which describes each and every American's 
constitutional right:

       The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
     houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and 
     seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, 
     but upon probable cause, supported by oath and affirmation, 
     and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
     persons or things to be seized.

  While the fifth amendment contains an explicit exclusionary rule in 
that ``No person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself * * *'' the fourth does not. The exclusionary 
rule is a mechanism created by the Supreme Court designed to enforce 
violations of the fourth amendment.
  This bill does not abolish the exclusionary rule, but rather improves 
it. This bill seeks to broaden the ``good faith exception'' by applying 
it to warrantless searches. The rationale of this is the same as 
searches with warrants which the Supreme Court addressed in the 1984 
Leon decision. The reasoning is that since the action was taken in good 
faith, there would be no deterrent effect, the means by which the 
fourth amendment is enforced. Some critics of this bill say that it 
allows the police officer to be ignorant of the law. This is not the 
case. The bill calls for an ``objectively reasonable belief'' on the 
part of the police officer. The police officer's belief must not only 
be reasonable to him or her, it must be an objective one made in good 
faith.
  As a former prosecutor, I have seen clearly guilty individuals go 
free merely because certain evidence was excluded, despite the best 
efforts of the police. H.R. 666 would end this unfair result. The 
safety of our community is more important than a law review article.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 
666, the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act. This legislation represents 
title VI of the Taking Back our Streets Act, one of the 10 points of 
the Republican Contract With America, and continues our efforts here in 
the House to address our Nation's crime problem. As you know, Mr. 
Speaker, we have already completed work on the Victim Restitution Act.
  Mr. Speaker, the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects 
Americans from unreasonable search and seizure of their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects. Under current law, if a court finds that 
evidence was obtained in violation of this amendment, that evidence 
cannot be used by the Government in its case against the defendant and 
is to be excluded at trial.
  Unfortunately, this exclusionary rule has been manipulated by 
skillful defense attorneys to protect murderers, drug dealers, rapists, 
and robbers. In one instance, more than 250 pounds of cocaine found in 
a car during a routine traffic stop were ruled inadmissible at trial 
because the officer did not have a warrant to search the car. This 
strict interpretation too often leads to the acquittal of many who are 
obviously guilty.
  In 1984, the Supreme Court modified the exclusionary rule to permit 
the introduction of evidence that was obtained in good faith reliance 
on a search warrant that was later found to be invalid. H.R. 666 
codifies this decision into law. However, as the above example makes 
clear there is a need for a similar good faith exemption in cases where 
police officers, acting in good faith, conduct a search or seizure 
without a warrant. Today's legislation creates such an exemption by 
allowing evidence to be admissible so long as the law enforcement 
officials who gather the evidence held an objectively reasonable belief 
that their action conformed to the requirements of the fourth 
amendment.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 666 strikes the proper balance between the rights 
of Americans against unreasonable search and seizure, and the rights of 
society to be free of criminal threat. It will help to protect 
America's citizens and put away America's criminals, and I urge its 
support.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  THe CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read for 
amendment under the 5-minute rule.
  The text of H.R. 666 is as follows:
       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Exclusionary Rule Reform Act 
     of 1995.''

     SEC. 2. ADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE.

       In General.--Chapter 223 of title 18, United States Code, 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 3510. Admissibility of evidence obtained by search or 
       seizure

       ``(a) Evidence Obtained by Objectively Reasonable Search or 
     Seizure.--Evidence which is obtained as a result of a search 
     or seizure shall not be excluded in a proceeding in a court 
     of the United States on the ground that the search or seizure 
     was in violation of the fourth amendment to the Constitution 
     of the United States, if the search or seizure was carried 
     out in circumstances justifying an objectively reasonable 
     belief that it was in conformity with the fourth amendment. 
     The fact that evidence was obtained pursuant to and within 
     the scope of a warrant constitutes prima facie evidence of 
     the existence of such circumstances.
       ``(b) Evidence Not Excludable by Statute or Rule.--
       ``(1) Generally.--Evidence shall not be excluded in a 
     proceeding in a court of the United States on the ground that 
     it was obtained in violation of a statute, an administrative 
     rule or regulation, or a rule of procedure unless exclusion 
     is expressly authorized by statute or by a rule prescribed by 
     the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.
       ``(2) Special rule relating to objectively reasonable 
     searches and seizures.--Evidence which is otherwise 
     excludable under paragraph (1) shall not be excluded if the 
     search or seizure was carried out in circumstances justifying 
     an objectively reasonable belief that the search or seizure 
     was in conformity with the statute, administrative rule or 
     regulation, or rule of procedure, the violation of which 
     occasioned its being excludable.
       ``(c) Rule of Construction.--This section shall not be 
     construed to require or authorize the exclusion of evidence 
     in any proceeding.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 223 of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:

``3510. Admissibility of evidence obtained by search or seizure.''.
                              {time}  1600

  The CHAIRMAN. During consideration of the bill for amendment, the 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may accord priority in 
recognition to a Member offering an amendment that has been printed in 
the designated place in the Congressional Record. Those amendments will 
be considered read.
  Are there any amendments to the bill?


                    Amendment Offered by Mr. Conyers

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  [[Page H1324]] The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Conyers: Page 2, strike line 1 and 
     all that follows through the end of the bill and inserting 
     the following:

     SEC. 2. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES PURSUANT TO AN INVALID WARRANT 
                   OR STATUTE.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 109 of title 18. United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end of the following:

     ``Sec. 2237. Good faith exception for evidence obtained by 
       invalid means

       ``Evidence which is obtained as a result of search or 
     seizure shall not be excluded in a proceeding in a court of 
     the United States on the ground that the search or seizure 
     was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution 
     of the United States, if the search or seizure was carried 
     out in objectively reasonable reliance--
       ``(1) on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral 
     magistrate or other judicial officer ultimately found to be 
     invalid, unless--
       ``(A) the judicial officer in issuing the warrant was 
     materially misled by information in an affidavit that the 
     affiant knew was false or would have known was false except 
     for his reckless disregard of the truth;
       ``(B) the judicial officer provided approval of the warrant 
     without exercising a neutral and detached review of the 
     application for the warrant;
       ``(C) the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in 
     indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its 
     existence entirely unreasonable; or
       ``(D) the warrant is so facially deficient that the 
     executing officers could not reasonably presume it to be 
     valid; or
       ``(2) on the constitutionality of a statute subsequently 
     found to constitutionally invalid.''
       (b) Clercial Amendment.--The table of chapters at the 
     beginning of chapter 109 of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``2237 Evidence obtained by invalid means.''

  (Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman and colleagues, we have heard continually 
that those who have brought H.R. 666 to the floor contend that all they 
want to do is codify existing law with respect to the exclusionary 
rule. If that is their simple goal, then what is the purpose of the 
current legislation before us since current Supreme Court decisions are 
controlling in American jurisprudence in the first place? In other 
words, why are we doing that?
  If, however, the sponsors of H.R. 666 content that even with Supreme 
Court decisions it is necessary for the Congress to put them in 
statute, I have no exceptions save one. Let us really codify the law as 
it exists and not use this as an exercise, as a pretext, totally 
invalidate the fourth amendment protections to innocent and law-abiding 
citizens.
  So, Mr. Chairman, I have brought forward this amendment to protect 
law-abiding citizens. This amendment codifies the key controlling case 
law on the so-called good-faith exception, which includes both the Leon 
case as well as the Krull case. In both cases the Supreme Court 
recognized a good-faith exception for police officers who rely either 
on an improperly issued search warrant, or as in Krull, an invalid 
statute as a basis to make a search or seizure of property. The 
reasoning of the court in these two cases was that police need this 
type of latitude in exercising their duties and that they should be 
held harmless for any error that a magistrate commits in issuing a 
warrant or any error that a legislature makes in passing a statute. 
Hence the phrase ``good-faith reliance.''
  Yet, both Supreme Court decisions that define the good-faith 
exceptions share a crucial, common aspect, the need for a law 
enforcement official to rely on a source of authority outside of 
himself to make the final determination that probable cause exits for 
search for evidence. Without the requirement of an external source of 
authority making such a determination, government and law enforcement 
agencies can simply be a tribunal to themselves as to when and how they 
will invade the privacy of law-abiding citizens in their homes. We have 
already seen the results of such carelessness in ill-conceived and 
disastrous raids in Texas and in Idaho.
  These cases dealing with good-faith reliance by law enforcement 
officials were developed by the more conservative Supreme Court 
appointees during the 1980's as a reaction to, perhaps, a very valid 
criticism, that the law on the exclusionary rule was too restrictive 
and confining on police officers. However, following the Leon and Krull 
cases, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor warned that the Supreme Court has 
reached the outer limits on the fourth amendment through its good-faith 
exception and that any further diminishment of the requirement of 
having an outside, neutral authority issue a warrant could lead to 
complete chaos and complete violation of our citizens' expectations of 
privacy in their own homes.
  Justice O'Connor further warned very perceptively that some in the 
Congress might want to push the envelope beyond these outer bounds to 
that, and I quote, ``they would not be perceived to be soft on crime,'' 
and we are now witnessing her warning and prediction come true in the 
form of the bill that is before us as passed out of the Committee on 
the Judiciary.
  My amendment would simply restate the law on good-faith reliance by 
police officers to exactly where it currently exists. That 
reaffirmation would keep the delicate balance struck by the court 
between assisting the police in their important duties while 
safeguarding the rights of innocent Americans from improper searches of 
their homes.
  Let us remember also that in addition to the good-faith exception, 
law enforcement already has the right to take whatever action it deems 
necessary in emergency circumstances under the ``plain view'' doctrine 
that would not be affected. In fact, if there is a desire to codify the 
good-faith exception, then my amendment provides us with just such an 
opportunity.
  I say to my colleagues, ``Support this amendment if you want to 
codify the existing Supreme Court decisions.''
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers].
  Mr. Chairman, I must oppose this amendment. It actually would reserve 
the court rules with regard to evidence in the area of the fifth and 
the eleventh circuits by adopting the Leon case and one little small 
additional exception from one other Supreme Court ruling dealing with 
statutes. We already have, as I explained a few moments ago in general 
debate, two of the circuits of our Federal court system, the fifth and 
the eleventh, which for quite some time now have had this broader good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule as their rule of evidence 
allowing more evidence in than has been yet certified by the Supreme 
Court as in the Leon case, which is what the gentleman from Michigan is 
trying to codify into law. He would by this amendment.
  So we all understand it, he would strike the bill that we have before 
us today and substitute his own language, his own language. The 
language of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] is the language 
derived, 98 percent of it, from the so-called Leon case that deals with 
the good-faith exception in cases where there have not been search 
warrants issued. He does not broaden it to all of those cases where 
there have not been search warrants issued, nor would he cover the 
Arizona case that is now before the Supreme Court where I described a 
situation which a warrant had been issued, but it had been illegally 
quashed some 17 days before the search occurred which resulted in the 
contraband being seized, which was then held to be inadmissible in that 
particular case on the basis of the previous Supreme Court rulings.
  I think this is way too narrow, and, as I said,

       It does change the law elsewhere in the country in ways 
     that are not beneficial, and I would urge my colleagues to 
     defeat this amendment and to stick with the broadening 
     provisions that we have placed in this bill in order to allow 
     the good-faith exception that all of us on this side have 
     promoted for quite some time.

  So, again I object and oppose this amendment and urge its defeat.
  Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I come down here today. I had no intention of coming 
down here until I started listening to the debate, and the more I 
listened to it, the more concerned I have become and the more convinced 
I am that we need the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Michigan 
[Mr. Conyers].
  [[Page H1325]] There are very few principles in our Constitution or 
in the amendments in our Bill of Rights that are more sacred than 
protecting people and their homes from unreasonable search and 
seizures.
  As I was in my office discussing matters with some constituents, the 
gentleman from North Carolina, who had a very long and distinguished 
career in law enforcement, came up and spoke in favor of H.R. 666, but 
what the gentleman said are words to this effect, that the fourth 
amendment applies only to law-abiding citizens, as he was 2 months ago.
  I say to my colleague, ``The fourth amendment applies to everyone in 
this country, whether you're a law-abiding citizen, whether you are 
driving down the road and being stopped by the police, or whether you 
are walking home at night and being stopped by the police. We are all 
citizens, and we all have the protection of the fourth amendment 
against unreasonable search and seizures.''
                              {time}  1610

  Having been a police officer for 12 years, 12 years of having worked 
the road while I was a police officer, I also went back and got my law 
degree and was assigned to special investigations. I also taught 
constitutional law, search and seizure and criminal law at the Michigan 
State police academies, and I continued to work the road and to do 
special investigations.
  No matter who you are, the fourth amendment applies to you. We do not 
know when the resources of the State or local or Federal Government 
will turn their resources on you, and you then become a suspect. You do 
not suddenly lose your fourth amendment rights. You cannot lose these 
rights.
  The gentleman from Florida mentioned the Arizona versus Evans case, 
and he said in his comment ``We all know he was guilty.'' That is the 
reason why we need the fourth amendment, because we do not know people 
are guilty until they are tried by a jury of their peers. It is not a 
subjective standard. It is reasonable search and seizure.
  The Leon standard as articulated by the Supreme Court in 1984, that 
was a Reagan Supreme Court that decided Leon. Last night we were 
handling President Reagan as a hero of the line item veto. Today we are 
saying his Court did not know what they were doing? It cannot be both 
ways. It cannot be both ways.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. STUPAK. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I have no problem with the Leon decision 
or what his Court decided. They did not have before them anything but 
the warrant cases. They had no nonwarrant cases we have up here today. 
So I have no squabble at all with Leon.
  Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, how can one get on the 
floor and say under this law we all knew in Evans versus Arizona the 
gentleman was guilty? That is the kind of standard we cannot have.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I 
never said the gentleman was necessarily guilty. I said there are many 
cases where the people were guilty out there who have been getting off 
on technicalities. Not necessarily that case. We know the evidence in 
that case was not allowed in, and therefore that is the problem. We 
assume that might have made him guilty. It might not have.
  Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, the reason we don't 
allow it in is because the standard is to be proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Beyond a reasonable doubt is a fair and honest doubt 
growing out of the evidence or the lack of evidence. The lack of 
evidence comes in when evidence illegally obtained is excluded from the 
courtroom procedure. It is not the subjective standard that the 
gentleman argues, but rather a very, very profound standard with 
parameters on it that the Supreme Court gives to all of us and the 
Constitution has guaranteed.
  Let us be clear about this: The ABA studies at the time of the Leon 
case found that less than 1 percent of the individuals arrested for 
felonies are released because of illegal search and seizures, less than 
1 percent. So there is a huge standard here, a very sacred standard, 
and we should not disregard it. Your H.R. 666, while well-intended, 
puts a good faith exception, and we do not know what that good faith 
is, other than the good faith as articulated in a police report. But 
the Conyers amendment says take the highest authority we have, the 
Supreme Court, let us codify it, and bring some reasonableness to the 
standard.
  Believe me, if we are wrong on one or two, so be it. But less than 1 
percent. Not everyone is guilty. You do not know when the resources of 
government will be turned on you.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Stupak] 
has expired.
  (At the request of Mr. Conyers and by unanimous consent, Mr. Stupak 
was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
  Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. 
Conyers].
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has been a law enforcement 
officer for many years in Michigan. I would just like to ask the 
gentleman, were the exceptions to the exclusionary rule sufficient 
while the gentleman was operating as a law enforcement officer? You 
have the good faith exception, you have the emergency exception, you 
have a number of provisions that it seems to me would allow any 
officer, even without a warrant, to be able to operate, and certainly 
in most cases to get a warrant from the magistrate.
  Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, the requirement I 
always felt was proper, having spent 12 years there. If I may expand, 
warrants are not needed in exigent circumstances like hot pursuit. 
Consent searches, you do not need a warrant. Stop and frisk, you do not 
need a warrant. Before you place someone in your squad car to transport 
them, you do not need a warrant. Inventory searches upon arrest, you do 
not need a warrant. Automobile searches, you do not need a warrant. 
Independent sources, and I can go on and on.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise for 
the purposes of having the minority leader and the majority leader 
conduct a colloquy on the further order of business today.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Schiff) having assumed the chair, Mr. Riggs, Chairman of the Committee 
of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that 
Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 666) to 
control crime by exclusionary rule reform, had come to no resolution 
thereon.

                          ____________________